

NAVAL AIR STATION BRUNSWICK, MAINE

BRAC COMMISSION HEARING
WASHINGTON, DC
AUGUST 10, 2005



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**AGENDA
for
BRAC COMMISSION HEARING**

August 10, 2005

**NAVAL AIR STATION, BRUNSWICK
Brunswick, ME**

216 Hart Senate Office Building
Washington, DC

1. OPENING STATEMENT - Sen. Olympia Snowe

2. ARGUMENTS AGAINST CLOSURE

RADM Harry Rich, USN (Ret)
CAPT Ralph Dean, USN (Ret)

3. ARGUMENTS AGAINST REALIGNMENT – CAPT Dean

4. ARGUMENTS FOR A FULLY OPERATIONAL AIRFIELD – RADM Rich

5. IMPACTS OF CLOSURE

- On Community – Rep. Tom Allen
- On State/Region – Gov. John Baldacci

6. CLOSING ARGUMENTS - Sen. Susan Collins

Testimony of
Senator Olympia J. Snowe
BRAC Commission
Naval Air Station, Brunswick
Opening Statement
August 10, 2005

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Commission, we thank you for this opportunity to speak in support of Naval Air Station Brunswick. We also thank each of you for visiting Brunswick to learn first-hand why it is the nation's premiere maritime patrol base.

The purpose of today's hearing is to address your consideration to close Brunswick. We are here to present the facts; facts that demonstrate that closing Brunswick poses an unacceptable risk to our nation's security. In doing so, we understand that, pursuant to the BRAC statute, the standard we must meet is that closure would be "inconsistent" with military value and other criteria of the law.

We will meet that standard because closing Brunswick – the only remaining fully operational, active-duty airfield in the Northeast – is inconsistent with the readiness value of Criterion 1, the training and staging values of Criterion 2, as well as the contingency, mobilization and surge values of Criterion 3.

Our case is built on two overarching and indisputable facts -

First, in defending the US homeland, geography matters. And if Brunswick is closed, it would be the ninth airfield closed by BRAC in the last 16 years, leaving – in the aftermath of the devastating attacks of 9-11 -- *no* fully operational, active duty airfields north of McGuire Air Force Base in central New Jersey. Creation of such an expansive, strategic void is clearly inconsistent with each of Criteria 1, 2 and 3.

Second – 'uncertain but foreseeable' -- as DoD has repeatedly said, is the very essence of the threat to our homeland defense and security.

That is exactly why Congress saw fit to require both DoD and this Commission to consider the surge and contingency requirements in Criterion 3 when making your respective

recommendations. And that is exactly why DoD concluded, when looking out the mandatory 20-year BRAC window in the face of such foreseeable threats, that it *could not close Brunswick* -- the last remaining fully operational airfield in the Northeast.

Over the next hour, we will demonstrate specifically why DoD expressly considered and repeatedly rejected such closure. You will hear from two former military commanders who understand current and future national security, homeland defense and homeland security requirements.

Our first witness will be Rear Admiral Harry Rich, former Commander of all the maritime patrol wings and squadrons in the Atlantic theater.

He will demonstrate that, on ten separate occasions during the BRAC process and on several occasions since -- including in testimony to this Commission -- the Secretary of the Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, Commanders of Fleet Forces Command, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, the Northern Command and OSD's Infrastructure Executive Council (IEC) all recognized and validated Brunswick's distinct military value. And this position has been re-stated emphatically twice -- in a DoD letter of July 14 to the commission, and in a Navy letter of July 26 in response to our request for a clear delineation of the homeland defense and surge requirements for Brunswick.

Following Admiral Rich will be retired P-3 pilot Captain Ralph Dean who, during several tours with operational squadrons and wing staffs, oversaw numerous detachment operations.

He will review DoD documents, released by the Department after it published its BRAC list in May, that illustrate how Brunswick will support DoD's emerging homeland security role...

Documents such as the Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, released in June, that requires the Department to provide maximum awareness of threats in air and sea approaches -- as well as maritime interception capabilities...

Where, in the words of DoD, successful responses are measured in "hours, not days."...

And, as maintained by the CNO in this report, there is a need to "extend the security of the United States seaward..." The bottom line is, closure denies rapid deployment."

And documents such as the National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness -- released in response to the National Security Presidential Directive 41 -- that requires maritime domain assets to “support the entire spectrum of national security events – from the Global War on Terrorism and stability operations to disaster response and recovery.”

Of course, Brunswick squadrons already -- consistent with the readiness and support values of Criteria 1 and 3 -- actively and successfully support such objectives.

But there is also the distinct military value of Brunswick’s crucial *future* capacity.

Here, all of the DoD’s emerging homeland defense planning documents make clear that surprise and uncertainty are precisely what DoD needs to plan for. And the military values of contingency and surge included in Criteria 3 are there for exactly that reason. Given DoD’s clear and emerging requirements for both flexibility and uncertainty, removing a diverse and strategic asset like Brunswick for maritime and land surveillance at this critical planning stage is simply not a risk that DoD is willing to take.

Captain Dean will explain how the Navy’s realignment recommendation to make Brunswick a “warm” base will require sustained detachment operations that will add millions to the cost of operations, increase already stretched personnel tempo, and effectively decrease the remaining service life of the P-3 – all counter to Criteria 4 and 5.

And he will also detail why such detachment operations cannot be run from just any airfield; that they in fact require specialized air and ground crews... maintenance facilities...mobile operations centers...and security for aircraft and weapons – and that we have not seen any comprehensive analyses of potential detachment airfields elsewhere in the Northeast.

Admiral Rich will return to explain why keeping Brunswick fully operational is the only valid option.

For example, he will discuss the introduction of the Multimission Maritime Aircraft and its associated Maritime Surveillance UAV, and why Brunswick, with the Navy’s only MMA-compatible hanger, dual runways, and egress over water into 63,000 square miles of unencumbered airspace make Brunswick the ideal MMA and UAV base now.

Finally, Congressman Allen and Governor Baldacci will detail the adverse economic and community impacts that a full closure will have on our state, and Senator Collins will provide the closing arguments as to why national security dictates a fully operational base.

In summary, DoD expressly considered and repeatedly rejected closing Brunswick because DoD knew – from both current operations and foreseeable future events – that closure would tie the planning hands of DoD and complete the full abandonment of the Northeast.

Either result, let alone both, is plainly inconsistent with Criteria 1 through 4 and the national defense requirements of our country. Or, as a high ranking war-fighting commander told me last spring regarding Brunswick, we should first “do no harm”.

I turn now to Admiral Rich, who will speak in greater depth to the strategic value and component commander requirements of Brunswick.

Testimony of
RADM Harry Rich, USN (ret)
BRAC Commission
Naval Air Station, Brunswick
Arguments Against Closure

August 10, 2005

Mr. Chairman, members of the commission, again, we thank you for the opportunity to express our concerns about the future of NAS Brunswick.

SLIDE – CASE OVERVIEW

Your options for Brunswick, as shown on this slide are three - close it; realign it; or leave it as it is.

Closing the last fully capable operational air station in the Northeast is fraught with danger. It is contrary to the expressed wishes of both the DoD and Navy, and ignores a vital NORTHCOM operational imperative.

The second option; realignment, as proposed by DoD, just doesn't make sense. We will show that it can't be justified on a financial basis and it distorts the defensive posture of the Atlantic Fleet Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Force to such a degree that operational effectiveness would be significantly degraded. Response time to urgent operational tasking would be delayed three hours or more at a time when minutes mean the difference between success and failure.

Finally, we will show that the third option; keeping NAS Brunswick fully operational with its assigned fleet air wing remaining in place, is the only viable option available.

In addition, it offers several money-saving, readiness enhancing options, such as introducing the follow-on Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft at Brunswick instead of Jacksonville and moving the reserve C-130 squadrons from Willow Grove to Brunswick

instead of McGuire AFB. These options are valid only if Brunswick remains fully operational.

SLIDE -CNO QUOTE

The closure option was rejected by senior leaders in DoD and Navy no fewer than 10 times during this year's BRAC deliberations.

The Chief of Naval Operations' **military judgment** is reflected in the statement on this slide...

SLIDE – WYNNE QUOTE

And by the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics on this slide...

SLIDE - WILLARD QUOTE

And by this quote from Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Willard's testimony on July 18. . .

SLIDE – DAVIS QUOTE

And finally, by the Secretary of the Navy's Special Assistant for Base Realignment and Closure. The quotes on this slide plus Admiral Willard's statement from the previous slide basically state our case in a nutshell.

SLIDE – CFFC QUOTE

The highest priority in your deliberations must be given to operational imperatives expressed by the commander responsible for implementing the homeland defense strategy.

In March of this year Commander, Fleet Forces Command (NORTHCOM's maritime component commander) told the Navy's Analysis Group, and I quote: "Closure of NAS Brunswick supports operational synergies associated with a single-site P-3, MMA force at the unacceptable expense of closing a base offering numerous

transformational and homeland defense basing opportunities” (end quote) Powerful testimony from the man responsible for homeland defense.

Captain Dean will further discuss why NAS Brunswick *specifically* is the clear and obvious choice to meet the component commander’s requirement.

