

**S&S Principals Meeting  
14 Mar 05 (1500)  
2C836, J-4 Conference Room, Pentagon**

Principal Attendees: VADM Lippert (S&S Chair; DLA), Mr. Neal (S&S JCSG Alternate, Army), Mr. Berkson, (USD AT&L), Mr. Estevez (USD AT&L), LtGen Wetekam (S&S JCSG Principal, Air Force) RDML Thompson (S&S Principal, Navy), Ms. Kinney (S&S Alternate, Marines), CAPT Wright (S&S Alternate, Navy).

Other Attendees: Col Neeley (S&S JCSG, Executive Secretary), Mr. Williams (S&S JCSG, Army Team), CAPT Coderre (S&S JCSG, Navy Team), Col King (S&S JCSG, Air Force Team), LtCol Truba (S&S JCSG Marine Lead), Mr. Marshall (S&S JCSG DLA Team), Mr. Meconnahey (S&S JCSG, COBRA Team Lead), COL Coe S&S JCSG Army Team), Ms. Lacy (S&S JCSG Army Team), CDR Goodwin (XO, S&S JCSG), Capt Rivera (S&S JCSG Marine Corps team), Mr. Bohinski (DoDIG), , Major Condon (USAF BRAC Office), Mr. Meyer (OSD), Mr. O'Rourke (DLA BRAC Office), LCDR Stark (S&S JCSG Data Team), CDR Martin (S&S JCSG Navy Team), CDR Goodwine (Navy BRAC Office), Major Champagne (S&S JCSG Data Team), LtCol Nalepa (S&S JCSG Data Team), Mr. Kramer (S&S JCSG Air Force Team), Mr. Colson (S&S JCSG Air Force Team), Mr. Desiderio (OSD), Mr. Nemfakos (S&S JCSG Advisor), CAPT Bianchi (USD AT&L)

Minutes:

- The 35<sup>th</sup> meeting of the S&S JCSG Principals began at 1505.
- VADM Lippert noted that he had briefed candidate recommendation S&S # 0048 to the Chairman of the Industrial Cross Service Group, Mr. Wynne. VADM Lippert reminded the group that S&S 0048 was a joint effort with Industrial # 0128, and documented the supply footprint in maintenance depot locations. VADM Lippert explained that savings were possible by reducing the personnel involved in the supply function at maintenance sites after DLA assumes this role, and especially by reducing excess inventory. VADM Lippert noted that over \$500 Million in duplicate inventory existed at the various maintenance locations. VADM Lippert cautioned the S&S JCSG to ensure that our scenarios do not double count inventory savings when considered in a developing scenario where the Navy plans to take savings from consolidating Naval aviation maintenance sites.
- VADM Lippert noted that additional IECs would be held including one likely to be held on Saturday, 2 April, with more to follow.
- Mr. Neal presented the Army's view of ICP issues related to candidate recommendations S&S # 0035 and S&S # 0029. Mr. Neal briefed that while FT

Monmouth remained a closure target, Detroit would remain in the Army's inventory and this impacted S&S analysis in S&S # 0029. Mr. Neal introduced Aberdeen as a desired location. Mr. Neal briefed the Army's payback analysis for the Army's preferred Virtual ICP version on chart 7.

