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## United States Senate

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August 10, 2005

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BRAC Commission

**AUG 17 2005**

Received

The Honorable Anthony Principi  
Chairman  
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission  
2521 S. Clark St., Suite 600  
Arlington, VA 22202

Dear Chairman Principi:

Thank you for your service as Chairman of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, and for affording the Mississippi delegation an opportunity to testify at the regional hearing in New Orleans regarding the critical importance of military installations in our State. As highlighted during that hearing, the Department of Defense (DoD) substantially deviated from the BRAC law when developing their recommendations regarding Keesler Medical Center, the 186<sup>th</sup> Air Refueling Wing, Naval Station Pascagoula, and the Navy Human Resources Service Center.

With particular regard to Naval Station Pascagoula, this letter forwards additional new information and data for consideration by the Commission. As noted by the attached memorandum, DoD's analysis deviated from the BRAC law in at least two fundamental respects. First, the Department clearly relied on transformational factors and priorities other than section 2913(f) selection criteria. Secondly, DoD substantially deviated from section 2913(e) by failing to fully evaluate the cost implications of assigning realigned missions from Naval Station Pascagoula to other installations. Further, DoD failed to evaluate the cost implications of assigning future and homeland defense missions to installations other than Naval Station Pascagoula.

I would greatly appreciate consideration of this new information and data by the Commission. The prospective abandonment of a permanent Naval presence in the Gulf is extremely troubling given the nature and extent of critical energy resources and defense infrastructure in the region. Naval Station Pascagoula is a virtually new, state-of-the-art base that is uniquely sized and located to best support current, future, surge, and homeland defense missions in the Gulf of Mexico. With kind regards, I am,

Sincerely yours,



Trent Lott

Memorandum Regarding Substantial Deviation from BRAC Law of Department of Defense  
Recommendation to Close Naval Station Pascagoula

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**Executive Summary**

The Department of Defense (DoD) proposes to close Naval Station Pascagoula, and relocate its ships, personnel, and support equipment to Naval Station Mayport, FL. Closure of Naval Station Pascagoula, coupled with the prospective closure of Naval Station Ingleside, will completely eliminate the permanent presence of Navy surface ships in the Gulf of Mexico.

Abandonment of a permanent presence in the Gulf is particularly troubling given the nature and extent of high-value infrastructure in the region. Specifically, the Gulf waters and coast include over 90% of US offshore oil and gas production, 30% of our gas and oil reserves, 50% of our busiest ports, and critical defense infrastructure that builds and supports more than 50% of our Naval Fleet.

DoD's recommendation regarding closure of Naval Station Pascagoula significantly deviates from the BRAC law in at least two fundamental respects. First, the Department relied on transformational factors and priorities other than section 2913(f) selection criteria. Specifically, no analysis was performed regarding the implications of abandoning "Strategically Dispersed Homeports," a current mission requirement that was codified in 1986. Additionally, the data-call for the 2005 BRAC round was substantially similar to the data-call utilized for 1995 BRAC round, clearly favoring "blue water" operations and Fleet concentration in lieu of the Navy's "future mission" priorities of coastal and littoral operations. Finally, there is no evidence that the Department's assessment considered "homeland defense" requirements articulated by the North American Aerospace Defense Command and United States Northern Command.

Secondly, DoD substantially deviated from section 2913(e) of the BRAC law by failing to evaluate the cost and merit of employing Pascagoula Naval Station to support current and future missions in the Gulf of Mexico, including homeland defense. In addition, it is not evident that the Navy considered the cost of upgrading and/or constructing new infrastructure at Key West or Pensacola to facilitate a continued Gulf Coast presence. Further, the Department failed to evaluate the merit and cost of realigning "homeland defense" type ships to Naval Station Pascagoula, particularly the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) – a ship that was specifically designed to address emerging threats in coastal waters, such as the Gulf of Mexico. Also, DoD failed to assess the value and efficiency of surge capability afforded by robust berthing, industrial, and training capability of Ingalls shipyard which builds over 50% of the Navy's ships and is located a mere 100 yards from Naval Station Pascagoula.

As only 1 of 2 highly efficient "Smart Bases," Naval Station Pascagoula is a virtually new, state-of-the-art base that is optimally sized and located to support the current, future, and homeland defense mission in the Gulf of Mexico. Naval Station Pascagoula is the only facility on the Gulf Coast that effectively leverages proximate infrastructure in the community, industry, and other military installations to provide a full range of mission and family services with no additional overhead cost to the Navy.

