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DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

FINAL DELIBERATION HEARING

23 JUNE TO 27 JUNE 1993

ARMY TEAM BRIEFINGS

ED BROWN

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

OPEN MEETING

9:00 a.m.

Hart Senate Office Building
Room 216
Washington, D.C.

Wednesday, June 23, 1993

COMMISSIONERS PRESENT:

Jim Courter, Chairman
CPT Peter B. Bowman, USN (Ret.)
Beverly B. Byron
Rebecca G. Cox
GEN Hansford T. Johnson, USAF (Ret.)
Harry C. McPherson, Jr.
Robert D. Stuart

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P R O C E E D I N G S

CHAIRMAN COURTER: The Base Closing Commission will come to order. Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. After three-and-a-half months of a pretty grueling schedule, the members of the 1993 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission are ready to begin some very, very difficult decisions about the domestic infrastructure of the United States military.

It has been, obviously, not a quiet spring for members of the Commission, nor has it been an early summer. We have been lobbied and approached by members of Congress, elected officials at every level, governors and state representatives. We have been courted by consultants that were hired by worried communities and now it's time for us to take our own counsel.

Just a word, very quickly, about the members of Congress and elected officials. With very few exceptions, and I mean very few, as much as they feel very strongly about their facilities, as much as they deeply believe that their bases should remain open for legitimate national security reasons, and as much as the stakes are very high and that they're concerned about -- and rightly so -- the future of

their towns and their constituents, they have been very courteous to this Commission.

And, they have been helpful to the process, by advocating the good things that their facilities have, by making sure that this Commission is totally aware of the military attributes of those bases that they represent, and that has added, I think, to the quality of the dialogue and the accuracy of the information that we're dealing with, and I want to commend the Members of Congress for showing the courtesy that they have to the individual members of this Commission during a very arduous and difficult process.

In the face of it all, the members of this Commission have not wavered at all from our commitment to render a fair and fiercely independent judgment with respect to the recommendations of the Secretary of Defense, which were published by him on March 12th of this year.

From beginning to end, start to finish, the Commissioners and I have really been privileged to participate in what is a very stimulating exercise of open government, I think one of the more robust examples of open government in Washington, D.C. We have clearly been blessed by this challenge for no other reason than the fact that we

have been part of it.

We visited, as you know, well over 100 bases in every corner of the United States. We've heard directly through testimony from over 200 members of Congress here on Capitol Hill and received thousands of telephone calls from elected representatives.

The 1993 Base Closing Commission is now ready to hold its final deliberations and will be starting the voting process this afternoon. As we do that, we're very sensitive to the fact that our decisions will have a very large

11 economic impact on communities.
12 And, as we discovered, in some parts of the
13 country, there has been three generations and four
14 generations of families working for the Navy, in some
15 instances, and the Army, in other instances, at Supply Depots
16 and shipyards and maintenance facilities.
17 Now, they are looking around and their lifestyle
18 will change, based on the final decisions on this Commission,
19 the President and the Congress. Their opportunities will
20 change, and we are well aware of the huge economic impact it
21 will have on these individuals and their families and their
22 lives, and that weighs very heavily because we're all human

1 beings. It's not good news for individual communities in the
2 short run. We firmly hope and we believe in the long run,
3 that every community will make the appropriate adjustments.
4 We have a very dynamic economy.
5 We have, obviously, an ambitious schedule this week
6 and I think members of the press have received it. On each
7 day, through Sunday, the 27th of June, the Commission will
8 carefully review all the 238 installations, large and small,
9 but all important, that are on either the Secretary's list
10 for recommended closures or our own.
11 By the time we complete our last vote some time
12 late on Sunday, obviously, everybody will know what the make
13 up is of this final list. It will be presented in written
14 form and report form to the president by July 1st.
15 When we finish Sunday with our votes late in the
16 afternoon or early in the evening, we will then have our
17 staff and members of the Commission write and finalize the
18 report that we'll be sending to the president, so the work is
19 not over on Sunday for the members of this Commission or the
20 staff.
21 Before we begin the final review and voting process
22 early this afternoon, we'll be spending this morning

1 revisiting three major categories that we failed to complete
2 last Friday and this afternoon, we'll be having some votes
3 and further discussion with regard to the Army facilities.
4 On Friday, June 25th, we'll move over to the House
5 side of the Capitol in Room 2167 of the Rayburn House Office
6 Building, which is the main hearing room of the House Public
7 Works Committee. We'll begin at 9:00 and finish
8 approximately 6:00 or 6:30 each day.
9 Saturday, June 26th, we'll return to Room G50 of
10 the Dirksen Senate Office Building, beginning, as we plan, at
11 9:00 o'clock in the morning and finishing about 6:30 in the
12 evening. We'll work through the day on Navy categories.
13 As I mentioned, if all goes well, we'll complete
14 our work with respect to votes and the public session by
15 6:30. We will have press availabilities twice a day. Our
16 custom is normally once a day but in view of the fact that
17 we're going to have votes and final deliberations and
18 hearings, we thought we would have it twice a day at around
19 12:00 or 12:30 in the morning and then at 6:00, 6:30 or 7:00
20 in the evening.
21 Because of the enormous amount of work that we have
22 to accomplish, we would respectfully ask the press that they

1 try to focus their questions on those facilities that we have
2 disposed of through votes. They may have very legitimate and
3 tough, challenging questions as to why we did that which we
4 did, although I think you'll understand why after you hear
5 the discussions among the Commissioners and between
6 Commissioners and staff.
7 We would rather not speculate on votes that have
8 not taken place, so if the press would indulge us with
9 respect to that, we would appreciate it, but on the other
10 hand, they are the press and when they ask the questions that

11 they think are important, we certainly understand that.
12 Let me just mention two things personally. Fi
13 members of the press and the public have seen t
14 Commissioners faces and heard our voices, not o
15 Washington but throughout the United States, and it's pre
16 obvious that we're not alone, but you haven't seen very mu
17 nor have you heard very much from the extraordinarily
18 dedicated and talented members of our staff, just four of
19 which are sitting in front of me now.
20 We have an additional 65 or 70 people that have
21 worked as hard as I've ever seen public servants work in
22 entire life, and I'm not just pandering. I've been on

1 Capitol Hill for many, many years, in this base closing
2 process, one a couple of years ago, a member of Congress
3 many, many years, and the folks that we managed to stitch
4 together for this work are talented and dedicated.
5 I believe, without exaggeration, they've worked
6 every weekend for the past six weeks. They were in the
7 office again last night until 12:00 or 1:00. They'll be
8 the office tonight until that time, getting up early in t
9 morning. They did work all last weekend, Saturday and
10 Sunday, will be working this weekend, Saturday and Sunday
11 and the nation doesn't know them but the nation really mu
12 tip its hat to these dedicated people who have done such
13 outstanding job.
14 I've heard from members of Congress the same thing,
15 that "Your staff is a talented one and a dedicated one."
16 want to publicly express my personal appreciation and the
17 appreciation from the Commission to this dedicated staff.
18 They are an outstanding group of individuals.
19 Finally, just a quick word as to why we're here.
20 It's clear, I think, and I can tell by talking to people t
21 I don't know, the people that I meet at bases, t
22 that we run into in airports and on the roads an

1 corners, as we've gone to the heartland of America and to
2 shores.
3 They recognize the requirement. They recognize
4 that which we have to do. It doesn't make it easy, but t
5 recognize, and I think America recognizes, that we are
6 blessedly capable of reducing significantly our defense
7 expenditures and spending that money on other things.
8 Cold War is over and we don't have to go into all that, bu
9 necessary component of making efficiencies is doing some v
10 painful things.
11 Home owners do it. Families do it. Private
12 enterprise does it and so must the Department of Defense,
13 that is, to get rid of everything that's not needed, so i
14 doesn't have to be supported, so it doesn't have to be
15 guarded, so it doesn't have to be kept warm or kept cool,
16 that means we're going to have to close a lot of bases in
17 this round, and there will be further mobility bases
18 domestically in the United States that will be closed in
19 1995, I suspect.
20 It is a classic area where the local interest
21 conflicts with the national interest. In this particular
22 situation, we have pledged -- this Commission has -- to m

1 sure that the national interest is served. That is our
2 master. We have to do that which is necessary for the com
3 good, even though the decision is very painful for a locat
4 or a region or a county or, in some instances, a state, b
5 that's our job and we're not going to shrink fro
6 Also, I might add that we're well aware, as
7 that this process was created because Congress an
8 administration found it so difficult to arrive at these
9 conclusions themselves, and that's not by way of criticis
10 those two remarkable and flexible institutions that are

11 imperfect and I suppose as imperfect as the people that work
12 in them.
13 We now know why it was impossible. There is an
14 extraordinary effort by communities to put their best foot
15 forward to show the absolute essentiality of their facility
16 and you're dealing in not simple terms. That which you do
17 with respect to one base affects another, and that which you
18 do in one part of the country affects another as well.
19 So, we recognize that because of the paralysis of
20 and the inability of Congress and the administration to make
21 these decisions and carry them out, without suspicion of
22 bias, without suspicion of political expediency, a Commission

1 had to be created that was the final judge and arbiter. The
2 process can only survive and will only be accepted by
3 Congress if this Commission meets in public, aggravates in
4 public, votes in public, and visits bases in public and
5 that's what we have tried to do.
6 As you know, we have not met and discuss and voted
7 behind closed doors. This is an exercise that is being
8 conducted totally in public and, because of that, there are
9 going to be disagreements among Commissioners. There may be,
10 at times, late in the afternoon, some heated discussions
11 between staff and Commissioners but please know that that, I
12 don't think, lessens the credibility of our product.
13 I think it should enhance it, because the
14 difficulty that we may have publicly in arriving at these
15 conclusions I think confirms and ratifies and proves that our
16 decisions have been made as public as we can possibly make
17 them.
18 To this moment, although individual Commissioners
19 are arriving at conclusions in their own minds, I cannot -- I
20 could not look any individual in this room in the face and
21 say, "That base stays open. That base is closed." We have
22 purposely kept our minds open, so I have the input of the

1 other Commissioners as we arrive at our final decisions.
2 That, I guess, is a long enough opening statement.
3 I would ask whether any other Commissioners have
4 anything to say before I introduce our staff, to proceed. Is
5 there anything that any of the Commissioners would like to
6 add to this?
7 COMMISSIONER STUART: Well, said, sir.
8 CHAIRMAN COURTER: We'll proceed and, Mr. Behrmann,
9 if you would start out, we'll complete this morning the three
10 categories that we failed to complete on Thursday.
11 MR. BEHRMANN: Mr. Chairman, I have no opening
12 comments. I think we could right into the NADEPs with Alex
13 Yellin and Roy Karadbil.
14 MR. YELLIN: Mr. Chairman, first, I'd like to thank
15 you for your comments. I'm sure the staff really appreciates
16 them. I'd like to now introduce Roy Karadbil who will be
17 presenting the Naval Air Depots. Please put up No. 1,
18 please.
19 MR. KARADBIL: You can also put up No. 2. Good
20 morning, Mr. Chairman, Commissioners. We'll start off here
21 with the first slides, indicating that there are six NADEPs.
22 The slide on the left shows you which ones are on the base

1 closure list. The other three were placed on the
2 consideration list in the May hearings. They are located
3 about the country on the map on the right.
4 Three and four, please. Slide 3 shows you the
5 three major issues to be discussed today about the NADEPs:
6 The capacity and how many need to be closed; the military
7 value, what it is and will it provide you a basis for
8 decision; and then the cost and savings and other non-cost
9 factors that will be used by you to make that decision.
10 Starting off in capacity, during this process, the

11 DOD determined excess capacity, and the slide on the right
12 shows you that excess capacity for each of the NADEPs. In
13 the bottom right-hand corner is the most important number.
14 It says there's 115 percent excess capacity, more than twice
15 as much as we need.
16 COMMISSIONER STUART: Is that based on eight-hour
17 operations?
18 MR. KARADBIL: This is based on a one shift, five
19 day a week operation, yes, sir.
20 COMMISSIONER STUART: One shift?
21 MR. KARADBIL: Yes, sir.
22 COMMISSIONER STUART: All right.

1 MR. KARADBIL: Remove three, put up five. When we
2 take those hours and we convert them into capacity
3 utilization, you now see a chart that shows all the NADEPs in
4 the BRAC process, DOD process, of capacity utilization at 46
5 percent overall.
6 The far right corner on the bottom gives you the
7 result of the Joint Chiefs, GEN Went, the Depots
8 Consolidation Study, and that came out with an estimate of 58
9 percent, both of these being right around 50 and indicating
10 that three NADEPs need to be closed to lose the excess
11 capacity.
12 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: Roy, your comment is that
13 both those numbers are pretty well researched and they only
14 serve to show you the order of magnitude, which is around 50?
15 MR. KARADBIL: Yes, they use slightly different
16 numbers, slightly different years, but they give you the same
17 general answer. Put up Slides 6 and 7, please.
18 COMMISSIONER BYRON: Roy, let me ask you on the
19 excess capacity, higher numbers, meaning more excess
20 capacity?
21 MR. KARADBIL: For the hours, the higher the
22 numbers, the more excess capacity.

1 COMMISSIONER BYRON: On four?
2 MR. KARADBIL: On the capacity utilization.
3 COMMISSIONER BYRON: The fact that in Norfolk, the
4 engine workload which they previously had done and now,
5 because of interservicing, which we have spent a great deal
6 of time talking about, it is now being done at Tinker, is
7 that a detriment to their numbers?
8 MR. KARADBIL: Not in these, because they are
9 counted as no hours of capacity at all, so there's no excess
10 involved at Norfolk in engines.
11 MR. BEHRMANN: Mrs. Byron, that will have an impact
12 when you get to looking at the overhead that they're carrying
13 presently, because they have not reduced some of their
14 management structure, which was there to support that
15 workload.
16 COMMISSIONER BYRON: I understand that, so that is
17 really negative on this slide?
18 MR. BEHRMANN: Yes, ma'am, not on this particular
19 slide, but it's --
20 COMMISSIONER BYRON: In the overall?
21 MR. BEHRMANN: Yes, ma'am, and we'll talk to that
22 at length when we get to that particular issue later on.

1 MR. YELLIN: Mrs. Byron, it can be a dramatic
2 effect on the cost implications of it, but this is really a
3 workload calculation, not a square footage utilization, so
4 the fact that they would have an empty building doesn't
5 impact this. It impacts the cost, obviously.
6 MR. KARADBIL: Slides 6 and 7. The next issue is
7 that of military value, where many of the groups of bases are
8 decided. On the top, DOD point awards; on the bottom are
9 adjusted totals.
10 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: Which means?

11 MR. KARADBIL: Which means that primarily --
12 MR. YELLIN: These are our adjustments.
13 MR. KARADBIL: Yes, they are our adjustments and
14 they are made to reverse some inconsistent judgments, to
15 correct some recording and mathematical errors, and to assign
16 more consistent credit for the special skills and
17 capabilities of the NADEPs.
18 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: Were those adjusted totals
19 reviewed by the services, and did they concur, or were they
20 not reviewed by the services?
21 MR. KARADBIL: They were not reviewed by the
22 services.

1 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: These were so close
2 together when you do the adjustments, that they are within
3 what the poll takers call the margin of error, aren't they?
4 MR. KARADBIL: I agree, yes, sir.
5 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: The North Island one on the
6 first viewgraph is a little bit different. It's
7 significantly different.
8 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: I'm talking about the
9 final judgment. You're really running between almost 62 and
10 67.
11 MR. KARADBIL: Yes. I think if I had taken longer,
12 I'd probably get closer together than even this.
13 MR. YELLIN: They are all very capable facilities.
14 They all have a lot of skills in many areas, and what we
15 tried to do was to make sure that they were all fairly
16 treated in the questioning that made up the military value
17 matrix that the Navy used.
18 MR. BEHRMANN: Our initial assumptions that any
19 three could be selected and that you would have at least a
20 military value average for those three that is higher or
21 equal to the present, has been validated. That was our
22 supposition May 21st.

1 I think Roy has just, by going through and
2 scrubbing these things overall, has said military value
3 really is not a great discriminator. They are all very
4 capable. They can all basically accomplish what we need to
5 if we go to three.
6 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: It's good for the country,
7 bad for the Commissioners. It would be great if there were
8 just three of them that just popped out as clear winners.
9 MR. KARADBIL: Yes, we're going to bank military
10 value in the NADEPs but unfortunately, it's not a
11 discriminator to make the final decision.
12 COMMISSIONER BYRON: Are any of them easier to
13 carve out from a base than another? When we look at re-use,
14 you know, several of them are right in the middle of a base
15 or as far into the base as you can get. Are any of them on
16 the fringes?
17 MR. KARADBIL: They're all tenants on the base, and
18 I don't believe it would be easy to take out the land they
19 occupy.
20 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: And with one exception, no
21 bases are scheduled to close that have NADEPs.
22 MR. KARADBIL: Correct. Only the Alameda Air

1 Station is on the list at present.
2 MR. BEHRMANN: Just one other note about military
3 value and then maybe we can move on to other things, but the
4 overall point score and the way they looked at all attributes
5 generally has them coming out about the same.
6 One of the things that I think you're going to
7 start to do is look at cost, look at, you know, their co
8 location with other assets, these sorts of things, so those
9 all do talk about military value points. I don't think you
10 can completely discount military value as an important issue
11 here, but the overall score, as done by the Navy, is just o
12 thing that's not going to let you discriminate.
13 We've seen this in the air mobility area. We'
14 had to go beyond that overall general score and g[redacted] t
15 some very specific military attributes, and I think [redacted]t's
16 what this slide is designed to tell you.
17 COMMISSIONER STUART: Let me ask a general, sort of
18 a principle question, of how private industrial capacity
19 metered into this. You probably saw -- I think I sent to
20 you -- the article yesterday in which the Navy announced a
21 new policy for the future, in which they would attempt to
22 utilize the private sector to a greater extent in this depo

1 activity. Would you comment a little on that?
2 MR. KARADBIL: In this process, the Navy
3 recognized there was a great deal of private sector
4 capability and that it mirrored most of the NADEPs'
5 operations but it was not taken into account because they
6 didn't have a specific knowledge of exactly what it was,
7 it would affect the cost, and how they might use it, so th
8 simply left it out, as it were, during this.
9 COMMISSIONER STUART: Did our staff people attempt
10 to assess that? It's a short time and you probably didn't
11 have an opportunity.
12 MR. YELLIN: One of the things the Navy did, in
13 looking at scenarios and looking at a certain NADEP, look
14 at the work at that NADEP, there were judgments made by th
15 Navy during this process, and we'll be showing you some of
16 this later in the presentation, that there were judgments
17 made by the Navy that said, "This piece of workload at thi
18 NADEP, it's appropriate to have a portion of that privatize
19 sent to the commercial sector," and that is a key part of t
20 analysis.
21 Each of the scenarios reflects the Navy's judg
22 about where workload at that NADEP should be dire[redacted]ith

1 to another NADEP or to an inter-serviced or to the private
2 sector, and that does have an effect on the cost analysis.
3 COMMISSIONER STUART: Thanks.
4 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: Along that same vein, I think
5 we have insufficient data because of differences between t
6 services and because of uncertified or zero information f
7 the private sector for us to make a thoughtful, detailed,
8 decision involving the private sector. That seems to me
9 be the case, anyway.
10 MR. KARADBIL: I agree completely.
11 COMMISSIONER STUART: I'm afraid that's correct,
12 Peter.
13 MR. YELLIN: Yes, sir, Commissioner Stuart. I
14 think the indications about the industrialization policy t
15 Naval Air Systems has announced, I think it's still indica
16 that this is an evolving process, that they are still look
17 more and more closely at their workload in order to furthe
18 define the core capabilities that they feel obligated to
19 maintain, to maintain the Navy's -- the requirements for
20 Navy's in-house capability.
21 COMMISSIONER STUART: But, in view of that, if the
22 Commission leans one way or another, with the possibility

1 more going to the commercial sector, on a close one, one
2 might lean toward closing, other things being equal.
3 MR. YELLIN: Yes, sir. The implications of a
4 NAVAIR industrialization policy is that more work will be
5 done in the private sector than has been done in [redacted]ast
6 that more work will be taken out of the governme[redacted]d
7 system to be done in the private sector; and tha[redacted]wi
8 go back to what they feel they need, that is, specifically
9 suited for government performance rather than private
10 performance, or put out to a competitive situation, where

6 the law says you cannot put an active unit on a reserve base
7 and you have to make March an active base, and that was what
threw the cost up.
MR. DiCAMILLO: It would retain its active duty
10 status, yes, sir. The Marines would be the predominant user,
11 as well as being active duty, and would probably have
12 to -- the Air Force would transfer ownership to the Marines,
13 and the Air Force Reserve, Air National Guard forces, would
14 be a tenant.
15 MR. CIRILLO: And, indeed, they suggested that in
16 response to the scenario.
17 COMMISSIONER STUART: Would you say the Navy is
18 going to look at that when they review these Naval Air
19 Stations?
20 MR. DiCAMILLO: Yes, I believe they have that on
21 their plate.
22 MR. CIRILLO: They have the cost information on

1 that and they have the responses and they're prepared for
2 that.
3 COMMISSIONER STUART: Maybe the General has got the
4 practical reason.
5 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Let's move right along here.
6 MR. CANTWELL: Slide 137 and 138, please. This is
7 the McGuire scenario to realign McGuire to an Air Reserve
8 installation. Scenario 1 is to close Plattsburgh instead of
9 McGuire, realigning McGuire. Scenario 2 is to retain McGuire
10 and to retain Plattsburgh, McGuire retaining its air lift
11 capability and Plattsburgh remaining as a tanker
12 installation.
13 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: We addressed these the other
14 day, right?
15 MR. CANTWELL: Yes, sir.
COMMISSIONER JOHN*SON: I think we've already
addressed these, Mr. Chairman.
18 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Yes, and then you have the
19 backup slides.
20 MR. CIRILLO: That would conclude the Air Force
21 presentation and I believe your morning schedule. We almost
22 got you back the time.

1 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Not exactly. In five minutes,
2 we'll have a press availability and we'll adjourn until 2:00
3 o'clock.
4 (Whereupon, at 12:38 p.m., a luncheon recess was
5 taken.)

1 A F T E R N O O N S E S S I O N
2 (2:26 p.m.)
3 CHAIRMAN COURTER: The Commission will come to
4 order. This is the beginning of further discussion and
5 votes, and we're starting with the Army.
6 One thing I wanted to mention and that is, there's
7 going to be, I think, an irresistible urge by some leaders,
8 political leaders and appointed leaders, to contact the
9 Commissioners after we have voted today, saying, "I found
10 additional information. You overlooked something and
11 therefore, would you bring it up again on Thursday? We'd
12 like further discussion and a second vote." That is the
13 danger in carrying out this process over a four or five-day
14 period.
15 I simply just want to say that we will consider
16 that when the votes are taken today, that they are final
votes, and we'll do the very best we can to keep it at that
and that's just a statement I'd like to make for the record.
Also, for those people that are here and listening,
20 we intend to start off, for example, this afternoon and
21 everybody that follows this process will understand it will
22 fall into a pattern, but we're going to take up the Army

1 Initial Entry Training/Branch Schools. It's scheduled from
2 2:00 to 3:00 o'clock.
3 We're not going to be duty bound to follow that.
4 We're starting 30 minutes late. That couldn't be avoided
5 because of the delay this morning. We intend on following,
6 as best we can, the schedule as we presented same to the
7 press and to the public earlier today, but if there is
8 obviously less discussion than would be allotted here, we'll
9 entertain a motion early. If it requires more, we'll take
10 more time.
11 We want to make sure that all the Commissioners are
12 comfortable with their votes, knowing that these votes will
13 have a great economic impact on communities and also an
14 impact on military capabilities, not only now but for many,
15 many years to come.
16 I will do the best I can in recognizing those
17 people that are proffering motions. A motion will require a
18 second for further discussion. We expect much of the
19 discussion to occur before we entertain a motion. There can
20 be a motion and I'll entertain one at any time to table the
21 vote, because sometimes, what we'll want to do is to rewrite
22 the motion.

1 Staff has anticipated various scenarios and various
2 motions. The motions may not follow specifically the
3 language that was provided to us by legal counsel and, if
4 that's the case, it's the Commission's intention to defer
5 voting until the motion can be reduced to writing and read
6 into the record, as we want no errors in this area
7 whatsoever.
8 If there is a motion and a second and a discussion
9 followed by a substitute motion, the substitute motion will
10 be recognized. It would require a second. We'll have
11 discussions on the substitute, and the voting will take
12 place. The first vote will be on the substitute and the
13 second vote will be on the original motion.
14 With respect to the votes, I will start and do the
15 best I can to make sure that not one Commissioner leads off
16 in every category. I'll spread out the opportunity to vote
17 first, as best and honestly as I possibly can.
18 If there is a Commissioner that, for whatever
19 reason, does not want to be the lead person that votes on a
20 particular issue, they should feel free to pass until later
21 on, and I'll go back to that individual Commissioner or
22 Commissioners that wanted to pass voting until the end.

1 That's certainly appropriate if they feel more comfortable in
2 doing that, for whatever reason.
3 Those are some of the things I wanted to mention
4 with regard to the motions. There is going to be, obviously,
5 some disagreements, perhaps, I assume, between the
6 Commissioners today, maybe tomorrow, and most certainly some
7 time and perhaps many times during this entire process.
8 There will be, in two or three instances,
9 Commissioners that want to recuse themselves from voting.
10 They have done so publicly various times before. A recusal
11 means that they will not participate in the discussion, nor
12 in the vote.
13 A recusal means that we have six Commissioners and
14 in order to change the recommendations of the Secretary of
15 Defense, it requires four votes, irrespective of a recusal,
16 because it has to be by majority. That means that even
17 though we have recusals in certain categories, it doesn't
18 change the requirement that you need four votes to change the
19 recommendations of the Secretary of Defense.
20 There is no -- and staff can correct me if I'm
21 wrong. I don't believe there is any category in which there
22 are two Commissioners that felt that he or she had to recuse

1 themselves. Is that correct?
2 MS. CHESTON: That is correct, Mr. Chairman.
3 CHAIRMAN COURTER: That is correct, Counsel. I
4 appreciate it. Is there any other business or statements
5 that should be made at this time by any of the Commissioners?
6 (No response.)
7 CHAIRMAN COURTER: If not, we will proceed with the
8 Army and Mr. Behrmann, if you would proceed.
9 MR. BEHRMANN: Mr. Chairman, could I just say one
10 thing about the motions? We have drafted just about every
11 conceivable option. There's no prejudice on our part. We've
12 tried to use it as a means of facilitation. I think that
13 there is a dearth of options for you to select from, and I
14 just wanted that to be clear for the record.
15 We'll move right to Ed Brown, who is going to start
16 the brief for us on Army bases.
17 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Mr. Brown, you are recognized.
18 You may proceed.
19 MR. BROWN: Mr. Chairman and Commissioners, I have
20 with me today the entire Army team. The analysts will be
21 talking to you in their respective areas where they have done
22 the work, starting off with me today at the table. On my

1 left is LTC Brian Duffy and to his left is Mr. John Graham.
2 If I may direct your attention to Slide 1, the top portion of
3 the chart shows the number of categories into which the Army
4 divided its installations for consideration.
5 The number on the right-hand column represents
6 those subjected to military value assessments within each
7 category. Highlighted categories, initial entry training,
8 branch schools, professional schools, command and control,
9 depots and commodity-oriented, have recommended for closure
10 or realignment by the Secretary of Defense or recommendations
11 added for further consideration by the Commission during its
12 hearings on the 29th of March and on May 21st.
13 The box at the bottom reflects the Commissioners'
14 addition of the U.S. Army Reserve Training Facility at Marcus
15 Hook, Pennsylvania, for consideration. This category was not
16 considered by the Army in its military value assessments;
17 therefore, I have separated it from the others.
18 If I may now direct your attention to Tab 1, we
19 have the first category that will be discussed, Initial Entry
20 Training and Branch Schools. The map, which is Slide 2, and
21 the accompanying chart, Slide 3, show the names and locations
22 of the Army's 13 initial entry training/branch school

1 installations.
2 The Secretary of Defense recommended that Fort
3 McClellan, Alabama be closed, and the Commissioners added
4 Fort Lee, Virginia, for further consideration. Before
5 discussing each installation, I would like to outline the
6 staff's evaluation of the impact of force structure
7 reductions on training loads at these installations.
8 In looking at these charts, it must be remembered
9 that both active and reserve component soldiers are trained,
10 so there cannot be a direct one-to-one correlation in force
11 structure reductions to reduction in the training load.
12 Slide 4 compares the training load at the Army's basic
13 training installations for fiscal years 1992 and 1997.
14 This chart assumes a force structure of 12 active
15 divisions. Through the period, there is a reduction of
16 almost 20 percent. That compares with a total force
17 reduction, both active and reserve, of approximately 15
18 percent.
19 Slide 5 shows the same information for the combined
20 arms installations, those that train the infantry, their
21 defense artillery, armor, aviation and artillery soldiers.
22 Through the period, there's a reduction of about six-and-a

1 half percent.
2 Slide 6 shows the same information for combat
3 support installations, Fort Leonard Wood where they train
4 engineers; Fort Gordon trains signal soldiers; Fort
5 McClellan, both chemical and military police; Fort Huachuc
6 military intelligence; and Fort Devens, which is in the
7 process of being closed and the training load is being
8 transferred from Fort Devens to Fort Huachuca. In this
9 category, there was a reduction of about nine percent.
10 Slide 7 shows the information for combat service
11 support installations. The installations shown along the
12 bottom, I will not detail them. There is a reduction of
13 about 18 percent in training load in these installations
14 through the period.
15 At Tab 2, we have the first installation to be
16 considered, Fort McClellan, Alabama. Slide 8 pictorially
17 shows the DOD recommendation. This recommendation is to
18 close Fort McClellan, move the Chemical School, the Milita
19 Police School and the DOD, Department of Defense Polygraph
20 Institute, to Fort Leonard Wood, retain Pelham Range, and
21 establish a reserve component enclave at Fort McClellan an
22 retain the capability for live agent training, the Chemica

1 Decontamination Training Facility, at Fort McClellan.
2 Slide 9 shows the relative locations of Fort
3 McClellan and Fort Leonard Wood. LTC Brian Duffy will
4 discuss Fort McClellan.
5 LTC DUFFY: Mr. Chairman, I'm just waiting for the
6 first slide.
7 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Would you move the mike closer,
8 please, so we have no problem hearing you? Thank you.
9 LTC DUFFY: I think you have a copy of this s
10 in your packets, Slide No. 10. On this slide, y the
11 various statistics for the base.
12 I point your attention to the last row. That shows
13 that the recommendation made by the Department of Defense
14 carries with it a one-time construction cost of $113.9
15 million. It has a steady state savings of approximately $
16 million and pays back in the year 2002, which would be th
17 years after the six-year BRAC period. I also point your
18 attention to the cumulative economic impact which is 16.8
19 percent cumulative economic impact.
20 Next slide, please. These are the major issues
21 that I would like to review. Those listed on the left a
22 what I would consider the driving issues for this

1 recommendation. Those are the ones I will cover. If you
2 have any questions about the issues on the right, I will
3 glad to cover those, also.
4 Next slide, please. The first issue, military
5 value, four installations ranked lower than Fort McClellar
6 Forts Lee and Eustis in Virginia, Fort Rucker in Alabama,
7 also, and Fort Huachuca. Fort Lee is the Quartermaster
8 Center and School. It has been studied for consolidation
9 along with Fort Eustis and I think that the Commission ha
10 taken it under consideration and understands those
11 installations.
12 Fort Rucker is the Army's Aviation Center and
13 School. It's a unique installation that trains aviators.
14 has 23 stage fields of various sizes, all adding up to a
15 couple hundred acres each. They are located on the outski
16 of the installation that makes it rather unique and diffic
17 to replicate.
18 Fort Huachuca is a gaining installation from
19 '91 and in the Army's recommendation was a gainer AC
20 '93. So, for that reason, it was not considered for clos
21 or realignment.
22 I think the point I would like to make is that

1 military value is merely the beginning part of the analysis,
2 and the service did not use military value as the sole
3 determinant of whether a base should be closed or realigned.
4 It did allow them to start the study.
5 At this point, I'd like to talk about the
6 separation of the Chemical School and the Chemical Defense
7 Training Facility. What I thought would be more useful was
8 to show you a picture of what the Chemical Defense Training
9 Facility is for those Commissioners who did not have an
10 opportunity to view it.
11 Mark, if I may have Slide No. 6, this is what the
12 facility looks like. Those buildings with the roofs that are
13 colored in orange are the areas where the agent is actually
14 contained, either in a laboratory, in a training area, or
15 being evacuated or incinerated. The blue building is an
16 administration building and classrooms.
17 Could I have the next slide, please? This shows
18 you some of the training that is conducted inside. Liquid
19 agent is poured on military equipment and soldiers are then
20 given a chance to practice their decontamination skills with
21 a live agent. Naturally, you can imagine it's rather a
22 fearful exercise. It's been proven to build their confidence

1 and competence and it makes them better trainers. Thank you,
2 Mark.
3 The CDTF, if I may use that acronym, is a one-of-a
4 kind facility. It was built in 1987. Studies commissioned
5 by the Army have shown this training actually does produce a
6 higher level of confidence in decontamination equipment and
7 skills than training in a simulated environment.
8 Within this facility, binary components are mixed
9 to produce a live, toxic agent. After completion of the
10 training, contaminated products are incinerated; thus, it has
11 a hazardous waste incinerator contained as part of this
12 facility.
13 This facility currently operates within the State
14 of Alabama with a clean air permit and that, to date, is the
15 only permit that has been required by the State of Alabama.
16 There has never been an accident or a discharge of toxic
17 chemicals or any other matter into the environment from this
18 facility.
19 As you see on the issues slide, the DOD
20 recommendation including leaving the CDTF at Fort McClellan.
21 This was done because it was believed that movement may not
22 be possible, and the Army saw value in the consolidation of

1 the three branch schools. Although separation produces
2 difficult logistics problems, the potential savings to close
3 the remainder of Fort McClellan, as well as combine three
4 maneuver combat branch schools as more attractive.
5 This part of the DOD recommendation has produced
6 almost unanimous disagreement with the DOD position from the
7 community. Their argument is that besides the logistical
8 nightmare, the resulting effect on doctrine and equipment
9 testing would be devastating to the development community.
10 Also, the community has presented the Commission
11 with the perception that the State of Alabama may require
12 additional permits for a stand-alone facility, requiring
13 response forces and adding additional costs if it were to be
14 left in place while the school moved. Of course, no one
15 knows the answer to that question, but it is a possibility.
16 We have looked at the economics of moving the CDTF
17 with the Chemical School and results show an additional $10
18 million savings would be saved each year. This represents
19 savings in base operations support as well as the movement of
20 soldiers between Fort Leonard Wood and Fort McClellan.
21 I think this naturally leads to the question of
22 whether or not the CDTF can be relocated at Fort Leonard

1 Wood, which is the next issue. The community has presented
2 the Commission with arguments that the CDTF either cannot be
3 permitted in Missouri, environmental permits, or if possible,
4 it requires so much time that the movement could not be
5 completed within the six-year time frame required by law.
6 They base the argument on the time it took to construct the
7 CDTF in Alabama.
8 The permit process there was started in 1981.
9 Construction began in 1983. It was finished in 1986 and then
10 tested with the first students being trained in 1987. It
11 was, indeed, a six-year process for this first facility. e
12 community at the Birmingham regional hearing suggested it
13 would be eight-and-a-half years before you could begin
14 training students in Missouri.
15 The Commission communicated with the Missouri
16 Department of Natural Resources to determine how long permits
17 would actually take and if there would be a problem. Their
18 response to the Commission suggests that the entire
19 permitting process would require from one-and-a-half to two
20 years for both part one and part two.
21 This does not include the time it takes to
22 construct, which would be an additional two years. This

1 leaves two years for problems to be resolved, that is, with
2 the information that they know today about the Chemical
3 Defense Training Facility. They have seen a copy of the
4 plans and they have also a copy of the operating SOPs.
5 In addition, we received two letters from local
6 Chambers of Commerce and a citizens group that they have not
7 found any public opposition to the relocation of the Chemical
8 School activities. Another question was posed back to the
9 Director of Missouri Natural Resources about the type of
10 opposition that could be expected from such a facility.
11 They replied that the public generally does not
12 oppose hazardous waste generators if they are actually
13 incinerating material within the state, that is produced
14 within the state. If the material comes from out of the
15 state, they have a violent public opposition. In particular,
16 they mentioned the Lake City Army Ammunition Plant which
17 itself has a hazardous waste incinerator. It was permitted
18 within nine months after the application was received by the
19 State of Missouri.
20 I don't mean to suggest that the permitting is a
21 sure thing. I can only tell you what the State has said. My
22 impressions of the area down there are that public opposition

1 would not be significant, if any at all, and that the state
2 and the post have a very cooperative relationship that will
3 allow permitting to proceed as quickly as can be expected;
4 however, I cannot find anybody that would promise that this
5 will be a sure thing.
6 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: I didn't understand your
7 last sentence.
8 LTC DUFFY: I'm sorry, sir?
9 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: I didn't hear your last
10 sentence.
11 LTC DUFFY: What I said was that I cannot guarantee
12 100 percent and neither can the state, that this facility
13 will be built in the four-year time frame that they think it
14 can, nor that there will be no public opposition.
15 CHAIRMAN COURTER: I can guarantee there's going to
16 be public opposition to it from my experience in the real
17 world. I know you're not quite finished your first
18 presentation.
19 But this is an issue that we've been living with
20 and I've been living with for three years, and this
21 Commission for the last three-and-a-half or four months.
22 feel very, very strongly about it, so I'm not going to bring

1 a motion myself at this particular time, but I'd like to open
2 a discussion.
3 It basically goes as follows. In 1991, the
4 Department of Defense, the Army recommendation was to close
5 the CDTF, close McClellan, keep Anniston open, and rid the
6 free world of the only live agent training capability that
7 I'm aware of or anybody is aware of. Indeed, it might be the
8 only, at the present time, functioning live agent training
9 facility in the entire world.
10 We, the Commission, rejected the proposal of the
11 Army in 1991, and the Army wasn't very pleased with that,
12 simply because they are always, as all the services,
13 correctly want to justify their actions and their proposals.
14 Then it was a surprise to me that they, in fact, backed down
15 from their 1991 position.
16 We heard the Army testify in lockstep that, indeed,
17 a CDTF facility, live agent training facility and
18 decontamination facility, is essential, and is imperative;
19 that it's more important for the instructors than anybody
20 else, because obviously, all recruits can't go through this
21 facility but it is a major component, and that they had erred
22 in making that recommendation in 1991.

1 In 1993, this year, their proposal is saying,
2 "We'll keep the CDTF open but, in essence, close down
3 everything else. Move the smoke training to Leonard Wood.
4 Separate the chemical school by moving that out, moving out
5 the DOD Polygraph Institute, and leaving just the facility,
6 the live agent training facility."
7 As far as I'm concerned, they have it half right
8 now, but they still don't have it all right, because I'm very
9 concerned about a number of things. One is the fact that I
10 don't have great confidence -- and the Army and I, as an
11 individual, agree that live agent training is important.
12 I don't have any great confidence that it can
13 possibly stay or will stay if the chemical school and the
14 CDTF training is bifurcated and one is in one location and
15 one is in another. That led, obviously, the very competent
16 people at Fort Leonard Wood, and they are, and the community
17 to come back and say, "No problem. We will do the permitting
18 to build one of these facilities."
19 Now, a decade ago or more, it took six to seven
20 years and today, with the increased environmental sensitivity
21 that communities have, with the great flexibility given to,
22 and properly, I suppose, latitude given to plaintiffs to sue

1 and tie up all sorts of important public works projects
2 throughout the land for decades.
3 I remember in my State of New Jersey, an interstate
4 highway wasn't completed for 25 years, and a highway is far
5 different than a CDTF, than chemical, live agent
6 capabilities, so it seems to me that if a community, not for
7 any fault of its own, not because there was official public
8 resistance to it but private individual resistance
9 manifesting itself in all sorts of litigation.
10 And, therefore, difficult funding questions, can
11 tie up a road for 20 years or 25 years, in almost any state,
12 not to mention landfills, hazardous waste facilities, burn
13 facilities, throughout this country, it could be an awfully
14 long time before a similar capability is built someplace else
15 and I'm very concerned about that.
16 And, therefore, it seems to me if you want to err,
17 you err on the side of giving our men and women the type of
18 training that everybody recognizes they need. Don't
19 bifurcate these two capabilities and make sure that they
20 exist. To me, it's not a pro Fort McClellan argument. It's
21 a pro-recruit argument and Army argument and Air Force
22 argument.

1 It's for our men and women in uniform that we
2 this capability and I just don't want to do anyth
3 conscience to degrade it. I think separating it wi gra
4 it and possibly lead to its demise, which the Army and man
5 of us agree with at this particular time that it should no
6 happen.
7 Also, I'm concerned. I know there's conflicting
8 information the Commission received with regard to Fort
9 Leonard Wood and its capability with regard to smoke
10 training. Ed, I believe that -- I mean, we had testimony or
11 week and then we had the harshest letter you'd ever heard, c
12 you repeated to me that you'd ever seen, where the Army
13 criticized, I guess, the commanding officer.
14 MR. BROWN: It was from the Commander of Fort
15 Leonard Wood to the Commander of Fort McClellan, Mr.
16 Chairman.
17 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Okay. So, there's an internal
18 disagreement with respect to that, and I don't know who to
19 believe with regard to the smoke training at Leonard Wood a
20 the present time.
21 Also, I'm concerned about the economic impact and I
22 know it's a smaller criterion and we want to make sure that

1 it's given its proper weight and it doesn't have the weight
2 of military criteria, but it seems to me that in this
3 community, what we're telling this community is that what
4 we're going to do is to close the base, in essence.
5 We're going to remove the jobs and the revenue
6 stream from the community and what we're leaving is a
7 Chemical Defense Training Facility, live agent training
8 facility, and a bunch of chemical weapons that have to be c
9 milled, so it's the worst of all worlds.
10 I've said earlier in this process and I've sa
11 today and I've kept my mind open, and I will liste the
12 other Commissioners. The deliberative process requires tha
13 but it seems to me that it's the worst of all scenarios whe
14 you're telling a community you're not only closing their
15 facility, but basically you can't use it because that whic
16 remains is that which no one community in America really
17 wants, and that is chemical weapons and chemical
18 demilitarization training facilities.
19 So, from the standpoint of the economies of that, I
20 don't know what all that land could be used for. On the
21 argument of military value and the degradation of the type
22 training, I'm fearful. Based on those two arguments, I fe

1 very strongly that the Commission would be making a mistak
2 if they accepted the Army's recommendations, even though th
3 came a long way from 1991. They're getting close, but I
4 think these two capabilities should be co-located, and I
5 guess I've said enough at the present time.
6 COMMISSIONER BYRON: Mr. Chairman, may I add on to
7 what you have said? I think one of the things that this
8 Commission has a responsibility, as we address the list th
9 was presented to us, and the first four criteria are milita
10 value. I think you spoke very dramatically and correctly,
11 the military value of an existing facility, the only one w
12 know of in the free world and I have to agree with you,
13 probably the only one in the world.
14 It hasn't been too long ago when this nation
15 agonized with a potential threat for a chemical environmen
16 of our troops a half a world away, and the fact that we ha
17 an opportunity, at least, to train and to build th oop
18 force up to understand how to operate in that typ
19 environment.
20 If we loose this training facility, I think the
21 next time it is going to be needed, we will not have that
22 much leeway and I think we will be in a much worse positio

1 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Thank you very much. There's a
2 couple of other things I want to mention and that is, I can
3 see, I mean, the State of Alabama making the argument. Now,
4 this facility is either grandfathered or permitted in
5 Alabama, but I am quite sure since it was permitted and
6 created and became a reality, the environmental standards of
7 Alabama are getting more strict, just like they are anyplace
8 else.
9 It wouldn't surprise me if based on the fact that
10 there's now a substantial changed use of that facility that
11 even Alabama, if the CDTF was left there and nothing else,
12 that the State of Alabama would want a reconsideration of the
13 permitting process and reconsideration as to whether this
14 type of use is consistent with the new, now upgraded
15 environmental standards that properly the State of Alabama
16 now has. That is something that concerns me, as well.
17 Finally, I know that this decision costs money and
18 the Commission's function, as much as anything else, is to
19 save money. I know that, by virtue of not closing Fort
20 McClellan, at least at the present time, and the requirement
21 that these two capabilities, the school and the CDTF, be
22 collocated, means $25-30 million per year. At least, those

1 are the numbers that were brought to my attention.
2 But I feel so strongly about the fact that we are
3 duty bound to give the very best capabilities to our men and
4 women in uniform, who are charged with the responsibility of
5 going out in battle and the battlefield may, in the future,
6 contain chemical agents, that it's worth the cost.
7 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: Mr. Chairman?
8 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Mr. McPherson.
9 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: I feel like the guy who
10 said, "Outside of that, Mrs. Lincoln, how did you like the
11 play?" I mean, after these very powerful statements, what is
12 the Army's rationale? COL Duffy, if you'd take a few minutes
13 to make the Army's case, it ought to go in the record.
14 LTC DUFFY: My conversations with various people in
15 the Army, the communication we've received from the Director
16 of the Army Basing Study, GEN Ballard, there seem to be two
17 reasons. One is that initially, in 1991, the CDTF would
18 start to be a luxury that the Army could no longer afford.
19 It was not that it was not a requirement. It was a
20 requirement.
21 Everybody recognizes the value of such a facility
22 but when all the requirements were put together, it could not

1 be afforded. Many important requirements end up being
2 unfunded.
3 The second thing is the reason it may have fallen
4 below the cut line, if you will, is that the importance never
5 really was studied. It was only after the '91 Commission
6 that the Army asked the Health Services Command to do a
7 study, which they did, and it was a very detailed study. It
8 involved physiological testing in order to make assumptions
9 about a person's competence level, et cetera, which they did,
10 that conclusively proved that the confidence of a soldier is
11 raised.
12 Again, these are the soldiers that train the
13 trainers. These are not the soldiers that actually are out
14 there on the front lines, but those are the ones that are
15 training the ones going to the front lines.
16 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: Why do they want to move
17 it to Leonard Wood? Why is the recommendation before us to
18 move it to Leonard Wood?
19 LTC DUFFY: The original recommendation?
20 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: I mean the '93
21 recommendation. Why is that here before us?
22 LTC DUFFY: The original recommendation was to

1 leave the Chemical Defense Training Facility mothballed at
2 Fort McClellan in 1991. In 1993, initially, the Army studied
3 the option of moving this to Fort Leonard Wood together with
4 the chemical school, realizing they should be collocated. We
5 do not know the reason why, but at some point in the decision
6 process from the documents we've been provided, it was
7 decided to leave it at Fort McClellan.
8 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: But a bigger question is:
9 Why move it to Fort Leonard Wood? As I understand the Army
10 position, very legitimately wanted to take care of the
11 synergism between chemical, military police, engineering, and
12 all that.
13 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: That's the reason it was
14 given to us a few weeks ago.
15 LTC DUFFY: Yes, sir, these are the --
16 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: Would you address that?
17 LTC DUFFY: Yes, sir. These three branches are the
18 combat support arms that are the direct support for the
19 fighting force, the infantry, the armor, et cetera. They are
20 side by side with them somewhere on the battlefield. They
21 are also the maneuver combat support elements versus those
22 that are fairly stationary or fixed, so they are peas in a

1 pod, if you will. There is a synergy to collocating them
2 because their operations, military operations, entail a
3 combined arms approach.
4 The engineer depends on the chemical branch and
5 vice-versa. All of us depend on the military police. There
6 is an opportunity here for the combat support arms to develop
7 joint combat support doctrine, to test it at Fort Leonard
8 Wood and by so doing, increase the readiness of the forces.
9 That's the real value of collocating these schools.
10 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: And that is a genuine
11 value, in your mind?
12 LTC DUFFY: Yes, sir. As an engineer, I can tell
13 you that's a value.
14 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: All right. So, if it were
15 possible to have these three collocated, those three,
16 training engineers and military police and chemical, in the
17 same place, and to have the chemical facility with them, that
18 would be the ideal situation?
19 LTC DUFFY: Yes, sir, it would.
20 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: The problem here is that
21 if you leave behind the chemical weapons, the problem the
22 Chairman has been addressing is that if you leave behind the

1 chemical weapons and move the chemical training, that sooner
2 or later, the emphasis on chemical training will dissipate
3 and if, indeed, it is ever possible to build the facility for
4 the chemical weapons in Missouri, it's going to be some time
5 before that can be done, quite a long time. Is that right?
6 LTC DUFFY: Sir, again, this is an opinion. This
7 is an opinion based on documents we've received, a careful
8 study by the State of Missouri, my discussions with people in
9 the State of Missouri. I am left with the impression that
10 the facility can be built.
11 Similar facilities have been built in the State of
12 Missouri, facilities more onerous than this facility, without
13 much public opposition. I use the example of Lake City Army
14 Ammunition Plant because it's a military facility. Military
15 facilities tend to gather a lot of attention just by their
16 nature.
17 This facility burns explosive matter. It releases,
18 it has the potential which will release hazardous chemicals
19 into the atmosphere. During the permitting process for that
20 facility, a public hearing was requested. In that public
21 hearing, four questions were received from the public. Those
22 questions were successfully answered.

1 From what I gather, the state requires technology
2 that will produce a 99.5 percent pure product outside of the
3 stack. I think there's a lot of confidence in the state's
4 ability to ensure that the environment is taken care of by
5 the public, so I personally have not yet found the reason to
6 doubt the fact that it could be built. I can't foresee the
7 future, but I have searched and I have just not found it yet.
8 Now, that is owing, of course, for the bias, naturally, of
9 the State of Missouri for the people in that region.
10 COMMISSIONER STUART: Brian, your answer to Mr.
11 McPherson really is that there are advantages of collocation
12 and as you've shown on your chart, the collocation saves
13 money. The Army has basically recommended that the training,
14 except for the live agent training, be given at Fort Leonard
15 Wood.
16 So, my question really is not taking a back seat to
17 the Chairman's concern about live chemical training, because
18 I think the poor man's nuclear bomb is probably the chemical
19 warfare, and I think it's tremendously important that we
20 maintain this capability, but I do sense that it would be a
21 greater cost effectiveness and long-run, that it would be a
22 better solution if we were to accept the Army's

1 recommendation to close the McClellan base, providing that we
2 can maintain that capability for live agent training.
3 It seems to me that's where the point of
4 disagreement is. I think we're all deeply concerned about
5 the maintenance of this capability. Wouldn't it be possible
6 to support the recommendations of DOD and, at the same time,
7 condition it upon having secured the environmental approvals
8 that are necessary, to make sure that we maintain the
9 capability if, as the Chairman has brought out, it sometimes
10 takes longer than we think?
11 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: As Brian mentioned earlier,
12 sir, it will require at least two years to get that
13 permitting and I'm prepared in a few minutes to offer a
14 motion which would require the Army to get the permitting
15 before they bring it back to BRAC '95. Nothing would happen
16 before then, anyway, and then there would be no question
17 about whether it could be moved or not.
18 In visiting Fort McClellan and listening to
19 everyone and reading all the expert advice we've gotten, I'm
20 convinced that the school and the live agent test facility
21 must be together, if it's going to do what's needed, not only
22 for our country but internationally.

1 It's an international asset to have those two
2 together and operating, and I believe that we ought to keep
3 it at Fort McClellan and ask the Secretary to have the Army
4 gain the permits before they bring it up again in '95, if
5 they desire. That will take care of all the concerns that we
6 have.
7 It also will take away the what-ifs. It will take
8 away -- maybe Missouri doesn't want it or someone else
9 doesn't want it. I'm prepared to make a motion when you're
10 ready, Mr. Chairman.
11 LTC DUFFY: Sir, if I may just mention something
12 about the permitting process, the permitting process starts
13 with the permission to build. That generally takes from nine
14 to 14 months. At that point, then, you can build.
15 The second permit is the important one which takes
16 place after construction and that is the operational test
17 permit. That is where they ensure that the technology
18 installed in the incinerator actually does clean by
19 byproducts to the state standard. That is the difficult one,
20 really.
21 CHAIRMAN COURTER: I think the first one is the
22 difficult one. There's no doubt in my mind that from a

1 technological standpoint, given no resistance and
2 cooperation, the facility can be duplicated. I mea
3 built once. It can be built again.
4 But, whether you get the permit to build, I think
5 is the crucial one and, therefore, I agree with Commission
6 Johnson.
7 COMMISSIONER STUART: I just would like to ask
8 Commissioner Johnson, since our mission is to endeavor to
9 save money, move the process along of cutting back on bases
10 as recommended, and we've heard that collocation is the
11 ultimate answer here, why couldn't we accept the DOD's
12 recommendations subject to assurance that they had the
13 environmental approval and the facilities were in place?
14 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: The problem is, number one,
15 you put the community of Fort McClellan in limbo for many,
16 many years, and you don't have a time table. If we go the
17 opposite direction, it will happen just as quickly if they
18 can gain those permits and certifications.
19 COMMISSIONER STUART: I would like to contend that
20 we keep them on pins and needles, anyway, because logic is
21 the Army thinks these should be collocated and they think
22 Leonard Wood is the place to go.

1 COMMISSIONER BYRON: Mr. Stuart, it's my
2 understanding that in the recommendation by DOD, it was no
3 to move the CDTF. It was to move the other facilities.
4 COMMISSIONER STUART: Yes.
5 COMMISSIONER BYRON: My understanding in your
6 suggestion right now is to also incorporate moving the CDT
7 COMMISSIONER STUART: Right.
8 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Let me mention something ab
9 doing something subject to. My only concern ther at
10 found from experience that unless our motions are so
11 carefully, with no weasel words whatsoever, no discretion,
12 totally, clearly defined, they're going to be -- the
13 recommendations are not going to be followed or they're goi
14 to be tied up in court forever.
15 I found that experience with respect to Fort Ord in
16 California when the intention of the Commission was to do
17 thing, and it turned out because we weren't artful and
18 careful in our language, something else occurred.
19 Also, when you say "subject to," there's going to
20 be, I think, arguments as to how long that contingency is
21 there. There's going to be legal arguments and I think,
22 perhaps, with merit that this Commission's job was to acce

1 or reject the recommendations of the services with regard
2 specific closures and realignments and, if we have to, mak
3 other recommendations, but not to do things subject to fut
4 actions.
5 I have problems with that in the sense that I'm not
6 sure that is within the parameters of what Congress inten
7 by giving us this responsibility.
8 COMMISSIONER STUART: Well, Mr. Chairman, you
9 wanted us to be fiercely independent.
10 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Yes, I did.
11 COMMISSIONER STUART: I submit that at Fort Ord, we
12 made that decision in '91 and we got the largest part of t
13 decision made. We have objected and been concerned in
14 discussing the Presidio, which will come up later, that t
15 kept more of that than was necessary, but basically, we ma
16 that decision and it stuck.
17 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Well, it's going to stick
18 because we're going to revisit the question later is
19 week. Words in motions -- this is my opinion and it may
20 be others, but I want our work to be so clear, so concise
21 because if we, in one motion, have the words "subject to,

22 and the next motion we're going to have the words "contingent

1 upon," and the next motion, it's going to be based on words
2 such as "subsequent to," and I don't think those are the
3 types of scenarios that we should get involved with.
4 I think we have to make decisions that are clear
5 cut based on all the information we have today rather than on
6 events that may or may not take place in the future. I think
7 that's the cleanest way to do it and in the perfect world, if
8 we were both the Congress and the Executive Branch and the
9 Secretary of Defense, I wouldn't mind those words, and the
10 courts.
11 COMMISSIONER STUART: The reason I'm concerned
12 about GEN Johnson's proposal is we're postponing a decision.
13 CHAIRMAN COURTER: No, we're not postponing
14 anything. My belief is that we should reject the Department
15 of Defense's recommendations. If the Department of Defense
16 feels strongly that McClellan is closed or should be closed,
17 they should get their ducks in order with regard to the
18 collocation of these facilities before they come back to
19 another Commission.
20 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: And that's what I propose in
21 my motion, sir, when you're ready.
22 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: I empathize with Commissioner

1 Stuart but I agree with the Chairman.
2 COMMISSIONER BYRON: Mr. Chairman, let me very
3 quickly talk about the difficulty any time you are talking
4 about moving munitions, any time you are talking about trying
5 to re-locate a chemical environment, you not only have to go
6 through the existing state, but you have to get permits from
7 each and every state that is adjacent or that you're going
8 through, and those permits are extremely difficult to get.
9 This is a very, very difficult thing.
10 This country is fortunate that we happen to have a
11 facility that is operational and was there when we needed it
12 not too long ago.
13 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Any further discussion before I
14 entertain a motion?
15 (No response.)
16 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner Johnson, do you
17 have a motion? You indicated you may have a motion.
18 MOTION
19 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Yes, sir. I move that the
20 Commission find that the Secretary of Defense deviated
21 substantially from the force structure plan and final
22 criteria in making his recommendation on Fort McClellan,

1 Alabama.
2 Therefore, the Commission rejects the
3 recommendation of the Secretary of Defense to close Fort
4 McClellan, relocate U.S. Army Chemical and Military Police
5 Schools and the Department of Defense Polygraph Institute to
6 Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri.
7 It also rejects transfer accountability of Pelham
8 Range and other required training support facilities through
9 licensing to the Army National Guard, and rejects retaining
10 an enclave for the U.S. Army Reserves and retaining the
11 capability for live agent training at Fort McClellan.
12 The Commission does recommend, if the Secretary of
13 Defense wants to move the Chemical School and the Chemical
14 Defense Training Facility in the future, that the Army pursue
15 all the required permits and certifications from the new site
16 prior to the 1995 Base Closure process.
17 The Commission finds this recommendation is
18 consistent with the force structure plan and final criteria.
19 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Is there a second to the motion?
20 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: I second.
21 CHAIRMAN COURTER: The motion has been seconded by

22 Commissioner Bowman. Any discussion on the motion?

1 COMMISSIONER STUART: Could I --
2 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Absolutely.
3 COMMISSIONER STUART: I have a variation, a second
4 motion, an alternative, and basically, it is what I've been
5 discussing, collocation subject to the CDTF closure being
6 accomplished with the Army getting the permits in accordance
7 with the environmental laws and regulations of Missouri. So,
8 shall I read the --
9 MS. CHESTON: Commissioner Stuart, I'm having a
10 hard time hearing you. Are you making a motion now or are
11 you discussing your alternative motion? I thought I heard
12 you say that you were discussing a possible alternative, and
13 I might suggest that before you actually make a second
14 motion, that there be a vote on the first that is pending.
15 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Thank you, Counsel. I
16 appreciate it. That would simplify things and simplify my
17 life quite a bit, but I think what we said in the very
18 beginning, that if a Commissioner felt compelled to offer a
19 substitute motion, the substitute motion would be recognized;
20 if it has a second, seconded; there would be discussion; and
21 then the vote would be on the substitute then followed by the
22 original motion.

1 MS. CHESTON: Perhaps I'm just having a hard time
2 hearing him. I didn't hear him say that what he's doing is
3 amending the first motion.
4 COMMISSIONER STUART: No, I'm offering a substitute
5 motion.
6 MS. CHESTON: Offering a substitute motion.
7 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner Stuart is offering
8 a substitute motion which, of course, will require a second.
9 Commissioner Stuart, do you want to read your substitute
10 motion?
11 MOTION
12 COMMISSIONER STUART: The language is lengthy, but
13 I will read it.
14 I move the Commission find the Secretary of Defense
15 deviated substantially from Criteria 1 and 4 and, therefore,
16 the Commission adopted the following recommendation.
17 Close Fort McClellan except for Pelham Range and
18 other required training support facilities to be licensed
19 through the Army National Guard, and an enclave to support
20 the U.S. Army Reserves, relocate the Chemical and Military
21 Police Schools to Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, close the
22 Chemical Defense Training Facility at Fort McClellan and

1 construct a replacement facility at Fort Leonard Wood,
2 subject to the CDTF closure being accomplished and the
3 permits secured by the Army, in accordance with environmental
4 laws and regulations, and following this, relocate the
5 Defense Polygraphic Institute to another location determined
6 by the Department of Defense.
7 The Commission finds this recommendation is
8 consistent with the force structure plan and final criteria.
9 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Is there a second to the motion,
10 to the substitute motion?
11 (No response.)
12 CHAIRMAN COURTER: There is no second to the
13 substitute motion. The motion fails. Any further discussion
14 on the original motion, the original motion made by
15 Commissioner Johnson?
16 (No response.)
17 CHAIRMAN COURTER: No further discussion. We will
18 call for a vote, and we will start to my far right with
19 Commissioner Peter Bowman.
20 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: Aye.
21 MS. CHESTON: Commissioner Bowman votes "aye."

22 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner Cox.

1 COMMISSIONER COX: Aye.
2 MS. CHESTON: Commissioner Cox votes "aye."
3 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner McPherson.
4 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: Aye.
5 MS. CHESTON: Commissioner McPherson votes "aye."
6 CHAIRMAN COURTER: The Chair votes "aye."
7 MS. CHESTON: Commissioner Courter votes "aye."
8 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner Stuart.
9 COMMISSIONER STUART: No.
10 MS. CHESTON: Commissioner Stuart votes "nay."
11 COMMISSIONER COX: Commissioner Byron.
12 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: Aye.
13 MS. CHESTON: Commissioner Byron votes "aye."
14 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner Johnson.
15 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Aye.
16 MS. CHESTON: Commissioner Johnson votes "aye."
17 The motion is to reject the Secretary of Defense's
18 recommendation with respect to Fort McClellan, Alabama. The
19 vote on the motion is six in favor, one opposed. The motion
20 passes.
21 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Mr. Brown, why don't you
22 proceed?

1 MR. BROWN: Mr. Chairman and Commissioners, at Tab
2 3, we have the next installation to be discussed, Fort Lee,
3 Virginia. Fort Lee was added for further consideration on
4 May 21st.
5 Slide 16 pictorially shows the option under
6 consideration, the closure of Fort Lee, the relocation of
7 Combined Arms Support Command, the Quartermaster School and
8 Center, and the Army Logistics Management College to Fort
9 Eustis, Virginia, and the Defense Commissary Agency to
10 Quantico, Virginia.
11 Slide 17 shows the relative locations of Fort Lee,
12 Fort Eustis and Quantico. Mr. John Graham will now discuss
13 Fort Lee. It's in your book at Tab 3.
14 MR. GRAHAM: Slide No. 18 shows the static
15 information for Fort Lee. What I'd like to do is highlight
16 the bottom line. The one-time cost for this proposal would
17 be a little over $529 million, a steady state savings of 28.5
18 million and the payback would be in excess of 100 years.
19 Next slide.
20 These are the issues that staff has reviewed in
21 regards to Fort Lee. I'd like to go through each of them and
22 I'll start on the next charts. Next slide. First off is

1 military value. Fort Lee was ranked 11 of 13 within its
2 category of Initial Entry Training/Branch Schools by the
3 Army.
4 The community argued that it was a multi-purpose
5 installation, that it was both command and control,
6 professional schooling, as well as initial entry training
7 and, therefore, should be viewed from the other Initial Entry
8 Training/Branch Schools, that it was more than a training
9 center.
10 Our review showed that the primary mission of Fort
11 Lee is the training of soldiers, noncommissioned officers and
12 officers, and that the Army did treat it fairly and it was
13 consistent in its assignment of installations to this
14 category, and it was ranked fairly against the others, so the
15 11 of 13 is a valid military value assessment.
16 The second issue is that of combat service support
17 training consolidation. The Army has consolidated some of
18 its combat service support training at Fort Lee, most notably
19 in officer training. It is also finalizing plans to
20 consolidate combat developments, doctrine developments and
21 training developments and standardization at Fort Lee.