Testimony of
CAPT Ralph Dean, USN (ret)
BRAC Commission
Naval Air Station, Brunswick
Arguments Against Closure and Realignment
August 10, 2005

SLIDE – NASB IS MEETING . . . TODAY

Mr. Chairman, Commissioners, the Department of Defense determination that NAS Brunswick is essential is founded in stated requirements to meet a very real threat, and the air station's unique capability to meet that threat. The nation's Strategy for Homeland Defense states (quote) "terrorists or rogue states will attempt multiple, simultaneous mass casualty attacks against the US homeland." (unquote)

Just as chilling is the Congressional Research Service assessment that an attack by terrorists armed with a nuclear device would kill at least 50,000 and as many as 1 million Americans. The Homeland Defense Strategy further states, (quote) "Adversaries [will present us] with a host of new challenges. They may attempt to use commercial vessels to transport terrorists or weapons to the United States. They may attempt to intrude on U.S. airspace with low-attitude aircraft, cruise missiles, and UAVs. They may attempt to convert maritime vessels, aircraft, and other modes of transportation into weapons." (unquote)

That's serious language, the most specific in the strategy in regard to the threat anywhere.

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, Paul McHale, has stated that he realized as soon as he took office that the biggest single area in which he could make gains was in maritime defense – against attack from the sea.

That threat has led to the requirement for a layered defense of the US homeland. That mission is being carried out by assets at NAS Brunswick *today*. Commander, Patrol Wing Five at NAS Brunswick has been designated as Commander, Task Unit 20.12.1, responsible to Commander, Second Fleet and NORTHCOM for Maritime Domain Awareness. His area of responsibility extends out 1500 nautical miles east over the Atlantic.

The scope of the requirement at any given time varies. Right now P-3 crews at Brunswick are providing a 12-hour ready alert for NORTHCOM. After the September 11, 2001 attacks a four-hour, armed ready alert was provided at Brunswick. That level of tasking and more could return at any time with the turn of events or a single piece of newly gained intelligence.

The second quote on this slide is critical. What is true of homeland defense missions in general is true in spades of maritime patrol and reconnaissance. The two key metrics are “how soon can you get there?” and “how long can you stay?” When you answer those questions you realize – basing matters.

SLIDE – MARITIME PATROL AND RECONNAISSANCE BASING. . .

This slide shows the current basing of both active and reserve P-3 squadrons, and shows why, when defending a geographic area, *geography* matters.

The closure option has been soundly rejected by DoD and the Navy and ruled unacceptable by the operational commander because it eliminates his only valid homeland defense basing option in a critical area – at a time when the threat is very real. Homeland defense is zero-defect work; a single mistake or failure is unacceptable. Clearly Mr. Chairman, closure is not a viable option.

Now some points about NAS Brunswick itself.

There is an enormous difference between just any suitable runway and a military air base. There is a correspondingly large difference between just any military airfield and a fully capable maritime patrol aircraft base.

Some may suggest that the operational requirement could be met with P-3 detachments to anywhere in the region. That is wrong.

SLIDE – TYPICAL P-3 DETACHMENT

As a point of interest, a nominal P-3 detachment is described on this slide. About one-half a squadron, enabling 3 launches a day – until the first aircraft breaks. P-3s can carry a small pack-up kit with some spare parts. Before long, the following is required:

SLIDE – DETACHMENT REQUIREMENTS

It is a fact that P-3 aircraft and crews perform detachment operations every day. It is just as true that those detachments cannot be performed out of a suitcase for very long.

Maritime patrol aircraft are complex platforms with a complex set of missions and demanding support requirements. Mission capability declines rapidly without fixed support and/or a robust (and expensive) logistics train.

With any detachment of any scope or duration, logistics support inevitably follows – and soon. They don't call it a "tail" for nothing; it is attached to the front end and is not far behind. Our maritime patrol aircraft bases in the United States, and all major P-3 deployment sites overseas, have evolved to provide this support, cost-effectively *relative to the suitcase option*.

NAS Brunswick is a system of systems, if you will - command and control (not just for maritime patrol, but for military operations of almost any kind), flight facilities, air traffic control, security and force protection, and systems to respond rapidly to aircraft and aircrew requirements. Many a detachment mission has been lost due to a failed aircraft generator, brake actuator, flight instrument or any of a thousand other P-3 components. Not at Brunswick. A call on the radio and the part is on the way to the bird. Crews and maintainers take that, and all the other support available at an MPA base, for granted - until their first preflight on any detachment. That level of support is just not available at any detachment site.

I have gone on about detachment operations longer than I should have, because anyone who would say that the requirement can be met that way is really missing the

point and this is critical. I remind you of the two key metrics – speed of response and endurance on station. For this requirement, the metrics mandate total, continuous readiness in the region everyday, year round and completely invalidate detachment operations as an option.

SLIDE – THE ANSWER. . .

So NAS Brunswick isn't just any runway, or just any military airfield, but a Maritime Patrol Aircraft base – and it is one heck of a base from which to operate. Some of its characteristics are listed here. Of particular importance to Fleet Forces Command are those regarding weapons storage, handling, and delivery – unique to NAS Brunswick in the region, *and* the resilience afforded by dual runways. (anyone who thinks that is not important should try flying into NAS Norfolk this summer. Their only runway is closed for repaving.)

SLIDE – WHY NASB IS THE ANSWER – OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

There are other reasons why NAS Brunswick is the answer. A few of those related to costs which would be incurred under any other option are listed here. None are trivial. The remaining fatigue life in the P-3 inventory is a precious asset which must be expended efficiently.

The impact on personnel of the additional detachments and deployments which would be required, the increased family separations and resulting effect on retention also cannot be ignored. Family separation is the number one reason which causes sailors to leave the Navy.

SLIDE – WHY NASB IS THE ANSWER – OTHER CONSIDERATIONS (2)

Insufficient P-3 simulator capacity exists at Jacksonville to adequately support the entire East Coast P-3 force. The simulators at Jacksonville are just about max'ed out now; in use 18 hours a day – 95% of capacity.

Moving beyond the maritime patrol community, twenty-nine tenant and supported activities would have to find another home or lifeline. These include the Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape school, ship's crew berthing and flight support for the Supervisor of Shipbuilding command at Bath, and the entire Naval Air Reserve

demographic in New England, which would be abandoned if NAS Brunswick were to close.

The final bullet on this slide is important, too. Brunswick is the preferred refueling stop for tactical jet and turboprop aircraft returning from Europe and CENTCOM. Also, quoting Ms. Davis again, NAS Brunswick is, (quote) "...an important location for aviation training, because it can and will remain capable of logistically supporting all of the aircraft currently in the DoD inventory. Its utility is not limited to DoD aircraft, but includes aircraft of the air national guard and other federal agencies." (unquote)

As a personal aside, I'd like to note that I have trained and instructed at every P-3 base from Pt. Mugu to Brunswick, from Jacksonville to Whidbey Island (and we used to have quite a few in between). I can say unequivocally, that encroachment, expandable pattern and variety of weather, is the best of them all for training. It's user-friendly and always open. In 2004 the NAS had zero hours of closure for weather.

SLIDE – NAS BRUNSWICK – CLOSURE DELIBERATIONS ...

With all of that one wonders how closing the air station could have been considered by the Navy – and it was, early in the process before military judgment was applied by senior Navy and DoD leaders.

Those early Navy deliberations were founded almost solely on quantitative measures based on eliminating excess capacity – a methodology fine for depots or widget factories, but not for operational bases. Those bases must be where they are needed, when they are needed. (and by the way, the Navy incorrectly calculated the capacity at its east coast maritime patrol bases anyway – we have provided you with a summary of that in your handouts).

SLIDE – REALIGNMENT

Having discussed closure at some length, I would like to very briefly touch on realignment – a proposal which has been a real head-scratcher for us. We've finally concluded that realignment is the failed result of the Navy's determination to save some money by single-siting like aircraft, that momentum, running up against the DoD determination – "wait a minute, you cannot close this national asset." Realignment is

neither fish nor fowl. It would degrade the readiness of the maritime patrol force, and save precious little money in the process. In the final analysis, it just doesn't make sense.

SLIDE OFF

We've addressed closure and touched on the realignment proposal. Admiral Rich will now conclude with the third option before you – retaining Naval Air Station Brunswick.

Sir.....

Testimony of
RADM Harry Rich, USN (ret)
BRAC Commission
Naval Air Station, Brunswick
Arguments For a Fully Operational Airfield
August 10, 2005

Finally, Mr. Chairman, the only option remaining, the clear choice, is to keep NAS Brunswick fully operational with the assigned air wing squadrons remaining in place. Only this option fully realizes the current and future military value of this national asset.

SLIDE – CURRENT NASB CAPABILITIES

NAS Brunswick is ready now for the aircraft that will replace the P-3, the Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft. No other maritime patrol air station can make that claim.

NAS Brunswick is ready now to accept expansion of current roles, for example, receiving the naval reserve squadrons from Willow Grove, rather than moving them to McGuire Air Force Base, saving over \$50 million in additional military construction funds.

SLIDE – NASB CURRENT CAPABILITIES (2)

NAS Brunswick is an ideal site for unmanned aerial vehicle operations from the standpoints of both efficiency and flight safety. The Broad-Area Maritime Surveillance UAV (known as BAMS) will accompany the MMA. In the words of RADM Mike Holmes, Commander, Patrol and Reconnaissance Group, (quote) “the BAMS UAV is going to play a big part in what the maritime patrol and reconnaissance community does in the future. Much of the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance that we’re picking up with the P-3 and the EP-3 can be transitioned to a UAV.” (Unquote) NAS Brunswick is ready for that future now.

