

THOMAS H. ALLEN  
1st DISTRICT OF MAINE



COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET  
COMMITTEE ON  
ENERGY AND COMMERCE

1127 LONGWORTH HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING  
WASHINGTON, DC 20515  
(202) 225-8118

57 EXCHANGE STREET, SUITE 302  
PORTLAND, ME 04101  
(207) 774-5019

208 MAIN STREET, SUITE 103  
SACO, ME 04072  
(207) 283-8054

Congress of the United States  
House of Representatives  
Washington, DC 20515-1901

SUBCOMMITTEES:  
HEALTH  
ENERGY AND AIR QUALITY  
ENVIRONMENT AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS

HOUSE OCEANS CAUCUS  
CO-CHAIR

AFFORDABLE MEDICINES TASK FORCE  
CO-CHAIR

<http://tomallen.house.gov>

FAX COVER

DATE: 7-19-05  
TO: BRAC COMMISSION  
FROM: ME-NH DELEGATION  
SUBJECT: RESPONSES TO ODO TESTIMONY  
NUMBER OF PAGES (W/ COVER): 28

703-699-2735

MESSAGE:

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**Congress of the United States**  
**Washington, DC 20515**

July 19, 2005

The Honorable Samuel Knox Skinner  
BRAC Commission  
521 South Clark Street  
Suite 600  
Arlington, VA 22202


Dear Commissioner Skinner:

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
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
Sincerely,

  
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United States Senator

  
SUSAN M. COLLINS  
United States Senator

  
JEB BRADLEY  
United States Representative

  
JUDD GREGG  
United States Senator

  
JOHN E. SUNUNU  
United States Senator

  
THOMAS H. ALLEN  
United States Representative

Enclosure

## Maine-New Hampshire Delegation

### Responses to Defense Department claims made at July 18 hearing

Secretary Wynne: realigning Pearl Harbor Shipyard would drastically reduce savings

**Response: Unsubstantiated by facts.** Realignment of Pearl Harbor would move long-term depot-level work from the least efficient shipyard and concentrate such maintenance at the most efficient shipyard (Portsmouth). According to DOD's own figures, the realignment of Pearl Harbor would save more money than the closure of Portsmouth. IND-0055 was the DOD scenario for the realignment of Pearl. The final COBRA run for IND-0055 showed a predicted NPV savings of \$1.8 billion and a three year payback. That is a 50 percent greater savings than DOD claims it would save by closing Portsmouth (Page DoN-24). That is before taking into account any of the problems noted with DOD's COBRA analysis of a Portsmouth closure. Testimony prepared for the July 6 hearing, but blocked by DOD intervention, supports position that keeping Portsmouth open and realigning Pearl is most cost effective option.

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**Congress of the United States**  
**Washington, DC 20515**

July 19, 2005

General Sue Ellen Turner  
BRAC Commission  
521 South Clark Street  
Suite 600  
Arlington, VA 22202

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
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
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
  
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Congress of the United States  
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General Lloyd Newton  
BRAC Commission  
521 South Clark Street  
Suite 600  
Arlington, VA 22202

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
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
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Congress of the United States  
Washington, DC 20515

July 19, 2005

General James T. Hill  
BRAC Commission  
521 South Clark Street  
Suite 600  
Arlington, VA 22202


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
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
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
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BRAC Commission  
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
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
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
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
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
Thank you for your consideration.

Sincerely,

  
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United States Senator

  
SUSAN M. COLLINS  
United States Senator

  
JEB BRADLEY  
United States Representative

  
JUDD GREGG  
United States Senator

  
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**Congress of the United States**  
**Washington, DC 20515**

July 19, 2005

Mr. Philip E. Coyle  
BRAC Commission  
521 South Clark Street  
Suite 600  
Arlington, VA 22202


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**Washington, DC 20515**

July 19, 2005

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Chairman, BRAC Commission  
521 South Clark Street  
Suite 600  
Arlington, VA 22202


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
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
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Arlington, VA 22202

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
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
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