

Testimony of the Barstow Community to the BRAC Commission

July 14, 2005

“Logistics controls all military campaigns and limits many.”
(General Dwight D. Eisenhower)

by

Patricia J. Morris, Member, Military Affairs Committee of the Barstow Area Chamber of
Commerce and Assistant to the City Manager, City of Barstow

Assisted by

- Robert Lucas, Chairman of the Military Affairs Committee of the Barstow Area Chamber of Commerce
- Rick Bremen (formerly Head of the Production Management Department of Maintenance Center Barstow)
- Kathleen Robles, Department of Community Development and Housing, County of San Bernardino
- Bea Lint, Advertising Director, *Desert Dispatch* daily newspaper



July 1, 2005

The Honorable Anthony Principi, Chairman
2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
2521 S. Clark St., Ste. 600
Arlington, VA 22202

RE: TESTIMONY SUBMITTAL - 2005 BRAC RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE PROPOSED
REALIGNMENT OF THE MARINE CORPS LOGISTICS BASE, BARSTOW, CA

Dear Chairman Principi:

We are writing to you as, respectively, the Supervisor of the First District of the County of San Bernardino and Mayor of the City of Barstow, where the Marine Corps Logistics Base Barstow (MCLBB) is located. As you are aware, the Department of Defense (DoD) has recommended a significant realignment to the MCLBB. The DoD's recommendations, if accepted, would have such substantial negative impacts on the combat-readiness and combat-effectiveness of the United States Marine Corps, as to constitute a substantial deviation from the military value criteria established for this Base Closure and Realignment Round (BRAC).

To summarize our concerns with the DoD's recommendations regarding the realignment of the MCLBB, there are three types of issues that need to be addressed: overall military value; military value relating to the suggestion to close both Marine Corps depots (Barstow, CA and Albany, GA) and transfer their workloads to an Army depot (Red River, TX) now under consideration for closure; and the economic impact analysis. While it is completely understood that military value is the primary force driving BRAC recommendations, it must be entered into the record that the economic impact analysis performed for the Barstow area was erroneous.

It is for these reasons our communities are hereby submitting written testimony to you to be entered into the record at the BRAC Commission Regional hearing in Los Angeles, on July 14, 2005.

Respectfully,

Bill Postmus
First District Supervisor
County of San Bernardino

Lawrence E. Dale
Mayor
City of Barstow

cc: U.S. Senator Dianne Feinstein
U.S. Senator Barbara Boxer
U.S. Representative Howard P. "Buck" McKeon

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
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
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Tab 1

I. Executive Summary

“Logistics controls all military campaigns and limits many.”
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To the Base Realignment and Closure Commission:

The Barstow community believes that the recommendation of the Department of Defense concerning ground depot maintenance performed at Marine Corps Logistics Base Barstow substantially deviates from BRAC Selection Criteria 1, 3 and 6; and probably substantially deviates from the Force Structure.

A. Military Value Issues

Relevant BRAC Selection Criteria

- 1. The current and future mission capabilities and the *impact on operational readiness of the total force of the Department of Defense, including the impact on joint warfighting, training, and readiness.*** (Emphasis added.)
- 3. The ability to *accommodate contingency, mobilization, surge and future total force requirements at both existing and potential receiving locations to support operations and training.*** (Emphasis added.)

The community and City of Barstow are closely following the 2005 Base Closure and Realignment (BRAC) round, and would oppose any recommendations which would, in our opinion, weaken the national defense. We believe that the recommendations of DoD regarding Marine Corps ground combat depot maintenance would do precisely that, by forcing the Marine Corps, America’s “9-1-1 *Emergency Response Force*” – an agile force by necessity – into a support paradigm originally designed for a large, stable and standing Army. The Marine Corps’ and the Army’s models of ground depot-level (i.e., fifth-echelon) maintenance are fundamentally and qualitatively different in ways that significantly impact combat-readiness and combat-effectiveness of their respective forces. This is by design.

Marine Corps ground combat depot maintenance has historically been organized to leverage the workforce’s broad-based expertise and inherent production efficiencies to minimize turnaround time (cycle time) in order to maximize combat readiness. Accordingly, both of the Corps’ two ground combat maintenance depots are “multi-commodity” depots, which means that they repair all components of “principal end items” [i.e., large vehicles such as Assault Amphibious Vehicles (AAVs) or Light Armored Vehicles (LAVs)] and all the weapons and equipment associated with them (such as night-vision sights and 50-caliber machine guns). In the Marine Corps model of ground combat depot maintenance, the principal end item (PEI) figuratively enters the “front door” of the Marine depot, is stripped of its components, and the PEI and its

components are rebuilt at the same depot. When the PEI leaves the depot by the "back door," it and all its components have been restored to "like new" condition or (in the case of PEIs that have been technologically upgraded) "better than new" condition.

Army depot maintenance, by contrast, has historically been organized to maximize the volume of workload by commodity (or commodity group) and to maximize economies of scale. Consequently, Army depots are "commodity depots" or "component depots" -- i.e., each one specializes in a limited number of commodities. In the Army model of ground combat depot maintenance, PEI's enter by the "front door" and are stripped of their components. Unlike the Marine Corps system of dealing with all items in house, the various components are packed and shipped to other Army depots where they are repaired and then returned to the "tear-down depot" for reassembly before the PEI ultimately reemerges intact. The economics of Army depot maintenance require that comparatively large volumes of the same commodity be on hand before they can be "worked." All the extra shipping of components back and forth to various Army depots and waiting to accumulate the appropriate amount of a given commodity at the depot that specializes in it are examples of Army practices that greatly increase cycle time. Historically, the only way to follow the Army model of depot maintenance has been to accept lower levels of combat readiness and to maintain comparatively large stocks of weapons and equipment so that it is possible to repair equipment to and from stock. This is what has been done. The mission of being America's "9-1-1 Emergency Response Force" has been assigned to the Marine Corps (not the Army). Also, the Army has historically been provided a budget to allow it to repair to and from large standing stocks of material not immediately required by its combat forces. Conversely, the Marine Corps' limited budget has never enabled it to repair to and from stock since nearly all its material is needed by the Fleet Marine Forces to maintain levels of combat readiness that enable immediate response when directed by the National Command Authorities.

A "real-world" example of the results of the differences between the Marine Corps' and the Army's model of depot maintenance is the case of the 50-caliber machine guns of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment -- an Army unit normally stationed at the National Training Center (NTC)/Fort Irwin to train combat units, but which was deployed to Iraq recently. Fort Irwin contracted the 5th-echelon repair of these guns to the Maintenance Center on board Marine Corps Logistics Base Barstow (MCLBB), one of the Marine Corps' two maintenance depots, because MCLBB could -- and did -- meet the required turnaround time of 30 days. This contrasted with the turnaround time of three years reportedly offered by Anniston Army Depot! It happens that MCLBB is close to the NTC/Fort Irwin, but it is clear from comparing the relative responsiveness of the two Services' depot systems that the proximity was not the reason MCLBB was selected to provide this support.

The fundamental differences between the organization and operation of Marine Corps and Army depots are causally related to the historical differences between their missions.

DoD's recommendation concerning Marine Corps ground depot maintenance is to

- consolidate depot maintenance of Engines/Transmissions, Other Components, and Small Arms/Personal Weapons at Anniston Army Depot, AL;
- consolidate depot maintenance of Conventional Weapons, Engines/Transmissions, Material Handling, Powertrain Components, Starters/Alternators/Generators, Test Measurement Diagnostic Equipment, and Wire at Marine Corps Logistics Base Albany, GA; and
- consolidate depot maintenance of Electronic Components (Non-Airborne), Electro-Optics/Night Vision/Forward-Looking-Infrared, Generators, Ground Support Equipment, Radar, and Radio at Tobyhanna Army Depot. PA.

If not rejected, this recommendation's implementation will ripple through our nation's national security capabilities in unintended – and untenable – ways. The effects will unacceptably increase cycle time (and cycle time for a small, agile force is life or death), adversely impact the combat-readiness and combat-effectiveness of the Marine Corps, and compromise the Corps' ability to fulfill its mission as America's "9-1-1 Emergency Response Force." The recommendation to consolidate depot maintenance workload to Marine Corps Logistics Base Albany (MCLBA) will also degrade the readiness of the Fleet Marine Forces now served primarily by MCLBB (by adding to cycle times the shipping time to and from MCLBA) and by eliminating important backup capability and capacity in the Corps logistics system.

The BRAC process is intended to eliminate excess capacity, but not at the expense of National Security. From a review of this recommendation's history in the Department of the Navy and DoD Joint Cross Service Groups' meeting minutes, it is clear there was an undue emphasis on finding savings rather than on protecting readiness. The recommendation appears to be based on an assumption that differences between Army and Marine Corps depot maintenance models either don't exist or are insignificant; and that, therefore, differences between the Army's and the Marine Corps' missions also either don't exist or are insignificant. As far as we can determine, these assumptions were neither explicitly considered nor tested. We believe both assumptions are clearly invalid and that therefore, the recommendation to realign MCLBB ground depot maintenance substantially deviates from BRAC Selection Criteria 1 and 3. Therefore we request that the Commission find that DoD substantially deviated from the Selection Criteria and reject DoD's recommendation regarding Marine Corps ground depot maintenance.

COMMUNITY RECOMMENDATION #1:

We, as representatives of the Barstow Community, ask the Base Realignment and Closure Commission to reject DoD's recommendation regarding Marine Corps ground combat maintenance as a substantial deviation from BRAC Selection Criteria 1 and 3.

There appears to be a fundamental disconnect between the direction of DoD's transformation and its recommendation regarding ground depot maintenance performed at MCLBB. Specifically, the tenor of the transformational National Military Strategy is

that the other services should become more like the Marine Corps (e.g., in terms of readiness, flexibility, agility and lethality). Around the world, DoD is reorganizing and redeploying its requirements-based structure to transform large, standing forces into smaller, more flexible, agile and lethal capabilities-based units. Yet DoD's recommendations regarding ground depot maintenance amount to moving away from the Marine Corps model toward the Army model (which is not nearly as responsive or flexible). We do not understand how such an action can be consistent with the emphasis of the National Military Strategy and the 20-Year Force Structure Plan on creating the agile, adaptable, expeditionary forces of the future that guided DoD's recommendations to the Commission. We ask the Commission to examine this issue carefully to ensure that DoD's recommendation for ground depot maintenance performed at MCLBB does not represent a substantial deviation from the Force Structure Plan. If there is a substantial deviation from the Force Structure Plan, we ask the Commission to reject the recommendation to realign MCLBB.

COMMUNITY RECOMMENDATION #2:

We, as representatives of the Barstow Community, ask the Commission to compare the direction of DoD's recommendation regarding ground depot maintenance at MCLBB with the direction of DoD transformation to ensure that DoD's recommendation does not represent a substantial deviation from the Force Structure Plan. If there is a substantial deviation from the Force Structure Plan, we ask the Commission to reject the recommendation to realign MCLBB.

If the capability of MCLBB is not gored in the name of cost savings, MCLBB can generate even more military value as the provider of ground depot maintenance to the National Training Center/Fort Irwin (NTC). The Army uses large numbers of tracked and wheeled combat vehicles in its exercises at Fort Irwin, most brought from their home stations by units "rotating" in for training. When these vehicles require maintenance or repair following training rotations, they currently are shipped by rail some 3,000 miles to the Anniston Army Depot in Alabama for repair and maintenance at a cost of about \$4,000 per principal end item (PEI). DoD could realize significant savings, obtain greater efficiencies and decrease the amount of time units are without needed equipment if they were serviced at MCLBB and then shipped directly to the owning organization. We understand that this is a policy matter and not a BRAC issue, but offer it as just one example of how MCLBB's military value can be further leveraged.

B. Possible Suggestions to Close MCLB Barstow, CA and MCLB Albany, GA and Transfer Their Workloads to an Army Depot

If any recommendations are made by communities such as Texarkana, TX to close the two Marine Corps depots and transfer their workloads to Red River Army Depot, TX as an alternative to the DoD recommendation to close Red River Army Depot, such recommendations should be rejected for several reasons:

- First, the differences between the organization of Marine Corps and Army depot maintenance cause them to produce different cycle times with significant impacts on the levels of combat-readiness and combat-effectiveness that can be achieved.
- Second, the Marine Corps has a unique workload – amphibious vehicles – that is the backbone of the Corps’ combat-readiness. No Army depot has the facilities, equipment, workforce or core requirement to support these systems. Even if DoD took the time and went to the considerable expense of facilitating Red River to work amphibious vehicles, there is every reason to expect that Army depots could not achieve the cycle times needed by the Marine Corps to support its required readiness levels.
- Lastly, even if the workload of the two Marine Corps depots were added to the current workload of Red River Army Depot, it would not make a significant difference in Red River’s capacity utilization rate. Therefore, Red River – and the Army’s depot system -- would still have significant excess capacity. Leaving Red River open even with the added workload of MCLBB and MCLBA would thus defeat the purpose of eliminating excess capacity in like activities -- one of the primary goals of the 2005 BRAC round.

COMMUNITY RECOMMENDATION #3:

We ask the Commission to fully consider the implications of further degrading Marine Corps readiness and reject any recommendations to close either or both Marine Corps depots and transfer their workloads to any Army depot(s) as a substantial deviation from BRAC Selection Criteria 1 and 3.

C. Economic Impact Issue

We are fully aware that the outcome of the BRAC 2005 process must be anchored primarily upon military value considerations. Nevertheless, we are obliged to point out for the sake of accuracy and the historical record that the analysis of the economic impact of the DOD recommendation concerning MCLBB is erroneous – and, indeed so mistaken as to constitute a substantial deviation from BRAC Selection Criterion 6.

Relevant BRAC Selection Criterion

6. The economic impact on existing communities *in the vicinity of military installations.* (Emphasis added.)

To estimate the impact on the “local economic area” (DOD Base Closure and Realignment Report to the Commission, Volume IV), DoD compared the number of jobs estimated to be lost at MCLBB to the total employment base of the San Bernardino-Riverside-Ontario, CA Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA), a geographical area that covers 27,259 square miles, has a combined population of 3,254,821 (2000 Census data) and is larger than ten states and the District of Columbia. By contrast, the City of Barstow, which is located in the hinterland of San Bernardino County, occupies 40

square miles, and in 2000 had a population of about 21,119. Barstow is a rural city with its own economic base – a city that confronts significant challenges because of its remoteness. Neither a suburb nor a bedroom community, Barstow is located 35 miles from the nearest city to the south, 140 miles from the nearest city to the east, 70 miles from the nearest city to the southwest, and 65 miles from the nearest city to the northwest. It is not surprising, therefore, that information developed by MCLBB indicates that over 72 percent of all employees of Maintenance Center Barstow (by far the largest employer on the base) live within just 20 miles of Barstow; and that virtually all employees of the base live within a 35-mile radius of Barstow. This is consistent with a poll conducted in March 2005 by California State University San Bernardino that showed that 64 percent of San Bernardino County residents spend less than an hour a day commuting to work, and 86 percent spend less than two hours a day commuting. Clearly, the only reasonable way to measure the economic impact of the recommended job loss is to compare it to the employment base of *Barstow*. The Economic and Community Development Department of San Bernardino County has done so, and estimates the impact at 8 percent of Barstow's labor force (rather than the less than 0.1 percent estimated by DoD). In other words, DoD's estimate understates the proposed job loss at least **by a factor of 80**. This use of incorrect indicators of "local" economic impact led DoD to incorrectly dismiss the economic impact of its recommendation, and is a substantial deviation from BRAC Selection Criterion 6. DoD's recommendation should therefore be rejected as a substantial deviation from BRAC Selection Criterion 6.

COMMUNITY RECOMMENDATION #4:

We appreciate the opportunity to correct what we believe is a serious misunderstanding of the true economic impact of the proposed realignment of Marine Corps Logistics Base Barstow. We request that the inaccuracy of DoD's purported analysis of the local economic impact of its recommendation be corrected, and that the true extent of the economic impact be considered by the BRAC Commission in its review of the recommendation to realign MCLBB.

D. Issues the Community Would Like the BRAC Commission to Investigate

1. Why were the maintenance depots not asked for cycle times for each commodity – a critical element both of depot effectiveness and operational readiness?
2. Was DoD's strategy based on maximizing military value of depots or maximizing cost efficiencies for commodities?
3. Was the possibility that Army and Marine Corps logistics are fundamentally and qualitatively different considered?

4. Would the effect of implementing DoD's recommendations be to convert one of the Corps' two multi-commodity depots into a "tear-down" facility?
5. Did DoD's pursuit of savings result in the Corps' losing its "just-in-time" repair and maintenance model and adopting something like the Army's specialized depot model?
6. Will DoD's recommendation harm Corps' combat readiness/effectiveness?
7. Will DoD's recommendation support the Marine Corps' turnaround response requirement?
8. If it's a good idea for 17 of 24 commodities now "worked" at MCLBB to be transferred to Army depots to be "worked" following the Army's model of ground depot maintenance, why don't the DoD's recommendation direct the Marine Corps to move ALL its depot maintenance to the Army model?
9. Does the 5th echelon maintenance of engines and transmissions that DoD recommended be transferred from MCLBB refer only to secondary depot repairables (i.e., engines and transmissions that arrive at MCLBB as components rather than as part of Principal End Items), or does it include ALL 5th echelon maintenance of engines and transmissions (even those that arrive at MCLBB as part of PEIs)?
10. Does the answer to the question above also apply to other commodities DoD is recommending be transferred from MCLBB that can arrive either as secondary depot repairables or embedded in PEIs?
11. What percentage of MCLBB's total workload in the commodities DoD recommends transferring arrive at MCLBB as secondary depot repairables and what percentage arrive embedded in PEIs?
12. Are the savings estimated by DoD to accrue as a result of the recommended realignment consistent with the answers to questions 9, 10 and 11 above?