22 Lieutenant General Wakefield, the Commanding

1 General at Fort Lee, under whose command this init[illegible]is
2 ongoing, stated that this initiative would save the [illegible] $5
3 million a year.
4 Our review of what has happened at Fort Lee shows
5 that there is a consolidation ongoing of the officer course
6 and that there is in development, but not yet approved by th
7 Department of the Army or Department of Defense, a plan to
8 consolidate the training and doctrine development at Fort
9 Lee, and there will be considerable savings from this
10 consolidation.
11 The third issue is unique facilities. The Army
12 argues that there are four unique facilities, truly unique
13 facilities on Fort Lee. The first is the Petroleum Trainin
14 Facility, which was opened in 1993. This is new. It's an
15 environmentally safe facility where we train -- we, the
16 nation -- train soldiers and Marines in inland distribution
17 of petroleum and bulk petroleum storage.
18 The second facility that the Army claims is unique
19 is water purification training where they train all of the
20 Army soldiers on how to purify water, which, as we found ou
21 in the Gulf War, is a vital requirement.
22 The Battle Support Center is a computer-assisted

1 wargaming center, which has the capability to be uplinked t
2 worldwide organizations from Korea to Germany, and it saves
3 money from bringing the soldiers to a central location to c
4 this type of training. The second is as part of the Army
5 Logistics Management Staff College, there is a satellite
6 education uplink at the center.
7 Our review shows that two of these are truly
8 unique. The POL training facility is the only on[illegible]OD
9 that does this type of inland distribution and bu[illegible]age
10 training and the water purification training faci[illegible]s th
11 only one within the Army and would have to be replicated.
12 The other two, the Battle Support Center and the
13 Satellite Education Center, are not as unique in that they
14 are not one of a kind, but since they are part of the
15 instructional requirements for the activities at Fort Lee,
16 they would have to be replicated wherever we decided to mo
17 those organizations from Fort Lee.
18 Next slide, Mark. The Army stated that the
19 Combined Arms Support Command, which is the headquarters a
20 Fort Lee and is also the command and control element for a
21 of the combat service support schools within the Army, the
22 Quartermaster's School, the Army Logistics Management

1 College, and associated activities, all needed to be
2 collocated at a given installation.
3 The Defense Commissary Agency and the Troop Support
4 Agency, the Troop Support Agency was the Army predecessor
5 the Defense Commissary Agency, it is slowly going out of
6 business but until it does, they need to be collocated. T
7 remaining units can go anywhere that we can find room for
8 them on an Army or other service installation.
9 Our analysis showed that the collocations stated by
10 the Army were reasonable, that you do get some synergies fr
11 collocating the activities stated. You reduce the overhea
12 in instructional requirements. You don't have to duplicat
13 any classrooms or other training facilities by collocating
14 those activities.
15 The next item is tenant synergy, which goes along
16 with the collocation. What we're really saying i[illegible] it
17 exists between these units that need to be collo[illegible] As
18 mentioned, they share instructional staff. They [illegible]
19 facilities, and that's the DOD position, and we found that
20 also was reasonable.
21 However, if you move the Quartermaster School, the

22 Army Logistics Management Staff College, and the Combined

1 Arms Support Command to another combat service support
2 training facility, you'll gain some additional efficiencies
3 just for those same reasons. You'll be able to reduce the
4 instructional requirement for overhead and also be able to
5 share in the training facilities.
6 RC tenants. On the post, there is a United States
7 Army Reserve Center and several reserve component units do
8 train at Fort Lee. The Army's intention is not to try to
9 carve out an RC enclave at Fort Lee if Fort Lee is directed
10 to be closed. There are other posts within the Virginia
11 area, Forts Pickett, A.P. Hill, Eustis itself, where these
12 units could be relocated, both for stationing and for
13 training purposes.
14 Now, the one thing that the community did mention
15 about this is that Fort Lee was used for mobilization in
16 Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Over 6,000 people came
17 through Fort Lee en route to the Gulf but, again, we found
18 that you can mobilize individual reservists or units at any
19 of those locations that I mentioned. It does not have to be
20 at Fort Lee.
21 Slide 22. Infrastructure. The Army stated that
22 they had spent over $31 million in the last 15 years on

1 infrastructure improvements on post. This is everything from
2 installing fiber optics telephones, burying the utilities, a
3 new water system, those types of things.
4 The communities in the surrounding area stated that
5 they had invested heavily in new schools, new utilities,
6 particularly in water and sewer capacity, to meet the
7 requirements of the population at Fort Lee.
8 Our findings are if Fort Lee is closed, there will
9 be an impact on the local community. They will have schools
10 that will not be fully utilized or may have to close, and
11 they will also have excess capacity in their utilities until
12 a re-use can be found for the facilities on Fort Lee.
13 The final issue is the closure of Fort Lee would be
14 a change to the 1988 Commission. The '88 Commission
15 recommended, and the Army has implemented, the movement of
16 the Supply and Food Service Specialist training from Fort
17 Jackson and Fort Dix, respectively, to Fort Lee, and that
18 they have spent about $16 million in military construction to
19 accommodate these changes.
20 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: John, could I interrupt
21 you? We're behind time and I was just thinking, in looking
22 at this, the break-even year on this is 2099?

1 MR. GRAHAM: Plus, over 100 years.
2 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: Plus? Mr. Chairman, I
3 don't think we need to talk about this anymore.
4 MR. GRAHAM: Any time you want to stop me, feel
5 free, sir.
6 CHAIRMAN COURTER: I appreciate that. That's the
7 Chair's sentiment and I know is Commissioner Stuart's
8 sentiment, as well. Is there anything, any questions of
9 Commissioners? We, in good faith, wanted to check this out
10 to see if there was any further opportunities for savings and
11 anticipating that which we did, of course, with respect to
12 McClellan.
13 COMMISSIONER BYRON: Mr. Chairman?
14 CHAIRMAN COURTER: The gentlelady is recognized.
15 COMMISSIONER BYRON: Do we have to do anything to
16 remove it from the list to be looked at and compared?
17 CHAIRMAN COURTER: No, there's no motion. It dies.
18 The Department of Defense's recommendations prevail.
19 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: I just wanted to take
20 exception with one thing you said, John. You stated that 11
21 out of 13 was the proper categorization. I happen to

22 disagree with that in the sense that a maneuver base, by

1 means of its large real estate, got many, many more points
2 than Fort Lee did and therefore, Lee went down on the list.
3 I think that the Army needs to pursue next time a better way
4 of evaluating that or highlighting that, one or the other,
5 because --
6 MR. GRAHAM: Sir, after our trip there, I did take
7 your concerns back to the Army Basing Study to talk about
8 multi-purpose installations and I don't know how they'll work
9 it out, but I did take those concerns back to them.
10 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: Yes, that's my only concern.
11 Otherwise, I totally agree with you, Commissioner McPherson.
12 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Thank you. Any further
13 discussion?
14 (No response.)
15 CHAIRMAN COURTER: We'll just move on. There's
16 lack of a motion. The recommendations of the Department of
17 Defense which was to keep Fort Lee prevail. Mr. Brown.
18 MR. BROWN: At Tab 4, Mr. Chairman, we have the
19 next category that will be discussed, Professional Schools.
20 The map, Slide 25, and the accompanying chart, Slide 26, show
21 the names and locations of the Army's five professional
22 school installations.

1 At Tab 5, we have the next installation to be
2 discussed, the Presidio of Monterey, to include the Presidio
3 of Monterey Annex. The Army recommended the closure of the
4 Presidio of Monterey and the Presidio of Monterey Annex to
5 the Secretary of Defense but he removed the recommendation
6 from the list prior to submitting it to the Commission
7 because of the potential impact on intelligence activities.
8 The Commission added the Presidio of Monterey in
9 its March 29th hearing and clarified its motion on May 21st,
10 by also adding the Presidio of Monterey Annex. Slide 27
11 pictorially shows the option under consideration; that is,
12 the relocation of the Defense Language Institute Foreign
13 Language Center from the Presidio of Monterey to Fort
14 Huachuca, where it would be contracted with a university that
15 can provide the training in that area.
16 LTC Duffy will discuss this recommendation.
17 LTC DUFFY: Next slide, please.
18 MR. BROWN: I beg your pardon. The map shows the
19 relative locations of Presidio of Monterey, the Presidio of
20 Monterey Annex and Fort Huachuca.
21 LTC DUFFY: Thank you. May I have the next slide,
22 Mark? Before you are the statistics on this recommendation.

1 In the Army's analysis, the first thing I'd like to point out
2 is that the Presidio of Monterey is 393 acres. The Presidio
3 of Monterey Annex is 1,500.
4 The one-time costs of 155 million with steady state
5 savings of 49 million, approximately, a cumulative economic
6 impact in the Monterey area of 27 percent in addition to six
7 percent from this recommendation alone. The other is from
8 the Fort Ord closure in '91.
9 Next slide, please. These are the three issues I
10 would like to highlight. Next slide, please. The first
11 issue is contracting language training. The DOD position is
12 that a contract study can be done or should be done after the
13 recommendation is voted on by the Commission.
14 The community took exception to that and believes
15 that a contract study is required by law -- not by law, but
16 by Office of Management and Budget Circular A-76. The Army
17 position that a study may be required is probably the best
18 position that we have to discuss the ability to contract out
19 language training
20 Such a contract study could take quite a bit of
21 time. Such a contract study could find that DLI actually is

22 a most efficient organization and should remain. Until that

1 study is done, at least, it is the position right now from
2 our analysis that the study is required. We will go with the
3 Army's recommendation.
4 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Brian, let me interrupt you on
5 this. I don't know where you are. Are you on a chart here?
6 You're on 31?
7 LTC DUFFY: This is the first issue.
8 CHAIRMAN COURTER: We are so familiar with this
9 thing we want to just cut right through to --
10 LTC DUFFY: Okay, I can move to the next issue,
11 sir, the Presidio of Monterey Annex?
12 CHAIRMAN COURTER: -- to the core, to the core of
13 the apple.
14 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Why don't we just discuss it
15 here, sir?
16 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Yes, why don't we discuss it?
17 We'll open ourselves up, Brian, to questions from the
18 Commission. Commissioner Johnson, did you want to start out
19 the discussion or questions?
20 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: I, as you, visited the DLI
21 and I believe that DLI offers a unique capability to the
22 Department of Defense. I believe it was placed on the list

1 because of the high cost of operating DLI. Your Commission
2 in '91 closed Fort Ord but kept a catonement open, which grew
3 into quite a catonement and made the cost very, very
4 difficult.
5 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Capital "C" catonement.
6 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: We've looked at Fort
7 Huachuca as the alternative and certainly the University of
8 Arizona could eventually build a DLI. It would take a long
9 time. The Presidio of Monterey DLI makes sense, but I
10 believe we need to look at the support structure that
11 supports DLI.
12 I believe that the Navy postgraduate school at
13 Monterey should be tasked to provide operational support to
14 DLI, housekeeping, if you will. The City of Monterey has a
15 very -- seemingly, a very good proposal in to provide that.
16 I recommend that we direct the Navy to provide the support
17 but also direct them to look at the potential of contracting
18 out to the city or some other agency.
19 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Let me just jump in here. I
20 agree with the analysis of Commissioner Johnson on this, that
21 Arizona, the University of Arizona, Fort Huachuca, could one
22 day be a preeminent Defense Language Institute. There is no

1 doubt in my mind, a great state, dedicated people, good
2 quality of life, but my sense is and my strong feeling is
3 that there's going to be a degradation in language training
4 if this is moved.
5 That reduction in capabilities and degradation and
6 disruption and dislocation will take place for many, many
7 years, and therefore we wanted to look for a cheaper way of
8 doing it where it now exists, and I concur with the fact that
9 the Presidio of Monterey is burdened with the operational
10 overhead that was forced upon it by a catonement area that
11 grew all out of proportion to what the 1991 Commission had
12 contemplated.
13 Therefore, what I like, also, is that which
14 Commissioner Johnson said, and that language with respect to
15 the consolidation of operations support with the Naval
16 postgraduate school, by inter-service agreement, and an
17 evaluation as to whether contracting out is going to be
18 helpful in the future, is, I think, language that should be
19 contained in our motion.
20 On the other hand, and I'm looking for the purpose
21 of the Commissioners Alternate Motion No. 4, and I was

22 reading that. Basically, it says retain the Presidio of

1 Monterey but dispose of all facilities at the Pres[illegible]
2 Monterey Annex except the housing, commissary and p[illegible]
3 exchange, required to support the Presidio of Monterey.
4 What I'm suggesting, and I don't know now without
5 further discussion, that what I'm interested in is a hybrid
6 motion between really 2 -- that language in 2 that I
7 mentioned, and Alternative 4.
8 What I don't want, frankly, is more language saying
9 that at the Annex, the DOD or Army should dispose of all
10 unneeded facilities because that's basically, it's my
11 understanding, what we did a couple of years ago, and their
12 definition of what is needed and essential is the thing tha
13 got DLI in trouble in the first instance.
14 So, I think we want to be very, very specific.
15 Now, we're not going to get a meets-and-bounds description o
16 what should be retained at Ord, but maybe we should have som
17 discussion as to what should be kept there. I know that
18 there is housing that is now being used, is essential for th
19 Presidio, as well as for the Navy postgraduate school.
20 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Sir, I'd recommend that we,
21 looking at your paper there at Alternative 2, where it says
22 dispose of all facilities at the Annex except housing,

1 commissary, post exchange, required to support the Presidio
2 of Monterey and Naval postgraduate school and then go on wit
3 the rest of 2.
4 COMMISSIONER BYRON: Brian, there is extensive
5 excess housing at the Annex, much more than DLI would need a
6 just an adequate amount?
7 LTC DUFFY: There is the correct amount. The Army
8 actually, when they sized it, sized it for a 3400-[illegible]nt
9 load.
10 COMMISSIONER BYRON: Then we don't need to ti[illegible]
11 housing anymore?
12 LTC DUFFY: No, ma'am. Our calculations show a
13 requirement for 1,045 housing units for the students,
14 faculty, plus the 500 that the Navy requires. I would hast
15 to add that I know you don't want to get too detailed, Mr.
16 Chairman.
17 CHAIRMAN COURTER: No, we want to get very
18 detailed. That's fine. Go ahead.
19 LTC DUFFY: There are some facilities located on
20 that annex that are critical to the quality of life such a
21 the child care center. The capacity of the child care
22 centers on the Peninsula between the Navy and the Army is

1 frankly unknown because Fort Ord still exists.
2 While it's downsizing, these facilities are being
3 right-sized. Nobody really knows exactly how much capaci
4 you need. Our calculations show that the one child care
5 center on the Presidio of Monterey is not sufficient.
6 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: Brian, if I could
7 interrupt you here, I think everybody on this Commission
8 pretty well agrees, in general terms, with what we want t
9 do. We want to stay in the Presidio and we want to get s
10 of this load of the Presidio's back that it's been carryi
11 for some time, and that made it fiscally unattractive.
12 What I would propose, Mr. Chairman and
13 Commissioners, is that we defer voting on an alternative
14 motion until tomorrow in order to give us, our counsel an
15 staff time to draft the resolution that will express what
16 think we all agree to, rather than go through a lo proc
17 of trying to cover each aspect of it today.
18 CHAIRMAN COURTER: I think that's a good
19 recommendation. Before we implement that recommendation
20 consider it, and I hope everybody will agree with it, I'm
21 just wondering whether there's anything else we want to

22 squeeze out of this hearing today, so tomorrow we're just

1 basically -- you know, I want to have this evening the
2 language precisely crafted so no one can misunderstand it.
3 If a child care center has to be placed in it, we
4 specifically mention the child care center.
5 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: Mr. Chairman?
6 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner Bowman?
7 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: I don't mean to craft it on
8 the spot here, but I think it can be done very simply by
9 taking Scenario No. 2 under the first bullet to say, "Keep
10 the Presidio of Monterey but dispose of all facilities at the
11 POM Annex except those agreed to as essential by the Defense
12 Language Institute and the Naval Postgraduate School."
13 CHAIRMAN COURTER: No.
14 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: What you will avoid is us
15 micromanaging, which is unsatisfactory, and you allow the
16 customers, if you will --
17 MR. BEHRMANN: Mr. Bowman, that's exactly what
18 happened in '91.
19 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Yeah, that's what happened, and
20 basically, if you leave it in the hands of those people that
21 ideally would like to have as much as possible, you know, we
22 would defeat --

1 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: What they're really setting
2 themselves up for in '95 is the same stuff. I didn't have
3 the history behind me to --
4 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Oh, boy. I want to -- I would
5 love to dispose of the thing in great clarity today, and I
6 like what Commissioner McPherson said, that we work out the
7 precise language so there's no further negotiations, there's
no loopholes, there's no flexible language.
We know precisely, number one, DLI stays open; and
10 number two, what it's going to be supported by and nothing
11 else, specifically named. That's my goal.
12 COMMISSIONER BYRON: Brian, is there currently a
13 clinic at the facility?
14 LTC DUFFY: Yes, ma'am, there's a Primus Clinic at
15 the Presidio of Monterey, not on the Annex but on the
16 Presidio of Monterey.
17 COMMISSIONER BYRON: At DLI, so that is not
18 something we should structure in our amendment. Is there
19 anything else in that category we should --
20 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Mr. Chairman, if I might
21 suggest the staff be very, very careful on adding things.
22 You know, you add child care and then you want to add

1 something else and so forth, and pretty soon you get exactly
2 where we are.
3 CHAIRMAN COURTER: I know.
4 COMMISSIONER STUART: I think we need to have a
5 very accurate definition. I think we're all concerned about
6 this being expanded to a larger operation, which has been the
7 drag and the reason the original --
8 COMMISSIONER BYRON: Specifically, we don't want
9 the golf courses. We don't want the stadium, et cetera.
10 CHAIRMAN COURTER: And excess land should be sold.
11 COMMISSIONER STUART: Exactly.
12 CHAIRMAN COURTER: I mean, you can draw the lines.
13 I've seen developers do it and surveyers do it to include two
14 facilities and 80 percent of the vacant land, and we're back
15 to the same problem we were before, and that's what I want to
avoid.
And, I think it's going to take some careful
18 drafting to make sure we end up with that which only is
19 needed, so the '95 Commission doesn't come back with the same
20 problem this one is faced with and that is, a good facility
21 that is burdened with the overhead by the Annex.

22 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: And I empathize with that. I

1 don't think the people that are going to use these facilities
2 are going to make the same mistake again. I really doubt
3 that, and I think we ought to avoid micromanaging in areas
4 that we're not totally competent or won't be competent by the
5 time we have to do this, but I strongly support Commissioner
6 McPherson's proposal.
7 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Brian, did you want to add to
8 this?
9 LTC DUFFY: Sir, I understand your intent. I think
10 that the recommendation to consolidate is good and there has
11 been the community -- those people who live on the peninsula
12 have all asked for that. DOD is moving towards those types
13 of arrangements.
14 However, some of these revenue producers that they
15 take away from them means that some of the quality of life
16 facilities will not be available. I don't know how many.
17 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: That's the trap. That's the
18 trap that everybody falls into.
19 CHAIRMAN COURTER: I agree. That's the trap that
20 everybody falls into.
21 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: There's nothing wrong with
22 contracting out child care.

1 LTC DUFFY: Yes, sir, there are many options. I
2 would like to say that I agree with Commissioner Bowman that
3 the Commander on the ground has to be -- is the person who
4 has, I think, the best feel of that.
5 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Let's continue to discuss it if
6 we want to, but I feel strongly that Commissioner McPherson
7 is right, and I feel absolutely strongly, I agree with
8 Commissioner Johnson on this thing. We simply must not
9 permit discretion because if you do, it's a trap and the same
10 thing will occur.
11 And they will be burdened with the overhead. There
12 will be another review. Their cost per student will shoot
13 out. Every computer will spit it out all over the Pentagon
14 and they'll be back in the same situation they are today and
15 we don't want that.
16 They want to be able to leave here tomorrow or when
17 the president signs this thing and the Congress ratifies our
18 work, knowing that that's the end of this, and they are not
19 burdened with nice things, terrific things, but they cannot
20 be burdened with that which is going to make their student
21 costs jut out and create signals and red flags in the future.
22 COMMISSIONER STUART: The Chairman said it well.

1 We just want the essential facilities and that should be
2 defined in the resolution we can discuss tomorrow.
3 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Any further discussion before we
4 table the votes on this matter until tomorrow?
5 COMMISSIONER BYRON: I don't think we need to
6 discuss it tomorrow. We'll just vote.
7 CHAIRMAN COURTER: We don't have to discuss it.
8 Well, we'll discuss the specific language after a motion is
9 made and seconded tomorrow. Is there any further discussion
10 on this matter? Does everybody agree -- I don't need a
11 formal motion -- that we defer the motion on the Presidio of
12 Monterey and the Annex until tomorrow?
13 COMMISSIONER STUART: Yes, sir.
14 COMMISSIONER BYRON: Yes.
15 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Everyone agrees. We'll move on
16 then, command and control.
17 MR. BROWN: Mr. Chairman, at Tab 6, we have the
18 next category that will be discussed, command and control.
19 The map, Slide 39, and the accompanying chart, Slide 40,
20 shows the names and locations of the Army's 11 command and
21 control installations.

22 The are 12 installations on this chart, and the

1 12th one is the Presidio of San Francisco. It was not
2 evaluated by the Army since it was closed by the 1988
3 Commission; however, it is included on the chart because
4 there is a DOD recommendation to redirect an activity that is
5 currently at this installation.
6 At Tab 7, we have the next installation to be
7 discussed, Fort Belvoir, Virginia. Slide 41 pictorially
8 shows the DOD recommendation; that is, to realign Fort
9 Belvoir, disestablish the Belvoir Research Development and
10 Engineering Center, in the top right-hand block, eliminate
11 six business areas that are within that organization,
12 transfer command and control of six business areas to the
13 Tank Automotive Command -- I beg your pardon, to the Night
14 Vision Engineering Organization at Fort Belvoir, and to
15 relocate five business areas to Detroit Arsenal.
16 Slide 32 shows the relative location of Fort
17 Belvoir and Detroit Arsenal. Mr. John Graham will discuss
18 this recommendation.
19 MR. GRAHAM: Next slide, Mark. This slide depicts
20 both the DOD recommendation which Ed just briefly outlined
21 and the static information about Fort Belvoir. Again, I'd
22 like to call your attention to the bottom line, the one-time

1 cost of 11.3 million, steady state savings of 13.4, and a
2 payback break-even point of 1996 for this recommendation.
3 Next slide is the major areas, issue areas, that
4 I'd like to discuss as we go through. We'll cover each of
5 them in detail but before I go on, one thing I would like to
6 point out is that in the community's argument, they did
7 not -- they supported the actual elimination of the Belvoir
8 Research Development and Engineering Center.
9 Their concerns were with the elimination of three
10 specific business areas, and the movement of the business
11 areas from Fort Belvoir to the Detroit Arsenal. Next slide.
12 The first issue, the first three issues are the elimination
13 of three business areas.
14 The first one is the elimination of the marine
15 craft business area. The DOD position is to eliminate this
16 business area. The Navy will provide the necessary
17 engineering support to the Army for marine craft under a tri
18 service reliance program.
19 This is a DOD initiative to reduce technological
20 bases within the services if there is not a service-unique
21 requirement. DOD's position is that the Navy is the
22 unquestioned lead in marine craft and therefore the marine

1 craft business area at Belvoir is not needed.
2 The community argued that this is a vital Army
3 mission, logistics over the shore, supportive, established
4 ports and coastal harbor/inland waterway support, are all
5 Army missions. They argued that the Army needed to retain
6 its expert acquisition personnel in order to stay current in
7 this. Otherwise, you lose the mission or you will impact on
8 readiness of the Army engineer forces and transportation
9 forces which use these.
10 Our findings are that inter-servicing will create
11 efficiencies. We're trying to end duplication by looking at
12 inter-servicing. This will do that in the marine craft
13 business area. The Army will maintain its acquisition
14 capability through an existing organization which is the
15 Weapons Systems Management for Marine Craft, which is located
16 in St. Louis.
17 The second business area that the community
18 recommended that we should retain and that the Army
19 recommended should be eliminated is construction equipment.
20 The DOD's position, that this is a nondevelopmental item and
21 that's the preferred procurement approach. A

22 nondevelopmental item is you buy it off the shelf,

1 essentially, with maybe some major modifications f[illegible]ar
2 use.
3 The Army's position is that research and
4 development for this will be done by the National Automotiv
5 Research and Development Center in Warren, Michigan, and tha
6 the acquisition expertise will be provided by the program
7 manager for construction equipment, an already existing
8 organization.
9 Again, the community argued that it should be
10 retained. They stated that the demise of this area will
11 result in Army forces using old and obsolete equipment
12 because there is not anybody overseeing the research,
13 development or acquisition.
14 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Who is the community you
15 keep referring to?
16 MR. GRAHAM: It was Representative Moran and Mr.
17 Lovelace, sir.
18 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Mr. Lovelace is who?
19 MR. GRAHAM: He was the former director of the
20 Belvoir Research Development and Engineering Center.
21 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: So, really, you're talking
22 about the development community when you say community?

1 MR. GRAHAM: Yes, sir.
2 COMMISSIONER COX: And the Congressman who
3 represents that area?
4 MR. GRAHAM: Yes, ma'am. We found that the Army
5 plan will end duplication in this effort. They already ha
6 folks who are doing the acquisition, and that the eliminati
7 will not hurt Army readiness, because they will maintain th
8 capability.
9 Elimination of topographic business areas, ag[illegible]
10 it's a nondevelopmental item. The Army buys the [illegible]off
11 the shelf, is their argument, and that the program manager
12 for specific weapons systems, such as artillery pieces,
13 routinely include this type of equipment in their projects
14 when they go out for bid and final development of the weapo
15 system itself.
16 They further argue that state-of-the-art equipment
17 is available from the civilian sector, and that the commun
18 argued to retain it because, again, it would cause old and
19 obsolete equipment and would impact on the readiness of Ar
20 forces. We found that this would not be the case, since th
21 do now rely on civilian industry and they will retain the
22 capability to do acquisition, that the readiness of the Ar

1 would not be impacted. Next chart.
2 The movement of the five business areas to Detroit
3 Arsenal, the DOD position is to move them from Belvoir to
4 Detroit. Collocation will facilitate concurrent engineer
5 of land force vehicles, and their bottom line position is
6 that costs are minimal to the overall savings, because you
7 get a synergy by collocating similar business areas with
8 those that already exist in Detroit.
9 The community argued that it needed to be retained
10 at Fort Belvoir and that the Army intent could be achieved
11 establishing a high speed data line between Detroit and
12 Belvoir, to give real world command and control, real tim
13 data transfer.
14 We think that additional efficiencies will be
15 gained by the collocation; however, if you do not move
16 business areas, there's a $9 million savings due pr[illegible]rily
17 the transportation and construction costs that w[illegible]
18 required in Detroit.
19 COMMISSIONER COX: I'm sorry, John. If we don't
20 move these?
21 MR. GRAHAM: Yes.

22 COMMISSIONER COX: The Army has recommended that we

move them?
MR. GRAHAM: Right.
COMMISSIONER COX: If we don't move them, it saves us $9 million?
MR. GRAHAM: Yes, ma'am, for one-time costs.
COMMISSIONER COX: For one-time costs.
MR. GRAHAM: Yes, ma'am.
COMMISSIONER COX: And we still get the same savings --
MR. GRAHAM: Yes, ma'am, roughly the same savings.
COMMISSIONER COX: -- we would have gotten without moving, but basically the Army argument is that we really need all of these things collocated for military purposes rather than saving?
MR. GRAHAM: Yes, ma'am, because from a research development and engineering standpoint, they want to try to streamline it as much as possible. You put them all together. They can form task forces to work on, say, the next armored bridging capability. The chassis is done by an organization that is at Detroit. The actual bridge is done at Belvoir. If you have the engineers in the same location, it just goes a little smoother.

COMMISSIONER COX: Basically, we're paying $9 million to try to get all of this operation together and the synergies that might come from that?
MR. GRAHAM: To bring them together, yes, ma'am.
COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: There certainly is great synergism in doing that.
COMMISSIONER COX: Right.
MR. GRAHAM: Yes.
COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: It should have been done from the get-go.
MR. GRAHAM: Yes, sir, and I think the Army is trying to correct that mistake, sir. The last issue is just the cost. The community stated that the Army had under estimated the cost of 11.3, and it would probably be closer to 26.
In our review, when we looked at what the Army was doing, the Army is going to go to Detroit, renovate facilities that are up there that are existing and empty. The community estimate is built on all new military construction. That's the big difference between those two numbers.
COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: Mr. Chairman, I have a

motion.
CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner McPherson has a motion.

MOTION

COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: I move that the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission adopts the following recommendation of the Secretary of Defense. I presume I have to read this thing.
Realign Fort Belvoir as follows: Dis-establish the Belvoir Research, Development and Engineering Center, Fort Belvoir, Virginia; eliminate the Tunnel Detection Materials Marine Craft; Topographic Equipment, Construction Equipment and Support Equipment business areas.
Relocate the Supply, Bridging, Counter-Mobility, Water Purification and Fuel Lubricant business areas to the Tank Automotive Research Development Engineering Center, Detroit Arsenal, Michigan.
Transfer command and control of the Physical Security, Battlefield Deception, Electric Power Remote Mine Detection Utilization, Environmental Controls and Low Cost

22 Low Observables business areas -- I wish there were an

acronym for all of this -- to the Night Vision Electro-Optics Directorate of the Communications, Electronics Research Development and Engineering Center, Fort Belvoir, Virginia.
COMMISSIONER STUART: My only question is, Mr. McPherson, are you pushing for more acronyms?
CHAIRMAN COURTER: Is there a second to the motion?
COMMISSIONER COX: Second.
CHAIRMAN COURTER: The motion has been moved and seconded. Is there any discussion on the motion?
(No response.)
CHAIRMAN COURTER: Hearing no desire for discussion on the motion, we'll start out with Commissioner Rebecca Cox.
COMMISSIONER COX: Aye.
MS. CHESTON: Commissioner Cox votes "aye."
CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner McPherson.
COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: Aye.
MS. CHESTON: Commissioner McPherson votes "aye."
CHAIRMAN COURTER: The Chair votes aye.
MS. CHESTON: The Chair votes "aye."
CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner Stuart?
COMMISSIONER STUART: Aye.
CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner Stuart voted "aye."

MS. CHESTON: Thank you. I didn't hear that. Commissioner Stuart votes "aye."
CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner Byron.
COMMISSIONER BYRON: Aye.
MS. CHESTON: Commissioner Byron votes "aye."
CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner Johnson.
COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Aye.
MS. CHESTON: Commissioner Johnson votes "aye."
CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner Bowman.
COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: Aye.
MS. CHESTON: Commissioner Bowman votes "aye." On the motion to accept the Secretary's recommendation on Fort Belvoir, Belvoir, Virginia, the vote is seven in favor, zero opposed. The motion passes.
CHAIRMAN COURTER: The Presidio of San Francisco. By way of background, let me just mention that in 1988, I believe it was 1988, there was, as we know, a Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, although I don't think it was called precisely that. That Commission was configured somewhat differently than this one.
The Commissioners were appointed by the Secretary of Defense without confirmation. They met in Washington

someplace, didn't visit any facilities and didn't hold any hearings, but certainly got their job done, and the fact that they came forward with a long list of recommended closures and realignments, and this was one of them.
They recommended closure of the Presidio of San Francisco and it's my recollection that that was supported not only by the Army but by San Francisco, as well, the City of San Francisco. I believe that was the case. In any event, the implementation of that 1988 BRAC decision was deferred as these things do take a period of time, anywhere between two and six years, to implement.
Now we're reaching the time that -- I believe it's the 7th Army?
MR. BROWN: 6th Army, Mr. Chairman.
CHAIRMAN COURTER: 6th Army? Thank you. The 6th Army is about to vacate, and then the land where the Presidio is was taken over by the Department of Interior to be run by the Park Service. Then there are a number of people, including the former Secretary of Defense, Michael Stone, that testified --
MR. BROWN: Army.

22 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Army, thank you, Michael Stone,

1 that testified before this Commission when we held a hearing
2 in California, saying that that's not a good idea, the
3 vacating of the 6th Army from the Presidio is not a good
4 idea, and that he thought that the 6th Army should stay. We
5 thought it was an engaging and interesting proposal.
6 His comments were, number one, the Park Service is
7 not equipped to do anything like this before. They deal with
8 parks. This isn't a park. It has hundreds and hundreds of
9 buildings and lots of people stay there. It's basically a
10 town, so they'll find it very difficult.
11 It would be good for the Army to stay because you
12 avoid the cost of moving, number one, and number two, you're
13 there in the San Francisco area in case of a natural
14 catastrophe, i.e., an earthquake, and people would want the
15 6th Army there to help in that type of a contingency.
16 That led us to wonder why, if the Secretary of the
17 Army was disposed to keep the 6th Army there, why he didn't
18 just make it happen when he was Secretary of the Army but be
19 that as it may, we checked with the new Secretary of Defense
20 as to that proposal, because it did, on its face, have some
21 logic to us.
22 It's my understanding that we did receive a

1 communique recently from whom, if the staff could --
2 MR. BROWN: We have received no communique from the
3 Department of Defense, Mr. Chairman. You have a letter today
4 from the Secretary of the Interior.
5 CHAIRMAN COURTER: The Secretary of the Interior
6 wrote a letter today seconding -- and I think this letter
7 should go in our record, and we'll make it go in the record,
8 but basically what the Secretary of the Interior indicates is
9 that he supports the retention of the 6th Army at the
10 Presidio of San Francisco; is that correct?
11 MR. BROWN: That's correct, Mr. Chairman.
12 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Now, have we received orally any
13 word from the Army? I thought we did.
14 MR. BROWN: We received indications that they would
15 accept the decision by the Commission to stay at the Presidio
16 of San Francisco rather than relocating to old Naval Air
17 Station Moffett now known as NASA/AMES if a suitable lease
18 arrangement to both the Department of the Interior and
19 Department of the Army can be negotiated.
20 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: And that letter says that
21 Interior is willing to do that, I believe.
22 COMMISSIONER BYRON: Mr. Chairman, when Presidio of

1 San Francisco was closed, there was in statute of law a
2 legislative initiative by Congressman Burton that states if
3 and when the military vacated the Presidio facilities, they
4 would revert to the Department of Interior, not under the
5 usual process as is the case in many of the other
6 installations that are closed.
7 COMMISSIONER STUART: We've done all the
8 commenting. Does the staff have any point of view on this?
9 MR. BROWN: I don't believe so, Commissioner
10 Stuart.
11 COMMISSIONER COX: Mr. Chairman, I have a motion.
12 CHAIRMAN COURTER: All right.
13 MR. BROWN: I think the Commission needs to realize
14 that there is an increased steady state cost if 6th Army
15 stays at the Presidio of San Francisco. It's comparable to
16 what it would be if they relocated to NASA/AMES. The steady
17 state cost is more than it would be if they moved to Fort
18 Carson, which was the original recommendation.
19 COMMISSIONER STUART: But that's been scrubbed by
20 the DOD, anyway.
21 MR. BROWN: No, it has not been scrubbed by DOD.

22 They were recommending that, of course, that be the redirect

1 however, it's always the option of the Commission
2 disapprove that redirect.
3 CHAIRMAN COURTER: But the point -- I think
4 Commissioner Stuart is right, that the Army thought we shoul
5 use Moffett Field.
6 MR. BROWN: That is the recommendation to the
7 Commission, sir.
8 CHAIRMAN COURTER: That has the same steady state
9 costs as does the Presidio?
10 MR. BROWN: Comparable, that's correct, Mr.
11 Chairman.
12 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Comparable, and the advantage in
13 staying at the Presidio is, number one, you don't have to
14 move and, number two, it is as well as AMES at Moffett,
15 located in the San Francisco Bay area.
16 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: And, Mr. Chairman, there's
17 a third advantage and it's one that I think the Commission
18 ought to take note of. The General Accounting Office
19 certainly took note in a couple of instances when it looked
20 at these recommendations this year, that the Pentagon, the
21 services, often look at things from a single focus, with a
22 single focus that has to do with their own budget.

1 They don't look at other services and the effect of
2 what they do on other services very often, and they certainl
3 don't look outside the Pentagon. Here is a case, I'm
4 persuaded, where the interests of the United States will be
5 advanced if we permit the Park Service and the Army to try t
6 negotiate some kind of cohabitation at the Presidio.
7 If they can't do it, if they want to load the Army
8 with too much fiscal responsibility and break the the
9 the Army in 1995 can very well leave, but at this
10 we're talking about the Park Service having respon ty
11 for finding tenants for about 6 million square feet of
12 buildings, and that is something that is going to be
13 really -- it's going to tax them. It will cost the United
14 States quite a lot and the area will suffer from it.
15 So, in my judgment, we should permit them an
16 opportunity to work out a lease agreement that will let th
17 live together and let the Army continue to play a role at
18 Presidio.
19 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner Cox had a motion, I
20 believe.
21 MOTION
22 COMMISSIONER COX: Yes, Mr. Chairman. I move that

1 the Commission find that the Secretary of Defense deviated
2 substantially from Criteria 2 and 4 and, therefore, that t
3 Commission adopt the following recommendation:
4 The 1988 Commission decision will be changed, to
5 allow only the 6th U.S. Army to remain at the Presidio of S
6 Francisco, California. The Department of the Interior and
7 the Department of the Army will negotiate a lease that is
8 favorable to both departments for the current facilities
9 occupied by the 6th U.S. Army and family housing at the
10 Presidio of San Francisco necessary to accommodate the
11 Headquarters members.
12 If agreement cannot be reached, the Commission
13 expects the Army to make a subsequent recommendation to th
14 1995 Commission for the relocation of the 6th U.S. Army.
15 Commission further recommends that the Defense Commissary
16 Agency and the Army and Air Force Exchange System min
17 the commissary and exchange requirements to suppo U.
18 Army based on sound business decisions.
19 The Commission finds this recommendation is
20 consistent with the force structure plan and final criter
21 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Is there a second to the motion?

22 COMMISSIONER BYRON: Second.

1 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: Second.
2 CHAIRMAN COURTER: The motion is made and properly
3 seconded. Any discussion on the motion?
4 (No response.)
5 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Hearing none, we start out with
6 Commissioner Harry McPherson.
7 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: Aye.
8 MS. CHESTON: Commissioner McPherson votes "aye."
9 CHAIRMAN COURTER: The Chair votes "aye."
10 MS. CHESTON: The Chair votes "aye."
11 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner Stuart?
12 COMMISSIONER STUART: Aye.
13 MS. CHESTON: Commissioner Stuart votes "aye."
14 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner Byron.
15 COMMISSIONER BYRON: Aye.
16 MS. CHESTON: Commissioner Byron votes "aye."
17 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner Johnson?
18 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Aye.
19 MS. CHESTON: Commissioner Johnson votes "aye."
20 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner Bowman.
21 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: Aye.
22 MS. CHESTON: Commissioner Bowman votes "aye."

1 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner Cox.
2 COMMISSIONER COX: Aye.
3 MS. CHESTON: Commissioner Cox votes "aye." The
4 motion is to reject the Secretary's recommendation on the
5 Presidio of San Francisco and, instead, to recommend that the
6 6th Army remains at Presidio of San Francisco. The vote on
7 the motion is seven in favor, zero opposed. The motion
8 passes.
9 CHAIRMAN COURTER: For the record, I know there are
10 some people that are keeping this record. I understand there
11 was a second by Commissioner Byron.
12 COMMISSIONER STUART: Both of them at the same
13 time.
14 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner Byron and others,
15 but Commissioner Byron was the lead person who seconded the
16 motion.
17 MS. CHESTON: Thank you for clarifying that.
18 CHAIRMAN COURTER: We're always concerned about the
19 record. Now, let's proceed.
20 MR. BROWN: At Tab 9, Mr. Chairman, we have the
21 next installation to be discussed. While you all were
22 discussing the Presidio of San Francisco, I was joined by two

1 new members of the staff. On my left is Mr. Bud Bale, whose
2 job it was to discuss the Presidio of San Francisco. He did
3 such a good job he didn't have to say anything to you all.
4 On his left is MAJ Gary Evans, who is also detailed from the
5 Department of the Army.
6 Fort McPherson was added for further consideration
7 on May 21st. Slide No. 57 shows the option under
8 consideration; that is, to close Fort McPherson.
9 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Let me stop you there, Ed, if I
10 may, and we'll recall very well the day that we added
11 McPherson and Gillem on the list and we wanted to, obviously,
12 consider it for an alternative possibility, but there was a
13 great deal of discussion then, and I believe it's correct
14 now, that we at least discuss, not vote but discuss,
15 McPherson and Gillem together, simply because of their
16 collocation and also because of the fact that one helps
17 support the other.
18 I think what I'd like to do is after we finish
19 McPherson, Fort McPherson, we then take up Fort Gillem and
20 get both of them on our plate.
21 MR. BROWN: Both of them will be discussed by Gary,
22 Mr. Chairman.

1 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Okay.
2 MR. BROWN: Slide 57 shows pictorially the option
3 that we're looking at which is to close Fort McPherson, move
4 Forces Command Headquarters, 3rd U.S. Army Headquarters, and
5 the U.S. Army Reserve Command to Fort Sam Houston or Fort
6 Hood. Fort Sam Houston is more economical so we will focus
7 on that one.
8 Slide 58 shows the relative location of Fort
9 McPherson and Fort Gillem which are almost one dot on that
10 map, as we found out there, in close proximity. This option
11 looks at, as I said, moving the activities of Fort McPherson
12 to Fort Sam Houston. The option that we will look at Fort
13 Gillem moves 2nd Army Headquarters from Fort Gillem to Fort
14 Stewart, which is also in Georgia.
15 MAJ Gary Evans will discuss both of these
16 recommendation.
17 MAJ EVANS: Mark, next slide, please. Sir, this is
18 the Atlanta area and shows the close proximity of the two
19 bases and the proximity of the international airfield there
20 at Hartsfield. Next slide, Mark.
21 Sir, this is the static installation information.
22 Again, the bottom line is the one-time cost in excess of $290

1 million and the steady state savings of 32.8 million and the
2 break-even year at 21 years, the year 2014. Next slide,
3 Mark.
4 These are the three primary issues we focused on.
5 On the left are the two driving issues that we noticed,
6 operational readiness and the cost. Next slide, please.
7 Under operational readiness, Forces Command has got a
8 worldwide mission going on throughout the world.
9 Their claim is that this mission would be disrupted
10 if a move were put on them at this point in time.
11 Additionally, the Department of the Army has said that Forces
12 Command is a major player in the present force structure
13 downsizing and a turbulence would affect that and their play
14 in that.
15 As far as the community looks at the operational
16 side, and when I speak of the community, I'm also including
17 the Fort McPherson staff structure. They claim that the
18 three major headquarters there, the Forces Command, 3rd Army
19 and U.S. Army Reserve Command should all be collocated.
20 There is a certain synergy involved in that,
21 especially where it works out with force structure and USARC,
22 the U.S. Army Reserve Command, but they do a lot of planning,

1 mobilization and contingency purposes for getting the
2 reserves where they need to be during crisis times.
3 As far as our findings go, there is a case that
4 says Forces Command and the U.S. Army Reserve Command should
5 be collocated just for those mobilization purposes. There is
6 another train of thought that 3rd Army should either be
7 collocated with Forces Command or U.S. Central Command, which
8 is the wartime headquarters, that the 3rd Army would then
9 become the Army component of CENTCOM during the wartime
10 scenario.
11 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: And you are recommending
12 that 3rd Army go to Fort Stewart?
13 MR. BROWN: That was 2nd Army, Commissioner
14 Johnson.
15 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: 2nd Army.
16 MR. BROWN: 2nd Army. It's one of the Continental
17 United States Armies that stationed at Fort Gillem and
18 headquartered at Fort Gillem.
19 MAJ EVANS: Yes, sir, that will be discussed with
20 Gillem. Underneath the cost, like we pointed out earlier,
21 it's got a high one-time cost, a steady state savings that

22 causes a break-even year at year 21. The driving point

1 behind the one-time cost is the replication of the new
2 FORSCOM Headquarters building.
3 As we took a tour of that, and I'm sure you caught
4 on, that's a pretty extensive creation they have there, with
5 a lot of high technology underneath. The impression that I
6 got from it is that Forces Command, with their worldwide
7 operations, they need that kind of communications link, so
8 that it's not unreasonable to think that they would want to
9 replicate that headquarters were they to move to another
10 location.
11 As far as the USARC, where we talked about the
12 collocation requirement, if you were to move the U.S. Army
13 Reserve Command along with them, there would be no
14 requirement for additional funds, since they already have a
15 project going to build their headquarters at Fort McPherson,
16 anyway. That would just be a transfer in place.
17 One additional funding requirement that was not a
18 part of the COBRA model that's come up is a need for dual
19 operations if they were to switch from Fort McPherson to Fort
20 Sam Houston. If you recall, during the course of their
21 operations, they said they couldn't move their headquarters
22 during the time of crisis.

1 As a soldier, I would tend to disagree with that,
2 since all along, we jump our headquarters, which is the term
3 we use, whether you're a battalion, a brigade or whatever.
4 What I will agree with, though, in their calculations, is it
5 does require dual equipment. You can't just all of a sudden
6 break down a headquarters, cut out all your communications
7 and move.
8 So, when they say they need a dual communications
9 to set up, they are going to need them both in operation for
10 a short time period and, unfortunately, most of that is sunk
11 cost because they've got to buy or lease the equipment for
12 the duration of the move. Being as that is a lot of
13 communication equipment, over $100 million, it may sound high
14 but for the extent of which they communicate and their
15 computer linkage, that may not be so out of sight.
16 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Isn't it true that 3rd Army
17 has a forward headquarters capability to begin with? Forces
18 Command does not, but they have the capability to operate out
19 of two locations now.
20 MAJ EVANS: Yes, sir.
21 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: In fact, they demonstrated
22 that during the Persian Gulf War, didn't they, so that it's

1 really not a big deal?
2 MAJ EVANS: Except that I'm not sure you'd want to
3 tie that requirement down in a CONUS move if there were the
4 possibility of a scenario going on overseas.
5 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: I understand, but it's
6 certainly not as difficult as you made it sound.
7 MAJ EVANS: I didn't say it was difficult, sir. I
8 just said it might be expensive. Next chart, please.
9 Sir, here is where we've portrayed the scenarios.
10 The scenario on the left is the status quo, keeping Fort
11 McPherson as is. The scenario on the right is closing it,
12 and moving the three headquarters to Fort Sam Houston.
13 COMMISSIONER STUART: Shall we move along and
14 accept the Chairman's suggestion to look at both of these
15 together?
16 MAJ EVANS: Go right into Gillem?
17 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Yes.
18 MAJ EVANS: Okay.
19 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: Gary, if I could just make
20 a comment and invite your comment, I don't think I've ever
21 seen a -- I've ever heard a defense of a location of an

22 installation based so much on its proximity to an

1 international airport. It seems kind of odd. Di m
2 to you?
3 MAJ EVANS: Sir, I put that under one of the
4 issues, the Atlanta location. It wasn't a driving factor.
5 That's why I didn't really brief it.
6 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: It seemed that an awful
7 lot of the testimony we were receiving, both in Atlanta an
8 recently up here from when GEN Sullivan spoke to us,
9 immediately after Secretary Aspin and GEN Powell spoke, he
10 zeroed in on this one and spoke about the proximity to the
11 airport. Why is that such a big deal?
12 MAJ EVANS: Well, an issue can be made, sir, in
13 that with FORSCOM having such a large oversight of the
14 forces, the CONUS forces, and the requirement they have fo
15 going out and visiting bases, that they have a lot of work
16 with the airlines and they gave to get to places.
17 COMMISSIONER COX: International? I'm sorry. It
18 may be just from an airline standpoint. The point is that
19 it's international or the point is that it's a hub?
20 MAJ EVANS: It's a hub is what it is. They don't
21 have to commute. Being that I was in Hampton, you'd have
22 catch the commuter flight to D.C. in order to catch a flig

1 anywhere else in the States.
2 COMMISSIONER COX: So, it's not Atlanta, per se.
3 It would be best if it were close to a hub, basically?
4 MAJ EVANS: right.
5 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Dulles would work just as
6 well, right?
7 COMMISSIONER COX: Dulles or Chicago or Boston or
8 Dallas?
9 COMMISSIONER BYRON: Excuse me. It seems to
10 asked that specific question and the answer that wh
11 I found absolutely ludicrous was that, "If we weren't in
12 Atlanta, no one would come." Now, that is not really the
13 answer.
14 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: They must be on Delta.
15 (Laughter)
16 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: What is that old thing?
17 When you die and go to heaven, you'll change planes in
18 Atlanta.
19 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: I empathize with the
20 requirement but think that it's vastly overblown and
21 exaggerated.
22 MAJ EVANS: As far as the transportation hub, I

1 might tend to agree with you, sir. I guess I would be
2 looking at the communications side, and they look at Atla
3 as being one of the five -- what they call a Class I
4 communication hub.
5 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: That seems to make more
6 sense.
7 MAJ EVANS: That being one of five cities, like I
8 said, there was another chart that went after that issue,
9 like I said, I didn't consider this to be one of the driv
10 factors here. The only other comment I'd make on there
11 that of those five communication hubs, there's not anothe
12 major installation near one of those that would be readi
13 available.
14 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Do you want us to vote on
15 McPherson or go on to Gillem, sir?
16 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Yes, let's go on to Gillem
17 at least get it on the table and then we can di her
18 either together or independently and obviously t
19 independently.
20 MAJ EVANS: Next chart, Mark. Sir, this is the
21 Scenario 2, Scenario 1 obviously being do nothing. Scen

22 2, Fort Gillem would move 2nd Army to Fort Stewart in

1 entirety and then the other elements on Fort Gillem would
2 move to the unknown Base "X" at this point in time.
3 One other added note there is that those elements
4 that actually are a part of Fort McPherson residing on Fort
5 Gillem would return to Fort McPherson. Next chart, please.
6 Now, the static installation information. Again, the one
7 time cost for a move, in excess of $370 million and a steady
8 state savings of only 5.6 million. This puts the break-even
9 year at 2094 plus.
10 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Why is the steady state savings
11 so little?
12 MAJ EVANS: In this scenario, sir, there's no
13 elimination of units. There's no elimination or savings of
14 personnel so, therefore, the personnel, in most cases, is
15 usually your driving savings factor and without that, it just
16 doesn't generate much in the way of savings.
17 CHAIRMAN COURTER: I was at Gillem and I mean, I
18 buy totally, completely, 100 percent, the arguments of the
19 Army with respect to McPherson. I think it's a very modern
20 facility. I think there's added value in the collocation
21 argument. I think it's probably overstated that it has to be
22 near Atlanta.

1 I'm convinced that it would be quite costly to move
2 it because of its communications capabilities, and you really
3 don't want those to go down, so you'd be basically building
4 duplicate communications facilities for FORSCOM. All the
5 while, you're keeping these, and then you take them down when
6 the others are up, which doesn't make a great deal of sense,
7 but Gillem is a different story.
8 Gillem is a bunch of warehouses, basically, and
9 there is some part, some fraction of Gillem, being used for
10 the support of McPherson, and I understand that. I want to
11 get into that. It's also my understanding that I believe
12 about 40 percent of the warehouses at Gillem are being used
13 by the exchanges.
14 MAJ EVANS: That's correct, sir.
15 MR. BROWN: The Army/Air Force Exchange System and
16 the distribution system, distribution center.
17 CHAIRMAN COURTER: The Army/Air Force Exchange and
18 Distribution System. Now, what's the acronym for that?
19 MR. BROWN: AAFES.
20 CHAIRMAN COURTER: AAFES.
21 MAJ BROWN: They've indicated they plan to move out
22 of Gillem, anyway, sir.

1 MR. EVANS: Sir, I don't think officially they've
2 come on line and made that claim. Now, there's a lot of
3 discussion on it and --
4 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: They have told the U.S.
5 Army.
6 MAJ EVANS: Again, sir, when we go to them, they
7 are still looking at the situation and haven't officially
8 come out, so you may know better than I do, then.
9 COMMISSIONER BYRON: Let's look at that scenario
10 under a different category. If AAFES moves out and if you
11 move 2nd Army to Fort Stewart, you are going to cut back
12 substantially on the personnel infrastructure that is
13 necessary because you will not have the warehousing to manage
14 for security.
15 MR. BEHRMANN: Mrs. Byron, we're trying to deal
16 with a couple of other issues. There's remaining warehouses
17 and then there's National Guard and Reserve units there
18 stationed on base.
19 Now, there is a possibility, and we're trying to
20 validate this now, that there may be some excess space at
21 Dobbins, which is sort of around the beltway on the other

22 side of Atlanta. It would probably be within the commute

1 distance for all National Guardsmen and Reservists.
2 We're trying to find out whether there's any excess
3 facilities there that we can avail ourselves of and maybe
4 drive that construction cost to duplicate facilities in
5 another location. We're not there yet. The AAFES thing just
6 kind of reared its head for us and with that 40 percent going
7 away, we're trying to find a way now to deal with the other
8 60 percent.
9 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: But we don't have to tell
10 the Army where to put every tenant that's on Gillem. We have
11 to say whether we recommend closing or keeping Gillem open,
12 and if we want to direct some, we can, but we don't have to.
13 Is that not true?
14 MAJ EVANS: Sir, that's true but I think what
15 Mr. Behrmann, the point he's trying to make is if we were
16 able to find space where there were existing facilities, we
17 would avoid the new construction costs, and right now, that's
18 what's driving the train.
19 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: But we also take away the
20 decision making from the Army if we tell the Army to put in
21 existing facilities. We can certainly direct that.
22 MR. BEHRMANN: You are dealing with a lot less to

1 bed down now, and the 40 percent definitely makes things
2 attractive.
3 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: AAFES?
4 MR. BEHRMANN: Yes, sir.
5 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: Is that in concrete yet? Is
6 that formally proposed?
7 MR. BEHRMANN: My understanding is that they plan
8 in the '96 timeframe to vacate their present home.
9 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: And I don't doubt that, but
10 is it formally written down such that we can base a decision
11 on it? Is it concrete?
12 MAJ EVANS: Sir, all our inquiries that we've gone
13 through, the TABS, the Total Army Basing Study, and Fort
14 McPherson, to try to talk to the AAFES people, is that they
15 have not made a decision at this point.
16 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Have you called the
17 Commander of AAFES?
18 MR. BEHRMANN: Yes, we have, and we've gotten
19 directly from them that that's their plan. Now, there may be
20 a little bit of shenanigans going on here.
21 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Who else is there to talk
22 to?

1 MR. BEHRMANN: Excuse me?
2 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: If you've talked to them and
3 they plan to withdraw from there, who else is there to talk
4 to?
5 MR. BEHRMANN: Well, I'm not so sure that they want
6 to put it in writing yet because --
7 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: That's my point.
8 MR. BEHRMANN: -- if we mandate the closure, then
9 it's a question of who can pay for their movements.
10 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: But we can very simply
11 transfer those warehouses to GSA as long as AAFES needs them,
12 and then they've got until '96 to move out.
13 MR. BEHRMANN: I'm not positive we can legally do
14 that. I can look into that. We could call GSA and find out,
15 you know, how we would effectuate that transfer. I'm not so
16 sure whether we can do it or not, but we'll look into it.
17 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: You can transfer them to
18 AAFES, can you now?
19 MS. CHESTON: Commissioner Johnson, I think without
20 confirming who owns the property and looking into some GSA
21 regulations, I'm not sure that we can sit here today and say

22 that that transfer can be made.

1 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: I'm prepared to make a
2 recommendation, a motion to close Gillem, and if we can
3 provide some details about where it ought to go, that's fine,
4 but we don't have to. The Army can do that. They can decide
5 where to send it. We don't have to tell them to send it
6 across town or to Fort McClellan or wherever.
7 MS. CHESTON: That's right.
8 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: And I agree with that. I
9 just think we need to have a firm basis on which to make that
10 recommendation, which I'm sure you do.
11 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Are we going to have any firmer
12 handle with respect to AAFES tomorrow than we do today?
13 MR. BEHRMANN: I'm not sure whether or not the
14 passage of 24 hours, given why we're deferring, whether
15 they're going to put that onto paper, Mr. Chairman. I don't
16 know that.
17 CHAIRMAN COURTER: See, I'm convinced -- I just
18 have a feeling that based on what I've heard that AAFES is,
19 in fact, going to do that which they say, that if this was
20 going to be closed, they could -- the Army could dispose of
21 those facilities. GSA would take them over. There's
22 probably -- it may be difficult. There's probably something

1 that could be done to McPherson, such that it's totally
2 supported by McPherson rather than Gillem, and you can close
3 something.
4 My problem is the fact that all the written
5 information I have in front of me, and I don't -- I mean,
6 just like Fort McClellan and the permitting problem at Fort
7 Leonard Wood, I don't want to vote on things that I know
8 might be able to be achieved, but that which is achieved or
9 is in writing and in hand, and all the evidence that's in
10 writing is that it's going to cost $100 million or more, $370
11 million, and there's not going to be a pay-back for 100
12 years.
13 MAJ EVANS: If I could add one comment to that,
14 too, sir, the cost to move AAFES, were the Army to pick up
15 the bill, would be $192 million. Now, were AAFES to come on
16 line prior to your vote and say, "We're moving and here are
17 the papers" --
18 CHAIRMAN COURTER: AAFES would pay for it.
19 MAJ EVANS: -- AAFES would pay that. Now, we ran a
20 COBRA model taking that 192-plus out of the one-time costs.
21 We still run into a break-even year about -- 52 years was
22 where it was.

1 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: That's as good as it gets,
2 right?
3 MAJ EVANS: Well, again, that's why we started
4 trying to look at the Dobbins availability, and my first
5 inquiries on Dobbins, it doesn't appear that that has
6 capacity but we're still looking into it, so even by taking
7 that AAFES cost out, that alone isn't going to be the saving
8 grace here. We've still got to find some more cost savings
9 in order to make this pay off.
10 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: Gary, what are the MILCON
11 projects on McPherson if you close Gillem? On page 70, your
12 statement is at the bottom right, "Closing Fort Gillem would
13 cause costly MILCON projects on Fort McPherson." What are
14 those?
15 MAJ EVANS: On Fort McPherson, we've got storage
16 buildings going in, general purpose admin, child support
17 center, an additional main exchange since the main exchange
18 that services that area was on Gillem.
19 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: What's the general
20 estimate of the cost of all of this?
21 MAJ EVANS: About 16 million is all for that one.

22 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: For all of the projects on

1 McPherson?
2 MAJ EVANS: For those projects at McPherson only,
3 were Gillem to close.
4 COMMISSIONER STUART: You're talking about
5 McPherson, not Gillem?
6 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: Yes.
7 MAJ EVANS: We're talking of closing Gillem and
8 building added military construction on McPherson.
9 COMMISSIONER BYRON: Gary, how many operations that
10 are McPherson operations are housed at Gillem?
11 MAJ EVANS: The Director of Logistics, the Director
12 of Engineering and Housing, that is with the McPherson
13 installation is actually housed on Gillem. You also have
14 overflow from Headquarters, 3rd Army, that works out of Fort
15 Gillem.
16 COMMISSIONER BYRON: Because I think one of the
17 points that they were making at McPherson was that because of
18 the new nature of their mission, they had to use Fort Gillem
19 to house and to take care of some of their excess capacity
20 because there was no longer available space at Fort
21 McPherson.
22 MAJ EVANS: That's true. That's what they were

1 doing over there. Now --
2 COMMISSIONER BYRON: Is there room to bring them
3 back if it's closed?
4 MAJ EVANS: I gave Mr. Stuart a paper one day and I
5 kind of light-heartedly said, "Turning the 18-hole golf
6 course into a 9-holer," and believe it or not, that would be
7 a piece of reality if you needed to find buildable acres, you
8 know, as much as I hate to say that. I like to go [illegible] elf
9 COMMISSIONER BYRON: I was looking at the
10 difference in acreage, too, and it's substantial.
11 MAJ EVANS: One other thing to keep in mind is that
12 you'd also mentioned others. USARC, the U.S. Army Reserve
13 Command, they are in leased space waiting for that new
14 project to go on at McPherson, so that building is going to
15 be taking place.
16 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: Go back for a minute to
17 the exchange, AAFES.
18 MAJ EVANS: Yes, sir.
19 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: The decision about what to
20 do about that is likely to be made in '96. Did I hear you
21 say that to someone?
22 MAJ EVANS: The decision, we were told, was

1 probably due out a month or so ago, and basically the
2 official word is that it's still under advisement. It's
3 still under --
4 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: And the movement is
5 supposed to be made in '96, if it were to move?
6 MAJ EVANS: That's the word we're getting, yes,
7 sir.
8 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: So that if the Commission
9 in '95 -- by that time, I assume somebody would have made a
10 decision. It wouldn't be too far behind the curve if the
11 Commission in '95 made the decision --
12 MAJ EVANS: No.
13 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: -- that we are being asked
14 to make now by Commissioner Johnson.
15 MAJ EVANS: The '95 Commission should easily be
16 able to have that information.
17 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Is not the decision im[illegible]
18 and the Army doesn't want it to be part of BRAC b[illegible] if
19 it's part of BRAC, they pay for the move. If AAFES does
20 not part of BRAC, they pay for it? Aren't we quibbling ov
21 who pays?

22 MAJ EVANS: Yes, sir.

COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: And it's imminent as opposed to two years from now?
MAJ EVANS: Absolutely, sir. Were I in the Army Budget Office, I wouldn't want to pay $192 million out of my pocket if I could avoid it.
COMMISSIONER STUART: We've been worried about "iffy" situations. We don't really have these facts yet, and I don't think we're in a position to go ahead and say this is a substantial deviation which requires us to close Gillem.
COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: If we don't do that, sir, we'll never close a base like Gillem or any other.
COMMISSIONER STUART: I felt that way about Fort McClellan. I'm concerned about this, that we don't have enough information yet.
COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: We never will have.
CHAIRMAN COURTER: Any further discussion before we entertain a motion on either Gillem or McPherson? I'll entertain a motion on either facility.

MOTION

COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: I'd like to make a motion on Gillem. I move the Commission find the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from the force structure and final

criteria in not recommending the closure of Fort Gillem. Therefore, the Commission recommends the closure of Fort Gillem and the movement of the Director of Engineering and Housing and all 3rd Army tenants to Fort McPherson, the 2nd Army to Fort Stewart.
The Commission further recommends the Army directly or through GSA make warehouse buildings at Fort Gillem available to the Army Air Force Exchange Service for as long as they need them.
The Commission finds the recommendation is consistent with the force structure plan and final criteria.
CHAIRMAN COURTER: Is there a second to the motion?
(No response.)
CHAIRMAN COURTER: Is there a second to the motion?
(No response.)
CHAIRMAN COURTER: The motion fails without a second. Is there a motion on McPherson?
(No response.)
CHAIRMAN COURTER: There is no motion on McPherson. The recommendation of the Department of Defense obviously stand.
Fort Monroe.

MR. BROWN: Mr. Chairman, at Tab 11, we have the next installation to be discussed, Fort Monroe, Virginia. Fort Monroe was added for further consideration on May 21st. Slide 21 pictorially shows the option under consideration.
It is the closure of Fort Monroe, the relocation of Training and Doctrine Command and the Reserve Officer Training Corps Cadet Command to Fort Eustis and moving the Naval Surface Warfare Detachment to Base "X." Slide 72 shows the relative location of Fort Monroe and Fort Eustis.
Mr. Bud Bale will discuss this recommendation.
MR. BALE: Next slide, please. This slide shows the static information concerning Fort Monroe. I draw your attention to the bottom line on the one-time costs. The number you see to the left without the parentheses around it is the original numbers provided to us.
The number surrounded by the parentheses is the most recent data that was provided by the Department of the Army. We received this Saturday and we really haven't had a lot of time to do a detailed analysis of the information.
COMMISSIONER STUART: Which is your number, Bud?
MR. BALE: Sir, the first number on the left is the

22 one we've had a chance to look at. The number on the right

was the latest data, based on a regional hearing and new information provided by the Army.
The basic difference from the initial evaluation of this, though, is that this is due to a greater one-time cost, primarily in construction and the furnishing of a new facility at Fort Eustis. The original version we had called for the Cadet Command moving to Fort Knox, so now they're housing more people.
Next slide, please. There is a wide variety of issues that we can discuss on here. I'm prepared to discuss the ones on the left and the ones on the right, unless you would like further discussion on those, I'll bypass.
CHAIRMAN COURTER: Are you on Slide 74?
MR. BALE: Yes, sir.
CHAIRMAN COURTER: Why don't you discuss those?
MR. BALE: All of them? Yes, sir. Okay. The next slide, please, on 75, goes down into the issues in a little bit more detail here. The Army points out that a move at this time would cause a disruption of the Training and Doctrine Command located at Fort Monroe and the valuable work that they are doing as the Office of Change for the Department of the Army.

The community strongly supports keeping the Training and Doctrine Command at Fort Monroe. When we looked at the options, we found that Fort Eustis is only 20 miles away. When we look at today's environment in the world, vastly changing, the trend is to downsize the military.
The civilian leadership is going to make some strong decisions on this, and we don't know when this change or these decisions are going to end, so there is always going to be turmoil in the foreseeable future in that. We feel that a well-developed plan could mitigate any problems that Training and Doctrine Command would have if the decision by the Commission is to move them to Fort Eustis.
The economics of the move, the next issue in this, is the Army feels that there will be a high cost concerned with clean-up. I'm going to talk about the environmental clean-up a little bit later on this and get into a little bit more detail.
The community also reiterates that Fort Monroe is a little bit unique in that it will revert back to the State of Virginia when the U.S. Government no longer has need for it as a defense usage, but the economics of the move, though, is that Fort Monroe is kind of a single-purpose installation.

We would not be able to take advantage of moving it to excess space at a multi-purpose installation.
The economic impact in the area we feel would be minimal because a move 20 miles down the road, most of the people are going to remain with the command, and they will be in the same Tidewater area. However, the local community adjacent to Fort Monroe would probably have a higher economic impact than the Tidewater area itself.
The environmental issue is one you all are well aware of from the regional hearings on that. The Army policy is that, really, there is no environmental problem at Fort Monroe as long as the Army stays there. They consider that unexploded ordinance is not an environmental problem unless there is some sort of a seepage. A recent study in 1990 by a contractor found that there is no environmental problem at Fort Monroe.
The community stresses the point, though, that the clean-up of any unexploded ordinance is an environmental issue to them and they would expect it hazard-free when they get it back. The environmental problems must be cleaned up,

21 no matter what the situation is. The military has to do
22 something about that.