Memorandum Regarding Substantial Deviation from BRAC Law of Department of Defense  
Recommendation to Close Naval Station Pascagoula

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## **Introduction**

The Department of Defense's (DoD) recommendation regarding closure of Pascagoula Naval Station is in contravention of the BRAC statute, and should not be ratified. The Department's analysis inappropriately relied on transformational factors and priorities other than section 2913(f) selection criteria, failing to consider current missions, future missions, and homeland defense missions. Specifically, the 2005 Navy's data call was substantially similar that that utilized for the 1995 BRAC assessment, reflecting an unreasonable bias towards eliminating all homeports in the Gulf of Mexico by consolidating surface/subsurface operations in Fleet concentration areas. However, unlike the 1995 BRAC round, the Navy's bias towards fleet concentration was not mitigated in their 2005 analysis by the Strategic Dispersal Homeport Program which mandates that Naval homeports be dispersed from main fleet concentration areas, implementing the militarily sound principles of dispersal, battlegroup integrity, and increasing the naval presence in the geographic flanks.

Further, DoD contravened section 2913(e) of the BRAC law by failing to evaluate the cost efficiency of Pascagoula Naval Station at supporting and delivering littoral and homeland defense capability in the Gulf of Mexico. In addition, DoD failed to evaluate the value, efficiency, synergy, and surge capability afforded by robust berthing, industrial, and training capability of Ingalls shipyard which is immediately proximate to the Naval Station.

### **I. The Recommendation**

Close Naval Station Pascagoula, MS. Relocate its ships along with dedicated personnel, equipment, and support to Naval Station Mayport, FL; Relocate the ship intermediate repair function to Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activity Mayport, Florida. The justification for this recommendation is:

Reduce excess berthing capacity while allowing for consolidation of surface ships in a Fleet concentration area. Sufficient capacity and Fleet dispersal is maintained with East Coast surface Fleet homeports of Naval Station Norfolk and Naval Station Mayport, FL. Gulf Coast presence can be achieved as needed with available Navy ports and Naval Air Station Key West, FL and Naval Air Station Pensacola, FL.

### **II. DoD's Recommendation Regarding Naval Station Pascagoula Substantially Deviates from Requirements of the BRAC Law**

1. DoD relied on transformational factors and priorities other than section 2913(f) selection criteria.

The military value criteria of section 2913(f) requires that the Department consider: (1) The current and future mission capabilities and the impact on operational readiness of the total force; and (2) The availability and condition of land, facilities, and associated airspace (including training areas suitable for maneuver by ground, naval, or air forces throughout a

diversity of climate and terrain areas and staging areas for the use of the Armed Forces in homeland defense missions) at both existing and potential receiving locations.

- a. The Navy did not perform any analysis regarding the cost/benefit analysis of abandoning the “Strategic Dispersal Homeport Program,” a current mission requirement that was codified in 1986, and was supported in subsequent budgets for Naval Station Pascagoula as recent as the President’s Budget request for 2005.

The Navy and Congress significantly debated the “Strategic Dispersal Homeport Program” between 1982 and 1985, and the Congress approved the program in 1986 in the Fiscal Year 1987 National Defense Authorization Act and respective Appropriations Act for that year. The Navy’s rationale for the program, revalidated when the Navy and Congress reconsidered the Program in 1991, was as follows:

- i. Avoid Overcrowding - Dispersing the ships to the 13 selected sites was necessary to avoid overcrowding at the Navy’s homeports as the Navy grew towards the 600-ship goal (CRS Report IB90077).

While there is a relationship between size of the Navy and the infrastructure that supports it, the decline in the quantity of ships from that era (approximately 600) to today’s projected level of 325 – 375 does not necessarily mean that overcrowding is not an issue. Rather, since the Navy continued to support military construction at dispersed homeports as recent as Fiscal Year 2005, it is arguable that fleet concentration areas have the space but not the right or sufficient infrastructure to support ships that would be relocated from the dispersed homeports.

- ii. Reduce Vulnerability to Pearl Harbor-like Attack – This argument focused on the threat of torpedo or cruise missile attacks from new, quieter Soviet submarines operating near U.S. ports, or a mining campaign by either those submarines or Soviet-bloc merchant ships (CRS Report IB90077).