13. How is the DoD's recommendation consistent with DoD's stated strategy of "maintaining a west coast depot maintenance presence" at MCLBB "to provide west coast operating forces with a close, responsive source for depot maintenance support" if the components comprising the workloads recommended to be consolidated have to be taken off PEIs and shipped across the country to be repaired? (And then -- presumably -- shipped back to MCLBB for remounting.)
14. Is DoD's recommendation that MCLBB "establish an additional 428,000 hours of amphibious vehicle capacity," consistent with other recommendations to transfer elsewhere the depot maintenance of much or most of the equipment and weapons associated with these vehicles? Does "an additional 428,000 hours of amphibious vehicle capacity" mean an additional 428,000 hours of actual workload?
15. Is the "Payback" acceptable when compared to the cost (in combat readiness and effectiveness) of giving up one of the Corps' multi-commodity maintenance depots?
16. How can the (comparatively) small amount of workload to be transferred to the Army depots make a worthwhile difference in their capacity utilization rates?
17. Does DoD's recommendation leave enough capacity at MCLBB to meet foreseeable requirements of fighting the war on terror?
18. Does DoD's recommendation leave enough capacity at MCLBB to allow timely repair of weapons and equipment that have been used in Afghanistan and Iraq and that may be needed very soon to confront a threat from other of our adversaries elsewhere?
19. Does the fundamental disconnect between the direction of DoD's transformation and its recommendation concerning ground depot maintenance at MCLBB substantially deviate from the Force Structure Plan?

COMMUNITY RECOMMENDATION #5:

We request that the Commission investigate the above issues as part of its review of the recommendation to realign MCLBB.

We thank the Commissions and staff for the sacrifices they are making to serve the country by accepting this very difficult but so important task of helping to shape the future security and safety of the United States.

Respectfully,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Robert Lucas".

Robert Lucas, Chairman, Military Affairs Committee of the Barstow Area Chamber of Commerce

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Lawrence E. Dale".

Lawrence E. Dale, City of Barstow

Tab 2

“Logistics controls all military campaigns and limits many.”
(General Dwight D. Eisenhower)

II. Military Value Issues

The Barstow community believes that the recommendation of the Department of Defense concerning ground depot maintenance performed at Marine Corps Logistics Base Barstow substantially deviates from BRAC Selection Criteria 1, 3 and 6; and probably substantially deviates from the Force Structure.

Relevant BRAC Selection Criteria

- 1. The current and future mission capabilities and the *impact on operational readiness* of the total force of the Department of Defense, including the impact on joint warfighting, training, and *readiness*. (Emphasis added.)**
- 3. The ability to *accommodate contingency, mobilization, surge and future total force requirements* at both existing and potential receiving locations *to support operations and training*. (Emphasis added.)**

a. Discussion

The community and City of Barstow are closely following the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round, and we oppose any recommendations which would, in our opinion, weaken the national defense. We believe that the recommendations of the Department of Defense (DoD) regarding Marine Corps ground depot maintenance would do precisely that, by forcing the Marine Corps, America’s “9-1-1 *Emergency Response Force*” – an agile force by necessity – into a support paradigm originally designed for a large, stable and standing Army. The Marine Corps’ and the Army’s models of ground depot maintenance (i.e., “fifth-echelon” maintenance) are fundamentally and qualitatively different in ways that significantly impact combat-readiness and combat-effectiveness of their respective forces. To understand this, one must understand the current National Military Strategy of the United States.

The “National Military Strategy of the United States of America” (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2004) describes the current security environment as containing a wider range of adversaries than ever before who seek asymmetric capabilities that they will use innovatively; and who threaten the United States throughout a battlespace more complex and widely distributed than ever before. This battlespace extends from critical regions overseas to the homeland and spans the global commons of international airspace, waters, space and cyberspace.

The National Military Strategy states that in order to deal with these threats, "The United States will conduct operations in widely diverse locations" while continuing "to emphasize precision, speed, [and] lethality, [e]nsuring current readiness while continuing to transform by "[a]dopting an 'in-stride' approach to transformation...." ("National Military Strategy," pp. 5 and 6.) The strategy further states that "[e]xecuting [it] requires a force able to generate decisive effects in any contingency and sustain multiple, overlapping operations."

The capabilities that the Marine Corps has traditionally been required to maintain match the foregoing description of the forces the United States must develop and maintain in the post- September 11 world. The mission of the Marine Corps has always been to provide just this flexibility and capability of quick response to changing conditions anywhere on the planet. Thus, the foreseeable contingencies that we must now deal with make the role of the Marine Corps — as the U.S.'s small, strike-trained, highly maneuverable and combat-ready service — even more important than it has ever been. Within the general framework of the National Military Strategy, the mission of the Marine Corps continues to be to serve as the nation's "9-1-1 force" and our "first responder" to crises. Accordingly, "Marine Corps Strategy 21" describes the Corps as "The Nation's Premier Expeditionary 'Total Force in Readiness'"; its "Core Competencies" as "Ready to Fight and Win...Expeditionary Culture...."; and its goals as "to ensure the Corps is the most ready when the Nation is the least ready." Moreover, the National Military Strategy effectively established as a goal to make the other branches of the armed services more like the Marine Corps -- in terms of combat readiness, agility, flexibility and responsiveness.

Logistical support is an important determinant of the ability of the Marine Corps (or any component of the U.S.'s forces) to perform its mission. A "rapid-strike force" must have "rapid-strike logistics." Because of the way Marine Corps ground depot maintenance is organized and does business, it is already "rapid-strike," by contrast to the way the repair depots of the other services, particularly the U.S. Army, are organized and do business.

Marine Corps Logistics Designed to Support its Mission

The Marine Corps' logistics operation is organized to provide the flexibility and quick response to changing conditions required by the mission of the Corps. The entire Marine Corps is served by two depot-level maintenance logistics bases — one in Barstow, California and one in Albany, Georgia — which provide what the Corps calls "localized support" to Marine Corps units depending on their location.

Marine Corps Logistics Base Barstow (MCLBB) supports all Marine Corps forces West of the Mississippi, in the Pacific, and in the Far East. MCLBB Barstow's unique mission of support to Fleet Marine Forces (FMF) in the Pacific is irreplaceable (in that *two-thirds* of Marine Corps ground equipment is located in the western U.S. and in the Pacific), but MCLBB also contributes about 25 percent of the support of the Maritime Propositioned Ships (MPS) that operate out of Blount Island on the East Coast. MCLBB Barstow is located within one day's travel time by road or rail of most of the Marine Corps units it

serves. It is uniquely located with respect to both rail and road transportation. MCLBB possesses the largest Department of Defense railhead in the continental United States, which because of its location is available not only to transport Marine Corps equipment being repaired, but also to ship the huge amounts of equipment used on training rotations at the National Training Center. MCLB Barstow is also a crossroads of the National Interstate Highway System (being located at the intersection of Interstate routes 15 and 40), and of the state highway system as well.

Marine Corps Logistics Base Albany (Georgia) supports all forces East of the mississippi, in Europe, and in the Near East. MCLB Albany supports Maritime Propositioned Ships and Fleet Marine Forces that operate out of Blount Island on the East Coast. It is not able to provide all of the support needed by the MPS, however; as noted above, MCLB Barstow provides a significant percentage of that support.

Marine Corps ground combat depot maintenance has historically been organized to leverage the workforce's broad-based expertise and inherent production efficiencies to minimize turnaround time (cycle time) in order to maximize combat readiness. Accordingly, both of the Corps' two ground combat maintenance depots are "multi-commodity" depots, which means that they repair all components of "principal end items" [i.e., large vehicles such as Assault Amphibious Vehicles (AAVs) or Light Armored Vehicles (LAVs)] *and all the weapons and equipment associated with them* (such as night-vision sights and 50-caliber machine guns). In the Marine Corps model of ground depot maintenance, the principal end item (PEI) figuratively enters the "front door" of the Marine depot, is stripped of its components, and the PEI and its components are rebuilt at the same depot. When the PEI leaves the depot by the "back door," it and all its components have been restored to "like new" condition or (in the case of PEIs that have been technologically upgraded) "better than new" condition. This model of depot maintenance is possible only because individual employees are cross-trained to repair several different types of equipment and each Marine Corps logistics base has the flexibility to realign its work force to accommodate shifts in workload categories, change production lines as needed, and perform special projects as required, with little or no lagtime. Both Marine Corps Logistics Bases must be, and are, "full-service" depots.

Army depot maintenance, by contrast, has historically been organized to maximize the volume of workload by commodity (or commodity group) and to maximize economies of scale. Consequently, Army depots are "commodity depots" or "component depots" -- i.e., each depot is highly specialized, repairs huge numbers of only a few types of equipment; and its employees are highly specialized as well. So specialized are Army depots that all the components of a Principal End Item (PEI) such as a vehicle that carries weapons, cannot be repaired at a single depot. In the Army model of ground combat depot maintenance, PEIs enter by the "front door" and are stripped of their components. Unlike the Marine Corps system of dealing with all items in house, the various components are packed and shipped to other Army depots where they are repaired and then returned to the "tear-down depot" for reassembly before the PEI ultimately reemerges intact. The economics of Army depot maintenance require that comparatively large volumes of the same commodity be on hand before they can be "worked." All the extra shipping of components back and forth to various Army depots

and waiting to accumulate the appropriate amount of a given commodity at the depot that specializes in it are examples of Army practices that greatly increase cycle time. Historically, the only way to follow the Army model of depot maintenance has been to accept lower levels of combat readiness and to maintain comparatively large stocks of weapons and equipment so that it is possible to repair equipment to and from stock. This is what has been done, since the mission of being the U.S.'s "**9-1-1 Emergency Response Force**" has been assigned to the Marine Corps, not the Army. Also, the Army has historically been provided a budget to allow it to repair to and from large standing stocks of material not immediately required by its combat forces. Conversely, the Marine Corps' limited budget has never enabled it to repair to and from stock since nearly all its material is needed by the Fleet Marine Forces to maintain levels of combat readiness that permit it to respond immediately when directed by the National Command Authorities.

Another way of expressing the distinction between Marine Corps and Army ground depot maintenance is to say that the two Marine Corps depots perform "commodity/system" maintenance on the "Wal*Mart model" of "just-in-time" repair and maintenance, whereas the many Army depots perform "component/subsystem" maintenance on the "Henry Ford model" of huge and highly specialized production lines.

A "real-world" example of the results of the differences between the Marine Corps' and the Army's model of depot maintenance is the case of the 50-caliber machine guns of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment -- an Army unit normally stationed at the National Training Center (NTC)/Fort Irwin to train combat units, but which was deployed to Iraq recently. Fort Irwin contracted the 5th-echelon repair of these guns to the Maintenance Center on board Marine Corps Logistics Base Barstow (MCLBB), one of the Marine Corps' two maintenance depots, because MCLBB could -- and did -- meet the required turnaround time of 30 days. This contrasted with the turnaround time of *three years* reportedly offered by Anniston Army Depot! It happens that MCLBB is close to the NTC/Fort Irwin, but it is clear from comparing the relative responsiveness of the two Services' depot systems that the proximity was not the reason MCLBB was selected to provide this support.

Another "real-world" example of the effect on combat readiness of the "Henry Ford" vs. the "Wal*Mart" model of ground depot maintenance is the story of how the Marine Corps got into the business of rebuilding image intensifiers. Nowadays, the United States fights its wars at night by choice, because we have image intensifying technology which enables us to see at night, when our enemies are blind. One of the major factors that allowed us to minimize U.S. casualties during the first gulf war was our ability to fight at night using night vision devices of all kinds -- from aviator night vision goggles to night vision devices built into large armored vehicles and night sights for missiles and other weapons. Image intensifiers are the crucial components of night vision devices.

Until 1988, the Army rebuilt all image intensifiers for all branches of the armed services. By 1988, however, the pipeline had grown to 18 months, and zero deliveries were projected for 1989. This was a crisis for the Marine Corps, and its leadership directed MCLB Barstow to establish immediately full depot-level capability for repairing image

intensifiers. Barstow established this capability and began production in 1989. Now, Barstow rebuilds thousands of image intensifiers per year, meeting or exceeding the original military specifications. MCLB Barstow rebuilds all types of image intensifiers in the Department of Defense's inventory, and among its customers are other services. In this context, DoD's recommendation to shift depot maintenance of night vision devices to Tobyhanna Army Depot is baffling. Army depot maintenance failed to achieve required cycle times before; why should we believe that they will do so now? This is not meant to impugn the professionalism or competence of Army depots; rather, the reduced level of responsiveness that they provide is a function of the way they do business.

A U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) report entitled "Military Prepositioning: Observations on Army and Marine Corps Programs During Operation Iraqi Freedom and Beyond" provides a third helpful "real-world" comparison, this time of the whole logistics systems (of which depot maintenance is an important component) of the two services. Many of the GAO's observations are relevant to an understanding of the differences between Army and Marine Corps logistics and the implications of those differences for combat readiness or the ability of each service to fulfill its mission. The GAO found that most of the problems with the readiness of prepositioned stocks were experienced by the Army, not the Marine Corps. "...Army officials said that some equipment was out-of-date and some critical items like trucks were in short supply and parts and other supplies were sometimes not available." On the other hand, "Marine Corps officials reported few shortfalls in their prepositioned stocks or mismatches with ... equipment [units had previously trained on]. This is likely due to two key differences between the services....[related to the way they maintain and train on their prepositioned equipment]." (For more information, see the GAO Report at Tab 4.)

BRAC Selection Criteria 1 and 3 state that in evaluating bases for closure or realignment, DoD will give priority consideration to the impact on operational readiness, as well as the ability of installations to accommodate contingency, mobilization, surge and future total force requirements, and to support operations.

Yet DoD recommends that MCLB Barstow be converted from a multi-commodity (24 commodities) depot into a seven-commodity depot by the transfer of 17 commodities to three Army depots and the other Marine Corps depot, all of which are located on the East Coast. This despite the fact that two-thirds of Marine Corps ground equipment is located in the western U.S. and the Pacific; and the fact that the Department of the Navy estimates that doing this will significantly add to turnaround time.

Of even greater concern is the fact that several of the commodities recommended to be transferred are components of Principal End Items (such as Amphibious Vehicles, Combat Vehicles and Tactical Vehicles). No one knows at this point whether DoD's recommendation is to transfer out ALL capacity to work such components, or just the such components that arrive separately at MCLB Barstow as "secondary depot repairables." This is one of the issues we ask the Commission to investigate (see Tab 7).

To recapitulate, following are lists of the commodities (or capacities) recommended to be transferred from MCLB Barstow to other depots, and commodities (or capacities) recommended to be retained. Commodities on the list for transfer which are components of Principal End Items (PEIs) to be retained at MCLB Barstow are shown in red.

- Recommended for transfer out of MCB:
 - Conventional Weapons
 - Electronic Components
 - Electro-Optics/Night Vision/FLIR
 - Engines/Transmissions
 - Generators
 - Ground Support Equipment
 - Material Handling
 - Other
 - Other Equipment
 - Powertrain Components
 - Radar
 - Radio
 - Small Arms/Personal Weapons
 - Starters/Alternators/Generators
 - Tactical Missiles
 - Testing Measurement Diagnostic Equipment
 - Wire

- Recommended to remain at MCB:
 - Amphibious Vehicles
 - Armament & Structural Components
 - Combat Vehicles
 - Construction Equipment
 - Fire Control Systems & Components
 - Other Components
 - Tactical Vehicles

It appears that DoD is recommending that MCLB Barstow be converted into a “tear-down” depot essentially on the Army model. We suspect this both because of the size of the estimated savings and because secondary depot repairables are such a small percentage of MCLBB’s workload in at least several of these commodities. For example, 57 percent of Engines and Transmissions worked by MCLB Barstow are associated with PEIs, another 39 percent are Paxman engines for which MCLBB is the sole source of repair, and only FOUR PERCENT OF Engines and Transmissions worked by MCLB Barstow are secondary depot repairables. Fully half of the Testing Measurement Diagnostic Equipment worked there is required to work remaining depot workload or to support customers located at MCLB Barstow.

In short, we believe that converting MCLBB into a “tear-down” depot on the Army model would have disastrous effects on turnaround time for almost all commodities in the Marine Corps’ arsenal. Even transferring commodities to the other Marine Corps depot (which would remain a multi-commodity depot) would degrade readiness by adding to turnaround time shipping time to and from MCLB Albany.

DoD’s Analysis Omitted the Most Important Factor from the Equation

If the differences between Army and Marine Corps ground depot maintenance are so stark and so clearly related to each service’s ability to fulfill its mission, how did DoD come to recommend transferring Marine Corps ground depot maintenance workload to

Army depots? The answer is that the methods of analysis chosen simply ignored the important differences between the Army's and the Marine Corps' missions, their consequent organizations of ground depot maintenance, and the implications of the differences between their organizations of ground depot maintenance for the ability of each service branch to fulfill their distinctive missions. This was done mainly in two ways, firstly, by leaving cycle time (turnaround time) out of the computation of military value, and secondly, by comparing commodity-to-commodity rather than depot-to-depot. The community's review of data calls to depots shows that cycle time was not among the data requested, and therefore could not have been considered as a component of military value. Both the Minutes and the Final Report of the Industrial Joint Cross-Service Group (the IJCSG, which analyzed all maintenance depots) indicate that at the beginning of the process, the IJCSG's Maintenance Subgroup, in order to "meet the goals set forth by the Secretary of Defense, ... established a strategy based upon minimizing the number of sites performing maintenance, while ... maximizing military value *at the commodity level.*" (JCSG Final Report, p. 3, emphasis added). As far as the Barstow community can determine, this assumption was never tested, nor were its implications for the distinct depot maintenance organizations maintained by the Army and the Marine Corps considered. Neither were alternate assumptions of maximizing military value *at the depot level* or maximizing military value at the commodity level *among Army depots* (either of which might have been more appropriate, given the differences between Army and Marine Corps logistics) considered.