1 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: What are they doing now,
2 Bud?
3 MR. BALE: As far as cleaning up the unexploded
4 ordinance, sir, nothing that I've been able to find out.
5 COMMISSIONER BYRON: Bud, let me touch that,
6 because you were with me when I did the base visit at Fort
7 Monroe and subsequently to some fairly stringent discussion
8 with the community and the base personnel, I have received
9 three phone calls, one from GEN Sullivan, who wanted to hear
10 my words and my concerns, and I said they were very strong.
11 I have been assured that the Army is going to put in place a
12 program to look at that facility and to begin cleaning up.
13 One of the key components that I found in the
14 ordinance, much of it is almost Civil War ordinance. There
15 is a four-foot water table and to do clean-up in that area,
16 you would have to do -- since it is on the Historic Register,
17 you would have to go down six to eight feet to find much of
18 that ordinance and you would have to do shoring to be able to
19 get into that component.
20 Now, there has been some ordinance that has been
21 found when they have been doing modifications, sewer lines,
22 housing project. I do not think, and I can't state this

1 emphatically, but I do not think it's the case where children
2 will be playing in a backyard sand pile and they will uncover
3 ordinance. I may be wrong on that, but I can assure you that
4 the Army has told me that they are going to update the study
5 that was done in -- was it 1980?
6 MR. BALE: 1990.
7 COMMISSIONER BYRON: Wasn't there a 1980 study,
8 also?
9 MR. BALE: Yes, ma'am.
10 COMMISSIONER BYRON: The 1980 study was much more
11 in-depth than the 1990 study, I believe.
12 MR. BALE: Yes, ma'am.
13 COMMISSIONER BYRON: I also looked at it from the
14 military value and the fact that TRADOC, which is the main
15 component on that base has been joined by the Air Force and
16 the Navy in that same area with their TRADOC command, so
17 there is an interaction between the three training commands
18 of the three branches of service.
19 CHAIRMAN COURTER: We have had discussion at
20 various times with regard to the costs of the environmental
21 clean-up and, I would imagine, unexploded ordinance does fall
22 into that category, and I believe it's the position of each

1 individual Commissioner -- it is my position; maybe it's not
2 everybody's -- that this, you know, attending to the
3 environmental concerns, the environmental needs of a
4 facility, is something that should be done irrespective of
5 what the decision is on whether the base stays open or
6 whether it closes.
7 COMMISSIONER BYRON: I agree with you.
8 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Fort Monroe tries to distinguish
9 it, I think, on two grounds, number one, saying this isn't
10 the normal environmental problems. You know, this is
11 unexploded ordinance. I don't know what the
12 distinction -- that's a distinction without a difference.
13 Two, they are saying there is a distinction here
14 and a difference because there is a reverter clause in the
15 land transfer that took place many, many years ago, such that
16 when it's closed and no longer being utilized for military
17 purposes or for the Army, it reverts automatically to the
18 Commonwealth of Virginia, and the Commonwealth of Virginia is
19 not going to accept it until it's brought up to the standards
20 that they impose elsewhere.

21 I remember I was not at all impressed with the
22 testimony of the gentleman from the environmental community

1 not environmental community, but from the State of V[illegible]nia
2 He was the Attorney General spokesperson or something.
3 COMMISSIONER BYRON: Assistant Attorney General.
4 CHAIRMAN COURTER: The Assistant Attorney General,
5 you know, and he was trying to say that, "If we get this lan
6 back, the Commonwealth has an interest in the health and
7 safety of its citizens and, therefore, we're going to deman
8 that the unexploded ordinance be cleaned up and attended to
9 before we accept it back," as if the Commonwealth of Virgin
10 does not have an interest in other citizens of the
11 Commonwealth, who are now living and working on the facility
12 that just happen to be wearing a uniform.
13 He could not assure me or this Commission that the
14 Commonwealth is not going to take the position that we want
15 that unexploded ordinance cleaned up, even though the Army
16 keeps it; that's my position.
17 My question to him was: How do we know the
18 Commonwealth, who has a legitimate concern about the health
19 and safety of its citizens, is not going to come back six
20 months from now and demand that this ordinance be cleaned up
21 even though the base is not closed and he couldn't. I'm no
22 sure whether he understood the point I was driving at.

1 It's a single-use base. It seems to me that
2 whatever dislocation would occur, should be able to be
3 handled. It's not that it's being moved a thousand miles
4 away. Was it 25 miles to Fort Eustis?
5 MR. BROWN: Yes, sir, twenty.
6 CHAIRMAN COURTER: It seems to me in the very
7 beginning that we were given, either informally or [illegible]
8 some words by the Army to the effect that they wa[illegible]
9 close it but felt they couldn't because of the cos[illegible] the
10 unexploded ordinance. Now, is that an informal, off the
11 record statement of someone in the Army or is that the
12 position of the Army?
13 MR. BROWN: It was briefed, Mr. Chairman, during
14 the Army's deliberation process for the selection of its
15 installations. At that time, the Army leadership took it o
16 the list for operational considerations, turbulence and th
17 expected environmental clean-up costs.
18 MR. BEHRMANN: GEN Ballard, who has been before us
19 twice, stated in his first appearance that really a drivin
20 decision not to close Monroe was because of the environment
21 problem.
22 CHAIRMAN COURTER: See, that, for this

1 Commissioner, is not a good enough reason. I mean, it see
2 to me that the men and women that work on these facilities
3 uniform or as civilians for the Department of Defense and f
4 the Army, deserve as much attention when it comes to the
5 environmental as anybody else.
6 Also, I mean, we've been dealing with the services
7 for a period of time now and all of them will say that tha
8 which they should do when it comes to the environment, the
9 know they have an obligation to do and they're going to do
10 when they get the money to do it.
11 COMMISSIONER STUART: Could I ask a supplementary
12 question?
13 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Yes.
14 COMMISSIONER STUART: Let's look ahead five or 10
15 years. Is this single-purpose TRADOC operation go[illegible] to
16 continue at the present headquarters? Won't they [illegible] bi
17 in the future, because as we try to get greater ef[illegible]cie
18 long run, and Fort Eustis is right across the way, why
19 couldn't that be done now?
20 MR. BROWN: There's no reason, Commissioner Stuart,

21 other than what might be the potential cost, and we're not
22 sure. We have two --

1 COMMISSIONER STUART: But if you're looking ahead
2 10 years, do you think they probably will be -- TRADOC will
3 be --
4 MR. BROWN: TRADOC will still be in existence. I'm
5 not sure where TRADOC will be located.
6 COMMISSIONER COX: But we don't expect the function
7 to disappear.
8 MR. BROWN: I do not expect the function to
9 disappear. It is the trainer of the Army.
10 MR. BEHRMANN: I really have got to say I think it
11 would be a mistake to move it away from that region. I think
12 you're looking at something here that's kind of unique.
13 There is a synergy of having all the training commands right
14 there, collocated. I think that makes some sense. You know,
15 the Air Force is right across the water and the Navy is
16 across the water.
17 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Historically, the Army was
18 the first to recognize the need to have a command that
19 developed doctrine and training. The Air Force used what was
20 then called the Tactical Air Command and worked out a
21 relationship, informal one, with TRADOC. They have now, as I
22 understand it, a formal group that works with them.

1 The Navy has established one in Norfolk, so you
2 have Hampton -- both of them in Hampton, Langley and Monroe,
3 and then Norfolk across. The Marines are nearby just south
4 of town in Quantico, so our own forces have brought together
5 all four services in the doctrine business.
6 Quite frankly, Monroe or TRADOC was the first and
7 it's still probably the leader in that area. I recommend we
8 leave it at Monroe as it is. In the future, I believe that
9 will be one of the last commands to be combined in the Army
10 because of their great feeling of the importance of training
11 and doctrine.
12 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: What is at Eustis right
13 now?
14 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: The training command and the
15 training school but, really, they don't have the facilities
16 to handle a command as large as TRADOC.
17 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: Eustis does not today?
18 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: No.
19 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: Is that the reason for the
20 $128 million?
21 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Yes, sir. Most of it is in
22 building a new facility for the TRADOC Headquarters and the

1 Cadet Command and the other people who are part of TRADOC.
2 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: Is there any kind of
3 synergy between that transportation school and TRADOC?
4 COMMISSIONER BYRON: None.
5 MR. BROWN: The transportation school is a
6 subordinate element of Training and Doctrine Command, two
7 echelons below the Headquarters.
8 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: And it's a school, whereas,
9 TRADOC is the element.
10 COMMISSIONER BYRON: A think tank.
11 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: A think tank, a Commissioner
12 Byron says.
13 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: It seems to me that while
14 I can see this need or wish to get rid of the single purpose
15 installations, that you don't really get anything. You don't
16 get any synergy from the combination. You spend $130 million
17 and it takes you at least 15 years to get it back, to get
18 square, and you have an uncertain and possibly very large
19 environmental clean-up cost, so I don't think it's a great
20 idea.

21 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: I think that, much as I am
22 very much for consolidation and synergism in relatively small

1 facilities and I also believe that we should clean up
2 problems if they exist, I think the counter to that is that
3 my understanding is that environmental clean-up, which would
4 be significant here, would, in the long term, come out of
5 Army operating funds. That's my understanding.
6 And, secondly, the State of Virginia, in this case,
7 should be the adjudicating authority as to whether it needs
8 immediate remediation or could be delayed, and I understand
9 that I think it's called a Class III, that they believe that
10 it doesn't need immediate remediation.
11 So, therefore, even though I am tempted to say,
12 "Yeah, let's consolidate and let's clean up," I don't think
13 it would be in the best interests.
14 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Is there a motion on --
15 MR. BORDEN: I have one more comment. I think
16 maybe the synergy question hasn't totally been answered from
17 an infrastructure standpoint because there is some synergy
18 from having duplicate support type facilities, and that's
19 what you gain by moving to Fort Eustis.
20 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Is there a motion on Fort
21 Monroe?
22 (No response.)

1 CHAIRMAN COURTER: There is no motion on Fort
2 Monroe. The recommendations of the Army to keep it open
3 remain. The Commission will take a 10-minute recess.
4 (A short recess was taken.)
5 CHAIRMAN COURTER: The Commission will return to
6 order and will commence business, and we'll proceed. Mr.
7 Brown, if you would start with the Commodity-Oriented
8 Installations.
9 MR. BROWN: Mr. Chairman, at Tab 12, we have the
10 next category that will be discussed, commodity oriented,
11 with the map, Slide 79, and the accompanying chart, Slide 80,
12 shows the names and locations of the Army's 12 commodity
13 oriented installations.
14 At Tab 13, we have the next installation to be
15 discussed, Vint Hill Farms, Virginia. Slide 81 pictorially
16 shows the DOD recommendation to close Vint Hill Farms,
17 relocate the maintenance and repair function of the
18 Intelligence Material Management Center to Tobyhanna Depot,
19 Pennsylvania, to transfer the remaining elements of the
20 Intelligence Material Management Center, the Program
21 Executive Officer for Intelligence and Electronics Warfare,
22 and the Electronics Warfare Directorate to Fort Monmouth.

1 The map at Chart 82, Slide 82, shows the relative
2 locations of Vint Hill Farms, Fort Monmouth and Tobyhanna
3 Army Depot. Mr. John Graham will discuss this installation.
4 MR. GRAHAM: This chart shows the static data about
5 Vint Hill Farms. I'd like to draw your attention to the
6 bottom with the one-time cost of 72.4, steady state savings
7 to 19.1 and a break-even year of 2,001, eight years into the
8 process. Next chart.
9 These are the issues that we reviewed. The ones on
10 the left are the issues that I'm going to speak to during
11 this briefing. The ones on the right I am prepared to
12 discuss if you have questions.
13 CHAIRMAN COURTER: The ones on the left or the
14 right?
15 MR. GRAHAM: The left in bold, sir. The left I
16 will talk to. The right I am prepared to talk to. Next
17 slide.
18 The first issue I'd like to talk about is unique
19 workforce. The work that is done at Vint Hill Farms for the
20 Intelligence and Electronics Warfare efforts of the Army and

21 other agencies is totally dependent upon the qualified and
22 highly skilled workforce.

1 These people are trained. The majority of them
2 have security clearances, most at the Top Secret level and a
3 lot of them, about 77 percent, have more than 10 years
4 experience working on these types of systems. The DOD
5 position is that for any of the folks who elect not to move,
6 when we do the realignment to Fort Monmouth and Tobyhanna,
7 that qualified replacements are available and could be hired
8 to replace them.
9 The community's position is that up to 80 percent
10 of the workforce will not move if Vint Hill Farms closes and
11 the activities are realigned at Tobyhanna or Fort Monmouth.
12 We found that the Army estimate of somewhere in the
13 neighborhood of 25 percent was probably low, people who would
14 not be willing to move.
15 It's probably closer, based on the military's
16 experience with moving like organizations that are heavily
17 civilianized, that it will be closer to the 80 percent who
18 will not move and will have to be replaced.
19 We also looked at the fact that it's a six-year
20 process. As you begin to phase things over, it's not like
21 we're going to say, "Next month, everybody has got to move."
22 With proper phasing, for those who elect not to move, you can

1 hire replacements and train them.
2 The next two issues are very closely interrelated
3 and I'll talk in generalities as we go through them. The
4 activities at Vint Hill Farms perform a variety of classified
5 work, both for Army, Department of Defense and non-Department
6 of Defense agencies. The Department's position is that the
7 move of the activities from Vint Hill to Fort Monmouth or
8 Tobyhanna will have minimal impact on their ability to supply
9 the support to these organizations.
10 The community presented the case that there needs
11 to be the capability within close proximity to the National
12 Capital Region, which is where most of these intelligence
13 agencies are located. They interact with them on a frequent
14 basis. They do work for them and by moving them further
15 away, there is the potential for serious harm to the national
16 security just because this interaction is not there to
17 happen.
18 As far as the coordination that the Army did with
19 both Army and Department of Defense agencies, the Army did
20 coordinate internally with the Assistant Chief of Staff for
21 Intelligence and with the Intelligence and Security Command,
22 which is the Army's major command for intelligence, and "no

1 OSD comment" on my slide means that when this action was
2 coordinated through the Department of Defense, nobody raised
3 a specific objection to the realignment.
4 As far as the non-DOD agencies, the Army did not
5 coordinate with anybody; however, the Commission did send out
6 letters to all of the affected customers, and they all came
7 back and said there would be little or no impact if the
8 activities --
9 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Are there any issues on this
10 closure from any of the Commissioners?
11 CHAIRMAN COURTER: I have no particular concerns.
12 The one thing I wanted to mention, and that is, that the
13 community through their elected representatives, talked much
14 in the office about the degradation in capabilities and
15 dislocation that would occur in some special access programs
16 that are taking place at Vint Hill Farms.
17 The Commission did meet with the appropriate people
18 in the intelligence community and were briefed on a highly
19 classified level at the Pentagon. I believe a couple staff
20 were and most Commissioners, and it was my view that although
21 that was very helpful for us, it was not something that th
22 community, the intelligence community, felt that they

1 couldn't handle. That was the sum and total of it
2 I can't go into exactly what was said, obviously,
3 but my clear and very clear recollection of that briefing
4 and we went through four programs -- that there was plans f
5 each one of them and it was the opinion of the community,
6 that is, the intelligence community, that they could handl
7 this.
8 They were -- as a matter of fact, we asked the
9 question whether they, in this particular instance and
10 generally in other instances, whether the intelligence
11 community and the special access community were brought
12 within the base closing process at some stage.
13 The answer to that question, and it was answered to
14 our satisfaction that not only in the case of Vint Hill Far
15 but in other cases, as well, that the special access
16 intelligence communities were brought into the process at t
17 appropriate level and that their concerns were taken under
18 consideration and were included in the recommendations of t
19 Secretary of Defense.
20 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: One thing, John, I'd like
21 to ask you to comment on. On No. 86, in the category of
22 synergy, the research and analyst staff finds that there w

1 be greater efficiencies from collocating Vint Hill Farms a
2 Fort Monmouth and Tobyhanna, and then it says "may not be
3 great as stated by the Army if CECOM Headquarters moves."
4 That means moves out of Fort Monmouth and goes to Rock
5 Island.
6 So, what is being proposed here, and we'll take up
7 Fort Monmouth, I know, next, but what's being proposed is
8 move this very sophisticated entity, which is a ing
9 agency of the CECOM up to the CECOM and at the v me
10 time, it's being proposed to move much of the leadership
11 CECOM out to Illinois. Is that correct?
12 MR. GRAHAM: Yes, sir. What that comment means is
13 that some of the efficiencies they are going to gain is
14 through -- by collocating, they'll do away with overhead
15 duplication and personnel authorizations.
16 There is the potential that the savings that the
17 Army has stated for this move, especially in the field of
18 logistics management, may not be as great as what the Arm
19 anticipating if you take the logistics part of CECOM
20 Headquarters and move it away. It's a few people, but I
21 thought I had to bring it out.
22 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: John, is there any lack of

1 synergy or the opposite of it -- I'm looking for the rig
2 word there -- or disefficiencies, I guess you could say,
3 the breaking apart of the repair and maintenance functio
4 from the R&D function?
5 MR. GRAHAM: In my opinion, no, sir, because what
6 we're doing is we're sending the repair and maintenance
7 function to Tobyhanna which is the Army Center for
8 Communications Electronics Repair.
9 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: Yes, but it seems to me you
10 might be separating the engineers from the repair people
11 MR. GRAHAM: That's essentially what you're doing,
12 is the folks who are doing the research, development an
13 engineering, and some limited production, from the guys
14 are doing the repair.
15 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: But you and the Army think
16 that's not significant?
17 MR. GRAHAM: No, sir.
18 MR. BEHRMANN: Mr. Bowman, I might disagree
19 that a little bit. I think there could be a little
20 degradation there.

21 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: I would think there would be
22 some.

1 MR. BEHRMANN: There probably will be some. One of
2 the things about Vint Hill is it works on very low density
3 quick turn equipment. They've got to support, you know,
4 rapid deployment, rapid repair. If something goes down, if
5 there's a new problem, they've got to be able to turn that
6 equipment fairly quickly due to who they service.
7 If you throw that into a larger depot away from
8 some of the folks that sort of maybe know what state-of-the
9 art -- what you can buy out there, it may degrade it a little
10 bit but, you know, there's trade-offs in this business. I
11 just want to make sure I put it in that context for you.
12 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: Right, I appreciate that.
13 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Any further discussion among the
14 Commissioners on Vint Hill Farms?
15 (No response.)
16 CHAIRMAN COURTER: The Chair will recognize a
17 Commissioner for the purposes of making a motion.
18 MOTION
19 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: Mr. Chairman, I move that
20 the Commission find that the Secretary of Defense did not
21 deviate substantially from the force structure plan and final
22 criteria; therefore, that the Commission adopt the following

1 recommendation of the Secretary of Defense:
2 Close Vint Hill Farms. Relocate the maintenance
3 and repair function of the Intelligence Material Management
4 Center to Tobyhanna Army Depot, Pennsylvania, transfer the
5 remaining elements of the Intelligence and Electronic Warfare
6 Directorate and the Program Executive Officer for
Intelligence and Electronic Warfare to Fort Monmouth, New
Jersey.
COMMISSIONER STUART: I'll second.
10 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Mr. Stuart seconds the motion.
11 Any discussion on the motion?
12 (No response.)
13 CHAIRMAN COURTER: We'll start by the gentleman to
14 my left, Mr. Stuart.
15 COMMISSIONER STUART: Aye.
16 MS. CHESTON: Commissioner Stuart votes "aye."
17 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner Byron?
18 COMMISSIONER BYRON: Aye.
19 MS. CHESTON: Commissioner Byron votes "aye."
20 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner Johnson?
21 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Aye.
22 MS. CHESTON: Commissioner Johnson vote "aye."

1 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner Bowman?
2 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: Aye.
3 MS. CHESTON: Commissioner Bowman votes "aye."
4 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner Cox.
5 COMMISSIONER COX: Aye.
6 MS. CHESTON: Commissioner Cox votes "aye."
7 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner McPherson?
8 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: Aye.
9 MS. CHESTON: Commissioner McPherson votes "aye."
10 CHAIRMAN COURTER: And the Chair votes aye.
11 MS. CHESTON: And the Chair votes "aye." On the
12 motion to accept the Secretary of Defense's recommendation to
13 close Vint Hill Farms, the vote is seven in favor, zero
14 opposed. The motion passes.
CHAIRMAN COURTER: Let's move on to Fort Monmouth.
MR. GRAHAM: Mr. Chairman, at Tab 14, we have the
next installation, Fort Monmouth, New Jersey. Slide 90
18 pictorially shows the DOD recommendation which is to move
19 Communications Electronics Command Headquarters from a leased
20 facility off or outside Fort Monmouth to Rock Island Arsenal

21 and to move the Chaplain School from Fort Monmouth to Fort
22 Jackson, South Carolina.

1 The map at Chart 91 shows the relative locations of
2 Fort Monmouth, Rock Island Arsenal and Fort Jackson. Mr. Bud
3 Bale will discuss this installation.
4 MR. BALE: The static data for Fort Monmouth is
5 shown in this chart. We have a one-time cost of $99.9
6 million for the move and will show a steady state savings of
7 21.9 million moving to the Rock Island. Next chart, please.
8 The issues on the left in bold I am prepared to
9 discuss and the ones on the right at your leisure or request.
10 Next page, please. The community brought up some points
11 that were hard to discuss, in that they think that the high
12 tech skills that are associated with the Communications
13 Electronics Command will be hard to duplicate or replicate
14 out at the Rock Island Arsenal.
15 The DOD position is that there are skills found in
16 the area and institutions, the same. Our findings are that
17 we found that there are available in the Rock Island
18 community institutions that can support the training of the
19 CECOM skills that we found, the high tech skills.
20 Part of it, too, goes with if Communications
21 Electronics Command is chosen to move by the Commission, then
22 the community thinks that a large number of the people will

1 not actually go out to Rock Island, that they will choose to
2 stay in the area.
3 The COBRA model that provides this uses a six
4 percent figure of the civilian force that will not move. We
5 probably agree with the civilian community that it will
6 probably be higher than the six percent but the true nature
7 we will not know until the move actually progresses.
8 The proposal is to move into excess space found at
9 Rock Island Arsenal. The community came up with a counter
10 proposal that they move out of leased space outside of Fort
11 Monmouth and to move onto space vacated at Fort Monmouth by
12 the 513th Military Intelligence Brigade and the Chaplain's
13 School. We found that both the proposals would meet the
14 Commission's requirements and are valid proposals.
15 CHAIRMAN COURTER: So, basically, the premise of
16 getting out of leased facilities, if it's meritorious, is
17 satisfied by keeping the functions at Fort Monmouth in
18 vacated DOD-owned facilities.
19 MR. BALE: Yes, Mr. Chairman.
20 COMMISSIONER BYRON: Will there be a cost involved
21 in upgrading those facilities that would be substantial?
22 MR. BALE: There will be a cost. It will not be

1 substantial. The facilities on Fort Monmouth were renovated
2 a little while back. They were a different kind of
3 headquarters so there will be some modification that has to
4 be done. It will be relatively inexpensive compared with the
5 construction that would have to go on at Rock Island.
6 COMMISSIONER BYRON: So, basically, the bottom line
7 is it would be more economically feasible to relocate inside
8 Fort Monmouth as opposed to moving to --
9 MR. BALE: Not exactly, Mrs. Byron. The operating
10 cost at Rock Island, Illinois, on an annual basis, it's a
11 less costly area to operate for your day-to-day operations
12 than the Fort Monmouth area.
13 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: And why is that?
14 MR. BALE: There's two things. It's just the cost
15 of living out there and then there is a factor I was going to
16 cover a little bit later that deals with personnel locality
17 pay. The people in the Fort Monmouth area --
18 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: So, with that reasoning, any
19 place that gets the higher rate because of the cost of
20 living, we should close all those bases.

21 MR. BALE: No, sir, I didn't say that.
22 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: That's what the proposal is

1 saying.
2 MR. BALE: The proposal would say that but we
3 differ with the proposal. Our comment is that any area that
4 is covered by the locality pay, any decision to move it to
5 another base or a location that is not covered by locality
6 pay could bias it against that installation.
7 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: But the majority of their
8 business is at Fort Monmouth, isn't it?
9 MR. BALE: The Communications Electronics Command's
10 business is, yes, sir. That's where their research and
11 development and their program executive officers are. One of
12 the arguments --
13 COMMISSIONER STUART: I was just going to ask you
14 what the driver was in the DOD recommendation to go to Rock
15 Island. Is it the steady state savings being greater?
16 MR. BALE: In the long run, sir, the steady state
17 savings are greater at Rock Island than they would be at the
18 Fort Monmouth area.
19 COMMISSIONER STUART: In the long run, is one base
20 going to be there and another not?
21 MR. BALE: I'm not sure I understand.
22 MR. BROWN: I'm not sure that we can predict that,

1 Commissioner Stuart.
2 MR. BEHRMANN: Do you get a total closure in either
3 scenario or no?
4 MR. BALE: This is not a closure that's at issue.
5 This is a realignment.
6 COMMISSIONER STUART: My point, essentially, is:
7 Is Rock Island, in all probability, going to be around longer
8 or is Fort Monmouth going to be around longer? We're dealing
9 with the force structure as it exists today.
10 MR. BEHRMANN: I think that depends which
11 Congressman you ask and which Senator you ask. I think
12 they'll fight very hard to keep both of those alive, and I
13 think it's the Army's plans to keep both installations
14 present.
15 COMMISSIONER STUART: But the Army did recommend
16 going to Fort --
17 MR. BALE: Rock Island.
18 COMMISSIONER STUART: Rock Island.
19 MR. BALE: Yes, sir.
20 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: But it was strictly from a
21 financial standpoint?
22 MR. BALE: It was from a financial point and from a

1 leased facility outside of Fort Monmouth at some $15 million
2 a year.
3 MR. BROWN: Mr. Stuart, if you look at the military
4 value assessment that the Army did, Rock Island Arsenal is
5 rated three of the 12. Fort Monmouth is number four, so they
6 are relatively close.
7 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: Someone suggested when I
8 was up there that this had slipped between the cracks with
9 the Army, because there is all this space that has been
10 vacated by the 513th and by the Chaplain's School and it's
11 excellent space.
12 They are a mile or two away from it in this leased
13 building, whose own cost is excessive because of the payment
14 they have to make to the GSA. They are moving up the
15 facility from Vint Hill Farms and at the very moment they're
16 doing it, they want to peel off a lot of people and move them
17 out to Rock Island.
18 From an organizational point of view, it doesn't
19 seem to make any sense at all and from a cost saving point of
20 view, they've got their relief right down the road from
21 everything except the pay differential. So, I think we ough
22 to save the Army from itself and realign them in Fort

1 Monmouth. If I could, I'd like to make this motio
2 Chairman.

MOTION

4 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: I move that the Commission
5 find that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially
6 from criteria in four. The Commission finds that the
7 Department misstated the cost differential between two
8 alternative choices.
9 Therefore, the Commission adopts the following
10 recommendation. Move CECOM Headquarters out of the leased
11 space and into space at Fort Monmouth vacated by the 513th
12 Military Intelligence Brigade and the Chaplain's School or
13 other suitable space, relocate the Chaplain's School to Fo
14 Jackson, consolidate activities to maximize utilization of
15 Main Post Fort Monmouth and to dispose of excess facilitie
16 and real property at Evans and Charles Woods sub-post as we
17 as main post, Fort Monmouth.
18 The Commission finds this recommendation is
19 consistent with the force structure plan and final criteri
20 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Do I hear a second to the
21 motion?
22 COMMISSIONER COX: Second.

1 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Before I ask for any discussion,
2 I have a technical amendment to the motion, and it's as
3 follows: After, therefore, the Commission, after that wor
4 "Commission" on the third line, add "rejects the Secretary
5 recommendation on Fort Monmouth and instead" and then I
6 continue "adopts the following recommendations." Do I hea
7 second?
8 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: I second.
9 CHAIRMAN COURTER: There's a second. Let's
10 of the technical amendment. All those in favor, say "aye
11 (Chorus of ayes.)
12 CHAIRMAN COURTER: All opposed?
13 (No response.)
14 CHAIRMAN COURTER: The amendment unanimously
15 passes. Counsel, do I need a roll call vote on that?
16 MS. CHESTON: No, I don't think you do.
17 COMMISSIONER STUART: Could we discuss it? Is it
18 time for discussion or not?
19 CHAIRMAN COURTER: It is now time for discussion on
20 the motion.
21 COMMISSIONER STUART: I'd just like to ask
22 Commissioner McPherson, we're doing this because of the l

1 range advantages to being in Fort Monmouth, because the
2 savings indicated were greater at Rock Island.
3 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: Well, Commissioner Stuart,
4 my reason for doing it is that the savings are likely to
5 very, very similar, and that the organizational efficiency
6 having the entire operation together in one locale,
7 particularly when they're bringing the Vint Hill Farms
8 contingent up there, outweigh any of the small savings
9 advantage for going to Rock Island, such as it may be.
10 CHAIRMAN COURTER: I think the Army just -- if I
11 could go in here, I think the Army just, when they did th
12 forgot about the fact that the relocation of some functio
13 from Fort Monmouth made available owned facilities and
14 therefore they could get out of leased space, which was t
15 desire. If you can get out of leased space and not move
16 normally, you don't want to move.
17 COMMISSIONER BYRON: I was going to say we a
18 getting out of the $15 million a year leased space, which
19 a key component when the Army was structuring this move.
20 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Any further discussion?

21 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: I tend to agree with what's
22 been stated, but I was going to ask the staff. I see some

1 heads nodding and things like that, but what evidence do you
2 find that says that the costs were misstated?
3 MR. BALE: The cost for both proposals shows a
4 savings over the present condition. When we take out the pay
5 differential and all that, it's almost an equal comparison to
6 the Rock Island, and we avoid the moving pay from some 900
7 miles from Fort Monmouth out to Rock Island, Illinois.
8 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Plus, from a military
9 standpoint, we leave the command headquarters where the
10 majority of their work is, and that should override any cost
11 differential.
12 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: I have a feeling that there
13 are some benefits that have yet to be quantified. That's
14 what we're really saying, or that are difficult to quantify
15 and, therefore, have not yet been, and I believe that;
16 however, I have a little difficulty coming up and saying
17 exactly what they are at the moment.
18 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Any further discussion?
19 (No response.)
20 CHAIRMAN COURTER: We'll start with Commissioner
21 Beverly Byron.
22 COMMISSIONER BYRON: Aye.

1 MS. CHESTON: Commissioner Byron votes "aye."
2 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner Johnson.
3 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Aye.
4 MS. CHESTON: Commissioner Johnson votes "aye."
5 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner Bowman.
6 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: Aye.
7 MS. CHESTON: Commissioner Bowman votes "aye."
8 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner Cox.
9 COMMISSIONER COX: Aye.
10 MS. CHESTON: Commissioner Cox votes "aye."
11 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner McPherson.
12 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: Aye.
13 MS. CHESTON: Commissioner McPherson votes "aye."
14 CHAIRMAN COURTER: The Chair votes "aye."
15 MS. CHESTON: The chair votes "aye."
16 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner Stuart.
17 COMMISSIONER STUART: Aye.
18 MS. CHESTON: Commissioner Stuart votes "aye." The
19 motion is to reject the Secretary's recommendation on Fort
20 Monmouth and instead, to recommend an alternative realignment
21 of Fort Monmouth. On that motion, the vote is seven in
22 favor, zero opposed. The motion passes.

1 CHAIRMAN COURTER: The Rock Island Arsenal.
2 MR. BROWN: Mr. Chairman, at Tab 15, we have the
3 next installation, the Rock Island Arsenal. Slide 98
4 pictorially shows the DOD recommendation, which is a redirect
5 of a 1991 Commission recommendation. It's to leave those
6 material management function of Armament, Munitions and
7 Chemical Command at Rock Island Arsenal rather than sending
8 it to Redstone Arsenal.
9 Slide 99 shows the relative location of Rock Island
10 Arsenal and Red Stone Arsenal. MAJ Gary Evans will discuss
11 the recommendation.
12 MAJ EVANS: Sir, the static installation chart,
13 once again, I direct you to the bottom line. The one-time
14 cost is zero; steady state savings one million; break-even
15 year immediate. The steady state savings, if you'd noticed
16 on the first chart, if you noticed, the redirect number was
17 different going back to Rock Island versus going to Redstone
18 Arsenal.
19 Rock Island determined that they could do the job
20 with 23 less personnel, and that's where you're generating
21 the steady state savings down there. Next chart, please.
22 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: Say that one again. That one

1 slipped right by me. The steady state savings are obtained
2 from?
3 MAJ EVANS: From the savings of 23 personnel
4 slots/positions that the Rock Island facility determined that
5 they could do the job for less, once it's realigned under the
6 Tank Automotive Command. The driving issues are on the left
7 side of the chart, operational issues and cost issues.
8 Personnel savings is an issue I'm prepared to talk about, if
9 you so choose. Next chart.
10 You really see this redirect as an operational
11 issue. Basically, it's the Army Materiel Command is coming
12 on line and saying that they believe that the alignment of
13 the Material Management Functions of the Armament and
14 Chemical portion of the Armament, Munitions and Chemical
15 Command, are better aligned with the Tank Automotive Command
16 than they would be aligned with the Missile Command.
17 Incidentally, were they to be aligned with the
18 Missile Command, they'd then create a new command called the
19 Missile, Ammunitions and Chemical Command, MACCOM.
20 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Do you have any speculation as
21 to what motivated this recommendation by the Army in 1991,
22 1990, 1991, because they wanted to change the commands.

1 They were going to create some movement of people, 1200 and
2 some, but they also indicated there would be substantial
3 savings to it. Now, what has changed in the meantime?
4 MAJ EVANS: Two years ago, sir, they had a piece
5 called the AMC Vision 2000 which, from what I could read and
6 determine, in talking to personnel, basically, it was going
7 to make the Redstone Arsenal somewhat of a showcase for all
8 commodity-oriented functions.
9 This was one piece of that grand movement to
10 fulfill that vision. Unfortunately, it was determined that
11 Vision 2000 was just not feasible because of the costs
12 involved. Within the last two years, for some reason that I
13 really haven't got a good answer on, it was that this piece
14 of that puzzle stayed in the system and got directed down to
15 Redstone Arsenal.
16 In the last two years, obvious to everybody, all
17 the services have gone through a downsizing that I don't
18 think they really anticipated two years ago, so with those
19 things in mind, that was a real driving factor, and then the
20 change of the vision. It's pretty much predicated then that
21 it was no longer feasible to do that move.
22 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Well, it's not that it makes

1 much difference, but what is the new command going to be
2 called?
3 MAJ EVANS: Sir, were it to go to Redstone Arsenal?
4 CHAIRMAN COURTER: No, if it stays. If it stays at
5 the Rock Island Arsenal pursuant to the recommendation of the
6 DOD?
7 MAJ EVANS: No, there is no new command, sir.
8 CHAIRMAN COURTER: There's not.
9 MAJ EVANS: What it does is it eliminates the
10 Armament, Munitions and Chemical Command and it takes those
11 materiel functions on the armament and chemical side and
12 realigns them with the existing Tank Automotive Command.
13 CHAIRMAN COURTER: So, TACOM stays?
14 MAJ EVANS: TACOM, yes, sir.
15 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: But you could go either way,
16 from what you said here. You could go with the missile
17 command and have a new MACCOM or whatever it is?
18 MAJ EVANS: In either event, you're right, sir.
19 You're going to eliminate a national inventory control point.
20 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: So, before, we approved, our

21 predecessors approved this move, and the Army has not
22 completed it, and now they want to reverse it?

1 MAJ EVANS: Yes, sir.
2 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: Where is TACOM Headquarters?
3 MAJ EVANS: Warren, Michigan, sir.
4 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: So, they won't be
5 collocated?
6 MAJ EVANS: It will be a split operation.
7 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: So, if we accept what the
8 previous agreement was, it goes to Huntsville?
9 MAJ EVANS: Yes, sir.
10 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: If we reverse it, then it
11 goes to Rock Island?
12 MAJ EVANS: It stays at Rock Island and realigns
13 under Tank Automotive Command.
14 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: In all cases, it won't be
15 collocated with Tank Command?
16 MAJ EVANS: Yes, sir, you're right.
17 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: Are there other parts of
18 TACOM that are not collocated with the Headquarters?
19 MAJ EVANS: Not to my knowledge, sir.
20 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: So, this would be the only
21 one, to your knowledge?
22 MAJ EVANS: Again, I don't have good knowledge on

1 that.
2 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: Right, I understand.
3 MAJ EVANS: What the Army and DOD have determined,
4 though, is that the functions within this materiel management
5 function is better aligned with the Tank Automotive side than
6 it is with the missile side, and that's why I was saying it's
7 really an operational issue.
8 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: The cost of going ahead
9 with this, over the Army's objection, would be $70 million,
10 and the cost of staying put is obviously to avoid that. It
11 seems to me that we are in no position as a Commission to
12 find that the Army is wrong in doing that.
13 MOTION
14 And so I would move that the Commission find that
15 the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from
16 the force structure and plan criteria; therefore, that the
17 Commission adopt the following recommendation of the
18 Secretary of Defense.
19 Instead of sending the materiel management
20 functions of the U.S. Army Armament, Munitions and Chemical
21 Command to Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, as recommended by the
22 1991 Base Closure Commission, reorganize these functions

1 under Tank Automotive Command with the functions remaining in
2 place at Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois.
3 COMMISSIONER STUART: I'll second that.
4 CHAIRMAN COURTER: It has been moved by
5 Commissioner McPherson, seconded by Commissioner Stuart, that
6 we accept the recommendations of the Department of Defense.
7 Is there any discussion on the motion?
8 (No response.)
9 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Hearing no discussion, we'll
10 start out with Commissioner Johnson.
11 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: No.
12 MS. CHESTON: Commissioner Johnson votes "no."
13 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner Bowman.
14 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: Aye.
15 MS. CHESTON: Commissioner Bowman votes "aye."
16 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner Cox.
17 COMMISSIONER COX: Aye.
18 MS. CHESTON: Commissioner Cox votes "aye."
19 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner McPherson.
20 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: Aye.
21 MS. CHESTON: Commissioner McPherson votes "aye."
22 CHAIRMAN COURTER: The Chair votes aye.

1 MS. CHESTON: The Chair votes "aye."
2 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner Stuart.
3 COMMISSIONER STUART: Aye.
4 MS. CHESTON: Commissioner Stuart votes "aye."
5 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner Byron.
6 COMMISSIONER BYRON: A reluctant aye.
7 MS. CHESTON: Commissioner Byron votes "aye." On
8 the motion to accept the Secretary's recommendation with
9 respect to Rock Island Arsenal, the vote is six in favor, o
10 opposed, the motion passes.
11 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Mr. Brown, why don't you proceed
12 with Marcus Hook?
13 MR. BROWN: Mr. Chairman, we have --
14 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Let me just ask you this
15 question. Is that the last topic for the day?
16 MR. BROWN: Yes, it is, Mr. Chairman.
17 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Okay. Just as a reminder for
18 those people that are still here, about five minutes after
19 complete business for today, there will be a press
20 availability for those Commissioners that want to stay, th
21 can. If they don't want to, that's their right. Tomorrow
22 just to remind everybody, we meet at 9:00 o'clock. What i

1 the location of that? Is it here, as well? It's in this
2 hearing room at 9:00 o'clock in the morning.
3 Mr. Brown, why don't you proceed?
4 MR. BROWN: Marcus Hook U.S. Army Reserve Center,
5 Pennsylvania, is the next installation to be discussed.
6 Marcus Hook was added for further consideration on May 21
7 as a result of the request of Congressman Weldon.
8 Slide 105 pictorially shows the location of M
9 Hook. The option under consideration would move [illegible] H
10 Reserve Center to the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard [illegible] wa
11 mothballed by the 1991 Commission. Mr. Bud Bale will
12 discuss this recommendation.
13 MR. BALE: Next slide, please. The Marcus Hook
14 operation is relatively small when you look at the one-ti
15 cost of the move and the steady state savings that would
16 result from it. Next chart, please.
17 MR. BROWN: Let me emphasize, Mr. Chairman, that is
18 a steady state cost for the move over the current operat
19 costs.
20 MR. BALE: Next slide, Mark. These are the issues
21 we are going to discuss today, sir. Next chart. The Arr
22 says that the military value of the Marcus Hook facility

1 high because the reserve unit that is located there, the
2 are only three units like this in the Army inventory. Tw
3 these units have the high density of marine craft. One i
4 active duty, the reserve unit is not.
5 CHAIRMAN COURTER: What precisely do they do there,
6 that is so unique that there's two other in the inventor
7 MR. BALE: This is a marine water craft. They have
8 tugboats, inland waterway and seagoing tugboats and barg
9 craft. They do the training to keep those people up to
10 Department of Transportation standards, which takes a fe
11 years, six to seven years, and they do the various missi
12 when the Army needs somebody to back them up.
13 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: I think a little known fact
14 is that Army owns a huge, at least, relatively speaking.
15 amount of barges, boats, don't they?
16 MR. BALE: Yes.
17 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: This is where those [illegible] n
18 the reserves get their training.
19 MR. BALE: This is one place, sir. Down at Fort
20 Eustis is the primary facility where the Army trains it

21 marine craft personnel.
22 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: Active duty?

1 MR. BALE: Active duty and reserve people that go
2 down there for basic training and then the advanced training
3 in that.
4 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: So, how does this differ from
5 that?
6 MR. BALE: This is a facility where people -- they
7 do some on-the-job training here to build the skills as they
8 go through, starting out as seamen and working up through the
9 warrant officers, who are the captains of the boats. They do
10 go out during their monthly drills and they actually try to
11 do the types of missions that they would do.
12 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: So, this is maintenance of
13 proficiency for reservists?
14 MR. BALE: It's proficiency training for
15 reservists.
16 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: But all those people get
17 their basic instruction, if you will, down at Eustis?
18 MR. BALE: Yes, sir.
19 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: Is this the only reserve
20 facility where that's done?
21 MR. BALE: This is the only reserve facility.
22 There is a National Guard unit, a reserve-type, that's out on

1 the West Coast. This is the only one on the East Coast.
2 MR. BROWN: This is a detachment of the 949th
3 Company that is headquartered at Curtis Bay near Baltimore,
4 Maryland.
5 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: Active duty?
6 MR. BROWN: No, reserve, also.
COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: Okay.
COMMISSIONER STUART: Bud, give us the pros and
9 cons of just moving it a little bit east on the river to
10 Philadelphia. Couldn't they have reserve training there?
11 You are answering a community's requests. They've been
12 making it for years to get this small installation out.
13 Wouldn't we get some advantages of consolidation and the
14 training goes on, and there are lots of reservists around
15 Philadelphia.
16 MR. BALE: Yes, sir. One of the options we looked
17 at was moving it to the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard which was
18 mothballed under the '91 BRAC. There are some things wrong
19 with it, and that's the first scenario we look at. The
20 facilities at the Philadelphia Shipyard are older facilities.
21 COMMISSIONER STUART: Are what?
22 MR. BALE: Older, dating back to, I think it's 18

1 something, some of them, and the facility that we did find
2 that they could occupy would take about $300,000 just to
3 repair the roof. It would also, then, have to take
4 renovation inside to make it into a facility that they could
5 do actual maintenance and do training inside.
6 The pier facility or dock facility at Philadelphia
7 Navy Shipyard would also take some upgrading in that the
8 utilities and the water supply to it, so they could handle,
9 take these boats that are there. There is a plan by the
10 Navy, too, to put some of the reserve fleet up into the Navy
11 Shipyard coming in '96, in the mothballed status.
12 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: If you believe your cost
13 information, it doesn't make any sense to move it.
14 MR. BALE: The facility, the Marcus Hook facility,
is owned by the government today. It's a very low cost to
them to operate. They do have to do some periodic
17 maintenance but basically, their cost is utilities for the
18 year and, as you see, it's relatively low.
19 Moving to the Philadelphia yard would take a one
20 time cost just to get it prepared and then would have a

21 higher operating cost because of the size of the facility
22 itself.

1 COMMISSIONER STUART: Why is the community so
2 anxious to move it?
3 MR. BALE: The community has limited land available
4 that they can use for the community. They developed a park
5 a river-side park, a few years back, and they would like to
6 expand this park, and the Marcus Hook facility sits right o
7 the side of it, and it is the only available place that the
8 could expand it to.
9 COMMISSIONER STUART: It's such a small
10 installation. On the other hand, I guess your costs are
11 higher in Philadelphia, unless it's factored to the
12 reservists?
13 MR. BALE: The recruiting for the reservists in the
14 Philadelphia, it's about 15 nautical miles or straight down
15 the Delaware River to the yard, and the recruiting for the
16 reservists probably wouldn't be a factor in doing that, in
17 the short move like that.
18 The biggest thing you'll see here is just the cost
19 of the shipyard to move the operation, to get the annual
20 recurring costs and the one-time cost of getting it up to
21 grade where they could actually use it.
22 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: I don't see where we could

1 find substantial deviation on this, or does anyone?
2 COMMISSIONER STUART: I'd be interested in whether
3 Matt or Ed had a point of view. Have you seen the facility?
4 MR. BEHRMANN: I am very familiar with this from
5 the '91 round. Again, it's here in '93. My read of the
6 situation is that it's a below-threshold action, that we
7 might best address by putting some recommendation language
8 into our report that says Army, Navy and the community of
9 Marcus Hook in a downsized environment.
10 You ought to look at the best way that that little
11 community can best utilize its waterfront, and once we know
12 exactly what's going to happen with the reserves at the
13 Shipyard, it doesn't seem to be a big enough unit that it
14 would present great problems.
15 Maybe once you flush that all out, you could move
16 this in and collocate it with the Navy reserves that are
17 going to be there, but I'm not certain that it's best to do
18 that right now and I'm not certain that you can find a
19 substantial deviation.
20 I think that may be about the best way to resolve
21 this issue and to, you know, strongly encourage the Army and
22 the Navy and this community that, clearly, they want to get

1 their hands on their waterfront property and maybe put it to
2 higher use in their eyes. I see that motivation.
3 COMMISSIONER BYRON: You have several scenarios
4 here and under Scenario 2, close Marcus Hook and move the
5 Army Reserve Unit to locate with its parent unit at Curtis
6 Bay. How large is that parent unit and how many people are
7 we talking about at the Marcus Hook unit?
8 MR. BALE: The Marcus Hook unit right now has two
9 boats, two tugboats, and two barges. It's scheduled to get
10 two more of each and a 100-ton crane. The parent unit at
11 Curtis Bay is the company headquarters and the rest of the
12 unit, basically. It's a company and its one detachment at
13 Marcus Hook.
14 I would have to get out of my briefcase the exact
15 numbers, but they have two large tugboats. They're getting
16 five more. They've got like five medium-sized tugboats, 128
17 foot, I believe it was, at least 20 barges, a 100-ton crane
18 already there, with another crane -- excuse me.
19 COMMISSIONER BYRON: Let's not belabor the point.
20 I guess maybe what I am suggesting is we put some language in

21 our report to have them look at consolidation.
22 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: One of the issues that I

1 think is relevant is if we cannot find substantial deviation,
2 do we have the authority to make recommendations?
3 MR. BALE: I would have to defer to counsel on
4 that, sir.
5 MS. CHESTON: You don't have the authority to
6 change the Secretary's recommendations and adopt your own in
7 lieu of the Secretary's recommendations, unless you find
8 substantial deviation.
9 COMMISSIONER BYRON: He recommended nothing on
10 this. I just --
11 MR. BEHRMANN: The answer is no. You'd have to
12 find the force structure violation and/or cost, manpower.
13 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: So, you're saying that a lot
14 of the things that we recommended that he had not addressed,
15 we could not recommend?
16 MS. CHESTON: No. If there is substantial
17 deviation in the Secretary's recommendations, as a whole,
18 including the fact that the Secretary did not recommend
19 closure or realignment of an installation, then you can add
20 an installation but unless there is a substantial deviation
21 in the fact that Marcus Hook is not on the list, then you
22 cannot recommend action with respect to Marcus Hook.

1 COMMISSIONER BYRON: We cannot mention Marcus Hook
2 unless we vote to --
3 MS. CHESTON: You cannot formally recommend it. In
4 the general discussion section of the report of Issues for
5 Future Consideration, you may want to mention it, but you
6 can't formally recommend it.
7 COMMISSIONER BYRON: That's basically, I think,
8 what I just said, and I was not advocating formally
9 recommending it, because I don't think today is the time to
10 address that. What I do think, since there is some
11 controversy over it or some question over it, I frankly think
12 it should stay where it is, but if it isn't going to stay,
13 then maybe I think we should make a comment in our report
14 that the Secretary should look at that.
15 MR. BEHRMANN: That's the language that I referred
16 to, Mrs. Byron, something that would not be a formal
17 recommendation but would be, you know, a recommendation that
18 they at least look at it and discuss it and, you know, look
19 at the wishes of the community in this regard.
20 CHAIRMAN COURTER: There is a number of issues that
21 we would want to place in the report with regard to future
22 policy and future considerations and this, I think, is

1 appropriate to add to that list. I know that we're roaring
2 through this week and the staff is over-burdened, but what we
3 want to make sure is that our concerns with regard to future
4 recommendations are placed in this report.
5 And they go back to my concern and Commissioner
6 Stuart's concern and others' concern with respect to GSA and
7 the way they cost out leases, with respect to the issue of
8 there's always a bias against leases because it comes out
9 from Operations and Maintenance, and in a real world of
10 depreciation in business, that bias should be eliminated for
11 strict analysis.
12 It deals with the issue, as well, we want in the
13 report of the issue of capacity and that -- I know it's going
14 to happen and that is, that for some services, particularly
15 Air Force already has, is going to give to Secretary Aspin
16 some time in 1995, a statement saying there's no excess
17 capacity anywhere and these are our numbers.
18 We all know that's not the case, and we don't want
19 the Secretary to be hoodwinked by the services' position with
20 respect to that, particularly the Air Force. There are a
21 number of other things that I've mentioned and others.
22 And, Mr. Behrmann, if you would make sure that

1 do include them, and what we may want to do now is to hav
2 whoever is drafting that section of the report, you know,
3 draft it in rough and just talk about the areas and give t
4 to the Commissioners some time Wednesday or Thursday, so t
5 we can add our own. When Sunday hits, it's going to be a
6 furious pace around here.
7 MR. BEHRMANN: Mr. Chairman, we've already done
8 that once, as you know, and we view that section as growin
9 day by day. I mean, there are going to be things like th
10 that we're going to address in the next week that are goi
11 to rear their head, and they're going to have to be
12 addressed, so we're prepared to add to that. We'll give
13 an update of issues that we see growing and ones that may
14 appropriately addressed in that section.
15 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Would you give each Commissioner
16 the latest version of that as soon this week as possible?
17 MR. BEHRMANN: Yes, sir.
18 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Separate and apart from all the
19 other things that would be in the report?
20 MR. BEHRMANN: I'll hand it to you each personally.
21 CHAIRMAN COURTER: That would be terrific. Thank
22 you very much.

1 COMMISSIONER BYRON: Mr. Chairman, I think it's
2 easier as we go along, when these issues come up, to make
3 notation to make sure that they have been taken down.
4 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Any other --
5 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: I was just going to say
6 that's an excellent idea. Relating back to Marcu[redacted]k,
7 would seem to me we would want to address issues[redacted]
8 Marcus Hook generally, rather than specifically,[redacted]er.
9 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Well, that's dicta and it has
10 not the force of law. Each Commissioner will have an
11 opportunity to have an input in the final language, so ma
12 your recommendations when you see the language. Any furt
13 discussion on Marcus Hook?
14 (No response.)
15 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Is there a motion? The Chair
16 will entertain a motion.
17 (No response.)
18 CHAIRMAN COURTER: There is no motion and we have,
19 therefore, completed the business for the day. We'll hav
20 press availability in about five minutes.
21 COMMISSIONER BYRON: I make a motion we adjourn.
22 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Do I hear a motion for

1 adjournment?
2 COMMISSIONER BYRON: I make a motion we adjourn.
3 CHAIRMAN COURTER: The motion is made by
4 Commissioner Byron.
5 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: Second.
6 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Seconded by McPherson. All
7 those in favor, say "aye"?
8 (Chorus of ayes.)
9 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Opposed?
10 (No response.)
11 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Passed unanimously.
12 (Whereupon, at 6:09 p.m., the hearing was
13 adjourned.)
14 * * * * *

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

OPEN MEETING

9:18 a.m.

Hart Senate Office Building
Room 216
Washington, D.C.

Thursday, June 24, 1993

COMMISSIONERS PRESENT:

Jim Courter, Chairman
CPT Peter B. Bowman, USN (Ret.)
Beverly B. Byron
Rebecca G. Cox
GEN Hansford T. Johnson, USAF (Ret.)
Harry C. McPherson, Jr.
Robert D. Stuart

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P R O C E E D I N G S

CHAIRMAN COURTER: The Commission will come to order this morning. As the Commissioners are finding their seats, I wanted to make one announcement and that is, that as everybody knows, Senator Arlen Specter was ill and he had an operation, and he's convalescing because of his operation, and I might say, also, that for those of you who do not know Arlen Specter, operations such as he had do not slow him down.

He was writing memos and notes from his hospital bed and he continues, during his convalescence, to be a strong advocate of Pennsylvania and will continue to do so, and we admire him tremendously -- his fortitude, his strength and his commitment to the people of Pennsylvania. In all my days, I've rarely seen such commitment. I want to acknowledge that.

Because of the extraordinary circumstances with regard to Senator Specter, I had offered him the opportunity to testify either yesterday or today, because he was hospitalized during the time he would have had his five minutes to testify before this committee.

For simple humanitarian concerns and also a sense

of fairness, we thought that we would interrupt these proceedings to have the Senator testify either yesterday or today. He is unable to do that.

So, what I would like to do is to make sure that his latest multi-page statement, the statement that he would otherwise have read before us, is part of the record, and it is 11 pages. I want to make sure that all Commissioners have an opportunity to read it, which they will. They have a copy of it. I am making sure that the testimony of Arlen Specter, in his absence, is part of our formal record. It is signed personally by Senator Specter.

There was one piece of unfinished business yesterday and that was with regard to the Defense Language Institute. We had come to a consensus as to what we wanted to do. It was pretty clear by members of the Commission.

We were not, however, totally comfortable with the language that we had had, and we spent some hours yesterday evening and this morning working on the precise language and, typically, along these lines, there are three or four versions. Each one is slightly different.

To refresh people's recollection on the Defense Language Institute, the consensus was that it should not be

moved because of the dislocation, because of the erosion in mission, because, therefore, there's a substantial deviation. That was initially placed on the Secretary's list, I should say the Secretary of the Army's list, because of the cost.

We found out that the cost was driven by the fact that it was burdened by the Defense Language Institute Annex,

7 which was the old Fort Ord and its huge overhead. When we
8 wanted most of Ord to be closed and everything excessed
9 except for that small part that was necessary and proper for
10 the support of the Defense Language Institute, that door was
11 opened a bit and was opened further.
12 Much of all the heavy overhead of Fort Ord was
13 placed on the Defense Language Institute, making the
14 calculations as to the cost per student hugely
15 disproportionate to what they really should be. It was the
16 feeling of this Commission that if we mandated the closure
17 and the excessing of additional property at the Annex, old
18 Fort Ord, that would satisfy the cost concerns.
19 We wanted to have specific language with respect to
20 that which would be maintained at the Annex, which is the old
21 Fort Ord, and we have done that. It's my understanding that
22 Commissioner Johnson has language, and we've all looked at

1 the two or three versions that we could use. I seem to favor
2 the first one. Let me turn this over to Commissioner Johnson
3 and let him explain the differences between the versions.
4 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Maybe we should take a
5 moment and read them, sir. There are a total of seven
6 alternatives. I think Number 5 is the lesser and Number 7
7 has more added, and I think those are the same except the
8 number of facilities that are retained at Fort Ord.
9 COMMISSIONER STUART: Why don't you highlight the
10 differences?
11 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Having just read them, I
12 think Number 5 and Number 7 are the same, except Number 5
13 maintains housing, commissary, child care facility, post
14 exchange.
15 Number 7 includes housing, post exchange,
16 commissary, youth center, fitness center, chapel, child care
17 center, elementary school, library, fire station and
18 security, base operations, warehouse, maintenance facilities,
19 which is a longer list.
20 CHAIRMAN COURTER: And that gets back into the
21 problem, in my mind, that we had with regard to the Defense
22 Language Institute. I misspoke. It was Number 1 on another

1 list and it is 5 that I think is more consistent with my own
2 thinking.
3 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: And both of these have the
4 sentence, "The Defense Department evaluate whether contracted
5 base operations support would provide savings for the
6 Presidio of Monterey, so I think they are consistent except
7 for the number of facilities maintained.
8 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: What is the difference
9 between 5 and 6?
10 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Six doesn't include the
11 comment about looking at contracting out. That's how I read
12 them. Counselor, can you help us?
13 MS. CHESTON: Yes, I'm just reviewing it, one
14 second. Yes, I think that's the fundamental difference.
15 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: That's the way I read it.
16 It's the same except it doesn't contract out.
17 CHAIRMAN COURTER: That's the only difference
18 between 5 and 6, the way I read it, as well. Both 5 and 6
19 say that the "consolidate base operations support for the
20 Presidio of Monterey and the Presidio of Monterey Annex with
21 the Naval Postgraduate School," so there's a potential for
22 additional efficiencies. The Postgraduate School is very

1 close the Defense Language Institute.
2 COMMISSIONER STUART: Am I correct that Alternative
3 2 is the most stripped down from the point of view of the
4 facilities?
5 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: But the problem of
6 Alternative 2 is it says "dispose of all unneeded
7 facilities," which leaves interpretation open, and I believe
8 you had that same problem in the last Commission, sir.
9 COMMISSIONER BYRON: You can drive a truck throug
10 that.
11 CHAIRMAN COURTER: That's what happened in --
12 COMMISSIONER STUART: That's a good reason not to
13 use that.
14 CHAIRMAN COURTER: We found that those words,
15 "keeping only that which is necessary," is open to broad
16 interpretation.
17 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: Mr. Chairman, you visited
18 this facility. Do you think they at least ought to look at
19 the idea of contracting out base operations support?
20 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Yes, I do.
21 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: So, you would go for 5?
22 CHAIRMAN COURTER: I would go for 5.

1 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: I guess the question, Mr.
2 Chairman, before we make a motion is: Is there anything on 7
3 that must -- an elementary school is certainly a state
4 requirement. Libraries, both the Postgraduate School and the
5 DLI would have those.
6 The fire station security, that would be done by
7 the Postgraduate School, since we give them that
8 responsibility. The base operations warehouse and
9 maintenance facilities, that's kind of open ended. Mrs.
10 Byron might have some thoughts on this.
11 COMMISSIONER BYRON: Mr. Chairman, I've looked at
12 Alternate 7. It has a package in it of many of the things
13 that I have looked at over the years as quality of life
14 issues. I am not convinced that those will go away if the
15 government is not operating them.
16 I think the private sector will probably come in,
17 and child care is a key component within our militar
18 communities today, but I also feel that that would b
19 operated by the private sector, and I think we are try to
20 look at consolidations and savings. My recommendation would
21 be to look at Alternate 5.
22 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Would you include child care

1 facilities in Alternative 5 or take it out?
2 COMMISSIONER BYRON: When we started to develop
3 child care within DOD, there was a strong feeling by many of
4 the members of Congress that the military should not be in
5 child care. Probably, the military should not have been in
6 child care but it is, and since it is, it's doing it
7 extremely well. The last -- I think we had 200 child care
8 facilities.
9 This is a fairly new child care facility. I would
10 assume it would be operated in the same facility by a
11 contractor or private industry, with first availability going
12 to the military community.
13 COMMISSIONER STUART: Ms. Byron, one of the
14 problems I've been troubled by is child care needs support
15 and support has been justified by the golf course, and that
16 starts to get into a larger area because of that kind of
17 funding.
18 COMMISSIONER BYRON: Mr. Stuart, I believe I said I
19 preferred Alternate 5, which does not mention child care.
20 COMMISSIONER STUART: Oh, yes, it does.
21 COMMISSIONER BYRON: I thought there was one that
22 did not have child care. I think the difficulty you're going

1 to run into is the funding level. Now, DOD has been ng
2 some child care but most of them are standing alone
3 fees that have come in from the population that has
4 using them.
5 COMMISSIONER STUART: I think, as one Commission, I
6 feel we shouldn't maintain a golf course as the funding

7 support for child care, even though we hope child care would
8 be maintained.
COMMISSIONER BYRON: I don't see the golf course
listed in Number 5.
11 COMMISSIONER STUART: Those are one of the things
12 that somehow appear as needed.
13 COMMISSIONER BYRON: I think the golf course and
14 the stadium and the school and those auxiliary facilities,
15 under 5, would be disposed of.
16 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Would you consider child
17 care under 5?
18 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Well, why don't we do it this
19 way, Commissioner Johnson? Why don't you read 5 and if
20 anyone feels strongly about deleting child care, there can be
21 an amendment to your amendment to delete it.
22 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Yes, sir.

1 MOTION
2 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: I move the Commission find
3 that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from the
4 force structure plan in Criteria 4 and, therefore, that the
5 Commission adopt the following recommendation:
6 Retain the Presidio of Monterey, but dispose of all
7 facilities that the Presidio of Monterey Annex except the
8 housing, commissary, child care facility and post exchange,
9 required to support the Presidio of Monterey and the Navy
10 Postgraduate School.
11 Consolidate base operations support with the Navy
12 Postgraduate School by interservice agreement. The
13 Department of Defense will evaluate whether contracted base
14 operations support would provide savings for the Presidio of
15 Monterey.
16 This Commission finds this recommendation is
consistent with the force structure plan and final criteria.
CHAIRMAN COURTER: Is there a second to the motion?
COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: Second.
20 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Seconded by Commissioner
21 McPherson. Any discussion on the motion?
22 COMMISSIONER STUART: Well, as the grandfather of

1 many, I hate to be against child care and I'm not against
2 child care, providing there's no golf course, a big
3 infrastructure, as the generator of the funds. GEN Johnson,
4 what is your feeling?
5 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Sir, I am no longer in the
6 military but my understanding is that child care is supported
7 by fees, as Mrs. Byron says, but also by appropriated funds
8 and not through the nonappropriated, which comes from golf
9 courses, so I don't believe golf courses have anything to do
10 with child care, and we're not recommending golf courses.
11 COMMISSIONER STUART: On that basis, I would
12 certainly support that. The staff had indicated they needed
13 the golf course. Isn't that true?
14 LTC DUFFY: Mr. Stuart, if I could, the amount of
15 money that a child care center can receive from appropriated
16 funds is limited by law. In the case of child care centers
17 right now in the military, I don't know of any example except
18 a contracted one that does not receive nonappropriated funds
19 for its subsistence.
20 COMMISSIONER STUART: So, you don't feel the golf
21 course is necessary for the support of the child care?
22 LTC DUFFY: No, it is necessary. That is the

oosition of the --
COMMISSIONER STUART: That's my hang-up.
LTC DUFFY: Yes, sir, that is the position of the
4 Navy.
5 COMMISSIONER BYRON: But there is more than just
6 the golf course. It comes from other nonappropriated funds;
7 correct?
8 LTC DUFFY: That's correct, ma'am. The policy is
9 that nonappropriated funds have to be self-sustaining at each
10 installation; otherwise, other installations are paying for
11 someone else's requirements.
12 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Is there not a law that says
13 you must use appropriated funds at a specified level in child
14 care? All commanders don't like the law, but that's the law.
15 COMMISSIONER BYRON: But it is in place and it has
16 been funded.
17 LTC DUFFY: That's the law. The law does not allow
18 enough appropriated funds to go into the child care center to
19 maintain it.
20 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: But isn't there a golf course
21 already there?
22 LTC DUFFY: There is one golf course at the Naval

1 Postgraduate School.
2 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: A Navy golf course?
3 LTC DUFFY: Talking to the Commander of the NPS or,
4 rather, his Director of Military Operations, they feel it's
5 too small to generate the revenue they need to take care of
6 their child care center, the child care center on the
7 Presidio of Monterey and the one in the housing area.
8 CHAIRMAN COURTER: But what we're doing, we're
9 discussing not who is going to run it, necessarily -- I know
10 what your point is -- but whether it's going to be not
11 excessed, whether the physical plant is still going to remain
12 in existence. It seems to me that if it is, there could be
13 arrangements made to contract it out.
14 LTC DUFFY: Sir, I think the attractiveness of
15 contracting it out is when the government owns the building
16 and the land, and the contractor doesn't have to pay those
17 costs.
18 CHAIRMAN COURTER: That's what I mean. The
19 government would own the building and the land. If the
20 motion passes as it is read right now, the child care
21 facility remains.
22 LTC DUFFY: That's correct, sir.