- Col Neeley noted that problems existed with the Army's proposals. One problem was that the S&S JCSG had collected MilVal data, but did not hold complete capacity data on Aberdeen. Col Neeley and the Council of Colonels added that MilVal showed that Aberdeen ranked fourth from the bottom in MilVal analysis, and incorporating Aberdeen may rearrange all of the optimization rankings in the summary depicted on chart 13. LCDR Stark affirmed that the addition of Aberdeen would indeed change the rankings. LtCol Nalepa amplified that Aberdeen would likely score near the bottom and would not rate as a desired site, especially since Aberdeen's response answered questions in a non-ICP manner.
- Mr. Nemfakos suggested that the S&S JCSG had done an extensive amount of analysis and it was probable that it would be too late to rework the entire scenario and still meet Mr. Wynne's cutoff date. Mr. Nemfakos suggested that the Army could propose its plan as an alternative ICP option at the ISG level after the S&S JCSG submitted its final candidate recommendation.
- Mr. Berkson asked how the Army's plan qualified as a Virtual ICP. Mr. Neal replied that the Army had not yet connected the headquarters element in the Army's recommended scenario, but the Army envisioned a single HQ element wherever AMC was located. Mr Berkson suggested that this approach added or merely relocated sites but was not a Virtual option and did not carry the type of savings depicted in S&S # 0035. VADM Lippert asked to evaluate how the Army's plan would be assessed at the ISG level. Mr. Nemfakos suggested that the ISG could decide between S&S # 0035 and the Army's recommendation based on some degree of military judgment. Mr. Nemfakos cautioned that since the Army's version of the scenario lacked sufficient strength of analysis, if presented by the S&S JCSG to the ISG, VADM Lippert would have an extremely difficult time justifying the Army's recommended scenario; especially since all previous efforts by the S&S JCSG were academically sound compared to the Army's mere preference for a location. Mr. Nemfakos suggested that only the ISG or IEC could choose between the Army's recommended option and S&S # 0035 at their level based on some degree of military judgment.
- VADM Lippert concluded that it appeared that the Army's scenario should go back to the Army to work and present to the ISG.
- RADM Thompson noted that the Army desired to vacate FT Monmouth and this was addressed during the last JCSG. RADM Thompson asked the group how the recently directed analysis on FT Monmouth in S&S # 0035 addressed this development. Col Neeley noted that other issues were present as well including keeping Detroit open. Col Neeley used the optimization chart to show available

options which relocated Army ICPs and associated headquarters elements to Detroit and Redstone based primarily on military value and optimization results.

- Mr. Neal then briefed chart 8, which answered issues raised at the last JCSG regarding personnel numbers and procurement totals. Mr. Neal noted that the majority of the previously submitted personnel in DLR management were in fact doing class VII vice class IX work and thus the estimate of 5,276 personnel engaged in DLR management was lowered to 1,679. Mr. Neal noted that the earlier Army data was in fact erroneous and apologized for the confusion.
- VADM Lippert wanted to clarify that the personnel numbers were now accurate. Mr. Neal stated they were to the best of his knowledge.
- Mr. Nemfakos asked why the Army's procurement savings estimate had declined significantly. Mr. Neal stated that the dollar values of procurement were overestimated, and since projected expenditures is the factor on which the procurement savings were based, the savings were thus overstated as well. Mr. Neal noted the Army had arrived at its revised figures after realizing that it was nonsensical that the Army's projected expenditures were more than Air Force's when Army buys a fraction of what the Air Force procures. Mr. Nemfakos cautioned that the Army ensure that it was submitting accurate procurement numbers that matched what was in budget projections. Mr. Meconnahey noted that the Army had revised the amount of funds projected to be in procurement to \$ 2 Billion and this dropped the payback values substantially. Mr. Neal noted that the baseline likely included a spike due to OIF but the projection ought to be based on pre-OIF baselines. Mr. Berkson disagreed and stated that the baseline should be what was in the FYDP. Mr. Neal stated that this method would not capture the supplemental expenditures. Mr. Neal expressed concern that the savings projections, if captured from the Army procurement lines, could harm the Army. Mr. Nemfakos noted that OSD had typically waited until savings stabilized before budgets were impacted, but that the Comptrollers may mark the budgets sooner in this BRAC. Mr. Nemfakos noted the real issue was that the Army needed to be accountable to the BRAC process, and be able to explain where the numbers and analysis came from. Mr. Nemfakos suggested that this scenario change offered by the Army appeared to deviate substantially from the BRAC process.
- VADM Lippert noted that he had discussed S&S # 0035 extensively with Mr. Wynne, who was very familiar with the scenario. VADM Lippert stated he would sum up the discussion and if any of the service representatives felt he had it incorrect that they should correct him. VADM Lippert then stated that he mentioned to Mr. Wynne that the Air Force, Army and Marines were against the proposal, the Navy was for it, and DLA felt it could do it. Mr. Wynne had directed that the savings potential was too great to ignore and for VADM Lippert and the S&S JCSG to send S&S # 0035 forward to the point that the SecDef may in fact make the final decision. VADM Lippert stated that the \$ 500 Million