While it is arguable that the Soviet threat has been significantly reduced, it is clear that a robust submarine threat from China is emerging. In addition, worldwide proliferation of highly capable and stealthy diesel submarines exacerbates the vulnerability of critical assets in the Gulf of Mexico.

In this regard, the Commission is strongly encouraged to receive a classified threat and vulnerability assessment of Fleet concentration areas to better understand the emerging threats from traditional and asymmetric opponents.

- iii. Move Closer to Operating Areas – Dispersing ships would move some of the Navy’s surface ships closer to operating areas in the northern North Atlantic, the North and Northwest Pacific, and the Caribbean. To the extent that the focus of US defense policy shifts away from the scenario of a war with the Soviets, and toward non-Soviet, non-NATO military contingencies, the importance of being closer to the Northern North Atlantic and the North and Northwest Pacific would appear to be reduced, while the importance of being close to the Caribbean would appear to be strengthened. (CRS Report IB90077).

Movement of Pascagoula based ships to Norfolk and Mayport clearly relocates critical Navy assets away from the Caribbean. But even more troubling is that DoD's BRAC recommendations move ships significantly further away from the newest and highest priority operating area - homeland defense in the Gulf of Mexico.

- iv. Improve Training and Recruiting – Dispersing ships would give the Navy better access to more diverse training environments (CRS Report IB90077).

Since implementing the Strategic Dispersal Homeport Program in 1986, the Navy has predominately consolidated training at Great Lakes Training Center and Fleet Concentration Areas. However, the Navy has not consolidated all training.

Specifically, Ingalls shipyard in Pascagoula still performs specialized and familiarization training for most surface combatants and all amphibious ships. In addition, specialized training is provided by the 2<sup>nd</sup> Air Force at Keesler Air Force Base and Naval Education and Training Command (NETC) at Pensacola. Riverine training and small boat maintenance training is also conducted proximate to Pascagoula by Special Operations Command and Naval Small Craft Training School located in the Stennis Space Center Buffer Zone.

- v. Expand Infrastructure and Preserve Industrial Base – Dispersing surface ships would enhance the Navy's overall readiness for a major war by expanding its infrastructure and preserving the Navy's supporting industrial base (CRS Report IB90077).

Naval Station Pascagoula is immediately proximate (across the channel) from Ingalls shipyard where 50% of surface combatants and all Navy amphibious ships are designed and constructed. The Naval base is uniquely situated to leverage and preserve this core national industrial capability and further reduce operating costs by relying on the hundreds of subcontractors proximate to Ingalls that support in-service ships.

As recently demonstrated during the repair of USS COLE, there is a natural synergy between the Naval Station's Ship Intermediate Maintenance Activity and Ingalls with regard to maintenance and repair of in-service ships. The ships homeported at the Naval Station, particularly the "Smart Ship" USS TICONDEROGA, leveraged the latest technology from Ingalls to reduce manning and decrease ship operating costs.

To be clear – this memorandum does not dispute that the BRAC Law affords flexibility to consider closure of homeports. To be certain, Section 2911 of the FY1991 defense authorization bill as reported by the House-Senate conference committee (H.R. 4739) inserts "homeport facility for any ship," in to 10 U.S.C. 2687(e) (1), making it clear that ship home ports are included under 10 U.S.C. 2687, which outlines procedures and conditions for carrying out military base closures and realignments (*Congressional Record*, daily ed., Oct 23, 1990).

Rather, it is asserted that the Navy contravened the military value criteria of section 2913(f) by omitting any analysis regarding abandonment of the Strategic Dispersal

Homeport Program, and the impact of eliminating strategically dispersed homeports on the operational readiness of the total force.

- b. The Navy's military value criteria for the 2005 BRAC round is substantially similar to the military value criteria utilized for the 1995 BRAC round, and does not appropriately consider "future mission capabilities."

Navy Infrastructure Evaluation Group (IEG) minutes of 25 March 2004 reflect deliberations regarding the establishment of criteria and weighting for the surface/subsurface operations review. The 5 "surface/subsurface attributes" approved by the group included operational infrastructure, operational training, port characteristics, environmental encroachment and personnel support.

Upon examination of *Attachment (1)*, it is evident that the data call regarding the surface/subsurface attributes are highly biased towards facility size, proximity to capabilities uniquely found in Fleet concentration areas, and nuclear ship/submarine berthing, operation, and maintenance. Specifically, 52% of "Operational Infrastructure" questions are biased against smaller installations; 42% of "Operational Training" questions indicate a similar bias; and 30% of questions regarding "Port Characteristics" also reflect this bias.