As the Commander, Fleet Forces Command noted, there are “transformational opportunities” at NAS Brunswick. One of these is the establishment of a homeland security/homeland defense “center of excellence.” The currently funded Armed Forces Reserve Center at Brunswick, will site National Guard, Marine reserve, and other units reporting to NORTHCOM for homeland security missions. Where homeland security *and homeland defense* assets are co-located, the potential for expanding missions and synergistic gains is great. Numerous government agencies, such as customs, DEA, INS and others, beyond DoD and the Department of Homeland Security, all have a stake in the future of NAS Brunswick.

SLIDE – THE BOTTOM LINE. . .

Most important of all – retaining NAS Brunswick and its assigned patrol wing optimizes the defensive posture of the Atlantic fleet long range maritime patrol and reconnaissance force. It ensures strategic flexibility at a time when the maritime defense strategy is still evolving and the threat seems to be escalating. It takes advantage of and makes good the huge investment the Navy has made to ensure the last remaining DoD operational air field in the northeast is ready for the next decade and beyond.

SLIDE OFF

The Navy has done well over the past 10 years, spending more than \$120 million to modernize and upgrade NAS Brunswick to make it fully ready for the future of maritime patrol aviation, and indeed all of DoD aviation. As most of you have seen, it’s ready now. The new \$32 million hangar is the only one of its kind designed specifically for the follow-on MMA aircraft, and as you have seen, NAS Brunswick is essentially a brand new airfield.

I was stationed in Brunswick three times during my 35 years on active duty and, in my opinion, no military installation in the country enjoys stronger support than the men and women of NAS Brunswick receive from the citizens of Maine. It’s a great place to live and work.

Retention figures from Brunswick-based squadrons reflect the quality of life in the greater Brunswick area. Just ask any sailor.

For these reasons and countless more, we believe our Navy and our country will be best served if the military value and strategic location of NAS Brunswick are leveraged in every way possible to enhance our national defense posture.

SLIDE – CURRENT MPA COVERAGE AREA (MAP)

The single most often used term to describe the value of NAS Brunswick is “strategic location.” To fully appreciate what that means you have to look at a map showing the location of maritime patrol airfields on the East Coast.

Take a good look at this slide. Those circles are 1000 nm – that equates to 3 hours flight time in the P-3. As the chart shows, targets of interest in the southern part of our coastal area and even in the Gulf of Mexico can be effectively covered by P-3s based in Jacksonville.

Now look at where the targets will be concentrated in the North Atlantic shipping lanes. Note how much of the shipping lanes are included in the 1000 mile circle from Jacksonville.

Ask yourself – if you were the operational commander responsible for defending the most populous part of the United States, the Northeast, where would you locate your maritime patrol forces in order to optimize their effectiveness?

We need to remind ourselves that we are at war and the enemy is probably the most insidious and unpredictable we’ve ever faced. The front lines are no longer just overseas. They are everywhere in the western world including our extensive Atlantic coastline. Making changes to critical infrastructure at this time is fraught with danger and can be justified only by showing that the change will significantly enhance our defense posture.

SLIDE – SUMMARY

Clearly, closing NAS Brunswick is not a viable option. Nothing could compensate for the loss of readiness inherent in such a move. The issue is national security, not excess capacity or single-siting aircraft

Realignment, as proposed by DoD, isn't much better. Yes, it would preserve a strategic asset for future use, but the need when viewed in the light of September 11, 2001 is more likely to be for immediate use. With the planes in Florida and a fully capable airfield in Maine left empty, the word "immediate" just wouldn't fit anymore. It would be *worse* than having a fire house with no fire engines. That leaves keeping NAS Brunswick fully operational, with the assigned air wing remaining in place, as the only remaining option.

(SLIDE OFF)


Mr. Chairman, Commissioners, you have a most unenviable task. Your challenge is to demonstrate wisdom and the moral courage to decide what is in the best interest of our country and national security.

If you do that, I'm confident a fully operational NAS Brunswick will continue to be a critical link in our national defense posture for many years to come.

We wish you well and we thank you for your dedication to public service.

I will now be followed by Congressman Allen...

Naval Air Station Brunswick, Maine



Case Overview

- Why Closure is not an acceptable option for NAS Brunswick: DOD has made the case.
- Why Realignment is a flawed concept and inappropriate for NASB.
- Why Maintaining NASB as a fully-capable Naval Air Station is the only acceptable option for the Navy, the Department of Defense, and the nation.

Brunswick Closure Rejected by Department of Defense

“This is a military value question more than anything else... We're really keeping a strategic capability in the Northeast. That's what it boils down to.”

*- ADM Vern Clark
Testimony to BRAC Commission
May 17, 2005*

Brunswick Closure Rejected by Department of Defense

“It came to our mind that having a strategic presence near borders in America made sense from a homeland security standpoint, made sense from a strategic surge and future capability standpoint.....”

*- The Hon. Michael W. Wynne
Testimony to BRAC Commission
July 18, 2005*

Brunswick Closure Rejected by Department of Defense

“Brunswick provided us that strategic ability to readily access the maritime environment in the extreme Northeast.”

*- ADM Robert Willard
Testimony to BRAC Commission
July 18, 2005*

NAS Brunswick Closure Rejected by Department of Defense

**Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy for Base
Realignment and Closure**

- *“The loss of NAS Brunswick will increase P-3 response time to any maritime threat against the northeast coast of the United States.”*
- *“NAS Brunswick also has enormous strategic value as the last remaining DoD airfield in the northeast.”*

**Ms. Anne R. Davis
Letter July 20, 2005**

NAS Brunswick Closure Rejected by Department of Defense

Commander, Fleet Forces Command

“Closure of NAS Brunswick supports operational synergies associated with a single-site P-3/MMA force at the unacceptable expense of closing a base offering numerous transformational and maritime Homeland Defense basing opportunities.”

***- CFFC input to DON Analysis
Group, March 2005***

NASB is Meeting Requirements for Homeland Defense Today


“Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support” Department of Defense, June 2005

- “The United States must have a **concept of operations for the active, layered maritime defense** of the US homeland. Such a concept will require naval forces to be responsible to US Northern Command....”
- “Timely in response and readily accessible, Homeland Defense and Civil Support missions require a **rapid response, often measured in hours, not days.**”

RESULT - COMPATRECONWING Five and its P-3 squadrons at Brunswick have been assigned responsibility as a Task Unit Commander under NORTHCOM for Maritime Domain Awareness and other responsibilities within his assigned sector of the North Atlantic.

Maritime Patrol Basing for Homeland Defense

*When Defending a Geographic Area,
Geography Matters!*



Typical P-3 Detachment Operations

- 5 Aircraft
- 5 Crews (11 Members Each)
- Maintenance Crew (20+)
- Mobile Operations Control Center (MOCC) and 12 Member Cadre (C-130 Required)

Capability:

- 3 Sorties/1 Ready Alert Per 24 Hours
- Assumes NO aircraft out of service for maintenance

Detachment Support Requirements

- Consumables (e.g., search stores)
- Undersea Warfare and air-to-surface weapons
- P-3 Supply support/storage and management
- Physical Security requirements
- Command, control, communications, computers, intelligence (C4I) facilities and staff
- Generic and P-3 specific aircraft support equipment
- Intermediate maintenance, test facilities, and robust logistics train
- Transportation; berthing; messing; specialized area training
- Dedicated planning and execution

Detachments will not get cheaper or easier with MMA and its contractor maintenance support

The Answer: Brunswick's Current Capabilities

- The last remaining fully-capable active duty military airfield protecting the northeastern U.S.

- Ideal for MPRA and other operational missions

- Dual runways for flexibility and resilience
- “Feet wet” at end of runway – optimal for live weapons missions
- Outstanding weapons storage and handling capability and capacity
- State-of-the-art command and control facilities
- Fully secured perimeter for force protection and mission assurance

Why Brunswick is the Answer:

Additional Considerations

- Impact of fatigue on remaining service life of the P-3 aircraft inventory
- Flight hours for transit to detachment operations
- Flight hours for transit to other theaters of operations
 - NAS Brunswick location optimal
- Increased Personnel Tempo and per diem expenses

Why Brunswick is the Answer:

Additional Considerations

- P-3 Flight Simulator and Weapons Systems Trainers
 - Readiness Impact and/or Replacement costs
- Impact/costs to tenant and other supported activities
- Impact on all of DOD aviation


Navy BRAC Deliberations

- Capacity analysis alone is inappropriate in determining **where operational bases are needed.**
- Savings from capacity reduction are irrelevant if they result in an operational base not being *where it is needed, when it is needed.*
- The Navy's overarching determination that single-siting like aircraft is always desirable completely ignored strategic location and other key military value factors.