estimate for ERP may be an expense with no benefit gained and he would not feel conscionable in spending a half a billion with no benefit. As a result, DLA would deal with DLR management in execution without the ERP investment and the \$ 500 million cost would leave the scenario estimates.

- VADM Lippert then specifically asked each Principal to re-affirm his or her position on S&S # 0035. Lt Gen Wetekam said the AF did not support the proposal. Ms. Kinney said the Marines did not support the proposal. Mr. Neal said the Army did not support the proposal. RADM Thompson said the Navy supported the proposal. VADM Lippert said he supported it and believed DLA could do it.
- An issue with the personnel counts was then identified by Mr. Neal. He asked if the DLA personnel were incorporated in the 10% savings estimate. Mr. Meonnahey stated the DLA personnel savings were included in the analysis. VADM Lippert stated he thought the 10 % was in fact voted out at the last principals meeting, and directed that the 10% savings applied to DLA personnel savings be removed.
- Ms. Kinney noted that if ERP costs were not incorporated in whatever program or system that evolved, then the services still would incur more costs to fund establishing an interface. VADM Lippert noted that he would attempt to extrapolate these additional interface costs. VADM Lippert concluded that per Mr. Wynne's direction, S&S # 0035 would go forward with the services' objections noted, and that the services would have every chance to discuss any issues with the ISG, IEC and the SecDef.
- Mr. Berkson noted that the best way to address the issue was to avoid the binary argument that there were interface requirements especially since there were already IT and other linkages with DLA that could be exploited based on previous initiatives. Mr. Berkson finalized that the backroom functions were clearly excess and it would be hard to justify arguments against the scenario with the links to DLA already in place.
- Lt Gen Wetekam stated that an equitable "apples-to-apples" comparison between S&S # 0035 and the S&S Single Service ICP scenarios (S&S # 0005, 0010, 0026, and 0029) could not be made because business process improvements were not appropriately addressed in the scenarios. Lt Gen Wetekam also expressed concerns that existing savings already offered by the Air Force in the budget would be forgotten and potential savings opportunities believed achievable by the Air Force from purchasing and supply change initiatives would be missed. He concluded by saying that ultimately the data collection and analysis on S&S # 0035 was flawed. VADM Lippert responded that savings were estimated over and above what the services could achieve.