1 COMMISSIONER BYRON: It remains government
2 property.
3 CHAIRMAN COURTER: It remains government property.
4 LTC DUFFY: Yes, sir.
5 MR. BEHRMANN: Mr. Chairman, I might make one
6 point, that if the golf courses on Fort Ord are excessed, the
7 alternative is for enlisted and officers to play the golf
8 course which is provided for them at NPS. Its play will go
9 up. Its revenue will go up and it may well be able to
10 sustain both. I think we're kind of -- we're getting into
11 semantics here.
12 COMMISSIONER BYRON: We can go into the same
13 formula with a commissary and a PX and we can talk about that
14 there's a Sam's Club five miles down the road or two miles
15 down the road, that we should, therefore, close the
16 commissary and we should, therefore, close the PX. I don't
17 see, in this scenario, us doing that.
18 I think the funds that come in which are
19 nonappropriated funds, which run the commissary, which run
20 the PX, are the same category funds that are used today to
21 run child care, except for the simple reason there is
22 legislation in place that states that a child care facility

1 on a base, there is an appropriated line for that.
2 Now, base commanders do not like to use that
3 appropriated line for funds for it, but if there is no other
4 source, that funding line is there and able to be utilized to
5 run that child care facility.
6 LTC DUFFY: As I understand it, they are at the

7 maximum allowed by law at both Naval Postgraduate School and
8 at Fort Ord right now for the appropriated funds, and they
9 are still about $500,000 short in nonappropriated funds.
10 COMMISSIONER BYRON: What is the waiting list or is
11 the child care facility utilized or under utilized?
12 LTC DUFFY: The problem right now with the entire
13 Annex is that the 7th Infantry Division has not left. No one
14 really knows what's going to happen. The Presidio of
15 Monterey Annex only houses about 300 of the DLI students at
16 present. So, there is one at the Presidio of Monterey,
17 which is under utilized. I think a lot of that has to do
18 with the location of where people live.
19 The ones on Fort Ord, as I understand it, are
20 spaced out. Of the three child care centers on Fort Ord,
21 none of them are at full capacity because the division has
22 left. They were built for an entire division and we don't

1 have that right now. The one at the Naval Postgraduate
2 School, as I understand it, is near the limit.
3 COMMISSIONER BYRON: Well, once again, I believe
4 that Mr. Johnson's amendment proposal gives us the
5 flexibility, if there is excess after the drawdown is taken
6 care of and there are three child care facilities, then I
7 think the Department has the capability of making that
8 assessment, whether they need one, two or three, depending
9 upon the number of the population. I am not today willing to
10 vote to eliminate the child care facility from the program.
11 I have no problem eliminating the golf courses.
12 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Brian, you're not making any
13 type of statement or implication that if a child care
14 facility is left in this amendment, that implicitly, you have
15 to have a golf course to support it? You're not making that
16 suggestion, are you? If you're making that suggestion, it
17 comes out.
18 LTC DUFFY: No, sir. I think the difficulty all
19 the commanders face is they've got to find a revenue stream.
20 CHAIRMAN COURTER: I understand. They'll find a
21 revenue stream, believe me. All we're trying to do is give
22 them the physical facilities and this amendment clearly, in

1 case anybody is listening, means the golf courses go.
2 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: At Ord.
3 MR. BEHRMANN: Mr. Chairman, I think you summed it
4 up. I think leaving them the facility provides them the
5 flexibility if they can't afford to do it without a revenue
6 stream and "You want to keep it, you're going to have to find
7 another way to pay for it and you're going to have to go to a
8 contractor or some shared arrangement or something of that
9 sort," and I think it provides flexibility.
10 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: Move the question.
11 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Well, we move the question.
12 That was a good thing to do. I see there are no amendments
13 to the amendment and it's been seconded and duly debated.
14 We'll start with Commissioner Bowman.
15 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: Aye.
16 MS. CHESTON: Commissioner Bowman votes "aye."
17 COMMISSIONER BYRON: Is this on Mr. Stuart's
18 amendment?
19 CHAIRMAN COURTER: There's no amendment. This is
20 the motion proffered by Commissioner Johnson.
21 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Alternative 5.
22 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Alternative 5, as written.

1 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: And that's what I understood
2 when I voted "aye."
3 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner Cox.
4 COMMISSIONER COX: Aye.
5 MS. CHESTON: Commissioner Cox votes "aye."
6 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner McPherson.
7 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: Aye.
8 MS. CHESTON: Commissioner McPherson votes "aye."
9 CHAIRMAN COURTER: The Chair votes "aye."
10 MS. CHESTON: The Chair votes "aye."
11 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner Stuart.
12 COMMISSIONER STUART: Aye.
13 MS. CHESTON: Commissioner Stuart votes "aye."
14 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner Byron.
15 COMMISSIONER BYRON: Aye.
16 MS. CHESTON: Commissioner Byron votes "aye."
17 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner Johnson.
18 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Aye.
19 MS. CHESTON: Commissioner Johnson votes "aye." On
20 the motion to retain the Presidio of Monterey but dispose of
21 various assets and consolidate base operations support with
22 the Naval Postgraduate School, the vote is seven in favor,

1 zero opposed, and the motion passes.
2 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Thank you very much, and we'll
3 proceed. Mr. Behrmann.
4 MR. BEHRMANN: Mr. Chairman, I believe we're ready
5 to move on to interservicing. Bob Cook will introduce the
6 team that's going to brief tactical missile maintenance.
7 MR. COOK: Good morning. This is the first of a
8 series of presentations with deal with interservicing issues.
9 Today, we'll address Letterkenny Army Depot and the potential
10 for consolidating the tactical missile workload at that
11 location, and Tooele Army Depot with the potential for
12 consolidating wheeled vehicle mission at that depot.
13 The DOD recommendation was to transfer these depot
14 workloads to other Army Depots, so the decision before the
15 Commission is to accept that recommendation or to invoke some
16 form of consolidation.
17 To offer the discussion for the Commissioners, [illegible]
18 Gary Evans is an Army detailee from DOD and will co[illegible]ery
19 brief overview of the Army Depot System and he'll be[illegible]owec
20 by Mr. Glenn Knoepfle, who is the analyst that did the
21 specific analysis for both of the bases.
22 MAJ EVANS: Good morning. If we could go to Tab 3,

1 I've been relegated to the back and we'll start there. This
2 overview will stand for both Letterkenny and Tooele. If you
3 look at the map, the main depots of the Depot System Command
4 consists of Tooele, Red River, Anniston, Letterkenny and
5 Tobyhanna.
6 When the Army did their study on the closure
7 process, they determined that there were two depots over
8 excess capacity, so when they did their iterations of how to
9 close depots, they took them in pairs. They determined
10 through their work that Tooele and Letterkenny would be the
11 two depots that they should realign into depot activities,
12 and the reason they realigned is because their maintaining
13 the ammunition storage capability at both places.
14 Given if both Letterkenny and Tooele close, the
15 chart on the left shows how the commodities would fall out
16 between the other three depots. Now, if you notice on the
17 bottom, undecided is missiles, and that was originally in a
18 Defense Management Review decision.
19 They decided that missiles would be consolidated at
20 Letterkenny about two years ago. Unfortunately, that hasn't
21 happened yet and during the DOD recommendation this time
22 around, they determined that it would not take place, as

1 originally planned.
2 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: Is there litigation a[illegible]
3 that?
4 MR. BEHRMANN: Yes, sir. It was turned off
5 originally due to a recommendation in '91 that there was
6 mention of a concurrent workload moving into Letterkenny ou

7 of Anniston, and we asked a number of questions about that in
8 1991 of the Department of the Army, and they viewed it as a
9 non-BRAC action.
10 We asked a lot of questions about it, so we did not
11 include it in our report. We weren't given costed data on
12 it. It was viewed by us as something that they could do on
13 their own and the only reason they mentioned it in the report
14 to us was as a mitigator for moving things out of
15 Letterkenny, to let that community know there is going to be
16 workload coming in to backfill.
17 We don't know how much. We don't know the full
18 impact, so we just want to kind of give you notice about
19 that. There was a suit filed that says that the movement of
20 that workload into Letterkenny was not blessed by BRAC;
21 therefore, it could not go on, you know, with all of the BRAC
22 safeguards. It happened on a fast track.

1 The court held on that and I believe it's in
2 appeal, Counsel.
3 MS. CHESTON: I think the short answer to your
4 question, Commissioner McPherson, is that the litigation does
5 not prohibit the Commission from adopting any of these
6 recommendations.
7 COMMISSIONER STUART: But on the other hand, hasn't
8 it been a factor in the Army's change of position?
9 MS. CHESTON: Yes.
10 MR. BEHRMANN: Yes, sir, it has been, and that's
11 why they didn't originally make the recommendation but if we
12 went ahead and mandated it as part of BRAC, it's completely
13 acceptable to do so.
14 COMMISSIONER STUART: The effect of this, in a way,
15 invites many other communities to use legal action to do the
16 same thing.
17 MR. BEHRMANN: Yes, sir.
18 COMMISSIONER STUART: That troubles me.
19 MR. BEHRMANN: That troubles me, sir, because I've
20 been deposed in a couple of those actions and I'd rather not
21 have to do it again.
22 COMMISSIONER STUART: Right.

1 COMMISSIONER BYRON: Matt, was there somewhere in
2 the discussion a quote by a judge who stated that had the
3 Commission specifically spelled out the missile mission?
4 MS. CHESTON: In the Letterkenny litigation, are
5 you referring to?
6 COMMISSIONER BYRON: Yes.
7 MS. CHESTON: The Letterkenny litigation did not
8 address specifically the BRAC process. Indeed, it said,
9 "This is not a BRAC action and we are not considering the
10 issue of what would happen if it were a BRAC action." They
11 just put that whole issue aside and they treated it as a non
12 BRAC action.
13 COMMISSIONER COX: But it is clear, Sheila, that
14 should we decide to consolidate the missile mission at
15 Letterkenny, that is not prohibited by the lawsuit?
16 MS. CHESTON: Yes.
17 MR. BEHRMANN: This may be a long answer to a short
18 question, and I apologize.
19 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: I also think Commissioner
20 Stuart's comment is very apt, that if this is permitted to
21 set a precedent for intervening and blocking these moves that
22 reduce the nation's excess capacity and make the Defense

1 Department more efficient, then it's to be resisted. Excuse
2 me. Go ahead.
3 MAJ EVANS: Our next chart, please. This depot
4 summary shows the '99 projected workload. What it outlines
5 is the capacity at each of the five depots, the projected
6 workload, and breaks it down into percent of utilization. If
7 you notice, we --
8 COMMISSIONER BYRON: Do you have a different
9 numbering on your chart?
10 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: We don't have these in our
11 charts. Ours is 33.
12 CHAIRMAN COURTER: That's okay.
13 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: We're okay.
14 MAJ EVANS: You'll notice there was 8.1 million
15 labor hours in excess capacity within the five depots, and
16 that's what the Department of the Army was trying to reduce.
17 Closing Letterkenny and Tooele increases the utilization of
18 the depots to 77 percent and decreases the excess capacity to
19 23 percent.
20 Not closing either or both maintains an excess
21 capacity. That, in turn, when you spread out the overhead,
22 could product higher labor rates at the existing depots in

1 the long term. The alternative to realigning these depots
2 would be to interservice them and Mr. Knoepfle will address
3 those issues.
4 MR. KNOEPFLE: Good morning, Mr. Chairman and
5 members of the Commission.
6 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Could you move the mike over so
7 we could hear you, please?
8 MR. COOK: This is Tab 1.
9 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Going back to Tab 1.
10 MR. COOK: Yes, sir.
11 MR. KNOEPFLE: As Gary said, the decision to
12 realign Letterkenny was intended by the Army to reduce excess
13 capacity within their depot structure. That decision did
14 not take into consideration interservicing. What happened
15 was in early 1991, DOD decided to consolidate tactical
16 missile maintenance at Letterkenny Army Depot.
17 In December 1992, the DOD announced that they
18 suspended plans to proceed with the consolidation effort
19 about the time that the Army was making its preliminary BRAC
20 decisions. The 1992 suspension notice came as a result of
21 the legal suit that we just talked about.
22 In addition to that, there was some conflicting

1 legislation passed in 1993, one which said if you're going to
2 move workload into Letterkenny, it has to be through
3 competition, and the other one said there was no money
4 available to effect a competition; therefore, it's kind of a
5 dead issue for 1993.
6 Charts 2 and 3. What we have here is a map and a
7 listing of the installations that could be potentially
8 impacted if tactical missile consolidation plans were to go
9 forward. You can see that two of the installations are on
10 the closure list and the others were added for consideration
11 of the potential interservicing action.
12 Now, as we go through this discussion, I think
13 there are three options that need to be considered. Number
14 one is to keep Letterkenny open and to direct the
15 interservicing in accordance with DOD's original plan.
16 Number 2 would be to realign Letterkenny, consolidate the
17 missile workload elsewhere. Number 3 would be to realign
18 Letterkenny and leave the missile workload where it is, at
19 the nine different locations.
20 Slide A and B, please. What we have here are
21 photographs showing the kinds of equipment that Letterkenny
22 currently is involved with the maintenance of. We have the

1 Patriot and the Hawk missile systems. They aren't working on
2 the explosive part of the missile. They are working on the
3 guidance and control, the control apparatus, the launchers,
4 the things that make the missile deliver to its intended
5 site.
6 Under the consolidation plan, missiles that are now

7 being maintained by the Navy and the Air Force would be
8 brought in to Letterkenny and what we're talking about is a
9 section of the missile. They would be disassembled at the
10 storage site and the guidance and control sections would be
11 brought into Letterkenny and repaired.
12 Slides C and D, please. The kinds of work that
13 would be involved are essentially electronic circuitry, fault
14 isolation and repair. You can see in the photographs there
15 people are working on circuit card assemblies. We toured six
16 of the nine sites that are potential candidates for
17 interservicing.
18 We saw lots of people doing essentially the same
19 thing. That's the kind of work that's being done. On the
20 right is a picture of a Pallidin, which I'll get into a
21 little later. That represents another one-third of
22 Letterkenny's future workload through 1997 or '98, possibly.

1 Slide 4. These are the issues that we'll be
2 discussing. Slide 5, please. This provides a little bit of
3 static information about Letterkenny Army Depot. You'll note
4 that the cost to operate the facility is about $67 million a
5 year. It's about 19,000 acres. A lot of those acres are
6 involved in the storage of conventional ammunition.
7 Slide 6. This slide lays out some of the arguments
8 against tactical missile consolidation and some of the
9 arguments for consolidation. DOD's position is that the
10 consolidation program has been terminated. It makes sense to
11 close Letterkenny. It eliminates excess capacity.
12 R&A staff findings, we've analyzed this whole
13 situation and we find that savings are possible from
14 consolidation, that they're not quite as significant as they
15 at one time were estimated to be, the reason being the
16 workload is about half of what was originally forecast in
17 1991.
18 Some of the missile systems are due to be retired
19 in the next few years, and it doesn't make economic sense to
20 bring those missile systems in, and a large part of the
21 reason for reduced savings is the fact that about 660,000
22 hours of direct labor hours of work is due to be transitioned

1 in from the private sector.
2 Right now, contractors are repairing certain
3 missile systems, and it's really uncertain as to whether or
4 not that will occur, given today's environment where the DOD
5 has made statements to the effect that they want the private
6 sector to be given a greater share of the maintenance
7 workload.
8 COMMISSIONER COX: But, Glenn, you find savings,
9 albeit reduced, from the 1991 savings? You continue to find
10 savings from consolidation.
11 MR. KNOEPFLE: Yes, ma'am, we do. Right.
12 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Would those savings go up if
13 there was more maintenance work that had to be done?
14 MR. KNOEPFLE: Yes, they would. The more work that
15 comes in, the more savings because the more work you have, it
16 reduces your overhead and it reduces your hourly labor rates.
17 MR. BEHRMANN: Mr. Chairman, one of the sort of
18 unique things here and a hard thing to kind of quantify, and
19 given the direction of this present administration, that they
20 want to emphasize things in the private sector and reliance
21 on that base, it's hard to say what may come in and what may
22 not come in.

1 But, if you don't go to one site and one site
2 that's properly facilitized to do this, you probably are not
3 going to be able to keep them honest and, I don't know, to
4 me, that's one of the issues that you've got to consider
5 here. It's not basically to go to GEN Yates' Jurassic Park,
6 "who is eating whose cabbage," but I think it is a question
7 of whether we are going to be able to keep them honest.
8 I'm not so sure that as workload comes down and
9 it's even being reduced at those places all around [illegible]
10 doing work, that you're going to be able to presen[illegible]
11 effective option to the private sector, and they m[illegible]
12 start to eat our lunch.
13 COMMISSIONER COX: The interservicing allows us to
14 have the efficiency of bringing all of the Navy, Army, Air
15 Force, work together.
16 MR. BEHRMANN: I think that's something that you've
17 got to consider and determine whether the recognized
18 reductions in savings from going to interservicing, it's
19 maybe not the most cost-effective option, but it's going to
20 get you some efficiencies in terms of competition with the
21 private sector. Regardless of who wins, the taxpayer is
22 going to get a lower --

1 COMMISSIONER COX: Right.
2 MR. KNOEPFLE: The arguments that seem to be in
3 favor of the missile consolidation plan are simply that you
4 would be reducing the number of depots that do similar kind
5 of work from nine down to one, and the community argues tha
6 the consolidation plan should go forward.
7 Letterkenny was selected as the most logical site
8 in 1990 for consolidation because they had the facilities
9 available at the time, which did not require any
10 substantial -- it didn't require any brick and mortar
11 construction, simply modification of the buildings that wer
12 already in existence.
13 COMMISSIONER COX: Glenn, wasn't a number of the
14 planning -- since this went fairly far along, wasn't a lot c
15 the planning, as far as consolidation, done at this point?
16 MR. KNOEPFLE: A lot of the planning had been
17 completed. As a matter of fact, according to a Mar[illegible] 1993
18 GAO report, $7 million has already been expended
19 accomplish this transition, some in building modi[illegible]on,
20 some in training or planning for training of personnel.
21 COMMISSIONER COX: My understanding is that because
22 a lot of this was done before, you could actually start

1 consolidating that mission very quickly. This is not a lo
2 lead time.
3 MR. KNOEPFLE: It was planned to start at about
4 this time, actually have people moving and workload
5 transitioning.
6 COMMISSIONER COX: Thank you.
7 MR. KNOEPFLE: Chart 7, please. I apologize for
8 the business of this chart, but I thought it was important
9 present the numbers that get you to the bottom line there,
10 the capacity utilization rates. In the DOD position, by
11 1999, DOD predicated a capacity utilization rate at
12 Letterkenny of 54 percent.
13 If you look at our footnote with the double
14 asterisks, we find that to be a possible utilization rate
15 It's pretty hard to predict out into the future beyond 19
16 but I want to talk to you about some of the variables tha
17 need to be considered in making this decision.
18 The first line is artillery and that, as I said,
19 right now, Letterkenny is doing some work in artillery.
20 Historically, they had been a wheeled vehicle and an
21 artillery maintenance activity. They have an ongoing joi
22 effort with FMC Corporation to modify some Pallidin weapo

1 systems. Letterkenny will refurbish and overhaul the chas
2 for Pallidin systems.
3 FMC will fabricate new gun turrets and gun b[illegible]
4 They will be put together on the Letterkenny compo[illegible] R
5 now, FMC Corporation is in the process of modifying one c
6 the buildings up there to accomplish this, and this work

7 go on through 1998 or 1997, depending upon whether or not
8 options are made to the existing contract and whether or not
9 FM -- foreign military sale buys materialize.
10 But, at any rate, through 1997, possibly 1998,
11 Letterkenny can depend on about a million hours of work in
12 this artillery line, and a good portion of that is from this
13 Pallidin modification system.
14 The next line that you should be aware of is this
15 line, workload from contract. Originally, it was planned at
16 about 668,000 hours of direct labor hours would be
17 transitioned from the private sector into Letterkenny by
18 1997. That's questionable, whether that can, in fact, be
19 accomplished, given the trend to keep work in the private
20 sector.
21 COMMISSIONER COX: That would have been 100 percent
22 of the private sector work?

1 MR. KNOEPFLE: Yes. Because of the uncertainties
2 involved with that transition, in the R&A staff findings
3 section, you'll see that we put in 125,000 hours which is
4 about 20 percent. The next line is transition of missile
5 maintenance workload from the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps
6 works on Hawk missile systems very similar to what
7 Letterkenny does. That's 110,000 hours.
8 So, if you add all of those figures up, you're at
9 2.7, 2.8 million hours, which will get Letterkenny to a 90
10 percent utilization rate by 1997.
11 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: Glenn, has the Marine Corps
12 agreed to do that?
13 MR. KNOEPFLE: The Marine Corps has not agreed to
14 do that. The Marine Corps was not part of the original
15 consolidation plan. The Marine Corps has -- they are a
16 multi-commodity oriented depot and they do everything at
17 their installations. Their labor rates are slightly lower
18 than at Letterkenny and in 1991, it was decided that it made
19 better sense, because of the way the Marine Corps is
20 organized, to keep that work at Barstow.
21 COMMISSIONER STUART: Following Commissioner
22 Bowman's question, would that have a kind of domino effect on

1 the Marine Corps' depots, transferring this workload up here?
2 MR. KNOEPFLE: If you take work away from any
3 depot, sir, you're going to penalize the utilization rates at
4 that facility, yes, sir.
5 MR. COOK: Mr. Stuart, the Marine utilization rates
6 are well up, around 100 percent, as it is, and the --
7 COMMISSIONER STUART: So, this is modest.
8 MR. COOK: It would be a modest loss to them,
9 that's right.
10 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: It wouldn't threaten Barstow
11 by itself?
12 MR. COOK: That's correct. Commissioner Bowman,
13 the Marine Corps would not endorse this plan. They are not
14 eager to transfer their workload.
15 COMMISSIONER COX: Is it fair to say that none of
16 the other services have endorsed interservicing? I mean,
17 don't we have the same problem with all of the services on
18 interservicing? They like the idea. They just don't like
19 moving their things.
20 MR. COOK: That's a fair statement.
21 MR. BEHRMANN: They all love to talk about it, as
22 long as they are being considered as a receiver.

1 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: On the other hand, it's not a
2 major part of this workload, either.
3 MR. COOK: Yes, sir, that's a true statement.
4 COMMISSIONER BYRON: I think we have seen the Navy
5 is already talking about interservicing their missile work.
6 COMMISSIONER COX: The Navy has been very
7 supportive, I think, of this proposal, certainly in '90 and
8 '91. I take it the Air Force had some doubts.
9 MR. KNOEPFLE: The Navy has talked about
10 interservicing their missile workload, given the scenario of
11 the Norfolk and Alameda closures, or else going to the
12 private sector. They also interservice the intermediate
13 level maintenance of the missile work, and that entails
14 taking the round into the Army facility and checking it out
15 electronically to make sure it's still a good round.
16 COMMISSIONER BYRON: Is that the same type of
17 intermediate facility that the Army happens to have 80 of, or
18 in that number, where many of the depots are empty because
19 there's that middle ground depot maintenance?
20 MR. KNOEPFLE: That's a little different. To do
21 intermediate maintenance on a missile, you have to be in a
22 secured area because you're dealing with explosives. You're

1 dealing with live rounds, as opposed to the 80 or so
2 intermediate level maintenance facilities for wheeled
3 vehicles where it's just a garage where people bring in their
4 vehicles for overhaul.
5 COMMISSIONER BYRON: The intermediate missile depot
6 maintenance is done at a certified --
7 MR. KNOEPFLE: Ammunition storage area, yes. I
8 think we can move on, if there's no further questions.
9 COMMISSIONER BYRON: Let me ask one other question
10 on Letterkenny. Letterkenny is going to continue in the
11 capacity of a facility. What type of cost to keep
12 operational will remain at Letterkenny versus what the
13 savings are going to be to move the depot part, the
14 maintenance part?
15 MR. KNOEPFLE: I hadn't really thought about that
16 too much, but the steady state savings --
17 COMMISSIONER BYRON: I guess what I'm saying is:
18 We're not closing a base.
19 MR. COOK: No, ma'am. It's going to be a
20 continuing storage area.
21 COMMISSIONER BYRON: We are keeping a facility
22 operational.

1 MR. COOK: We sure are.
2 COMMISSIONER BYRON: We are not going to get cost
3 savings by having excess facilities that we can go on the
4 open mark for utilization.
5 MR. COOK: Yes, ma'am.
6 COMMISSIONER COX: Even if we took the DOD
7 recommendation, because of the ammunition storage, we can't
8 close Letterkenny.
9 CHAIRMAN COURTER: That's a good point. One of the
10 things we want to do through consolidation is close, and this
11 is a situation that if you took the Army's recommendation of
12 nonconsolidation, you still don't get the advantage of a
13 closure because of that which is necessary to perform at
14 Letterkenny.
15 MR. COOK: You're right. That's right, Mr.
16 Chairman, and you might bear that in mind as we discuss
17 Tooele because the same issue applies there.
18 MR. KNOEPFLE: I think if you look at the annual
19 operating cost at Letterkenny, you're talking about $67
20 million, and if you want to jump ahead to --
21 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Which line are you on now?
22 MR. KNOEPFLE: The 67 million was on slide -- I

1 believe it's 3.
2 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Three or five?
3 MR. KNOEPFLE: Five, I'm sorry.
4 MR. COOK: This is the annual operating cost for
5 the depot.
6 MR. KNOEPFLE: If you jump ahead to Slide 9, the

7 steady state savings from closing Letterkenny or realigning
8 Letterkenny is about $30 million, so I guess the answer to
9 your question is that it's probably going to cost $30 million
10 to keep the residual workload.
11 COMMISSIONER COX: In fact, because of the FMC work
12 on the Pallidin, in any case, you couldn't close even the
13 rest of the facilities through 1998, is that correct?
14 MR. KNOEPFLE: Correct. Can we move to Slide 8?
15 This chart shows DOD's estimated cost to accomplish the
16 missile consolidation effort at Letterkenny. You'll notice
17 there's a difference in the total cost on the DOD position
18 and the R&A staff findings position.
19 The original forecast cost to accomplish this
20 consolidation was 39.1 million. As I mentioned previously,
21 several systems are no longer considered viable candidates
22 for transfer because they will soon be retired from the

1 system, and the cost to transfer those systems, versus the
2 savings that you would realize just doesn't make economic
3 sense.
4 So, if you discount those three or four systems,
5 you're talking about the cost to accomplish this
6 consolidation of about $30 million, which includes about 5.6
7 to modify the buildings at Letterkenny and 24.9 to move
8 people, train people, and also transfer some equipments from
9 the other eight locations.
10 COMMISSIONER COX: My understanding, Glenn, is that
11 some of that 30 million has already been spent.
12 MR. KNOEPFLE: Yes, ma'am, that's true. The GAO
13 report indicated $7 million has been spent.
14 COMMISSIONER COX: So, an additional 23 million or
15 so is --
16 MR. KNOEPFLE: Right.
17 COMMISSIONER COX: We just deduct that. Okay.
18 MR. KNOEPFLE: Now, the savings that have been
19 estimated that you could expect from the consolidation plan,
20 if all the workload came in as originally planned, you'd be
21 talking about $31.6 million in steady state recurring
22 savings.

1 If nothing comes in from a contractor, you're
2 talking about $9 million in recurring savings. If you allow
3 for the 20 percent factor that we've talked about previously,
4 your steady state savings would be about 13.2.
5 COMMISSIONER COX: So, Glenn, if they bid and won
6 roughly 20 percent on a lower bid, we would make back our
7 one-time cost just in a two-year period or a little over
8 that?
9 MR. KNOEPFLE: A little over two years, yes. We
10 will move to Slide 9. If you look at the cost, the
11 comparative cost for realigning Letterkenny, the one-time
12 cost to accomplish that effort would be about $106 million,
13 and the steady state savings, as predicted by the COBRA
14 analysis, would be $30 million. The economic impact on the
15 community would be about 6.5 percent. Are there any
16 questions?
17 (No response.)
18 MR. KNOEPFLE: The next couple of charts, 10 and
19 12, show us a comparison of a number of different factors of
20 the facilities that are potentially impacted. We're talking
21 about the number of people that are currently involved,
22 directly involved, with the missile maintenance workload at

1 the various facilities and you'll see Letterkenny has 557
2 people actually today involved in that Hawk and Patriot work.
3 Anniston is the next largest, having 415 people involved in
4 the workload.
5 The labor rates are somewhat comparable.
6 Letterkenny's overall rate in 1992 was a little on the high
7 side, but then their utilization was down at the time,
8 because they were in the process of transitioning, m[illegible]g
9 out.
10 COMMISSIONER COX: They thought they were getti[illegible]
11 the missiles and so they were moving out all of the other
12 work.
13 MR. KNOEPFLE: Right. The whole thing about the
14 cost of the direct labor hours is it's totally dependent upon
15 the volume of workload that you have.
16 COMMISSIONER STUART: But, Glenn, as I read these
17 numbers, if we were to consolidate at Letterkenny, Red River,
18 Anniston and Tobyhanna would be affected and lose those
19 positions?
20 MR. KNOEPFLE: Yes, sir.
21 MR. COOK: One of the things to bear in mind,
22 Commissioner Stuart, is that the Army did do an extensive

1 study of missile consolidation and came down with Letterkenn
2 as being the optimal place to effect that consolidation, so
3 in those studies, I think, they did some in-depth analysis t
4 support that. Certainly, things have changed in terms of
5 workload and so on of force structure, but I think the tenet
6 of that study are probably still very valid.
7 COMMISSIONER STUART: That's very helpful.
8 MR. KNOEPFLE: Charts 11 and 13. We're going to
9 look at Alameda now. No, what we want is 11 and 13. We war
10 to look at the size of the existing facility. Letterkenny
11 has 231,000 square feet dedicated to tactical missile
12 maintenance. Anniston has 206,000 square feet. Hill Air
13 Force Base has about 80,000, if I recall up there -- no,
14 40,000.
15 There are other places that could be considered a
16 alternatives to Letterkenny if the decision was ma[illegible] to
17 close. In our visits, we discussed these possib[illegible] wi
18 the officials. Anniston, Hill Air Force Base, A[illegible]
19 seemed to have facilities available and an interest to
20 accommodate this consolidation if the Commission should
21 choose not to do it at Letterkenny.
22 COMMISSIONER STUART: But the impact is pretty low

1 at the bottom of that page, the impacts on workforce?
2 MR. KNOEPFLE: Yes, sir. The impact on the
3 workforce there is if you take those employees away from t
4 facilities and, of course, you can see that it's a major b
5 to Letterkenny. Without the missile consolidation workloa
6 Letterkenny's utilization rates would be down in the 30
7 percent range by 1997-98.
8 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: And with it, where are
9 they?
10 MR. KNOEPFLE: Excuse me?
11 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: With that workload, they
12 are -- where is the Letterkenny utilization rate?
13 MR. COOK: It would be up around 90 percent,
14 maintaining the artillery workload, and 20 percent of the
15 contractor effort recalled.
16 MR. KNOEPFLE: We'll move ahead to Slide 14. To
17 wrap this thing up, we'll try to talk about the pros and c
18 once again. The pros, the things that seem to be in favor
19 a consolidation program, you would be consolidating simil
20 work currently done at nine locations into a single site,
21 you would have some overhead savings and reduce overhead
22 costs.

1 You could expect annual savings ranging betw
2 nine and 31.6 million dollars as we discussed p[illegible]ly
3 The down side of it all is that we're not really [illegible] wh
4 the total impact on Letterkenny's utilization rate is go
5 to be in the 1998 timeframe. If the artillery workload

6 away, you're down in the 57-58 percent range, which is pretty
7 close to what DOD predicted.
8 Also, I guess as has been said previously, the
9 utilization rates at the losing sites would suffer somewhat
10 as a result of taking work away from these activities, like,
11 for example, Anniston Army Depot's utilization rate would
12 probably go down by five to 10 percent.
13 COMMISSIONER COX: Mr. Chairman, I have a motion,
14 if appropriate.
15 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Before you bring your motion, I
16 just want to say one thing and that is, that this Commission
17 has wrestled for months over the issue of consolidation.
18 Everybody that I've spoken to inside Congress, outside, in
19 the Pentagon, in the administration and private sector,
20 recognizes the logic of consolidation.
21 The problem is, of course, no one really wants to
22 give up anything. You have tremendous service jealousies

1 with regard to that which they do. There's -- it's almost
2 impossible to get the services to cooperate. They'll all
3 testify and say, "Oh, we're robust when it comes to
4 interservicing."
5 Correct me if I'm wrong. My recollection is, on
6 all the services, interservicing yields or totals about three
7 percent, and no one really can deny that, but one by one, the
8 services are saying, "Well, we believe that and we're more
9 generous than somebody else," and "We give six percent," and
10 "We give more away for interservicing than we get," and
11 "We're not going to give any more unless we get some," and so
12 therefore, nothing, and nothing happens.
13 This is a situation where the Army itself
14 recommended interservicing not long ago for, I think, good
15 and compelling reasons. It was interrupted and now there's a
16 recommendation not to do it. Secondly, it's a situation
17 where any reasonable anticipated volume of work will make up
18 whatever efficiencies occurs by non-interservicing, it seems
19 to me.
20 Thirdly, let me say that this Commission would like
21 to have a magic wand and effect interservicing in all
22 commodities but we cannot do it. It's probably impossible to

1 do it, either by this Commission or a Commission devoted only
2 with regard to that issue of interservicing, but we tried it
3 mightily and we are continuing to try to carve out those
4 commodity areas that are more receptive to interservicing
5 than others.
6 We looked at fixed wing and it was too complex, too
7 much disagreement with regard to capacity, too many different
8 facilities spread all over the country among all the services
9 doing some work and so, we had to reject a very ambitious
10 effort that we started in the very beginning with regard to
11 fixed wing interservicing and consolidation.
12 We carved out four areas to concentrate on,
13 thinking that it's within the real world of
14 accomplishability. This, it seems to me, is one area where
15 we can make a mark and we can make a beginning, and a
16 worthwhile beginning. It's not radical by this Commission.
17 We're confirming the studies of GAO and the Army just a
18 couple of years ago that it makes sense. The cost savings
19 are compelling if we do it.
20 I feel strongly that in this particular instance, I
21 mean, it's not changing the landscape of the world but a
22 journey of a thousand miles has to begin someplace, and we

might as well begin here. That's my feeling. I'll entertain
a motion.
3 COMMISSIONER COX: Mr. Chairman, I move that the
4 Commission find the Secretary of Defense deviated
5 substantially from final criteria 1 and 4. Therefore, the
6 Commission rejects the Secretary's recommendation on
7 Letterkenny Army Depot, Pennsylvania, and instead adopts the
8 following recommendation:
9 Letterkenny Army Depot will remain open.
10 Consolidate tactical missile maintenance at the depot as
11 originally planned. Add tactical missile maintenance
12 workload currently being accomplished by the Marine Corps
13 Logistics Base in Barstow, California, to the consolidation
14 plan.
15 Retain current artillery workload at Letterkenny.
16 Retain the Systems Integration Management Activity East at
17 Letterkenny Depot Activity until the Defense Information
18 System Agency completes its review of activities relocated
19 under the DMRD 918. Relocate Depot Systems Command to Rock
20 Island Arsenal, Illinois, and consolidate with the Armament,
21 Munitions and Chemical Compound Command into the Industrial
22 Operations Command, as approved by the 1991 Commission.

1 The Commission finds this recommendation is
2 consistent with the force structure plan and final criteria.
3 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Do I hear a second to the
4 motion?
5 COMMISSIONER STUART: Second.
6 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Seconded by Commissioner Stuart.
7 The motion was by Commissioner Cox. Any discussion on the
8 motion?
9 COMMISSIONER COX: I think you said it very well,
10 Mr. Chairman.
11 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Any discussion on the motion?
12 Any amendments to the motion or substitutes to the motion?
13 (No response.)
14 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Hearing none, the Commission
15 will vote. We'll start with Commissioner McPherson.
16 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: Aye.
17 MS. CHESTON: Commissioner McPherson votes "aye."
18 CHAIRMAN COURTER: The Chair votes aye.
19 MS. CHESTON: Commissioner Courter votes "aye."
20 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner Stuart.
21 COMMISSIONER STUART: Aye.
22 MS. CHESTON: Commissioner Stuart votes "aye."

1 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner Byron.
2 COMMISSIONER BYRON: Aye.
3 MS. CHESTON: Commissioner Byron votes "aye."
4 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner Johnson.
5 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Aye.
6 MS. CHESTON: Commissioner Johnson votes "aye."
7 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner Bowman.
8 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: Aye.
9 MS. CHESTON: Commissioner Bowman votes "aye."
10 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner Cox.
11 COMMISSIONER COX: Aye.
12 MS. CHESTON: Commissioner Cox votes "aye." On the
13 motion to reject the Secretary's recommendation on
14 Letterkenny and to retain missile consolidation work at
15 Letterkenny, the vote is seven in favor, zero opposed. The
16 motion passes.
17 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Let's proceed.
18 MR. COOK: Mr. Chairman, the next interservice
19 issue entails the wheeled vehicle potential for consolidation
20 and interservicing at Tooele Army Depot. Again, if you will
21 turn to Tab 3 in your books -- I beg your pardon, Tab 2 in
22 your books --

1 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Could you suspend, please, Mr.
2 Cook?
3 MR. COOK: Yes, sir.
4 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Those ladies and gentlemen that
5 are leaving, if you'd do so quietly and those picking up

6 papers do so quietly, you may proceed, thank you.
7 MR. COOK: Thank you, sir. The wheeled vehicle
8 category --
9 CHAIRMAN COURTER: The room will please come to
10 order. Thank you very much. You may proceed.
11 MR. COOK: Thank you, sir. The wheeled vehicle
12 potential consolidation interservicing issues that attend to
13 Tooele Army Depot will again be discussed by Mr. Knoepfle.
14 MR. KNOEPFLE: What we have here is a listing of
15 the three sites that are potential candidates for
16 interservicing. You have Tooele Army Depot which has already
17 been recommended by the Secretary for realignment, Marine
18 Corps Base Barstow and Albany were added as potential
19 candidates for interservicing.
20 We'll move ahead to Slide 18. These are the issues
21 that we'll be discussing that are highlighted there. The
22 other issues we can discuss if need be. Slide 19 provides

1 some static information about the bases that we're going to
2 be talking about.
3 Tooele Army Depot has annual operating costs of
4 $104 million; Marine Corps Base Albany, 52 million; Barstow,
5 57 million. The steady state savings from the Tooele
6 realignment are $51 million. The steady state savings, you
7 have to understand, now, for Barstow and Albany, we're
8 talking about total closure of those facilities, at $29
9 million.
10 The cost to accomplish that closure for Barstow is
11 357 million. Based on the COBRA analysis that we got for
12 Albany, it's an $846 million cost to close and a long, long
13 time to ever recover that in terms of savings.
14 COMMISSIONER STUART: Can I ask you why is the cost
15 to close that wonderful Tooele Depot so light?
16 MR. KNOEPFLE: The Marine Corps, the way they're
17 structured, they are multi-commodity depots, to include
18 maintenance activities, storage facilities and what-not, and
19 basically, the whole Marine Corps Logistics System revolves
20 around these two activities, and if we close Barstow or
21 Albany, you have to kind of replicate it someplace, and
22 that's one of the prime reasons. There's a lot of

1 construction to duplicate, while it's already there.
2 COMMISSIONER COX: And that couldn't just, say,
3 move to Tooele, because there are so many different
4 commodities?
5 MR. KNOEPFLE: Well, you could move the maintenance
6 activity to a wide variety of different places. As a matter
7 of fact --
8 COMMISSIONER COX: But the rest of it?
9 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: But Ms. Cox's question is:
10 You could not take what's done at Barstow and what's done at
11 Albany and transfer it to Tooele only?
12 MR. KNOEPFLE: No, it has to go to --
13 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: Her question related to that.
14 MR. KNOEPFLE: I'm sorry. It has to go to a wide
15 range of places.
16 COMMISSIONER BYRON: Glenn, the question that we
17 keep wrestling with and that is, total usage of a depot and a
18 facility, and the debate that we had, I believe, at Barstow
19 and Albany are operating at almost 100 percent?
20 MR. KNOEPFLE: Better than 100 percent.
21 COMMISSIONER BYRON: Tooele and wheeled vehicles is
22 currently operating at?

1 MR. KNOEPFLE: 32 to 35 percent, depending.
2 COMMISSIONER BYRON: What were the numbers that if
3 all the wheeled vehicles from Barstow and Albany came to
4 Tooele, it would move them up to?
5 MR. KNOEPFLE: 66 percent, based on our analysis.
6 COMMISSIONER STUART: Glenn, you showed it as high
7 at 66. I've heard a lower number.
8 MR. KNOEPFLE: Some analyses will show as low a
9 percent, I believe.
10 COMMISSIONER BYRON: I think 56 stuck in --
11 MR. KNOEPFLE: 45?
12 COMMISSIONER BYRON: 56 was one figure that was
13 utilized.
14 MR. KNOEPFLE: One of the factors, as you recall in
15 our visit, too, is to make Tooele prosper, it would require
16 not only transfer of vehicular workload from Albany and
17 Barstow, but also, the Army has a tendency now to do their
18 depot type maintenance at the 80 facilities that you talked
19 about earlier.
20 COMMISSIONER BYRON: Yes.
21 MR. KNOEPFLE: That's another important factor that
22 needs to be considered.

1 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: Glenn, just before we leave
2 No. 19, having visited Tooele and Albany, when I look at th
3 Albany costs to close, I think they're high, quite frankly.
4 MR. KNOEPFLE: Yes, sir.
5 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: And maybe even Barstow.
6 MR. KNOEPFLE: Yes, they are.
7 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: I didn't visit Barstow, but
8 as I take a look at those, those numbers look large, althoug
9 you don't need to explain to me why they're different from
10 Tooele. I understand that.
11 MR. COOK: They're showing a $56 million steady
12 state expense over the out-years and we question that, too,
13 Commissioner Bowman. Part of it has to do with their
14 maintenance philosophy, laying in spares, constant
15 transportation costs to Tooele, as opposed to Albany, so
16 those things are probably valid costs. Having sa[illegible]t,
17 there's no question that that's high.
18 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: Right, I just wanted to
19 that comment.
20 MR. KNOEPFLE: Slide 20. I show you the cumulative
21 economic impact.
22 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: Did we determine, a couple of

1 days ago or last week, we had real questions as to what wa
2 the proximity of Tooele to Salt Lake City?
3 MR. KNOEPFLE: I'm the one that probably caused
4 that inconsistency in the testimony. Now, Tooele Army Dep
5 is about a 30 to 40-minute drive from Salt Lake City. Sin
6 last Friday, we've been in touch with Tooele Army Depot an
7 we were told that 62 percent of the Tooele employees do, i
8 fact, live in Tooele County and 38 percent commute from
9 somewhere in the Salt Lake City metropolitan area.
10 COMMISSIONER STUART: So, if you use this MSA,
11 you've got to destroy the numbers.
12 MR. KNOEPFLE: Absolutely.
13 MR. COOK: Yes, sir, you sure do.
14 MR. KNOEPFLE: So, the 31 percent is closer to
15 maybe what it should be.
16 MR. COOK: When we used the Salt Lake City MSA last
17 time, Commissioner Stuart, we had an inordinately low figu
18 for the cumulative economic impact.
19 COMMISSIONER BYRON: I haven't been to Albany,
20 Georgia, but I have been to Barstow, and you've got 1900
21 civilian employees at Barstow and what are you using as yo
22 metropolitan statistical area, because I've got news for yo

1 There's nothing there.
2 MR. KNOEPFLE: Yes, ma'am, I agree with you.
3 COMMISSIONER BYRON: You're talking about less than
4 one-tenth of a percent impact?
5 MR. KNOEPFLE: What happened here is these are DOD

6 facts and numbers. This is based upon a San Bernardino
7 Valley standard statistical metropolitan area which is, I'm
8 told the area is the hugest, the largest county anywhere in
9 the United States. It's a land mass that's about the size of
10 West Virginia, so obviously there's lots and lots of people
11 there, but Barstow is an isolated community in the middle of
12 that.
13 COMMISSIONER BYRON: And it's on the other side of
14 the mountains?
15 MR. KNOEPFLE: Yes, ma'am.
16 COMMISSIONER BYRON: And it's the only show in
17 town?
18 MR. KNOEPFLE: If you were to consider a major
19 realignment of Barstow, the economic impact would be --
20 COMMISSIONER BYRON: I would say it would be up in
21 the twenties.
22 MR. KNOEPFLE: Yes.

1 MR. COOK: The problem is, Commissioner Byron, when
2 you have an MSA over a million strong and you've got 500
3 folks that are going to be unemployed still in that MSA.
4 COMMISSIONER BYRON: Well, if you're questioning
5 Tooele and Salt Lake City, I mean, you've got to play by the
6 same level playing field, so if you're questioning those
7 numbers, then you've got to play fair with Barstow and
8 Albany.
9 MR. COOK: Yes, ma'am, and in our attempt to play
10 fairly, we put them into the MSA where the base clearly
11 resides, which is the San Bernardino Riverside MSA.
12 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: And I just want to sum this
13 all up, because I think we all understand it, but I visited
14 two of these three facilities and they are magnificent
15 facilities, each one of them, but these numbers are not
16 numbers that I can relate to and just sum it up like that.
17 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Let me ask you a series of
18 questions and if you would, interrupt me if they're wrong, or
19 if you want to respond to them, Bob.
20 Although we don't know the precise figure, a figure
21 stands out in my mind and my notes that in order to ship the
22 wheeled vehicles from the Marine Corps Depots to Tooele,

1 you're talking in terms of an increased cost. I have
2 something like $36 million. Do we have a figure on that at
3 all?
4 MR. KNOEPFLE: That's if you realign both
5 activities, about $18 million for each.
6 CHAIRMAN COURTER: About $18 million to move the
7 vehicles back and forth for each one?
8 MR. KNOEPFLE: Yes, sir.
9 CHAIRMAN COURTER: I have also, which was testimony
10 from the Marine Corps, that because of their requirement for
11 maritime prepositioning, and therefore the fact that they
12 have to -- they have a very short timeframe, a short window
13 within which to repair their vehicles. In fact, they were
14 talking to us about the fact that it had to be done within, I
15 believe, 90 days. I believe it was 30 days off-load, 30 days
16 on-load and -- maybe it's 60 days.
17 MR. KNOEPFLE: Sixty days.
18 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Sixty days repair turn-around,
19 and since that would be impossible, shipping these things to
20 a different part of the country, they indicated to us, the
21 Marine Corps in their testimony, that the inventory pipeline
22 would have to be upgraded by about $120 million.

MR. KNOEPFLE: Yes, sir.
CHAIRMAN COURTER: Is that a confirmed figure or a
3 reasonable figure?
4 MR. KNOEPFLE: That's a reasonable figure and
5 that's included in the COBRA analysis that we talked about
6 earlier.
7 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: You may have already said
8 this, Glenn. You probably did. What would be the effect on
9 Tooele's utilization if you did take Albany and Barstow
10 wheeled vehicles?
11 MR. KNOEPFLE: Okay, we can jump ahead to Slide 22
12 and we've got that information presented. This is based upon
13 1994 projected workloads. Right now, you can predict a
14 utilization rate of 42 percent at Tooele Army Depot with just
15 workload, Army workload that's currently scheduled and
16 predicted to come in there.
17 Transferring work from Barstow would bring it up to
18 55 percent. Transferring just work from Albany would bring
19 it to 52 percent. Transferring work from Barstow and Albany
20 would bring it to 66 percent. Then again, if the Army were
21 to kind of require all of their depot-type work to be brought
22 into Tooele, you could bring it to 80 percent.

1 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: Speaking of that, the
2 Marines are quick to say that the Army hasn't done that and
3 to question why not. Why hasn't the Army sent the rest of
4 it?
5 MR. COOK: It's a cost figure, and I think that MAJ
6 Evans can certainly give some first-hand experiences, what he
7 went through when he was working on the issues.
8 MAJ EVANS: Sir, in a prior life at an Army
9 installation, I ran a direct support maintenance company and
10 back then, before the days of DBOF, the Defense Business
11 Operating Fund, it was more of a case of readiness.
12 Let's say, for example, a tank engine, if the
13 installation were to go zero balance on tank engines and we
14 needed a replacement to get a tank back on the field, then
15 what we'd do is we'd carry the tank engine or the best broken
16 one we had over to the Director of Logistics on the
17 installation.
18 Normally, we could get them to perform close to, if
19 not depot-level repair work on that engine. We could get the
20 engine back rather quickly, back in a vehicle, and we'd get
21 the tank back on the battlefield.
22 Nowadays, with the DBOF system and the commanders

1 on the installations have more control over their funds, both
2 good and bad. They are kind of out shopping now for the best
3 deal in town in order to save their money. The Director of
4 Logistics facilities are giving them a better price, so to
5 speak.
6 Additionally, in some cases, they are able to go
7 downtown to a local contractor and get work done, so that's
8 part of the system of what you're seeing now. Primarily,
9 it's in the case of secondary items that this is happening.
10 I've confirmed this not only with Tooele but with Anniston.
11 Anniston is feeling the pinch on tank engines, also, and
12 that's what is going on there, is the commanders on the
13 installations.
14 I'm not saying -- it may be when GEN Ballard talked
15 the other day and he kind of laid out what the Army policy
16 was from organization to depot level, and the fact that by
17 policy, they don't do that on an installation, by policy, he
18 was right, but since they are doing it, I'm not saying that's
19 necessarily bad for the Army because overall, they may be
20 saving money in the big picture.
21 COMMISSIONER STUART: They may be getting a better
22 deal.

1 MAJ EVANS: It will cause an effect on the depot
2 system overall, though, and again you're going to see
3 increase in excess capacity.
4 COMMISSIONER COX: But if you're going to hear Mr.
5 McPherson's question, Army is refusing to transfer this work

6 to Tooele or wherever but they want the Marine Corps to do
7 so?
8 MR. COOK: That's accurate. I suspect it will be
9 very difficult to ever get to the 89 percent and one could
10 make the case for the Army trying to get whale on the Marine
11 Corps.
12 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Let me mention something.
13 Tooele is not without its arguments, and I know there's a lot
14 of dollars that create a big burden, certainly, and we just
15 mentioned some of them. The capacity is a problem and the
16 additional cost of transferring equipment from one part of
17 the country to another, the increased $120-130 million for
18 the inventory because of the time delay, all sorts of other
19 arguments.
20 But, I mean, this is the type of a vote that really
21 makes you sick and I can say that with total and complete
22 honesty. I was at Tooele. They have a consolidated

1 maintenance facility which i the finest in America, perhaps
2 one of the finest in the world. It's brand new. The ribbon
3 cutting took place a couple, two or three years ago with
4 Secretary Cheney. It cost the United States taxpayers $115
5 million.
6 Tooele County will experience increased
7 unemployment by about 30 percent and Tooele is one of those
8 situations where we're asking them, that community, to house
9 our ammunition and to demilitarize our chemical weapons, but
10 we won't give you any real jobs. Those that you have, we're
11 taking away.
12 You have the most patriotic people, or among the
13 most, in any part of the country. The work ethic is
14 outstanding. Things don't rot our rust out in the desert, so
15 you don't have to build huge warehouses. You just line them
16 up for years and nothing happens to them because there's
17 almost no moisture in the air. The quality of life is
18 outstanding.
19 Then we run into this huge brick wall of money, but
20 it's a -- you know, we're between a rock and a hard place
21 here, and I feel pretty badly about the situation. I'm
22 throwing that out there just to remind everybody that it's a

1 very, very difficult situation, and a very extraordinarily
2 excruciatingly a difficult vote.
3 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: And I, having been to Tooele,
4 also, I second everything the Chairman said. Ready for a
5 motion, sir.
6 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: Ready for a motion, sir.
7 COMMISSIONER COX: If I could just ask Mrs. Byron,
8 you've brought up these 80-some facilities at various places.
9 In your view, is there any way to move some of that work to
10 Tooele? Does that make any sense? I mean, I think the
11 numbers on the Marine stuff to Tooele is just overwhelming
12 but maybe there's another option here.
13 COMMISSIONER BYRON: I brought it up when we had
14 the Secretary before us and GEN Sullivan last week. I
15 brought it up when we had the Army team before us last week,
16 trying to give an opportunity for them to discuss those
17 facilities.
18 Once again, it comes back to the point that
19 Commanders are not willing and are not enamored with losing
20 control of their equipment to a depot when they feel that
21 they have the capabilities for very sophisticated
22 intermediary maintenance on the military base. That way,

1 they keep control of their equipment.
2 I saw no movement whatsoever from either DOD or
3 from the Army in stating that they would look at that, that
4 it was something they would take into consideration, that
5 they were aware of the problem, that they were going to look
6 at it in the future, as this Commission wrestles with the
7 excess capacity that we have in our depot maintenar
8 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: Mr. Chairman, having [redacted]
9 all this and not having visited them, but having he[redacted]e
10 case made very strongly by the Utah delegation and hearing
11 everything you've said, it seems to me, nevertheless, that
12 the Pentagon's recommendation is the only one this Commissio
13 can follow.
14 MOTION
15 So, I move that the Commission find that the
16 Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the
17 force structure plan and final criteria and, therefore, tha
18 the Commission adopt the following recommendation of the
19 Secretary of Defense:
20 Realign Tooele Army Depot by reducing it to a depot
21 activity and placing it under the command and control of Re
22 River Army Depot, Texas. Retain conventional ammunition

1 storage and the chemical demilitarization mission. The depo
2 workload will move to other depot maintenance activities
3 including the private sector. The activities of the depot
4 not associated with the remaining mission will be
5 inactivated, transferred or eliminated, as appropriate.
6 COMMISSIONER BYRON: I second it.
7 CHAIRMAN COURTER: The motion has been made by
8 Commissioner McPherson and seconded by Commissioner Byron.
9 Is there any discussion on the motion?
10 (No response.)
11 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Seeing there is no discussion,
12 we'll start out with Commissioner Rebecca Cox.
13 COMMISSIONER COX: Aye.
14 MS. CHESTON: Commissioner Cox votes "aye."
15 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner McPherson.
16 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: Aye.
17 MS. CHESTON: Commissioner McPherson votes "a[redacted]
18 CHAIRMAN COURTER: The Chair votes aye.
19 MS. CHESTON: I'm sorry. I didn't hear that.
20 CHAIRMAN COURTER: I voted aye.
21 MS. CHESTON: Chairman Courter votes "aye."
22 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner Stuart.

1 COMMISSIONER STUART: Aye.
2 MS. CHESTON: Commissioner Stuart votes "aye."
3 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner Byron.
4 COMMISSIONER BYRON: Aye.
5 MS. CHESTON: Commissioner Byron votes "aye."
6 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner Johnson.
7 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Aye.
8 MS. CHESTON: Commissioner Johnson votes "aye."
9 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner Bowman.
10 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: Aye.
11 MS. CHESTON: And Commissioner Bowman votes "aye."
12 The motion is to accept the Secretary's recommendation to
13 realign Tooele. The motion is seven in favor, zero oppose
14 The motion passes.
15 MR. BORDEN: Mr. Chairman, that wraps up all the
16 Army proposals by DOD and then the additional ones to look
17 by the Commission and so now, we'll get into the Air Forc
18 area, and we'll start with large aircraft.
19 MR. CIRILLO: Good morning, Mr. Chairman and
20 Commissioners. In front of you, you have the book and we
21 be going right to Tab 1 for this portion of the presentati
22 We'll put up here the map, Slide 1 and Slide 2, and the

1 of aircraft categories that were evaluated from [redacted]r
2 Force. As a reminder, the bold aircraft categori[redacted]ill
3 discussed today and the first thing tomorrow as far as t
4 Air Force.

1 that was a requirement put on by OSD. OSD wanted an 18-inch
2 floor at least for the computer center, just because
3 underneath the floor, you have chilled water and all your
electrical cables and communication cables.
5 After looking at 12-inch floors and 18-inch floors
6 and checking some of the background data, we think 18-inch
7 floors allows room for expansion as a proper guideline.
8 Next slide, please.
9 At the Commission, we had Dr. Mitch Karpman do some
10 statistical analysis on the data. And we came up with our
11 new ranking and also a DOD adjusted ranking. The DOD
12 adjusted ranking takes into account the changes and accuracy
13 of the data that came in.
14 As you can see, for the most part, our ranking and
15 their ranking are approximately the same. There's only a
16 couple sites there at the bottom that they differ at all.
17 The Army ranking used a mean and a standard deviation to
18 determine what rank they would have, while the DOD adjusted
19 ranking used a maximum and minimum, a very level type of
20 determination.
21 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: What changes does the staff
22 recommend to the DOD?

1 LTC MILLER: We would suggest that our ranking
2 shows San Diego comes on the list; Warner-Robins comes off
3 the list. However, we would probably suggested that, since
4 San Diego isn't supposed to close until '96, and since this
5 is going to be revisited --
6 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Could you go a little slower? I
7 think we got you there, but speak a little bit more clearly.
8 LTC MILLER: Okay. Since San Diego was supposed to
9 close in '96, according to the megacenter -- the way they
10 were going to run their megacenters, then we would probably
11 recommend that San Diego remain open and Warner-Robins remain
open.
CHAIRMAN COURTER: And Warner-Robins.
14 LTC MILLER: And we revisit in 1995 BRAC.
15 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: So what do we have to do to
16 change the DOD recommendation? Nothing?
17 CHAIRMAN COURTER: No, Warner-Robins, I guess, we
18 would have to change, right?
19 LTC MILLER: It would be a motion 2 is what it
20 would be. We would be taking Cleveland off the list because
21 of data errors. Cleveland, which was ranked initially 14th,
22 is now number 24. Cleveland would go off the list. We would

1 add San Diego to the list and McClellan to the list.
2 McClellan was not on the list, only because they thought the
3 Air Force base was going to close, or else it would have been
4 on the list in the first place.
5 MR. COOK: Alternate motion 2 is the one that
6 applies.
7 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Does that cover all the
8 contingencies, alternate motion 2?
9 MR. COOK: It does, Mr. Chairman.
10 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Sir, I move alternate motion
11 2.
12 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Why don't you read the first
13 part of the motion.
14 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: I move the Commission find
15 the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from criteria
16 2 and 3 and, therefore, the Commission rejects the
17 Secretary's recommendation on DOD-wide data center
18 consolidation plan and instead adopts the following
19 recommendation: And the only changes is adds McClellan and
San Diego and deletes Cleveland and Warner-Robins.
CHAIRMAN COURTER: And we have a hard copy of the
22 motion?

1 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Yes, sir.
2 MS. HOOK: Would you please read the latter
3 language on the next page?
4 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: The end language?
5 MS. HOOK: The last sentence.
6 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: The Commission finds this
7 recommendation --
8 LTC MILLER: Commissioner Johnson?
9 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Yes.
10 LTC MILLER: Did you just say it deleted Warner
11 Robins? It did not delete Warner-Robins. Okay.
12 COMMISSIONER STUART: It was accurate.
13 COMMISSIONER BYRON: It adds Cleveland, San
14 Diego --
15 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: I'm sorry. I read the wrong
16 one. Alternate motion two, the stem is the same. It adds
17 McClellan and San Diego and deletes Cleveland.
18 I move the Commission find the Secretary of Defense
19 deviated substantially from criteria 2 and 3 and, therefore,
20 the Commission rejects the Secretary's recommendation on DOD
21 wide data center consolidation plan and instead adopts the
22 following recommendation: Disestablish the 43 DISA

1 information process centers listed below.
2 And it's the same as the DOD, except adding
3 McClellan and San Diego. It deletes Cleveland. And the last
4 line says the Commission finds this recommendation is
5 consistent with the force structure plan and final criteria.
6 COMMISSIONER MCPHERSON: Second.
7 CHAIRMAN COURTER: The motion is made by
8 Commissioner McPherson. It's made by Johnson and seconded by
9 McPherson.
10 Any discussion on the motion?
11 (No response.)
12 CHAIRMAN COURTER: All those in favor, say "aye."
13 (Chorus of ayes.)
14 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Opposed?
15 (No response.)
16 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Passed. That does it. Before
17 we go -- that does it?
18 MR. COOK: Yes.
19 CHAIRMAN COURTER: One last thing that I have, and
20 that is that we have a gentleman with us that has been with
21 the Base Closing Commission since 1991. And he will be
22 leaving relatively soon to a command position outside of

1 Washington, D.C. And he has been a stalwart help to the
2 Commission.
3 And he has had a remarkable career in the Air
4 Force. And he has become a close personal friend to us all.
5 We'll miss him very much. Colonel Wayne Purser.
6 Sir, thank you very much for everything. We really
7 appreciate it.
8 (Applause.)
9 MR. BEHRMANN: Mr. Chairman, I just would like all
10 of my friends across America to know that we could not have
11 done our job without Wayne. He has done everything from
12 vacuum our carpets in the middle of the night to get us
13 classified briefs within an hour's notice. And he's one of
14 my closest friends. And I greatly appreciate his help.
15 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Thank you very much. The other
16 commissioners may want to say something at this juncture.
17 Commissioner Bob Stuart is recognized.
18 COMMISSIONER STUART: I want to second what Matt
19 has said about Wayne and broaden that.
20 Wayne, you have been singularly cooperative. I've
21 gone two rounds on this. I think my secretary's in love with
22 you.

(Laughter.)
COMMISSIONER STUART: She thinks you're the most cooperative person. And the complexity -- I don't think the public out here realizes how difficult arranging our respective schedules and the patience required. Wayne, you've done everything that has made all this happen.
But I also want to broaden my comments. I've worked in a lot of businesses and done a lot of things. But this staff that you've collected here, Mr. Chairman, is really outstanding. A lot of us as commissioners have called up late at night, we have been over there late at night. They're all working. We go home at 11 o'clock; they're there until 2 o'clock.
They're talented, dedicated. I congratulate and thank all of you, because you've helped to make us understand all these issues. Insofar as we have handled ourselves correctly, it has been with your support. Thank you very much. CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner Byron?
COMMISSIONER BYRON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As you all have noted, I have been keeping a tally sheet as we go along. And you will be interested to know that the Commission just cast its 118th vote in our process. And none

of those votes would have been possible, or we would not have been able to address any of those had we not had the backup of the staff.
And sometimes people have said we have got too much detail. Other times, we haven't gotten enough detail. And, if they don't bring all the backup slides over, we are sure to ask for them. If they bring them, then they wonder why they have to carry them back in the middle of the night. And yet that is the process.
And, as you have said again and again, it is an open process. Fortunately, in the last few days, the staff has been given at least an opportunity for the American public to identify their faces, because prior to that, all they heard was the commissioners and those individuals testifying in support of their communities.
But, in the last few days, they have seen what a fine staff this is. And they're the ones that I certainly hope will not show up to work next weekend. Now, that does not mean that they're not going to be all week finalizing the report, because it has to, as you know, be on the President's desk on Thursday afternoon.
But I certainly would hope no one is at the office

on Friday, Saturday, Sunday, Monday. It just happens to be a long weekend.
CHAIRMAN COURTER: Thank you. We're relieved to know that you weren't writing a diary with all those notes.
(Laughter.)
CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner Johnson.
COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: I join the other commissioners in thanking the staff. I also enlarge that to all the commissioners as a group. We come from many different backgrounds. We compliment each other. And I believe that we have worked well together under the leadership of our Chairman.
He certainly had enormous patience with us newcomers. He and Bob did it once before. He has had tremendous insights into all the issues and provided persuasive leadership.
Lastly, I would like to say to the American people, we thank you for the opportunity to serve you in this role. I hope that we have always kept the best interest of our nation first. We have hurt some communities. We have helped some. But I hope we're judged, as always, focusing on what's best for America. And America is what we're all for. Thank

you.
CHAIRMAN COURTER: Beautiful statement. Thank you very much.
Commissioner Peter Bowman.
COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: I happen to know that Wayne Purser, underneath his Air Force blue uniform there, has -- I've got to say this correctly here -- a red "S," symblomatic of Superman. I was very careful to pronounce that correctly. Unlike the Bill Cosby version, you want a red "S."
I viewed these hearings that we have been conducting in two phases. One was the investigative hearings and the site and regional hearings that we conducted, site visits. And that was emotionally-draining -- excuse me. I wanted to say physically draining and sometimes emotionally draining.
This last five or six days -- I kind of lose track after awhile -- has been both physically demanding and brutal on at least my psyche and emotions. And I know that probably pales in comparison to what people across the country have been feeling, both the highs of the joys when it went their way, and the lows when it didn't.
I am very, very thankful for all those who allowed

me and the other commissioners to be a part of what I call a democracy in action, to be doing something for the country. I will never have this opportunity to perform in this manner again, I am sure.
I think each of the commissioners is one of the most outstanding people that I've met and known. And we have only been together for a couple of months. But we certainly have gotten to know each other very, very well as we traveled together, voted together, and just listened to the communities making the presentations.
Some people have said we're pretty good as individuals and really great as a team. And I feel that personally.
The staff, totally supportive. That's an understatement, and it's in bold and capital letters. So thanks for everything that you did and will continue to do as you continue to pay us, I think, as time goes on, for travel claims and things. The government's a little slow sometimes, but they always come through.
MR. BEHRMANN: We can turn our attention to that now, Mr. Bowman.
COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: I know.