Realignment: A Flawed and Contradictory Recommendation

- Like closure, realignment fails to optimize the positioning and readiness of the maritime patrol and reconnaissance force.
- Realignment provides no significant savings
 - Savings incorrectly calculated by Navy
 - AIMD savings overstated (ignored MMA introduction)
 - Incorrectly stated demolition costs
 - Increased costs of operations from and transits to the Northeast (and other theaters) not included
 - Hidden costs (also associated with closure) were ignored

Naval Air Station Brunswick, Maine



Brunswick's Additional Missions

- Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft Basing and Support

- Introduction of MMA at Brunswick would eliminate 50% of MILCON required at Jacksonville under a closure scenario for Brunswick, and would postpone the other 50%.**

- Basing for Reserve units from NAS JRB Willow Grove

Brunswick's Additional Missions

- **Broad Area Maritime Surveillance UAV**
 - Dual runways ideal for UAV operations
 - Immediate, unencumbered access to overwater airspace
- **Air Force Reserve Predator UAV units**

Seamless Homeland Security/Homeland Defense


The Bottom Line:

Component Commander Requirements

- NAS Brunswick, with its assigned Air Wing, is the single, clear choice to meet those requirements, because...

- *Only a fully capable Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft base in the region can:*
 - *Optimize strategic laydown of MPRA force*
 - *Maximize force readiness and efficiency*
 - *Be cost-effective over the long term*

Naval Air Station Brunswick, Maine





KEFLAVIK

SHIPPING LANES

CURRENT MPA COVERAGE AREA

Mercator Projection

Radius of all circles = 1000 NM

Military Judgment: Brunswick is Vital

1. Closure: *Rejected* by the most senior DoD officials in the BRAC process.
2. Realignment: A flawed concept that degrades readiness and is inappropriate for NAS Brunswick.
3. Fully operational: Brunswick, with assigned Air Wing in place, is ***the only acceptable option for the Navy, DoD, and the nation.***

Testimony of
Representative Tom Allen
before the
Base Realignment and Closure Commission
on
Naval Air Station, Brunswick
Community and Workforce Impact
Washington, DC
August 10, 2005

I am Congressman Tom Allen from the First District of Maine. I will speak to the additional, far-reaching negative impacts that closure, as compared to realignment, would have on the community and the workforce.

I represent the Naval Air Station's three home towns:

- Brunswick, which hosts the main base and the airfield;
- Topsham, which hosts housing, a Commissary, a Marine and Army recruiting headquarters and MWR activities; and
- Bath, with its Supervisor of Shipbuilding command that oversees destroyer construction at Bath Iron Works. NAS Brunswick hosts the tenant command for all SUPSHIP activities at Bath.

I want to emphasize that the towns do not want this base closed. Unequivocally, the community wants NAS Brunswick open and actively defending the nation.

[show slide 1]

The town councils of Brunswick, Topsham and Bath unanimously passed proclamations in support of an open and fully operational NAS Brunswick. I ask consent to include in the record copies of these proclamations.

The community and NAS Brunswick have established numerous cooperative arrangements and integrated activities. This slide highlights examples of community support.

[show slide 2]

The workforce at NAS Brunswick is indispensable to the ability of the base to carry out its mission. Their labors turned \$120 million of investment into a fully modern facility, and built the only hangar at any maritime patrol base able to support the new Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft.

I ask consent to include in the record testimony by Bill Babbin of the National Association of Government Employees local R1-77. His statement represents the views of the 643 civilian workers at NAS Brunswick, all of whom would lose their jobs and ability to serve the nation under closure. Bill speaks to the pride of the workforce, their concerns about closure on our national security, and addresses the high quality of life for sailors and their families in Brunswick.

[slide off]

NAS Brunswick plays an irreplaceable role in the military life of the community and the region. As the only active duty operational base for more than 200 miles, Brunswick enables New Englanders to work and train alongside sailors on active duty, from young people in the Naval Sea Cadet program to the 1,100 Reservists who come from throughout the region to drill. If the base is closed, this cultural connection will be lost.

Our entire society will suffer if the military way of life, and the values of patriotism, service and sacrifice, is not accessible to Americans in every corner of the country.

I now turn to Governor Baldacci.

Town Proclamations



The Town of Brunswick...



The Town of Topsham...



The City of Bath...

“ ... declare and affirm their complete support for the retention of NAS Brunswick as a fully operational naval air station.”

all June 1, 2005

Community support for NAS Brunswick

- Military/Community Council cited as model by commanders
- NASB Commander on Board of MidCoast Chamber of Commerce
- Chamber provides Community Resource Guide for military families
- NASB representative on Town's Comprehensive Planning Committee
- Town's Economic Development Department coordinates with NASB to meet needs of military families
- Town-NASB mutual aid agreements on firefighting and police jurisdiction
- Regular meetings between Town Manger and NASB Commander
- Brunswick School Department's military transition programs

Testimony of
Governor John Baldacci
before the
BRAC Commission Regional Field Hearing
on
Naval Air Station, Brunswick
Economic Impact of Closure
August 10, 2005

I am Governor John Baldacci and I am going to address the economic impact of closing Naval Air Station Brunswick. The challenges presented by this closure are similar to those presented by realignment, which I discussed on July 6th. However, the Department of Defense's own analysis shows that the impact on the region and state from a full closure are far greater. Naval Air Station Brunswick is one of Maine's largest employers and its loss will be devastating.

The Department of Defense generated an economic impact report when it considered closing rather than realigning Brunswick, a scenario that DOD ultimately rejected for the reasons you just heard from Admiral Rich and Captain Dean. **(PUT UP SLIDE ONE)** The report states that closing Brunswick will result in the loss of 2,700 military and 658 non-military personnel. The ripple impact of these job losses will be an additional 2,659. Thus the total indirect and direct job losses caused by closing NASB will be 6,017 jobs.

Naval Air Station Brunswick is located in rural Mid-Coast Maine, in the Bath-Brunswick Labor Market, which has a workforce of just over 40,000. **(PUT UP SLIDE TWO)** The 6,017 positions that will be lost through closure represent 15% of this labor market. In fact, closure of NASB will be the second most devastating BRAC action by economic area in the country. Such a significant loss will be a catastrophe and will cause unemployment in the area to increase from 4.1% to 15%.


The economic impact estimated by DOD is only a partial picture of what will actually happen. Critically, the DOD analysis ignores the economic effects of population migrations. In their analysis, it is as if all military personnel were to leave, but their families were to stay behind. This will be the case in Brunswick, where up to 5,700 dependents of military personnel will leave the area under the proposed closure. This will have a significant ripple effect.

Job losses will be difficult for every state; but the size of many other states' economies will help them soften the blow. Maine has a small population and a small workforce compared to other states. Additionally, the mid-coast Maine economy is today struggling with major workforce reductions at Bath Iron Works (BIW), builder of Navy destroyers, located next-door to Brunswick. In 2004 and 2005, BIW laid off 675 workers from jobs paying some of the highest wages in the region; and 500 of these individuals are still on unemployment. This situation coupled with the small size of the state work force to absorb positions lost through this closure, will present extreme challenges for the region.

In 2004, the Naval Air Station had a \$211 million direct impact on the local economy. The removal of 6,017 positions from the area and this significant loss of spending will cripple the region for many years to come. Let me be clear: the closure of Naval Air Station Brunswick will have the direct effect of a federally-induced, major economic recession for this region, one from which our economists calculate it will be a full decade in recovery.

Thank you for your time. I am pleased to introduce Senator Susan Collins.

Economic Impact of NASB Closure



Source: Department of Defense, *Economic Impact Report*, BRAC Scenario DON-138

BRAC Job Loss by Economic Area

Area	State	Area Employment	BRAC Loss as % of Area
Clovis	NM	23,348	-20.5%
Bath-Brunswick	ME	40,117	-14.99%
Martin County	IN	8,525	-11.6%
Norwich/New London	CT	168,620	-9.4%
Fairbanks	AK	54,469	-8.6%
Rapid City	SD	79,970	-8.5%
Grand Forks	ND	66,242	-7.4%
Mountain Home	ID	14,441	-6.2%
King George County	VA	14,171	-5.5%
Elizabethtown	KY	65,926	-4.5%

Sources: Department of Defense, *Base Closure and Realignment Report Vol. 1 of 2 Results & Processes*, May 2005 AND Maine Department of Labor, *Labor Market Services*

**STATEMENT OF SENATOR SUSAN M. COLLINS
BRAC COMMISSION HEARING
WASHINGTON, D.C.
AUGUST 10, 2005
BRUNSWICK NAVAL AIR STATION**

Mr. Chairman and Commissioners, I am Senator Susan Collins. We complete our presentation today by returning to the critical consideration of military value.

The closure of Brunswick Naval Air Station would be harmful to our national and homeland security. That is not just my personal opinion; it is the considered and repeated military judgment of the Department of Defense. This judgment has been stated many times during the BRAC deliberative process and most recently was reiterated in a July 26, 2005, letter from the Navy to me, which I ask be included in the record.

The Department of Defense rejected the closure of Brunswick Naval Air Station because of the base's clear military value, specifically its strategic location, surge capability, and ability to handle all DoD aircraft.

In its July 26th letter from Anne Davis, Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy for Base Realignment and Closure, the Navy laid out a compelling case for the retention of Brunswick. While this letter reiterates the Department's proposal for realignment, it actually makes a strong case *against* closure. Let me read the Navy's own words from this letter:

"Commander Fleet Forces Command supports retention of Brunswick ... because it will support future requirements for homeland defense and surge capability. The *specific* Maritime Homeland Defense requirement is stated in terms of response time to any maritime threat against the northeast coast of the United States. Because this area is not a standard operating area for U.S. naval vessels, and because of the proximity of NAS Brunswick to the great circle navigation routes from Europe, P-3s operating out of NAS Brunswick currently provide the Maritime Homeland Defense initial response coverage.