- Mr. Meconnahey amplified stating that the assumption incorporated an over and above potential from combining procurement efforts at one location, especially when the same customer base was being utilized. Mr. Berkson noted that the savings could be had when the three other services' efforts were combined in an aggregation. Mr. Berkson stated that the Air Force efforts, no matter how robust, could never total to the opportunity that the combined services' potential provided. No matter what the services put on the table, the combined efforts would trump each individual service's effort.
- Lt Gen Wetekam stated he did not concur and re-stated that the analysis was flawed. The Air Force had recently done the analysis using the Air Forces' inventory initiatives and \$ 1.26 Billion was estimated as savings, with approximately 30% of these savings already removed from the Air Force baseline.
- Mr. Berkson countered that one entity approaching the contactor would always result in a savings beyond each individual service approaching the contractor. Mr. Neal noted that combined buys between the Army and Marine Corps were already factored in to the Army's projections. So the group could focus on the issue, Mr. Neal stated that the point being made was that no matter what the savings were for each service, that a combined purchase could do better. Mr. Neal then argued that what the group was missing is that S&S # 0035 risks breaking the readiness models in each service. Mr. Berkson responded to the risk discussion and noted that there was a line between the backroom and frontroom functions that needed to be defined, and transaction processes especially with regard to technical work needed definition in implementation.
- Lt Gen Wetekam stated he believed that S&S # 0035 is an especially risky scenario with regard to readiness. This is based on past experience both from the Consumable Item Transfer (CIT) initiative and the last BRAC round where the Air Force closed two ICPs. Lt Gen Wetekam added that with regard to the consumable item transfer (CIT), the services shared equal blame with DLA for any of the problems experienced by the department in implementing this initiative but that S&S # 0035 presents the same type of risks. VADM Lippert noted that he believed that the SecDef would likely ask these very questions and each service would have its opportunity to discuss pertinent issues.
- RADM Thompson noted that the Navy feels that the scenario is logical and supports the frontroom and backroom split.
- Mr. Berkson asked what flexibility the team had to define the line between technical work and DLA managing the backroom functions. Mr. Nemfakos stated that it depended on the way in which the BRAC language was written. More explicit language would potentially cause harm since the split would be defined in a manner that might prevent needed flexibility.

- Ms. Kinney suggested that one of the issues is that an apples to apples comparison may not yet be had in the scenario. This lack of fidelity in the data may be preventing a clear discussion of the payback and risk tradeoffs.
- VADM Lippert stated that a plan B was needed in case S&S # 0035 was rejected.
- Mr. Nemfakos noted that if the services argue against S&S # 0035, that the savings would be taken anyway, and the services would have to find an alternative means to earn the savings without the benefit of the program that was to earn them.
- Lt Gen Wetekam stated that the Air Force would go to the Virtual ICP as described in S&S # 0026, and would welcome OSD policy guidance and help to get to the savings requirements comparable to what could be had from S&S # 0035. Performance based agreements (PBA) savings were noted as a key step in achieving the Air Force savings estimates.
- Mr. Neal stated that the Army would prefer a Virtual ICP as discussed. Mr. Berkson challenged if this was in fact a Virtual ICP with a true consolidation of backroom functions at the Army level.
- The Principals discussed if business process improvement savings estimates should be incorporated in each if the service specific ICP options. Mr. Nemfakos noted that if one service used the process savings, then all should. Lt Gen Wetekam noted he was concerned about a double tax, especially when some of the savings were already removed from the Air Force's baseline.
- Mr. Neal noted that the Army concurred with using business process savings to match S&S # 0035 levels. Mr. Neal asked if the group would consider allowing only the contracting function to transfer to DLA as an option that could be factored into S&S # 0035.
- RADM Thompson reiterated that the Navy supported S&S # 0035. If S&S # 0035 was not approved then the Navy would withdraw support to S&S # 0010 given that S&S # 0010 savings were limited and the Navy already has implemented a Virtual ICP. RADM Thompson also noted that he would explore the business process savings proposition.
- Mr. Berkson noted that none of the other options would get close to the savings in S&S # 0035.
- VADM Lippert noted that with no closure in Philadelphia, he would seek a Virtual ICP and look for related savings.