The fundamental differences between the organization and operation of Marine Corps and Army depots are causally related to the differences between their missions. Marine Corps' ground depot maintenance was "transformed" in the summer of 2003 to provide greater flexibility and support to its warfighters by integrating the global Marine Corps logistics, maintenance management, supply chain management, distribution management and strategic prepositioning functions.

DoD's recommendation concerning Marine Corps ground depot maintenance is to

- consolidate depot maintenance of Engines/Transmissions, Other Components, and Small Arms/Personal Weapons at Anniston Army Depot, AL;
- consolidate depot maintenance of Conventional Weapons, Engines/Transmissions, Material Handling, Powertrain Components, Starters/Alternators/Generators, Test Measurement Diagnostic Equipment, and Wire at Marine Corps Logistics Base Albany, GA; and
- consolidate depot maintenance of Electronic Components (Non-Airborne), Electro-Optics/Night Vision/Forward-Looking-Infrared, Generators, Ground Support Equipment, Radar, and Radio at Tobyhanna Army Depot, PA.

If not rejected, this recommendation's implementation will ripple through our nation's national security capabilities in unintended – and untenable – ways. The effects will unacceptably increase cycle time (and cycle time for a small, agile force is life or death), adversely impact the combat-readiness and combat-effectiveness of the Marine Corps, and compromise the Corps' ability to fulfill its mission as America's "9-1-1 Emergency

Response Force.” The recommendation to consolidate depot maintenance workload to Marine Corps Logistics Base Albany (MCLBA) will also degrade the readiness of the Fleet Marine Forces now served primarily by MCLBB (by adding to cycle times the shipping time to and from MCLBA) and by eliminating important backup capability and capacity in the Corps logistics system.

The BRAC process is intended to eliminate excess capacity, but not at the expense of National Security. From a review of this recommendation’s history in the Department of the Navy and DoD Joint Cross Service Groups’ meeting minutes, it is clear there was an undue emphasis on finding savings rather than on protecting readiness. The recommendation appears to be based on an assumption that differences between Army and Marine Corps depot maintenance models either don’t exist or are insignificant; and that, therefore, differences between the Army’s and the Marine Corps’ missions also either don’t exist or are insignificant. As far as we can determine, these assumptions were neither explicitly considered nor tested. We believe both assumptions are clearly invalid and that therefore, the recommendation to realign MCLBB ground depot maintenance substantially deviates from BRAC Selection Criteria 1 and 3. Therefore we request that the Commission find that DoD substantially deviated from the Selection Criteria and reject DoD’s recommendation regarding Marine Corps ground depot maintenance.

COMMUNITY RECOMMENDATION #1:

We, as representatives of the Barstow Community, ask the Base Realignment and Closure Commission to reject DoD’s recommendation regarding Marine Corps ground combat maintenance as a substantial deviation from BRAC Selection Criteria 1 and 3.

There appears to be a fundamental disconnect between the direction of DoD’s transformation and its recommendation regarding ground depot maintenance performed at MCLBB. Specifically, the tenor of the transformational National Military Strategy is that the other services should become more like the Marine Corps (e.g., in terms of readiness, flexibility, agility and lethality). Accordingly, DoD is reorganizing and redeploying its requirements-based structure around the world to transform large, standing forces into smaller, more flexible, agile and lethal capabilities-based units. Yet DoD’s recommendations regarding ground depot maintenance amount to moving away from the Marine Corps model toward the Army model (which is not nearly as responsive or flexible). We do not understand how such an action can be consistent with the emphasis of the National Military Strategy and the 20-Year Force Structure Plan on creating the agile, adaptable, expeditionary forces of the future that guided DoD’s recommendations to the Commission. It seems to us that the direction of change in ground depot-level maintenance should rather be toward the Marine Corps’ model of multi-commodity, “just-in-time” repair and maintenance, not only because that would be more consistent with the needs of our future forces, but also because the money to purchase the large inventories of equipment that make the use of the Army’s model feasible is simply not available.

We ask the Commission to examine this issue carefully to ensure that DoD's recommendation for ground depot maintenance performed at MCLBB does not represent a substantial deviation from the Force Structure Plan. If there is a substantial deviation from the Force Structure Plan, we ask the Commission to reject the recommendation to realign MCLBB.

COMMUNITY RECOMMENDATION #2:

We, as representatives of the Barstow Community, ask the Commission to compare the direction of DoD's recommendation regarding ground depot maintenance at MCLBB with the direction of DoD transformation to ensure that DoD's recommendation does not represent a substantial deviation from the Force Structure Plan. If there is a substantial deviation from the Force Structure Plan, we ask the Commission to reject the recommendation to realign MCLBB.

If the capability of MCLBB is not gored in the name of cost savings, MCLBB can generate even more military value as the provider of ground depot maintenance to the National Training Center/Fort Irwin (NTC). The Army uses large numbers of tracked and wheeled combat vehicles in its exercises at Fort Irwin, most brought from their home stations by units "rotating" in for training. When these vehicles require maintenance or repair following training rotations, they currently are shipped by rail some 3,000 miles to the Anniston Army Depot in Alabama for repair and maintenance at a cost of about \$4,000 per principal end item (PEI). DoD could realize significant savings, obtain greater efficiencies and decrease the amount of time units are without needed equipment if they were serviced at MCLBB and then shipped directly to the owning organization. We understand that this is a policy matter and not a BRAC issue, but offer it as just one example of how MCLBB's military value can be further leveraged.

EXAMPLES OF ANOMALIES FOUND DURING OUR EXAMINATION OF THE RECORD OF DOD'S IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BRAC PROCESS

We would like to bring to the Commission's attention example of anomalies we discovered during our review of the record.

1.) Minutes of the Infrastructure Evaluation Group Meeting of Feb 10, 2005, p. 10:

Industrial [Joint Cross-Service Group]: MajGen Williams informed the IEG that the Marine Corps expressed concern that the JCSG's scenarios affecting the MCLB Barstow, CA **do not adequately address Marine Corps needs** for depot maintenance, climate controlled storage, and an asset integration site to adequately provide logistical support to the warfighter. (Community comment: The Marine Corps' objection is still valid vis a vis the recommended realignment.)

2.) Meeting Minutes of the Industrial Joint Cross-Service Group, 02/24/05

“Referring to IND-0127A,...the Marine Corps is concerned that the [Maintenance] sub-group may not have captured true military readiness and military value based on a peacetime data capture. Mr. Wynne [Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics] said the scenario has enormous payback quickly and asked everyone to look hard at the scenario....Mr. Wynne said that IND-0127A ... will continue forward through the [Infrastructure Steering Group] because the payback is very good and there doesn't appear to be any impact to military value....”
(Community comment: This is an example of what we believe was an undue emphasis on finding savings and not protecting readiness.)

3.) 01 April 2005

Industrial JCSG 2nd Briefing Notes

Date: Tuesday, March 29, 2005

Subject: *Second Candidate Recommendation Briefing by Industrial JCSG to BRAC Red Team*

Questions that arose:

- Are your Ground Maintenance Capacity charts really based on uncertified data? *Solid line is represents the first data call. Then there was an increase, shown by dotted box. The Army has certified the aggregate numbers, but not the breakouts. But will be certified before you are finished? Yes. (Salomon) (Community comment: We understand that not all of the data was actually certified.)*
- Need to strengthen your military judgment statements in the quad charts of candidate recommendations IND-0127A and IND-0127B by explaining why the judgment used is necessary or consequential.
(Community comment: We do not believe that the “military judgment” underlying the final version of IND-0127A was ever adequately explained; nor did it truly address the Marine Corps’ concerns about effectively giving up one of its two multi-commodity depots.)

4.) **N-MM-0465-a DONReviewofCandiateRecommendations.doc:**

IND-0127A [scenario initially for closure of MCLBB; later modified to realignment] Eliminates only heavy equipment ground maintenance depot west of Mississippi- logistics concerns to support West coast requirements. Analysis measured workload based on peacetime tempo and 1.5 shifts; does not measure what we believe to be the "requirement" as substantiated by recent throughput. (Community comment: We believe that these problems with a possible closure are also true of the recommended realignment.)

IND-127B Use of 1.5 shifts as an analytical construct may overall begin to overtax our industrial facilities, particularly for ground equipment. (Community comment: We agree.)

5.) From: DON - Anne R. Davis - April 05, 2005:

Memorandum for Acting Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics)

Subj: Provision of Certified Department of the Navy Data to the BRAC 2005 Industrial Joint Cross Service Group

The GWOT workload up-date provided in response to Discrepancy Data Call 2996 represents Marine Corps War Time Depot Surge requirements. The workload identified in the various commodity groups greatly exceeds, in some instances, the stated commodity group capacities. It should be recognized that the identified workloads are surge requirements and do not represent the Peace Time norms for the individual commodity groups. It should also be recognized that the Depot's ability to respond to this requirement is not limited to the Total Capacity or even Maximum Capacity capabilities as submitted in the Capacity Data Call. Depot response to War Time surge requirements includes hiring temp workers, establishing temp work stations/positions, utilization of indirect workers to accomplish low skill work requirements during overtime hours, etc. Marine Corps depots also have the unique capability to rapidly re-align individual commodity group capacities to accommodate continuously changing workload requirements that have been the hallmark of the GWOT. This capability is available as a result of the Marine Corps continuing to maintain true multi-commodity Maintenance Centers staffed by highly skilled and extensively cross-trained employees. **Unfortunately, sufficient time does not exist to redo and certify to auditable standards the capacity analysis necessary to demonstrate possible options to this additional workload.**

6.) MCLBB 20 Apr 05 Red Team Briefing Notes:

Is it the Department or the Marine Corps that is registering a complaint about this candidate recommendation (DON-0165R)? *The Secretary and the CNO [Chief of Naval Operations] are worried about consolidated the maintenance functions. The Marine Corps is worried about having all maintenance activities on the east coast.* (Johnson) (Community comment: This is still a concern if the Marine Corps is giving up one of its two multi-commodity depots.)

7.) GAO Report to Congress on BRAC, July 1, 2005, p. 108

The Industrial Joint Cross-Service Group had proposed to close the depot maintenance functions at Barstow because of its low military value and to increase opportunities for joint maintenance at Army depots doing similar work. However, the Marine Corps objected to the closure because that would eliminate its only West Coast ground vehicle depot maintenance presence and would increase repair cycle times for the Marine's West Coast equipment by increasing rail transit and customer turnaround time by 10 to 30 days. (Community comment: The Marine Corps' objection is still valid vis a vis the recommended realignment.)

Tab 3

II. b. Marine Corps Logistics Base Barstow: Essential to the Readiness of "America's 9-1-1 Emergency Response Force"

Following is a "White Paper" prepared by the City of Barstow to explain further the importance of Marine Corps Logistics Base Barstow (MCLBB) to the combat readiness of the Marine Corps – and indeed, to all branches of the armed services.

MCLBB is essential to operational forces, to regional military installations, and to the "Joint National Training Capability." MCLBB provides essential military value to the Marine Corps, to multiple branches of the U.S. armed forces, to the Department of Defense (DoD) as a whole, and as an enabler of DoD's "Joint National Training Capability." Future threats will arise from the Pacific Rim. Thus, strategic considerations require the preservation and enhancement of MCLBB.

MCLBB can be leveraged to provide even more military value at less cost using statutory authorities DoD has obtained from Congress. Such authorities as "Center of Industrial and Technical Excellence (CITE) and "Enhanced Use Leasing" (EUL) could be used to more intensively exploit assets that DoD considers to be "non-excess but underused," generating new revenues to offset operating costs, and/or reducing the "footprint" of DoD facilities. In addition, all heavy equipment used at the NTC should be repaired at MCB, rather than (as now) brought to the rail yard at MCLBB and shipped across the country for repair at the Anniston Army Depot in Alabama.

MCLBB is important to DoD "transformation" from a requirements-based to a capabilities-based force capable of meeting and defeating the threats the U.S. faces in the 21st century. MCLBB units are facilitated and staffed by skilled personnel and ideally located to support DoD's transition to "iterative" design, testing and development of new vehicles. In other words, to quote from the National Military Strategy, MCLBB could be used by DoD to assist in transforming the force "through rapid prototyping, field experimentation, organizational redesign and concept development."

MCLBB offers great value to Homeland Security and Homeland Defense, both because of its capabilities and its location between Los Angeles and Las Vegas but outside potential terrorist "target areas." MCLBB is located at the hub of an extensive road, rail and air transportation network and connected by rail to the third largest port complex in the world.

Marine Corps Logistics Base Barstow:
Essential to the Readiness of the U.S.'s "9-1-1" Emergency
Response Force

Executive Summary

Marine Corps Logistics Base Barstow (MCLBB) represents *significant military value* to the Department of Defense (DoD), both as key to Marine Corps ground depot maintenance and within the context of a "transformed" DoD, as well as for *the current force*. The installation offers *significant operational value and potential due to its location* in the high desert, approximately 120 miles east of Los Angeles; at the nexus of major road and rail intersections; close to major commercial and military aviation facilities and within 150 miles of the third-largest port complex (Los Angeles / Long Beach) in the world and the San Diego Mega-Port.

MCLBB supports organizations from all Services that are inextricably linked to: the success of combat and training operations around the world; the effectiveness of critical installations in the region and the realization of DoD's vision for a transformed military force and operational structure to meet emerging 21st Century challenges.

MCLBB is Essential to Operational Forces. Tenant units are direct support elements to the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) based at Camp Pendleton, CA, and its worldwide operations. They provide full-spectrum maintenance and modernization services *to combat organizations worldwide*. *Thousands of pieces of MCLBB serviced equipment has been used in combat and/or contingency operations of six of the nine United States Unified Commands*. MCLBB units also *directly support* the Marine Corps – *America's 911 Emergency Response Force* and the *high-priority, Maritime Pre-Positioned Force (MPF) program*. The region's high-desert, low-humidity climate allows end item open storage for decades with little-to-no adverse effects.

MCLBB is Essential to Regional Installations and Training. MCLBB units operate *DoD's largest rail yard*. *The rail yard - and training enabled by it - are essential to the success of training at the Army's National Training Center at Fort Irwin ("NTC/Fort Irwin")* for Active and Reserve Component unit training from across the country. *The rail yard is used to provide similar support to the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center (MCAGCC) at Marine Corps Base 29 Palms ("29 Palms")* that – during peacetime – hosts one-third of the Fleet Marine Force's (FMF) Active and Reserve Component units in training exercises each year. MCLBB units also provide *essential logistical support and rapid turnaround maintenance support to Camp Pendleton and 29 Palms* that supports *annual training of tens of thousands of Active and Reserve Component personnel from all Services*.

MCLBB is a "Joint/Federal Installation," but More Importantly, a Key Enabler of the Nation's Most Important "Joint/Federal Complex." Its units represent organizations from, or with responsibility to support, *United States Unified Commands; Defense Agencies; and Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) activities*. *MCLBB provides essential transportation, logistics management and maintenance training and services* for units and equipment at *NTC/Fort Irwin, Marine Corps's MCAGCC, 29 Palms and Camp Pendleton* and the Navy's *Port Hueneme*. In addition, its *support to NTC/Fort Irwin enables DoD's Joint National Training Capability in the Southwestern United*

Disclaimer: This paper was prepared by the City of Barstow ("City") without the coordination of Marine Corps Logistics Base Barstow (MCLBB) host or tenant organizations' leaders. The opinions expressed are those of the City and do not reflect the views of MCLBB leaders, tenant organizations or any other DoD or Federal Activity.

States. Maximum value of the Joint/Federal Complex could not be realized without the physical infrastructure and technical expertise available from MCLBB.