“United States Northern Command, working in cooperation with the military departments and the U.S. Coast Guard, is developing an air-to-surface concept of operations that will address this responsiveness concern with other assets or force packages that will be combined with the current P-3 mission capabilities to facilitate maximum response flexibility. Numerous sites in the northeast have been considered as potentially feasible locations to conduct P-3 detachment operations ... and NAS Brunswick *continues to be viewed by the Navy as the optimal site in New England.*”

The letter continues: “In addition to its location in the northeast, NAS Brunswick is an *ideal location* ... because it has a fully functional weapons facility that can support all weapons available for deployment aboard the P-3, and because its geographic location permits armed aircraft to depart on maritime missions without flying over inhabited areas” end quote. In fact, the letter does not fully recognize the complete scope of Brunswick’s capabilities to support weapons requirements of other platforms, including surface combatants.

The letter goes on to say: “NAS Brunswick also has *enormous strategic value* as the last remaining active DoD airfield in the northeast. NAS Brunswick supports ... several large NATO joint training exercise opportunities. In addition, NAS Brunswick is a critical logistics and refueling hub for DoD aircraft flowing in and out of the U.S. Central Command and U.S. European Command theatre of operations.

“Brunswick will also continue to function as an important location for aviation training, because it can and will remain capable of logistically supporting all of the aircraft currently in DoD inventory. Its utility is not limited to DoD aircraft, but includes aircraft of the Air National Guard and other Federal agencies.”

Commissioners, these are not my words; they are the Navy’s. Closing Brunswick would leave the Northeast more vulnerable to threats and would create an intolerable risk for the Department and the nation. Moreover, the DoD recommendation to realign Brunswick ignores the Department’s emphasis on what the Department itself describes as the base’s “enormous strategic value.”

Although Ms. Davis' response in this letter is focused on using Brunswick for detachment operations, it clearly states that this naval air station is vital for the Maritime Homeland Defense of the northeast United States.

The closure or realignment of Brunswick, and the subsequent removal of the base's aircraft, would significantly and dangerously degrade operational readiness and would increase response time in emergencies. The proposed realignment would not meet the needs of Northern Command's homeland defense missions and would result in diminished effectiveness and lower efficiency, with numerous hidden costs associated with detachments.

Commissioners, closure or realignment would violate the BRAC criteria. The Navy, Department of Defense and national security are best served by a fully operational base at Brunswick. Thank you for your attention to our presentations.

Naval Aviation Excess Capacity and East Coast Maritime Patrol Aircraft: A Flawed Analysis

Issue: East Coast Naval Aviation excess capacity in the Maritime Patrol Aircraft Community is not as large as currently calculated..

Discussion: In a Secretary of Defense memorandum for the Secretaries of the Military Departments dated November 15, 2002, the Secretary stated that “At a minimum, BRAC 2005 must eliminate excess physical capacity.”¹ The memorandum further states that “BRAC 2005 should be the means by which we reconfigure our current infrastructure into one in which operational capacity maximizes *both* warfighting capability and efficiency.”² From this guidance, the Department of the Navy analyzed Aviation Operations using a capacity data call that was created to measure an installation’s ability to house aviation squadrons and units while properly maintaining aircraft, providing ample airfield operating resources and training infrastructure, and ensuring sufficient support facilities.³ What these capacity data calls failed to measure, however, were the conditions of many hangars that are currently considered either substandard or inadequate. When the Navy’s existing Aviation Operations capacity is closely examined, it will be seen that many hangars today are actually planned for demolition in the near future which will reduce overall “excess capacity.”

The principal capacity metric for Aviation Operations used by the Navy was the “Hangar Module.” A Hangar Module was defined as the hangar space, line space, administrative space, operational space, and maintenance shop space required to house one aircraft squadron. Additionally, since actual hangar space is dependent on the type of aircraft to be housed in a particular hangar, data was collected for two different types of

¹ Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments dated November 15, 2002; Subject: Transformation Through Base Realignment and Closure; page 1.

² Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments dated November 15, 2002; Subject: Transformation Through Base Realignment and Closure; page 1.

³ DOD Base Closure and realignment Report to the Commission; Department of the Navy, Analyses and Recommendations (Vol. IV), page C-2.

hangars – Type I hangars, built to house carrier-based aircraft, and Type II hangars built to house larger aircraft, such as the P-3.⁴ It should be noted that during the Department of the Navy's Analysis Group (DAG) meeting on 31 August 2004 concerns that the new Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA) and the C-40 (both Boeing 737 aircraft) did not fit into one of the two hangar module types was highlighted. A review of all DAG meeting minutes did not reveal any additional discussions concerning this discrepancy in hangar types for the MMA or C-40. It can only be assumed that the Navy erroneously considered that the C-40 and MMA aircraft can be housed in Type II hangars.

Volume IV (Department of the Navy, Analyses and Recommendations) of the DOD Base Closure and Realignment Report to the Commission states that the Navy's two recommendations for closure (NAS Atlanta and NAS Willow Grove) decreases excess capacity for Aviation Operations from 19% to 16%.⁵ Not considered in this review of excess capacity are the future reductions of capacity due to the demolition of old, unusable hangars. For the East Coast Maritime Patrol community, the capacity reported through the data call process actually counted hangars that were graded either substandard or inadequate and never considered the fact that many of these hangars are scheduled for demolition.

Navy analysis determined that NAS Brunswick currently has 20 Type II Hangar Modules. At the time of the Navy's capacity data call two hangars with Service Facility Condition Codes of "Inadequate" were included in the total number of hangar modules. Since this data call, Hangar 3, which equated to 4 hangar modules, has been demolished and Hangar 1, which is another 4 hangar modules, is due to be demolished in FY06 due to failing rafters.⁶ Reducing the available hangar modules at NAS Brunswick due to the demolition of Hangars 1 and 3 will leave this base with a capacity of only 12.

⁴ DOD Base Closure and realignment Report to the Commission; Department of the Navy, Analyses and Recommendations (Vol. IV), pages C-2 and C-3.

⁵ DOD Base Closure and realignment Report to the Commission; Department of the Navy, Analyses and Recommendations (Vol. IV), page C-8

⁶ BRAC Capacity Data Call, 7 January; Certified by: Anne Davis; Originating Activity: NAS Brunswick, ME; Date: 3/28/2005; page 72

Additionally, Navy analysis determined that NAS Jacksonville has a capacity of 20.5 Type II hangar modules. These hangar modules equate to nine different hangar structures with seven structures given a Service Facility Condition Code of "Substandard." Four hangars, Hangars 113, 114, 115, and 116, are to be demolished following the completion of the S-3 aircraft sundown plan in FY08. These four hangars must be demolished to provide ramp space prior to the arrival of the Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA), the follow on aircraft to the P-3, and are old and not suitable for the MMA. Hangars 113, 114, 115, and 116 represent eight hangar modules. There are also three other hangars at NAS Jacksonville with Service Facility Conditions Codes of "Substandard" that host the Navy's helicopter community. Several of these hangars are also to be demolished to make ready for the construction of new helicopter hangar facilities at Jacksonville.⁷

Finally, of the 20.5 hangar modules at NAS Jacksonville, only 7.5 modules are used by the P-3 and C-40 communities (Hangar 1000 – 5 modules; VP-30 hangar with 2.5 modules). None of these modules are capable of hosting the MMA or C-40 aircraft which are derivatives of Boeing's 737 aircraft. As a result, a new MMA hangar is planned to be built at NAS Jacksonville and major renovations will be needed to hangar 1000.

In summary, it can be seen from the above analysis that the excess capacity believed to exist at the two East Coast Maritime Patrol air bases will soon be greatly reduced due to the demolition of substandard and inadequate hangars. Capacity at NAS Brunswick has already been reduced 4 hangar modules with the demolition of Hangar 3 in December 2004. When Hangar 1 is demolished in FY06, the base capacity will be further reduced four additional hangar modules. The net result is a hangar capacity at NAS Brunswick of 12 hangar modules. At NAS Jacksonville, hangar capacity will be reduced as the S-3 aircraft community completes decommissioning in FY08. When hangars 113, 114, 115 and 116 are demolished to create ramp space for the introduction

⁷ BRAC Capacity Data Call, 7 January; Certified by Anne Davis; Originating Activity, NAS Jacksonville, FL; 3/28/2005, page 87

of the MMA aircraft, excess capacity will be reduced by eight hangar modules. Capacity at Jacksonville will be further reduced as substandard hangars are demolished for the recapitalization of hangars for the helicopter community. Although new hangars will be built at Jacksonville for the MMA and for Navy helicopters, the demolition of old, substandard hangars will yield a net reduction in overall hangar capacity at the base. Thus, from this analysis it can be seen that the overall excess capacity within Naval Aviation is much less than currently calculated and the recommendations to consolidate all Navy MPA squadron at one air base should be carefully reconsidered.