MR. BEHRMANN: You'll get your check real soon, sir.
(Laughter.)
COMMISSIONER BYRON: But not next weekend.
COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: I will always treasure these memories as long as I live, and I'm just very, very grateful for the experience.
CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner Rebecca Cox, who is busier than anybody, having a son as well as closing bases.
COMMISSIONER COX: Thank you.
I just want to join everyone in both thanking our fellow commissioners and the staff, which certainly, in all of my years in working on staffs and running staffs, working with staffs, are really the most incredible staff that I've ever seen put together on one team. And they certainly deserve more credit than they will ever get.
Let me add to that, though, because there's an enormous amount of work that went into this whole Commission both from the Department of Defense, whose really main job was and to whom we gave extreme deference as far as their decisions and their numbers, sometimes even though they might not have been our decisions ourselves. And to our staff, who

1 spent an enormous amount of time doing that.
2 But the staff worked with thousands of people
3 across the United States in communities and their elected
4 officials. And those people, probably as much as anybody,
5 brought to this staff both expertise and information. They
6 helped us as we went across the country. They have been,
7 some of them, at every one of these hearings all the way
8 across the country.
9 And those are the people who are most affected by
10 it. But they are probably, as much as anyone, the folks who
11 have really brought to this process both the human element
12 and, in many cases, the actual data that we relied on and the
13 different issues that we ended up looking at.
14 And so I want to thank them, because I think
15 without the communities and those folks who represent them,
16 we could not have made the kind of decisions we made. And
17 they may not always be what the communities have wanted, but
18 without them, this process would not be possible. It is, in
19 fact, important to the future of the national security.
20 And I might just add that, as we go out of the '93
21 BRAC and into the '95 BRAC, in looking at the budget
22 proposals, which include another 120 some odd billion dollars

1 in cuts in defense, that process will be even more important.
2 And I hope that we will be as lucky in the future with both
3 the staff and the communities that are involved.
4 Because, given the amount of data and, frankly, the
5 softness of some of the data, we'll need them. So I thank
6 them.
7 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner, thank you very
8 much.
9 And, finally, we would like to hear from
10 Commissioner McPherson, the wise wordsmith from Washington.
11 COMMISSIONER MCPHERSON: Well, I think I've talked
12 about enough during these last few days. Everybody has heard
13 plenty from me.
14 I do want to recognize a few people, though. There
15 are three de facto commissioners who are not sitting up here,
16 but out there. One of them is Commissioner Sonny Montgomery
17 of Mississippi, who has been at virtually -- I think at every
18 meeting every day that we have ever had here in Washington.
19 And, if there ever was a representative of the people who
20 cared as much about the premiere installation in his area,
21 his district, I do not know who it was. But Sonny has been
22 here at all times.

1 The two others are Mayor Joe Riley of Charleston
2 and Howard Chapman, who is the director of transportation at
3 Charleston. They have been there at every moment. As I
4 turned every corner of hotels and far off states, there would
5 be Howard or there would be Mayor Riley reminding me of the
6 jeopardy that Charleston was in.
7 Senator Thurmond, your tenacity in coming here,
8 your dedication in being here is quite extraordinary.
9 And Senator Hollings, yours -- and I know that
10 Governor Campbell has been giving his days and nights to
11 working and trying to save what he could for Charleston. And
12 I hope we have done that today. I hope we have put together
13 the pieces that will make it possible for Charleston to
14 survive in company with the United States Navy and with the
15 military.
16 As for the staff, I've worked in government for 13
17 years, and I've been in law practice ever since then. I
18 wrote a book about all that one time. Those of you who are
19 lucky enough to find it in a second-hand store someplace will
20 see that in the chapter called "Army and State," I described
21 the office I had in the Pentagon.
22 I had five colonels in my office. And, given where

1 it was, it was sort of a back water, but an extremely
2 interesting back water. And these colonels knew they weren't
3 going to make general. And that didn't have the slightest
4 effect on them, so far as their commitment and their
5 dedication.
6 I never met five individuals more positive, who
7 were more like what an old boss of mine, Lyndon Johnson,
8 called "can-do men." They were can-do men. And I want to
9 tell you that I did not discover that quality in the people
10 around me since then until I found it in this staff. This is
11 a can-do staff.
12 And that seems like such a cliche, but it
13 represents the difference between somebody who looks at you
14 and says, "Gosh, there are a lot of problems with that" and
15 somebody who looks at you and says, "We can do that. We'll
16 do it. We'll put that together. We'll find those numbers.
17 We'll make those comparisons. We'll help you try to make the
18 right decision."
19 And that's the message that came to me from you
20 guys all the time, every one of you, and nobody any more than
21 Wayne. There wasn't any time or any need, any simple
22 connection, any cutting through of red tape that Wayne didn't

1 do, didn't perform. And I know I'm just immensely grateful
2 that he was there to do it.
3 Matt and Ben and Alex and Ed and Frank and all you
4 guys who ran this just have my profound gratitude. It would
5 have been miserable without you. As it is, while my body has
6 given out, my mind, curiously my heart, very strangely,
7 regards this experience with real poignancy. I really have a
8 strong feeling.
9 I guess I'll end up with this. I am, as the world
10 knows, I guess -- the world that knows anything about me
11 knows -- a committed Democrat and have been forever and keep
12 hoping that the Democratic Administration will succeed and
13 triumph over all its foes. And when I was appointed to this
14 Commission, I knew that the Chairman was going to be a
15 conservative Republican Congressman from New Jersey.
16 And, in the first place, I was kind of astonished
17 by that; A, that the Congressman who did it one time would
18 have the temerity to do it again; and second that Bill
19 Clinton would, without batting an eye, reappoint him and make
20 him the Chairman.
21 And all I can say is that I am profoundly glad he
22 did. Jim Courter is the best Chairman of anything that I

1 ever worked on. And that includes quite a lot of things. He
2 is a patriot. He is a straight shooter. There's not one
3 decision that he has made that I have ever had the slightest
4 feeling of partisanship about.
5 And it has caused me to be a better man and a
6 better member of this Commission and has taken away some of
7 the partisanship that is inherent in my nature and has caused
8 me to cast votes and do things that I'm proud of now and that
9 were hard to do, because the job we're doing, as everyone on
10 Earth has told us -- you remember the litany, "I don't envy
11 your job. It's the hardest job I've ever seen. We have got
12 to downsize. The Cold War is over. We have got to cut out
13 bases. But" --
14 There was always that "but." Not mine. Well, we
15 went through, and we eliminated a lot, and I think we shaped
16 a series of recommendations to the Congress and to the
17 President that is worthy. And it would not have been done
18 without the leadership of Jim Courter.
19 (Applause.)
20 COMMISSIONER BYRON: May I add one thing? For
21 those of you that have watched this seven members of this
22 Commission pull together, there is one key component that we

1 have always had in the back of our mind, and that is the
2 responsibility and the challenges and the fact that, within
3 the legislation, it's stated that, were we to find different
4 than the Secretary's recommendation, we would have to find
5 substantial deviation.
6 And to make sure that we understood all of those
7 facts, because none of us, now that we have finally finished
8 our deliberations, cares to spend the next period of time in
9 litigation, there has been a General Counsel of this
10 Commission that on a regular basis has reminded us what is
11 within the parameters of the law and what is without the
12 parameters of the law.
13 And so, for Sheila and her assistant, Mary Anne,
14 both of them who were not terribly hefty in the beginning, I
15 am glad the deliberations are over, because I'm not sure
16 whether they could have handled another week of no sleep, no
17 food, and the pace. I think we got our final deliberations
18 just in time to be able to have two fantastic General
19 Counsels that are now ready to go continue their legal
20 careers in another manner.
21 COMMISSIONER STUART: Here, here. I second
22 Beverly's comments.

1 (Applause.)
2 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Any other comments by ladies and
3 gentlemen of the Commission?
4 I'll entertain a motion to adjourn.
5 COMMISSIONER STUART: I move.
6 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Is there a second to the motion?
7
8 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: Second.
9 COMMISSIONER STUART: The Commission is adjourned.
10 All those in favor, say "aye."
11 (Chorus of ayes.)
12 CHAIRMAN COURTER: We are adjourned.
13 (Whereupon, at 4:15 p.m., the Commission was
14 adjourned.)
15 * * * * *

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1 INITIAL ENTRY TRAINING/BRANCH SCHOOLS

2 Fort McClellan, Alabama

3 Fort Lee, Virginia

4 PROFESSIONAL SCHOOLS

5 Presidio of Monterey/Presidio of Monterey Annex, California

6 COMMAND AND CONTROL

7 Fort Belvoir, Virginia

8 Presidio of San Francisco, California

9 Fort McPherson, Georgia

10 Fort Gillem, Georgia

11 Fort Monroe, Virginia

12 COMMODITY ORIENTED

13 Vint Hill Farms, Virginia

14 Fort Monmouth, New Jersey

15 Rock Island Arsenal, Illionois

16 USAR TRAINING FACILITY

16 Marcus Hook USAR Training Facility

- Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman and Commissioners, the top portion of chart 1 shows the number of categories into which the Army divided its installations for consideration
- Number of installations represents those subjected to military value assessment within each category
- Highlighted categories have installations recommended for closure or realignment by the Secretary of Defense or added for further consideration for closure or realignment during the hearings on March 29th and May 21st
- The box at the bottom reflects the Commissioner's addition of a US Army Reserve Training Facility for consideration
- This category was not considered by the Army

Army Categories

CATEGORY	NUMBER
Maneuver	11
Major Training Areas	10
Initial Entry Training/Branch Schools	13
Professional Schools	5
Command and Control	11
Depots	11
Commodity Oriented	12
Production	13
Proving Grounds	4
Ports	3
Medical Centers	2

CATEGORY	NUMBER
USAR Training Facility	1

Highlighted categories have installations DoD has recommended for closure or realignment or Commissioners have added for further consideration for closure or realignment.

Document Separator

Tab 1

- At Tab 1, we have the first category that will be discussed--**INITIAL ENTRY TRAINING/BRANCH SCHOOLS**
- The map, slide 2, and the accompanying chart, slide 3, show the names and locations of the Army's 13 initial entry training/branch school installations
- The Secretary of Defense recommended that Fort McClellan, Alabama, be closed and the Commissioner's added Fort Lee, Virginia, for further consideration
- Before discussing each installation, I would like to outline the staff's evaluation of the impact of force structure reductions on the training loads at these installations
- In looking at these charts, it must be remembered that both active and reserve soldiers are trained so there cannot be a one-to-one correlation in force structure reduction of the active component to reduction in training load
- Slide 4 compares the training load at the Army's basic training installations for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1997. This chart assumes a force structure of 12 active Army and 8 reserve divisions, two of which are cadre divisions
- Through the period there is a reduction of 19.6%--that compares to a total force structure reduction, both active and reserve, of approximately 15%
- Slide 5 shows the same information for the combined arms installations--those that train infantry, artillery, armor, and aviation soldiers
- Through the period there is a reduction of 6.5%
- Slide 6 shows the same information for the combat support installations
- In this category, there is a reduction of 9%
- Slide 7 shows the information for combat service support installations
- In this category, there is a reduction of 18.2%

BRANCH SCHOOLS



DOD Recommendation for Closure

Commissioner Candidate for further consideration

Operational Installations

2

Army Initial Entry Training/Branch School Bases

Fort Benning, GA 2	Fort Jackson, SC 7	**Fort McClellan, AL 9 (C)**
Fort Bliss, TX 1	Fort Knox, KY 3	Fort Rucker, AL 10
Fort Eustis/Story, VA 11	**Fort Lee, VA 11 (*)**	Fort Sam Houston, TX 8
Fort Gordon, GA 6	Fort Leonard Wood, MO 5	Fort Sill, OK 4
Fort Huachuca, AZ 11		

(C) = DoD recommendation for closure
(R) = DoD recommendation for realignment
(*) = Commissioner candidate for further consideration

BASIC TRAINING LOAD



19,262 → 15,489 Δ 19.6%

COMBAT ARMS
Average Daily Student Load



-1,837

28,161 → 26,324 Δ -6.5%

5

COMBAT SUPPORT ARMS
Average Daily Student Load



9,937 8,147 5,627 5,369 3,993 4,073 1,248 2,223

-1,954

21,766 → 19,812 Δ -9.0%

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT ARMS
Average Daily Student Load



12,294 11,616 6,630 5,875 5,111 4,898 2,938 2,427 2,116 2,022 986 739

- 6,157

33,784 → 27,627 Δ -18.2 %

83,711 → 73,763 Δ -11.9 %

Document Separator

Tab 2

- At Tab 2, we have the first installation to be considered, Fort McClellan, Alabama
- Slide 8 pictorially shows the DoD recommendation **DISCUSS**
- Slide 9 shows the relative location of Fort McClellan and Fort Leonard Wood
- LTC Brian Duffy will discuss Fort McClellan

FT. McCLELLAN, AL

DOD RECOMMENDATION:




Jefferson City
Fort Leonard Wood
DOD Recommendation for Closure
Operational Installation
0
50
100
Miles
Huntsville
Fort McClellan
Atlanta
Birmingham

Fort McClellan, Alabama

DoD Recommendation: Close Fort McClellan. Relocate the U.S. Army Chemical and Military Police schools and Department of Defense Polygraph Institute (DODPI) to Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. Transfer accountability for Pelham Range and other required training support facilities, through licensing, to the Army National Guard. Retain an enclave for the U.S. Army reserves. Retain the capability for live-agent training at Fort McClellan.

Visiting Commissioner: Commissioner Johnson

Category: Initial Entry Training / Branch School

LAND (Acres)	BUILDINGS (Million Square Feet)	FAMILY HOUSING (Units)	PERSONNEL Mil	Stu	Civ
46,000 (24,000 on Pelham Range)	6.7	2,867	2,326	4,073	1,105

PERMANENT FACILITIES (%)	ANNUAL OPERATING COST ($ M)	COST FACTORS Construction	Per Diem	VHA Officer	Enlisted
87	51.7	0.79	67	0	0

ONE TIME COSTS ($M) Construction	Housing	STEADY STATE SAVINGS ($M)	BREAK EVEN YEAR	ECONOMIC IMPACT (%) 93	Cumulative
113.9 77.6	0.0	33.7	2002 (Year 9)	- 17.6	- 16.8

Issues Reviewed
Fort McClellan, AL

MILITARY VALUE	
SEPARATION OF CHEMICAL SCHOOL AND CDTF	JOINT TRAINING
MOVEMENT OF CDTF	TRAINING QUALITY
SMOKE TRAINING	REUSE POTENTIAL
ANNISTON ARMY DEPOT CHEMICAL DEMILITARIZATION SITE	RETURN ON INVESTMENT
LOCATION OF DOD POLYGRAPH INSTITUTE	

11

Issues
Fort McClellan, AL

ISSUE	DoD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION	R&A STAFF FINDINGS
MILITARY VALUE	9 OF 13	• LOWER MILITARY VALUE INSTALLATIONS RETAINED	• VALIDATED 9 OF 13 RANKING • MILITARY VALUE NOT SOLE DRIVER
SEPARATION OF CHEMICAL SCHOOL AND CDTF	• CDTF REMAIN AT FT. McCLELLAN	• COLLOCATE WITH CHEMICAL SCHOOL	• COLLOCATION: • SAVES $ 10M / YEAR AND FACILITATES TESTING • REDUCES ANNUAL OPERATING COSTS: $4.6M VS. $10.2M
MOVEMENT OF CDTF	• RETAIN CAPABILITY AT FT. McCLELLAN	• ENVIRONMENTAL RESTRICTIONS PREVENT OR SERIOUSLY DELAY MOVEMENT	• CAN BE MOVED • PERMITTING NOT CERTAIN • 6 YEARS TO COMPLETE
SMOKE TRAINING	• CAN BE CONDUCTED AT FT. LEONARD WOOD	• CANNOT BE CONDUCTED AT FT. LEONARD WOOD SIX MONTHS OF YEAR	• SMOKE TRAINING CAN BE CONDUCTED 12 MONTHS • SMOKE WILL NOT BE ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEM
ANNISTON ARMY DEPOT CHEMICAL DEMILITARIZATION SITE	• OPERATIONS TO BEGIN IN 1998	• CANNOT OPERATE WITHOUT FT. McCLELLAN RESOURCES	• SERVICE CAN ARRANGE FOR SAME LEVEL OF SUPPORT WITHOUT FT. McCLELLAN • NATIONAL, STATE & LOCAL DISASTER PROGRAMS IN PLACE
LOCATION OF DOD POLYGRAPH INSTITUTE	• ORIGINALLY FT. LEONARD WOOD, MO • CHANGE LOCATION TO FT. JACKSON, SC	• CANNOT PERFORM MISSION AT FT. LEONARD WOOD	• LET DOD DETERMINE LOCATION

FORT McCLELLAN

DOD RECOMMENDATION



SCENARIO I: CDTF MOVES TO FORT LEONARD WOOD
DODPI TO BASE "X"



Scenario Summary
Fort McClellan, AL

DOD RECOMMENDATION		SCENARIO I		SCENARIO II	
• CLOSE FT. McCLELLAN RETAIN CDTF		• CLOSE FT. McCLELLAN MOVE CDTF		• KEEP FT. McCLELLAN OPEN	
One Time Costs: $ 115.2 M **Steady State Savings: $ 32.8 M** **Break Even Year: 2002**		**One Time Costs: $ 143.9 M** **Steady State Savings: $ 42.2** **Break Even Year: 2002**		**One Time Costs:** **Steady State Savings:** NONE **Break Even Year:**	
PRO	**CON**	**PRO**	**CON**	**PRO**	**CON**
• SAVES $33 M ANNUALLY • REDUCES EXCESS FACILITY INVENTORY • CONSOLIDATES THE MANEUVER COMBAT SUPPORT SCHOOLS - TRAINING SYNERGY	• DIFFICULT TO TEST EQUIPMENT AND DOCTRINE • DIFFICULT TO TRAIN CHEMICAL SCHOOL STUDENTS • REDUCES ALLIED USE OF CDTF • AFFECTS PUBLIC ACCEPTANCE OF CHEM DEMIL FACILITY AT ANNISTON • ECONOMIC IMPACT ON COMMUNITY	• SAVES $ 42 M ANNUALLY • FACILITATES CHEM SCHOOL EQUIPMENT AND DOCTRINE TESTING •CONSOLIDATES THE MANEUVER COMBAT SUPPORT ARM SCHOOLS - TRAINING SYNERGY • DOES NOT AFFECT ALLIED USE OF CDTF	• ECONOMIC IMPACT ON COMMUNITY • AFFECTS PUBLIC ACCEPTANCE OF CHEM DEMIL FACILITY	• NO DISRUPTION • CHEM DEMIL SITE RESPONSE FORCE RETAINED • USAF DISASTER PREP SCHOOL MOVES TO FT. McCLELLAN (86 PERSONNEL) • NO IMPACT ON COMMUNITY • DOES NOT AFFECT ALLIED USE OF CDTF	• EXCESS IN TRAINING BASE RETAINED • DOES NOT PRODUCE $33-42 M IN SAVINGS • DOES NOT CONSOLIDATE THE MANEUVER COMBAT SUPPORT ARMS

14

Issues
Fort McClellan, AL
(Continued)

ISSUE	DoD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION	R&A STAFF FINDINGS
JOINT TRAINING - CHEMICAL AND MILITARY POLICE	• ROOM AT FT. LEONARD WOOD FOR OTHER SERVICES • USAF: WILL MOVE IF ECONOMICAL	• CLOSURE DESTROYS POSSIBILITY OF JOINT TRAINING	• JOINT TRAINING IS POSSIBLE AT FT. LEONARD WOOD • NO EXCESS FACILITIES WILL BE LEFT AFTER MOVE
TRAINING QUALITY	• NO DEGRADATION	• DEGRADED FOR 5-10 YEARS	• NO DEGRADATION IF ARMY FOLLOWS ENGR/ INTEL SCHOOL MODELS
REUSE POTENTIAL	• MINIMUM FACILITIES RETAINED • AMOUNT DETERMINED AFTER COMMISSION VOTE • COMMUNITIES WON'T DO REUSE PLANNING BEFORE VOTE	• LIMITED BY RESERVE COMPONENT USE, CDTF AND ENVIRONMENTAL RESTRICTIONS	• 45% OF ACREAGE & 71% OF FACILITIES RETURNED • MORE RETURNED IF ARNG CAN'T AFFORD IT • SERVICE MUST CLEAN UP TO STANDARDS DETERMINED BY APPROVED REUSE PLAN
RETURN ON INVESTMENT		<u>COSTS UNDERSTATED FOR:</u> • CDTF CONSTRUCTION • ADMIN OVERHEAD • CHAMPUS • RIF / UNEMPLOYMENT • FAMILY HOUSING • MOVING	• CDTF COSTS ACCURATE • ARMY OVERHEAD CALCULATION JUSTIFIED • NO ADDITIONAL COSTS DUE TO CHAMPUS • RIF / UNEMPLOYMENT COSTS - 30% VS. 11% • NO ADDITIONAL FAMILY HOUSING REQD • MOVING COSTS ACCURATE - NO HAP AUTHORIZED

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Initial Entry Training/Branch School

Fort McClellan, AL:

Accept DoD Recommendation [Close Ft. McClellan. Relocate to Ft. Leonard Wood. CDTF stays Ft. McClellan.]:

I move that the Commission find that the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force structure plan and final criteria and, therefore, that the Commission adopt the following recommendation of the Secretary of Defense: Close Fort McClellan. Relocate the U.S. Army Chemical and Military Police Schools and the Department of Defense Polygraph Institute (DODPI) to Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. Transfer accountability for Pelham Range and other required training support facilities, through licensing, to the Army National Guard. Retain an enclave for the U.S. Army Reserves. Retain the capability for live-agent training at Fort McClellan.

	JOHNSON	BYRON	STUART	COURTER	McPHERSON	COX	BOWMAN
Motion							
Second							
"AYE"							
"NAY"							

Reject DoD Recommendation:

I move that the Commission find that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from the force structure plan and final criteria in making his recommendation on Fort McClellan, AL. Therefore, the Commission rejects and does not make the following recommendation of the Secretary: Close Fort McClellan. Relocate the U.S. Army Chemical and Military Police Schools and the Department of Defense Polygraph Institute (DODPI) to Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. Transfer accountability for Pelham Range and other required training support facilities, through licensing, to the Army National Guard. Retain an enclave for the U.S. Army Reserves. Retain the capability for live-agent training at Fort McClellan.

	JOHNSON	BYRON	STUART	COURTER	McPHERSON	COX	BOWMAN
Motion	✓						
Second							✓
"AYE"	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓
"NAY"			✓				

Alternative Motion [Close Ft. McClellan. Relocate to Ft. Leonard Wood. CDTF to Ft. Leonard Wood.]:

I move that the Commission find that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from criteria 1 and 4, and, therefore, that the Commission adopt the following recommendation: Close Fort McClellan except for Pelham Range and other required training support facilities to be licensed to the Army National Guard, and an enclave to support the U.S. Army Reserves; relocate the Chemical and Military Police Schools to Fort Leonard +Wood, Missouri; close the Chemical Decontamination Training Facility at Fort McClellan and construct a replacement facility at Fort Leonard Wood;* and relocate the Department of Defense Polygraph Institute to another location determined by the Department of Defense. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

	JOHNSON	BYRON	STUART	COURTER	McPHERSON	COX	BOWMAN
Motion			✓				
Second							
"AYE"							
"NAY"							

No SECOND

* subject to

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Initial Entry Training/Branch School

Fort McClellan, AL:

Accept DoD Recommendation [Close Ft. McClellan. Relocate to Ft. Leonard Wood. CDTF stays Ft. McClellan.]:

I move that the Commission find that the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force structure plan and final criteria and, therefore, that the Commission adopt the following recommendation of the Secretary of Defense: Close Fort McClellan. Relocate the U.S. Army Chemical and Military Police Schools and the Department of Defense Polygraph Institute (DODPI) to Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. Transfer accountability for Pelham Range and other required training support facilities, through licensing, to the Army National Guard. Retain an enclave for the U.S. Army Reserves. Retain the capability for live-agent training at Fort McClellan.

Reject DoD Recommendation:

I move that the Commission find that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from the force structure plan and final criteria in making his recommendation on Fort McClellan, AL. Therefore, the Commission rejects and does not make the following recommendation of the Secretary: Close Fort McClellan. Relocate the U.S. Army Chemical and Military Police Schools and the Department of Defense Polygraph Institute (DODPI) to Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. Transfer accountability for Pelham Range and other required training support facilities, through licensing, to the Army National Guard. Retain an enclave for the U.S. Army Reserves. Retain the capability for live-agent training at Fort McClellan.

Alternative Motion [Close Ft. McClellan. Relocate to Ft. Leonard Wood. CDTF to Ft. Leonard Wood.]:

I move that the Commission find that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from criteria 1 and 4, and, therefore, that the Commission adopt the following recommendation: Close Fort McClellan except for Pelham Range and other required training support facilities to be licensed to the Army National Guard, and an enclave to support the U.S. Army Reserves; relocate the Chemical and Military Police Schools to Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri; close the Chemical Decontamination Training Facility at Fort McClellan and construct a replacement facility at Fort Leonard Wood; and relocate the Department of Defense Polygraph Institute to another location determined by the Department of Defense. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

Made by MT
Passed

Draft Motions

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Initial Entry Training/Branch School

Fort McClellan, AL:

Accept DoD Recommendation [Close Ft. McClellan. Relocate to Ft. Leonard Wood. CDTF stays Ft. McClellan.]:

I move that the Commission find that the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force structure plan and final criteria and, therefore, that the Commission adopt the following recommendation of the Secretary of Defense. Close Fort McClellan. Relocate the U.S. Army Chemical and Military Police Schools and the Department of Defense Polygraph Institute (DODPI) to Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. Transfer accountability for Pelham Range and other required training support facilities, through licensing, to the Army National Guard. Retain an enclave for the U.S. Army Reserves. Retain the capability for live-agent training at Fort McClellan.

Reject DoD Recommendation:

I move that the Commission find that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from the force structure plan and final criteria in making his recommendation on Fort McClellan, AL. Therefore, the Commission rejects ~~and does not make the following~~ recommendation of the Secretary: Close Fort McClellan. Relocate the U.S. Army Chemical and Military Police Schools and the Department of Defense Polygraph Institute (DODPI) to Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. Transfer accountability for Pelham Range and other required training support facilities, through licensing, to the Army National Guard. Retain an enclave for the U.S. Army Reserves. Retain the capability for live-agent training at Fort McClellan. ~~Further recommend the Sec of Defense~~ In the future

HH 1
1 - Stewart

The Commission does recommend:

If the SecDef wants to move the School and CDTF, the Commission ~~recommends~~ recommends the Army chemical pursue all of the required permits and certifications from the new site prior to the 1995 Base Closure process.

Chemical Decontamination Training Facility

Fort McClellan, Alabama

DoD Recommendation

Close Fort McClellan. Relocate the U.S. Army Chemical and Military Police Schools and the Department of Defense Polygraph Institute (DODPI) to Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. Transfer accountability for Pelham Range and other required training support facilities, through licensing, to the Army National Guard. Retain an enclave for the U.S. Army Reserves. Retain the capability for live-agent training at Fort McClellan.

Draft Commission Recommendation

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close Fort McClellan. Relocate the U.S. Army Chemical and Military Police Schools and the Department of Defense Polygraph Institute (DODPI) to Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. Transfer accountability for Pelham Range and other required training support facilities, through licensing, to the Army National Guard. Retain an enclave for the U.S. Army Reserves. Retain the capability for live-agent training at Fort McClellan.

Alternative

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from criteria 1 and 4. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: Close Fort McClellan except for Pelham Range and other required training support facilities to be licensed to the Army National Guard, and an enclave to support the U.S. Army Reserves; relocate the Chemical and Military Police Schools to Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri; close the Chemical Decontamination Training Facility at Fort McClellan and construct a replacement facility at Fort Leonard Wood; and relocate the Department of Defense Polygraph Institute to another location determined by the Department of Defense. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

Document Separator

Tab 3

- At Tab 3, we have the next installation to be discussed, Fort Lee, Virginia
- Fort Lee was added for further consideration on May 21st
- Slide 16 pictorially shows option under consideration **DISCUSS**
- Slide 17 shows the relative location of Fort Lee, Fort Eustis, and Quantico
- Mr. John Graham will discuss Fort McClellan

FT. LEE, VA

SCENARIO I: CLOSE FORT LEE




Aberdeen
Proving Ground
MCCDC Quantico
Fort Knox
Fort Lee
Fort Eustis
Fort Story
Redstone
Arsenal
Fort Rucker
Commissioner Candidate for further consideration
Operational Installations
0
100
200
Miles

Fort Lee, Virginia

Commissioner Add for Consideration: Study for closure due to excess capacity.

Visiting Commissioner: Commissioner Bowman

Category: Initial Entry Training/Branch Schools

LAND (Acres)	BUILDINGS (Million Square Feet)	FAMILY HOUSING (Units)	PERSONNEL Mil	Stu	Civ
5,574	7.3	4,524	3,067	4,898	3,890

PERMANENT FACILITIES (%)	ANNUAL OPERATING COST ($ M)	COST FACTORS Construction	Per Diem	VHA Officer	Enlisted
84	76	0.87	70	58	64

ONE TIME COSTS ($M) Construction	Housing	STEADY STATE SAVINGS ($M)	BREAK EVEN YEAR	ECONOMIC IMPACT (%) 93	Cumulative
529.3		28.5	2099+		
381.5	0.5		(Year 100+)	- 4.0	- 4.0

Issues Reviewed
Fort Lee, VA

MILITARY VALUE

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT TRAINING CONSOLIDATION

UNIQUE FACILITIES

COLLOCATION OF TENANTS

TENANT SYNERGY

RESERVE COMPONENT TENANTS

INFRASTRUCTURE

CHANGE TO 1988 COMMISSION

Issues
Fort Lee, VA

ISSUE	DoD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION	R&A STAFF FINDINGS
MILITARY VALUE	11 OF 13	• POST SHOULD BE VIEWED AS MULTI PURPOSE • IS MORE THAN A TRAINING CENTER	• PRIMARY MISSION OF BASE IS TRAINING • ARMY CONSISTENT IN ITS TREATMENT
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT TRAINING CONSOLIDATION	• ARMY HAS CONSOLIDATED SOME COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT TRAINING AT FT LEE • ALSO CONSOLIDATING DEVELOPMENTAL ACTIVITIES AT FT LEE • WILL SAVE $54 MILLION • LONG RANGE PLAN TO CONSOLIDATE MORE ON POST		• HAVE BEGUN TO CONSOLIDATE TRAINING FOR COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT OFFICERS AT FT LEE • CONSOLIDATION PLANS NOT FINALIZED • CONSIDERABLE SAVINGS • WILL NOT CLOSE AN INSTALLATION
UNIQUE FACILITIES	• PETROLEUM TRAINING FACILITY - NEW IN 1993 USED TO TRAIN OTHER SERVICES • WATER PURIFICATION TRAINING FACILITY • BATTLE SUPPORT CENTER - COMPUTER ASSISTED WARGAMING CENTER • SATELLITE EDUCATION CENTER		• WATER PURIFICATION FACILITY NEEDS ENVIRONMENTAL PERMITS TO OPERATE • ALL FACILITIES CAN BE MOVED AND REPLICATED ELSEWHERE • REQUIREMENTS FOR THE FACILITIES DO NOT GO AWAY IF POST CLOSED

Issues
Fort Lee, VA
(Continued)

ISSUE	DoD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION	R&A STAFF FINDINGS
COLLOCATION OF TENANT ACTIVITIES	• COMBINED ARMS SUPPORT COMMAND, QUARTERMASTER SCHOOL, ARMY LOGISTICS MANAGEMENT COLLEGE AND ASSOCIATED ACTIVITIES NEED TO BE COLLOCATED • DEFENSE COMMISSARY AGENCY AND TROOP SUPPORT AGENCY NEED TO BE COLLOCATED • REMAINING TENANTS NEED NOT BE COLLOCATED		• COLLOCATION REDUCES REDUNDANCIES IN OVERHEAD • STATED REQUIREMENTS FOR COLLOCATION ARE REASONABLE
TENANT SYNERGY	• SYNERGY EXISTS BETWEEN THOSE UNITS THAT NEED TO BE COLLOCATED SHARED OVERHEAD, INSTRUCTORS, ETC		• EFFICIENCIES GAINED BY COLLOCATION • DEPENDENT UPON RELOCATION TO ANOTHER COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT TRAINING POST
RC TENANTS	• WILL MOVE ALL TENANTS IF FORT LEE CLOSES	• FORT LEE REQUIRED FOR RESERVE TRAINING AND MOBILIZATION	• TRAINING AND MOBILIZATION CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED AT OTHER INSTALLATIONS

Issues
Fort Lee, VA
(Continued)

ISSUE	DoD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION	R&A STAFF FINDINGS
INFRASTRUCTURE	• ARMY HAS SPENT $31 MILLION IN LAST 15 YEARS ON INFRASTRUCTURE IMPROVEMENTS ON POST	• HAVE INVESTED HEAVILY IN SCHOOLS, WATER AND SEWER LINES TO ACCOMMODATE THE NEEDS OF THE MILITARY POPULATION	• CLOSURE WILL HAVE IMPACT ON THE LOCAL SCHOOL SYSTEMS
CHANGE TO 1988 COMMISSION	• SUPPLY & FOOD SERVICE SPECIALIST TRAINING MOVED TO FORT LEE FROM FORT JACKSON AND FORT DIX • CONSTRUCTION FOR THESE ACTIVITIES RECENTLY COMPLETED	• CAN COUNTRY AFFORD TO KEEP SPENDING MONEY EVERY FEW YEARS TO MOVE THE SAME ORGANIZATIONS	• APPROXIMATELY $16 MILLION SPENT SINCE 1988 TO ACCOMMODATE NEW ACTIVITIES ON POST

SCENARIO I: CLOSE FORT LEE



Scenario Summary
Fort Lee, VA

RECOMMENDATION		SCENARIO I	
• CLOSE FORT LEE • RELOCATE COMBINED ARMS SUPPORT COMMAND, QUARTERMASTER SCHOOL & CENTER, ARMY LOGISTICS MANAGEMENT COLLEGE TO FORT EUSTIS, VA • RELOCATE DEFENSE COMMISSARY AGENCY TO MCCDC QUANTICO, VA		• LEAVE FORT LEE OPEN	
One Time Costs: $ 529.3 **Steady State Savings:** $ 28.5 **Break Even Year:** 2099+		**One Time Costs:** **Steady State Savings:** NONE **Break Even Year:**	
PRO	**CON**	**PRO**	**CON**
• REDUCES ARMY INFRASTRUCTURE • WILL FACILITATE CONSOLIDATION OF ARMY COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT TRAINING	• HIGH COST • LONG PAY BACK PERIOD • UNDOES ARMY PLAN TO CONSOLIDATE COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT ACTIVITIES AT FORT LEE • WILL HAVE TO REPLICATE EXISTING TRAINING FACILITIES • NEGATES WHAT 1988 COMMISSION RECOMMENDED	• AVOIDS CONSTRUCTION AND TRANSPORTATION COSTS • ALLOWS ARMY CONSOLIDATION PLAN TO PROCEED • MAINTAINS COMMISSION CONTINUITY	• LIMITED ARMY INFRASTRUCTURE REDUCTION • ARMY CONSOLIDATION PLAN DOES NOT SPECIFICALLY CALL FOR ANY CLOSURES

Fort Lee, VA:

DoD Recommendation -- none.

Alternative Motion [Close Ft. Lee. Move to Ft. Eustis.]:

I move that the Commission find that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from criteria 1 and 2, and, therefore, that the Commission adopt the following recommendation: Close Fort Lee. Relocate the Combined Arms Support Command, the Quartermaster School & Center, the Army Logistics Management College, and associated activities to Fort Eustis, Virginia; and transfer the Defense Commissary Agency to the Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, Virginia. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

	JOHNSON	BYRON	STUART	COURTER	McPHERSON	COX	BOWMAN
Motion							
Second							
"AYE"							
"NAY"							

Fort Lee, VA:

DoD Recommendation -- none.

Alternative Motion [Close Ft. Lee. Move to Ft. Eustis.]:

I move that the Commission find that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from criteria 1 and 2, and, therefore, that the Commission adopt the following recommendation: Close Fort Lee. Relocate the Combined Arms Support Command, the Quartermaster School & Center, the Army Logistics Management College, and associated activities to Fort Eustis, Virginia; and transfer the Defense Commissary Agency to the Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, Virginia. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

Fort Lee, Virginia

DoD Recommendation

None. Commissioner add for further consideration.

Draft Commission Recommendation

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from criteria 1 and 2. The Commission, therefore, recommends the following: Close Fort Lee. Relocate the Combined Arms Support Command, the Quartermaster School & Center, the Army Logistics Management College, and associated activities to Fort Eustis, Virginia; and transfer the Defense Commissary Agency to the Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, Virginia. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

Document Separator

Tab 4

- At Tab 4, we have the next category that will be discussed--**PROFESSIONAL SCHOOLS**
- The map, slide 25, and the accompanying chart, slide 26, show the names and locations of the Army's 5 professional school installations

PROFESSIONAL SCHOOLS



Commissioner Candidate for further consideration

Operational Installations

Army Professional School Bases

Carlisle Barracks, PA 5	Fort McNair, DC 4	West Point, NY 2
Fort Leavenworth, KS 1	**Presidio of Monterey/Presidio of Monterey Annex, CA** 3 **(*)**	

(C) = DoD recommendation for closure
(R) = DoD recommendation for realignment
(*) = Commissioner candidate for further consideration

Document Separator

Tab 5

- At Tab 5, we have the next installation to be discussed, Presidio of Monterey, to include the Presidio of Monterey Annex, California
- The Army recommended the closure of the Presidio of Monterey, to include the Presidio of Monterey Annex, to the Secretary of Defense, but he removed the recommendation from the list because of the potential impact on intelligence activities
- The Presidio of Monterey was added for further consideration on March 29th
- Slide 27 pictorially shows option under consideration **DISCUSS**
- Slide 28 shows the relative location of the Presidio of Monterey, the Presidio of Monterey Annex, and Fort Huachuca
- LTC Brian Duffy will discuss this recommendation

PRESIDIO OF MONTEREY/
PRESIDIO OF MONTEREY ANNEX

ARMY RECOMMENDATION:




San Jose
Fort Ord
Presidio of Monterey
Presidio of Monterey Annex
Commissioner Candidate for further consideration
Operational Installations
0
100
200
Miles
Tucson
Fort Huachuca
Mexico

Presidio of Monterey / Presidio of Monterey Annex, California

Commissioner Add for Consideration: Study for Closure due to the lack of documented objective analysis to substantiate Department of Defense removal from the list of recommendations submitted by the Army to the Secretary of Defense.

Visiting Commissioner: Commissioners Courter and Johnson

Category: Professional School

LAND (Acres)	BUILDINGS (Million Square Feet)	FAMILY HOUSING (Units)	PERSONNEL Mil	Stu	Civ
393 (PRESIDIO) 1,500 (POM ANNEX)	5.9	1,683	386	2,496	1,618

PERMANENT FACILITIES (%)	ANNUAL OPERATING COST ($ M)	COST FACTORS Construction	Per Diem	VHA Officer	Enlisted
92	53.8	1.21	100	394	329

ONE TIME COSTS ($M) Construction	Housing	STEADY STATE SAVINGS ($M)	BREAK EVEN YEAR	ECONOMIC IMPACT (%) 93	Cumulative
155.5 109.8	36.7	48.9	2001 (YEAR 8)	- 6.4	- 27.2

Issues Reviewed
Presidio of Monterey / Presidio of Monterey Annex, CA

CONTRACTING LANGUAGE TRAINING	DISRUPTION TO INTELLIGENCE MISSION
PRESIDIO OF MONTEREY ANNEX	DLI LOCATION
BASE OPERATIONS ALTERNATIVE	UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA PROPOSAL
	RETURN ON INVESTMENT
	ECONOMIC IMPACT
	FT. HUACHUCA INFRASTRUCTURE

Issues
Presidio of Monterey / Presidio of Monterey Annex, CA

ISSUE	DoD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION	R&A STAFF FINDINGS
CONTRACTING LANGUAGE TRAINING	• COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES STUDY CAN BE STARTED AFTER RECOMMENDATION IS APPROVED	• CONTRACT STUDY MUST BE PERFORMED BEFORE VOTE • RECOMMENDATION TO RELOCATE WILL REQUIRE ARBITRATION	• ARMY DETERMINATION THAT CONTRACT STUDY IS REQUIRED COULD DELAY EXECUTION • PROCESS TAKES 2-3 YEARS • STUDY MAY FIND DLI SHOULD STAY
PRESIDIO OF MONTEREY ANNEX	• ANNEX SIZED FOR REUSE PLANNING, FINAL SIZE NOT YET FINALIZED • WILL BE DOWNSIZED AS NEEDED (500-MAN CAMPUS)	• ANNEX IS NOT NECESSARY • DLI ONLY REQUIRES 803 HOUSING UNITS, PX, COMMISSARY	POM ANNEX SIZED FOR: • DLI REQUIREMENTS • MAINTENANCE OF MWR FUNDS • ACTUAL DLI HOUSING AUTHORIZATION IS 1046 (90% OF REQUIREMENT FOR 2,496 STUDENTS) • 500 UNITS FOR NAVY/CG
BASE OPERATIONS ALTERNATIVES	• $45.2 M FOR ENTIRE ANNEX, $ 36.7 M ATTRIBUTED TO DLI ONLY (POM AND POM ANNEX)	• INTERSERVICE WITH NAVY POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL • CONTRACT BASE OPERATIONS SUPPORT	COST: • $ 35.1 SAVINGS: • $ 10.1 M (VS. $45.2 M ESTIMATE FOR DLI PLUS ANNEX) • DETERMINED BY CONTRACT STUDY


Presidio of Monterey Annex
Fort Ord
Presidio of Monterey
Navy Annex (Housing)
Naval Postgraduate School
Commissioner Candidates for further consideration
Operational installations
0
2.5
5
Miles

Monterey
Bay
Marina
Fort Ord
Sand City
Seaside
Del Rey
Oaks
Monterey
Peninsula
Airport
Monterey
0
8000
FEET

PRESIDIO OF MONTEREY ANNEX



Scenario Summary
Presidio of Monterey/ Presidio of Monterey Annex, CA

ARMY RECOMMENDATION		SCENARIO I	
• CLOSE PRESIDIO OF MONTEREY • RELOCATE DLI TO FT. HUACHUCA • CONTRACT LANGUAGE TRAINING WITH UNIVERSITY		• DIRECT DoD TO CONDUCT CONTRACTING OUT STUDY FOR DLI LANGUAGE TRAINING AT FT. HUACHUCA • IF STUDY SHOWS COST SAVINGS, CLOSE PRESIDIO OF MONTEREY, MOVE DLI TO FT. HUACHUCA, CONTRACT LANGUAGE TRAINING	
One Time Cost: $ 153.9 M **Steady State Savings: $ 20.9 M** **Break Even Year: 2018**		**One Time Costs: TO BE DETERMINED THROUGH** **Steady State Savings: CONTRACT STUDY** **Break Even Year:**	
PRO	**CON**	**PRO**	**CON**
• SAVES $$ • ARMY GAINS OPERATIONAL BENEFITS • MOVES TO A LOWER COST AREA	• DOES NOT HAVE LEGAL SUFFICIENCY (COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES STUDY) • TIES LANGUAGE INSTRUCTION TO BUILDINGS NOT OWNED BY GOVERNMENT • TEMPORARY DISRUPTION OF LANGUAGE INSTRUCTION • ADDS TO THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF FT. ORD CLOSURE • LONG PAYBACK PERIOD	• MEETS LEGAL REQUIREMENTS • PROVIDES ADDITIONAL TIME TO STUDY • POTENTIAL TO SAVE $$ • MOVES TO A LOWER COST AREA • ARMY GAINS OPERATIONAL BENEFITS • PREVENTS ADDITIONAL ECONOMIC IMPACT ON COMMUNITY	• MAY NOT BE ABLE TO MOVE WITHIN 6 YEAR TIME LIMIT • TEMPORARY DISRUPTION OF LANGUAGE INSTRUCTION • UNCERTAIN FUTURE OF CONGRESSIONAL MORATORIUM ON A-76 CONTRACTS • ADDS TO THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF FT. ORD CLOSURE

Scenario Summary
Presidio of Monterey/ Presidio of Monterey Annex, CA

SCENARIO II		SCENARIO III	
• KEEP PRESIDIO OF MONTEREY, BUT DISPOSE OF ALL UNNEEDED FACILITIES AT POM ANNEX • CONSOLIDATE BASE OPERATIONS WITH NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL • CONDUCT CONTRACTING OUT STUDY FOR BASE OPERATIONS		• KEEP PRESIDIO OF MONTEREY • EXCESS ANNEX, EXCEPT FOR HOUSING, PX, COMMISSARY	
One Time Costs: $ 1.6 M **Steady State Savings: $ 10.1 M** **Break Even Year: 1996**		**One Time Costs: TO BE DETERMINED THROUGH** **Steady State Savings: CONTRACT STUDY** **Break Even Year:**	
PRO	**CON**	**PRO**	**CON**
• REDUCES OVERHEAD AND DUPLICATION OF SOME SERVICES - SAVE $$ • PROPERTY RETURNED TO COMMUNITY • MAINTAINS DOD STRUCTURE TO SOLVE BASOPS PROBLEMS IN-HOUSE • ADDRESSES POTENTIAL FOR LOWER COSTS THROUGH CONTRACT BASE OPERATIONS SUPPORT	• DISRUPTION WHILE TRANSFERRING TO JOINT OPERATING SYSTEMS • IF BASOPS FACILITIES ARE EXCESSED, FLEXIBILITY TO CHANGE CONTRACTORS WILL BE LOST • UNCERTAIN FUTURE OF CONGRESSIONAL MORATORIUM ON COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY CONTRACTS	• PROVIDES PROPERTY TO COMMUNITY • HELPS TO REDUCE ECONOMIC IMPACT FROM FT ORD CLOSURE	• POTENTIAL COST TO REBUILD MWR AND BASOPS FACILITIES ON PRESIDIO, • INCREASES APPROPRIATED FUND SUPPORT TO MWR ACTIVITIES • INCREASED COST TO DOD ($ 1.2 M CURENT LEASES, $ 3.9 M POTENTIAL LEASES)

Issues
Presidio of Monterey / Presidio of Monterey Annex, CA
(Continued)

ISSUE	DoD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION	R&A STAFF FINDINGS
MOVE DISRUPTS INTELLIGENCE MISSION	DOD POSITION: • UNACCEPTABLE DISRUPTION • REQUIRES FURTHER ANALYSIS ARMY POSITION: • BENEFICIAL TO LANGUAGE RETENTION	• WILL TAKE YEARS TO RECOVER	SMOOTH TRANSITION: • POSSIBLE, BUT CHALLENGING • HAS A COST
DLI LOCATION	• FT. HUACHUCA PROVIDES BEST OPERATIONAL LOCATION	• SYNERGY WITH OTHER MONTEREY ORGANIZATIONS • FACULTY EASY TO RECRUIT IN LOCAL AREA	• SYNERGY IN MONTEREY NOT UNLIKE ARIZONA • ARIZONA ALSO HAS CULTURAL DIVERSITY
UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA PROPOSAL	OSD VALIDATED: • UNIVERSITY: $ 47.9 M • DLI: $ 53.1 M	COMMUNITY ESTIMATES: • ARIZONA: $ 38.2 - 44.9 M • MONTEREY: $ 42.9 M (NOT INCLUDING BASOPS) • DLI "MOST EFFICIENT ORGANIZATION" NOT KNOWN	• MUST HAVE 10% SAVINGS TO MEET A-76 REQUIREMENT = $ 46.4 • TYPICAL: 15-20% SAVINGS = $ 41-44 M

Issues
Presidio of Monterey / Presidio of Monterey Annex, CA
(Continued)

ISSUE	DoD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION	R&A STAFF FINDINGS
RETURN ON INVESTMENT	• FORCE STRUCTURE DECLINE • STANDARD FACTORS BASED ON GOVT STATISTICS • RELOCATION COSTS ACCURATE • MILCON BASED ON SITE SURVEY	• INCORRECT STUDENT LOAD • UNREASONABLE STANDARD FACTORS • RELOCATION COSTS UNDERSTATED • MILCON REQUIREMENTS UNDERSTATED	• FORCE STRUCTURE ASSUMPTION VALID - UNIQUE TIMING • SOME STANDARD FACTORS ADJUSTED • RELOCATION COSTS INCREASE PAYBACK YEAR • SOME ADDITIONAL CONSTRUCTION REQUIRED
ECONOMIC IMPACT	21 %	32 - 40 %	27.2 %
FT. HUACHUCA INFRASTRUCTURE	• COMMUNITY CAN HANDLE REQUIREMENT - VALIDATED BY OSD TASK FORCE	• SCARCE WATER RESOURCES • INSUFFICIENT HOUSING • SEWAGE OVERCAPACITY • NEW ROADS REQUIRED	• WATER ISSUE TYPICAL OF SOUTHWEST - MORE STUDY REQUIRED • HOUSING ASSUMPTION VALID • SEWAGE PROBLEM TO BE FIXED BY CITY • ROADS INCLUDED IN MILCON ONE-TIME COSTS

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Professional School

Presidio of Monterey/POM Annex, CA:

DoD Recommendation -- none.

Alternative Motions:

Alternative 1 [Study Contracting Language School. Close POM if savings there.]: I move that the Commission find that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from the force-structure plan and criteria 4, and, therefore, that the Commission adopt the following recommendation: The Department of Defense will conduct a study to determine the savings of contract language training in the Fort Huachuca, Arizona, area. If the study confirms a cost savings, the Commission recommends the closure of the Presidio of Monterey and the Presidio of Monterey Annex (part of Fort Ord), and the relocation of the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center to Fort Huachuca and the contracting of the foreign language training with a contractor that is able to provide this training at or near Fort Huachuca. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

	JOHNSON	BYRON	STUART	COURTER	McPHERSON	COX	BOWMAN
Motion							
Second							
"AYE"							
"NAY"							

Alternative 2 [Retain POM. Dispose of excess at Annex. Interservice BASOPS.]: I move that the Commission find that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from the force-structure plan and criteria 4, and, therefore, that the Commission adopt the following recommendation: Retain the Presidio of Monterey but dispose of all unneeded facilities at the Presidio of Monterey Annex. Consolidate base operations support with the Naval Post Graduate School by interservice agreement. The Department of Defense will evaluate whether contracted base operations support would provide savings for the Presidio of Monterey, the Presidio of Monterey Annex and the Naval Postgraduate School. The

Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

	JOHNSON	BYRON	STUART	COURTER	McPHERSON	COX	BOWMAN
Motion							
Second							
"AYE"							
"NAY"							

Alternative 3 [Retain POM. Consolidate BASOPS with Navy. Dispose unneeded facilities after consolidation.]:

I move that the Commission find that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from the force-structure plan and criterion 4, and, therefore, that the Commission adopt the following recommendation: Retain the Presidio of Monterey and the Presidio of Monterey Annex; consolidate base operations support for the Presidio of Monterey and the Presidio of Monterey Annex with the Naval Postgraduate School; and dispose of unneeded facilities at the Presidio of Monterey Annex after determining which facilities are required by the consolidated base operations organization. The Department of Defense will evaluate whether contracted base operations support would provide savings for the Presidio of Monterey, the Presidio of Monterey Annex and the Naval Postgraduate School. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

	JOHNSON	BYRON	STUART	COURTER	McPHERSON	COX	BOWMAN
Motion							
Second							
"AYE"							
"NAY"							

Alternative 4 [Retain POM. Keep only housing at Annex.]: I move that the Commission find that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from the force-structure plan and criterion 4, and, therefore, that the Commission adopt the following recommendation: Retain the Presidio of Monterey but dispose of all facilities at the Presidio of Monterey Annex, except the housing, commissary, and post exchange required to support the Presidio

of Monterey. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

	JOHNSON	BYRON	STUART	COURTER	McPHERSON	COX	BOWMAN
Motion							
Second							
"AYE"							
"NAY"							

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Professional School

Presidio of Monterey/POM Annex, CA:

DoD Recommendation -- none.

Alternative Motions:

Alternative 1 [Study Contracting Language School. Close POM if savings there.]: I move that the Commission find that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from the force-structure plan and criteria 4, and, therefore, that the Commission adopt the following recommendation: The Department of Defense will conduct a study to determine the savings of contract language training in the Fort Huachuca, Arizona, area. If the study confirms a cost savings, the Commission recommends the closure of the Presidio of Monterey and the Presidio of Monterey Annex (part of Fort Ord), and the relocation of the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center to Fort Huachuca and the contracting of the foreign language training with a contractor that is able to provide this training at or near Fort Huachuca. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

Alternative 2 [Retain POM. Dispose of excess at Annex. Interservice BASOPS.]: I move that the Commission find that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from the force-structure plan and criteria 4, and, therefore, that the Commission adopt the following recommendation: Retain the Presidio of Monterey but dispose of all unneeded facilities at the Presidio of Monterey Annex. Consolidate base operations support with the Naval Post Graduate School by interservice agreement. The Department of Defense will evaluate whether contracted base operations support would provide savings for the Presidio of Monterey, the Presidio of Monterey Annex and the Naval Postgraduate School. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

Alternative 3 [Retain POM. Consolidate BASOPS with Navy. Dispose unneeded facilities after consolidation.]: I move that the Commission find that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from the force-structure plan and criterion 4, and, therefore, that the Commission adopt

the following recommendation: Retain the Presidio of Monterey and the Presidio of Monterey Annex; consolidate base operations support for the Presidio of Monterey and the Presidio of Monterey Annex with the Naval Postgraduate School; and dispose of unneeded facilities at the Presidio of Monterey Annex after determining which facilities are required by the consolidated base operations organization. The Department of Defense will evaluate whether contracted base operations support would provide savings for the Presidio of Monterey, the Presidio of Monterey Annex and the Naval Postgraduate School. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

Alternative 4 [Retain POM. Keep only housing at Annex.]: I move that the Commission find that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from the force-structure plan and criterion 4, and, therefore, that the Commission adopt the following recommendation: Retain the Presidio of Monterey but dispose of all facilities at the Presidio of Monterey Annex, except the housing, commissary, and post exchange required to support the Presidio of Monterey. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

DoD Recommendation

None. Commissioner add for further consideration.

Draft Commission Recommendation

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from the force-structure plan and criteria 4. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: The Department of Defense will conduct a study to determine the savings of contract language training in the Fort Huachuca, Arizona, area. If the study confirms a cost savings, the Commission recommends the closure of the Presidio of Monterey and the Presidio of Monterey Annex (part of Fort Ord), and the relocation of the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center to Fort Huachuca and the contracting of the foreign language training with a contractor who must be able to provide this training at or near Fort Huachuca. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

Alternative 1

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from the force-structure plan and criteria 4. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: Retain the Presidio of Monterey but dispose of all unneeded facilities at the Presidio of Monterey Annex. Consolidate base operations support with the Naval Post Graduate School by interservice agreement. The Department of Defense will evaluate whether contracted base operations support would provide savings for the Presidio of Monterey, the Presidio of Monterey Annex and the Naval Postgraduate School. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

Alternative 2

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from the force-structure plan and criterion 4. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: Retain the Presidio of Monterey and the Presidio of Monterey Annex; consolidate base operations support for the Presidio of Monterey and the Presidio of Monterey Annex with the Naval Postgraduate School; and dispose of unneeded facilities at the Presidio of Monterey Annex after determining which facilities are required by the consolidated base operations organization. The Department of Defense will evaluate whether contracted base operations support would provide savings for the Presidio of Monterey, the Presidio of Monterey Annex and the Naval Postgraduate School. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

Alternative 3

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from the force-structure plan and criteria 4. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: Retain the Presidio of Monterey but dispose of all facilities at the Presidio of Monterey Annex, except the housing required to support the Presidio of Monterey. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

General Johnson

Supp
HTd

Alternative 5 [Retain POM. Consolidate BASOPS with Navy. Dispose all facilities at POM Annex except housing etc. to support POM and Naval School. Evaluate for Contracting BASOPS.]:

I move that the Commission find that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from the force-structure plan and criterion 4, and, therefore, that the Commission adopt the following recommendation: Retain the Presidio of Monterey but dispose of all facilities at the Presidio of Monterey Annex except the housing, commissary, child care facility, and post-exchange required to support the Presidio of Monterey and Navy Post Graduate School. Consolidate base operations support with the Naval Post Graduate School by interservice agreement. The Department of Defense will evaluate whether contracted base operations support would provide savings for the Presidio of Monterey. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

(MB)
Alternative 6 [Retain POM. Consolidate BASOPS with Navy. Dispose unneeded facilities after consolidation.]:

I move that the Commission find that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from the force-structure plan and criterion 4, and, therefore, that the Commission adopt the following recommendation: Retain the Presidio of Monterey and the Presidio of Monterey Annex; consolidate base operations support for the Presidio of Monterey and the Presidio of Monterey Annex with the Naval Post Graduate School; and dispose of all facilities at the Presidio of Monterey Annex, except the housing, commissary, child care facilities and post-exchange required to support the Presidio of Monterey. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

Document Separator

Tab 6

- At Tab 6, we have the next category that will be discussed--**COMMAND AND CONTROL**
- The map, slide 39, and the accompanying chart, slide 40, show the names and locations of the Army's 11 command and control installations
- The twelfth installation, the Presidio of San Francisco, was not evaluated by the Army since it was closed by the 1988 Commission, but it is included here since DoD recommended a redirect that affects the installation

COMMAND AND CONTROL INSTALLATIONS



Army Command and Control Bases

Fort Belvoir, VA	1	(R)	**Fort McPherson, GA**	4	(*)	Fort Ritchie, MD	7	
Fort Buchanan, PR	9		Fort Meade, MD	2		Fort Shafter, HI	3	
Fort Gillem, GA	8	(*)	**Fort Monroe, VA**	6	(*)	Fort Totten, NY	11	
Fort Hamilton, NY	10		Fort Myer, VA	4		**Presidio of San Francisco, CA**		(†)

(C) = DoD recommendation for closure
(R) = DoD recommendation for realignment
(†) = DoD recommendation for redirect
(*) = Commissioner candidate for further consideration

Document Separator

Tab 7

- At Tab 7, we have the next installation to be discussed, Fort Belvoir, Virginia
- Slide 41 pictorially shows the DoD recommendation **DISCUSS**
- Slide 42 shows the relative location of Fort Belvoir and Detroit Arsenal
- Mr. John Graham will discuss this recommendation

FT. BELVOIR, VA

DOD RECOMMENDATION:




Detroit Arsenal
DOD Recommendation for Realignment
Operational Installation
0
50
100
Miles
Fort
Belvoir

42

Fort Belvoir, Virginia

DoD Recommendation: Realign Fort Belvoir as follows: disestablish the Belvoir Research, Development and Engineering Center (BRDEC), Fort Belvoir, VA. Relocate the Supply, Bridging, Counter Mobility, Water Purification and Fuel/Lubricant Business Areas to the Tank Automotive Research, Development and Engineering Center (TARDEC), Detroit Arsenal, MI. Transfer command and control of the Physical Security, Battlefield Deception, Electric Power, Remote Mine Detection/Neutralization, Environmental Controls and Low Cost/Low Observables Business Areas to the Night Vision Electro-Optics Directorate (NVEOD) of the Communication and Electronics Research, Development and Engineering Center (CERDEC), Fort Belvoir, VA.