MCLBB Can Be Leveraged for Greater Benefit to DoD. MCLBB offers many ways of generating even greater military value for much less cost. MCLBB units have nearly all the *equipment, facilities and skills needed to repair and/or refurbish the vehicles and heavy equipment brought to the NTC/Fort Irwin and/or used there by units during training.* DoD could realize *significant savings, obtain greater efficiencies and decrease the time units are without needed equipment items if they were serviced at MCLBB.* The installation possesses Center for Industrial and Technical Excellence (CITE) designation for several core competencies – several with value to private sector companies. Using the *CITE authority, MCLBB could contract, subcontract or partner with private sector and other public sector entities to generate revenues that could be used to offset operating expenses, reduce labor rates, modernize equipment, etc.* – all of which would benefit DoD. *Enhanced Use Leasing (EUL) Authority* could also be employed to reduce *maintenance costs, improve installation operating efficiency and (again) generate revenues that could be used to offset operating expenses, reduce labor rates, modernize equipment, etc*

MCLBB Is Important to DoD Transformation. MCLBB units are *facilitized and staffed by skilled personnel and ideally located to support DoD's transition to "iterative" design, testing and development of new vehicles.* *CITE and/or EUL Authority could be used to make the necessary facilities, space and personnel available for innovative public-private sector partnering.* *Virtually all required joint testing and development activity could be conducted within a 100-mile radius.* The installation could also be an *important element in providing services, testing practices and collecting data to support Sea Basing Transformational Concepts.* Sea Basing envisions projecting and sustaining combat power from the sea – including the ability to provide depot-level logistics and maintenance support – without reliance on land bases in the operating area. By using MCLBB to simulate *the Sea Base Depot Facility, DoD could obtain data and insight, as well as test important concepts and operational practices as a routine part of training rotations to regional installations in ways that would not otherwise be possible.*

MCLBB Can Be a Valuable Contributor to Homeland Security and Homeland Defense. The installation is a *secure, unencroached facility* located at the *nexus* of road, rail and aviation lines of communications *strategically positioned* in Southern California, in close proximity to the Los Angeles basin and Las Vegas metropolitan area, but distant enough to avoid these “target boxes” of a terrorist attack. It possesses *large staging areas* to support forces and equipment and the *climate to permit viable open storage of equipment for the use by the Armed Forces or emergency responders in homeland defense missions.*

As an essential component of Marine Corps ground depot maintenance, MCLBB provides the *proper level and integration of logistics capability, flexibility and responsiveness needed by the Marine Corps and contributes directly to the readiness of FMF worldwide operations.* MCLBB provides an estimated 25 percent of the support received by the 16 Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS) that are critical to the Marine Corps' warfighting capabilities. Organized to support Marine Corps Combat Power, MCLBB is *essential to the proper training, equipping, and modernization of the Nation's 911 Emergency Response Force and major combat and combat-support forces of all Services.* Its strategic position, facility investments, skilled workforce and multi-role potential offer *significant military value* to DoD that can be used to maximize operational efficiencies and envisioning, testing and implementing initiatives to transform DoD and protect United States National Interests in the 21st Century.


Marine Corps Logistics Base Barstow: Essential to the Readiness of the U.S.'s "9-1-1" Emergency Response Force

Purpose:

The purpose of this paper is to summarize characteristics of the Marine Corps Logistics Base Barstow (MCLBB) that make it essential to the readiness of the U.S.'s "9-1-1" Emergency Response Force, and that represent significant military value attributes for the Department of Defense (DoD). The focus of the paper is on the possible roles and missions of the installation and its units within the context of a "transformed" DoD, as well as its current military value.

Background:

MCLBB is a key component of the Marine Corps Logistics Command ("LOGCOM"), which consists of LOGCOM Headquarters, Albany, GA; Marine Corps Logistics Base Barstow (MCLBB), CA; Marine Corps Logistics Base Albany (MCLBA), GA; and the Command (BIC), focused logistics operations peacetime combat readiness the Marine Corps. Marine integrated into its operational strategies and is cost effective Security needs and supports the Marine Corps Maneuver Warfare and responds rapidly to critical situations worldwide. LOGCOM's logistics capabilities are melded into a single focus by its four installations/activities – LOGCOM Headquarters at MCLBA, MCLBA, MCLBB and BIC. This small, efficient set of activities provides the robust logistics, force-enabling capability required to support the Fleet Marine Forces' (FMF) worldwide operations and constitutes an essential part of the *Marine Corps' Readiness Logistics Team*.



The LOGCOM organization was formed from two separate Marine Corps command structures – principally Material Command – during the summer of 2003 around readiness core competencies to integrate the global Marine Corps logistics, maintenance management, supply chain management, distribution management and strategic prepositioning functions. The reorganization was just one step in the *Marine Corps Logistics Bases (MARCORLOGBASES) Strategic Plan 2003 – 2005* to focus on reducing depot maintenance costs and increasing functional efficiencies. The reorganization supports transformation of Marine Corps logistics to provide greater flexibility and support to its warfighters. The evolving Maritime Prepositioning Force Program (MPFP) supports transition to the Naval Services' concept of *Maritime Prepositioning Force 2010* to successfully conduct Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare. This evolution is an important part of the overall DoD transformation from a requirements-based force into a more lethal, flexible and agile capabilities-based fighting force. The Secretary of Defense notionally recognized the Marine

Corps' reorganization and focus on transforming its logistics operations and support in his kickoff memorandum for the base realignment and closure (BRAC) process authorized for 2005.

“... BRAC 2005 can make an even more profound contribution to transforming the Department by rationalizing our infrastructure with defense strategy. BRAC 2005 should be the means by which we reconfigure our current infrastructure into one in which operational capacity maximizes *both* warfighting capability and efficiency.”

MCLBB plays a significant role in the LOGCOM mission, taking equipment from operational FMF units and rebuilding, repairing and returning it to field operations or readiness stocks. While MCLBB has primary responsibilities for supporting the Pacific Fleet and forces stationed west of the Mississippi, on the West Coast and in the Far East and Asia, it also provides an estimated 25 percent of LOGCOM's support to the Marine Corps Maritime Pre-Positioned Force Program (MPFP) that is managed and coordinated by Blount Island Command (BIC) in Jacksonville, FL. The MPFP consists of sixteen maritime prepositioning ships (MPS) and the Norway Forward Deployed Equipment Program. Each of the MPS is offloaded at Blount Island once every 33 months to have its equipment and supplies inspected, repaired/replaced and cleaned, if necessary. MPFP assets have been used since the initial stages of Operations Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Iraqi Freedom (OIF). The availability and readiness of much of the equipment has been cited as an important element of the successful “dash to Baghdad” by United States forces in OIF. MPFP assets are also used in humanitarian missions, and six ships mobilized to support the United States' relief effort for victims of the tsunami that devastated Southeast Asia on December 26, 2004. Support for reconstitution and replacement of MPFP assets damaged in combat theaters and during the relief effort is a high priority mission of MCLBB.

For efficient and time-critical transportation responsiveness, MCLBB was deliberately sited and directly linked to robust sea, air, rail and road transportation networks to meet combat-critical delivery deadlines. Its roles and missions are essential components of military value for all Services and are inextricably linked to the success of combatant commanders and operations around the world. Additionally, MCLBB's support is essential to the effectiveness of critical military installations in the region surrounding its activities and is an important enabler for DoD's vision of more efficient activities and a transformed military able to meet emerging challenges of the 21st Century.

MCLBB is located in Barstow, California, on the High Desert of San Bernardino County approximately 120 miles east of Los Angeles at the intersection of major interstate (I-15 and I-40) and state highways (CH-247 and CH-58). Barstow is also home to major rail yards owned by the two largest cargo railroads (Burlington Northern Santa Fe and Union Pacific) in the United States; and within 150 miles of the third-largest port complex (Los Angeles / Long Beach) in the world and the San Diego Mega-Port that includes significant commercial and Naval maritime presence. Barstow-Daggett Airport can be used by a wide range of military aircraft – including strategic lift aircraft. Only 35 miles to the southwest, the robust Southern California Logistics Airport (former George Air Force Base) can handle military and commercial aircraft of any size and is poised to become one of the largest international cargo airports in the country. MCLBB consists of approximately 6,177 acres, over 5 million square feet of facilities in 408 buildings and more than 2.2 million square yards of open storage representing a PRV of approximately \$1.3 billion.

MCLBB supports 12 military and civilian governmental organizations, but is comprised of five major organizations:

- √ Headquarters Battalion that provides needed infrastructure and service support to assigned units.
- √ Marine Corps Maintenance Center Barstow (MCB) to provide multi-commodity, depot maintenance across the entire maintenance spectrum for weapon systems and support equipment of the Marine Corps and subsystems for customers from other Services and Federal Agencies.
- √ Navy Fleet Support Division (FSD) to receive, store, manage, preserve and ship equipment to and from Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEF) and Navy units worldwide.
- √ U.S. Transportation Command's (TRANSCOM) Defense Distribution Center (DDC) providing DoD with services similar to those described for FSD.
- √ Army Movement Control Element (AMCE) providing rail operation support for training rotations at the National Training Center (NTC) – Fort Irwin.

Collectively, these organizations comprise MCLBB. The installation is primarily a Marine Corps logistics support base responsible to the Marine Corps Logistics Command (LOGCOM) in Albany, GA, home to the Marine Corps' East coast maintenance depot. However, MCLBB is much more than a simple Marine Corps logistics facility: its roles and missions represent military value to all Services and are inextricably linked to the success of combatant commanders and operations around the world; and the effectiveness of critical installations in the region and DoD's vision of more efficient activities and a transformed military able to meet emerging challenges of the 21st Century.

Discussion:

- *MCLBB is Essential to Operational Forces.* Its units:
 - are direct support elements to the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) based at Camp Pendleton, CA, and its worldwide operations. When combat forces were deployed to the *Global War on Terrorism*, they relied on – and benefited from – logistics support from MCLBB. Personnel from MCLBB *deployed into the Operation Iraqi Freedom* operating area to assess, repair and upgrade essential equipment damaged in combat.
 - provide repair, modernization, technical assistance, testing, diagnostics and equipment preservation services, up to and including the most industrially-demanding, 5th-echelon maintenance (heavy metal bending), *to combat organizations worldwide.* Serviced equipment includes a *wide range of items* such as tanks, ground and amphibious vehicles, missile and gunnery systems, small arms, etc. *from all branches of the military and operational theaters. Thousands of pieces of MCLBB-serviced equipment have been used in combat and/or contingency operations of six of the nine United States Unified Commands: Central, European, Northern, Pacific, Southern and Special Operations.* MCB is the *only remaining wheeled, ground vehicle maintenance facility west of the Mississippi River.*
 - *provide the Marine Corps – America's 911 Emergency Response Force – flexible, rapid turnaround of the highest priority equipment and materiel as determined by the Commandant and Combatant Commanders.* The *workforce is highly skilled and cross-trained* to enable

“commodity/system maintenance,” as opposed to “component/subsystem maintenance” meaning *equipment receives all services on-site thereby maximizing efficiency and workflow control.*

- receive, provide life-cycle management, maintain and ship equipment used by DoD and Federal agencies globally, as well as directly into *the high-priority, Maritime Pre-Positioned Force (MPF) program* – a fleet of 16 ships on station around the world to provide rapid, combat power and support to Marine forces. Based on this program’s success supporting combat operations, the prepositioning program is being increased to provide a more robust capability for rapid delivery and sustainment of forces ashore. The Commandant of the Marine Corps stated that *one of the keys to the success* of the unprecedented “*sprint*” to Baghdad during Operation Iraqi Freedom was the *MPF and high readiness rate of the equipment Marines “fell on”* in theater.
 - benefit from MCLBB’s *high-desert, low-humidity climate* that makes the majority of its 6,177 acres *the ideal location for open storage of critical logistics assets* owned by all Services as *covered, climate-controlled facilities are not required* to protect equipment from weather for years, as opposed to other parts of the country. Items can be stored in the open for decades with little-to-no adverse effects.
 - *support United States Unified Commands* and their organizations either directly through direct logistics activities or *TRANSCOM’s DDC* – one of the largest in DoD. *Equipment critical to mission effectiveness* is received, serviced, maintained and *shipped* from a 20-warehouse complex whose value is enhanced by MCLBB’s immediate access to *domestic and international destinations via multiple road, rail, air and sea transportation options.*
- *MCLBB is Essential to Regional Installations.* Its units:
- operate *DoD’s largest rail yard* to enable successful training rotations at the *NTC/Fort Irwin* – the country’s premier ground-force training venue and crown jewel of the *National Joint Training Capability (NJTC)*. At 1,000-square miles, NTC/Fort Irwin is approximately the size of Rhode Island and the only place DoD can practice brigade-size, force-on-force operations in the United States. Hundreds of railcars, thousands of pieces and tons of materiel transit the rail complex at MCLBB annually. The AMCE provides *quality control of the operations and skill-training* for personnel deploying to the NTC/Fort Irwin for training. *The rail yard and operation of the AMCE are essential elements of mission-profile training* conducted at NTC/Fort Irwin and the pre-deployment, deployment, and re-deployment portions of Active and Reserve Component unit training from across the country.
 - use *the rail yard to support the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center (MCAGCC)* at Marine Corps Base 29 Palms (“29 Palms”). The MCAGCC – during peacetime – hosts one-third of the Fleet Marine Force’s (FMF) Active and Reserve Component units in training exercises each year. Units rotating to/from 29 Palms’ MCAGCC use the rail yard to deploy and redeploy similar equipment and materiel to that transiting MCLBB for training rotations at NTC/Fort Irwin.

- *manage logistical support requirements of equipment items, weapons systems, components and provides rapid turnaround maintenance support to Camp Pendleton – one of DoD’s busiest training installations. Camp Pendleton is comprised of over 125,000 acres that include more than 17 miles of shoreline that make it home to the majority of Marine Corps Amphibious Training. In addition, the installation operates and maintains firing ranges for everything from 9-mm small arms to 155-mm artillery weapons, landing beaches, personnel and equipment aerial drop zones, aircraft bombing and gunnery ranges, Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT) “towns,” and large maneuver areas for training tactical units. MCLBB personnel regularly deploy to Camp Pendleton to provide on-site, time-critical maintenance and support of weapons and support equipment. MCLBB’s rail yard and regional, ready-source of expert personnel are essential to the effective operations of Camp Pendleton and annual training of over 65,000 Active and Reserve Component personnel from all Services.*
 - *provide rapid turnaround inspection, repair, upgrade and rebuild maintenance support to 29 Palms – the largest live fire and maneuver facility in the United States. As noted in the foregoing, in peacetime the MCAGCC trains approximately one-third of FMF forces annually. Since the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan at the beginning of the Global War on Terrorism, it has trained all deploying Marine ground combat and combat-support units. As with Camp Pendleton, MCLBB’s rail yard and regional, ready-source of expert maintenance personnel are essential to the effective training of units at the MCAGCC.*
- *MCLBB is a “Joint/Federal Installation,” but More Importantly, a Key Enabler of the Nation’s Most Important “Joint/Federal Complex.” Its units:*
- *include organizations from, and with responsibilities for, one of nine United States Unified Commands as well as Defense Agencies, Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) activities.*
 - *provide essential transportation, logistics management and maintenance training and services for the Army’s NTC/Fort Irwin, Marine Corps’s MCAGCC, 29 Palms and Camp Pendleton and the Navy’s Port Hueneme. Both NTC/Fort Irwin and 29 Palms are programmed to significantly expand their training activities including the challenging area of Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT). Increased training will result in increased logistics management, maintenance training and services making MCLBB even more valuable in the future than currently. These training installations serve all Services and their training facilities and special use land-, air-, and sea-spaces are used by combat and combat-support organizations individually – and in concert – to develop, test and operationalize joint employment concepts. In addition, MCLBB’s support to NTC/Fort Irwin enables DoD’s Joint National Training Capability in the Southwest. Maximum value of the Joint/Federal Complex could not be realized without the physical infrastructure and technical expertise available from MCLBB.*

➤ *MCLBB Can Be Leveraged for Greater Benefit to DoD.* MCLBB offers many ways of generating even greater military value for much less cost. Its units:

- have nearly all the *equipment, facilities and skills needed to repair and/or refurbish the vehicles and heavy equipment used by units during training at the NTC/Fort Irwin.* Currently, Army end items requiring depot-level servicing following training rotations are shipped via the MCLBB rail yard to Anniston Army Depot, AL, serviced and then shipped to the parent unit. DoD could realize *significant savings, obtain greater efficiencies and decrease the amount of time units are without needed equipment items if they were serviced at MCLBB and then shipped directly to the owning organization, possibly even as the unit returns to home station.*
- *possess Center for Industrial and Technical Excellence (CITE) designation for several core competencies – several with value to private sector companies. With the CITE designation comes authority to contract, subcontract or partner with private sector and other public sector entities to perform additional work for hire. The authority also permits leasing underused facilities and equipment to non-DoD partners. Revenues realized from such activity can be used to offset operating expenses, reduce labor rates, modernize equipment, etc. – all of which would benefit DoD.* MCLBB is currently considering opportunities to form CITE partnerships.
- could use *Enhanced Use Leasing (EUL) Authority* to reduce the *infrastructure footprint, maintenance costs, and improve operating efficiency.* EUL Authority could be used to lease non-excess, but underused warehouse units, rail, partial covered storage, or open space. *Connected via rail to the third largest port complex in the world – Ports of Long Beach and Los Angeles (LA/LB) – MCLBB could (if DoD agreed) support an Inland Port in underused space. Projected cargo throughput, using 2000 as a baseline, for LA/LB will increase by 300 to 400 percent by 2020, offering an opportunity for MCLBB to generate revenue to offset operating costs by establishing an Inland Port with underused land and facilities.*

➤ *MCLBB Is Important to DoD Transformation.* Its units:

- are *facilitized and staffed by skilled personnel and ideally located to support DoD's transition to "iterative" design, testing and development of new ground vehicles. CITE and/or EUL Authority could be used to make the necessary facilities, space and personnel available for efficient public-private sector partnering.* For example, a new general utility vehicle in design for use by the Army and Marine Corps could be *tested on existing MCLBB test tracks, in the highly instrumented environments of the NTC/Fort Irwin and subjected to the harsh, live-fire challenges at the MCAGCC at 29 Palms. Edwards AFB and Naval Base Ventura offer additional test venues/capabilities, if needed. Virtually all required joint testing and development activity could be conducted within a 100-mile radius of MCLBB.*
- could be *important elements in providing services, testing practices and collecting data to support Sea Basing Transformational Concepts.* Sea Basing envisions projecting and sustaining combat power from the sea – including the ability to provide depot-level logistics and

maintenance support – without reliance on land bases in the operating area. The concept includes using “sea based” maintenance personnel to project forward to the land-based combat forces for repairs not requiring large, specialized equipment. When such repairs are required, equipment will be removed to the Sea Base and its organic, depot-level maintenance facility will service the items for return to combat forces ashore. *MCLBB’s* location and core competencies in a *region* of heavy Army, Marine Corps and Special Operations training could permit it to “*play the role*” of the *Sea Base depot-level maintenance facility*. As *equipment* used in training rotations or exercises at NTC/Fort Irwin, 29 Palms, Camp Pendleton, Naval Base Ventura, Fort Hunter Liggett, etc., *requires maintenance services*, *MCLBB personnel* could “*deploy forward*” and repair it. Those *items needing more robust capability*, could be *airlifted* via helicopter (V/MV-22 “Osprey” when operational) to the *MCLBB “Sea Base”* and returned. As part of *MCLBB’s* responsibilities, *personnel* would *gather data on types and frequencies of repairs* for all items, as well as *evaluate the types of repair equipment, supplies and repair parts* that should be *included in Sea Base Depot Facility stocks*. The *frequent training deployments* to the region’s training venues *simulate actual operational demands* as best can be done short of combat operations. *Use of MCLBB to simulate the Sea Base Depot Facility* could provide DoD *important concept testing and operational practices otherwise unavailable*.