CRS Report for Congress

Received through the CRS Web

Terrorist Nuclear Attacks on Seaports: Threat and Response

Jonathan Medalia
Specialist in National Defense
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

Summary

This report focuses on a possible terrorist nuclear attack on a U.S. seaport, a low-probability but high-consequence threat. Ports are vulnerable; an attack could cause local devastation and affect the global economy. Terrorists might obtain a bomb in several ways, though each presents difficulties. Current ability to detect a bomb appears limited. The United States is using technology, intelligence, international cooperation, etc., to try to thwart an attack. Issues for Congress include choosing a suitable level of effort, safeguarding foreign nuclear material, improving port security, and mitigating economic effects of an attack. This report will be updated as developments occur.

Background

Terrorists have tried to obtain weapons of mass destruction – chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons. Hearings and media articles since September 11 have highlighted radiological dispersal devices, or “dirty bombs,” which would use standard explosives or other means to disperse radioactive materials. Dirty bombs would be quite feasible for a terrorist group to make, given the limited expertise needed and the availability of explosives and radioactive material. An attack with such a weapon likely would kill or injure few people and cause little property damage, though it could cause panic and might require closing some areas for an undetermined time. While a terrorist attack using a nuclear weapon (a device that caused a substantial nuclear explosive yield, as distinct from a dirty bomb) has much lower feasibility, it merits consideration because it would have much higher consequence.

The September 11 attacks showed that many U.S. facilities could be attractive targets for terrorist attack. One set of targets that has attracted attention from Congress is the nation’s seaports. (See CRS Report RS21079, *Maritime Security: Overview of Issues*.) If terrorists smuggled a Hiroshima-sized bomb (15 kilotons) into a port and set it off, the attack would destroy buildings out to a mile or two; start fires, especially in a port that handled petroleum and chemicals; spread fallout over many square miles; disrupt commerce; and kill many people. By one estimate, a 10- to 20-kiloton weapon detonated in a major seaport or Washington, DC, would kill 50,000 to 1 million people and would

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result in direct property damage of \$50 to \$500 billion, losses due to trade disruption of \$100 billion to \$200 billion, and indirect costs of \$300 billion to \$1.2 trillion.¹

Terrorists might try to smuggle a bomb into a U.S. port in many ways, such as in a tanker or a dry bulk freighter, but sea containers may provide them a particularly attractive route. A container is “[a] truck trailer body that can be detached from the chassis for loading into a vessel, a rail car or stacked in a container depot.”² Much of the world’s cargo moves by container.³ The (then) U.S. Customs Service processed 5.7 million containers entering the United States by ship in 2001.⁴ It screens data for all these containers,⁵ but inspects “only about 2 percent of the total volume of trade entering the country each year.”⁶ Containers could easily hold a nuclear weapon. Robert Bonner, Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection, believes that an attack using a bomb in a container would halt container shipments, leading to “devastating” consequences for the global economy, bringing some countries to “the edge of economic collapse.”⁷ The October 2002 lockout of West Coast ports demonstrated some of these ripple effects on the world economy on a small scale. People can, however, find ways to minimize economic problems. The Y2K computer bug did not result in disaster, in part because organizations took steps to ward off the problem. In an effort to reduce port vulnerability, Congress passed S. 1214, Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-295).

Terrorist nuclear weapons: routes to a bomb. A terrorist group (as distinct from a nation) might obtain a nuclear bomb by several plausible routes. In each case, a reasonable estimate of explosive yield is that of the Hiroshima bomb, 15 kilotons, equivalent to the explosive force of 15,000 tons of TNT.

Russia. Strategic nuclear weapons (long-range weapons the Soviet Union would have used to attack the United States) are reportedly well guarded on missiles or, thanks in part to U.S. assistance, in storage. In contrast, thousands of lower-yield weapons intended for use in combat are less well secured, and numbers and locations are uncertain. (See CRS Issue Brief IB98038, *Nuclear Weapons in Russia: Safety, Security, and Control*

¹ Abt Associates, “The Economic Impact of Nuclear Terrorist Attacks on Freight Transport Systems in an Age of Seaport Vulnerability,” executive summary, April 30, 2003, p. 7. [http://www.abtassociates.com/reports/ES-Economic_Impact_of_Nuclear_Terrorist_Attacks.pdf]

² U.S. Department of Transportation. Maritime Administration. “Glossary of Shipping Terms.” [<http://www.marad.dot.gov/publications/glossary/C.html>]. Typical dimensions of a container are 40 ft by 8½ ft by 8 ft.

³ U.S. Department of the Treasury. Customs Service. Factsheet: “U.S. Customs Container Security Initiative to Safeguard U.S., Global Economy.” February 2002. [http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/press_releases/22002/02222002.xml]

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ U.S. Department of the Treasury. Customs Service. Fact Sheet: “The ‘2 Percent Myth’: Automated System, Technology, People Screen Cargo for Contraband,” May 2002.

⁶ U.S. Department of the Treasury. Customs Service. Robert Bonner, U.S. Customs Commissioner, Speech Before the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., January 17, 2002. [http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/commissioner/speeches_statements/archives/jan172002.xml]

⁷ Ibid.

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Issues.) Terrorists might buy or steal one of these weapons. The weapons might (or might not) have devices to prevent unauthorized use, or terrorists might lack confidence that they could make a weapon work. Without such confidence, terrorists might “mine” the weapon for nuclear materials and components to make their own device.

Pakistan. Other nations have nuclear weapons. U.S., British, French, and Israeli weapons are thought to be well guarded. Chinese weapons are also thought to be well guarded, though less is known on this point. Control is less certain for India and Pakistan. Of the two, it appears more likely that terrorists might obtain a bomb from Pakistan. That nation asserts that it has complete control over its weapons, but that could change if Pakistan were taken over by Islamic fundamentalists sympathetic to al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups. In this scenario, the “donors” would presumably give the terrorists detailed instructions for operating the bombs.

Build a bomb. The Hiroshima bomb was a “gun assembly” weapon. Its nuclear explosive component was a gun barrel about 6 inches in diameter by 6 feet long. It was capped at each end, with standard explosive at one end, a mass of uranium highly enriched in the isotope 235 (highly enriched uranium, or HEU) at the other end, and a second HEU mass in the middle. Detonating the explosive shot one mass of HEU into the other, rapidly assembling a mass large enough to support a fission chain reaction. (Plutonium cannot be used.) This is the simplest type of nuclear weapon. U.S. scientists had such high confidence in the design that they did not test the Hiroshima bomb.

Many experts believe that a terrorist group having access to HEU and the requisite skills, but without the resources available to a nation, could build such a weapon. Five former Los Alamos nuclear weapons experts held that a crude nuclear weapon “could be constructed by a group not previously engaged in designing or building nuclear weapons, providing a number of requirements were adequately met.”⁸ The requirements they list, though, are substantial. They include detailed design drawings and specifications; individuals skilled in a wide range of weapons skills; the necessary equipment; and extensive preparations to create a bomb quickly once in possession of HEU so as to reduce the risk of detection. A National Research Council study presents another view. “The basic technical information needed to construct a workable nuclear device is readily available in the open literature. The primary impediment that prevents countries or technically competent terrorist groups from developing nuclear weapons is the availability of SNM [special nuclear materials, i.e., HEU and plutonium-239], especially HEU.”⁹

It would be difficult for a terrorist group to obtain enough HEU for a weapon. Many nations have gone to great lengths to protect it. The International Atomic Energy Agency has safeguards to protect, among other things, HEU in nuclear reactors. The United States has had a number of programs over the past decade to help former Soviet republics protect nuclear weapons, material, and knowledge. (See CRS Report 97-1027, *Nunn-*

⁸ J. Carson Mark, Theodore Taylor, Eugene Eyster, William Maraman, and Jacob Wechsler, “Can Terrorists Build Nuclear Weapons?” Washington, Nuclear Control Institute. n.d., n.p. [<http://www.nci.org/k-m/makeab.htm>].

⁹ National Research Council. Committee on Science and Technology for Countering Terrorism. *Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and Technology in Countering Terrorism*. Washington, National Academy Press, 2002, p. 40. [<http://www.nap.edu/catalog/10415.html>].

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Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs: Issues for Congress.) Perhaps the best evidence that these efforts have succeeded so far is that terrorists have not detonated a nuclear weapon. At the same time, some are concerned that terrorists could obtain HEU. For example, the National Research Council study noted above rated the threat level from SNM from Russia as “High – large inventories of SNM are stored at many sites that apparently lack inventory controls and indigenous threats have increased.”¹⁰

Vulnerability of ports and shipping. Ports may be attractive targets for terrorists. With many of the largest ports in or near major cities, a nuclear bomb detonated in a port could kill many thousands of people, interrupt flows of U.S. commerce, and perhaps cause a global economic disruption. Ports are vulnerable. Many are flat, being at the ocean’s edge, so would offer little shielding against weapon effects. Some have great quantities of inflammable material, such as fuel; fires could extend the area of destruction and release toxic gases. While ports may stretch on for miles, a 15-kiloton weapon would have enough force to destroy many key facilities of a typical port.