Visiting Commissioner: N/A

Category: Command and Control

LAND (Acres)	BUILDINGS (Million Square Feet)	FAMILY HOUSING (Units)	PERSONNEL Mil	Stu	Civ
8,655	9.8	3,410	5,483	1,751	8,352

PERMANENT FACILITIES (%)	ANNUAL OPERATING COST ($M)	COST FACTORS Construction	Per Diem	VHA Officer	Enlisted
82	139	1.05	144	448	360

ONE TIME COSTS ($M) Construction	Housing	STEADY STATE SAVINGS ($M)	BREAK EVEN YEAR	ECONOMIC IMPACT (%) 93	Cumulative
11.3		13.4	1996		
4.7	0		(Year 3)	< - 1	- 1.9

Issues Reviewed
Fort Belvoir, VA

ELIMINATION OF 3 BUSINESS AREAS MOVEMENT OF BUSINESS AREAS TO DETROIT ARSENAL COSTS OF THE REALIGNMENT	

Issues
Fort Belvoir, VA

ISSUE	DoD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION	R&A STAFF FINDINGS
ELIMINATION OF MARINE CRAFT BUSINESS AREA	• ELIMINATE • NAVY WILL PROVIDE ENGINEERING SUPPORT • ACQUISITION SUPPORT PROVIDED BY WEAPON SYSTEM MANAGER FOR MARINE CRAFT	• RETAIN • IS A VITAL ARMY MISSION • EXPERT ACQUISITION PERSONNEL REQUIRED	• INTERSERVICING WILL CREATE EFFICIENCIES IN R&D AND ENGINEERING • ARMY WILL MAINTAIN ITS ACQUISITION CAPABILITY
ELIMINATION OF CONSTRUCTION EQUIPMENT BUSINESS AREA	• NON-DEVELOPMENTAL ITEM IS PREFERRED PROCUREMENT APPROACH • R&D WILL BE DONE BY NATIONAL AUTOMOTIVE R&D CENTER • ACQUISITION EXPERTISE PROVIDED BY PROGRAM MANAGER FOR CONSTRUCTION EQUIPMENT	• RETAIN • DEMISE WILL RESULT IN OLD AND OBSOLETE EQUIPMENT BEING USED • WILL ADVERSELY AFFECT ARMY READINESS	• ARMY PLAN WILL END DUPLICATIONS OF EFFORT WHILE MAINTAINING CAPABILITY
ELIMINATION OF TOPOGRAPHIC EQUIPMENT BUSINESS AREA	• NON-DEVELOPMENTAL ITEM PROCUREMENT IS PREFERRED ALTERNATIVE • PROGRAM MANAGERS FOR SPECIFIC WEAPONS SYSTEMS INCLUDE REQUIREMENTS FOR THIS TYPE EQUIPMENT IN THEIR PROJECTS	• RETAIN • REQUIRED FOR SUCH THINGS AS ARTILLERY GUN EMPLACEMENT AND MAP MAKING • ELIMINATION WILL IMPACT ON ARMY READINESS	• RELIANCE ON CIVILIAN INDUSTRY DOES NOT ADVERSELY IMPACT ARMY READINESS • PROGRAM MANAGERS INCLUDE ANCILLARY REQUIREMENTS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF WEAPONS SYSTEMS

Issues
Fort Belvoir, VA
(Continued)

ISSUE	DoD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION	R&A STAFF FINDINGS
MOVEMENT OF FIVE BUSINESS AREAS TO DETROIT ARSENAL	• BRDEC DEVELOPS MUCH OF THE EQUIPMENT PROCURED BY TACOM • COLLOCATION WILL FACILITATE CONCURRENT ENGINEERING AND IMPROVE EFFICIENCY AND QUALITY • COSTS ARE MINIMAL IN COMPARISON TO SAVINGS	• RETAIN AT FORT BELVOIR • TRANSFER COMMAND AND CONTROL TO TANK AUTOMOTIVE RDEC • SAVES MOVING AND CONSTRUCTION COSTS	• ADDITIONAL EFFICIENCIES WILL BE GAINED BY COLLOCATION • IF DO NOT MOVE, ONE TIME COSTS WILL BE $9 MILLION LESS WITH SAME SAVINGS
COSTS	• ONE-TIME COST IS $11.3 MILLION, INCLUDING ALL CONSTRUCTION	• ARMY UNDERESTIMATED CONSTRUCTION COSTS BY APPROXIMATELY $15 MILLION • TOTAL COST WILL BE $26.2 MILLION	• ACTUAL COSTS WILL BE ABOUT WHAT DoD PROJECTS • COMMUNITY ESTIMATE BASED ON ALL NEW CONSTRUCTION • ARMY PLAN CALLS FOR RENOVATION OF EXISTING FACILITIES

FORT BELVOIR

DOD RECOMMENDATION



SCENARIO I: 5 BUSINESS AREAS REMAIN AT FORT BELVOIR



Scenario Summary
Fort Belvoir, VA

DOD RECOMMENDATION		SCENARIO I	
• DISESTABLISH BRDEC AND ELIMINATE 6 BUSINESS AREAS • RELOCATE 5 BUSINESS AREAS TO DETROIT ARSENAL, MI • TRANSFER C&C OF 6 BUSINESS AREAS TO CERDEC AT FT. BELVOIR		• ELIMINATE BRDEC AND 6 BUSINESS AREAS • TRANSFER C&C OF 5 BUSINESS AREAS TO TARDEC BUT LEAVE AT FORT BELVOIR • TRANSFER C&C OF 6 BUSINESS AREAS TO CERDEC AT FORT BELVOIR	
One Time Costs: $11.3 M **Steady State Savings:** $13.4 M **Break Even Year:** 1996		**One Time Costs:** $2.8 M **Steady State Savings:** $13.4 M **Break Even Year:** 1995	
PRO	**CON**	**PRO**	**CON**
• INCREASED EFFICIENCY THROUGH COLLOCATION • ALLOWS CONCURRENT ENGINEERING OF FUTURE LAND FORCE VEHICLES • ALLOWS SHIFTING OF WORK FORCE TO HANDLE CHANGING PRIORITIES • ELIMINATES DUPLICATION • WORKS WITHIN TRI-SERVICE RELIANCE INITIATIVE • SHORT PAY BACK PERIOD	• CONSTRUCTION COSTS - TO REPLICATE EXISTING FACILITIES • TRANSPORTATION COSTS • CURRENT WORK FORCE MAY NOT MOVE - WOULD HAVE TO BE REPLACED • MAY ELIMINATE 3 BUSINESS AREAS THAT HAVE VITAL ARMY MISSION - COMMUNITY POSITION	• SAVES CONSTRUCTION COSTS • SAVES TRANSPORTATION COSTS • WORK FORCE REMAINS IN PLACE • SAME ANNUALIZED SAVINGS - WITH LOWER ONE-TIME COST	• WILL NOT GAIN EFFICIENCIES BY COLLOCATION WITH SIMILAR FUNCTIONS • WILL NOT ALLOW SHIFTING OF PERSONNEL TO MEET CHANGING MISSIONS • WILL DEGRADE THE CONCURRENT ENGINEERING OF FUTURE LAND FORCE VEHICLES • COORDINATION WILL FALL OFF OVER TIME

FORT BELVOIR

SCENARIO II: RETAIN 3 ADDITIONAL BUSINESS AREAS



SCENARIO III: RETAIN 3 ADDITIONAL BUSINESS AREAS AT FORT BELVOIR



Scenario Summary
Fort Belvoir, VA

Scenario II		Scenario III	
• DISESTABLISH BRDEC AND ELIMINATE 3 BUSINESS AREAS • RETAIN 3 ADDITIONAL BUSINESS AREAS PER COMMUNITY RECOMMENDATION AT FT. BELVOIR • RELOCATE 5 BUSINESS AREAS TO DETROIT ARSENAL • TRANSFER C&C OF 6 BUSINESS AREAS TO CERDEC AT FT. BELVOIR		• DISESTABLISH BRDEC- ELIMINATE 3 BUSINESS AREAS • RETAIN 3 ADDITIONAL BUSINESS AREAS PER COMMUNITY RECOMMENDATION AT FORT BELVOIR • TRANSFER C&C OF 5 BUSINESS AREAS TO TARDEC BUT LEAVE AT FT. BELVOIR • TRANSFER C&C OF 6 BUSINESS AREAS TO CERDEC AT FT. BELVOIR	
One Time Costs: $10.9 M **Steady State Savings:** $11.1 M **Break Even Year:** 1996		**One Time Costs:** $2.3 M **Steady State Savings:** $11.1 M **Break Even Year:** 1995	
PRO	**CON**	**PRO**	**CON**
• INCREASED EFFICIENCY THROUGH COLLOCATION • ALLOWS CONCURRENT ENGINEERING OF FUTURE LAND FORCE VEHICLES • ALLOWS SHIFTING OF WORK FORCE TO HANDLE CHANGING PRIORITIES • SHORT PAY BACK PERIOD	• DUPLICATES ENGINEERING SERVICES PROVIDED BY THE NAVY FOR MARINE CRAFT • DUPLICATES SOME FUNCTIONS RESIDENT IN OTHER ARMY ORGANIZATIONS • DUPLICATES CIVILIAN INDUSTRY EFFORTS - CAN BUY OFF THE SHELF • MAY HAVE TO REPLACE CURRENT WORKFORCE • LONG TERM SAVINGS NOT AS GREAT AS PER DOD RECOMMENDATION	• AVOIDS CONSTRUCTION AND TRANSPORTATION COSTS • LOW ONE TIME COST • WORKFORCE REMAINS ON PLACE	• DUPLICATES ENGINEERING SERVICES PROVIDED BY THE NAVY FOR MARINE CRAFT • DUPLICATES SOME FUNCTIONS RESIDENT IN OTHER ARMY ORGANIZATIONS • DUPLICATES CIVILIAN INDUSTRY EFFORTS - CAN BUY OFF THE SHELF • MAY HAVE TO REPLACE CURRENT WORKFORCE • LONG TERM SAVINGS NOT AS GREAT AS PER DOD RECOMMENDATION

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

C11

Command/Control

Fort Belvoir, VA:

Accept DoD Recommendation [Disestablish BRDEC. 5 Areas to Detroit. Rest stay at Ft. Belvoir.]:

I move that the Commission find that the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force structure plan and final criteria and, therefore, that the Commission adopt the following recommendation of the Secretary of Defense: Realign Fort Belvoir as follows: disestablish the Belvoir Research, Development and Engineering Center (BRDEC), Fort Belvoir, Virginia. Eliminate the Tunnel Detection, Materials, Marine Craft, Topographic Equipment, Construction Equipment and Support Equipment business areas. Relocate the Supply, Bridging, Counter Mobility, Water Purification, and Fuel/Lubricant Business Areas to the Tank Automotive Research, Development and Engineering Center (TARDEC), Detroit Arsenal, Michigan. Transfer command and control of the Physical Security, Battlefield Deception, Electric Power, Remote Mine Detection/Neutralization, Environmental Controls and Low Cost/Low Observables Business Areas to the Night Vision Electro-Optics Directorate (NVEOD) of the Communication and Electronics Research, Development and Engineering Center (CERDEC), Fort Belvoir, Virginia.

	JOHNSON	BYRON	STUART	COURTER	McPHERSON	COX	BOWMAN
Motion					✓		
Second						✓	
"AYE"	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
"NAY"							

Reject DoD Recommendation:

I move that the Commission find that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from the force structure plan and final criteria in making his recommendation on Fort Belvoir, Virginia. Therefore, the Commission rejects and does not make the following recommendation of the Secretary: Realign Fort Belvoir as follows: disestablish the Belvoir Research, Development and Engineering Center (BRDEC), Fort Belvoir, Virginia. Eliminate the Tunnel Detection, Materials, Marine Craft, Topographic Equipment, Construction Equipment and Support Equipment business areas. Relocate the Supply,

Bridging, Counter Mobility, Water Purification, and Fuel/Lubricant Business Areas to the Tank Automotive Research, Development and Engineering Center (TARDEC), Detroit Arsenal, Michigan. Transfer command and control of the Physical Security, Battlefield Deception, Electric Power, Remote Mine Detection/Neutralization, Environmental Controls and Low Cost/Low Observables Business Areas to the Night Vision Electro-Optics Directorate (NVEOD) of the Communication and Electronics Research, Development and Engineering Center (CERDEC), Fort Belvoir, Virginia.

	JOHNSON	BYRON	STUART	COURTER	McPHERSON	COX	BOWMAN
Motion							
Second							
"AYE"							
"NAY"							

Alternative Motion [Disestablish BRDEC. All areas stay at Belvoir.]:

I move that the Commission find that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from criteria 2 and 4, and, therefore, that the Commission adopt the following recommendation: Disestablish the Belvoir Research, Development and Engineering Center; eliminate the Tunnel Detection, Materials, Marine Craft, Topographic Equipment, Construction Equipment and Support Equipment business areas; transfer command and control of the Supply, Bridging, Counter Mobility, Water Purification and Fuel/Lubricant business areas to the Tank Automotive Research, Development and Engineering Center, Detroit Arsenal, Michigan, with the business areas remaining at Fort Belvoir, Virginia; and transfer command and control of the Physical Security, Battlefield Deception, Electric Power, Remote Mine Detection/Neutralization, Environmental Controls and Low Cost/Low Observables business areas to the Night Vision Electro-Optics Directorate of the Communication Electronics Research, Development and Engineering Center, Fort Belvoir, Virginia. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

	JOHNSON	BYRON	STUART	COURTER	McPHERSON	COX	BOUMAN
Motion							
Second							
"AYE"							
"NAY"							

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Command/Control

Fort Belvoir, VA:

Accept DoD Recommendation [Disestablish BRDEC. 5 Areas to Detroit. Rest stay at Ft. Belvoir.]:

I move that the Commission find that the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force structure plan and final criteria and, therefore, that the Commission adopt the following recommendation of the Secretary of Defense: Realign Fort Belvoir as follows: disestablish the Belvoir Research, Development and Engineering Center (BRDEC), Fort Belvoir, Virginia. Eliminate the Tunnel Detection, Materials, Marine Craft, Topographic Equipment, Construction Equipment and Support Equipment business areas. Relocate the Supply, Bridging, Counter Mobility, Water Purification, and Fuel/Lubricant Business Areas to the Tank Automotive Research, Development and Engineering Center (TARDEC), Detroit Arsenal, Michigan. Transfer command and control of the Physical Security, Battlefield Deception, Electric Power, Remote Mine Detection/Neutralization, Environmental Controls and Low Cost/Low Observables Business Areas to the Night Vision Electro-Optics Directorate (NVEOD) of the Communication and Electronics Research, Development and Engineering Center (CERDEC), Fort Belvoir, Virginia.

Reject DoD Recommendation:

I move that the Commission find that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from the force structure plan and final criteria in making his recommendation on Fort Belvoir, Virginia. Therefore, the Commission rejects and does not make the following recommendation of the Secretary: Realign Fort Belvoir as follows: disestablish the Belvoir Research, Development and Engineering Center (BRDEC), Fort Belvoir, Virginia. Eliminate the Tunnel Detection, Materials, Marine Craft, Topographic Equipment, Construction Equipment and Support Equipment business areas. Relocate the Supply, Bridging, Counter Mobility, Water Purification, and Fuel/Lubricant Business Areas to the Tank Automotive Research, Development and Engineering Center (TARDEC), Detroit Arsenal, Michigan. Transfer command and control of the Physical Security, Battlefield Deception, Electric Power, Remote Mine Detection/Neutralization, Environmental Controls and Low Cost/Low Observables Business Areas to the Night Vision Electro-Optics Directorate (NVEOD) of the Communication and Electronics Research, Development and Engineering Center (CERDEC), Fort Belvoir, Virginia.

Alternative Motion [Disestablish BRDEC. All areas stay at Belvoir.]:

I move that the Commission find that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from criteria 2 and 4, and, therefore, that the Commission adopt the following recommendation: Disestablish the Belvoir Research, Development and Engineering Center; eliminate the Tunnel Detection, Materials, Marine Craft, Topographic Equipment, Construction Equipment and Support Equipment business areas; transfer command and control of the Supply, Bridging, Counter Mobility, Water Purification and Fuel/Lubricant business areas to the Tank Automotive Research, Development and Engineering Center, Detroit Arsenal, Michigan, with the business areas remaining at Fort Belvoir, Virginia; and transfer command and control of the Physical Security, Battlefield Deception, Electric Power, Remote Mine Detection/Neutralization, Environmental Controls and Low Cost/Low Observables business areas to the Night Vision Electro-Optics Directorate of the Communication Electronics Research, Development and Engineering Center, Fort Belvoir, Virginia. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

DoD Recommendation

Realign Fort Belvoir as follows: disestablish the Belvoir Research, Development and Engineering Center (BRDEC), Fort Belvoir, Virginia. Relocate the Supply, Bridging, Counter Mobility, Water Purification, and Fuel/Lubricant Business Areas to Tank Automotive Research, Development and Engineering Center (TARDEC), Detroit Arsenal, Michigan. Transfer command and control of the Physical Security, Battlefield Deception, Electric Power, Remote Mine Detection/Neutralization, Environmental Controls and Low Cost/Low Observables Business Areas to the Night Vision Electro-Optics Directorate (NVEOD) of the Communication and Electronics Research, Development and Engineering Center (CERDEC), Fort Belvoir, Virginia.

Draft Commission Recommendation

The Commission finds that the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: Realign Fort Belvoir as follows. Disestablish the Belvoir Research, Development and Engineering Center (BRDEC), Fort Belvoir, Virginia. Relocate the Supply, Bridging, Counter Mobility, Water Purification, and Fuel/Lubricant Business Areas to the Tank Automotive Research, Development and Engineering Center (TARDEC), Detroit Arsenal, Michigan. Transfer command and control of the Physical Security, Battlefield Deception, Electric Power, Remote Mine Detection/Neutralization, Environmental Controls and Low Cost/Low Observables Business Areas to the Night Vision Electro-Optics Directorate (NVEOD) of the Communication and Electronics Research, Development and Engineering Center (CERDEC), Fort Belvoir, Virginia.

Alternative 1

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from criteria 2 and 4. Thus, the Commission recommends the following: Disestablish the Belvoir Research, Development and Engineering Center; eliminate the Tunnel Detection, Materials, Marine Craft, Topographic Equipment, Construction Equipment and Support Equipment business areas; transfer command and control of the Supply, Bridging, Counter Mobility, Water Purification and Fuel/Lubricant business areas to the Tank Automotive Research, Development and Engineering Center, Detroit Arsenal, Michigan, with the business areas remaining at Fort Belvoir, Virginia; and transfer command and control of the Physical Security, Battlefield Deception, Electric Power, Remote Mine Detection/Neutralization, Environmental Controls and Low Cost/Low Observables business areas to the Night Vision Electro-Optics Directorate of the Communication Electronics Research, Development and Engineering Center, Fort Belvoir, Virginia. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

Alternative 2

The Commission finds that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from criteria 1. Thus, the Commission recommends the following: Disestablish the Belvoir Research, Development and Engineering Center; retain the Marine Craft, Topographic Equipment, and the Construction Equipment business areas and transfer command and control of the business areas to the Tank Automotive Research, Development, and Engineering Center (TARDEC), Detroit Arsenal, Michigan, with the business areas remaining at Fort Belvoir, Virginia; eliminate the Tunnel Detection, Materials, and Support Equipment business areas; relocate the Supply, Bridging, Counter Mobility, Water Purification and Fuel/Lubricant business areas to TARDEC; and transfer command and control of the Physical Security, Battlefield Deception, Electric Power, Remote Mine Detection/Neutralization, Environmental Controls, and Low Cost/Low Observables business areas to the Night Vision Electro-Optics Directorate of the Communication Electronics Research, Development, and Engineering Center, Fort Belvoir, Virginia. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

Alternative 3

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from criteria 1, 2, and 4. Thus, the Commission recommends the following: Disestablish the Belvoir Research, Development, and Engineering Center; retain the Marine Craft, Topographic Equipment, and the Construction Equipment business areas and transfer command and control of the business areas to Tank Automotive Research, Development, and Engineering Center (TARDEC), Detroit Arsenal, Michigan, with the business areas remaining at Fort Belvoir, Virginia; eliminate the Tunnel Detection, Materials, and Support Equipment business areas; transfer command and control of the Supply, Bridging, Counter Mobility, Water Purification, Marine Craft, Topographic Equipment, Construction Equipment, and Fuel/Lubricant business areas to TARDEC with the business areas remaining at Fort Belvoir, Virginia; and transfer command and control of the Physical Security, Battlefield Deception, Electric Power, Remote Mine Detection/Neutralization, Environmental Controls, and Low Cost/Low Observables business areas to the Night Vision Electro-Optics Directorate of the Communication Electronics Research, Development and Engineering Center, Fort Belvoir, Virginia. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

Document Separator

Tab 8

- At Tab 8, we have the next installation to be discussed, the Presidio of San Francisco, California
- Slide 49 pictorially shows the DoD recommendation **DISCUSS**
- Slide 50 shows the relative location of the Presidio of San Francisco, NASA Ames, and Fort Carson
- Mr. Bud Bale will discuss this recommendation

PRESIDIO OF SAN FRANCISCO

DOD RECOMMENDATION:

REDIRECT

HQ, 6th US ARMY → **FT. CARSON, CO** (X)

HQ, 6th US ARMY → **NASA AMES, CA**


Denver
Colorado Springs
Fort Carson
Presidio of San Francisco
(** BRAC 88 closing **)
NASA Ames
(Moffett Field)
DOD Recommended Change
Operational Installation
0
100
200
Miles

Presidio of San Francisco, California

DoD Recommendation: Change the recommendation of the 1988 Commission regarding the Presidio of San Francisco, as follows: relocate Headquarters, Sixth U.S. Army from Presidio San Francisco to NASA Ames, CA, instead of Fort Carson, CO as originally approved by the Defense Secretary's Commission on Base Realignment and Closure in 1988.

Visiting Commissioner: N/A

Category: Command & Control

LAND (Acres)	BUILDINGS (Million Square Feet)	FAMILY HOUSING (Units)	PERSONNEL		
			Mil	Stu	Civ
1,280	6.6	1,173	238	0	105

PERMANENT FACILITIES (%)	ANNUAL OPERATING COST ($ M)	COST FACTORS		VHA	
		Construction	Per Diem	Officer	Enlisted
80	69.3	1.39	126	727	431

ONE TIME COSTS ($M)		STEADY STATE SAVINGS ($M)	BREAK EVEN YEAR	ECONOMIC IMPACT (%)	
Construction	Housing			93	Cumulative
9.0		- 6.5	NEVER		
6.2	0			<-1	- 1.2

Issues Reviewed
Presidio of San Francisco, CA

MILITARY VALUE	
OPERATIONAL	
ECONOMICS OF MOVE	
AVAILABILITY AND CONDITION OF FACILITIES	

Issues
Presidio of San Francisco, CA

ISSUE	DoD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION	R&A STAFF FINDINGS
MILITARY VALUE	• VALUE IS ENHANCED BY STAYING IN CA	• COMMUNITY AGREES	• MISSION IS REGIONAL NOT SITE SPECIFIC • COMMUNICATION AND TRAVEL CAPABILITY ARE FOREMOST
OPERATIONAL	• 75% OF RESERVE UNITS ARE ON THE WEST COAST • PROVIDES BEST AVAILABLE LOCATION TO EXERCISE COMMAND & CONTROL RESPONSIBILITY		• 58% OF UNITS AND 59% OF PERSONNEL ON WEST COAST • 38% OF UNITS AND 38% OF PERSONNEL IN CA
ECONOMICS OF MOVE	• ARMY IS WILLING TO ACCEPT STEADY-STATE COST FOR OPERATIONAL REASONS	• MOVING TO NASA AMES DOES NOT ACHIEVE ANY OF THE COST SAVINGS OVER STAYING AT PSF • UNIT MUST MOVE TWICE DUE TO RENOVATION AT NASA AMES	• BRAC 88 REASON FOR MOVE WAS TO MOVE OUT OF HIGH COSTS AREA • KEEPS UNIT IN A HIGH COST AREA • ESTIMATED ANNUAL RECURRING COSTS ARE $2.5M FOR CARSON vs $6.5M FOR NASA AMES
AVAILABILITY AND CONDITION OF FACILITIES	• NO HOUSING ON POST • FAMILY HOUSING IS ADEQUATE IN COMMUNITY	• NO CAPACITY AT NASA AMES	• ADEQUATE AT PSF • FORT CARSON HAS LIMITED AVAILABLE ON POST • NASA AMES HAS NO FAMILY HOUSING AVAILABLE ON BASE

PRESIDIO OF SAN FRANCISCO

DOD RECOMMENDATION:

REDIRECT

HQ, 6th US ARMY → ~~FT. CARSON, CO~~

HQ, 6th US ARMY → NASA AMES, CA

SCENARIO I:

HQ, 6th US ARMY → FT. CARSON, CO

Scenario Summary
Presidio of San Francisco, CA

DOD RECOMMENDATION		SCENARIO I	
• CHANGE THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE 1988 COMMISSION ON THE PRESIDIO OF SAN FRANCISCO • RELOCATE HEADQUARTERS, SIXTH U.S. ARMY FROM PRESIDIO SAN FRANCISCO TO NASA AMES, CA INSTEAD OF FORT CARSON, CO		• DO NOT CHANGE THE 1988 DECISION. REALIGN THE SIXTH U.S. ARMY HEADQUARTERS TO FORT CARSON, COLORADO.	
ONE-TIME COSTS: $ 9.0 MILLION **STEADY STATE SAVINGS:** - $ 6.5 MILLION **BREAK EVEN YEAR:** NEVER		**ONE-TIME COSTS:** $ 17.2 MILLION **STEADY STATE SAVINGS:** - $ 2.9 MILLION **BREAK EVEN YEAR:** NEVER	
PRO	**CON**	**PRO**	**CON**
• KEEPS HEADQUARTERS ON WEST COAST • RELATIVELY NEAR TO KEY WEST COAST PORTS OF DEBARKATION • AVOIDS CONSTRUCTION OF NEW FACILITIES AT FT. CARSON • AVOIDS LONG DISTANCE MOVE • NEAR LARGE POPULATION PRIME FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES	• KEEPS HEADQUARTERS IN A HIGH OPERATING COST AREA • KEEPS HEADQUARTERS IN A GEOLOGICALLY UNSTABLE AREA RATHER THAN NEAR IT • NO FAMILY HOUSING ON BASE • DISRUPTION OF HEADQUARTERS ACTIVITY DURING MOVE • LEASE FROM NASA • PUTS A MILITARY PRESENCE ON AN INSTALLATION CLOSED BY 1991 COMMISSION	• PROVIDES THE GREATEST SAVING IN THE LONG RUN • MOVES HEADQUARTERS OUT OF A HIGH OPERATING COST AREA • MOVES HEADQUARTERS OUT OF A GEOLOGICALLY UNSTABLE AREA • PUTS HEADQUARTERS ON A MULTI-FUNCTION BASE • FAMILY HOUSING AVAILABLE ON BASE	• POSSIBLE INCREASE IN BUSINESS RELATED TRAVEL COST • DISTANCE TO WEST COAST PORTS OF DEBARKATION • DISRUPTION OF HEADQUARTERS ACTIVITY DURING MOVE

55

Scenario Summary
Presidio of San Francisco, CA

SCENARIO II	
• CHANGE THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE 1988 COMMISSION ON PRESIDIO OF SAN FRANCISCO • ALLOW ONLY THE HEADQUARTERS SIXTH U.S. ARMY TO STAY • ARMY TO CONFER WITH DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR TO NEGOTIATE A FAVORABLE LEASE FOR PORTION OF CURRENT FACILITIES AND FAMILY HOUSING • DEFENSE COMMISSARY AGENCY AND THE ARMY AND AIR FORCE EXCHANGE SYSTEM TO DETERMINE THE COMMISSARY AND EXCHANGE REQUIREMENTS BASED ON SOUND BUSINESS DECISIONS	
ONE-TIME COSTS: $ 1.4 MILLION **STEADY STATE SAVINGS:** - $ 6.0 MILLION **BREAK EVEN YEAR:** NEVER	
PRO	**CON**
• KEEPS HEADQUARTERS ON WEST COAST • RELATIVELY NEAR TO KEY WEST COAST PORTS OF DEBARKATION • AVOIDS CONSTRUCTION OF FACILITIES AT FT. CARSON • AVOIDS MOVING COST • NEAR LARGE POPULATION PRIME FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES • AVOIDS DISRUPTION OF HEADQUARTERS DUE TO A MOVE	• FAILS TO CAPITALIZE ON EXCESS SPACE AT ANOTHER INSTALLATION • KEEPS HEADQUARTERS IN HIGH COST AREA • KEEPS HEADQUARTERS IN A GEOLOGICALLY UNSTABLE AREA RATHER THAN NEAR IT • LEASE FROM NATIONAL PARK SERVICE • KEEPS MILITARY PRESENCE ON AN INSTALLATION CLOSED BY 1988 COMMISSION

Presidio of San Francisco, CA:

Accept DoD Recommendation [6th Army to NASA Ames.]:

I move that the Commission find that the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force structure plan and final criteria and therefore, that the Commission adopt the following recommendation of the Secretary of Defense: Relocate Headquarters, Sixth U.S. Army from Presidio San Francisco to NASA Ames, CA, instead of Fort Carson, CO, as originally approved by the Defense Secretary's Commission on Base Realignment and Closure in 1988.

	JOHNSON	BYRON	STUART	COURTER	McPHERSON	COX	BOWMAN
Motion							
Second							
"AYE"							
"NAY"							

Alternative Motions:

Alternative 1 [6th Army to Ft. Carson.]:

I move that the Commission find that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from criteria 2 and 4, and, therefore, that the Commission reject the Secretary's recommendation on the Presidio of San Francisco, CA and adopt the following recommendation: The 1988 decision will stand. Realign the Sixth U.S. Army to Fort Carson, Colorado. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

	JOHNSON	BYRON	STUART	COURTER	McPHERSON	COX	BOWMAN
Motion							
Second							
"AYE"							
"NAY"							

Alternative 2 [6th Army remains at Presidio of San Francisco.]:

I move that the Commission find that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially

from criteria 2 and 4, and, therefore, that the Commission adopt the following recommendation: The 1988 Commission decision will be changed to allow only the Sixth U.S. Army to remain at the Presidio of San Francisco, California. The Department of the Interior and the Department of the Army will negotiate a lease that is favorable to both departments for the current facilities occupied by Sixth U.S. Army and family housing at the Presidio of San Francisco necessary to accommodate the headquarters members. If agreement cannot be reached, the Commission expects the Army to make a subsequent recommendation to the 1995 Commission for the relocation of Sixth U.S. Army. The Commission further recommends the Defense Commissary Agency and the Army and Air Force Exchange System determine the commissary and exchange requirements to support Sixth U.S. Army based on sound business decisions. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

	JOHNSON	BYRON	STUART	COURTER	McPHERSON	COX	BOWMAN
Motion						✓	
Second		✓			✓		
"AYE"	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
"NAY"							

Presidio of San Francisco, CA:

Accept DoD Recommendation [6th Army to NASA Ames.]:
I move that the Commission find that the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force structure plan and final criteria and therefore, that the Commission adopt the following recommendation of the Secretary of Defense: Relocate Headquarters, Sixth U.S. Army from Presidio San Francisco to NASA Ames, CA, instead of Fort Carson, CO, as originally approved by the Defense Secretary's Commission on Base Realignment and Closure in 1988.

Alternative Motions:

Reject DoD Recommendation/Alternative 1 [6th Army to Ft. Carson.]:
I move that the Commission find that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from criteria 2 and 4, and, therefore, that the Commission reject the Secretary's recommendation on the Presidio of San Francisco, CA and adopt the following recommendation: The 1988 decision will stand. Realign the Sixth U.S. Army to Fort Carson, Colorado. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

Alternative 2 [6th Army remains at Presidio of San Francisco.]:
I move that the Commission find that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from criteria 2 and 4, and, therefore, that the Commission adopt the following recommendation: The 1988 Commission decision will be changed to allow only the Sixth U.S. Army to remain at the Presidio of San Francisco, California. The Department of the Interior and the Department of the Army will negotiate a lease that is favorable to both departments for the current facilities occupied by Sixth U.S. Army and family housing at the Presidio of San Francisco necessary to accommodate the headquarters members. If agreement cannot be reached, the Commission expects the Army to make a subsequent recommendation to the 1995 Commission for the relocation of Sixth U.S. Army. The Commission further recommends the Defense Commissary Agency and the Army and Air Force Exchange System determine the commissary and exchange requirements to support Sixth U.S. Army based on sound business decisions. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

DoD Recommendation

Change the recommendation of the 1988 Commission regarding the Presidio of San Francisco, as follows: relocate Headquarters, Sixth U.S. Army from Presidio San Francisco to NASA Ames, CA, instead of Fort Carson, CO, as originally approved by the Defense Secretary's Commission on Base Realignment and Closure in 1988.

Draft Commission Recommendation

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: Relocate Headquarters, Sixth U.S. Army from Presidio San Francisco to NASA Ames, CA, instead of Fort Carson, CO, as originally approved by the Defense Secretary's Commission on Base Realignment and Closure in 1988.

Alternative 1

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from criteria 2 and 4. The Commission, therefore, recommends the following: the 1988 decision will stand. Realign the Sixth U.S. Army to Fort Carson, Colorado. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

Alternative 2

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from criteria 2 and 4. The Commission, therefore, recommends the following: the 1988 Commission decision will be changed to allow only the Sixth U.S. Army to remain at the Presidio of San Francisco, California. The Department of Interior and the Department of the Army will negotiate a lease that is favorable to both departments for the current facilities occupied by Sixth U.S. Army and family housing at the Presidio of San Francisco necessary to accommodate the headquarters members. If agreement cannot be reached, the Commission expects the Army to make a subsequent recommendation to the 1995 Commission for the relocation of Sixth U.S. Army. The Commission further recommends the Defense Commissary Agency and the Army and Air Force Exchange System determine the commissary and exchange requirements to support Sixth U.S. Army based on sound business decisions. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

Document Separator

Tab 9

Document Separator

Tab 10

- At Tab 9, we have the next installation to be discussed, Fort McPherson, Georgia
- Fort McPherson was added for further consideration on May 21st
- Slide 57 pictorially shows option under consideration **DISCUSS**
- Slide 58 shows the relative location of Fort McPherson and Fort Sam Houston
- Fort Gillem and Fort Stewart, which will be discussed after Fort McPherson are also shown
- MAJ Gary Evans will discuss this recommendation

FT. McPHERSON

SCENARIO II:

FORT McPHERSON → FORSCOM, 3D ARMY, USARC → FT. SAM HOUSTON

OR

FT. HOOD



Commissioner Candidates for further consideration

Operational Installations


Dobbins AFB
Atlanta
Fort McPherson
Hartsfield IAP
Fort Gillem
Commissioner Candidates for further consideration
Counties and Highways also displayed
0
5
10
Miles

59

Fort McPherson, Georgia

Commissioner Add for Consideration: Study for closure due to excess capacity.

Visiting Commissioner: Commissioner Courter

Category: Command and Control

LAND (Acres)	BUILDINGS (Million Square Feet)	FAMILY HOUSING (Units)	PERSONNEL Mil	Stu	Civ
494	1.9	9,062	1,771	0	2,644

PERMANENT FACILITIES (%)	ANNUAL OPERATING COST ($ M)	COST FACTORS Construction	Per Diem	VHA Officer	Enlisted
94	42.5	0.83	113	158	145

ONE TIME COSTS ($M) Construction	Housing	STEADY STATE SAVINGS ($M)	BREAK EVEN YEAR	ECONOMIC IMPACT (%) 93	Cumulative
290.9		32.8	2014		
124.8	3.6		(Year 21)	- 0.5	- 0.8

Issues Reviewed
Fort McPherson, GA

OPERATIONAL READINESS COST	ATLANTA LOCATION

Issues
Fort McPherson, GA

ISSUE	DoD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION	R&A STAFF FINDINGS
OPERATIONAL READINESS	• FORCES COMMAND HAS ONGOING WORLDWIDE MISSIONS THAT WOULD BE DISRUPTED • FORCES COMMAND IS MAJOR PLAYER IN PRESENT DOWNSIZING AND FORCE STRUCTURE CHANGES; TURBULENCE OF MOVING WILL HAVE ADVERSE EFFECT UPON FUTURE ARMY	• FT MCPHERSON COLLOCATES THREE HEADQUARTERS: FORSCOM, THIRD ARMY, US ARMY RESERVE COMMAND • THESE THREE HQ'S SHOULD REMAIN TOGETHER FOR PLANNING, MOBILIZATION, AND CONTINGENCY PURPOSES	• FORCES COMMAND AND US ARMY RESERVE COMMAND SHOULD BE COLLOCATED • THIRD ARMY SHOULD BE COLLOCATED WITH EITHER FORCES COMMAND OR US CENTRAL COMMAND
COSTS	• ONE-TIME COST ($M): 290.9 • BREAK EVEN YEAR: 2014 (YEAR 21) • STEADY STATE SAVINGS ($M): 32.8	• EXPENSIVE MILCON DOLLARS TO REPLICATE NEW FORSCOM HQ'S BUILDING ($87.9M) • NO ADDITIONAL FUNDS NEEDED FOR NEW USARC HQ'S SINCE FUNDING ALREADY APPROVED FOR FT MCPHERSON • REQUIRES ADDITIONAL $101.7M FOR DUAL OPERATION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS DURING TRANSITION PERIOD	• NEAR TERM COSTS: HIGH • LONG TERM SAVINGS: HIGH • EQUATES TO LONG LEAD TIME BEFORE BREAK EVEN YEAR

Scenario Summary
Fort McPherson, GA

SCENARIO I		SCENARIO II	
• DOD DID NOT RECOMMEND FORT MCPHERSON FOR CLOSURE OR REALIGNMENT • FORT MCPHERSON TO STAY OPEN WITH ALL ACTIVITIES REMAINING ON INSTALLATION		• CLOSE FORT MCPHERSON • RELOCATE FORCES COMMAND, THIRD ARMY, AND US ARMY RESERVE COMMAND TO FT SAM HOUSTON, TX OR FT HOOD, TX	
One-Time Costs: **Steady State Savings:** NONE **Break Even Year:**		**One-Time Costs:** $290.9M **Steady State Savings:** $32.8M **Break Even Year:** 2014 (YEAR 21)	
PRO	**CON**	**PRO**	**CON**
• FORSCOM OPERATES WITHOUT INTERRUPTION OF MOVING • FORSCOM REMAINS IN TRANSPORTATION/ COMMUNICATIONS HUB	• LOSE STEADY STATE SAVINGS OF $32.8M IN THE FUTURE	• CLOSES SMALL, SINGLE PURPOSE INSTALLATION • EVENTUALLY ACHIEVES STEADY STATE SAVINGS OF $32.8M • MAINTAINS SYNERGY OF KEEPING THREE HQ'S AT ONE LOCATION	• HIGH TOTAL ONE TIME COST: $291M, FT SAM HOUSTON; $345M, FT HOOD • INCREASED EXPENSE AND TIME FOR TRAVEL TO FORSCOM UNITS/ HQDA • LONG LEAD TIME BEFORE BREAK EVEN POINT (YEAR 21)

Issues
Fort McPherson, GA
(Continued)

ISSUE	DoD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION	R&A STAFF FINDINGS
ATLANTA LOCATION	• ATLANTA IS THE BEST LOCATION FOR FORCES COMMAND	• INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT • 80 PERCENT OF FORSCOM UNITS WITHIN 4 HOURS VIA AIRPLANE; WITHIN 1 DAY VIA AUTOMOBILE • OFFERS CLASS I COMMUNICATIONS HUB • SKILLED CIVILIAN WORK FORCE	• FIVE CLASS I COMMUNICATION HUBS: ATLANTA, CHICAGO, DALLAS, LOS ANGELES, NEW YORK • NO OTHER EXISTING ARMY POST IS NEAR CLASS I COMMUNICATION HUB AND INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT

Fort McPherson, GA:

DoD Recommendation -- none.

Alternative Motion [Close Ft. McPherson, GA. Move to Ft. Sam Houston.]:

I move that the Commission find that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from criterion 5, and, therefore, that the Commission adopt the following recommendation: Close Fort McPherson and realign Forces Command, Third U.S. Army, and U.S. Army Reserve Command to Fort Sam Houston, Texas. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

Fort McPherson, Georgia

DoD Recommendation

None. Commissioner add for further consideration.

Draft Commission Recommendation

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from criterion 5. The Commission, therefore, recommends the following: Close Fort McPherson and realign Forces Command, Third U.S. Army, and U.S. Army Reserve Command to Fort Sam Houston, Texas. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

Document Separator

Tab 11

- At Tab 10, we have the next installation to be discussed, Fort Gillem
- Fort Gillem was added for further consideration on May 21st
- Slide 65 pictorially shows option under consideration **DISCUSS**
- Gary Evans will discuss this recommendation also

FORT GILLEM

SCENARIO II:



Fort Gillem, Georgia

Commissioner Add for Further Consideration: Study for closure due to excess capacity

Visiting Commissioner: Commissioner Courter

Category: Command and Control

LAND (Acres)	BUILDINGS (Million Square Feet)	FAMILY HOUSING (Units)	PERSONNEL Mil	Stu	Civ
1,428	6.6	4,565	570	0	2,356

PERMANENT FACILITIES (%)	ANNUAL OPERATING COST ($ M)	COST FACTORS Construction	Per Diem	VHA Officer	Enlisted
72	16.5	0.83	113	158	145

ONE TIME COSTS ($M) Construction	Housing	STEADY STATE SAVINGS ($M)	BREAK EVEN YEAR	ECONOMIC IMPACT (%) 93	Cumulative
370.8 256.0	20.4	5.6	2094+ (Year 101+)	- 0.3	- 0.8

Issues Reviewed
Fort Gillem, Georgia

COST	MAJOR TENANTS RELIANCE OF FORT MCPHERSON

Issues
Fort Gillem, GA

ISSUE	DoD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION	R&A STAFF FINDINGS
COSTS	• ONE-TIME COST ($M): 370.8 • BREAK EVEN YEAR: 2094+ (Year 101+) • STEADY STATE SAVINGS ($M): 5.6	• ONE-TIME COSTS TOO HIGH • PAY BACK PERIOD TOO LONG	• NO UNITS ARE DOWNSIZED FROM CLOSURE • EQUATES TO SMALL PERSONNEL SAVINGS • EQUATES TO SMALL STEADY STATE SAVINGS THAT TAKE TOO LONG TO OFFSET COSTS • LARGE MILITARY CONSTRUCTION COSTS TO MOVE ACTIVITIES TO OTHER BASES

Scenario Summary
Fort Gillem, GA

SCENARIO I		SCENARIO II	
• STATUS QUO • DO NOT CLOSE FORT GILLEM		• CLOSE FORT GILLEM • MOVE SECOND ARMY TO FORT STEWART • MOVE FT MCPHERSON OVERFLOW BACK TO FT MCPHERSON (MILCON REQUIRED) • OTHER MOVES TO BE DETERMINED (BASE X)	
One-Time Costs: **Steady State Savings:** NONE **Break Even Year:**		**One-Time Costs:** $370.8M **Steady State Savings:** $5.6M **Break Even Year:** 2094+ (Year 101+)	
PRO	**CON**	**PRO**	**CON**
• UNITS/ACTIVITIES BENEFIT FROM ATLANTA AREA (TRANSPORTATION HUB, SKILLED WORKERS, ETC.) • DOES NOT SPEND CLOSING DOLLARS WITHOUT FUTURE SAVINGS	• DOES NOT REDUCE INFRASTRUCTURE • STAND ALONE FACILITY	• REDUCES INFRASTRUCTURE • CONSOLIDATES UNITS AND MISSIONS TO MULTIFUNCTIONAL INSTALLATIONS	• TOO LONG TO BREAK EVEN POINT • REQUIRES EXPENSIVE MILCON (BIGGEST $ DRIVER IS AAFES)

Issues
Fort Gillem, Georgia
(Continued)

ISSUE	DoD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION	R&A STAFF FINDINGS
MAJOR TENANTS	• ARMY AIR FORCE EXCHANGE SERVICE (AAFES) - REGIONAL HEADQUARTERS AND ATLANTA DISTRIBUTION CENTER • HQ, SECOND U.S. ARMY • CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION COMMAND AND WORLDWIDE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION LABORATORY • HQ, 2D RECRUITING BRIGADE • DIRECTOR OF LOGISTICS AND DIRECTOR OF ENGINEERING AND HOUSING FROM FT MCPHERSON	• AAFES, SECOND ARMY, AND 2D RECRUITING BRIGADE HAVE REGIONAL MISSIONS THAT BENEFIT FROM THE TRANSPORTATION HUB OF ATLANTA • CID COMMAND AND LABORATORY RECEIVE EVIDENCE FROM WORLDWIDE SOURCES; ALSO BENEFITS FROM HARTSFIELD INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT	• MAJOR UNITS HAVE REGIONAL MISSIONS THAT BENEFIT FROM ATLANTA LOCATION
RELIANCE OF FT MCPHERSON	• SUB-POST OF FT MCPHERSON	• SERVES FT MCPHERSON BY PROVIDING OVERFLOW SPACE • HOUSES DIRECTOR OF LOGISTICS (DOL) AND DIRECTOR OF ENGINEERING AND HOUSING (DEH) FOR FT MCPHERSON • SERVES COMMUNITY (ACTIVE AND RETIRED) BY PROVIDING POST EXCHANGE AND COMMISSARY COMPLEX	• FT GILLEM PROVIDES VALUE TO FT MCPHERSON AND MILITARY COMMUNITY • FT MCPHERSON AND FT GILLEM LINKED IN MUTUAL SUPPORT • COULD CLOSE FT MCPHERSON WITHOUT CAUSING COSTLY MILCON ON FT GILLEM • CLOSING FT GILLEM WOULD CAUSE COSTLY MILCON PROJECTS ON FT MCPHERSON

Fort Gillem, GA:

DoD Recommendation -- none.

Alternative Motion [Leave Ft. Gillem, GA Open.]:

I move that the Commission find that Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force structure plan and the selection criteria, and, therefore, the Commission recommends that Fort Gillem remain open without change.

	JOHNSON	BYRON	STUART	COURTER	McPHERSON	COX	BOWMAN
Motion							
Second							
"AYE"							
"NAY"							

Fort McPherson, GA:

DoD Recommendation -- none.

Alternative Motion [Close Ft. McPherson, GA. Move to Ft. Sam Houston.]:

I move that the Commission find that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from criterion 5, and, therefore, that the Commission adopt the following recommendation: Close Fort McPherson and realign Forces Command, Third U.S. Army, and U.S. Army Reserve Command to Fort Sam Houston, Texas. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

	JOHNSON	BYRON	STUART	COURTER	McPHERSON	COX	BOWMAN
Motion	✓						
Second							
"AYE"							
"NAY"							

Fort Gillem, GA:

DoD Recommendation -- none.

Alternative Motion [Leave Ft. Gillem, GA Open.]:

I move that the Commission find that Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force structure plan and the selection criteria, and, therefore, the Commission recommends that Fort Gillem remain open without change.

DoD Recommendation

None. Commissioner add for further consideration.

Draft Commission Recommendation

The Commission finds DoD's recommendations did not deviate substantially from the force structure plan and the selection criteria. The Commission, therefore, recommends that Fort Gillem remain open without change.

Document Separator

Tab 12

- At Tab 11 we have the next installation to be discussed, Fort Monroe, Virginia
- Fort Monroe was added for further consideration on May 21st
- Slide 71 pictorially shows option under consideration **DISCUSS**
- Slide 72 shows the relative location of Fort Monroe and Fort Eustis
- Bud Bale will discuss this recommendation

FT. MONROE, VA

SCENARIO I:

CLOSE




Richmond
Fort Eustis
Langley AFB
Fort Monroe
Norfolk
Commissioner Candidate for further consideration
Operational Installation
0
10
20
Miles

12

Fort Monroe, Virginia

Commissioner Add for Consideration: Study for closure due to excess capacity.

Visiting Commissioner: Commissioner Byron

Category: Command and Control

LAND (Acres)	BUILDINGS (Million Square Feet)	FAMILY HOUSING (Units)	PERSONNEL Mil	Stu	Civ
570	1.99	1,007	826	33	1,714

PERMANENT FACILITIES (%)	ANNUAL OPERATING COST ($ M)	COST FACTORS Construction	Per Diem	VHA Officer	Enlisted)
91	29.9	0.92	94	167	115

ONE TIME COSTS ($M) Construction	Housing	STEADY STATE SAVINGS ($M)	BREAK EVEN YEAR	ECONOMIC IMPACT (%) 93	Cumulative
70.3 (127.9) 41.9 (91.1)	1.6 (2.0)	31.8 (19.3)	2000 (2008) YEAR 7 (YEAR 15)	- 0	- 6.1

Issues Reviewed
Fort Monroe, VA

OPERATIONAL ECONOMICS OF MOVE ECONOMIC IMPACT ENVIRONMENTAL	COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT SCHOOL CONSOLIDATION

Issues
Fort Monroe, VA

ISSUE	DoD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION	R&A STAFF FINDINGS
OPERATIONAL	• WOULD DISRUPT RESTRUCTURING OF COMBAT DEVELOPMENT, DOCTRINE, AND TRAINING SUPPORT SYSTEMS • WOULD DISRUPT INTERNAL COMMAND MANAGEMENT REORGANIZATION • CURRENT LOCATION PROVIDES FOR JOINT ACTIVITY	• SUPPORTS KEEPING TRADOC IN THE COMMUNITY	• MOVE IS ONLY 20 MILES • NO PROGNOSIS ON END OF FORCE STRUCTURE DECISIONS • TRADOC WILL REMAIN IN AREA AND AVAILABLE FOR JOINT ACTIVITIES • WELL DEVELOPED MOVEMENT PLAN WOULD DECREASE OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS
ECONOMICS OF MOVE	• ARMY EXPRESSED CONCERN WITH HIGH COST OF CLEANUP - ONE FACTOR IN DEFERRAL DECISION	• HIGH COST TO PROVIDE ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP SUPPORTS KEEPING ARMY AT FT. MONROE	• VACATES SINGLE PURPOSE INSTALLATION • UTILIZES EXCESS CAPACITY AT ANOTHER INSTALLATION • TRUE EXTENT OF CLEANUP COSTS UNKNOWN BUT NOT A CONSIDERATION
ECONOMIC IMPACT		• COMBINATION OF CLOSING OTHER INSTALLATIONS REPRESENTS THREAT TO STATE ECONOMY	• ECONOMIC IMPACT LIMITED AS MAJORITY OF UNITS STAY IN THE AREA
ENVIRONMENTAL	• UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE IS NOT A PROBLEM UNTIL ARMY LEAVES • POTENTIAL HIGH COST OF CLEANUP (UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE)	• STRESSES INSTALLATION REVERTS BACK TO STATE WHEN NO LONGER USED FOR DEFENSE • EXPECTS LAND TO BE TURNED BACK HAZARD FREE	• MUST BE ACCOMPLISHED ANYWAY • POTENTIAL REQUIREMENT TO ADD COST OF ARCHAEOLOGICAL DIG TO ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP COST • TRUE MAGNITUDE OF CLEANUP AND EXTENT OF COSTS NOT KNOWN

FT. MONROE, VA

SCENARIO I:

CLOSE



Scenario Summary
Fort Monroe, VA

SCENARIO I		SCENARIO II	
• CLOSE FORT MONROE. MOVE TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND AND THE RESERVE OFFICERS TRAINING CORPS CADET COMMAND TO FORT EUSTIS, VIRGINIA		• THAT FORT MONROE REMAIN OPEN.	
ONE-TIME COSTS: $ 127.9 MILLION **STEADY STATE SAVINGS:** $ 19.2 MILLION **BREAK EVEN YEAR:** 2008 (YEAR 15)		**ONE-TIME COSTS:** **STEADY STATE SAVINGS:** NONE **BREAK EVEN YEAR:**	
PRO	**CON**	**PRO**	**CON**
• PROVIDES THE GREATEST SAVING IN THE LONG RUN • CLOSES A SINGLE PURPOSE INSTALLATION • UTILIZES EXCESS SPACE ON OTHER INSTALLATIONS • KEEPS TRADOC IN AREA FOR JOINT ACTIVITY WITH AIR COMBAT COMMAND, CINCLANT AND THE FUTURE JCS JOINT WARFARE CENTER	• DISRUPTION OF HEADQUARTERS ACTIVITY DURING MOVE • POTENTIAL LONG PAY BACK PERIOD (ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP) • MAY INTERFERE WITH FUTURE ARMY PLAN TO CONSOLIDATE CSS TRAINING	• AVOIDS CONSTRUCTION OF NEW FACILITIES AT FT. EUSTIS • AVOIDS COSTS OF MOVE • AVOIDS TURBULENCE IN HEADQUARTERS DUE TO A MOVE • KEEPS ARMY PRESENCE ON A NATIONAL HISTORIC LANDMARK • KEEPS TRADOC IN AREA FOR JOINT ACTIVITY WITH AIR COMBAT COMMAND, CINCLANT AND THE FUTURE JCS JOINT WARFARE CENTER	• FAILS TO CLOSE A SINGLE PURPOSE INSTALLATION • FAILS TO CAPITALIZE ON EXCESS SPACE ON ANOTHER INSTALLATION • NO LONG TERM SAVINGS

Issues
Fort Monroe, VA
(Continued)

ISSUE	DoD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION	R&A STAFF FINDINGS
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT SCHOOL CONSOLIDATION	• MOVE WOULD PREVENT CONSOLIDATION OF COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT TRAINING	• NONE	• COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT TRAINING CONSOLIDATION IS ONLY UNDER STUDY

Fort Monroe, VA:

DoD Recommendation -- none.

Alternative Motion [Close Ft. Monroe, VA. Move to Ft. Eustis.]:

I move that the Commission find that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from criteria 1 and 2, and, therefore, that the Commission adopt the following recommendation: Close Fort Monroe and relocate Training and Doctrine Command and Reserve Officers Training Corps Cadet Command to Fort Eustis, Virginia. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

	JOHNSON	BYRON	STUART	COURTER	McPHERSON	COX	BOWMAN
Motion							
Second							
"AYE"							
"NAY"							

Fort Monroe, VA:

DoD Recommendation -- none.

Alternative Motion [Close Ft. Monroe, VA. Move to Ft. Eustis.]:

I move that the Commission find that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from criteria 1 and 2, and, therefore, that the Commission adopt the following recommendation: Close Fort Monroe and relocate Training and Doctrine Command and Reserve Officers Training Corps Cadet Command to Fort Eustis, Virginia. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

DoD Recommendation

None. Commissioner add for further consideration.

Draft Commission Recommendation

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from criteria 1 and 2. The Commission, therefore, recommends the following: Close Fort Monroe and relocate Training and Doctrine Command and Reserve Officers Training Corps Cadet Command to Fort Eustis, Virginia. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

- At Tab 12, we have the next category that will be discussed--**COMMODITY ORIENTED**
- The map, slide 79, and the accompanying chart, slide 80, show the names and locations of the Army's 12 commodity oriented installations


Detroit Arsenal
Cold Regions Research Lab
Natick RDEC
Rock Island Arsenal
Picatinny Arsenal
Fort Detrick
Fort Monmouth
Army Research Laboratory
St. Louis
Federal Center
Vint Hill Farms
Redstone Arsenal
Belvoir Fuels Activity
DOD Recommendation for Closure
DOD Recommendation for Realignment
DOD Recommended Change
Operational Installations

Army Commodity Oriented Bases

Army Research Laboratory, MD	8	Fort Detrick, MD	6	Redstone Arsenal, AL	1
Belvoir Fuels Activity, TX	12	**Fort Monmouth, NJ**	4 (R)	**Rock Island Arsenal, IL**	3 (†)
Cold Regions Research Laboratory, NH	7	Natick RDEC, MA	11	St. Louis Federal Center, MO	10
Detroit Arsenal, MI	5	Picatinny Arsenal, NJ	2	**Vint Hill Farms, VA**	9 (C)

(C) = DoD recommendation for closure
(R) = DoD recommendation for realignment
(†) = DoD recommendation for redirect
(*) = Commissioner candidate for further consideration

Document Separator

Tab 13

- At Tab 13 we have the next installation to be discussed, Vint Hill Farms, Virginia
- Slide 81 pictorially shows the DoD recommendation **DISCUSS**
- Slide 82 shows the relative location of Vint Hill Farms, Fort Monmouth, and Tobyhanna Army Depot
- John Graham will discuss this recommendation

VINT HILL FARMS, VA

DOD RECOMMENDATION:




DOD Recommendation for Closure
Operational Installations
0
45
90
Miles
Tobyhanna Army Depot
Fort Monmouth
Fort Meade
Fort Belvoir
Vint Hill Farms

Vint Hill Farms, Virginia

DoD Recommendation: Close Vint Hill Farms. Relocate the maintenance and repair function of the Intelligence Material Management Center (IMMC) to Tobyhanna Depot, PA. Transfer the remaining elements of IMMC, the Signal Warfare Directorate, and the Program Executive Officer (PEO) for Intelligence and Electronic Warfare (IEW) to Fort Monmouth, NJ.

Visiting Commissioner: Commissioner McPherson

Category: Commodity Oriented

LAND (Acres)	BUILDINGS (Million Square Feet)	FAMILY HOUSING (Units)	PERSONNEL Mil	Stu	Civ
701	1.2	366	796	0	1,071

PERMANENT FACILITIES (%)	ANNUAL OPERATING COST ($ M)	COST FACTORS Construction	Per Diem	VHA Officer	Enlisted
85	19.6	0.94	77	397	340

ONE TIME COSTS ($M) Construction	Housing	STEADY STATE SAVINGS ($M)	BREAK EVEN YEAR	ECONOMIC IMPACT (%) 93	Cumulative
72.4		19.1	2001		
44	0		(Year 8)	- 14	- 14

Issues Reviewed
Vint Hill Farms, VA

UNIQUE WORK FORCE	MILITARY VALUE
CLASSIFIED WORK/ACTIVITIES	SPECIAL ACCESS PROGRAMS
SYNERGY OF COLLOCATING ACTIVITIES	CAPACITY OF THE POST
RADIO FREQUENCY QUIET ZONE	COST DIFFERENTIAL AT FORT MONMOUTH

Issues
Vint Hill Farms, VA

ISSUE	DoD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION	R&A STAFF FINDINGS
UNIQUE WORK FORCE	• QUALIFIED REPLACEMENTS ARE AVAILABLE IN THE FORT MONMOUTH AREA	• SUCCESS OF ACTIVITIES DEPENDS ON QUALITY WORK FORCE • UP TO 80% WILL NOT MOVE	• PROPER PHASING OF MOVE WILL MINIMIZE PERSONNEL TURBULENCE
CLASSIFIED WORK FOR ARMY AND DOD AGENCIES	• MOVE WILL HAVE MINIMAL IMPACT	• NEED TO BE CLOSE TO AGENCIES SUCH AS INSCOM, DIA, AND OTHER SERVICES IN THE NCR TO COORDINATE	• MOVE COORDINATED WITH ARMY INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES • NO OSD COMMENT
CLASSIFIED WORK FOR NON-DOD AGENCIES	• MOVE WILL HAVE MINIMAL IMPACT	• AGENCIES LOCATED IN THE NCR • POTENTIAL HARM TO NATIONAL SECURITY IF REQUIRED TO MOVE	• STATE, TREASURY, NSA, CIA, FBI, DEA ALL STATE LITTLE OR NO IMPACT AS A RESULT OF THE MOVE

Issues
Vint Hill Farms, VA
(Continued)

ISSUE	DoD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION	R&A STAFF FINDINGS
SYNERGY	WILL INCREASE: • AT FORT MONMOUTH DUE TO COLLOCATION WITH SIMILAR FUNCTIONS • AT TOBYHANNA BY COLLOCATING ALL COMMUNICATION-ELECTRONICS REPAIR	• CURRENTLY EXISTS AT VINT HILL FARMS BECAUSE ALL FUNCTIONS ARE COLLOCATED AT ONE INSTALLATION • SPLITTING BETWEEN TWO WILL HURT	• GREATER EFFICIENCIES WILL BE GAINED BY COLLOCATING SIMILAR ACTIVITIES AT FORT MONMOUTH AND TOBYHANNA ARMY DEPOT • MAY NOT BE AS GREAT AS STATED BY THE ARMY IF CECOM HQS MOVES
RADIO FREQUENCY QUIET ZONE	• NOT SIGNIFICANT FOR ACCOMPLISHMENT OF MISSION • REQUIREMENT, WHEN NEEDED, CAN BE MET AT WHITE SANDS OR FORT HUACHUCA	• REQUIRED FOR SOME OF R&D AND TESTING CONDUCTED • STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS HAVE WORKED TO PRESERVE QUIET ZONE	• TRAVEL TO WHITE SANDS OR FORT HUACHUCA WILL INCREASE COSTS • TIME SENSITIVE WORK MAY BE DELAYED • OVERALL IMPACT SHOULD BE MINIMAL

VINT HILL FARMS

DOD RECOMMENDATION



SCENARIO I: LEAVE VINT HILL FARMS OPEN



Scenario Summary
Vint Hill Farms, VA

DOD RECOMMENDATION		SCENARIO I	
• CLOSE VINT HILL FARMS • RELOCATE MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR FUNCTION OF IMMC TO TOBYHANNA ARMY DEPOT, PA • RELOCATE REMAINDER OF IMMC, INTELLIGENCE & ELECTRONIC WARFARE DIRECTORATE (IEW), AND PEO FOR IEW TO FT. MONMOUTH, NJ		• LEAVE VINT HILL FARMS OPEN	
One Time Costs: $ 72.4 **Steady State Savings:** $ 19.1 **Break Even Year:** 2001		**One Time Costs:** **Steady State Savings:** NONE **Break Even Year:**	
PRO	CON	PRO	CON
• CONSOLIDATES SIMILAR FUNCTIONS • CREATES EFFICIENCIES • LONG TERM SAVINGS • POSTURES CECOM/PEO's FOR FUTURE DOWNSIZING	• CONSTRUCTION AND TRANSPORTATION COSTS • MAY HAVE TO REPLACE EXPERIENCED WORKFORCE • POTENTIAL "DOWNTIME" IN PROVIDING SERVICES TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY • WILL BE FURTHER AWAY FROM CUSTOMERS	• RETAINS QUALITY WORKFORCE • REMAIN CLOSE TO CUSTOMERS • SAVES IMMEDIATE OUTLAYS (CONSTRUCTION AND TRANSPORTATION COSTS)	• NO LONG TERM SAVINGS • PEO - IEW CONTINUES TO BE SPLIT BETWEEN TWO LOCATIONS • NO REDUCTION IN OVERHEAD • DOES NOT ALLOW FOR FUTURE SYNERGISTIC DOWNSIZING

Issues
Vint Hill Farms, VA
(Continued)

ISSUE	DoD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION	R&A STAFF FINDINGS
MILITARY VALUE	9 of 12 (Fort Monmouth 4 of 12)	• ARMY DID NOT TAKE INTO ACCOUNT UNIT MISSIONS WHEN DETERMINING RELATIVE RANK	• ARMY WAS CONSISTENT IN PROCESS USED TO DETERMINE RELATIVE RANKINGS IN CATEGORY
CAPACITY OF THE POST	• MOVE OF THE 201st MI BATTALION CAUSES POST TO BE UNDER-UTILIZED	• MOVE OF THE UNIT WILL NOT CAUSE POST TO UNDER-UTILIZED	• ARMY OVERSTATED IMPACT • UNIT ACCOUNTS FOR ONLY 7% OF SPACE ON POST
SPECIAL ACCESS PROGRAMS		• SEVERAL ON POST • ARMY DID NOT CONSIDER THEM WHEN FORMULATING RECOMMENDATION • COMMISSION NEEDS TO LOOK AT POTENTIAL IMPACT IF POST IS CLOSED	
COST DIFFERENTIAL AT FORT MONMOUTH	• COSTS AND SAVINGS TAKE INTO ACCOUNT 8% PAY DIFFERENTIAL	• WHY MOVE FROM A LOW TO A HIGHER COST AREA	• ARMY DID ACCOUNT FOR PAY DIFFERENTIAL IN COST AND SAVINGS COMPUTATIONS

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Commodity Oriented

Vint Hill Farms, VA:

Accept DoD Recommendation [Close Vint Hill Farms, VA. Move to Ft. Monmouth and Tobyhanna.]:

I move that the Commission find that the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force structure plan and final criteria and, therefore, that the Commission adopt the following recommendation of the Secretary of Defense: Close Vint Hill Farms. Relocate the maintenance and repair function of the Intelligence Material Management Center (IMMC) to Tobyhanna Army Depot, PA. Transfer the remaining elements of IMMC, the Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Directorate (formerly the Signal Warfare Directorate), and the program executive officer (PEO) for Intelligence and Electronic Warfare (IEW) to Fort Monmouth, NJ.

	JOHNSON	BYRON	STUART	COURTER	McPHERSON	COX	BOWMAN
Motion					✓		
Second			✓				
"AYE"	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
"NAY"							

Alternative Motion [Leave Vint Hill Farms, VA open.]:

I move that the Commission find that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from criteria 1 and 4, and, therefore, that the Commission reject the Secretary's recommendation on Vint Hill Farms, VA and adopt the following recommendation: Vint Hill Farms will remain open. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

	JOHNSON	BYRON	STUART	COURTER	McPHERSON	COX	BOWMAN
Motion							
Second							
"AYE"							
"NAY"							

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Commodity Oriented

Vint Hill Farms, VA:

Accept DoD Recommendation [Close Vint Hill Farms, VA. Move to Ft. Monmouth and Tobyhanna.]:

I move that the Commission find that the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force structure plan and final criteria and, therefore, that the Commission adopt the following recommendation of the Secretary of Defense: Close Vint Hill Farms. Relocate the maintenance and repair function of the Intelligence Material Management Center (IMMC) to Tobyhanna Army Depot, PA. Transfer the remaining elements of IMMC, the Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Directorate (formerly the Signal Warfare Directorate), and the program executive officer (PEO) for Intelligence and Electronic Warfare (IEW) to Fort Monmouth, NJ.

Reject DoD Recommendation/Alternative Motion [Leave Vint Hill Farms, VA open.]:

I move that the Commission find that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from criteria 1 and 4, and, therefore, that the Commission reject the Secretary's recommendation on Vint Hill Farms, VA and adopt the following recommendation: Vint Hill Farms will remain open. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

DoD Recommendation

Close Vint Hill Farms. Relocate the maintenance and repair function of the Intelligence Material Management Center (IMMC) to Tobyhanna Army Depot, PA. Transfer the remaining elements of IMMC, the Signal Warfare Directorate, and the program executive officer (PEO) for Intelligence and Electronic Warfare (IEW) to Fort Monmouth, NJ.

Draft Commission Recommendation

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: Close Vint Hill Farms. Relocate the maintenance and repair function of the Intelligence Material Management Center (IMMC) to Tobyhanna Army Depot, PA. Transfer the remaining elements of IMMC, the Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Directorate (formerly the Signal Warfare Directorate), and the program executive officer (PEO) for Intelligence and Electronic Warfare (IEW) to Fort Monmouth, NJ. The Commission finds that DoD's recommendation did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and the selection criteria.

Alternative

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from criteria 1 and 4. Thus the Commission recommends the following: Vint Hill Farms will remain open. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

Document Separator

Tab 14

- At Tab 14 we have the next installation to be discussed, Fort Monmouth, New Jersey
- Slide 90 pictorially shows the DoD recommendation **DISCUSS**
- Slide 91 shows the relative location of Fort Monmouth, Rock Island Arsenal, and Fort Jackson
- Bud Bale will discuss this recommendation

FT. MONMOUTH, NJ

DOD RECOMMENDATION:




Rock Island Arsenal
Fort Monmouth
Fort Jackson
0
100
200
Miles
Operational Installations
DOD Recommendation for Realignment

Fort Monmouth, NJ

DoD Recommendation: Realign Fort Monmouth. Relocate the headquarters of U.S. Army Communications Electronic Command (CECOM) from leased space outside Fort Monmouth to Rock Island Arsenal, IL and transfer the Chaplain School to Fort Jackson, SC. Consolidate activities to maximize utilization of main post Fort Monmouth. Dispose of excess facilities and real property at Evans and Charles Woods sub posts, as well as main post, Fort Monmouth.