- *MCLBB Can Be a Valuable Contributor to Homeland Security and Homeland Defense*. The installation is a *secure facility* located at the intersection of *major North-South and East-West highways and rail lines*; has a significant *aviation facility* immediately available (Barstow-Daggett Airport) and is only 35 miles from a large commercial logistics airport; is *strategically positioned* in Southern California, in close proximity to the Los Angeles basin and Las Vegas metropolitan area, but distant enough to avoid these “target boxes” of a terrorist attack. It possesses *large staging areas* to support forces and equipment and the *climate to permit viable open storage* of equipment for *the use by the Armed Forces or emergency responders in homeland defense missions*. These characteristics could make *MCLBB an ideal location to stage Homeland Security or Homeland Defense operations, equipment and response teams*.

Conclusion:

MCLBB and its units provide the proper level of logistics capability, flexibility and responsiveness needed by the Marine Corps. Together, they contribute directly to the readiness of FMF worldwide operations. Organized to support Marine Corps Combat Power, MCLBB is *essential* to the proper training, equipping, and modernization of the *Nation’s 911 Emergency Response Force* and major combat and combat-support *forces of all Services*. MCLBB’s strategic location, facility investments, skilled workforce and multi-role potential offer *significant military value* to DoD and the Marine Corps that can be used to maximize operational efficiencies and envisioning, testing and implementing initiatives to transform DoD and protect United States National Interests in the 21st Century.

APPENDIX

ACRONYMS & TERMS

29 Palms	Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center, 29 Palms, CA
AAD	Anniston Army Depot, Anniston, AL
AMCE	Army Movement Control Element
BIC	Blount Island Command, Jacksonville, FL
BRAC	Base Realignment and Closure
CITE	Center for Technical Excellence
DDC	Defense Distribution Center
Department	Department of Defense
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DLA	Defense Logistics Agency
DoD	Department of Defense
EUL	Enhanced Use Lease
FMF	Fleet Marine Forces
FSD	Fleet Support Division
GWOT	Global War on Terrorism
I MEF	1 st MEF
II MEF	2 nd MEF
JGRC	Joint Gulf Range Complex
JRRC	Joint Regional Readiness Center
LA/LB	Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach, CA
Laboratory	Joint NBC Equipment Assessment Laboratory, MCLBA
LOGCOM	Marine Corps Logistics Command
MCA	Marine Corps Maintenance Center Albany
MCAGCC	Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center, 29 Palms, CA
MCB	Marine Corps Maintenance Center Barstow
MCLBA	Marine Corps Logistics Base Albany, GA
MCLBB	Marine Corps Logistics Base Barstow, CA
MEF	Marine Expeditionary Force
MOUT	Military Operations in Urban Terrain

MPF	Maritime Pre-Positioned Fleet
MPFP	Maritime Pre-Positioned Force Program
MPS	Maritime Pre-Positioned Ships
NASA	National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NBC	Nuclear, Biological and Chemical
NJTC	National Joint Training Capability
NTC	Army National Training Center, Fort Irwin, CA
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OIF	Operation Iraqi Freedom
PRV	Plant Replacement Value
TRANSCOM	United States Transportation Command

Tab 4

II. c. "Military Prepositioning: Observations on Army and Marine Corps Programs During Operation Iraqi Freedom and Beyond," General Accounting Office

GAO

Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on Readiness,
Committee on Armed Services, House of
Representatives

For Release on Delivery
Expected at 2 p.m. EST
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MILITARY PREPOSITIONING

Observations on Army and Marine Corps Programs During Operation Iraqi Freedom and Beyond

Statement of William M. Solis, Director,
Defense Management and Capabilities





Highlights

Highlights of GAO-04-562T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on Readiness, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives

Why GAO Did This Study

Since the Cold War, the Department of Defense (DOD) has increased its reliance on prepositioned stocks of military equipment and supplies, primarily because it can no longer plan on having a large forward troop presence. Prepositioned stocks are stored on ships and on land in the Persian Gulf and other regions around the world. Prepositioning allows the military to respond rapidly to conflicts. Ideally, units need only to bring troops and a small amount of materiel to the conflict area. Once there, troops can draw on prepositioned equipment and supplies, and then move quickly into combat.

Today's testimony describes (1) the performance and availability of Army and Marine Corps prepositioned equipment and supplies to support Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF); (2) current status of the stocks and plans to reconstitute them; and (3) key issues facing the military as it reshapes these programs to support DOD's force transformation efforts.

GAO's observations are based on ongoing work as well as previous reports on equipment accountability, supply distribution, and other logistics issues during OIF, plus other past work on spare parts shortages and on the readiness of prepositioning programs.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-562T

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on the link above. For more information, contact William M. Solis at (202) 512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov.

MILITARY PREPOSITIONING

Observations on Army and Marine Corps Programs During Operation Iraqi Freedom and Beyond

What GAO Found

The importance of prepositioned stocks was dramatically illustrated during OIF. While they faced some challenges, the Army and Marine Corps relied heavily on prepositioned combat equipment and supplies to decisively defeat the Iraqi military. They both reported that prepositioned stocks were a key factor in the success of OIF. Prepositioned stocks provided most of the combat equipment used and, for the most part, this equipment was in good condition and maintained high readiness rates. However, the Army's prepositioned equipment included some older models of equipment and shortfalls in support equipment such as trucks, spare parts, and other supplies. Moreover, the warfighter did not always know what prepositioned stocks were available in theater, apparently worsening an already overwhelmed supply-and-distribution system. The units were able to overcome these challenges; fortunately, the long time available to build up forces allowed units to fill many of the shortages and adjust to unfamiliar equipment.

Much of the prepositioned equipment is still being used to support continuing operations in Iraq. It will be several years—depending on how long Iraqi Freedom operations continue—before these stocks will be available to return to prepositioning programs. And, even after they become available, much of the equipment will likely require substantial maintenance, or may be worn out beyond repair. The Army has estimated that it has an unfunded requirement of over \$1 billion for reconstituting the prepositioned equipment used in OIF. However, since most prepositioned equipment is still in Southwest Asia and has not been turned back to the Army Materiel Command for reconstitution, most of the funding is not required at this time. When the prepositioned equipment is no longer needed in theater, decisions will have to be made about what equipment can be repaired by combat units, what equipment must go to depot, and what equipment must be replaced with existing or new equipment to enable the Army to reconstitute the prepositioned sets that were downloaded for OIF.

DOD faces many issues as it rebuilds its prepositioning program and makes plans for how such stocks fit into its future. In the near term, the Army and Marines must necessarily focus on supporting ongoing OIF operations. While waiting to reconstitute its program, the Army also has an opportunity to address shortfalls and modernize remaining stocks. For the longer term, DOD may need to (1) determine the role of prepositioning in light of efforts to transform the military; (2) establish sound prepositioning requirements that support joint expeditionary forces; and (3) ensure that the program is resourced commensurate with its priority and is affordable even as the force is transformed. Congress will play a key role in reviewing DOD's assessment of the cost effectiveness of various options to support its overall mission, including prepositioning and other alternatives for projecting forces quickly.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our work on logistical issues related to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), focusing on prepositioned stocks. Since the end of the Cold War, the Department of Defense (DOD) has increased its reliance on prepositioned reserves of military equipment and supplies since it can no longer plan on having a large forward troop presence. Prepositioned stocks are stored on ships and on land in the Persian Gulf and other regions around the world. Prepositioning can speed response times. Ideally, the military needs only to bring troops and a small amount of materiel to the area of conflict. Once there, troops can draw on prepositioned equipment and supplies, and then move rapidly into combat.

My statement today reflects our preliminary observations drawn from ongoing work as well as previously published reports. As requested, my testimony today will focus on the performance, reconstitution, and future of prepositioning programs. Specifically, it describes (1) the performance and availability of Army and Marine Corps prepositioned equipment and supplies to support OIF; (2) the current status of the stocks and plans to reconstitute them; and (3) key issues facing the military as it reshapes these programs to support the military's force transformation efforts.

Summary

The importance of prepositioned stocks was dramatically illustrated during OIF. While they faced some challenges, the Army and Marine Corps relied heavily on prepositioned combat equipment and supplies to decisively defeat the Iraqi military. The following summarizes our preliminary observations and issues to consider for the future.

- Army and Marine Corps officials reported that prepositioned stocks were a key factor in the success of OIF. Prepositioned stocks provided a significant amount of the combat equipment used by the Army and the Marine Corps. For the most part, the prepositioned combat systems were in good condition and reportedly maintained high readiness rates throughout the war. However, the Army's prepositioning program had some less-than-modern equipment and had shortfalls, such as trucks, spare parts, and other items. Moreover, the warfighters did not always know what prepositioned sustainment stocks were available in theater, apparently worsening an already overwhelmed theater supply-and-distribution system. While these challenges were not insurmountable to the units, they did slow them down. Fortunately, the long time available to build up forces allowed U.S. forces to fill many of the shortages and adjust to unfamiliar equipment.

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- Much of the prepositioned equipment is still being used to support continuing operations in Iraq. It will be several years—depending on how long Iraqi Freedom operations continue—before these stocks will be available to return to prepositioning programs. And, even after these stocks become available, much of the equipment will likely require substantial maintenance, or it may be worn out beyond repair. The Army has estimated that it has an unfunded requirement of over \$1 billion for reconstituting the prepositioned equipment used in OIF. However, since most prepositioned equipment is still in Southwest Asia and has not been turned back to the Army Materiel Command for reconstitution, most of the funding is not required at this time. When the prepositioned equipment is no longer needed in theater, decisions will have to be made about what equipment can be repaired by combat units, what equipment must go to depot, and what equipment must be replaced with existing or new equipment to enable the Army to reconstitute the prepositioned sets that were downloaded for OIF. In the interim, both the Army and Marines have kept some land- or sea-based prepositioned stocks in the Pacific to cover a possible contingency in that region.
 - The defense department faces many issues as it rebuilds its prepositioning program and makes plans for how such stocks fit into the future. In the near term, the Army and the Marine Corps must necessarily focus on supporting ongoing operations in OIF. And while it may be several years before most prepositioned assets are available to fully reconstitute the Army's programs, opportunities exist to address shortfalls and selectively modernize the remaining stocks. For the longer term, the department may need to rethink its prepositioning programs to ensure that they are in sync with overall transformation goals and the evolving military strategy. Some changes are already underway. For example, the Army and Marine Corps are pursuing sea-basing ideas—where prepositioning ships could serve as floating logistics bases. Importantly, DOD needs to consider affordability. The drawdown of Army forces made prepositioning a practical alternative in recent years because the service had ample equipment. However, as the services' equipment is transformed or recapitalized, it may not be practical to buy enough equipment for units to have one set at their home station and another set in prepositioning. Consideration of the cost of various options will be critical as the department evaluates alternatives for transforming its force structure to achieve future mission objectives. Congress will have a key role in reviewing the department's assessment of the cost-effectiveness of options to support DOD's overall mission, including mobility and force projection.

In responding to your request, we conducted work that included officials from Headquarters, U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps, Washington, D.C.; Army Field Support Command, Rock Island, Illinois; Combat Equipment

Group-Afloat, Goose Creek, South Carolina; and Blount Island Command, Jacksonville, Florida. At these locations, we interviewed officials familiar with repositioning issues during OIF as well as plans for the future. We reviewed and obtained relevant documentation and performed analyses of reconstitution and options for the future. We also reviewed after-action reports on OIF and Operation Desert Storm. We obtained service estimates for funding prepositioned stocks requirements, but we did not validate these estimates. In addition, we drew on the preliminary results of our ongoing reviews of OIF lessons learned and OIF reconstitution and on our recent reports on OIF supply and distribution issues, Stryker deployment, and Army spare parts shortages. We also relied on our 2001 report on Army war reserve spare parts shortages, 1998 report on repositioning in the Army and the Air Force, and early 1990s reports on Operation Desert Storm.¹ We performed our work in March 2004 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Background


The basic purpose of repositioning is to allow DOD to field combat-ready forces in days rather than in the weeks it would take if the forces and all necessary equipment and supplies had to be brought from the United States. However, the stocks must be (1) available in sufficient quantities to meet the needs of deploying forces and (2) in good condition. For repositioning programs, these factors define “readiness.” If on-hand stocks are not what is needed—or are in poor condition—the purpose of repositioning may be defeated because the unit will lose valuable time obtaining or repairing equipment and supplies. U.S. forces had months to build up for OIF, so speed was not imperative. Repositioning sites became reception and staging areas during the months leading up to the war, and afforded the military the necessary time and access in Kuwait to build up its forces for the later offensive operations of OIF.

¹ U.S. General Accounting Office, *Defense Logistics: Preliminary Observations on the Effectiveness of Logistics Activities during Operation Iraqi Freedom*, GAO-04-305R (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 18, 2003); *Military Transformation: Realistic Deployment Timelines Needed for Army Stryker Brigades*, GAO-03-801 (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2003); *Defense Inventory: The Army Needs a Plan to Overcome Critical Spare Parts Shortages*, GAO-03-705 (Washington, D.C.: June 27, 2003); *Defense Inventory: Army War Reserve Spare Parts Requirements Are Uncertain*, GAO-01-425 (Washington, D.C.: May 10, 2001); *Military Prepositioning: Army and Air Force Programs Need to Be Reassessed*, GAO/NSIAD-99-6 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 16, 1998); *Operation Desert Shield/Storm: Impact of Defense Cooperation Account Funding on Future Maintenance Budgets*, GAO/NSIAD-93-179 (Washington, D.C.: June 10, 1993); and *Operation Desert Storm: Early Performance Assessment of Bradley and Abrams*, GAO/NSIAD-92-94 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 10, 1992).

Prepositioning programs grew in importance to U.S. military strategy after the end of the Cold War, particularly for the Army. Recognizing that it would have fewer forward-stationed ground forces—and to support the two-war strategy of the day—the Army used equipment made available from its drawdown to field new sets of combat equipment ashore in the Persian Gulf and in Korea. It also began an afloat program in the 1990s, using large ships to keep equipment and supplies available to support operations around the world. The Marine Corps has had a prepositioned capability since the 1980s. Its three Marine Expeditionary Forces are each assigned a squadron of ships packed with equipment and supplies—the Marines view this equipment as their “go-to-war” gear. Both the services also have retained some stocks in Europe, although the Army stocks have steadily declined since the end of the Cold War.² Today, the Army has sites in the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Italy, while the Marine Corps retains stocks in Norway. Figure 1 shows the location of Army and Marine Corps prepositioned equipment prior to OIF.

² U.S. General Accounting Office, *Army War Reserves: DOD Could Save Millions by Aligning Resources with the Reduced European Mission*, GAO/NSIAD-97-158 (Washington, D.C.: Jul. 11, 1997).

Figure 1: Location of Army and Marine Prepositioned Equipment Prior to OIF



Sources: Army and Marine Corps data.

Prepositioning is an important part of DOD's overall strategic mobility calculus. The U.S. military can deliver equipment and supplies in three ways: by air, by sea, or by prepositioning. Each part of this triad has its own advantages and disadvantages. Airlift is fast, but it is expensive to use and impractical for moving all of the material needed for a large-scale deployment. Although ships can carry large loads, they are relatively slow. Prepositioning lessens the strain on expensive airlift and reduces the reliance on relatively slow sealift deliveries. However, prepositioning requires the military to maintain equipment that essentially duplicates what the unit has at home station. Moreover, if the prepositioned equipment stocks are incomplete, the unit may have to bring along so

much additional equipment that using it could still strain lift, especially scarce airlift in the early days of a conflict.

Prepositioned Equipment Performed Well in OIF, Despite Shortfalls and Other Logistical Challenges

The Army and Marine Corps reported that their prepositioned equipment performed well during OIF but that some problems emerged. We reviewed lessons-learned reports and talked to Army and Marine Corps officials who managed or used the equipment. We heard general consensus that major combat equipment was generally in good condition when drawn and that it performed well during the conflict. However, Army officials said that some equipment was out-of-date and some critical items like trucks were in short supply and parts and other supplies were sometimes not available. The officials agreed that, overall, OIF demonstrated that prepositioned stocks could successfully support major combat operations.

Most of the issues we heard were with the Army's program. Marine Corps officials reported few shortfalls in their prepositioned stocks or mismatches with unit equipment. This is likely due to two key differences between the services. First, the Marines view prepositioned stocks as their "go-to-war" gear and give the stocks a very high priority for fill and modernization. Second, the units that will use the prepositioned stocks are assigned in advance and the Marine Corps told us that the combat units feel a sense of "ownership" in the equipment. This manifests itself in important ways. For example, the Marines have periodic conferences with all involved parties to work out exactly what their ships will carry and what the units will need to bring with them to the fight. Such an effort to tailor the prepositioned equipment increases familiarity, allows for prewar planning, and thus minimizes surprises or last-minute adjustments. The Marines also train with their gear periodically. By contrast, the Army does not designate the sets for any particular unit and provides little training with the equipment, especially with the afloat stocks.