Front-line ability to detect nuclear weapons is limited. CRS visits to the Customs Service in Baltimore in July 2002 and the Coast Guard in Philadelphia in August 2002 produced the following information. Customs’ Container Security Initiative (CSI) seeks to improve security at foreign ports for U.S.-bound containers, but Customs inspectors do not inspect cargo there and do not control personnel selection or port operations. The Coast Guard cannot open containers at sea for various reasons. For example, they are tightly packed and the door is part of a container’s structure, so one container under others might crumple if the door were opened. Technology is lacking. A Coast Guard officer wrote, “our method of detecting nuclear and biological weapons is ... our eyes, ears, and brains. We currently have no more sophisticated equipment than that.” At Baltimore, Customs inspects about 2 percent of containers. For some, it uses a sophisticated machine that x-rays entire containers; for others, it unloads all items from a container, may x-ray them, and searches some items. Customs agents have pager-size radiation detectors. Terrorists could exploit weaknesses. They could infiltrate foreign ports as inspectors or longshoremen, and pass a container with a weapon into a secured zone. The Coast Guard almost certainly could not detect a bomb in a container or in the structure of a ship. Customs targets containers for inspection based on cargo manifest data, port of last call, shipping line, etc. Terrorists, however, could be expected to go to great lengths to make a bomb-carrying container appear normal. Small radiation detectors might detect highly radioactive isotopes usable in dirty bombs, but could not be sure of detecting less-radioactive uranium-235. Once a ship arrives in port, any inspection could be too late.

Responses and Countermeasures

The central approach to reducing vulnerability to a terrorist nuclear attack is defense in depth, which uses multiple methods to detect and interdict a weapon. Many existing technologies aid this effort; others are under development. Intelligence seeks clues that terrorists were trying to obtain HEU or to make or smuggle a bomb. Coast Guard, Customs, and others conduct inspections. U.S. agreements with foreign governments help

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 44.

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screen cargo.¹¹ Although no one method is perfect, together they can increase the odds of detecting a weapon. It would be harder to evade several means of detection than just one, as attempts to reduce what one sensor detects may make a bomb more visible to another sensor using a different signature, or may reduce the likelihood that the bomb would work. Further, a terrorist group would not know the limits of detection capability, so would have to assume a capability greater than what existed. Defense in depth could involve outfitting every port, airport, and border crossing with several types of sensors and the personnel to operate them, expanding intelligence capabilities with new sensors and analysts, placing more U.S. agents in foreign ports, and upgrading Coast Guard and Customs equipment and adding personnel. Such steps would involve large costs.

While press articles focus on how the United States can augment its detection capabilities, the struggle is two-sided. If we deploy a new sensor at some ports, terrorists might detonate a weapon before it is inspected, or hide it in a container bound for another port. If foreign ports screened containers before being loaded onto U.S.-bound ships, they could infiltrate the port. If we secured the world's largest ports, they could use smaller ones. If we assured the security of every U.S.-bound container, they might smuggle a weapon in a freighter or supertanker. If we secured all U.S.-bound containers, they might ship a bomb to Mexico and bring it into the United States in a small boat or airplane. In short, despite overwhelming advantages that the United States and its trading partners possess in technology and organization, terrorists have other advantages.

Policy Options

Securing nuclear materials. The possibility that a terrorist group could make a nuclear weapon given enough HEU, and the difficulty of preventing terrorists from smuggling a weapon into a U.S. port, show the value of the effort to secure nuclear weapons and materials in Russia and elsewhere. Are current efforts sufficient?

Forensics. The United States can often identify the origin of nuclear material used in a bomb. This forensic capability strengthens the value of controlling Russian nuclear weapons and materials: finding that material for a bomb detonated in the United States came from Russia, a likely source, would in all probability lead to the conclusion that the material was stolen rather than that Russia conducted the attack. At the same time, augmenting already-excellent forensic capability through technology and intelligence could help deter other nations from giving nuclear materials to a terrorist group.

Ports in major cities. The terrorist weapons discussed earlier have much less explosive yield than nuclear weapons carried by bombers and long-range missiles, and a smaller destructive radius. Blast damage might extend 1 to 2 miles. (Fire and fallout

¹¹ For example, the Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Bureau of the Department of Homeland Security implements the Container Security Initiative (CSI), which involves bilateral agreements with foreign ports that export to the United States. Under CSI, which began in January 2002, CBP teams work with host governments to identify high-risk containers for screening before the containers leave port. A CBP website reports in August 2003 that the top 20 ports worldwide, which handle about 70% of containers destined for the United States, participate in CSI, and that more will participate.

[http://www.customs.gov/xp/cgov/import/cargo_control/csi] See also Bonner, Speech Before the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

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might extend beyond that range.) Accordingly, it might be argued that ports with the greatest number of people living or working within a mile or two of cargo docks, such as Philadelphia and New York, should have highest priority in receiving security resources.

Overseas inspections. Inspection of ships in U.S. ports would be too late to prevent a nuclear explosion, so the United States might require screening of U.S.-bound cargo by U.S. personnel in ports originating shipments. Other nations might view such a requirement as an infringement on their prerogatives, but the size of the U.S. market would presumably make exporting nations more willing to consider such measures.

Ameliorating economic consequences. Civil defense studies over decades examined how to ameliorate the destructive effects of a large nuclear attack. This effort, and more recent emergency preparedness efforts, provide a template for response and recovery following a terrorist attack using one 15-kiloton weapon. This work does not, however, address possible global economic consequences and how to predict and mitigate them. These issues could benefit from further study and analyses.

What level of effort? While the United States is increasing its efforts to counter nuclear terrorism, the current level of effort might stop only an unsophisticated attempt to smuggle a nuclear weapon into the United States. Terrorists who might acquire a nuclear weapon, though, would surely go to great lengths to deliver it. A massive U.S. counterterrorism effort would increase security, but would require many more security personnel, large-scale diversion of technology resources, possible civil liberties concerns, and high cost. A low level of effort appears politically untenable. At issue is whether a moderate level of effort is effective, and whether a high level of effort is supportable.

Recent Developments

Recent bills related to terrorist nuclear attacks on seaports include S. 746, Anti-Terrorism and Port Security Act of 2003; H.R. 1010, Port Protection Act of 2003; S. 193, Radiation Detection for Dirty Bomb Material in Containers and Bulk Cargo Act of 2003; H.R. 2193, Port Security Improvements Act of 2003; H.R. 2376, Anti-Terrorism and Port Security Act of 2003; and S. 1147, High-Tech Port Security Act of 2003. The Senate Governmental Affairs Committee held a hearing on March 20, 2003, "Cargo Containers: The Next Terrorist Target?" The House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee held a hearing on port security antiterrorism programs on June 3, 2003. Related CRS reports include "Nuclear and Radiological Terrorism," in the electronic briefing book on terrorism, and CRS Report RL31733, *Port and Maritime Security: Background and Issues for Congress*. On May 31, President Bush announced a Proliferation Security Initiative under which the United States and allies "have begun working on new agreements to search planes and ships carrying suspect cargo and to seize illegal weapons or missile technologies." On June 12, Secretary Ridge announced the launch of Phase 2 of the CSI, expanding it to additional countries, and the release of \$170 million in port security grants. On July 1, the Coast Guard published interim rules in the *Federal Register* "to promulgate maritime security requirements mandated by the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002" (P.L. 107-295). On July 23, the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) published a proposed rule in the *Federal Register* that would require shippers (by land, sea, or air) to provide CBP with information electronically on the contents of cargo in advance of its arrival.



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
1000 NAVY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20350-1000

July 26, 2005

The Honorable Susan M. Collins
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Senator Collins:

This is in response to the July 21, 2005, email from Ms. Mackenzie Eaglen of your staff concerning the strategic value of Naval Air Station (NAS) Brunswick. Specifically, Ms. Eaglen asked: "What is the strategic importance of BNAS and define the associated homeland defense and surge capability requirements of BNAS?"

Commander Fleet Forces Command (CFFC) supports retention of NAS Brunswick as a Naval Air Field (NAF) because it will support future requirements for homeland defense and surge capability. The specific Maritime Homeland Defense (MHLD) requirement is stated in terms of response time and aircraft mission capabilities. The loss of NAS Brunswick will increase P-3 response time to any maritime threat against the northeast coast of the United States. Because this area is not a standard operating area for U.S. naval vessels, and because of the proximity of NAS Brunswick to the great circle navigation routes from Europe, P-3s operating out of NAS Brunswick currently provide the MHLD initial response coverage. United States Northern Command, working in cooperation with the military departments and the U.S. Coast Guard, is developing an air-to-surface concept of operations that will address this responsiveness concern with other assets or force packages that will be combined with the current P-3 mission capabilities to facilitate maximum response flexibility. Numerous sites in the northeast have been considered as potentially feasible locations to conduct P-3 detachment operations (although additional detailed analysis is required), and NAS Brunswick continues to be viewed by the Navy as the optimal site in New England for P-3 detachment operations. In addition to its location in the northeast, NAS Brunswick is an ideal location to support P-3 detachment missions because it has a fully functional weapons facility that can support all weapons available for deployment onboard the P-3, and because its geographic location permits armed aircraft to depart on maritime missions without flying over inhabited areas.

NAS Brunswick also has enormous strategic value as the last remaining active DoD airfield in the northeast. NAS Brunswick supports (and NAF Brunswick will continue to support) several large NATO joint training exercise opportunities. In addition, NAS Brunswick is a critical logistics and refueling hub for DoD aircraft flowing in and out of the U.S. Central Command and U.S. European Command theatre of operations. NAS Brunswick will also continue to function as an important location for aviation training, because it can and will remain capable of logistically supporting all of the aircraft currently in the DoD inventory. Its utility is not limited to DoD aircraft, but includes

aircraft of the Air National Guard and other Federal agencies. NAS Brunswick will function in a similar manner to NAS Key West, which also has no home-based operational assets. In addition, NAF Brunswick will continue to be the home of the Department of the Navy's east coast Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) School, and will also continue to host Navy and Marine Corps reserve units.