Visiting Commissioner: Commissioner McPherson

Category: Commodity Oriented

LAND (Acres)	BUILDINGS (Million Square Feet)	FAMILY HOUSING (Units)	PERSONNEL		
			Mil	Stu	Civ
2,105	6.05	1,629	2,248	170	6,551

PERMANENT FACILITIES (%)	ANNUAL OPERATING COST ($ M)	COST FACTORS		VHA	
		Construction	Per Diem	Officer	Enlisted)
78	73.7	1.13	102	477	336

ONE TIME COSTS ($M)		STEADY STATE SAVINGS ($M)	BREAK EVEN YEAR	ECONOMIC IMPACT (%)	
Construction	Housing			93	Cumulative
99.9		20.9	2002		
34.6	0		(YEAR 9)	- 1.7	- 1.7

Issues Reviewed
Fort Monmouth, NJ

CIVILIAN MOVE/REPLACEMENT	MILITARY VALUE
MOVES TO EXCESS SPACE	LEASED FACILITY
ACCESS TO HIGH TECH R&D	
SPLIT OF HQS AND ELEMENTS	
ECONOMICS OF MOVE	

Issues
Fort Monmouth, NJ

ISSUE	DoD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION	R&A STAFF FINDINGS
CIVILIAN MOVE/ REPLACEMENT	• HIGH TECH SKILLS AND PERSONNEL ARE AVAILABLE IN THE ROCK ISLAND ARSENAL AREA	• MANY WILL NOT MOVE • HIGH TECH SKILLS WILL BE HARD TO REPLACE AT ROCK ISLAND ARSENAL	• SKILLED PERSONNEL ARE AVAILABLE AT BOTH LOCATIONS • TRUE EXTENT OF CIVILIANS ELECTING TO MOVE IS NOT KNOWN
MOVES TO EXCESS SPACE	• SUPPORTS PLAN TO MOVE INTO EXCESS SPACE AT ROCK ISLAND	• FACILITY AT ROCK ISLAND IS WAREHOUSE • CONSIDERABLE INVESTMENT NEEDED	• EXCESS SPACE EXISTS AT BOTH ROCK ISLAND ARSENAL AND FORT MONMOUTH (WITH MOVE OF 513TH AND CHAPLAIN SCHOOL)
ACCESS TO HIGH TECH R&D	• ELEMENTS OF CECOM REQUIRING ACCESS ARE REMAINING AT FT MONMOUTH	• NJ AND NY AREA IS EAST COAST HIGH-TECH CENTER • NOT AVAILABLE IN ROCK ISLAND AREA	• AVAILABLE AT BOTH AREAS ALTHOUGH THERE IS A LARGER CONCENTRATION IN NJ AND NY AREA
SPLIT OF HQS AND ELEMENTS	• PRESENTS NO PROBLEM	• WILL CAUSE SERIOUS PROBLEM DUE TO SEPARATION • ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL WILL BE REQUIRED AT FT. MONMOUTH	• BOTH SEPARATION ARGUMENTS CAN BE SUPPORTED • MATRIX SUPPORT PERSONNEL TO REMAIN
ECONOMICS OF MOVE	• PROVIDES GREATEST SAVINGS IN THE LONG RUN	•LOCALITY PAY SHOULD NOT BE A CONSIDERATION • ADDITIONAL TRAVEL WILL BE REQUIRED	• BOTH OPTIONS OFFER SAVINGS • CONGRESSIONAL MANDATED LOCALITY PAY NOT REQUIRED AT ROCK ISLAND ARSENAL • ADDITIONAL TRAVEL MIGHT BE REQUIRED

FT. MONMOUTH, NJ

DOD RECOMMENDATION:



SCENARIO I:



Scenario Summary
Fort Monmouth, NJ

DOD RECOMMENDATION		SCENARIO I	
• REALIGN FORT MONMOUTH. RELOCATE THE HEADQUARTERS OF U.S. ARMY COMMUNICATIONS ELECTRONIC COMMAND FROM LEASED SPACE OUTSIDE FORT MONMOUTH, NEW JERSEY TO ROCK ISLAND ARSENAL, ILLINOIS AND TRANSFER THE CHAPLAIN SCHOOL TO FORT JACKSON, SOUTH CAROLINA. • CONSOLIDATE ACTIVITIES TO MAXIMIZE UTILIZATION OF MAIN POST FORT MONMOUTH. •DISPOSE OF EXCESS FACILITIES AND REAL PROPERTY AT EVANS AND CHARLES WOODS SUB POSTS, AS WELL AS MAIN POST, FORT MONMOUTH.		• REALIGN FORT MONMOUTH. RELOCATE THE HEADQUARTERS OF U.S. ARMY COMMUNICATIONS ELECTRONIC COMMAND FROM LEASED SPACE OUTSIDE FORT MONMOUTH INTO SPACE ON FORT MONMOUTH VACATED BY 513TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BRIGADE, THE CHAPLAIN SCHOOL OR OTHER SUITABLE SPACE • RELOCATE THE CHAPLAIN SCHOOL TO FORT JACKSON, SOUTH CAROLINA • CONSOLIDATE ACTIVITIES TO MAXIMIZE UTILIZATION OF MAIN POST FORT MONMOUTH • DISPOSE OF EXCESS FACILITIES AND REAL PROPERTY AT EVANS AND CHARLES WOODS SUB-POSTS, AS WELL AS MAIN POST FORT MONMOUTH	
ONE-TIME COSTS: $ 99.9 MILLION **STEADY STATE SAVINGS:** $ 20.9 MILLION **BREAK EVEN YEAR:** 2002 (YEAR 9)		**ONE-TIME COSTS:** $ 63.6 MILLION **STEADY STATE SAVINGS:** $ 13.3 MILLION **BREAK EVEN YEAR:** 2003 (YEAR 10) Need to sumb of $15m lease	
PRO	**CON**	**PRO**	**CON**
• PROVIDES THE GREATEST SAVINGS IN THE LONG RUN • VACATES LEASED BUILDING ($15 MILLION) • UTILIZES EXCESS SPACE AT ROCK ISLAND ARSENAL • MOVES TO AREA WITH LOWER OPERATING COSTS	• SEPARATION OF CECOM HEADQUARTERS FROM ITS PEOS AND R&D ELEMENTS • DISRUPTION OF HEADQUARTERS DURING MOVE • MAY BE DIFFICULT TO REPLACE EXPERIENCED WORKFORCE • FURTHER AWAY FROM AGENCIES HEADQUARTERS INTERACTS WITH	• VACATES LEASED BUILDING ($15 MILLION) • UTILIZES EXCESS SPACE MADE AVAILABLE ON MAIN POST FORT MONMOUTH • CONSOLIDATES CECOM HEADQUARTERS WITH ITS PEOS AND R&D ELEMENTS • REDUCES ONE-TIME COSTS • LEAST TURBULENCE TO CIVILIAN WORKFORCE	• KEEPS HEADQUARTERS IN HIGH OPERATING COST AREA • LESS LONG TERM SAVINGS THAN DOD RECOMMENDATION

Issues
Fort Monmouth, NJ
(Continued)

ISSUE	DoD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION	R&A STAFF FINDINGS
MILITARY VALUE	4 OF 12	• CONCERNED ABOUT CHANGE FROM 3 TO 4	• REVISED DATA DUE TO REVIEW OF DATA BY AAA CAUSED CHANGE
LEASED FACILITY	• HIGH RECURRING COST, NEED TO VACATE	• SUPPORTS THE MOVE OUT OF LEASED SPACE	• ALL ALTERNATIVES CALL FOR VACATION OF LEASED SPACE

Fort Monmouth, NJ:

Accept DoD Recommendation [Realign Ft. Monmouth, NJ. Move CECOM to Rock Island.]:

I move that the Commission find that the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force structure plan and final criteria and, therefore, that the Commission adopt the following recommendation of the Secretary of Defense: Realign Fort Monmouth. Relocate the headquarters of U.S. Army Communications Electronic Command (CECOM) from leased space outside Fort Monmouth to Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois and transfer the Chaplain School to Fort Jackson, South Carolina. Consolidate activities to maximize utilization of main post Fort Monmouth. Dispose of excess facilities and real property at Evans and Charles Woods sub posts, as well as main post, Fort Monmouth.

	JOHNSON	BYRON	STUART	COURTER	McPHERSON	COX	BOWMAN
Motion							
Second							
"AYE"							
"NAY"							

Reject DoD Recommendation:

I move that the Commission find that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from the force structure plan and final criteria in making his recommendation on Fort Monmouth, NJ. Therefore, the Commission rejects and does not make the following recommendation of the Secretary: Realign Fort Monmouth. Relocate the headquarters of U.S. Army Communications Electronic Command (CECOM) from leased space outside Fort Monmouth to Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois and transfer the Chaplain School to Fort Jackson, South Carolina. Consolidate activities to maximize utilization of main post Fort Monmouth. Dispose of excess facilities and real property at Evans and Charles Woods sub posts, as well as main post, Fort Monmouth.

	JOHNSON	BYRON	STUART	COURTER	McPHERSON	COX	BOWMAN
Motion							
Second							
"AYE"							
"NAY"							

Alternative Motion [Realign Ft. Monmouth. Move CECOM to main post Ft. Monmouth.]: rejects the Secretary's recommendation on Fort Monmouth and instead

I move that the Commission find that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from criterion 4. The Commission finds that the Department misstated the cost differential between two alternative choices. Therefore, the Commission adopts the following recommendation: Move CECOM headquarters out of the leased space and into space at Fort Monmouth vacated by the 513th Military Intelligence Brigade and the Chaplain School or other suitable space; relocate the Chaplain School to Fort Jackson; consolidate activities to maximize utilization of main post Fort Monmouth; and dispose of excess facilities and real property at Evans and Charles Woods sub posts, as well as main post Fort Monmouth. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

	JOHNSON	BYRON	STUART	COURTER	McPHERSON	COX	BOWMAN
Motion					✓		
Second						✓	
"AYE"	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
"NAY"							

Fort Monmouth, NJ:

Accept DoD Recommendation [Realign Ft. Monmouth, NJ. Move CECOM to Rock Island.]:
I move that the Commission find that the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force structure plan and final criteria and, therefore, that the Commission adopt the following recommendation of the Secretary of Defense: Realign Fort Monmouth. Relocate the headquarters of U.S. Army Communications Electronic Command (CECOM) from leased space outside Fort Monmouth to Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois and transfer the Chaplain School to Fort Jackson, South Carolina. Consolidate activities to maximize utilization of main post Fort Monmouth. Dispose of excess facilities and real property at Evans and Charles Woods sub posts, as well as main post, Fort Monmouth.

Reject DoD Recommendation:
I move that the Commission find that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from the force structure plan and final criteria in making his recommendation on Fort Monmouth, NJ. Therefore, the Commission rejects and does not make the following recommendation of the Secretary: Realign Fort Monmouth. Relocate the headquarters of U.S. Army Communications Electronic Command (CECOM) from leased space outside Fort Monmouth to Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois and transfer the Chaplain School to Fort Jackson, South Carolina. Consolidate activities to maximize utilization of main post Fort Monmouth. Dispose of excess facilities and real property at Evans and Charles Woods sub posts, as well as main post, Fort Monmouth.

Alternative Motion [Realign Ft. Monmouth. Move CECOM to main post Ft. Monmouth.]:
I move that the Commission find that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from criterion 4. The Commission finds that the Department misstated the cost differential between two alternative choices. Therefore, the Commission adopts the following recommendation: Move CECOM headquarters out of the leased space and into space at Fort Monmouth vacated by the 513th Military Intelligence Brigade and the Chaplain School or other suitable space; relocate the Chaplain School to Fort Jackson; consolidate activities to maximize utilization of main post Fort Monmouth; and dispose of excess facilities and real property at Evans and Charles Woods sub posts, as well as main post Fort Monmouth. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

DoD Recommendation

Realign Fort Monmouth. Relocate the headquarters of U.S. Army Communications Electronic Command (CECOM) from leased space outside Fort Monmouth to Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois and transfer the Chaplain School to Fort Jackson, South Carolina. Consolidate activities to maximize utilization of main post Fort Monmouth. Dispose of excess facilities and real property at Evans and Charles Woods sub posts, as well as main post, Fort Monmouth.

Draft Commission Recommendation

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: Realign Fort Monmouth. Relocate the headquarters of U.S. Army Communications Electronic Command (CECOM) from leased space outside Fort Monmouth to Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois and transfer the Chaplain School to Fort Jackson, South Carolina. Consolidate activities to maximize utilization of main post Fort Monmouth. Dispose of excess facilities and real property at Evans and Charles Woods sub posts, as well as main post, Fort Monmouth.

Alternative

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from criterion 4. The Commission found that the Department had misstated the cost differential between two alternative choices. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: Move CECOM headquarters out of the leased space and into space at Fort Monmouth vacated by the 513th Military Intelligence Brigade and the Chaplain School or other suitable space; relocate the Chaplain School Fort Jackson; consolidate activities to maximize utilization of main post Fort Monmouth; and dispose of excess facilities and real property at Evans and Charles Woods sub posts, as well as main post Fort Monmouth. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

Document Separator

Tab 15

- At Tab 15 we have the next installation to be discussed, Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois
- Slide 98 pictorially shows the DoD recommendation **DISCUSS**
- Slide 99 shows the relative location of Rock Island Arsenal and Redstone Arsenal
- Gary Evans will discuss this recommendation

ROCK ISLAND ARSENAL, IL

DOD RECOMMENDATION:



SCENARIO I: 1991 COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION




Rock Island Arsenal
Redstone Arsenal
0
100
200
Miles

Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois

DoD Recommendation: Change the recommendation of the 1991 Commission regarding Rock Island, IL, as follows. Instead of sending the materiel management functions of U.S. Army Armament, Munitions and Chemical Command (AMCCOM) to Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, as recommended by the 1991 Base Closure Commission, reorganize these functions under Tank Automotive Command (TACOM) with the functions remaining in place at Rock Island, IL.

Visiting Commissioner: None

Category: Commodity Oriented

LAND (Acres)	BUILDINGS (Million Square Feet)	FAMILY HOUSING (Units)	PERSONNEL Mil	Stu	Civ
891	6.4	258	437	100	7,988

PERMANENT FACILITIES (%)	ANNUAL OPERATING COST ($ M)	COST FACTORS Construction	Per Diem	VHA Officer	Enlisted
100	72.8	1.02	77	0	3

ONE TIME COSTS ($M) Construction	Housing	STEADY STATE SAVINGS ($M)	BREAK EVEN YEAR	ECONOMIC IMPACT (%) 93	Cumulative
0	0	1.0	Immediate	0	0

Issues Reviewed
Rock Island Arsenal, Alabama

OPERATIONAL COSTS	PERSONNEL SAVINGS

Issues
Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois

ISSUE	DoD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION	R&A STAFF FINDINGS
OPERATIONAL	• THE ARMAMENT AND CHEMICAL MATERIEL MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS OF THE ARMAMENT, MUNITIONS AND CHEMICAL COMMAND (AMCCOM) ARE MORE CLOSELY ALIGNED TO THE TANK AUTOMOTIVE COMMAND (TACOM) THAN TO THE MISSILE COMMAND (MICOM) • MISSILE ARMAMENT AND CHEMICAL COMMAND (MACCOM) WAS TO BE AN INTEGRAL PART OF ARMY MATERIEL COMMAND'S (AMC) VISION 2000 WHICH IS NO LONGER FEASIBLE/AFFORDABLE	• QUAD CITIES (ROCK ISLAND ARSENAL AREA) AGREES WITH ARMY POSITION. • HUNTSVILLE COMMUNITY ARGUES THAT REASONS FOR 1991 COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION FOR TRANSFER TO REDSTONE ARSENAL ARE JUST AS COMPELLING TODAY AS TWO YEARS AGO.	• COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY MATERIEL COMMAND (AMC) HAD CORE COMPETENCY ADVOCATES REVIEW ESTABLISHMENT OF MACCOM. • CORE COMPETENCY ADVOCATES DETERMINED THAT CLOSER ALIGNMENT EXISTED BETWEEN ARMAMENT AND CHASSIS (TACOM) THAN BETWEEN ARMAMENT AND MISSILE. • RETAINING FUNCTIONS AT ROCK ISLAND SUPPORTS AMC'S VISION
COSTS	• RETAIN AT ROCK ISLAND ARSENAL •• AVOIDS MILITARY CONSTRUCTION COSTS OF $26.2M •• AVOIDS PERSONNEL MOVEMENT COSTS OF $44.1M • STEADY STATE SAVINGS FROM PERSONNEL ELIMINATIONS OF $1.0M	• QUAD CITIES SUPPORTS ARMY POSITION • HUNTSVILLE COMMUNITY ARGUES THAT SAVINGS FROM POSSIBLE TRANSFER SHOULD REMAIN VALID	• BOTTOM LINE: •• MOVING MISSION TO REDSTONE ARSENAL HAS ONE-TIME COSTS OF $70.7M •• RETAINING MISSION AT ROCK ISLAND ARSENAL AVOIDS ONE TIME COSTS OF $70.7M AND HAS A STEADY STATE SAVINGS OF $1.0M

Scenario Summary
Rock Island Arsenal, IL

DOD RECOMMENDATION		SCENARIO I	
• REDIRECT 1991 COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION • RETAIN ARMAMENTS, MUNITIONS AND CHEMICAL COMMAND (AMCCOM) MATERIEL MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS AT ROCK ISLAND ARSENAL • REALIGN NATIONAL INVENTORY CONTROL POINT (NICP) FUNCTIONS UNDER TANK AUTOMOTIVE COMMAND (TACOM) NICP		• UPHOLD 1991 COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION • RELOCATE AMCCOM MATERIEL MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS TO REDSTONE ARSENAL, AL • REALIGN NICP FUNCTIONS UNDER MISSILE COMMAND (MICOM) NICP	
One-Time Costs: - $44.1M **Steady State Savings:** $1.0M + $38.8M **Break Even Year:** Immediate		**One-Time Costs:** $70.3M **Steady State Savings:** $38.8M **Break Even Year:** 1 Year	
PRO	**CON**	**PRO**	**CON**
• MILCON COST AVOIDANCE OF $26.2M • PERSONNEL MOVING COST AVOIDANCE OF $44.1M • ELIMINATES ONE NICP • SUPPORTS AMC VISION • ALREADY REALIZES PERSONNEL SAVINGS OF $38.8M	• NICP OPERATES IN TWO LOCATIONS - TACOM AND ROCK ISLAND ARSENAL	• ELIMINATES ONE NICP • NICP OPERATES FROM ONE LOCATION • ALREADY REALIZES PERSONNEL SAVINGS OF $38.8M	• REQUIRES MILCON OF $44.1M • REQUIRES PERSONNEL MOVING COSTS OF $26.2M • SUPPORTS OLD AMC VISION 2000; NOT NEW VISION

Issues
Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois
(Continued)

ISSUE	DoD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION	R&A STAFF FINDINGS
PERSONNEL SAVINGS	• ARMY HAS ALREADY TAKEN THE PERSONNEL SAVINGS AT ROCK ISLAND ARSENAL (FROM THE MATERIEL MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS) THAT WERE TO BE REALIZED	• QUAD CITIES COMMUNITY AGREES WITH ARMY POSITION • HUNTSVILLE COMMUNITY DISAGREES WITH THE ARMY POSITION •• BELIEVES THAT THE PERSONNEL SAVINGS TAKEN AT ROCK ISLAND ARSENAL WERE DUE COURSE DOWNSIZING CUTS AND SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN CREDITED AGAINST THE FUTURE TRANSFER •• BELIEVES THAT AN ADDITIONAL 38 PERCENT CAN BE TAKEN FROM DUPLICATED MANAGEMENT POSITIONS	• PERSONNEL SAVINGS WERE ALREADY EXECUTED • ORIGINAL SAVINGS DUE TO TRANSFER OF FUNCTIONS IS NO LONGER A FACTOR • ROCK ISLAND ARSENAL WILL CLAIM AN ADDITIONAL 23 POSITIONS ELIMINATED

Rock Island Arsenal, IL:

Accept DoD Recommendation [Change Rock Island 1991 recommendation. Activity stays at Rock Island.]:

I move that the Commission find that the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force structure plan and final criteria and, therefore, that the Commission adopt the following recommendation of the Secretary of Defense: Instead of sending the materiel management functions of U.S. Army Armament, Munitions and Chemical Command (AMCCOM) to Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, as recommended by the 1991 Base Closure Commission, reorganize these functions under Tank Automotive Command (TACOM) with the functions remaining in place at Rock Island Arsenal, IL.

	JOHNSON	BYRON	STUART	COURTER	McPHERSON	COX	BOWMAN
Motion					✓		
Second			✓				
"AYE"		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
"NAY"	✓						

Reject DoD Recommendation:

I move that the Commission find that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from the force structure plan and final criteria in making his recommendation on Rock Island Arsenal, IL. Therefore, the Commission rejects and does not make the following recommendation of the Secretary: Instead of sending the materiel management functions of U.S. Army Armament, Munitions and Chemical Command (AMCCOM) to Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, as recommended by the 1991 Base Closure Commission, reorganize these functions under Tank Automotive Command (TACOM) with the functions remaining in place at Rock Island Arsenal, IL.

	JOHNSON	BYRON	STUART	COURTER	McPHERSON	COX	BOWMAN
Motion							
Second							
"AYE"							
"NAY"							

Rock Island Arsenal, IL:

Accept DoD Recommendation [Change Rock Island 1991 recommendation. Activity stays at Rock Island.]:

I move that the Commission find that the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force structure plan and final criteria and, therefore, that the Commission adopt the following recommendation of the Secretary of Defense: Instead of sending the materiel management functions of U.S. Army Armament, Munitions and Chemical Command (AMCCOM) to Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, as recommended by the 1991 Base Closure Commission, reorganize these functions under Tank Automotive Command (TACOM) with the functions remaining in place at Rock Island Arsenal, IL.

Reject DoD Recommendation:

I move that the Commission find that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from the force structure plan and final criteria in making his recommendation on Rock Island Arsenal, IL. Therefore, the Commission rejects and does not make the following recommendation of the Secretary: Instead of sending the materiel management functions of U.S. Army Armament, Munitions and Chemical Command (AMCCOM) to Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, as recommended by the 1991 Base Closure Commission, reorganize these functions under Tank Automotive Command (TACOM) with the functions remaining in place at Rock Island Arsenal, IL.

Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois

DoD Recommendation

Change the recommendation of the 1991 Commission regarding Rock Island Arsenal, IL, as follows. Instead of sending the materiel management functions of U.S. Army Armament, Munitions and Chemical Command (AMCCOM) to Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, as recommended by the 1991 Base Closure Commission, reorganize these functions under Tank Automotive Command (TACOM) with the functions remaining in place at Rock Island Arsenal, IL.

Draft Commission Recommendation

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: Change the recommendation of the 1991 Commission regarding Rock Island Arsenal, IL, as follows. Instead of sending the materiel management functions of U.S. Army Armament, Munitions and Chemical Command (AMCCOM) to Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, as recommended by the 1991 Base Closure Commission, reorganize these functions under Tank Automotive Command (TACOM) with the functions remaining in place at Rock Island Arsenal, IL.

Alternative

(Haven't figured out a good way to have the Commissioners endorse the 1991 recommendation as yet.)

Document Separator

Tab 16

- At Tab 16 we have the next installation to be discussed, Marcus Hook US Army Reserve Center, Pennsylvania
- Marcus Hook was added for further consideration on May 21st as a result of the request of Congressman Weldon
- Slide 105 pictorially shows option under consideration **DISCUSS**
- Bud Bale will discuss this recommendation


Pennsylvania
Philadelphia
New Jersey
Marcus Hook Reserve Center
Philadelphia
Naval Shipyard
Wilmington
Delaware
Maryland
0
10
20
Miles

Marcus Hook USAR Center, Pennsylvania

Commissioner Add for Consideration: Study for closure due to a request by the community.

Visiting Commissioner: N/A

Category: USAR Training Facility

LAND (Acres)	BUILDINGS (Million Square Feet)	FAMILY HOUSING (Units)	PERSONNEL Mil	Stu	Civ
2	0.09	0	36	3	11

PERMANENT FACILITIES (%)	ANNUAL OPERATING COST ($ M)	COST FACTORS Construction	Per Diem	VHA Officer	Enlisted
100	0.32	1.13	125	297	181

ONE TIME COSTS ($M) Construction	Housing	STEADY STATE SAVINGS ($M)	BREAK EVEN YEAR	ECONOMIC IMPACT (%) 93	Cumulative
1.7		- 0.2	NEVER	0.0	0.0
1.6	0				

Issues Reviewed
Marcus Hook USAR Center, PA

MILITARY VALUE

ECONOMICS OF MOVE

REUSE PLAN

TRAINED MARINE CREW DIFFICULT TO FIND REPLACEMENTS

Issues
Marcus Hook USAR Center, PA

ISSUE	DoD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION	R&A STAFF FINDINGS
MILITARY VALUE	• PLAYS CRITICAL ROLE, ONLY 3 UNITS IN ARMY INVENTORY (ONLY 2 HAVE THE LARGE NUMBER OF MARINE CRAFT)	• FEELS FACILITY IS UNDER UTILIZED	• DEPARTMENT VALIDATED REQUIREMENT FOR CONTINUATION OF UNIT • UNIT TO GET ADDITIONAL TUG
ECONOMICS OF MOVE	• SUITABLE DOCK FACILITY IS DIFFICULT TO FIND AND EXPENSIVE TO REPLACE • CURRENT FACILITY IS OWNED BY ARMY, REPLACEMENT WOULD BE COSTLY	• SUPPORTS MOVE TO PHILADELPHIA NAVAL SHIPYARD WHICH HAS CAPACITY TO HOLD UNIT	• REQUIRES ACCESS TO DEEP WATER CHANNEL • AGREE THAT REPLACEMENT COST WOULD BE HIGH TO REPLICATE CURRENT FACILITY
REUSE PLAN		• COMMUNITY HAS WELL DEVELOPED PLAN FOR REUSE	• COMMUNITY WANTS TO EXPAND ADJOINING RIVERFRONT PARK
TRAINED MARINE CREW	• DIFFICULT TO FIND REPLACEMENTS. 7 TO 8 YEARS TO TRAIN TO MEET DOT STANDARDS		• IT TAKES LONGER FOR RESERVISTS TO MEET AND ACHIEVE TRAINING

MARCUS HOOK USAR CTR

SCENARIO I:

CLOSE

MARCUS HOOK USAR CTR → PHILADELPHIA NAVAL SHIPYARD

SCENARIO II:

CLOSE

MARCUS HOOK USAR CTR → CURTIS BAY, MD

Scenario Summary
Marcus Hook USAR Center, PA

SCENARIO I	
• CLOSE THE MARCUS HOOK ARMY RESERVE CENTER AND FACILITY. MOVE THE ARMY RESERVE UNIT TO THE PHILADELPHIA NAVAL SHIPYARD	
ONE-TIME COSTS: $ 1.7 MILLION **STEADY STATE SAVINGS:** - $ 0.2 MILLION **BREAK EVEN YEAR:** NEVER	
PRO	**CON**
• MEETS COMMUNITY REQUEST TO OBTAIN FACILITY • LARGER FACILITY THAN PRESENT WITH BETTER CAPABILITY FOR GROWTH	• RECURRING OPERATING COST MORE COSTLY THAN PRESENT CONDITION • EXTREMELY OLD BUILDING IN NEED OF REPAIR AND REQUIRING UPGRADE/IMPROVEMENT • MAY INTERFERE WITH NAVY PLAN TO BERTH RESERVE FLEET

Scenario Summary
Marcus Hook USAR Center, PA

SCENARIO II		SCENARIO III	
• CLOSE THE MARCUS HOOK ARMY RESERVE CENTER AND FACILITY. MOVE THE ARMY RESERVE UNIT TO LOCATE WITH ITS PARENT UNIT AT CURTIS BAY, MD.		• THAT THE MARCUS HOOK ARMY RESERVE CENTER AND FACILITY NOT BE CLOSED AS REQUESTED BY THE LOCAL COMMUNITY.	
ONE-TIME COSTS: $ 6.05 MILLION **STEADY STATE SAVINGS:** - $ 0.02 MILLION **BREAK EVEN YEAR:** NEVER		**ONE-TIME COSTS:** **STEADY STATE SAVINGS:** NONE **BREAK EVEN YEAR:**	
PRO	**CON**	**PRO**	**CON**
• MEETS COMMUNITY REQUEST TO OBTAIN FACILITY • CONSOLIDATES ALL OF UNIT AT ONE LOCATION	• MOST COSTLY IN CONSTRUCTION DUE TO DOCK UPGRADE REQUIREMENTS • POTENTIAL REQUITING PROBLEM DUE TO SATURATION IN AREA	• KEEPS HIGH MILITARY VALUE UNIT AND ALLOWS CONTINUED UNINTERRUPTED OPERATION • LOW OPERATING COST • KEEPS UNIT IN BEST AVAILABLE FACILITIES • AREA SUPPORTS RECRUITING EFFORT	• DOES NOT MEET COMMUNITY'S OBJECTIVE OF OBTAINING FACILITY • LIMITED ABILITY TO EXPAND

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

USAR Training

Marcus Hook USAR Center, PA:

DoD Recommendation -- none.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

USAR Training

Marcus Hook USAR Center, PA:

DoD Recommendation -- none.

Marcus Hook USAR .ter, Pennsylvania

DoD Recommendation

None. Commissioner add for further consideration.

Draft Commission Recommendation

The Commission finds DoD did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and the criteria. However, DoD did not give special consideration and emphasis to the request of local government adjacent to the installation. The Commission recommends that the Marcus Hook Army Reserve Center and facility be closed and the reserve unit move to the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard.

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Tab 17

LETTERKENNY (ALT)

	BOWMAN	COX	McPHERSON	COULTER	STUART	BYRON	JOHNSON
MOTION		✓					
SECOND					✓		
YES	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
NO							

TOOELE (DOD)

	BOWMAN	COX	McPHERSON	COULTER	STUART	BYRON	JOHNSON
MOTION			✓				
SECOND						✓	
YES	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
NO							

DEFENSE MAINTENANCE DEPOTS

INTERSERVICING ISSUES

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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TAB 2.....BACKUP SLIDES -- TM

TAB 3.....WHEELED VEHICLE MAINTENANCE

TAB 4.....BACKUP SLIDES -- WV

TAB 5.....ARMY MAINTENANCE DEPOT STRUCTURE

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE & REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
DELIBERATIVE HEARINGS
24 JUNE 1993

Document Separator

Tab 1

Depot Maintenance Interservicing Categories

CATEGORY	NUMBER
Tactical Missiles	~~8~~ 9
Wheeled Vehicles	3
Rotary Wing Aircraft	3
Ground Communications and Electronics	4

Depot Maintenance Interservicing

Category: Tactical Missiles

SITE	LOCATION	STATUS
Letterkenny Army Depot	Chambersburg, PA	R
Anniston Army Depot	Anniston, AL	*
Red River Army Depot	Texarkana, TX	*
Tobyhanna Army Depot	Tobyhanna, PA	*
Naval Aviation Depot Alameda	Alameda, CA	C
Naval Aviation Depot Norfolk	Norfolk, VA	C
Naval Weapons Station Seal Beach	Seal Beach, CA	*
Air Force Logistics Center Ogden	Ogden, UT	*
Marine Corps Logistics Base Barstow	Barstow, CA	*

C = DoD recommendation for closure
R = DoD recommendation for realignment
* = Commission addition for further consideration

DOD Tactical Missile Maintenance Depots



Depot Maintenance Interservicing Issues

Category: Tactical Missiles

Pro's & Con's of Tactical Missile Consolidation	Are Existing Facilities Available To Accommodate Consolidated DoD Workload?
Impact of Interservicing on Capacity Utilization	Does Installation Store UP-Rounds?
Cost and Savings Comparisons ($M)	Does Installation Perform Intermediate Level Maintenance?
Direct Missile Employees (Mil/Civ)	One-Time Costs to Accommodate Missile Consolidation ($M)
Cost of Direct Labor Hour without Overhead (FY'92)	Annual Savings from Missile Consolidation ($M)
Cost of Direct Labor Hour with Overhead (FY'92)	Depot Employees (Mil/Civ)
Percentage Impact on Depot Workforce If Missile Work is Transferred	Currently Assigned Missile Systems
Size of Existing Depot Maintenance Facility	Workload Assignments Other Than Missiles

Depot Maintenance
Interservicing
Letterkenny Army Depot, Chambersburg, PA

DoD Recommendation:

- REALIGN Letterkenny Army Depot, Chambersburg, PA.
- TRANSFER the workload to other DoD maintenance activities and the private sector.
- DO NOT CONSOLIDATE tactical missile maintenance.

Commission Recommendation:

- STUDY THE FEASIBILITY OF INTERSERVICING the tactical missile workload, which requires further study of the Alameda, Norfolk, Tobyhanna, Barstow, Red River, Anniston, Seal Beach, and Ogden depots.
- DIRECT THE INTERSERVICING of tactical missile maintenance programs in accordance with DoD's original plan.

Visiting Commissioner: Ms. Byron

Category: Tactical Missiles

LAND (Acres)	BUILDINGS (Million Square Feet)	FAMILY HOUSING (Units)	PERSONNEL		
			Mil	Stu	Civ
19,243	8.070	270	100	0	4,234

PERMANENT FACILITIES (%)	ANNUAL OPERATING COST ($M)	COST FACTORS		VHA	
		Construction	Per Diem	Officer	Enlisted
82	$67.4	1.00	$78	$59	$3

Depot Maintenance
Interservicing
Letterkenny Army Depot, Chambersburg, PA
Pro's and Con's of Tactical Missile Workload Consolidation

Category: Tactical Missiles

ISSUE	DoD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION	R&A STAFF FINDINGS
ARGUMENTS AGAINST TACTICAL MISSILE CONSOLIDATION	Realignment will reduce excess capacity within the Army's Ground Systems and Equipment depots. • DMRD 908 SAVINGS • CONSOLIDATION PLAN DOES NOT IDENTIFY	NA	Expected savings are now less significant: • Reduced workload • Retiring missile systems • Assumes transfer of work from the private sector • Depot underutilized.
ARGUMENTS FOR TACTICAL MISSILE CONSOLIDATION	• DOD estimated savings of $128 million over a five year period. • Savings generated from reduced facility operating costs. • Letterkenny was only site with sufficient facilities to handle consolidated tactical missile workload.	• Facilities are available without brick and mortar construction. • Similar work currently being conducted at 9 DoD depots and 7 private sector facilities. • Tactical missile consolidation plan should continue. • Artillery workload should not transfer.	• Letterkenny has facilities and plans in process to accomodate consolidation • Would eliminate redundant repair capabilities at 9 DoD depots

Depot Maintenance
Interservicing
Letterkenny Army Depot, Chambersburg, PA
Impact of Interservicing on Capacity Utilization

Category: Tactical Missiles

ISSUE	DoD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION			R&A STAFF FINDINGS		
IMPACT ON CAPACITY UTILIZATION (Direct Labor Hours in 000s)	There is insufficient tactical missile maintenance workload to increase the depot utilization rate.	'93	'95	'97	'93	'95	'97
• **CAPACITY**		2,392	3,080	3,080	2,392	3,080	3,080
• **WORKLOAD(ARTILLERY)**		628	791	**1,040**	628	791	**1,040**
• **WORKLOAD (MISSILES ALREADY ASSIGNED)**		564	864	965	564	864	965
• **WORKLOAD (MISSILES FROM DoD DEPOTS)**		43	586	640	43	491	544
• **WORKLOAD (MISSILES FROM CONTRACT)**		0	133	**668**	0	27	**125**
• **WORKLOAD (MISSILES FROM MARINE CORPS) ***			110	110		110	110
• **WORKLOAD TOTAL**		1,225	2,484	**3,423**	1,235	2,283	**2,784**
CAPACITY UTILIZATION RATE WITH TACTICAL MISSILE CONSOLIDATION	DOD predicted a depot utilization rate of 54% in FY 1999.	'93	'95	'97	'93	'95	'97
		51%	81%	**111%**	51%	74%	**90%****

(*) = Not part of the original DoD tactical missile consolidation plan.
(**) = Community representatives argued artillery workload should not transfer to Anniston in 1998 as curretly planned. If the transfer is effected, the projected utilization rate for Letterkenny would drop about 57 percent in 1998 and beyond.

Depot Maintenance
Interservicing
Letterkenny Army Depot, Chambersburg, PA
Cost and Savings Comparisons ($M)

Category: Tactical Missiles

ISSUE	DoD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION	R&A STAFF FINDINGS
ONE-TIME COSTS TO ACCOMODATE MISSILE CONSOLIDATION ($M)			
• **BRICK AND MORTAR**	None		None
• **MODIFICATIONS TO BUILDINGS**	$6.5	• TESTIMONY STATED *7M COULD BE DEDUCTED BECAUSE ALREADY SPENT (P43, 24 JUN)	$5.6
• **EQUIPMENT & PERSONNEL TRANFERS, TRAINING**	$32.6	• REPORT STATES 23.1 WHICH INCLUDES - 7.4 FROM SMA-E REDIRECT	$24.9
	TOTAL $39.1		**TOTAL $30.5**
ANNUAL SAVINGS FROM MISSILE CONOLIDATIONS ($M)	$31.6		• With work from contractors: $31.6 • With limited work from contractors: $13.2 • With no work from contractors: $9.0

Depot Maintenance
Interservicing
Letterkenny Army Depot, Chambersburg, PA
Cost and Savings Comparisons ($M)
(Continued)

Category: Tactical Missiles

ISSUE	DoD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION	R&A STAFF FINDINGS
ONE-TIME COST FOR DEPOT REALIGNMENT ($M)	$106	NA	$106
STEADY STATE SAVINGS FROM DEPOT CLOSURE ($M)	$30	NA	$30
POSITIONS ELIMINATED BY DEPOT REALIGNMENT (Mil/Civ)	2 1,944	NA	2 1,944
BREAK EVEN YEAR	2000	NA	2000
ECONOMIC IMPACT (%) ('93/Cumulative)	6.5%	NA	6.5%

Depot Maintenance Interservicing Comparative Analysis

Category: Tactical Missiles

ISSUE	LETTERKENNY ARMY DEPOT	RED RIVER ARMY DEPOT	ANNISTON ARMY DEPOT	TOBYHANNA ARMY DEPOT
DIRECT MISSILE EMPLOYEES (Mil/Civ)	0 557	0 174	0 415	0 20
COST OF DIRECT LABOR HOUR WITHOUT OVERHEAD (FY'92)	$20.33	$17.47	$20.13	$19.01
COST OF DIRECT LABOR HOUR WITH OVERHEAD (FY'92)	$55.36	$49.43	$47.12	$42.74
PERCENTAGE IMPACT ON DEPOT WORKFORCE IF MISSILE WORK IS TRANSFERRED	23%	6%	12%	less than 1%

Depot Maintenance Interservicing Comparative Analysis
(Continued)

ISSUE	LETTERKENNY ARMY DEPOT	RED RIVER ARMY DEPOT	ANNISTON ARMY DEPOT	TOBYHANNA ARMY DEPOT
SIZE OF EXISTING DEPOT MAINTENANCE FACILITY (in square feet)	231,000	84,350	206,322	11,250
ARE FACILITIES AVAILABLE TO ACCOMODATE CONSOLIDATED DoD WORKLOAD?	Yes, with no brick and mortar.	No	Yes	No
DOES INSTALLATION STORE UP-ROUNDS?	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
DOES INSTALLATION PERFORM INTERMEDIATE-LEVEL MISSILE MAINTENANCE?	Yes	Yes	Yes	No

Depot Maintenance
Interservicing
Comparative Analysis

Category: Tactical Missiles

ISSUE	ALAMEDA NAVAL DEPOT	NORFOLK NAVAL DEPOT	SEAL BEACH NAVAL WEAPONS STATION	OGDEN AIR LOGISTICS CENTER	BARSTOW MARINE CORPS LOGISTICS BASE
DIRECT MISSILE EMPLOYEES (Mil/Civ)	0 45	0 11	0 25	0 116	0 105
COST OF DIRECT LABOR HOUR WITHOUT OVERHEAD (FY'92)	$26.40	$18.61	$23.92	$23.86	$22.97
COST OF DIRECT LABOR HOUR WITH OVERHEAD (FY'92)	$85.03	$49.65	$51.76	$57.77	$47.16
PERCENTAGE IMPACT ON DEPOT WORKFORCE IF MISSILE WORK IS TRANSFERRED	1%	less than 1%	14%	1%	9%

Depot Maintenance Interservicing Comparative Analysis
(Continued)

ISSUE	ALAMEDA NAVAL DEPOT	NORFOLK NAVAL DEPOT	SEAL BEACH NAVAL WEAPONS STATION	OGDEN AIR LOGISTICS CENTER	BARSTOW MARINE CORPS LOGISTICS BASE
SIZE OF EXISTING DEPOT MAINTENANCE FACILITY (in square feet)	80,000	17,069	12,869	40,000	40,728
ARE FACILITIES AVAILABLE TO ACCOMODATE EXPANDED WORKLOAD?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
DOES INSTALLATION STORE UP-ROUNDS?	No	No	Yes	Yes	No
DOES INSTALLATION PERFORM INTERMEDIATE-LEVEL MISSILE MAINTENANCE?	No	No	Yes	Yes	No

Depot Maintenance
Interservicing
Tactical Missiles
Summary

DoD Recommendation:

- **REALIGN** Letterkenny Army Depot, Chambersburg, PA.
- **TRANSFER** the workload to other DoD maintenance activities and the private sector.
- **DO NOT CONSOLIDATE** tactical missile maintenance.

Alternate Recommendation:

- **STUDY THE FEASIBILITY OF INTERSERVICING** the tactical missile workload, which requires further study of the Alameda, Norfolk, Tobyhanna, Barstow, Red River, Anniston, Seal Beach, and Ogden depots.
- **DIRECT THE INTERSERVICING** of tactical missile maintenance programs in accordance with DoD's original plan.

• **PROS** •• Would consolidate similar work currently being performed at 9 DoD depots and private sector firms. •• Reduce overhead costs. •• Annual savings ranging from $9.0M to $31.6M.
• **CONS** •• Declining workload may leave Letterkenny Army Depot underutilized. •• Depends on transfer of workload from the private sector and retention of artillery workload.

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Tab 2

Depot Maintenance
Interservicing -- Tactical Missiles
Issue

DIRECT MISSILE EMPLOYEES
(Mil/Civ)

BU 1

Depot Maintenance
Interservicing
Direct Missile Employees
(Mil/Civ)

Category: Tactical Missiles

BASE	DoD POSITION		COMMUNITY POSITION		R & A STAFF FINDINGS	
LETTERKENNY ARMY DEPOT	0	557	0	557	0	557
ANNISTON ARMY DEPOT	0	415	0	415	0	415
RED RIVER ARMY DEPOT	0	174	0	174	0	174
TOBYHANNA ARMY DEPOT	0	20	0	20	0	20
NAVAL AVIATION DEPOT ALAMEDA	0	45	0	45	0	45
NAVAL AVIATION DEPOT NORFOLK	0	11	0	11	0	11
NAVAL WEAPONS STATION SEAL BEACH	0	25	0	25	0	25
AIR FORCE LOGISTICS CENTER OGDEN	0	116	0	116	0	116
MARINE CORPS LOGISTICS BASE BARSTOW	0	105	0	105	0	105

BU 2

Depot Maintenance
Interservicing -- Tactical Missiles
Issue

COST OF DIRECT LABOR HOUR WITHOUT OVERHEAD
(FY'92)

BU3

Depot Maintenance
Interservicing
Cost of Direct Labor Hour Without Overhead
(FY'92)

Category: Tactical Missiles

BASE	DoD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION	R & A STAFF FINDINGS
LETTERKENNY ARMY DEPOT	$20.33	$20.33	$20.33
ANNISTON ARMY DEPOT	$20.13	$20.13	$20.13
RED RIVER ARMY DEPOT	$17.47	$17.47	$17.47
TOBYHANNA ARMY DEPOT	$19.01	$19.01	$19.01
NAVAL AVIATION DEPOT ALAMEDA	$26.40	$26.40	$26.40
NAVAL AVIATION DEPOT NORFOLK	$18.61	$18.61	$18.61
NAVAL WEAPONS STATION SEAL BEACH	$23.92	$23.92	$23.92
AIR FORCE LOGISTICS CENTER OGDEN	$23.86	$23.86	$23.86
MARINE CORPS LOGISTICS BASE BARSTOW	$22.97	$22.97	$22.97

BU4

COST OF DIRECT LABOR HOUR WITH OVERHEAD
(FY'92)

BU5

Depot Maintenance
Interservicing
Cost of Direct Labor Hour With Overhead
(FY'92)

Category: Tactical Missiles

BASE	DoD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION	R & A STAFF FINDINGS
LETTERKENNY ARMY DEPOT	$55.30		$55.30
ANNISTON ARMY DEPOT	$47.12		$47.12
RED RIVER ARMY DEPOT	$49.43		$49.43
TOBYHANNA ARMY DEPOT	$42.74		$42.74
NAVAL AVIATION DEPOT ALAMEDA	$85.03		$85.03
NAVAL AVIATION DEPOT NORFOLK	$49.65		$49.65
NAVAL WEAPONS STATION SEAL BEACH	$51.76		$51.76
AIR FORCE LOGISTICS CENTER OGDEN	$57.77		$57.77
MARINE CORPS LOGISTICS BASE BARSTOW	$47.16		$47.16

BUG

PERCENTAGE IMPACT ON DEPOT WORKFORCE IF MISSILE WORK IS TRANSFERRED

B07

Depot Maintenance
Interservicing
Percentage Impact on Depot Workforce
If Missile Work is Transferred

Category: Tactical Missiles

BASE	DoD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION	R & A STAFF FINDINGS
LETTERKENNY ARMY	23%	23%	23%
ANNISTON ARMY DEPOT	6%	6%	6%
RED RIVER ARMY DEPOT	12%	12%	12%
TOBYHANNA ARMY DEPOT	less than 1%	less than 1%	less than 1%
NAVAL AVIATION DEPOT ALAMEDA	1%	1%	1%
NAVAL AVIATION DEPOT NORFOLK	less than 1%	less than 1%	less than 1%
NAVAL WEAPONS STATION SEAL BEACH	14%	14%	14%
AIR FORCE LOGISTICS CENTER OGDEN	1%	1%	1%
MARINE CORPS LOGISTICS BASE BARSTOW	9%	9%	9%

BU8

SIZE OF EXISTING DEPOT MAINTENANCE FACILITY
(in square feet)

Depot Maintenance
Interservicing
Size of Existing Depot Maintenance Facility
(in square feet)

Category: Tactical Missiles

BASE	DoD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION	R & A STAFF FINDINGS
LETTERKENNY ARMY DEPOT	231,000	231,000	231,000
ANNISTON ARMY DEPOT	206,322	206,322	206,322
RED RIVER ARMY DEPOT	84,350	84,350	84,350
TOBYHANNA ARMY DEPOT	11,250	11,250	11,250
NAVAL AVIATION DEPOT ALAMEDA	80,000	80,000	80,000
NAVAL AVIATION DEPOT NORFOLK	17,069	17,069	17,069
NAVAL WEAPONS STATION SEAL BEACH	12,687	12,687	12,687
AIR FORCE LOGISTICS CENTER OGDEN			
MARINE CORPS LOGISTICS BASE BARSTOW	40,728	40,728	40,728

BU10

Depot Maintenance
Interservicing -- Tactical Missiles
Issue

ARE EXISTING FACILITIES AVAILABLE TO ACCOMMODATE CONSOLIDATED DoD WORKLOAD?

BU 11

Depot Maintenance
Interservicing
Are Existing Facilities Available to Accommodate Consolidated DoD Workload?

Category: Tactical Missiles

BASE	DoD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION	R & A STAFF FINDINGS
LETTERKENNY ARMY DEPOT	Yes	Yes	Yes
ANNISTON ARMY DEPOT	Yes	Yes	Yes
RED RIVER ARMY DEPOT	No	No	No
TOBYHANNA ARMY DEPOT	No	No	No
NAVAL AVIATION DEPOT ALAMEDA	Yes	Yes	Yes
NAVAL AVIATION DEPOT NORFOLK	Yes	Yes	Yes
NAVAL WEAPONS STATION SEAL BEACH	Yes	Yes	Yes
AIR FORCE LOGISTICS CENTER OGDEN	Yes	Yes	Yes
MARINE CORPS LOGISTICS BASE BARSTOW	No	No	No

BU 22

DOES INSTALLATION STORE UP-ROUNDS?

BU13

Depot Maintenance
Interservicing
Does Installation Store UP-Rounds?

Category: Tactical Missiles

BASE	DoD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION	R & A STAFF FINDINGS
LETTERKENNY ARMY DEPOT	Yes	Yes	Yes
ANNISTON ARMY DEPOT	Yes	Yes	Yes
RED RIVER ARMY DEPOT	Yes	Yes	Yes
TOBYHANNA ARMY DEPOT	No	No	No
NAVAL AVIATION DEPOT ALAMEDA	No	No	No
NAVAL AVIATION DEPOT NORFOLK	No	No	No
NAVAL WEAPONS STATION SEAL BEACH	Yes	Yes	Yes
AIR FORCE LOGISTICS CENTER OGDEN	Yes	Yes	Yes
MARINE CORPS LOGISTICS BASE BARSTOW	No	No	No

BU14

Depot Maintenance
Interservicing -- Tactical Missiles
Issue

DOES INSTALLATION PERFORM INTERMEDIATE-LEVEL MAINTENANCE?

BU25

Depot Maintenance Interservicing Does Installation Perform Intermediate-Level Maintenance?

Category: Tactical Missiles

BASE	DoD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION	R & A STAFF FINDINGS
LETTERKENNY ARMY DEPOT	Yes	Yes	Yes
ANNISTON ARMY DEPOT	Yes	Yes	Yes
RED RIVER ARMY DEPOT	Yes	Yes	Yes
TOBYHANNA ARMY DEPOT	No	No	No
NAVAL AVIATION DEPOT ALAMEDA	No	No	No
NAVAL AVIATION DEPOT NORFOLK	No	No	No
NAVAL WEAPONS STATION SEAL BEACH	Yes	Yes	Yes
AIR FORCE LOGISTICS CENTER OGDEN	Yes	Yes	Yes
MARINE CORPS LOGISTICS BASE BARSTOW	No	No	No

BU16

Depot Maintenance Interservicing -- Tactical Missiles Issue

DEPOT EMPLOYEES
(Mil/Civ)

BU17

Depot Maintenance Interservicing Depot Employees (Mil/Civ)

Category: Tactical Missiles

BASE	DoD POSITION		COMMUNITY POSITION	R & A STAFF FINDINGS	
LETTERKENNY ARMY DEPOT	14	2,422		14	2,422
ANNISTON ARMY DEPOT	7	3,498		7	3,498
RED RIVER ARMY DEPOT	8	2,917		8	2,917
TOBYHANNA ARMY DEPOT	6	3,017		6	3,017
NAVAL AVIATION DEPOT ALAMEDA	32	3,362		32	3,362
NAVAL AVIATION DEPOT NORFOLK	30	4,175		30	4,175
NAVAL WEAPONS STATION SEAL BEACH	0	185		0	185
AIR FORCE LOGISTICS CENTER OGDEN	2,249	9,414		2,249	9,414
MARINE CORPS LOGISTICS BASE BARSTOW	8	1,100		8	1,100

BU18

Depot Maintenance
Interservicing -- Tactical Missiles
Issue

CURRENTLY ASSIGNED MISSILE SYSTEMS

BU29

Depot Maintenance
Interservicing
Currently Assigned Missile Systems

Category: Tactical Missiles

BASE	DoD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION	R & A STAFF FINDINGS
LETTERKENNY ARMY DEPOT	Hawk and Patriot ground equipment	DDMC assigned missile systems from 7 DEPOTS AND 7 CONTRACTORS.	HAWK and Patriot ground control equipment currently; others after consolidation.
ANNISTON ARMY DEPOT	TOW, COBRA, ATACMs, Avenger, Hellfire, Dragon, Shillelagh (*), LCSS (*)		
RED RIVER ARMY DEPOT	MLRS, TOW (for Bradley), Chaparral (*)		
TOBYHANNA ARMY DEPOT	ANTSQ-73 (*)		
NAVAL AVIATION DEPOT ALAMEDA	Sparrow, Phoenix		
NAVAL AVIATION DEPOT NORFOLK	Sidewinder		
NAVAL WEAPONS STATION SEAL BEACH	Standard		
AIR FORCE LOGISTICS CENTER OGDEN	Sidewinder, Maverick		
MARINE CORPS LOGISTICS BASE BARSTOW	Hawk ground equipment		

(*) = Not scheduled for transfer due to age of weapon system.

BU20

WORKLOAD ASSIGNMENTS OTHER THAN MISSILES

BU21

Depot Maintenance
Interservicing
Workload Assignments Other Than Missiles

Category: Tactical Missiles

BASE	DoD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION	R & A STAFF FINDINGS
LETTERKENNY ARMY DEPOT	Artillery systems, explosives storage		Artillery systems, explosives storage
ANNISTON ARMY DEPOT	Heavy combat vehicles, small arms, munitions storage		Heavy combat vehicles, small arms, munitions storage
RED RIVER ARMY DEPOT	Light combat vehicles, artillery, explosives storage		Light combat vehicles, artillery, explosives storage
TOBYHANNA ARMY DEPOT	Ground communications and electronics		Ground communications and electronics
NAVAL AVIATION DEPOT ALAMEDA	S-3, P-3, and A-6 aircraft		S-3, P-3, and A-6 aircraft
NAVAL AVIATION DEPOT NORFOLK	F-14 and A-6 aircraft		F-14 and A-6 aircraft
NAVAL WEAPONS STATION SEAL BEACH	Aircraft support equipment and explosives storage		Aircraft support equipment and explosives storage
AIR FORCE LOGISTICS CENTER OGDEN	F-16, F-4, and C-130 aircraft, strategic missiles, explosives storage		F-16, F-4, and C-130 aircraft, strategic missiles, explosives storage
MARINE CORPS LOGISTICS BASE BARSTOW	Multi-commodity depot		Multi-commodity depot

BU22

Depot Maintenance Interservicing Comparative Analysis

Category: Tactical Missiles

ISSUE	LETTERKENNY ARMY DEPOT	RED RIVER ARMY DEPOT	ANNISTON ARMY DEPOT	TOBYHANNA ARMY DEPOT
INSTALLATION PERSONNEL (Mil/Civ)	66 4,143	11 4,518	9 3,900	26 3,922
DEPOT EMPLOYEES (Mil/Civ)	14 2,422	8 2,917	7 3,498	6 3,017
CURRENTLY ASSIGNED MISSILE SYSTEMS	Hawk Patriot	MLRS TOW BFVS Chaparral (*)	TOW, COBRA, ATCMS, Avenger, Hellfire, TOW II, Dragon, LCSS(*), Shillelagh (*)	ANTSQ-73(*)
WORKLOAD ASSIGNMENTS OTHER THAN MISSILES	Artillery systems, explosives storage	Light combat vehicles, artillery systems, explosives storage	Heavy combat vehicles, small arms, munitions storage	Ground communications and electronics

(*) = Not scheduled for transfer due to age of weapon system.

BU23

Depot Maintenance Interservicing Comparative Analysis

Category: Tactical Missiles

ISSUE	ALAMEDA NAVAL DEPOT	NORFOLK NAVAL DEPOT	SEAL BEACH NAVAL WEAPONS STATION	OGDEN AIR LOGISTICS CENTER	BARSTOW MARINE CORPS LOGISTICS BASE
INSTALLATION PERSONNEL (Mil/Civ)	11,091 4,298	9,145 6,998	270 1,434	4,719 11,640	436 1,813
DEPOT EMPLOYEES (Mil/Civ)	32 3,362	30 4,175	0 185	2,249 9,414	8 1,100
CURRENTLY ASSIGNED MISSILE SYSTEMS	Sparrow Phoenix	Sidewinder	Standard	Sidewinder Maverick	Hawk
WORKLOAD ASSIGNMENTS OTHER THAN MISSILES	S-3, P-3, and A-6 aircraft	F-14 and A-6 aircraft	Aircraft support equipment, explosives storage	F-16, F-4, C-130 aircraft, strategic missile systems, explosives storage	Multi-commodity depot

BU24

Depot Maintenance
Interservicing
Arguments Against Tactical Missile Consolidation at Letterkenny Army Depot

- **REDUCED WORKLOAD**
  - Original forecast: 2,300,000 direct labor hours
  - Current forecast from DoD depots: 544,000
  - Current forecast from contractors: 125,000 to 668,000
- **MISSILE SYSTEMS NO LONGER SUBJECT TO TRANSFER**
  - Land Combat Support System (LCSS)
  - Chaparral
  - Shillelagh
  - AN/TSQ-73 (HAWK component)

BU25

Depot Maintenance
Interservicing
Tactical Missile Systems
Currently Maintained by the Private Sector

CONTRACTOR	MISSILE SYSTEM
General Dynamics	Stinger
Raytheon	HAWK, Patriot
Hughes	TOW, AMRAM
Rockwell	Hellfire
LVS	MLRS
Boeing	Avenger
Texas Instruments	HARM

BU26

Document Separator

Tab 3

Depot Maintenance Interservicing Categories

CATEGORY	NUMBER
Tactical Missiles	3
Wheeled Vehicles	3
Rotary Wing Aircraft	3
Ground Communications and Electronics	4

Depot Maintenance Interservicing

Category: Wheeled Vehicles

SITE	LOCATION	STATUS
Tooele Army Depot	Tooele, UT	R
Marine Corps Logistics Base Barstow	Barstow, CA	*
Marine Corps Logistics Base Albany	Albany, GA	*

R = DoD recommendation for realignment
* = Commission addition for further consideration

Depot Maintenance
Interservicing
Issues

Category: Wheeled Vehicles

Proximity to Major Marine Corps Depot Customers	Impact of Interservicing on Hourly Direct Labor Rates Including Overhead (FY'94)
Unique Mission(s)	Impact of Interservicing on Capacity Utilization (FY'94)
Investment in Buildings and Equipment ($M) (Last 10 Years)	Comparative Prices
Cost of Direct Labor Hour Without Overhead (FY'92)	Personnel Positions Eliminated (Mil/Civ)
Cost of Direct Labor Hour With Overhead (FY'92)	

Depot Maintenance
Interservicing
Static Base Information

Category: Wheeled Vehicles

ISSUE (Visiting Commissioner)	TOOELE ARMY DEPOT (Mr. Bowman)	MARINE CORPS LOGISTICS BASE ALBANY (Mr. Bowman)	MARINE CORPS LOGISTICS BASE BARSTOW (Ms. Byron)
LAND (Acres)	44,096	3,586	5,703
BUILDINGS (Million Square Feet)	7.4	6.4	6.4
FAMILY HOUSING (Units)	0	675	364
PERSONNEL • Military • Students • Civilian	 55 0 2,969	 766 140 2,643	 551 20 1,904
ANNUAL OPERATING COST ($M)	$104.2	$52.3	$57.6
COST FACTORS • Construction Index • Per Diem	 1.02 $96	 0.80 $77	 1.30 $86
VHA • Officer • Enlisted	 $98 $55	 $0 $4	 $64 $124
ONE-TIME COST TO CLOSE DEPOT ($M)	$73.7	$846.7	$357.4
STEADY STATE SAVINGS ($M)	$51.0	None	$29.7
BREAK EVEN YEAR	1994	Never	2031

Depot Maintenance Interservicing Static Base Information

(Continued)

Category: Wheeled Vehicles

ISSUE	TOOELE ARMY DEPOT		MARINE CORPS LOGISTICS BASE ALBANY		MARINE CORPS LOGISTICS BASE BARSTOW	
ECONOMIC IMPACT (%) ('93/Cumuative)	31.8%	31.8%	2.3%	2.3%	0.1%	0.1%

Depot Maintenance
Interservicing
Comparative Analysis

Commission Recommendation: STUDY THE FEASIBILITY OF INTERSERVICING the wheeled vehicles workload from the Maine Corps depots to the Tooele Army depot.

Category: Wheeled Vehicles

ISSUE	TOOELE ARMY DEPOT	MCLB ALBANY	MCLB BARSTOW
PROXIMITY TO MAJOR MARINE CORPS DEPOT CUSTOMERS	Miles Camp Pendleton, CA 711 Bloundt Island, FL 2,338 Camp Lejeune, NC 2,264	Miles Camp Lejeune, NC 520 Bloundt Island, FL 200	Miles Camp Pendleton, CA 157 29 Palms, CA 75 National Training Center, CA 35
UNIQUE MISSION(S)	• Army Center of excellence for tactical wheeled vehicles • "State of the Market" component repair facility	• Multi-commodity repair depot • Houses the only Marine Corps ICP • Direct support of MPF	• Multi-Commodity repair depot • Largest rail-head in DoD supporting National Training Center
INVESTMENT IN BUILDINGS AND EQUIPMENT ($M) (Last 10 Years)	$149	$14.9	$17.8
COST OF DIRECT LABOR HOUR WITHOUT OVERHEAD (FY'92)	$19.59	$18.34	$22.97

Depot Maintenance Interservicing Comparative Analysis
(Continued)

Category: Wheeled Vehicles

ISSUE	TOOELE ARMY DEPOT	MCLB ALBANY	MCLB BARSTOW
COST OF DIRECT LABOR HOUR WITH OVERHEAD (FY'92)	$68.16	$38.24	$47.16
IMPACT OF INTERSERVICING ON HOURLY DIRECT LABOR RATES INCLUDING OVERHEAD (FY'94)			
• Without Interservicing	$82.95	$36.13	$48.14
• With Barstow transfer to Tooele	$69.80	NA	$48.14
• With Albany transfer to Tooele	$71.35	$36.13	NA
• With Barstow & Albany transfer to Tooele	$61.38	$36.13	$48.14
• With Barstow, Albany, & Other Army to Tooele	$50.73	$36.13	$48.14
IMPACT OF INTERSERVICING ON CAPACITY UTILIZATION (FY'94)			
• Without Interservicing	42 %	110 %	118 %
• With Barstow transfer to Tooele	55 %	--	95 %
• With Albany transfer to Tooele	52 %	91%	--
• With Barstow & Albany transfer to Tooele	66 %	--	--
• With Barstow, Albany, & Other Army to Tooele	89 %	--	--

Depot Maintenance
Interservicing
Wheeled Vehicles
Summary

Commission Recommendation: **STUDY THE FEASIBILITY OF INTERSERVICING** the wheeled vehicles workload from the Marine Corps depots to the Tooele Army depot.

- **PROS**
  - Takes advantage of new "State of the Market" component rework facilities.
  - Interservicing reduces Army's hourly rates and improves Tooele's utilization rates.
  - Retention of depot is dependent upon use of facility by **ALL** Army customers.
- **CONS**
  - Marine Corps' interservicing alone will not solve the Army's low utilization problem.
  - Marine Corps' multi-commodity approach is designed for effective support of maritime pre-positioned ships.
  - Generally longer shipping distances.

Depot Maintenance
Interservicing
Tooele Army Depot, Tooele, UT

Commissioner Recommendation:

- **STUDY THE FEASIBILITY OF INTERSERVICING** the wheeled vehicles workload from the Marine Corps depots to the Tooele Army depot.

Category: Wheeled Vehicles

ISSUE	DoD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION	R&A STAFF FINDINGS
PROXIMITY TO MAJOR MARINE CORPS DEPOT CUSTOMERS	• Marines are multi-commodity, strategically located • Army is "Center of Excellence" for wheeled vehicles	Tooele community argued interservicing of wheeled vehicles by the Marines would provide economic and timely delivery of end items.	• Marine depots provide faster repair turn-around. • Quicker response to Fleet needs. • Less pipeline assets.
UNIQUE MISSION(S)	Army "Center of Excellence" for wheeled vehicles.	Army "Center of Excellence" for wheeled vehicles.	Army "Center of Excellence" for wheeled vehicles.
INVESTMENT IN BUILDINGS AND EQUIPMENT ($M) (Last 10 Years)	$149	$149	$149
COST OF DIRECT LABOR HOUR WITHOUT OVERHEAD (FY'92)	$19.59	NA	$19.59

Depot Maintenance Interservicing
Tooele Army Depot, Tooele, UT
(Continued)

ISSUE	DoD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION	R&A STAFF FINDINGS
COST OF DIRECT LABOR HOUR WITH OVERHEAD (FY'92)	$68.16	Total rate will decrease with added work.	Total rate will decrease with added work.
IMPACT OF INTERSERVICING ON HOURLY DIRECT LABOR RATES INCLUDING OVERHEAD (FY'94)	Even with the complete transfer of work from Albany and Barstow, Marines will pay more.	Total hourly rate will decrease with added work.	Tooele hourly rate would drop 26%, but Marines would still pay more for a single hour of work.
IMPACT OF INTERSERVICING ON CAPACITY UTILIZATION (FY'94)	Transfer of work from both Barstow and Albany would increase Tooele's rate to 39% from 35% by 1999.	• Transfer of work from Barstow would increase Tooele's rate to 44% from 35%. • Transfer of work from Albany would increase Tooele's rate to 49% from 35%. • Transfer of work from both Barstow and Albany would increase Tooele's rate to 58% from 35%.	• Transfer of work from Barstow would increase Tooele's rate in FY'94 to 55% from 42%. • Transfer of work from Albany would increase Tooele's rate to 52% from 42%. • Transfer of work from Barstow and Albany would incease Tooele's rate to 66% from 42%.

Depot Maintenance
Interservicing
Marine Corps Logistics Base (MCLB) Albany, GA

Commissioner Recommendation:

- **STUDY THE FEASIBILITY OF INTERSERVICING** the wheeled vehicles workload from the Marine Corps depots to the Tooele Army depot.

Category: Wheeled Vehicles

ISSUE	DoD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION	R&A STAFF FINDINGS
PROXIMITY TO MAJOR MARINE CORPS DEPOT CUSTOMERS	Strategically located to Camp Lejeune, NC, and Bloundt Island (MPF), FL.	Strategically located to Camp Lejeune, NC, and Bloundt Island (MPF), FL.	Strategically located to Camp Lejeune, NC, and Bloundt Island (MPF), FL.
UNIQUE MISSION(S)	• Multi-commodity depot • Support MPF	• Multi-commodity depot • Support MPF	• Multi-commodity depot • Support MPF
INVESTMENT IN BUILDINGS AND EQUIPMENT ($M) (Last 10 Years)	$14.9	NA	$14.9
COST OF DIRECT LABOR HOUR WITHOUT OVERHEAD (FY'92)	$18.34	NA	$18.34

Depot Maintenance
Interservicing
Marine Corps Logistics Base (MCLB) Albany, GA
(Continued)

ISSUE	DoD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION	R&A STAFF FINDINGS
COST OF DIRECT LABOR HOUR WITH OVERHEAD (FY'92)	$38.24	NA	$38.24
IMPACT OF INTERSERVICING ON HOURLY DIRECT LABOR RATES INCLUDING OVERHEAD (FY'94)	NA	NA	NA
IMPACT OF INTERSERVICING ON CAPACITY UTILIZATION (FY'94)	NA	NA	Albany utilization rate would drop to 91% from 110%.