Prepositioned Combat Equipment Performed Well

Personnel who used and managed the equipment agreed that the tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and howitzers were in good condition when they were drawn from the prepositioned stocks; moreover, the equipment generally stayed operational throughout the fight. For example, the Third Infantry Division after-action report said that new systems and older systems proved to be very valuable and the tanks and Bradleys were both lethal and survivable. Additionally, according to Army Materiel Command documents, combat personnel reported that their equipment, in many cases, worked better than what they had at home station. Moreover, operational readiness data we reviewed showed that major combat

equipment stayed operational, even in heavy combat across hundreds of miles. In fact, officials from both services agreed that OIF validated the prepositioning concept and showed that it can successfully support major combat operations. Moreover, the U.S. Central Command, in an internal lessons-learned effort, concluded that prepositioned stocks “proved their worth and were critical in successfully executing OIF.”

Some Prepositioned Equipment Was Out-of-Date or Did Not Match Unit Needs

Some of the Army’s prepositioned equipment was outdated or did not match what the units were used to at home station. At times, this required the units to “train down” to older and less-capable equipment or bring their own equipment from home. Examples include:

- **Bradleys**—The prepositioned stocks contained some older Bradley Fighting Vehicles that had not received upgrades installed since Operation Desert Storm. Such improvements included items like laser range finders, Global Positioning System navigation, thermal viewers, battlefield identification systems, and others. In addition, division personnel brought their own “Linebacker” Bradleys instead of using the outdated prepositioned stocks that would have required the crew to get out of the vehicle to fire.
- **M113 Personnel Carriers**—The prepositioned stocks contained many older model M113A2 vehicles. This model has difficulty keeping up with Abrams tanks and requires more repairs than the newer model M113A3, which the units had at home station.
- **Trucks**—The prepositioned stocks included 1960s-vintage model trucks that had manual transmissions and were more difficult to repair. Most units now use newer models that have automatic transmissions. The effect of this was that soldiers had to learn to drive stick shifts when they could have been performing other tasks needed to prepare for war; in addition, maintenance personnel were unfamiliar with fixing manual transmissions.
- **Tank Recovery Vehicle**—The prepositioned stocks contained M-88A1 recovery vehicles. These vehicles have long been known to lack sufficient power, speed, and reliability. We reported similar issues after Operation Desert Storm.³ According to data collected by the Army Materiel Command, these vehicles broke down frequently, generally could not keep up with the fast-paced operations, and did not have the needed capabilities even when they were in operation.

³ GAO/NSIAD-92-94.

None of these problems, however, were insurmountable. The U.S. forces had months to prepare for OIF, and plenty of time to adjust to the equipment they had available. Additionally, the U.S. forces faced an adversary whose military proved much less capable than U.S. forces.

Army Faced Spare Parts Shortfalls and Theater Distribution Issues

Our preliminary work also identified shortfalls in available spare parts and major problems with the theater distribution system, which were influenced by shortages of trucks and material handling equipment. Prior to OIF, the Army had significant shortages in its prepositioned stocks, especially in spare parts. This is a long-standing problem. We reported in 2001 that the status of the Army's prepositioned stocks and war reserves was of strategic concern because of shortages in spare parts.⁴ At that time the Army had on hand about 35 percent of its stated requirements of prepositioned spare parts and had about a \$1-billion shortfall in required spare parts for war reserves.

Table 1 shows the percentage of authorized parts that were available in March 2001 in the prepositioned stocks that were later used in OIF. These stocks represent a 15-day supply of spare and repair parts for brigade units (Prescribed Load List) and for the forward support battalion that backs up the brigade unit stocks (Authorized Stockage List). While the goal for these stocks was to be filled to 100 percent, according to Army officials the Army has not had sufficient funds to fill out the stocks. In March 2002, the Army staff directed that immediate measures be taken to fix the shortages and provided \$25 million to support this effort. The requirements for needed spare and repair parts were to be filled to the extent possible by taking stocks from the peacetime inventory or, if unavailable there, from new procurement.

⁴ GAO-01-425.

Table 1: Status of Army Unit Spare Parts Available in Afloat and Selected Land-Based Prepositioned Sets in March 2001^a

Location	Unit type	Type of spare parts	Percent fill of authorization
Afloat	Brigade set	ASL	63
		PLL	60
	Corps Support	ASL	0
		PLL	30
	Theater Support 1	ASL	18
		PLL	15
Theater Support 2	ASL	0	
	PLL	6	
Qatar	Brigade set	ASL	13
		PLL	19
	Division base	ASL	0
		PLL	0

Legend: ASL= Authorized Stockage List, PLL=Prescribed Load List

Source: Army Materiel Command.

^aInformation is provided for prepositioned sets later used in OIF that were managed by the Army Materiel Command. Army Central Command managed the Kuwait set.

By the time the war started in March of 2003, the fill rate had been substantially improved but significant shortages remained. The warfighter still lacked critical, high-value replacement parts like engines and transmissions. These items were not available in the supply system and could not be acquired in time. Shortages in spare and repair parts have been a systemic problem in the Army over the past few years. Our recent reports on Army spares discussed this issue⁵ and, as previously noted, our 2001 report highlighted problems specifically with prepositioned spares. According to Army officials, the fill rates for prepositioned spare parts—especially high-value spares—were purposely kept down because of systemwide shortfalls. The Army’s plan to mitigate this known risk was to have the units using the prepositioned sets to bring their own high-value spare parts in addition to obtaining spare parts from non-deploying units.

⁵ GAO-03-705.

Nonetheless, according to the Third Infantry Division OIF after-action report, spare parts shortages were a problem and there were also other shortfalls. In fact, basic loads of food and water, fuel, construction materials, and ammunition were also insufficient to meet the unit sustainment requirements.

The combatant commander had built up the OIF force over a period of months, departing from doctrinal plans to have receiving units in theater to receive the stocks. When it came time to bring in the backup supplies, over 3,000 containers were download from the sustainment ships, which contained the required classes of supply—food, fuel, and spare parts, among others. The theater supply-and-distribution system became overwhelmed. The situation was worsened by the inability to track assets available in theater, which meant that the warfighter did not know what was available. The Third Infantry Division OIF after-action report noted that some items were flown in from Europe or Fort Stewart because they were not available on the local market. Taken together, all these factors contributed to a situation that one Army after-action report bluntly described as “chaos.”

Our recent report on logistics activities in OIF described a theater distribution capability that was insufficient and ineffective in managing and transporting the large amount of supplies and equipment during OIF.⁶ For example, the distribution of supplies to forward units was delayed because adequate transportation assets, such as cargo trucks and materiel handling equipment, were not available within the theater of operations. The distribution of supplies was also delayed because cargo arriving in shipping containers and pallets had to be separated and repackaged several times for delivery to multiple units in different locations. In addition, DOD’s lack of an effective process for prioritizing cargo for delivery precluded the effective use of scarce theater transportation assets. Finally, one of the major causes of distribution problems during OIF was that most Army and Marine Corps logistics personnel and equipment did not deploy to the theater until after combat troops arrived, and in fact, most Army personnel did not arrive until after major combat operations were underway.

⁶ GAO-04-305R.

Continuing Support of Operations Will Likely Delay Reconstitution

Forces are being rotated to relieve personnel in theater. Instead of bringing their own equipment, these troops are continuing to use prepositioned stocks. Thus, it may be several years—depending on how long the Iraqi operations continue—before these stocks can be reconstituted.

The Marine Corps used two of its three prepositioned squadrons (11 of 16 ships) to support OIF. As the Marines withdrew, they repaired some equipment in theater but sent much of it back to their maintenance facility in Blount Island, Florida. By late 2003, the Marine Corps had one of the two squadrons reconstituted through an abbreviated maintenance cycle, and sent back to sea.⁷ However, to support ongoing operations in Iraq, the Marine Corps sent equipment for one squadron back to Iraq, where it is expected to remain for all or most of 2004. The Marine Corps is currently performing maintenance on the second squadron of equipment that was used during OIF, and this work is scheduled to be completed in 2005.

Most of the equipment that the Army used for OIF is still in use or is being held in theater in the event it may be needed in the future. The Army used nearly all of its prepositioned ship stocks and its ashore stocks in Kuwait and Qatar, as well as drawing some stocks from Europe. In total, this included more than 10,000 pieces of rolling stock, 670,000 repair parts, 3,000 containers, and thousands of additional pieces of other equipment. According to Army officials, the Army is repairing this equipment in theater and reissuing it piece-by-piece to support ongoing operations. Thus far, the Army has reissued more than 11,000 pieces of equipment, and it envisions that it will have to issue more of its remaining equipment to support future operations. Thus, it may be 2006 or later before this equipment becomes available to be reconstituted to refill the prepositioned stocks. Officials also told us that, after having been in use for years in harsh desert conditions, much of the equipment would likely require substantial maintenance and some will be worn out beyond repair. Figure 2 shows OIF trucks needing repair.

⁷ Marine Corps officials told us that they focused on getting equipment repaired to a mission-capable status, but did not return the equipment to the high standard to which it is normally maintained.

Figure 2: Some Trucks Used in OIF that Need Repair



Source: U.S. Army.

Both the Army and the Marine Corps have retained prepositioned stocks in the Pacific to cover a possible contingency in that region. While the Marine Corps used two of its three squadrons in OIF, it left the other squadron afloat near Guam. The Army used most of its ship stocks for OIF, but it still has a brigade set available in Korea and one combat ship is on station to support a potential conflict in Korea, although it is only partially filled. Both the Army and the Marine Corps used stocks from Europe to support OIF. The current status of the services' prepositioned sets is discussed in table 2.

Table 2: Current Status of Selected Prepositioning Programs (as of March 2004)

	Location	Status
Army	Kuwait and Qatar	The equipment and supplies from these locations are still in use to support continuing operations in Iraq.
	Korea	This brigade set of equipment is currently filled to approximately 90 percent.
	Afloat	Equipment and supplies from 10 of 11 ships were downloaded to support OIF and most of this equipment remains in Iraq or Kuwait. One combat ship has been partially filled to support two Army battalions. One ammunition ship remains on station and another is in its maintenance cycle. The Army is also working to reconstitute equipment for a support ship and another combat ship, but it is unclear how much equipment will be available to source these requirements.
	Europe	Stocks in Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Italy have been depleted to support ongoing operations.
Marines	Afloat (Guam)	This 6-ship squadron was not used in OIF and has almost its full complement of stocks.
	Afloat (Mediterranean)	One ship has been downloaded in support of OIF and another has been partially downloaded. This squadron's equipment is currently filled to about half of its requirement and will complete its normal maintenance cycle in 2005.
	Afloat (Diego Garcia)	This squadron's equipment was used during the first phase of OIF, was repaired to combat condition but not to normal standards, and has been downloaded for reuse in Iraq.
	Norway	Stocks in Norway were used to support OIF. Currently, the stocks have approximately two-thirds of the authorized equipment.

Source: U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps data.

Army and Marine Corps maintenance officials told us that it is difficult to reliably estimate the costs of reconstituting the equipment because so much of it is still in use. As a result, the reconstitution timeline is unclear. Based on past experience, it is reasonable to expect that the harsh desert environment in the Persian Gulf region will exact a heavy toll on the equipment. For example, we reported in 1993 that equipment returned from Operation Desert Storm was in much worse shape than expected because of exposure for lengthy periods to harsh desert conditions. The Army has estimated that the cost for reconstituting its prepositioned equipment assets is about \$1.7 billion for depot maintenance, unit level maintenance, and procurement of required parts and supplies. A request for about \$700 million was included in the fiscal year 2004 Global War on Terrorism supplemental budget, leaving a projected shortfall of about \$1 billion. Army Materiel Command officials said they have thus far received only a small part of the amount funded in the 2004 supplemental for reconstitution of the prepositioned equipment, but they noted that not much equipment has been available. Additionally, continuing operations in Iraq have been consuming much of the Army's supplemental funding intended for reconstitution. Since much of the equipment is still in Southwest Asia, it is unclear how much reconstitution funding for its prepositioned equipment the Army can use in fiscal year 2005. But it is

clear that there is a significant bill that will have to be paid for reconstitution of Army prepositioned stocks at some point in the future, if the Army intends to reconfigure the afloat and land-based prepositioned sets that have been used in OIF.

Issues Facing the Prepositioning Program

The defense department faces many issues as it rebuilds its prepositioning program and makes plans for how such stocks fit into the transformed military. In the near term, the Army and the Marine Corps must focus on supporting current operations and reconstituting their prepositioning sets. Moreover, we believe that the Army may be able to take some actions to address the shortfalls and other problems it experienced during OIF. In the long term, however, DOD faces fundamental issues as it plans the future of its prepositioning programs.

Near-Term Issues

As it reconstitutes its program, the Army would likely benefit from addressing the issues brought to light during OIF, giving priority to actions that would address long-standing problems, mitigate near-term risk, and shore up readiness in key parts of its prepositioning program. These include

- ensuring that it has adequate equipment and spare parts and sustainment supplies in its prepositioning programs, giving priority to afloat and Korea stocks;
- selectively modernizing equipment so that it will match unit equipment and better meet operational needs; and
- planning and conducting training to practice drawing and using prepositioned stocks, especially afloat stocks.

Based on some contrasts in the experiences between the Army and the Marine Corps with their prepositioned equipment and supplies in OIF, some officials we spoke to agree that establishing a closer relationship between operational units and the prepositioned stocks they would be expected to use in a contingency is critical to wartime success. The Marines practice with their stocks and the Army could benefit from training on how to unload, prepare, and support prepositioned stocks, particularly afloat stocks. While the Army has had some exercises using its land-based equipment in Kuwait and Korea, it has not recently conducted a training exercise to practice unloading its afloat assets. According to Army officials, such exercises have been scheduled over the past few years, but were cancelled due to lack of funding.

Long-term Issues

The long-term issues transcend the Army and Marines, and demand a coordinated effort by the department. In our view, three main areas should guide the effort.

- **Determine the role of prepositioning in light of the efforts to transform the military.** Perhaps it is time for DOD to go back to the drawing board and ask: what is the military trying to achieve with these stocks and how do they fit into future operational plans? If, as indicated in Desert Storm and OIF, prepositioning is to continue to play an important part in meeting future military commitments, priority is needed for prepositioning as a part of transformation planning in the future.
- **Establish sound prepositioning requirements that support joint expeditionary forces.** If DOD decides that prepositioning is to continue to play an important role in supporting future combat operations, establishing sound requirements that are fully integrated is critical. The department is beginning to rethink what capabilities could be needed. For example, the Army and Marines are pursuing sea-basing ideas—where prepositioning ships could serve as offshore logistics bases. Such ideas seem to have merit, but are still in the conceptual phases, and it is not clear to what extent the concepts are being approached to maximize potential for joint operations. In our view, options will be needed to find ways to cost-effectively integrate prepositioning requirements into the transforming DOD force structure requirements. For example, Rand recently published a report suggesting that the military consider prepositioning support equipment to help the Stryker brigade meet deployment timelines.⁸ Such support equipment constitutes much of the weight and volume of the brigade, but a relatively small part of the costs compared to the combat systems. Such an option may be needed, since our recent report revealed that the Army would likely be unable to meet its deployment timelines for the Stryker brigade.⁹
- **Ensure that the program is resourced commensurate with its priority, and is affordable even as the force is transformed.** In our view, DOD must consider affordability. In the past, the drawdown of Army forces made prepositioning a practical alternative because it made extra equipment available. However, as the services' equipment is transformed and recapitalized, it may not be practical to buy enough equipment for

⁸ Eric Pelty, John M. Halliday, and Aimee Bower, *Speed and Power: Toward an Expeditionary Army* (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Arroyo Center, 2003).

⁹ U.S. General Accounting Office, *Army Stryker Brigades: Assessment of External Logistics Support Should Be Documented for the Congressionally Mandated Review of the Army's Operational Evaluation Plan*, GAO-03-484R (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 28, 2003).

units at home station and for prepositioning. Prepositioned stocks are intended to reduce response times and enable forces to meet the demands of the full spectrum of military operations. Once the future role of prepositioning is determined, and program requirements are set, it will be important to give the program proper funding priority. Congress will have a key role in reviewing the department's assessment of the cost effectiveness of options to support DOD's overall mission, including prepositioning and other alternatives for projecting forces quickly to the far reaches of the globe.

Mr. Chairman, I hope this information is useful to Congress as it considers DOD's plans and funding requests for reconstituting its prepositioned stocks as well as integrating prepositioning into the department's transformation of its military forces.

This concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to answer any questions that you or the Members of the Subcommittee may have.

Contacts and Acknowledgments

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Tab 5

III. Possible Suggestions to Close MCLB Barstow, CA and MCLB Albany, GA and Transfer Their Workloads to an Army Depot

The Barstow community understands that in an effort to prevent the closure of Red Army Depot (RRAD) which was recommended by DoD, the community of Texarkana, Texas may have retained a professional consultant to craft and direct a strategy of advocating the closure of both Marine Corps Logistics Base Barstow (MCLBB) and Marine Corps Logistics Base Albany (MCLBA), and transferring their workloads to RRAD). Any suggestion to close the two Marine Corps depots and transfer their workload to RRAD is similar to those made by communities such as Sacramento, CA and Toelle, UT during the 1991 and 1993 BRAC rounds, and should be rejected just as those were, for much the same reasons.