- VADM Lippert noted that the S&S JCSG needed to staff a “Plan B” for presentation at the next S&S JCSG Principal’s meeting scheduled for 18 March 2005.
- Col Neeley and Col King attempted to define what the results of what Plan B would be like, and noted difficulty in coming up with an answer.
- Mr. Nemfakos suggested allowing the Council of Colonels to assess the situation, and provide VADM Lippert an update if the Friday JCSG was required.
- Col Neeley briefed chart 10 and clarified the savings projections.
- Col King addressed the option to facilitate closure of FT Monmouth. Mr. Nemfakos clarified that the Army would have to offer as a substitute the Aberdeen location at the ISG level or in the final BRAC language based on Military Judgment.
- RADM Thompson asked how the S&S JCSG decided to place the FT Monmouth personnel at Redstone. Col King noted that the final site selection was based on MilVal and the manner in which the optimization chart ranked the sites
- Col King provided background on the S&S # 0035 fact sheets.
- Col King briefed S&S # 0050. The scenario had one outstanding RFC with the Air Force and this issue should be able to be resolved shortly. Col King outlined the costs that were driving the scenario RFC questions.
- CAPT Coderre asked what effect S&S # 0050 would have on S&S # 0035 as it was currently written. Col King answered that it would have no effect and only come into effect if a plan B version of S&S # 0035 were to be approved.
- Col Neeley briefed the way ahead. Col Neeley noted that if the Army directed that Red River would close, S&S # 0048 was ready and accomplished the S&S portion. If Barstow also closed based on Navy direction, S&S # 0051 was nearing completion, accommodated a change at Barstow and could go forward.

- Col King was directed to prepare S&S # 0035 for presentation at the 24 March 2005 ISG.
- VADM Lippert expressed thanks for the efforts of the team.
- The Meeting concluded at 1700.

Approved: *ADeAgros*



KEITH W. LIPPERT  
Vice Admiral, SC, USN  
Director,  
Defense Logistics Agency  
Chairman, Supply and Storage,  
Joint Cross Service Group

Attachments:

1. Briefing Slides

ACTIVITY: S&S JCSG  
CONTROL NUMBER# 5094-0469  
COPY 1 OF 1 COPIES  
DATE RECEIVED 4 April 2005  
TIME RECEIVED 0800  
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# **Supply and Storage Joint Cross-Service Group (S&S JCSG)**

## **Principals' Meeting**

### **March 14, 2005**

### **Chair: VADM Keith Lippert**



## Agenda

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- Chairman's Remarks VADM Lippert
- Army Issues Mr. Neal
- Tasking Review Col Neeley
- S&S-0035 Col King
  - Assumptions Discussion Mr. Meconnahey
- Way Ahead Col Neeley



## Chairman Remarks

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- S&S-0048 briefed to Mr. Wynne 10 Mar 05
  - 15 Mar 05 brief to ISG
  - Duplicate inventory savings (IND-0126)
- SecDef: Increase time
- IEC meet Saturday after Easter (2 Apr 05)
- 24 Mar 05 final date for all ISG briefs



## Army Issues

Mr. Neal




# Army Life Cycle Management Concept (LCMC)

DCN: 11446

**What it Does for the Army**

- LCMC Cdr can balance resources to address weapon system readiness problems on short notice.
- Allows horizontal & vertical integration all weapon system development and support functions
- Get sustainment logistics involved early in product life-cycle...PMs more involved in sustainment activities
- Reduce maintenance burden on Soldier and reduce life-cycle costs
- Get products to Soldiers faster
- One voice/one POC to the Soldier in the field



Warfighter

**LCMC Integrated MGMT Functions**  
 Program Management, Technology update, Procurement, Industrial Base Mgmt, item mgmt, ILS support, maintenance mgmt, sustainment engineering, data mgmt, Field Assistance (LARs), configuration control, Reliability engineering, Resource balancing,

Sustainment Flow

Acquisition

14 Mar 05, F100, v.1.1

(Additional discussion: Slide 15)



# Technical JCSG Scenarios

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DCN: 11446

## TECH-0035...Army Land C4ISR Center

Realigns Fort Monmouth, NJ by relocating technical functions to various locations.

## TECH-0045...Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Center

Closes Natick Soldier Systems Center, MA by relocating technical functions to various locations.

***Army would like to support these!***



# Candidate Recommendation

**Candidate Recommendation:** Establish a Virtual Army Inventory Control Point with a control element at Headquarters AMC and operational cells co-located with their Inventory Materiel Management Center (IMMC). Realign outlying Integrated Materiel Management functions from Fort Huachuca, Soldier Systems Command and Fort Monmouth to Aberdeen Proving Grounds and Soldier Systems Command and Rock Island to Detroit Arsenal.