Depot Maintenance
Interservicing
Marine Corps Logistics Base (MCLB) Barstow, CA

Commissioner Recommendation:

- STUDY THE FEASIBILITY OF INTERSERVICING the wheeled vehicles workload from the Marine Corps depots to the Tooele Army depot.

Category: Wheeled Vehicles

ISSUE	DoD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION	R&A STAFF FINDINGS
PROXIMITY TO MAJOR MARINE CORPS DEPOT CUSTOMERS	Strategically located to Camp Pendleton and 29 Palms, CA.	Strategically located to Camp Pendleton and 29 Palms, CA.	Strategically located to Camp Pendleton and 29 Palms, CA.
UNIQUE MISSION(S)	Multi-commodity depot providing "one-stop shopping" and flexibility in scheduling.	NA	Multi-commodity depot providing "one-stop shopping" and flexibility in scheduling.
INVESTMENT IN BUILDINGS AND EQUIPMENT ($M) (Last 10 Years)	$17.8	NA	$17.8
COST OF DIRECT LABOR HOUR WITHOUT OVERHEAD (FY'92)	$22.97	NA	$22.97
COST OF DIRECT LABOR HOUR WITH OVERHEAD (FY'92)	$47.16	NA	$47.16

Depot Maintenance
Interservicing
Marine Corps Logistics Base (MCLB) Barstow, CA
(Continued)

ISSUE	DoD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION	R&A STAFF FINDINGS
IMPACT OF INTERSERVICING ON HOURLY DIRECT LABOR RATES INCLUDING OVERHEAD (FY'94)	NA	NA	NA
IMPACT OF INTERSERVICING ON CAPACITY UTILIZATION (FY'94)	NA	NA	Barstow utilization rate would drop to 95% from 118%.

Document Separator

Tab 4

PROXIMITY TO MAJOR MARINE CORPS DEPOT CUSTOMERS

BU 27

Depot Maintenance
Proximity to Major Marine Corps Depot Customers

Category: Wheeled Vehicles

BASE	DoD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION	R & A STAFF FINDINGS
Tooele Army Depot, Tooele, UT	• Marines are multi-commodity, strategically located • Army is "Center of Excellence" for wheeled vehicles	Tooele community argued interservicing of wheeled vehicles by the Marines would provide economic and timely delivery of end items.	Marine depots seem to provide faster repair turn-around.
Marine Corps Logistics Base, Barstow, CA	Support major West coast customers and the Far East.	Support major West coast customers and the Far East.	Support major West coast customers and the Far East.
Marine Corps Logistics Base, Albany, GA	Support major East coast customers and Bloundt Island, FL.	Support major East coast customers and Bloundt Island, FL.	Support major East coast customers and Bloundt Island, FL.

BU28

Depot Maintenance
Interservicing -- Wheeled Vehicles
Issue

UNIQUE MISSION(S)

B029

Depot Maintenance
Unique Mission(s)

Category: Wheeled Vehicles

BASE	DoD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION	R & A STAFF FINDINGS
Tooele Army Depot, Tooele, UT	Army "Center of Excellence" for wheeled vehicles.	Army "Center of Excellence" for wheeled vehicles.	Army "Center of Excellence" for wheeled vehicles.
Marine Corps Logistics Base, Barstow, CA	Multi-commodity depot.	Multi-commodity depot.	Multi-commodity depot.
Marine Corps Logistics Base, Albany, GA	Multi-commodity depot.	Multi-commodity depot.	Multi-commodity depot.

BU30

INVESTMENT IN BUILDINGS AND EQUIPMENT
($M) (Last 10 Years)

Depot Maintenance
Investment in Buildings and Equipment
($M) (Last 10 Years)

Category: Wheeled Vehicles

BASE	DoD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION	R & A STAFF FINDINGS
Tooele Army Depot, Tooele, UT	$149	$149	$149
Marine Corps Logistics Base, Barstow, CA	$17.8	NA	$17.8
Marine Corps Logistics Base, Albany, GA	$14.9	NA	$14.9

BU32

Depot Maintenance
Interservicing -- Wheeled Vehicles
Issue

COST OF DIRECT LABOR HOUR WITHOUT OVERHEAD
(FY'92)

BU 33

Depot Maintenance
Cost of Direct Labor Hour Without Overhead
(FY'92)

Category: Wheeled Vehicles

BASE	DoD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION	R & A STAFF FINDINGS
Tooele Army Depot, Tooele, UT	$19.59	NA	$19.59
Marine Corps Logistics Base, Barstow, CA	$22.97	NA	$22.97
Marine Corps Logistics Base, Albany, GA	$18.34	NA	$18.34

BU34

Depot Maintenance
Interservicing -- Wheeled Vehicles
Issue

COST OF DIRECT LABOR HOUR WITH OVERHEAD
(FY'92)

BU35

Depot Maintenance
Cost of Direct Labor Hour With Overhead
(FY'92)

Category: Wheeled Vehicles

BASE	DoD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION	R & A STAFF FINDINGS
Tooele Army Depot, Tooele, UT	$68.16	NA	$68.16
Marine Corps Logistics Base, Barstow, CA	$47.16	NA	$47.16
Marine Corps Logistics Base, Albany, GA	$38.24	NA	$38.24

BU36

Depot Maintenance
Interservicing -- Wheeled Vehicles
Issue

IMPACT OF INTERSERVICING ON HOURLY DIRECT LABOR RATES INCLUDING OVERHEAD (FY'94)

BU37

Depot Maintenance
Impact of Interservicing on Hourly Direct Labor Rates Including Overhead (FY'94)

Category: Wheeled Vehicles

BASE	DoD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION	R & A STAFF FINDINGS
Tooele Army Depot, Tooele, UT	Even with the complete transfer of work from Albany and Barstow, Marines will pay more.	Total hourly rate will decrease with added work.	Rate in FY'94 would drop to $61.38 from $82.95 -- still higher than Marines are paying in their own depots.
Marine Corps Logistics Base, Barstow, CA	No change	NA	No change
Marine Corps Logistics Base, Albany, GA	No change	NA	No change

BU 38

IMPACT OF INTERSERVICING ON CAPACITY UTILIZATION (FY'94)

BU39

Depot Maintenance
Impact of Interservicing on Capacity Utilization (FY'94)

Category: Wheeled Vehicles

BASE	DoD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION	R & A STAFF FINDINGS
Tooele Army Depot, Tooele, UT	Transfer of work from both Barstow and Albany would increase Tooele's rate in FY'99 to 39% from 35%.	• Transfer of work from Barstow would increase Tooele's rate to 58% from 36%. • Transfer of work from both Barstow and Albany would increase Tooele's rate to 77% from 36%.	• Transfer of work from Barstow would increase Tooele's rate to 58% from 41%. • Transfer of work from Barstow and Albany would incease Tooele's rate to 75% from 41%.
Marine Corps Logistics Base, Barstow, CA	Decreases to 95% from 118%	NA	Decreases to 95% from 118%
Marine Corps Logistics Base, Albany, GA	Decreases to 91% from 110%	NA	Decreases to 91% from 110%

BU 40

Depot Maintenance
Interservicing -- Wheeled Vehicles
Issue

COMPARATIVE PRICES

BU 41

Depot Maintenance
Comparative Prices

Category: Wheeled Vehicles

BASE	DoD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION	R & A STAFF FINDINGS
Tooele Army Depot, Tooele, UT	Marine Corps will pay more: • cost of repair • added transportation	Prices will drop and become more competitive.	• Army hourly rates will be higher even with full interservicing. • Overall "bottom line" costs may be lower for some items, but too close to call
Marine Corps Logistics Base, Barstow, CA	Marine Corps will pay more: • added transportation • additional maintenance float, i.e., more inventory	Multi-commodity depot provides flexible scheduling at lowest possible cost.	• Army hourly rates will be higher even with full interservicing. • Overall "bottom line" costs may be lower for some items, but too close to call
Marine Corps Logistics Base, Albany, GA	Marine Corps will pay more: • added transportation • additional maintenance float, i.e., more inventory	Multi-commodity depot priveds flexible scheduling at lowest possible cost.	• Army hourly rates will be higher even with full interservicing. • Overall "bottom line" costs may be lower for some items, but too close to call

BU42

Depot Maintenance
Interservicing -- Wheeled Vehicles
Issue

PERSONNEL POSITIONS ELIMINATED
(Mil/Civ)

B043

Depot Maintenance
Personnel Positions Eliminated
(Mil/Civ)

Category: Wheeled Vehicles

BASE	DoD POSITION		COMMUNITY POSITION	R & A STAFF FINDINGS	
Tooele Army Depot, Tooele, UT	0	1,268	NA	0	1,268
Marine Corps Logistics Base, Barstow, CA	436	311	NA	436	311
Marine Corps Logistics Base, Albany, GA	358	342	NA	358	342

B044

Depot Maintenance Interservicing Comparative Analysis

Category: Wheeled Vehicles

ISSUE	TOOELE ARMY DEPOT			MCLB ALBANY			MCLB BARSTOW		
COMPARATIVE PRICES	COST ($)	HRS	DAYS	COST ($)	HRS	DAYS	COST ($)	HRS	DAYS
• Refueler	32,188	393	135	43,195	774	37	42,188	743	40
• Low-bed Trailer - M870 and M172A	53,358	662	46	19,509	316	120	23,686	391	125
• Cargo Trailer - M101	3,377	49	16	2,973	51	25	1,665	31	23
• Semi-Trailer - M349	13,000	111	36	--	--	--	21,222	350	130
• 5 Ton Truck - M806	49,000	680	53	22,172	432	30	22,136	389	30
• 5 Ton Truck - M973	16,984	398	37	20,791	394	30	22,500	389	30
• HMMWV Engine	3,819	40	4	3,005	39	25	--	--	--
• HMMWV - M998	12,347	189	45	13,576	238	21	14,381	240	20
• HMMWV - M1043	15,033	213	45	15,080	270	22	18,059	289	23
• HMMWV - M1045	14,548	214	45	15,080	278	22	18,059	289	30

BU45

Depot Maintenance Interservicing Comparative Analysis
(Continued)

ISSUE	TOOELE ARMY DEPOT	MCLB ALBANY	MCLB BARSTOW
PERSONNEL POSITIONS ELIMINATED			
• **Military**	0	358	436
• **Civilian**	1,268	342	311

BU46

HMMWV TOW CARRIER MODEL M1045



BU47

TRUCK, 5 TON CARGO



BU48

ENGINE, HMMWV



BU49

TRAILER SEMI 25 TON M172A



BU50

Depot Maintenance
Interservicing -- Wheeled Vehicles
Impact on Tooele Utilization and Labor Rates from Expanded Use of Depot Facilities by the Marine Corps and All Army Customers

SCENARIO	FORECAST WORKLOAD (Direct Labor Hours in 000s)	CAPACITY (Direct Labor Hours in 000s)	APPLICABLE RATES	
			UTILIZATION (%)	LABOR ($)
CURRENT TOOELE WORKLOAD	876	2,100	42	82.95
ADD: WHEELED VEHICLES FROM MCLB BARSTOW	**273** (1,149)		55	69.80
ADD: WHEELED VEHICLES FROM MCLB ALBANY	**22** (1,377)		66	61.38
ADD: WHEELED VEHICLES FROM ARMY	**500** (1,877)		89	50.73

BU 51

Depot Maintenance
Interservicing -- Wheeled Vehicles
Impact on Tooele Utilization and Labor Rates from Expanded Use of Depot Facilities by the Marine Corps and All Army Customers

SCENARIO	FORECAST WORKLOAD (Direct Labor Hours in 000s)	CAPACITY (Direct Labor Hours in 000s)	APPLICABLE RATES	
			UTILIZATION (%)	LABOR ($)
CURRENT TOOELE WORKLOAD	876	2,100	42	82.95
ADD: WHEELED VEHICLES FROM MCLB BARSTOW	273 (1,149)		55	69.80
ADD: WHEELED VEHICLES FROM MCLB ALBANY	22 (1,377)		66	61.38
ADD: WHEELED VEHICLES FROM ARMY	500 (1,877)		89	50.73

TOOELE ARMY DEPOT

DOD RECOMMENDATION:

REALIGN



BU 52

TOOELE ARMY DEPOT

SCENARIO II:



AU 53

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Tab 5

DEPOTS



DOD Recommendations for Realignments

Commissioner Candidates for further consideration

ARMY DEPOT STRUCTURE IF LETTERKENNY & TOOELE CLOSE

ANNISTON ARMY DEPOT

HEAVY TRACK COMBAT VEHICLE
ARTILLERY
SMALL ARMS

RED RIVER ARMY DEPOT

LIGHT TRACK COMBAT VEHICLES
CONSTRUCTION EQUIPMENT
GENERAL PURPOSE EQUIPMENT
TACTICAL WHEELED VEHICLES

TOBYHANNA ARMY DEPOT

GROUND COMMUNICATION & ELECTRONICS

UNDECIDED

MISSILES

DEPOT SUMMARY
1999 PROJECTED WORKLOAD

DEPOT	CAPACITY*	WORKLOAD*	UTILIZATION
ANNISTON	4.5	2.5	56%
LETTERKENNY	2.7	1.5	54%
RED RIVER	3.1	2.2	68%
TOOELE	2.1	0.7	35%
TOBYHANNA	6.5	4.0	61%
TOTAL	18.9	10.8	57%

* DIRECT LABOR HOURS IN MILLIONS

- CLOSING LETTERKENNY AND TOOELE ARMY DEPOTS
  - •• INCREASES UTILIZATION TO 77 PERCENT
  - •• DECREASES EXCESS CAPACITY FROM 43 PERCENT TO 23 PERCENT
- NOT CLOSING EITHER OR BOTH DEPOTS
  - •• MAINTAINS ~~UNACCEPTABLE~~ EXCESS CAPACITY
  - •• WILL RESULT IN HIGHER LABOR RATES ACROSS ALL DEPOTS
- ALTERNATIVE --- INTERSERVICING
  - •• GAIN EFFICIENCIES BY CONSOLIDATING AT MOST COST EFFECTIVE DEPOT
  - •• SHOULD BE A ZERO-SUM GAIN --- ANOTHER DEPOT SHOULD CLOSE TO DECREASE EXCESS CAPACITY

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Army Depot

Letterkenny Army Depot, PA:

Accept DoD Recommendation [Realign Letterkenny.]:

I move that the Commission find that the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force structure plan and final criteria and, therefore, that the Commission adopt the following recommendation of the Secretary of Defense: Realign Letterkenny Army Depot (LEAD) by reducing it to a depot activity and placing it under the command and control of Tobyhanna Army Depot, PA. Relocate the maintenance functions and associated workload to other depot maintenance activities, including the private sector. Retain the conventional ammunition storage mission and the regional Test Measurement and Diagnostic Equipment (TMDE) mission. Change the recommendation of the 1991 Commission regarding Letterkenny as follows. Instead of sending Systems Integration Management Activity East (SIMA-E) to Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois, as recommended by the 1991 Commission, retain this activity in place. Retain the SIMA-E and the Information Processing Center at Letterkenny until the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) completes its review of activities relocated under Defense Management Review Decision (DMRD) 918. The activities of the depot not associated with the remaining mission will be inactivated, transferred or otherwise eliminated. Missile maintenance workload will not consolidate at Letterkenny, as originally planned. However, Depot Systems Command will relocate to Rock Island Arsenal, where it will consolidate under the Industrial Operations Command there, as approved by the 1991 Commission.

Reject DoD Recommendation:

I move that the Commission find that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from the force structure plan and final criteria in making his recommendation on Letterkenny Army Depot, PA. Therefore, the Commission rejects and does not make the following recommendation of the Secretary: Realign Letterkenny Army Depot (LEAD) by reducing it to a depot activity and placing it under the command and control of Tobyhanna Army Depot, PA. Relocate the maintenance functions and associated workload to other depot maintenance activities, including the private sector. Retain the conventional ammunition storage mission and the regional Test Measurement and Diagnostic Equipment (TMDE) mission. Change the recommendation of the 1991 Commission regarding Letterkenny as follows. Instead of sending Systems Integration Management Activity East (SIMA-E) to Rock Island

Arsenal, Illinois, as recommended by the 1991 Commission, retain this activity in place. Retain the SIMA-E and the Information Processing Center at Letterkenny until the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) completes its review of activities relocated under Defense Management Review Decision (DMRD) 918. The activities of the depot not associated with the remaining mission will be inactivated, transferred or otherwise eliminated. Missile maintenance workload will not consolidate at Letterkenny, as originally planned. However, Depot Systems Command will relocate to Rock Island Arsenal, where it will consolidate under the Industrial Operations Command there, as approved by the 1991 Commission.

Alternate Motions:

Alternate Motion 1 [Realign Letterkenny: Consolidate Missiles elsewhere]:

I move that the Commission find that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criteria 2 and 4. Therefore, the Commission rejects the Secretary's recommendation on Letterkenny Army Depot, Pennsylvania, and, instead, adopts the following recommendation: realign Letterkenny Army Depot to a Depot Activity under the command and control of Tobyhanna Army Depot; relocate the maintenance functions and associated workload (excluding tactical missile maintenance functions) to other maintenance activities, including the private sector; retain the conventional ammunition storage and the regional Test, Measurement, Diagnostic Equipment (TMDE) missions at Letterkenny Depot Activity; and inactivate, transfer, or eliminate activities of the depot not associated with the remaining mission.

Tactical missile maintenance workload will not be consolidated at Letterkenny as originally planned. Consolidate the tactical missile maintenance workload at one of the following potential sites: Ogden Air Logistics Center, Utah or Anniston Army Depot, Alabama; or another installation found suitable by DOD.

Retain the Systems Integration Management Activity-East (SIMA-E) at Letterkenny Depot Activity until the Defense Information Systems Agency completes its review of activities relocated under DMRD 918. Relocate Depot Systems Command to Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois, and consolidate with the Armament, Munitions, and Chemical Command into the Industrial Operations Command, as approved by the 1991 Commission.

The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force structure plan and final criteria.

Alternate Motion 2 [Reject Letterkenny realignment: Keep missile consolidation and artillery work at LEAD]:

I move that the Commission find that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially

from final criteria 1 and 4. Therefore, the Commission rejects the Secretary's recommendation on Letterkenny Army Depot, Pennsylvania, and, instead, adopts the following recommendation: Letterkenny Army Depot will remain open. Consolidate tactical missile maintenance at the depot as originally planned. Add to its consolidation plan, tactical missile maintenance workload currently being accomplished by the Marine Corps Logistics Base in Barstow, California, to DOD's consolidation plan. Retain current light combat vehicle workload at Letterkenny.

Retain the Systems Integration Management Activity-East (SIMA-E) at Letterkenny Depot Activity until the Defense Information Systems Agency completes its review of activities relocated under DMRD 918. Relocate Depot Systems Command to Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois, and consolidate with the Armament, Munitions, and Chemical Command into the Industrial Operations Command, as approved by the 1991 Commission.

The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force structure plan and final criteria.

Tooele Army Depot, UT:

Accept DoD Recommendation [Realign Toole.]:

I move that the Commission find that the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force structure plan and final criteria and, therefore, that the Commission adopt the following recommendation of the Secretary of Defense: Realign Tooele Army Depot (TEAD) by reducing it to a depot activity and placing it under the command and control of Red River Army Depot, TX. Retain conventional ammunition storage and the chemical demilitarization mission. The depot workload will move to other depot maintenance activities, including the private sector. The activities of the depot not associated with the remaining mission will be inactivated, transferred or eliminated, as appropriate.

Reject DoD Recommendation:

I move that the Commission find that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from the force structure plan and final criteria in making his recommendation on Tooele Army Depot, UT. Therefore, the Commission rejects and does not make the following recommendation of the Secretary: Realign Tooele Army Depot (TEAD) by reducing it to a depot activity and placing it under the command and control of Red River Army Depot, TX. Retain conventional ammunition storage and the chemical demilitarization mission. The depot workload will move to other depot maintenance activities, including the private

sector. The activities of the depot not associated with the remaining mission will be inactivated, transferred or eliminated, as appropriate.

Alternate Motion [Reject Tooele realignment: Interservice Marine Corps wheeled vehicle workload]:

I move that the Commission find that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from the force structure plan and final criteria 2 and 4, and, therefore, that the Commission reject the Secretary's recommendation on Tooele Army Depot, Utah, and, instead, adopt the following recommendation: consolidate all depot level wheeled vehicle repairs at Tooele Army Depot. Interservice Marine Corps Logistics Base Barstow, CA and Marine Corps Logistics Base Albany, GA wheeled vehicle workload and associated secondary items to Tooele Army Depot, UT. Continue to look for potential interservicing agreements for the workloads remaining at Marine Corps Logistics Base Barstow and Albany with the potential of closing one or both facilities in the future. The Army should ensure that all depot level maintenance in the Army is conducted at Tooele Army Depot and not performed at the installation level. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force structure plan and final criteria.

Document Separator

SEARCH FOR REPLACEMENT SITES
FOR THE U.S. ARMY RESERVE FACILITY
MARCUS HOOK, PENNSYLVANIA

Prepared by:

Office of the Chief, Army Reserve

Washington, D.C. 20310-2400

March 1994

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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

ORIGIN OF DIRECTIVE:

Section 378, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, Public Law 103-160, "Report on Replacement Sites for Army Reserve Facility in Marcus Hook, Pennsylvania."

DEFINITION OF REQUIREMENT:

Section 378 directs that "Not later than March 1, 1994, the Secretary of the Army shall submit to the Congress a report evaluating the suitability of each site within a 100-mile radius of the Army Reserve Facility in Marcus Hook, Pennsylvania, that may be considered by the Secretary as a replacement facility for the Army Reserve Facility." It was further directed that the report address four specific questions in the findings at each site identified during the search. These findings are presented in Part III Analysis of Sites Identified of this report.

The Marcus Hook facility supports operations of the following activities:

Detachment 1, 949th Transportation Company (Float Craft), U.S. Army Reserve

Branch Maintenance Activity, U.S. Army Reserve

South Operations Branch, Defense Contract Management Area Operations (DCMAO), Philadelphia, Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)

Corps of Engineers (COE), Survey Branch

Part III of this report will focus on the needs of Det 1, 949th TC CO and the Branch Maintenance Activity only. The DLA and COE use the Marcus Hook facility because it offers the most inexpensive space and the best access to their respective areas of operation, neither support or depend upon U.S. Army Reserve operations. If the Marcus Hook facility were no longer available, both would seek replacement facilities not necessarily collocated with the Reserve units. The costs generated by their relocation were not included in this study, but they are both Department of Defense activities and their displacement would add to the impact of vacating the Marcus Hook facility.

II. GENERAL GUIDANCE:

MISSION & TRAINING NEEDS OF TENANTS:

Detachment 1, 949th Transportation Company (Float Craft)

The 949th TC CO is one of only three Floating Craft units in the entire Army structure (one is active component and the other National Guard). The organization of each varies, but the 949th TC CO has 50% of the Army's total tug boat capability. The need for all three units has been validated through the year 2001 by the Total Army Analysis process.

The mission of the unit is to support terminal operations in fixed and logistics-over-the-shore (LOTS) environments. The unit loads and discharges heavy lift cargo exceeding the capability of the gear on the delivering ship and transports liquid and dry cargo intra-terminal, via inland waterways and coast-wise operations. The unit is also prepared to support fire fighting, salvage and port security operations.

Training and operational support for Detachment 1 is coordinated by the parent unit at Curtis Bay, south of Baltimore, Maryland. Crew licensing requires 24 and 48 hour "continuous operation" training missions, often performed during weekend drills. These missions require maintenance support from personnel at the parent unit location since the Area Maintenance Support Activity (AMSA) is closed on weekends. Eighty percent of unit personnel are operational and the other 20 percent provide administrative support. Operational personnel are outside the Reserve center 50-75 percent of the time training on the tugs. The Marcus Hook location offers a very good opportunity for operational training with travel to Curtis Bay is via the Chesapeake and Delaware Canal and the Chesapeake Bay. This is an 8 hour trip for small tugs and 6-7 hours for large tugs. At the Curtis Bay location the Detachment participates in mini-LOTS operations with other transportation terminal units. It would not be feasible to move the Detachment north to the New York or New Jersey shore since the small tugs are not ocean going vessels. The greater distance would also extend the travel time and decrease the time available for other essential training.

Branch Maintenance Activity

This is a full-time operation providing direct maintenance support for the marine equipment assigned to Det 1, 949th TC CO at Marcus Hook. AMSA employees are dual status, full-time civil service employees and members of the reserve unit.

South Operations Branch, DCMAO Philadelphia, DLA

The South Operations Branch is responsible for the Quality Assurance activity at Department of Defense contractor plants located in Delaware and Chester Counties in Pennsylvania, Gloucester, Salem, Cumberland, Cape May and Atlantic Counties in New Jersey and the entire state of Delaware. This office also provides regional management and training for all field agents.

Corps of Engineers Survey Branch

The pier at Marcus Hook is a base for a Corps vessel used for collection of hydrographic survey data for dredging projects and mapping information required for maintaining the navigation channel in the Delaware River. This vessel dedicates 20% of its time in the Marcus Hook area because the adjacent river bed has one of the fastest shoaling rates of any area river and requires dredging of an area 800' X 7,000' at least twice annually.

CURRENT FACILITY UTILIZATION:

Detachment 1, 949th Transportation Company (Float Craft)

PERSONNEL - 55 Reserve Unit Members
5 Full Time Support

EQUIPMENT - 1 Large Tug
2 Small Tugs
4 Barges

SPACE UTILIZATION - 8,439 Sq Foot Training Building
(Existing) 400 Sq Foot Unheated Storage
581 Sq Yard POV Parking
931 Linear Foot Pier

Branch Maintenance Activity

PERSONNEL - 10 Civilian Employees

EQUIPMENT - Not Applicable

SPACE UTILIZATION - Uses 7 bay maintenance shop area and shares POV parking area shown above.

South Operations Branch, DCMAO Philadelphia, DLA

PERSONNEL - 12 Full Time

EQUIPMENT - Not Applicable

SPACE UTILIZATION - Occupies 1,039 sq ft of office space on the second floor (weekdays only) under permit with the Army since Jan 81. This being 14% of the total building space, DLA pays that portion of the utility costs, $350 per month.

Corps of Engineers Survey Branch

PERSONNEL - Not Applicable

EQUIPMENT - 45' Survey Vessel

SPACE UTILIZATION - Requires use of dock space 20% of the operational time and access for crew pick-up/discharge.

METHOD OF SEARCH:

The Philadelphia Harbor was surveyed on both sides of the Delaware River, north to Morrisville, New Jersey (just south of Trenton). Above this point, the main channel of the river is not dredged to a sufficient level for commercial traffic. The New Jersey coast was surveyed south of Nantuxent Cove at Bridgeton, New Jersey. The Delaware coast was searched to just south of the Chesapeake & Delaware Canal entrance. The Chesapeake Bay was searched from Chesapeake City to Curtis Bay, including areas around Aberdeen Proving Grounds and Edgewood, Maryland.

Port Authority officials of Philadelphia, Wilmington and Baltimore were requested to identify sites in their respective areas. Military locations were visited, and commercial real estate brokers were contacted to obtain leads on possible sites.

At the conclusion of the initial field search for alternate sites, 11 were considered to be candidates within the prescribed 100 mile radius. After further investigation, 5 sites in the Baltimore area were discounted since they could not be supported demographically. A second site at the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard was also eliminated due to a lack of building space, contamination, and the dock space being unprotected from weather conditions. In addition, this area accumulates a considerable amount of debris due to water currents. The remaining 5 sites were inspected March 22, 1994.

III. ANALYSIS OF SITES IDENTIFIED:

ASSUMPTIONS:

1. All construction/renovation would be performed in FY 97 and will take one year.

2. Any Defense Logistics Agency relocation would be to leased space near the Marcus Hook site. Cost of the DLA relocation would be the same for any Reserve site other than Marcus Hook.

3. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) vessel would relocate to a commercial dock; only increased costs for docking and travel time to work sites were estimated. The USACE vessel location and increased USACE costs would be the same for any Reserve site other than Marcus Hook.

4. Annual personnel payroll expenses, supplies, furnishings and equipment are the same for all alternatives and are not included in this analysis.

5. No hazardous, toxic, or radioactive waste (HTRW) testing or cleanup is needed if Reserve continues to occupy the Marcus Hook site; recent environmental projects have eliminated problems in the building and as long as the pier and site paving remain in place no site cleanup will be necessary. HTRW testing would be necessary at Marcus Hook for every relocation alternative in order to determine if a cleanup is required before disposal of the site. In addition, HTRW testing would be needed before Government investment at any alternative site. Therefore, costs for preliminary assessment screening (PAS) is included in each relocation alternative for two sites, Marcus Hook and the alternative site. Potential costs for site cleanups were not included in this analysis.

6. No major repair or replacement projects are expected at Marcus Hook during the period of analysis due to recently completed projects and improvements to the building and pier.

7. Maintenance and repair costs would be reasonably equal to those at the present facility upon completion of the required construction at all other sites.

8. Revenue from potential sale of Marcus Hook upon relocation to alternative site was not included.

9. Dredging costs at all locations are considered to be "wash costs" at all sites due to unknown conditions at the new sites.

INDEX TO MAP PAGES



SITE ANALYSIS: Description of Subject Site

Location:	U.S. Army Reserve Center, Marcus Hook, Pennsylvania. Located at the Delaware River at the east end of Route 452.
Owner:	Government.
Land Area:	Approximately 1.75 acres
Improvements:	
Buildings:	Two story brick building with 8,439 square feet used for office and maintenance and two smaller buildings with 400 square feet used for storage.
Pier:	428' long with a Tee shaped area at the end totalling 931 linear feet. Has 30,000 lbs load capacity with electricity (440 and 110) security lighting, and fresh water.
Site:	Buildings and pier are completely fenced with 6' chain link, 1' barbed wire on top and a double gate entrance. Also has 2,529 SF of paved parking. There is limited potential for expansion with Sun Oil Co plant to the south and Market Square Memorial Park to the north.
Other:	200 linear feet of shoreline.
Water Depth:	16' 6" at end of pier dropping to 30' in main channel within 50' of pier.
Availability:	Existing
Asking Price:	N/A
Sale:	N/A
Lease:	N/A
Broker/Contact:	Robert Young, Facility Manager
Advantages:	Facility size and location supports unit training, operating costs are minimal, provides space and access to the river for other DOD activities at minimal cost.
Disadvantages:	Conflict with community development plans.

SITE ANALYSIS: Associated Costs at Subject Site - Marcus Hook

Utilities and Services

The cost for all utilities and contract services in 1993 was $31,359. Costs were escalated to $33,109 in 1996 dollars and inflated every year to the end of the analysis.

SITE ANALYSIS: Description of Alternate Site Number 1

Location:	Fort Mifflin, Pennsylvania. Located on the Delaware River just north of Philadelphia International Airport.
Owner:	Government. Operated by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Philadelphia District.
Land Area:	Approximately 445 acres.
Improvements:	
Buildings:	There are no excess buildings available.
Pier:	There is no excess pier space available.
Site:	Construction of roads, paved parking, and security fencing is required. Sufficient land is available for Det 1, 949th needs.
Other:	Sufficient shoreline is available to support construction of a new pier.
Water Depth:	Dredging would be required for the new pier.
Availability:	Not available without construction or displacement of current tenant.
Asking Price:	N/A
Sale:	N/A
Lease:	N/A
Broker/Contact:	Mr. Bob Johnson
Advantages:	Vacates Marcus Hook facility.
Disadvantages:	New construction for training building and pier is required. Relocation would disrupt unit operations. The Corps survey vessel would relocate and DLA would move to leased space near Marcus Hook.

SITE ANALYSIS: Associated Costs at Alternate Site 1 - Ft Mifflin

Initial Investment Expense Items

Construction of a new building (8,439 square feet)	$1,329,505
Pier Construction	$857,582
Parking, fencing and roads	$761,232

These one time costs, totalling $2,948,319, have been inflated to 1997 dollars when the expenditure is most likely to occur.

Utilities and Services

Operating costs for Fort Mifflin are expected to be 10 percent less than at Marcus Hook due to efficiencies achieved with a newly constructed building.

HTRW Costs

This expense item includes the estimated cost of testing any alternative construction site for hazardous, toxic or radioactive waste (HTRW), and the cost of testing and clearing the Marcus Hook site for the same. This cost is expected to be incurred in 1996 ($211,160) and in 1997 ($217,495 inflated to 1997 dollars).

Annual Cost of COE Vessel

This item includes the estimated increase in annual costs of docking fees and travel time to work sites if the vessel is relocated from Marcus Hook to any other nearby facility. The cost was estimated to be $42,232 in 1996 prices. No expenditure is incurred until 1997. Inflation factors were used from 1997 to the end of the period of analysis.

Additional Defense Logistics Agency Annual Cost

This is the additional annual cost DLA estimates it will cost to operate from an alternative facility if it relocates from Marcus Hook and would be the same for all alternate sites. The cost in 1996 dollars is $29,734 which was inflated to 1998 when the expenditure is expected to begin.

Defense Logistics Agency Moving Cost

This item is the one time moving cost of the Defense Logistics Agency to vacate Marcus Hook and move to a nearby location. It would be the same for all alternatives and is expected to be incurred in the year 1998 at a cost of $13,244.

Unit Moving and PAS Costs

This is the one time expense of moving from Marcus Hook to an alternative site estimated to cost $50,000. Preliminary assessment screening costs were estimated at $100,000.

SITE ANALYSIS: Description of Alternate Site Number 2

Location:	Philadelphia Naval Shipyard, Philadelphia, PA, on the Delaware River, south of the city.
Owner:	Government. Operated by the U.S. Navy.
Land Area:	Total area not known. However, sufficient land is available for Det 1, 949th needs.
Improvements:	
Buildings:	The Navy has stated that Building #3 is available. It consists of 51,509 sf and would be shared with other tenants. The building was constructed in 1876 and requires major renovation to prepare it for occupancy.
Pier:	Pier 1, adjacent to Bldg #3 was to be used for inactive fleet ships, but may be made available. The three sides measure 395 feet on the east side, 320 feet on the west and 150 feet across totalling 865 linear feet.
Site:	Security fencing is required.
Other:	The Navy has stated that all facilities will be permitted in the current condition and the tenant will make any improvements.
Water Depth:	20 ft
Availability:	Immediate.
Asking Price:	N/A
Sale:	N/A
Lease:	The tenant would maintain the facility in lieu of a lease cost.
Broker/Contact:	Bud Simmons, Business Office, Navy Yard
Advantages:	Vacates Marcus Hook facility.
Disadvantages:	Construction is required to renovate existing building and pier. Unit would have to share costs of unneeded services provided by the Shipyard. Relocation would disrupt unit operations. The Corps survey vessel would have to relocate. DLA would have to lease space near Marcus Hook.

SITE ANALYSIS: Associated Costs at Alternate Site 2 - Philadelphia Naval Shipyard

Initial Investment Expense Items

Building Rehab	$967,012
Pier Rehab	$348,907
Parking, fencing and roads	$10,875

These one time costs, totalling $1,326,794, have been inflated to 1997 dollars when the expenditure is most likely to occur.

Utilities and Services

The cost of utilities and services is estimated to be the same as at Marcus Hook because the same operations will occur in a renovated older building.

HTRW Costs
Annual Cost of CEO Vessel
Additional DLA Annual Cost
DLA Moving Cost
Unit Moving and PAS Costs

Same as Alternate Site 1.

Site Lease

The cost of leasing the land and existing pier would be offset by the tenant performing all required maintenance and repair.

SITE ANALYSIS: Description of Alternate Site Number 3

Location:	Philadelphia Waterfront, Pier #96 located at the intersection of Delaware Avenue and Oregon Avenue.
Owner:	City of Philadelphia Port Authority.
Land Area:	Total area not known. Sufficient land is available for Det 1, 949th needs.
Improvements:	
Buildings:	An existing shelter with a metal roof and no sides would have to be demolished.
Pier:	The pier is approximately 120' x 500' and requires rehabilitation.
Site:	This area is known to have a high vandalism rate, and extensive physical security measures will be required. Port Authority officials have stated that vandals have released boats in this area in the past.
Other:	N/A
Water Depth:	The channel is dredged to 40' and to approximately 20' at pier side.
Availability:	Immediate.
Asking Price:	N/A
Sale:	N/A
Lease:	Terms for lease of land are not yet known.
Broker/Contact:	City of Philadelphia Port Authority.
Advantages:	Vacates Marcus Hook facility.
Disadvantages:	Construction of a new building and pier improvements are required. Security is a major concern. Relocation would disrupt unit operations. The Corps survey vessel would have to relocate. DLA would have to lease space near Marcus Hook.

SITE ANALYSIS: Associated Costs at Alternate Site 3 - Municipal Pier #96

Initial Investment Expense Items

Building Construction	$1,329,505
Pier Rehab	$337,117
Parking, Security fencing	$217,495

These one time costs, totalling $1,884,117, have been inflated to 1997 dollars when the expenditure is most likely to occur.

Utilities and Services
HTRW Costs
Annual Cost of COE Vessel
Additional DLA Annual Cost
DLA Moving Costs
Unit Moving and PAS Costs

Same as Alternate Site 1.

Site Lease

Lease costs are estimated to be $47,511 per year in 1996 dollars.

Security Services Contract

The cost for 24 hour security guard service was estimated at $139,126 in 1996 dollars.

SITE ANALYSIS: Description of Alternate Site Number 4

Location:	Old Coast Guard Station located on Cumberland Street in Gloucester City, New Jersey, South of the Walt Whitman Bridge.
Owner:	City of Gloucester.
Land Area:	Pier plus approximately 6 acres of land.
Improvements:	
Buildings:	The old Coast Guard administrative building and other garage type buildings are scheduled to be demolished.
Pier:	Approximately 350 feet X 350 feet, requires some repair.
Site:	Needs security fence and may require a guard when not occupied.
Other:	Zoning is mixed use office/residential/ commercial. The city would prefer a commercial operator at this site to improve employment opportunities.
Water Depth:	Approximately 20'.
Availability:	Immediate.
Asking Price:	N/A
Sale:	N/A
Lease:	Terms for lease of land and pier are not known.
Broker/Contact:	Paul Kane, Clerk, City of Gloucester.
Advantages:	Vacates Marcus Hook facility.
Disadvantages:	Construction of a new building and pier improvements are required. Security may be required. Relocation would disrupt unit operations. The Corps survey vessel would have to relocate. DLA would have to lease space near Marcus Hook.

SITE ANALYSIS: Associated Costs at Alternate Site 4 - Old Coast Guard Station

Initial Investment Expense Items

Demolition	$21,811
Building Construction	$1,329,505
Rehab Pier & Fence	$54,528
Parking Upgrade	$32,717

These one time costs, totalling $1,438,561, have been inflated to 1997 dollars when the expenditure is most likely to occur.

Utilities and Services
HTRW Costs
Annual Cost of COE Vessel
Additional DLA Annual Cost
DLA Moving Cost
Unit Moving and PAS Costs

Same as Alternate Site 1.

Site Lease

Lease costs are estimated to be $104,841 per year in 1996 dollars.

Security Services Contract

The cost for 16 hour security guard service was estimated at $88,939 in 1996 dollars.

ECONOMIC ANALYSIS:

The economic analysis was prepared in accordance with OMB Circular A-94. The discount rate was obtained from the Administration's economic assumptions for the budget published annually in Appendix C of OMB Circular A-94. The analysis compares subject site at Marcus Hook and the four alternatives. All differential life cycle costs associated with these alternatives were inflated by 3% per year. Based on the costs, discount rate, and period of analysis, a Net Present Value (NPV)* was calculated for each alternative. Based on the NPVs of the five sites, Marcus Hook is the least costly option to providing facilities for the Army Reserves mission.

DISCOUNT RATE:	5.80%
PERIOD OF ANALYSIS:	25 YEARS
START YEAR:	1996
BASE YEAR:	1996
PROJECT OBJECTIVE :	To provide pier space for 3 tugs and 4 barges, a building with 8,439 square feet to provide space for training, maintenance, and storage for a period of 25 years.

ALTERNATE	NPV
SUBJECT - MARCUS HOOK	$1,059,805
#1 - FORT MIFFLIN	$5,000,061
#2 - PHILA NAVY YD	$3,448,003
#3 - MUNICIPAL PIER #96	$7,524,468
#4 - COAST GUARD STATION	$7,130,047

* Net Present Value represents the cumulative present value of costs and demonstrates the amount of money that needs to be invested in 1994 (base year) at a nominal rate of 5.8 percent to meet all the future differential costs associated with the alternative, during the period of analysis.

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS:

FINAL ANALYSIS:

A considerable amount of effort has been expended in the development of this study. The Headquarters, U.S. Army Corps of Engineer, Baltimore District and Philadelphia District each contributed to the search for alternate sites. Four sites were found during this search which had not been previously identified, Wharves G and H at the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard, Fort Mifflin, Port Authority Pier #96 and the Old Coast Guard Station in Gloucester, New Jersey.

This study addresses the four alternate sites which were suitable from a mission and training standpoint of the U.S. Army Reserve unit. The other tenant activities, DLA and COE, provide no support to the unit and were secondary to the purpose of the study. The current facility at Marcus Hook was evaluated using the same criteria and is included in this report as a basis for comparison.

The rank order of the five sites are:

Number 1 - Marcus Hook
Number 2 - Philadelphia Naval Shipyard
Number 3 - Fort Mifflin
Number 4 - Old Coast Guard Station
Number 5 - Municipal Pier #96

The above ranking is not based on any one variable, though it is the same order as was derived through economic analysis.

RECOMMENDATION:

Remain in present facilities at Marcus Hook, Pennsylvania.

Document Separator

	Chairman Dixon	Commissioner Cornella	Commissioner Cox	Commissioner Davis	Commissioner Kling	Commissioner Montoya	Commissioner Robles	Commissioner Steele
Motion								
Second								
"AYE"								
"NAY"								

	Chairman Dixon	Commissioner Cornella	Commissioner Cox	Commissioner Davis	Commissioner Kling	Commissioner Montoya	Commissioner Robles	Commissioner Steele
Motion								
Second								
"AYE"								
"NAY"								

FINAL DRAFT

FINAL DELIBERATIONS
JUNE 23-27, 1993

1. **Fort McClellan, AL**

(a) I move that the Commission find that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from the force structure plan and final criteria in making his recommendation on Fort McClellan, AL. Therefore, the Commission rejects and does not make the following recommendation of the Secretary: "Close Fort McClellan. Relocate the U.S. Army Chemical and Military Police Schools and the Department of Defense Polygraph Institute (DODPI) to Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. Transfer accountability for Pelham Range and other required training support facilities, through licensing, to the Army National Guard. Retain an enclave for the U.S. Army Reserves. Retain the capability for live-agent training at Fort McClellan." The Commission does 17 recommend that if the Secretary of Defense wants to move the Chemical Defense School and Chemical Decontamination Training Facility in the future, the Army should pursue all of the required permits and certificates for the new site prior to the 1995 base closure process. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force structure plan and final criteria.

Motion made by: Johnson
Motion seconded by: Bowman
Vote for: (see below)
Vote against:

(b) Motion to amend motion on Ft. McClellan to read:
I move that the Commission find that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from criteria 1 and 4, and, therefore, that the Commission adopt the following recommendation: close Fort McClellan except for Pelham Range and other required training support facilities to be licensed to the Army National Guard, and an enclave to support the U.S. Army Reserves; relocate the Chemical and Military Police Schools to Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri; close the Chemical Decontamination Training Facility at Fort McClellan and construct a replacement facility at Fort Leonard Wood subject to CDTF permits; and relocate the Department of Defense Polygraph Institute to another location determined by the Department of Defense. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

Motion made by: Stuart
Motion seconded by: None
Vote for: N/A
Vote against: N/A

(c) Motion to amend fails for lack of second. Vote on original motion (above):

Vote for: Bowman, Cox, McPherson, Courter, Byron, Johnson (6)
Vote against: Stuart (1)

2. **Presidio of Monterey/POM Annex, CA**
Discussion. Motion/vote tabled/deferred.

3. **Fort Belvoir, VA**
I move that the Commission find that the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force structure plan and final criteria and, therefore, that the Commission adopt the following recommendation of the Secretary of Defense: realign Fort Belvoir as follows: Disestablish the Belvoir Research, Development and Engineering Center (BRDEC), Fort Belvoir, Virginia. Eliminate the Tunnel Detection, Materials, Marine Craft, Topographic Equipment, Construction Equipment and Support Equipment business areas. Relocate the Supply, Bridging, Counter Mobility, Water Purification, and Fuel/Lubricant Business Areas to the Tank Automotive Research, Development and Engineering Center (TARDEC), Detroit Arsenal, Michigan. Transfer command and control of the Physical Security, Battlefield Deception, Electric Power, Remote Mine Detection/Neutralization, Environmental Controls and Low Cost/Low Observables Business Areas to the Night Vision Electro-Optics Directorate (NVEOD) of the Communication and Electronics Research, Development and Engineering Center (CERDEC), Fort Belvoir, Virginia.

Motion made by: McPherson
Motion seconded by: Cox
Vote for: Unanimous (7)
Vote against: (0)

4. **Presidio of San Francisco, CA**
I move that the Commission find that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from criteria 2 and 4, and, therefore, that the Commission adopt the following recommendation: The 1988 Commission decision will be changed to allow only the Sixth U.S. Army to remain at the Presidio of San Francisco, California. The Department of the Interior and the Department of the Army will negotiate a lease that is favorable to both departments for the current facilities occupied by Sixth U.S. Army and family housing at the Presidio of San Francisco necessary to accommodate the headquarters members. If agreement cannot be reached, the Commission expects the Army to make a subsequent recommendation to the 1995 Commission for the relocation of Sixth U.S. Army. The Commission further recommends the Defense Commissary Agency and the Army and Air Force Exchange System determine the commissary and exchange requirements to support Sixth U.S. Army based on sound business decisions. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force structure plan and final criteria.

Motion made by: Cox
Motion seconded by: Byron
Vote for: Unanimous (7)
Vote against: (0)

5. **Ft. Gillem, GA**
I move that the Commission find that Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from the force structure and final criteria in not recommending the closure of Ft. Gillem. Therefore, the Commission recommends the closure of Ft. Gillem and the movement of the Director of Engineering and Housing and all 3rd Army Tenants to Ft. McPherson, Georgia, and 2nd Army to Ft. Stewart. The Commission further recommends the Army, directly or through GSA, make the warehouse buildings at Ft. Gillem available to the Army and Air Force Exchange Service as long as they wish to remain a tenant there. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force structure plan and final criteria.

Motion made by: Johnson
Motion seconded by: None
Vote for: N/A
Vote against: N/A

6. **Ft. McPherson, GA**
No motion.

7. **Ft. Lee, VA**
No motion.

8. **Ft. Monroe, VA**
No motion.

9. **Vint Hill Farms, VA**
I move that the Commission find that the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force structure plan and final criteria and, therefore, that the Commission adopt the following recommendation of the Secretary of Defense: Close Vint Hill Farms. Relocate the maintenance and repair function of the Intelligence Material Management Center (IMMC) to Tobyhanna Army Depot, PA. Transfer the remaining elements of IMMC, the Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Directorate (formerly the Signal Warfare Directorate), and the program executive officer (PEO) for Intelligence and Electronic Warfare (IEW) to Ft. Monmouth, NJ.

Motion made by: McPherson
Motion seconded by: Stuart
Vote for: Unanimous (7)
Vote against: N/A (0)

10. **Ft. Monmouth, NJ**
(a) I move that the Commission find that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from criterion 4. The Commission finds that the Department misstated the cost differential between two alternative choices. Therefore, the Commission adopts the following recommendation: Move CECOM headquarters out of the leased space and into space at Ft. Monmouth vacated by the 513th Military Intelligence Brigade and the Chaplain School or other suitable space; relocate the Chaplain School to Ft. Jackson; consolidate activities to maximize utilization of main post Ft. Monmouth; and dispose of excess facilities and real property at Evans and Charles Woods sub posts, as well as main post Ft. Monmouth. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force structure plan and final criteria.

Motion made by: McPherson
Motion seconded by: Cox
Vote for: N/A
Vote against: N/A

(b) Motion to make technical amendment to insert the following: "rejects the Secretary's recommendation on Ft. Monmouth, and, instead."

Motion made by: Courter
Motion seconded by: Cox
Vote for: Unanimous (7) [voice vote]
Vote against: (0)

(c) Vote on amended motion:
I move that the Commission find that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from criterion 4. The Commission finds that the Department misstated the cost differential between two alternative choices. Therefore, the Commission rejects the Secretary's recommendation on Ft. Monmouth, and, instead, adopts the following recommendation: Move CECOM headquarters out of the leased space and into space at Ft. Monmouth vacated by the 513th Military Intelligence Brigade and the Chaplain School or other suitable space; relocate the Chaplain School to Ft. Jackson; consolidate activities to maximize utilization of main post Ft. Monmouth; and dispose of excess facilities and real property at Evans and Charles Woods sub posts, as well as main post Ft. Monmouth. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force structure plan and final criteria.

Vote for: Unanimous (7)
Vote against: (0)

11. **Rock Island Arsenal, IL**
I move that the Commission find that the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force structure plan and final criteria and, therefore, that the Commission adopt the following recommendation of the Secretary of Defense: Instead of sending the materiel management functions of U.S. Army Armament, Munitions and Chemical Command (AMCCOM) to Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, as recommended by the 1991 Base Closure Commission, reorganize these functions under Tank Automotive Command (TACOM) with the functions remaining in place at Rock Island Arsenal, IL.

Motion made by: McPherson
Motion seconded by: Stuart
Vote for: Byron, Stuart, Courter, McPherson, Cox, Bowman (6)
Vote against: Johnson (1)

12. **Marcus Hook USAR Center, PA**
No motion.

13. **Presidio of Monterey/Presidio of Monterey Annex, CA** [previously deferred]
I move that the Commission find that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from the force-structure plan and criterion 4, and, therefore, that the Commission adopt the following recommendation: Retain the Presidio of Monterey but dispose of all facilities at the Presidio of Monterey Annex except the housing, commissary, child care facility, and post-exchange required to support the Presidio of Monterey and Navy Post Graduate School. Consolidate base operations support with the Naval Post Graduate School by interservice agreement. The Department of Defense will evaluate whether contracted base operations support would provide savings for the Presidio of Monterey. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

Motion made by: Johnson
Motion seconded by: McPherson
Vote for: Unanimous (7)
Vote against: (0)

14. **Letterkenny Army Depot, PA**

I move that the Commission find that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criteria 1 and 4. Therefore, the Commission rejects the Secretary's recommendation on Letterkenny Army Depot, Pennsylvania, and, instead, adopts the following recommendation: Letterkenny Army Depot will remain open. Consolidate tactical missile maintenance at the depot as originally planned. Add tactical missile maintenance workload currently being accomplished by the Marine Corps Logistics Base in Barstow, California, to the consolidation plan. Retain current artillery workload at Letterkenny.

Retain the Systems Integration Management Activity-East (SIMA-E) at Letterkenny Depot Activity until the Defense Information Systems Agency completes its review of activities relocated under DMRD 918. Relocate Depot Systems Command to Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois, and consolidate with the Armament, Munitions, and Chemical Command into the Industrial Operations Command, as approved by the 1991 Commission.

The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force structure plan and final criteria.

Motion made by: Cox
Motion seconded by: Stuart
Vote for: Unanimous (7)
Vote against: (0)

15. **Tooele Army Depot, UT**

I move that the Commission find that the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force structure plan and final criteria and, therefore, that the Commission adopt the following recommendation of the Secretary of Defense: Realign Tooele Army Depot (TEAD) by reducing it to a depot activity and placing it under the command and control of Red River Army Depot, TX. Retain conventional ammunition storage and the chemical demilitarization mission. The depot workload will move to other depot maintenance activities, including the private sector. The activities of the depot not associated with the remaining mission will be inactivated, transferred or eliminated, as appropriate.

Motion made by: McPherson
Motion seconded by: Byron
Vote for: Unanimous (7)
Vote against: (0)

16. **McGuire AFB, NJ**
I move that the Commission find that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criteria 1, 2, 3, and 4 and, therefore, that the Commission reject the Secretary's recommendation on McGuire AFB, and, instead, adopt the following recommendation: Retain McGuire AFB as an active installation. The 438th and 514th Airlift Wings, the 170th Air Refueling Group (ANG), and the 108th Air Refueling Wing (ANG) will remain at McGuire AFB. Move the 19 KC-10 aircraft from Barksdale AFB to McGuire AFB. Move the requisite number of KC-135 aircraft to establish the East Coast Mobility Base at McGuire AFB. The C-130 913th Airlift Group (AFRES) remains at Willow Grove NAS, PA. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force structure plan and final criteria.

Motion made by: Johnson
Motion seconded by: Stuart
Vote for: Bowman, Cox, McPherson, Courter, Stuart, Johnson (6)
Vote against: Byron (1)

17. **Grand Forks AFB, ND**
I move to withdraw Grand Forks AFB, ND, from further consideration by the Commission.

Motion made by: Johnson
Motion seconded by: Byron
Vote for: Unanimous (7) [voice vote]
Vote against: (0)

ARMY BASING STRATEGY

- *Force Structure:*
  - *12 Active Component Divisions (9 CONUS)*
  - *8 National Guard Divisions (2 Cadre)*
- *Maintain capability to station 10 divisions in CONUS*
- *Identify opportunities to eliminate, collocate, or consolidate branch school, center, and industrial base functions*
- *Close small, single purpose installations where feasible*
- *Preserve flexibility and capability to expand and meet future force structure and technology requirements*
- *Provide adequate land and training facilities*
- *Consider environmental impacts of stationing and training*
- *Provide mobilization and deployment capability*
- *Eliminate sites of marginal utility*

MILEAGE BETWEEN MAJOR ARMY INSTALLATIONS	Belvoir	Benning	Bliss	Bragg	Campbell	Carlisle	Carson	Devens	Dix	Eustis	Gordon	Harrison	Hood	Houston	Huachuca	Jackson
Belvoir	–	746	1972	312	724	136	1697	441	183	144	532	608	1480	1599	2243	449
Benning	746	–	1394	498	397	818	1404	1168	910	718	243	640	854	956	1672	324
Bliss	1972	1394	–	1824	1308	1962	568	2349	2107	1971	1584	1435	590	572	309	1665
Bragg	312	498	1824	–	576	444	1684	753	495	274	259	641	1291	1408	2095	176
Campbell	724	397	1308	576	–	745	1112	1134	887	723	440	278	816	935	1579	503
Carlisle	138	818	1962	444	745	–	1626	395	151	276	634	537	1516	1635	2209	557
Carson	1697	1404	568	1684	1112	1626	–	2013	1771	1724	1534	1099	815	884	779	1615
Devens	441	1168	2349	753	1131	395	2013	–	272	570	973	916	1901	2020	2596	890
Dix	183	910	2107	495	887	151	1771	272	–	309	715	682	643	1762	2354	1632
Eustis	144	718	1971	274	723	276	1724	570	309	–	504	676	1479	1598	2242	421
Gordon	532	243	1584	259	440	634	1534	973	715	504	–	661	1044	1161	1862	85
Harrison	608	640	1435	641	278	537	1099	916	682	676	661	–	1054	1173	1682	638
Hood	1480	854	590	1291	816	1516	815	1901	643	1479	1044	1054	–	149	895	1125
Houston	1599	956	572	1408	935	1635	884	2020	1762	1598	1161	1173	149	–	877	1242
Huachuca	2243	1672	309	2095	1579	2209	779	2596	2354	2242	1862	1682	895	877	–	1943
Jackson	449	324	1665	176	503	557	1615	890	1632	421	85	638	1125	1242	1943	–
Knox	641	494	1453	606	164	591	1141	980	736	646	537	154	961	1080	1711	547
Leavenworth	1136	879	947	1124	552	1065	594	1442	1210	1164	992	538	675	794	1194	1055
Lee	111	639	1930	205	682	243	1691	552	294	83	425	643	1421	1538	2201	342
Lewis	2750	2706	1739	2862	2379	2679	1401	2966	2824	2888	2819	2230	2117	2181	1587	2853
McClellan	728	160	1355	491	268	766	1309	1150	892	700	247	511	815	932	1633	328
McNair	16	742	1967	328	719	122	1681	426	168	160	548	592	1475	1594	2238	465
McPherson	629	118	1443	392	299	701	1393	1051	793	601	146	542	903	1020	1721	227
Meade	42	769	1994	354	746	104	1697	405	147	181	574	608	1502	1621	2265	491
Monmouth	223	950	2145	535	927	189	1809	251	47	323	755	720	1683	1802	2392	672
Monroe	162	705	1989	258	741	294	1742	554	293	20	491	694	1487	1604	2263	408
Ord	2933	2457	1118	2791	2275	2862	1324	3203	3007	2938	2591	2366	1704	1686	894	2672
Polk	1240	593	943	1030	617	1276	1036	1661	1403	1239	783	278	403	412	1221	864
Riley	1232	974	820	1219	647	1161	467	1548	1306	1259	1087	634	624	743	1067	1150
Rucker	861	134	1370	611	418	933	1525	1283	1025	833	364	661	830	869	1648	445
Sheridan	730	812	1471	842	415	659	1087	991	804	868	855	210	1119	1238	1718	833
Sill	1413	935	613	1265	749	1372	602	1759	1517	1412	1065	845	303	396	884	1146
Wood	992	690	1045	974	402	921	782	1308	1066	1014	820	394	678	797	1292	901
USMA	289	1016	2178	601	956	233	1842	193	120	418	821	745	1747	1866	2425	738

	Knox	Leavenworth	Lee	Lewis	McClellan	McNair	McPherson	Meade	Monmouth	Monroe	Ord	Polk	Riley	Rucker	Sheridan	Sill	Wood	USMA
Belvoir	641	1136	111	2750	728	16	629	42	223	162	2933	1240	1232	861	730	1413	992	289
Benning	494	879	639	2706	160	742	118	769	950	705	2457	593	974	134	812	935	690	1016
Bliss	1453	947	1930	1739	1355	1967	1443	1994	2145	1989	1118	943	820	1370	1471	613	1045	2178
Bragg	606	1124	205	2862	491	328	392	354	535	258	2791	1030	1219	611	842	1265	974	601
Campbell	164	552	682	2379	268	719	299	746	927	741	2275	617	647	418	415	749	402	956
Carlisle	591	1065	243	2679	766	122	701	104	189	294	2862	1276	1161	933	659	1372	921	233
Carson	1141	594	1691	1401	1309	1681	1393	1697	1809	1742	1324	1036	467	1404	1087	602	782	842
Devens	980	1442	552	2966	1150	426	1051	405	251	554	3203	1661	1548	1283	991	1759	1308	193
Dix	736	1210	294	2824	892	168	793	147	47	293	3007	1403	1306	1025	804	1517	1066	120
Eustis	646	1164	83	2888	700	160	601	181	323	20	2938	1239	1259	833	868	1412	1014	418
Gordon	537	992	425	2819	247	548	146	574	755	491	2591	783	1087	364	855	1065	820	821
Harrison	154	538	643	2230	511	592	542	608	720	694	2366	878	634	661	210	845	394	745
Hood	961	675	1421	2117	815	1475	903	1502	1683	1487	1704	403	624	830	1119	303	678	1747
Houston	1080	794	1538	2181	932	1594	1020	1621	1802	1604	1685	412	743	869	1238	396	797	1866
Huachuca	1711	1194	2201	1587	1633	2238	1721	2265	2392	2260	894	1221	1067	1648	1718	884	1292	2425
Jackson	547	1055	342	2853	328	465	227	491	672	408	2672	864	1150	445	833	1146	901	738
Knox	–	581	613	2369	365	636	396	662	774	664	2395	762	676	515	349	874	431	812
Leavenworth	581	–	1131	1851	784	1120	851	1136	1248	1182	1863	710	129	879	544	436	257	1271
Lee	613	1131	–	2855	621	127	522	153	334	88	2897	1160	1226	754	835	1371	981	400
Lewis	2369	1851	2855	–	2611	2734	2678	2750	2862	2906	871	2408	1798	2706	2027	1973	2084	2853
McClellan	365	784	621	2611	–	724	106	751	932	687	2366	554	879	185	683	840	595	997
McNair	636	1126	127	2734	724	–	625	27	208	178	2917	1235	1216	857	714	1408	976	274
McPherson	396	851	522	2678	106	625	–	652	833	588	2450	642	946	233	714	924	679	899
Meade	662	1136	153	2750	751	27	652	–	187	196	2933	1262	1232	884	730	1435	992	253
Monmouth	774	1248	334	2862	932	208	833	187	–	307	3045	1443	1344	1065	842	1555	1104	99
Monroe	684	1182	88	2906	687	178	588	196	307	–	2956	1226	1277	820	886	1430	1032	402
Ord	2395	1863	2097	871	2366	2917	2450	2933	3045	2956	–	2020	1736	2437	2263	1589	1976	3042
Polk	762	710	1160	2408	554	1235	642	1262	1443	1226	2020	–	752	567	969	504	635	1507
Riley	675	129	1226	1798	879	1216	946	1232	1344	1277	1736	752	–	974	654	357	352	1377
Rucker	515	879	754	2706	185	857	233	884	1065	820	2437	567	974	–	833	921	690	1131
Sheridan	349	544	835	2027	683	714	714	730	842	886	2263	969	654	833	–	896	445	833
Sill	874	436	1371	1973	840	1408	924	1435	1555	1430	1589	504	357	921	896	–	455	1588
Wood	431	257	981	2084	595	976	679	992	1104	1032	1976	635	352	690	445	455	–	1137
USMA	812	1271	400	2853	997	274	899	253	99	402	3042	1507	1377	1131	833	1588	1137	–

BASIC TRAINING LOAD




COMBAT ARMS
Average Daily Student Load
12000
10000
8000
6000
4000
2000
0
-1163
-695
624
-205
-398
FISCAL YEAR 1992
FISCAL YEAR 1997
BENNING
BLISS
KNOX
RUCKER
SILL


COMBAT SUPPORT ARMS
Average Daily Student Load
10000
9000
8000
7000
6000
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
0
-1790
-258
80
975
- 961
FISCAL YEAR 1992
FISCAL YEAR 1997
LND WOOD
GORDON
MCCLELLAN
HUACHUCA
DEVENS


COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT ARMS
Average Daily Student Load
14000
12000
10000
8000
6000
4000
2000
0
-678
-755
-213
-511
- 44
-247
-2244
-1465
FISCAL YEAR 1992
FISCAL YEAR 1997
JACKSON
S HOUSTON
LEE
ABERDEEN
EUSTIS
REDSTONE
HARRISON
DIX

AVAILABLE ASSETS

PROFESSIONAL SCHOOL INSTALLATIONS

CATEGORY		CARLISLE	LEAVENWORTH	McNAIR	PRESIDIO OF MONTEREY	WEST POINT
OPS BLDGS	(SF)					
ADMIN	(SF)		268,000		15,000	528,000
MAINTENANCE	(SF)	12,000				
TRAINING/INSTRUCTION	(SF)	161,000		329,000		
SUPPLY/STORAGE	(SF)		65,000			29,000
COMMUNITY SUPPORT	(SF)	53,290	149,302			957,882
BARRACKS @ 2+2	(PN)	34	115			
FAMILY HOUSING	(EA)	137		697		
BUILDABLE ACRES		25	104	4	200	0

AVAILABLE ASSETS

COMMAND AND CONTROL INSTALLATIONS

CATEGORY		BELVOIR	BUCHANAN	GILLEM	HAMILTON	McPHERSON
OPS BLDGS	(SF)	12,000				
ADMIN	(SF)	83,570		168,000	77,000	98,000
MAINTENANCE	(SF)	131,000		329,000	6,000	
TRAINING/INSTRUCTION	(SF)	287,000				
SUPPLY/STORAGE	(SF)		10,000	662,000		
COMMUNITY SUPPORT	(SF)	66,102	140,100	97,000	87,000	
BARRACKS @ 2+2	(PN)				335	191
FAMILY HOUSING	(EA)	657	99	4,134	1,027	7,773
BUILDABLE ACRES		700	610	270	10	34

AVAILABLE ASSETS

COMMAND AND CONTROL INSTALLATIONS

CATEGORY		MEADE	MONROE	MYER	RITCHIE	SHAFTER	TOTTEN
OPS BLDGS	(SF)						
ADMIN	(SF)		173,000	18,000			107,000
MAINTENANCE	(SF)	18,000	49,000	30,000			20,000
TRAINING/INSTRUCTION	(SF)						
SUPPLY/STORAGE	(SF)			37,449			9,000
COMMUNITY SUPPORT	(SF)		3,240	138,270			52,000
BARRACKS @ 2+2	(PN)	680	53	1,579	80	213	
FAMILY HOUSING	(EA)	6,192	373	2,098	1,758		185
BUILDABLE ACRES		750	125	0	255	549	15

U.S. Army Reductions

		1988	1993	1995
Troop Strength (000)	United States	518	483	432
	(Δ %)		(- 7)	(- 17)
	Overseas	254	105	90
	(Δ %)		(- 59)	(- 65)
Installations	United States	140	98	
	(Δ %)		(- 30)	
	Overseas	956	551	
	(Δ %)		(- 42)	