We have already described (under “Military Value Issues,” above) the differences between the organizations of Army and Marine Corps ground depot maintenance and how these differences impact readiness. For example, recall that the inability of the Army to meet its schedule for the repair of image intensifiers (also discussed above under “Military Value Issues”) had a potentially disastrous impact on the combat readiness of the Marine Corps. Closing both Marine Corps Logistics Bases and transferring their workload to an Army depot would similarly endanger the combat readiness of the Marine Corps. Please note that in making this assertion, we are not impugning the competence of Army depots; rather, we are pointing out that the way they are organized simply does not allow them to meet the combat readiness requirements of the Marine Corps.

In addition to the organizational differences between Army and Marine Corps ground depot maintenance that impact readiness, there is the fact that the amphibious capability of the Marine Corps is both unique to the Corps and the backbone of the Corps’ combat-readiness. To quote “Marine Corps Strategy 21,” the Corps is

“the only Service specifically tasked by Congress to operate as an integrated combined arms force providing a joint force enabler in three dimensions – air, land, and sea.”

No other branch of the Armed Services is required to maintain the amphibious capability of the Marines, and as the U.S. continues to pull back from overseas bases and increase the number of prepositioning ships (per the Department of the Navy’s testimony to the Commission), this capability of the Marine Corps becomes even more important. We understand that amphibious systems constitute about half of the workload of MCLB Barstow currently, and that this percentage is expected to increase in the future. No Army depot has the facilities, equipment, workforce or core requirement to support these systems. Even if DoD took the time and went to the considerable expense of facilitating Red River Army Depot to work amphibious vehicles, there is every reason to expect that Army depots could not achieve the cycle times needed by the Marine Corps to support its required readiness levels.

To recapitulate, any recommendation by communities such as Texarkana, TX to close the two Marine Corps depots and transfer their workloads to Red River Army Depot, TX as an alternative to the DoD recommendation to close Red River Army Depot should be rejected for several reasons:

- First, the differences between the organization of Marine Corps and Army depot maintenance cause them to produce different cycle times with significant impacts on the

levels of combat-readiness and combat-effectiveness that can be achieved.

- Second, the Marine Corps has a unique workload – amphibious vehicles – that is the backbone of the Corps’ combat-readiness. No Army depot has the facilities, equipment, workforce or core requirement to support these systems. Even if DoD took the time and went to the considerable expense of facilitizing Red River to work amphibious vehicles, there is every reason to expect that Army depots could not achieve the cycle times needed by the Marine Corps to support its required readiness levels.
- Lastly, even if the workload of the two Marine Corps depots were added to the current workload of Red River Army Depot, it would not make a significant difference in Red River’s capacity utilization rate. Therefore, Red River – and the Army’s depot system -- would still have significant excess capacity. Leaving Red River open even with the added workload of MCLBB and MCLBA would thus defeat the purpose of eliminating excess capacity in like activities -- one of the primary goals of the 2005 BRAC round.

COMMUNITY RECOMMENDATION #3:

We ask the Commission to fully consider the implications of further degrading Marine Corps readiness and to reject any recommendations to close either or both Marine Corps depots and transfer their workloads to any Army depot(s) as a substantial deviation from BRAC Selection Criteria 1 and 3.

Tab 6

IV. Economic Impact Issues

We are fully aware that the outcome of the BRAC 2005 process must and will turn primarily upon military value considerations. Nevertheless, we are obliged to point out for the sake of accuracy and the historical record that the analysis of the economic impact of the Department of Defense (DoD)'s recommendations concerning Marine Corps Logistics Base Barstow (MCLBB) that was submitted to the BRAC Commission by DoD is erroneous -- and, indeed so far off as to constitute a substantial deviation from BRAC Selection Criterion 6.

Relevant BRAC Selection Criterion

6. The economic impact on existing communities *in the vicinity of military installations.* (Emphasis added.)

To estimate the impact on the "local economic area" (DOD Base Closure and Realignment Report to the Commission, Volume IV), DoD compared the number of jobs estimated to be lost at MCLBB to the total employment base of the San Bernardino-Riverside-Ontario, CA Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA). The San Bernardino-Riverside-Ontario, CA MSA consists of the land area and population of two counties — the largest county in the continental United States (San Bernardino) and the fourth-largest (Riverside). Together, the two counties cover 27,259 square miles and have a combined population of 3,254,821 (2000 Census data). They are larger than ten states (West Virginia, Maryland, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Vermont, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Connecticut, Delaware and Rhode Island) and the District of Columbia.

By contrast, the City of Barstow, which is located in the hinterland of San Bernardino County, occupies 40 square miles, and in 2000 had a population of about 21,119. Barstow is a rural city with its own economic base — one that confronts significant challenges because of its remoteness. Neither a suburb nor a bedroom community, Barstow is located 35 miles from the nearest city to the south, 140 miles from the nearest city to the east, 70 miles from the nearest city to the southwest, and 65 miles from the nearest city to the northwest. Almost everyone who lives in the Barstow area also works in the Barstow area. It is not surprising, therefore, that information developed by MCLBB indicates that over 72 percent of all employees of Maintenance Center Barstow (by far the largest employer on the base) live within just 20 miles of Barstow; and virtually all the employees of the base live within a 35-mile radius of Barstow. This is consistent with a poll conducted in March 2005 by California State University San Bernardino that showed that 64 percent of San Bernardino County residents spend less than an hour a day commuting to work, and 86 percent spend less than two hours a day commuting. Thus, it is clearly absurd to attempt to gauge the economic impact of the proposed realignment of the Marine Corps base in Barstow by comparing the number of persons employed there with the total employment base of the Counties of Riverside and San Bernardino, as is done in the DoD analysis.

Clearly, the only reasonable way to measure the economic impact of the recommended job loss is to compare it to the employment base of *Barstow*. The Economic and Community Development Department of San Bernardino County has done just that, and estimates the impact at 8 percent of Barstow's labor force. DoD's own Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA) estimates that the total employment of MCLBB constitutes 11 percent of Barstow's total labor force and 12 percent of

actual employment in Barstow. Using OEA's figures, the proposed total net job loss of 815 direct and indirect jobs would amount to about seven percent of actual employment for Barstow.

Thus, these two disparate sources agree that the recommended job loss would amount to seven to eight percent of Barstow's employment base, rather than the less than one-tenth of one percent estimated by DoD. In other words, DoD's estimate understates the proposed job loss ***by at least a factor of 80.***

We say that DoD's estimate understates the proposed job loss by ***at least*** a factor of 80 because even the eight-percent figure given above understates the true impact of the proposed job loss since it does not consider that the jobs to be lost are the "Cadillac jobs" of this economy. Forty percent of Barstow's economy is related to the transient travel industry here, serving the 60 or so million people who drive through Barstow yearly and stop for gas, a meal or to stay overnight. Most of the jobs associated with this sector of Barstow's economy are relatively low-skilled jobs requiring comparatively little education or training and paying the minimum wage or close to it, with no benefits – certainly not enough to support a family. Examples of such jobs would be hotel cleaning staff and fast-food restaurant workers. Barstow also has a comparatively large retail sector for a town its size, because of the presence of two outlet malls; and most of these retail jobs too pay at or close to minimum wage and do not offer benefits. The jobs to be lost at MCLB Barstow, by contrast, pay well (enough to support a family) and offer full benefits. So the least we can say is that the use of incorrect indicators of "local" economic impact led DoD to incorrectly dismiss the economic impact of its recommendation; and that DoD's recommendation should be rejected as a substantial deviation from BRAC Selection Criterion 6.

COMMUNITY RECOMMENDATION #4:

We appreciate the opportunity to correct what we believe is a serious misunderstanding of the true economic impact of the proposed realignment of Marine Corps Logistics Base Barstow. We request that the inaccuracy of DoD's purported analysis of the local economic impact of its recommendation be corrected, and that the true extent of the economic impact be considered by the BRAC Commission in its review of the recommendation to realign MCLBB.

Tab 7

V. Issues the Barstow Community Would Like the BRAC Commission to Investigate

There are a number of issues we believe the Commission must investigate during its review of the recommendation to realign MCLB Barstow. They range from compliance with the National Military Strategy, to DoD perspective and intent, to the implications for how the realignment recommendation will be executed.

1. Why were the maintenance depots not asked for cycle times for each commodity – a critical element both of depot effectiveness and operational readiness?
2. Was DoD's strategy based on maximizing military value of depots or maximizing cost efficiencies for commodities?
3. Was the possibility that Army and Marine Corps logistics are fundamentally and qualitatively different considered?
4. Would the effect of implementing DoD's recommendations be to convert one of the Corps' two multi-commodity depots into a "tear-down" facility?
5. Did DoD's pursuit of savings result in the Corps' losing its "just-in-time" repair and maintenance model and adopting something like the Army's specialized depot model?
6. Will DoD's recommendation harm Corps' combat readiness/effectiveness?
7. Will DoD's recommendation support the Marine Corps' turnaround response requirement?
8. If it's a good idea for 17 of 24 commodities now "worked" at MCLBB to be transferred to Army depots to be "worked" following the Army's model of ground depot maintenance, why don't the DoD's recommendation direct the Marine Corps to move ALL its depot maintenance to the Army model?
9. Does the 5th echelon maintenance of engines and transmissions that DoD recommended be transferred from MCLBB refer only to secondary depot repairables (i.e., engines and transmissions that arrive at MCLBB as components rather than as part of Principal End Items), or does it include ALL 5th echelon maintenance of engines and transmissions (even those that arrive at MCLBB as part of PEIs)?
10. Does the answer to the question above also apply to other commodities DoD is recommending be transferred from MCLBB

that can arrive either as secondary depot repairables or embedded in PEIs?

11. What percentage of MCLBB's total workload in the commodities DoD recommends transferring arrive at MCLBB as secondary depot repairables and what percentage arrive embedded in PEIs?
12. Are the savings estimated by DoD to accrue as a result of the recommended realignment consistent with the answers to questions 9, 10 and 11 above?
13. How is the DoD's recommendation consistent with DoD's stated strategy of "maintaining a west coast depot maintenance presence" at MCLBB "to provide west coast operating forces with a close, responsive source for depot maintenance support" if the components comprising the workloads recommended to be consolidated have to be taken off PEIs and shipped across the country to be repaired? (And then -- presumably -- shipped back to MCLBB for remounting.)
14. Is DoD's recommendation that MCLBB "establish an additional 428,000 hours of amphibious vehicle capacity," consistent with other recommendations to transfer elsewhere the depot maintenance of much or most of the equipment and weapons associated with these vehicles? Does "an additional 428,000 hours of amphibious vehicle capacity" mean an additional 428,000 hours of actual workload?
15. Is the "Payback" acceptable when compared to the cost (in combat readiness and effectiveness) of giving up one of the Corps' multi-commodity maintenance depots?
16. How can the (comparatively) small amount of workload to be transferred to the Army depots make a worthwhile difference in their capacity utilization rates?
17. Does DoD's recommendation leave enough capacity at MCLBB to meet foreseeable requirements of fighting the war on terror?
18. Does DoD's recommendation leave enough capacity at MCLBB to allow timely repair of weapons and equipment that have been used in Afghanistan and Iraq and that may be needed very soon to confront a threat from other of our adversaries elsewhere?
19. Does the fundamental disconnect between the direction of DoD's transformation and its recommendation concerning ground depot maintenance at MCLBB substantially deviate from the Force Structure Plan?

COMMUNITY RECOMMENDATION #5:

We request that the Commission investigate the above issues as part of its review of the recommendation to realign MCLBB.

The Community thanks the Commission and staff for the opportunity to present our concerns to you.

Tab 8

VI. Letters to the BRAC Commission



California Defense Alliance

"California's Communities for National Defense"

June 27, 2005

Chairman Anthony Principi
Base Realignment and Closure Commission
2521 South Clark Street, 6th Floor
Arlington VA 22202

Dear Chairman Principi:

The California Defense Alliance, Inc. is a nonprofit public benefit corporation that seeks to improve the national defense. We believe that the world's premier infrastructure for meeting military needs already exists in the State of California and adjacent areas in the southwestern United States. Accordingly, we seek to economically maintain this infrastructure and to encourage further Department of Defense (DoD) consolidations in California for the improvement of national defense.

In the same vein, we are closely following the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round, and would oppose any recommendations which in our opinion would weaken the national defense. We believe that the recommendations of DoD regarding Marine Corps ground combat depot maintenance would do precisely that, because the Marine Corps' and the Army's models of ground combat depot (i.e., fifth-echelon) maintenance are fundamentally and qualitatively different in ways that significantly impact combat-readiness and combat-effectiveness of their respective forces.

Marine Corps ground combat depot maintenance has historically been organized to leverage the workforce's broad-based expertise and inherent production efficiencies to minimize turnaround time (cycle time) in order to maximize combat readiness. Accordingly, both of the Corps' two ground combat maintenance depots are "multi-commodity" depots, which means that they repair all components of "principal end items" [i.e., large vehicles such as Assault Amphibious Vehicles (AAVs) or Light Armored Vehicles (LAVs)] and all the weapons and equipment associated with them

(such as night-vision sights and 50-caliber machine guns). In the Marine Corps model of ground combat depot maintenance, the principal end item (PEI) figuratively enters the “front door” of the Marine depot, is stripped of its components, and the PEI and its components are rebuilt at the same depot. When the PEI leaves the depot by the “back door,” it and all its components have been restored to “like new” condition or (in the case of PEI’s that have been technologically upgraded) “better than new” condition.

Army depot maintenance, by contrast, has historically been organized to maximize the volume of workload by commodity (or commodity group) and to maximize economies of scale. Consequently, Army depots are “commodity depots” or “component depots” – i.e., each one specializes in a limited number of commodities. In the Army model of ground combat depot maintenance, PEI’s enter by the “front door” and are stripped of their components. Unlike the Marine Corps system of dealing with all items in house, the various components are packed and shipped to other Army depots where they are repaired and then returned to the “tear down depot” for reassembly before the PEI ultimately reemerges intact. The economics of Army depot maintenance require that comparatively large volumes of the same commodity be on hand before they can be “worked.” All the extra shipping of components back and forth to various Army depots and waiting to accumulate the appropriate amount of a given commodity at the depot that specializes in it are examples of Army practices that greatly increase cycle time. Historically, the only way to follow the Army model of depot maintenance has been to accept lower levels of combat readiness and to maintain comparatively large stocks of weapons and equipment so that it is possible to repair equipment to and from stock. This is what has been done. The mission of being the U.S.’s **“9-1-1 emergency response force”** has been assigned to the Marine Corps (not the Army). Also, the Army has historically been provided a budget to allow it repair to and from large standing stocks of material not immediately required by its combat forces. Conversely, the Marine Corps’ limited budget has never enabled it to repair to and from stock since nearly all its material is needed by the Fleet Marine Forces to maintain levels of combat readiness that permit it to respond immediately when directed by the National Command Authority.

A “real-world” example of the results of the differences between the Marine Corps’ and the Army’s models of depot maintenance is the case of the 50-caliber machine guns of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment — an Army unit normally stationed at the National Training Center (NTC)/Fort Irwin to train troops, but which was deployed to Iraq recently. Fort Irwin contracted the 5th-echelon repair of these guns to the Maintenance Center on board Marine Corps Logistics Base Barstow (MCLBB), one of the Marine Corps’ two maintenance depots that happens to be located nearby, because MCLBB could and did meet the required turnaround time of 30 days. This contrasted with the turnaround time of *three years* reportedly offered by Anniston Army Depot!

The fundamental differences between the organization and operation of Marine Corps and Army depots are causally related to the differences between their missions. DoD’s recommendations to


- consolidate depot maintenance of Engines/Transmissions, Other Components, and Small Arms/Personal Weapons at Anniston Army Depot, AL;
- consolidate depot maintenance of Conventional Weapons, Engines/Transmissions, Material Handling, Powertrain Components, Starters/Alternators/Generators, Test Measurement Diagnostic Equipment, and Wire at Marine Corps Logistics Base Albany, GA; and
- consolidate depot maintenance of Electronic Components (Non-Airborne), Electro-Optics/Night Vision/Forward-Looking-Infrared, Generators, Ground Support Equipment, Radar, and Radio at Tobyhanna Army Depot. PA

will unacceptably increase cycle time, adversely impact the combat-readiness and combat-effectiveness of the Marine Corps, and compromise the Corps' ability to fulfill its mission as the U.S.'s "9-1-1 emergency response force." The recommendation to consolidate depot maintenance workload to Marine Corps Logistics Base Albany (MCLBA) will degrade the readiness of the Marine Corps units now served primarily by MCLBB (by adding to cycle times the shipping time to and from MCLBA). Therefore, we, the members of the Board of Directors of the California Defense Alliance, ask the Base Realignment and Closure Commission to reject DoD's recommendations regarding Marine Corps ground combat maintenance.

Respectfully,



Don Maben, President
The Board of Directors



264 S. Leland Norton Way, # B140
San Bernardino, CA 92408
(909) 382-0024
Fax (909) 382-0025

July 6, 2005

The Honorable Anthony Principi, Chairman
2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
2521 S. Clark St., Ste. 600
Arlington, VA 22202

Dear Chairman Principi:

Inland Action is an organization of public spirited citizens who are banded together to identify issues, bring people and resources together, and catalyze solutions that promote economic development in the "Inland Empire," the two-county area that comprises the San Bernardino-Riverside-Ontario, CA Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA).

We consider ourselves obligated to set the record straight regarding the erroneous analysis that was presented of the economic impact of the Department of Defense (DoD)'s recommendations concerning Marine Corps Logistics Base (MCLB) Barstow. To estimate the "local economic impact," DoD analysts compared the number of jobs estimated to be lost at MCLBB to the total employment base of the entire San Bernardino-Riverside-Ontario, CA MSA, which covers 27,259 square miles (a larger area than the state of West Virginia), and has a total population of 3,254,821 (2000 Census data).