## Justification

- ✓ Aligns outlying IMMC sites with their LCMC organization
- ✓ Aligns with TECH scenario 35 and 45 and enables the closure of Soldier Systems Command and Fort Monmouth
- ✓ Reduces overhead and streamlines business processes

## Military Value

- ✓ Improves Military Value by consolidating functions at Installations with the highest military value

## Payback

- ✓ One time cost: \$190.9M
- ✓ Net Implementation Cost: \$143.4M
- ✓ Annual Recurring savings: (\$19.1M)
- ✓ Payback Period: 12 years
- ✓ NPV (savings): (\$47.6M)

## Impacts

- ✓ Criterion 6: Analysis in progress.
- ✓ Criterion 7: Low Risk. Two elements improve and two decline in moving from Rock Island to Detroit and two elements improve and two decline in moving from Ft. Monmouth to Aberdeen.
- ✓ Criterion 8: Minimal impact.

- |  |   |   |   |
|--|---|---|---|
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Strategy | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Capacity Analysis / Data Verification       | <input type="checkbox"/> JCSG Recommended                 | <input type="checkbox"/> De-conflicted w/JCSGs    |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> COBRA    | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Military Value Analysis / Data Verification | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Criteria 6-8 Analysis | <input type="checkbox"/> De-conflicted w/Services |



# COBRA Results Using Revised Army Input

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<u>Original</u>		<u>Revised</u>
1,205	Positions Eliminated:	981
1,347	Positions Realigned:	1,049
\$645.1M	One-time Cost:	\$622.7M
\$486.3M	Net Implementation Savings:	\$215.1M
\$269.4M	Annual Savings:	\$209.5M
\$2,951.8M	NPV (Savings):	\$2,137.7M
\$0.0	MILCON:	\$0.0



# Tasking Review

Col Neeley



## Tasking Review

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- Mr. Meconnahey meet with components as necessary on S&S-0035:
  - Personnel numbers
  - 2% PBL savings projections beyond what Components are projecting
- Mr. Williams to check if inventory numbers are factored in S&S-0048, develops projections for inventory savings if not
- Mr. Williams to add Pearl Harbor to S&S-0048
- Submit S&S-0048 to OGC and OSD
- Col King update S&S-0035 with options for Fort Monmouth
- COL Coe to add a document enrichment point paper on the LMI Risk versus Reward study
- S&S JCSG Admin
  - Distribute Red Team minutes to principals
  - Draft a letter to Mr. Potochney on S&S JCSG discussion on S&S-0030
- OSD Mr. Meyer to check if the privatization scenarios need to be briefed at a future IEC



## ICP Discussion

# Col King



## ICP Scenario Status

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- S&S-0005: OSD
- S&S-0010: OSD
- S&S-0026: OSD
- S&S-0029: OSD
- S&S-0035: OSD
- S&S-0050: COBRA Pending
- S&S-00??: Enabling Proposal (Fort Monmouth to Redstone)





## S&S-0035 Data Fact Sheet

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### ■ Functions

- As listed in COBRA data call
- Service personnel inputs
- DLR definition

### ■ Business Process Improvements

- As listed in COBRA data call



# S&S-0050

**Candidate Recommendation:** Realign Cryptologic Product Support Group, Lackland AFB, TX, by relocating the National Inventory Control Point (NICP) functions to Warner Robins NICP, Robins AFB, GA

### Justification

- ✓Enabler to Industrial JCSG Scenario 0086 proposal to move all cryptologic maintenance to Tobyhanna Army Depot, PA
- ✓Warner Robins NICP manages/repairs airborne electronic warfare and avionic hardware and software which are technically similar to cryptologic items