I trust this information satisfactorily addresses your immediate concerns. My staff is available to meet with your staff to respond to any specific questions. If we can be of further assistance, please let me know.

Sincerely,



over Anne Rathmell Davis
Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy
For Base Realignment and Closure

Testimony of
William L. Babbin
National Association of Government Employees, R1-77
before the
Base Realignment and Closure Commission
on
Naval Air Station, Brunswick
Washington, DC
August 10, 2005

My name is Bill Babbin. I am the president of the National Association of Government Employees local R1-77 at Naval Air Station Brunswick (NASB).

You've read the quotes and heard the remarks made by many in senior leadership positions throughout the Defense Department regarding the value of NASB. I'd also like to share with you today the thoughts and concerns of the proud men and women who serve the NASB in various capacities. Many of my brothers and sisters have spent their entire life tied to the military in one capacity or another and are very proud of their service to their nation and consider the military in general an extended family. We serve each day knowing that each of us is as equally important as the other in accomplishing the mission of the Navy. We know the high value of NASB for today and the future of America.

The employees of NASB have worked tirelessly to help bring the millions of dollars in investments in infrastructure to make NASB a base for today and tomorrow. We also realize that the threats to our great nation will change and along with those changes so must the mission of Navy. For this very reason we built the brand new 32 million dollar hangar, the only hangar today in the inventory able to accommodate the new Multi-Mission Maritime Aircraft. We understand the value of having a base with dual 8,000 foot runways, unencumbered airspace, easy access to the major shipping lanes and our close proximity to Europe.

I'd like to also talk about the quality of life in Maine because I think this is an important factor when DOD considers the quality of life for its military members and the location of a military facility. The data the DOD collected for this subject showed some interesting results that didn't surprise me but just enforced what I have always known as a father of three living in Maine. And that is that Maine is a great place to raise a family.

These DOD numbers showed that the local Uniform Crime Reports per 100,000 people for the Brunswick area was 3,148, well below the national average of 4,118. Jacksonville was 5,821 per 100,000, well above the national average.

It also showed that Brunswick area had a physician to patient ratio of 1:212, while Jacksonville is at 1:384.

Moreover Brunswick average pupil to teacher ratio is 12:1 with an average high school graduation rate of 87 percent. Jacksonville has a pupil to teacher ratio of 19:1 with an average high school graduation rate of 68 percent.

The unemployment numbers for Brunswick are 3 percent. For Jacksonville they are 5 percent. For spouses who have to move and locate work in Jacksonville it will compound the problem.

Those numbers, combined with the strategic location, unencumbered air space, room to grow, easy access to the sea-lanes and the infrastructure investments already made, paint a clear picture for those of us who provide the services for the Naval Air Station: that NASB should remain intact as is.

The workers of NASB serve her proudly and want to continue to do so. NASB needs viable missions that keep planes flying at NASB and the military community alive in the area for the security of America.

**TOWN OF BRUNSWICK
PROCLAMATION IN SUPPORT OF THE
BRUNSWICK NAVAL AIR STATION**

WHEREAS NAS Brunswick is the only active military facility capable of providing aerial surveillance and interdiction along the United States northeastern corridor, more commonly known as the New England coast and the Maritimes; and

WHEREAS NAS Brunswick is a major asset in the support of Homeland Security and Defense, and, more particularly, in the fight against terrorism in the United States; and

WHEREAS NAS Brunswick is geographically situated such that joint forces may operate and train together; and

WHEREAS NAS Brunswick is sufficient in size and capacity to allow joint military use with both active and reserve units; and

WHEREAS NAS Brunswick has recently been completely reconstructed to handle any aircraft in the military inventory, past, present and projected for the future; and

WHEREAS NAS Brunswick has a logistical advantage as the only fully operational air facility in the northeast; and

WHEREAS NAS Brunswick is a welcome and vital link in the continued success of the economy of the Bath, Brunswick, Topsham region and the entire social fabric of the surrounding communities;

NOW THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED that,

The Town of Brunswick, Maine declares and affirms its complete support for the retention of NAS Brunswick as a fully operational naval air station;


The community fully supports the Constitutional rights and authority of the BRAC Commission in requiring the deliverance of any and all pertinent Department of Defense data for a full review by said commission; and

The community supports and encourages the retention of all assets now currently located at NAS Brunswick, allowing for the continued security of the United States homeland, in general, and the northeastern coastline, in particular; and

The community would expect the Department of Defense to recognize the inherent vital economic and protective role that NAS Brunswick holds in the northeast, in particular, and for the United States, at large; and

The community fully endorses and sanctions NAS Brunswick in its current use, as well as its potential use in establishing essential joint military force structures in the future defense of the American homeland.

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that this Proclamation seeks and enjoins the continuation of the Department of the Navy activities as enumerated above at NAS Brunswick.



Signed this 1st day of June, 2005.



Forrest Lowe, Chairman

WHEREAS NAS Brunswick is the only active military facility capable of providing aerial surveillance and interdiction along the United States northeastern corridor, more commonly known as the New England coast and the Maritimes; and

WHEREAS NAS Brunswick is a major asset in the support of Homeland Security and Defense, and, more particularly, in the fight against terrorism in the United States; and

WHEREAS NAS Brunswick is geographically situated such that joint forces may operate and train together; and

WHEREAS NAS Brunswick is sufficient in size and capacity to allow joint military use with both active and reserves units; and

WHEREAS NAS Brunswick has recently been completely reconstructed to handle any aircraft in the military inventory, both past, present and projected for the future; and

WHEREAS NAS Brunswick has a logistical advantage as the only fully operational air facility in the northeast; and

WHEREAS NAS Brunswick is a welcome and vital link in the continued success of the Bath, Brunswick, Topsham region economy and the entire social fabric of the surrounding communities;

NOW THEREFORE BE IT PROCLAIMED AND RESOLVED that the City of Bath, Maine declares and affirms through this vote complete support by the Honorable Bath City Council for the retention of NAS Brunswick as a fully operational naval air station; that the Bath City Council fully supports the Constitutional rights and authority of the BRAC Commission in requiring the deliverance of any and all pertinent Department of Defense data for a full review by said commission; that the Bath City Council supports and encourages the retention of all assets now currently located at NAS Brunswick, allowing for the continued security of the United States homeland, in general, and the Northeastern Coastline, in particular; that the Bath City Council would expect the Department of Defense to recognize the inherent vital economic and protective role that NAS Brunswick holds in the northeast, in particular, and for the United States, at large; that the Bath City Council fully endorses and sanctions NAS Brunswick in its current use, as well as its potential use in establishing essential joint military force structures in the future defense of the American homeland; and through this Proclamation seeks and enjoins the continuation of the Department of Navy activities as enumerated above at NAS Brunswick.

[Signature]
Andrew Winglass, Chairperson

<i>[Signature]</i>	<i>[Signature]</i>
_____ Bernard A. Wyman Jr.	_____
_____ Ernest R. Mitchell	_____
_____ Guthe Pagudo	_____



**TOWN OF TOPSHAM
PROCLAMATION IN SUPPORT OF THE
BRUNSWICK NAVAL AIR STATION**

- WHEREAS** NAS Brunswick is the only active military facility capable of providing aerial surveillance and interdiction along the United States northeastern corridor, more commonly known as the New England coast and the Maritimes; and
- WHEREAS** NAS Brunswick is a major asset in the support of Homeland Security and Defense, and, more particularly, in the fight against terrorism in the United States; and
- WHEREAS** NAS Brunswick is geographically situated such that joint forces may operate and train together; and
- WHEREAS** NAS Brunswick is sufficient in size and capacity to allow joint military use with both active and reserve units; and
- WHEREAS** NAS Brunswick has recently been completely reconstructed to handle any aircraft in the military inventory, past, present and projected for the future; and
- WHEREAS** NAS Brunswick has a logistical advantage as the only fully operational air facility in the northeast; and
- WHEREAS** NAS Brunswick is a welcome and vital link in the continued success of the economy of the Bath, Brunswick, Topsham region and the entire social fabric of the surrounding communities;

NOW THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED that,

The Town of Topsham, Maine declares and affirms its complete support for the retention of NAS Brunswick as a fully operational naval air station;

The community fully supports the Constitutional rights and authority of the BRAC Commission in requiring the deliverance of any and all pertinent Department of Defense data for a full review by said commission; and

The community supports and encourages the retention of all assets now currently located at NAS Brunswick, allowing for the continued security of the United States homeland, in general, and the northeastern coastline, in particular; and

The community would expect the Department of Defense to recognize the inherent vital economic and protective role that NAS Brunswick holds in the northeast, in particular, and for the United States, at large; and

The Community fully endorses and sanctions NAS Brunswick in its current use, as well as its potential use in establishing essential joint military force structures in the future defense of the American homeland.

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that this Proclamation seeks and enjoins the continuation of the Department of the Navy activities as enumerated above at NAS Brunswick.

Signed this 1st day of June, 2005.



Donald Russell
Donald Russell, Chairman