By contrast, the City of Barstow, which is located in the hinterland of San Bernardino County, occupies 40 square miles, and in 2000 had a population of about 21,119. Barstow is a rural city with its own economic base. Neither a bedroom community nor a suburb, it is located 35 miles from the nearest city to the south, 140 miles from the nearest city to the east, 70 miles from the nearest city to the southwest, and 65 miles from the nearest city to the northwest. Furthermore, almost everyone who lives in the Barstow area also works in the Barstow area. Thus, it is clearly absurd to attempt to gauge the economic impact of the proposed realignment of MCLB Barstow by comparing the number of persons employed there with the total employment base of the Counties of Riverside and San Bernardino. Rather, the only reasonable way to measure the economic impact of the recommended job loss is to compare it to the employment base of Barstow. Estimates by the County of San Bernardino and DoD's own Office of Economic Adjustment indicate that the true impact of the proposed job losses is between seven and eight percent of Barstow's economic base, rather than the less than one-tenth of one percent estimated by DoD.

We respectfully request that you correct the record regarding this, and that you consider the true economic impact of the proposed actions as you deliberate on DoD's recommendations.

Sincerely,

Judi Battey
President/CEO
Inland Action Inc.



Barstow Unified School District

551 South Avenue "H" ☒ Barstow, CA 92311

(760) 255-6006 ☎ Fax (760) 255-6007

July 6, 2005

Dear Senator Feinstein and All Members of the BRAC Commission:

This letter recognizes the arguments and five recommendations made by other community leaders, and they are fully supported by the Barstow Unified School District to maintain the Marine Corps Logistics Base Barstow at its present functioning level or to even increase the bases' contributions. The base is equipped to handle so many desperately required services, and by testimony, the men and women assigned to the base are so committed to doing an excellent job in support of our military actions. Closing the base would deprive our troops of a facility which is fully capable of meeting critical demands with all required flexibility. It would also say to a community (and school district) that has always given so much support to the men and women assigned to the base, to their children, and to the bases' objectives that "we don't need you and your commitment to excellence in serving our military's efforts."

Looking at this base's considerable attributes of location, trained and dedicated employees, and the facility itself, this is not a time to close the base or to reduce its contribution, but rather we should be looking at increasing its services. Our service men and women deserve and require the best, and they need it in quick response and with great flexibility.

Respectfully submitted,

Jerry H. Bergmans, Ph.D.
Superintendent

JHB:pdp

c: P. Morris

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small

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Assembly California Legislature



BILL MAZE

ASSEMBLY MEMBER, THIRTY-FOURTH DISTRICT

COMMITTEES
AGRICULTURE, VICE-CHAIR
BUSINESS & FINANCE
WATER, PARKS & WILDLIFE

Senator Dianne Feinstein
Hart Office Building
Room 331
Washington, D.C. 20510

July 5, 2005

RE: BRAC Recommendations affecting Barstow, CA

Dear Senator *Dianne* Feinstein,


Enclosed is a letter I wish for you to relay to the Base Realignment and Closure Commission (BRAC) on my behalf. As you are aware, the commission's recommendations include a severe cut to the Marine Corps Logistics Base Barstow (MCLBB). As the city's Assembly representative, I have seen the struggles Barstow is facing. It is a uniquely situated city, and is one of only three cities in California with a declining population. Should the commission's recommendations be adopted, the personnel cuts would be devastating to both the base and the city itself.

There are three main areas of concern that I have with the recommendations. Firstly, I believe that the commission has not adequately evaluated the military value that MCLBB offers to the Marine Corps, and the nation's defense. Secondly, it is without question that such a dramatic reduction in personnel will devastate the Barstow community. I disagree with the method in which the commission evaluated the economic impact of the reduction, and ask that you reiterate to the commission that their methodology on this matter was flawed. Clearly, California's representatives will have a much better understanding of how Barstow is geographically situated, and this must be emphasized by Barstow's representatives. Thirdly, based on the commission's recommendations, I expect some suggestions will be made to attempt to streamline the work done by Marines at MCLBB by combining their work with the Army. The commission must reevaluate these circumstances, in light of the inherently different ways the Army and Marine Corps operates.

I implore you to please submit this letter to the commission and fight hard to overturn the recommendations made by BRAC as they pertain to Barstow. I stand ready to assist you in your efforts to protect Barstow, and all of California, from personnel cuts and base closures that are vitally important to this nation's security.

If I can be of any further assistance on this matter, please do not hesitate to contact me

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Bill Maze". The signature is stylized with large, sweeping loops and a long horizontal stroke at the end.

BILL MAZE
Assemblyman, 34th District

CC; Mayor Lawrence Dale. City of Barstow

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Assembly California Legislature



BILL MAZE
ASSEMBLY MEMBER, THIRTY-FOURTH DISTRICT

COMMITTEES
AGRICULTURE, VICE CHAIR
BUSINESS & PROFESSIONS
WATER, PARKS & WILDLIFE

Base Realignment and Closure Commission
2521 South Clark Street, Suite 600
Arlington, VA, 22202.

RE: BRAC Commission Recommendations Relating to Barstow, CA

July 1, 2005

To the Base Realignment and Closure Commission:

In reviewing the Base Realignment and Closure recommendations made for the 2005 round of base closures, I have three areas of concern related to the Department of Defense's recommendations concerning MCLBB that I (representing the Barstow community) would like to bring to your attention. These issues are military value, economic impact and issues related to suggestions that I expect to be made to close both Marine Corps depots and transfer their workloads to an Army depot now on the closure list.

I. Military Value Issues

I, the community and City of Barstow are closely following the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round, and I would oppose any recommendations which in my opinion would weaken the national defense. I believe that the recommendations of DoD regarding Marine Corps ground combat depot maintenance would do precisely that, because the Marine Corps' and the Army's models of ground combat depot (i.e., fifth-echelon) maintenance are fundamentally and qualitatively different in ways that significantly impact combat-readiness and combat-effectiveness of their respective forces.

Marine Corps ground combat depot maintenance has historically been organized to leverage the workforce's broad-based expertise and inherent production efficiencies to minimize turnaround time (cycle time) in order to maximize combat readiness. Accordingly, both of the Corps' two ground combat maintenance depots are "multi-commodity" depots, which means that they repair all components of "principal end items" [i.e., large vehicles such as Assault Amphibious Vehicles (AAVs) or Light Armored Vehicles (LAVs)] and all the weapons and equipment associated with them (such as night-vision sights and 50-caliber machine guns). In the Marine Corps model of

ground combat depot maintenance, the principal end item (PEI) figuratively enters the "front door" of the Marine depot, is stripped of its components, and the PEI and its components are rebuilt at the same depot. When the PEI leaves the depot by the "back door," it and all its components have been restored to "like new" condition or (in the case of PEIs that have been technologically upgraded) "better than new" condition.

Army depot maintenance, by contrast, has historically been organized to maximize the volume of workload by commodity (or commodity group) and to maximize economies of scale. Consequently, Army depots are "commodity depots" or "component depots" -- i.e., each one specializes in a limited number of commodities. In the Army model of ground combat depot maintenance, PEIs enter by the "front door" and are stripped of their components. Unlike the Marine Corps system of dealing with all items in house, the various components are packed and shipped to other Army depots where they are repaired and then returned to the "tear-down depot" for reassembly before the PEI ultimately reemerges intact. The economics of Army depot maintenance require that comparatively large volumes of the same commodity be on hand before they can be "worked." All the extra shipping of components back and forth to various Army depots and waiting to accumulate the appropriate amount of a given commodity at the depot that specializes in it are examples of Army practices that greatly increase cycle time. Historically, the only way to follow the Army model of depot maintenance has been to accept lower levels of combat readiness and to maintain comparatively large stocks of weapons and equipment so that it is possible to repair equipment to and from stock. This is what has been done. The mission of being the U.S.'s "9-1-1 emergency response force" has been assigned to the Marine Corps (not the Army). Also, the Army has historically been provided a budget to allow it to repair to and from large standing stocks of material not immediately required by its combat forces. Conversely, the Marine Corps' limited budget has never enabled it to repair to and from stock since nearly all its material is needed by the Fleet Marine Forces to maintain levels of combat readiness that permit it to respond immediately when directed by the National Command Authority.

A "real-world" example of the results of the differences between the Marine Corps' and the Army's model of depot maintenance is the case of the 50-caliber machine guns of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment -- an Army unit normally stationed at the National Training Center (NTC)/Fort Irwin to train troops, but which was deployed to Iraq recently. Fort Irwin contracted the 5th-echelon repair of these guns to the Maintenance Center on Marine Corps Logistics Base Barstow (MCLBB), one of the Marine Corps' two maintenance depots, because MCLBB could and did meet the required turnaround time of 30 days. This contrasted with the turnaround time of three years reportedly offered by Anniston Army Depot!

The fundamental differences between the organization and operation of Marine Corps and Army depots are causally related to the differences between their missions. DoD's recommendations to

- Consolidate depot maintenance of Engines/Transmissions, Other Components, and Small Arms/Personal Weapons at Anniston Army Depot, AL;
- Consolidate depot maintenance of Conventional Weapons, Engines/Transmissions, Material Handling, Powertrain Components, Starters/Alternators/Generators, Test Measurement Diagnostic Equipment, and Wire at Marine Corps Logistics Base Albany, GA; and
- Consolidate depot maintenance of Electronic Components (Non-Airborne), Electro-Optics/Night Vision/Forward-Looking-Infrared, Generators, Ground Support Equipment, Radar, and Radio at Tobyhanna Army Depot, PA

will, in my opinion, unacceptably increase cycle time, adversely impact the combat-readiness and combat-effectiveness of the Marine Corps, and compromise the Corps' ability to fulfill its mission as the U.S.'s "9-1-1 emergency response force." The recommendation to consolidate depot maintenance workload to Marine Corps Logistics Base Albany (MCLBA) will degrade the readiness of the Marine Corps units now served primarily by MCLBB (by adding to cycle times the shipping time to and from MCLBA).

These recommendations appear to be based on an assumption that differences between Army and Marine Corps depot maintenance either don't exist or are insignificant; and that, therefore, the differences between the Army's and the Marine Corps' missions also either don't exist or are insignificant. As far as I can determine, this assumption was neither explicitly considered nor tested, and since it is invalid, it led to recommendations that substantially deviate from the military value criteria established for BRAC 2005. Therefore, as a representative of the Barstow Community, I ask the Base Realignment and Closure Commission to overturn DoD's recommendations regarding Marine Corps ground combat maintenance.

II. Economic Impact Issue

I am fully aware that the outcome of the BRAC 2005 process must and will turn primary upon military value considerations. Nevertheless, I am obliged to point out for the sake of accuracy and the historical record that the analysis of the economic impact of the Department of Defense (DOD)'s recommendations concerning Marine Corps Logistics Base Barstow (MCLBB) that was submitted to the BRAC Commission by DoD is substantially different to the point of being erroneous. To estimate the "local economic impact," DoD compared the number of jobs estimated to be lost at MCLBB to the total employment base of the San Bernardino-Riverside-Ontario, CA Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA), a geographical area that comprises the largest county (San Bernardino) and the third-largest county (Riverside) in the continental United States, and that is larger than 11 eastern states. Barstow (where MCLBB is located) is close to the northeastern boundary of that MSA. Barstow is also 35 miles away from the nearest city on the south, and 60 miles or more away from the nearest cities to the north, east and west. It is not surprising, therefore, that information developed by MCLBB indicates that over 72 percent of all employees of Maintenance Center Barstow (by far the largest employer on the base) live within just 20 miles of Barstow. Clearly, the only reasonable way to

measure the economic impact of the recommended job loss is to compare it to the employment base of Barstow. The Economic and Community Development Department of San Bernardino County has done so, and estimates the impact at 7.89 percent of Barstow's labor force (rather than the less than one-tenth of one percent estimated by DoD). I respectfully request that the inaccuracy of DoD's purported analysis of the local economic impact of its recommendations be corrected, and that the true extent of the economic impact be considered by the BRAC Commission.

III. Suggestions to Close MCLB Barstow, CA and MCLB Albany, GA and Transfer Their Workloads to an Army Depot


Any suggestions by communities such as Texarkana, TX to close the two Marine Corps depots and transfer their workloads to Red River Army Depot, TX (instead of closing Red River as was recommended by DoD) should be rejected for several reasons:

- First, the differences between the organization of Marine Corps and Army depot maintenance cause them to achieve different cycle times and different levels of combat-readiness and combat-effectiveness, as described above. Second, the Marine Corps has a unique workload - amphibious vehicles - that is the backbone of Corps combat-readiness and that Army depots are not competent to "work." Even if DoD took the time and went to the considerable expense of facilitizing Red River to work amphibious vehicles, there is every reason to expect that Army depots could not achieve the cycle times needed by the Marine Corps - again, as noted above. Additionally, it is my recollection that in recent years, the Department of Defense had constructed an amphibious pond and specially engineered test track to test this Marine-specific vehicle. The test track and test pond were constructed to enable Maintenance Center Barstow (MCB) at Marine Corps Logistics Base (MCLB) Barstow to test tracked, wheeled and amphibious vehicles in water, on land and on specific degrees of slope to confirm that the vehicles have been rebuilt to "new" or "better than new" specifications. The facility consists of a test track covering 161 acres with specially designed terrain that simulates actual combat situations, and a "floating pond" measuring 53,000 square feet by 15 feet deep for testing amphibious vehicles. It does not seem prudent in my estimation to abandon this new investment.
- Lastly, there is the fact that even adding the workload of the two Marine Corps depots to the current workload of Red River Army Depot (RRAD) would not make a significant difference in Red River's capacity utilization rate. RRAD would therefore still have significant excess capacity. Leaving RRAD open even with the added workload of MCLBB and MCLBA would thus defeat the purpose of eliminating excess capacity in like activities, as a reminder, that is one of the primary goals of the 2005 BRAC round.

The suggestion to close the two Marine Corps depots and transfer their workload to RRAD is similar to those made by communities such as Sacramento, CA and Toelle, UT during the 1991 and 1993 BRAC rounds, and should be rejected just as those were.

Thank you for the opportunity to address these areas of concern. Please feel free to contact me for an clarifications or questions.

Respectfully,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Bill Maze', is written over a horizontal line. The signature is stylized and extends below the line with a large loop.

BILL MAZE
Assemblyman, 34th District

MEMBERS

SAM AANESTAD
ELAINE K. ALQUIST
DENISE MORENO-DUCHENY
CHRISTINE KEHOE
ALAN LOWENTHAL
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California State Senate



SELECT COMMITTEE ON DEFENSE & AEROSPACE INDUSTRY

STATE CAPITOL, ROOM 2068
SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA 95814

SENATOR ROY ASHBURN
CHAIR

July 7, 2005

The Honorable Anthony Principi
Chairman
2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
2521 S. Clark St., Ste. 600
Arlington, VA 22202

Dear Chairman Principi:

I am writing to you concerning the negative impact the Department of Defense (DoD) recommendation to realign the Marine Corps Logistics Base Barstow (MCLBB) will have on the operational readiness of the Marine Corps.

While the goal to maximize capacity and utilization of depot operations is laudable, I believe the DoD neglected to consider two core factors of military value during the process of developing the recommendation to realign MCLBB. The two missing factors are the strategic location of a depot and cycle-time or turn-around time for maintenance and repair of vehicles or components. Both of these are critical to the combat readiness of any military force.

The recently released Government Accounting Office (GAO) analysis on the DoD's process and recommendations noted that the Marine Corps objected to a proposed closure of MCLBB based on these two factors.

The Marine Corps objected to the closure because that would eliminate its only West Coast ground vehicle depot maintenance presence and would increase repair cycle times for the Marine's West Coast equipment by increasing rail transit and customer turnaround time... (GAO Report 05-785, page 109).

The objections by the Marine Corps and additional remarks in the GAO report only serve to validate that these two factors were not considered or, at the very least, weighted properly in the DoD's selection process.

The Honorable Anthony Principi
July 7, 2005
Page 2

Another flaw in the DoD's process of reviewing depot operations with respect to the equipment turn-around time is that no consideration was given to the fact that Marine Corps depots operate under entirely different organizational principles than those of the Army, Navy or Air Force. A Marine Corps depot is organized so as to return the equipment to the warfighter in better-than-new condition as fast as possible because the warfighter must be ready to be deployed on a moment's notice.


For these reasons, I fully support the Barstow Community's request for the Commission to overturn the DoD's recommendations to transfer fifth-echelon repair work out of MCLBB. I am certain that once these factors are applied to the selection process, the data will demonstrate that MCLBB is highly valuable component of the DoD's military operations.

I also support the Barstow Community's recommendation that additional work from the Navy and Army could be directed to the MCLBB. I firmly believe that when the military value of MCLBB's strategic location, including its close proximity to the National Training Center (Fort Irwin), and its ability to process equipment on a short cycle are considered, the DoD will realize that expansion of the MCLBB will better achieve its goal to maximize capacity and utilization of depot operations.

The proposal to repair ground vehicles from Fort Irwin at MCLBB makes sense from an economical and personnel standpoint. The DoD will save by not having to pay shipment costs to transport a broken vehicle to another depot. The DoD will also save the costs of "missed" training time due to equipment failure. A soldier can return to training faster due to the MCLBB's rapid repair cycle time.

Thank you for your consideration of my comments.

Best regards,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Roy Ashburn". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large, prominent initial "R".

Roy Ashburn
Chairman