### Military Value

- ✓Military Judgment: Derive synergy from co-location of technically similar commodities
- ✓Secure facility available

### Payback

- ✓One Time Cost: \$X.XM
- ✓Net Implementation Cost: \$X.XM
- ✓Annual Recurring Savings: \$X.XM
- ✓Payback Period: X years
- ✓NPV (savings): \$X.XM

### Impacts

- ✓Criterion 6: -835; <0.1%
- ✓Criterion 7: Crime Index (Robins AFB)
- ✓Criterion 8: Water resources (Robins AFB)

- |                                   |   |  |  |
|-----------------------------------|---|--|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Strategy | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Capacity Analysis / Data Verification       | <input type="checkbox"/> JCSG/MilDep Recommended | <input type="checkbox"/> De-conflicted w/JCSGs   |
| <input type="checkbox"/> COBRA    | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Military Value Analysis / Data Verification | <input type="checkbox"/> Criteria 6-8 Analysis   | <input type="checkbox"/> De-conflicted w/MilDepS |



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## Assumptions Discussion

Mr. Meconnahey



## PBA/Corporate Contract Savings

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### ■ Assumptions on Inventory Reduction (2%)

- What we mean by 2 Percent
  - Services have averaged 1 - 2 % annual growth in Corporate Contracts when compared against annual materiel procurement dollar values
  - DLA has averaged 4 - 5 % annual growth
  - Due to proposed consolidation and above factors, we estimate an increase in corporate contracts at 2% annually (over and above current levels)



## Personnel Savings

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- S&S Principals approved 10% reduction in all positions across the board (2% per year FY06 - FY10)
- Number of personnel assigned to backroom functions
- Number of personnel not assigned to backroom functions




# Candidate Recommendations Status and Way Ahead

Col Neeley



# Candidate Recommendation Status



**Tuesday**



# Meeting Schedule

## March 2005

Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Saturday	Sunday
	1	2	3	4	5	6
7	8 <b>JCSG</b> 0900-1100 DLA	9	10 I/S&S JCSG <b>IEC</b>	11 <b>ISG</b> 1030-1200 3D1019	12	13
14 <b>JCSG</b> 1500-1700 2C836	15 <b>ISG</b> <b>1030-1200</b> <b>3D1019</b>	16	17	18 <u>TBD</u> <b>JCSG</b> 1500-1700 DLA	19	20
21 <b>IEC</b> 1645-1730 3E928	22	23	24 <b>ISG</b> <b>1030-1200</b> <b>3D1019</b>	25	26	27
28	29	30	31			



# Meeting Schedule

## April 2005

Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Saturday	Sunday
				1 <b>ISG</b> 1030-1200 3D1019	2	3
4	5	6	7	8 <b>ISG</b> 1030-1200 3D1019	9	10
11 <b>IEC</b> <b>JCSG</b>	12	13	14	15 <b>ISG</b> 1030-1200 3D1019	16	17
18	19	20	21	22 <b>ISG</b> 1030-1200 3D1019	23	24
25	26 <b>IEC</b> 1645-1730 3E928	27	28	29 <b>ISG</b> 1030-1200 3D1019	30	1 May



# Meeting Schedule

## May 2005

Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Saturday	Sunday
2 <b>IEC</b> 1645-1730 3E928	3	4	5	6	7	8
9 <b>JCSG</b> <b>IEC</b>	10	11	12	13 <b>ISG</b> 1030-1200 3D1019	14	15
16	17	18	19	20 <b>ISG</b> 1030-1200 3D1019	21	22
23	24	25	26	27 <b>ISG</b> 1030-1200 3D1019	28	29
30	31					



**Backup**

**TBD**



## Plan B

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- Air Force                      Virtual ICP
- Army                              Virtual ICP
- Navy                              Internal Management Efficiencies
- Marines                        Internal Management Efficiencies
- DLA                                Internal Management Efficiencies