The Navy's military criteria ignore future mission capabilities of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), solely relying on the "Cruiser Equivalent" as the principal metric. As noted by *Attachment (2)*, the primary factors for consideration include linear feet of berthing, pier and slip width, shore power, and hotel/support services. By using these criteria, the Navy disadvantages Naval Station Pascagoula by ignoring the base's cost and mission efficiency of supporting smaller future ships such as the LCS and future frigates.

By example, a primary enabler of LCS is the Fire Scout Unmanned Aerial Vehicle. Pascagoula Naval Station received no credit for being proximate to the Fire Scout assembly plant, which will support maintenance, repair and training for the vehicles. Nor did the Naval Station receive credit for being proximate to multiple LCS subcontractors that are located in Pascagoula (e.g., Lockheed, Raytheon, Bofors).

- c. The Navy's military value criteria utilized for the 2005 BRAC round does not appropriately consider "homeland defense missions."

The only reference to "homeland defense" in the Navy's data call is the question (*Attachment (1)*), question SEA -15), "Does your activity perform any of the following missions? (y/n) – Homeland Defense? (y/n)"

On its face, question SEA-15 only reflects the declaration of "Homeland Defense" missions that are currently performed, and makes no attempt to consider or value prospective homeland defense mission requirements.

Further, there is no evidence that the Navy's data call for surface/subsurface operations, or subsequent deliberations by the Navy IEG ever reflected specific homeland defense

and homeland security recommendations articulated by the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM) in their letter of 29 Oct 2004 (*Attachment ( 3)*).

In particular, the NORTHCOM/NORAD letter urges that:

“DoD BRAC recommendations should consider homeland defense and homeland security requirements identified in the emerging DoD Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support. We want to ensure that impacts to our missions and possible unintended consequences to our capability are taken into account in any BRAC adjustments.”

Specific NORAD/NORTHCOM recommendations of 29 Oct 2004 that affect current and prospective missions of Naval Station Pascagoula include:

- i. Providing a secure operating environment for focused strategic, asymmetric, counterterrorism, counterintelligence and law enforcement sensitive intelligence and information fusion efforts in support of homeland defense, maritime analysis, and civil support operations. The “Joint Fires Network Unit” (also known as LSS and DCGS-N) located at Naval Station Pascagoula performs this function.
- ii. Department of Homeland Security’s provision of homeland security. The USCG presence at the Naval Station directly supports this mission.
- iii. Quick reaction force, rapid reaction force, and JTF-CS responses. This is a mission that LCS could execute from Naval Station Pascagoula to protect high value shipping lanes, ports, oil/gas reserves, and oil production in the gulf. Currently, USCG has asserted that they can only protect 12 of over 4000 oil platforms in the Gulf of Mexico for a period of 8 days.
- iv. Homeland defense-related intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, to include over the horizon radar sites. The “Joint Fires Network Unit” located at Naval Station Pascagoula performs this function.

With regard to further definition of the prospective homeland defense mission in the Gulf, *Attachment (4)*, presents the unclassified testimony of FBI Special Agent Jarboe before the US House of Representatives, Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs and International Relations. Of particular note, Agent Jarboe states:

“The high volume of maritime traffic in the large ports, both commercial and noncommercial, provide ample cover for the movement of illicit goods. Eleven of the top 15 ports in trade volume in the United States and 6 of the top 10 ports in volume of foreign trade are located on the Gulf of Mexico. It is a concern that terrorist organizations could take advantage of well-established, well-known criminal patterns to further their own objectives, such as concealing money laundering operations, transport and distribution of explosives and/or hazardous materials, or illegal entry into the United States.”

Agent Jarboe's comments are very unique in that they unclassified; the Commission is strongly encouraged to receive a classified assessment regarding emergent threats, vulnerability, and prospective response in the Gulf of Mexico.

By *Attachment (5)*, pertinent statistics are presented regarding the diversity and extent of vulnerable assets in the Gulf of Mexico, for which the homeland defense mission requirements are still under development. Of particular note, the Gulf contains 4021 energy production platforms, accounting for 93% of US offshore oil production and approximately 98% of US gas production. Further, as noted previously, the Gulf Coast includes the Nation's busiest ports, and even one terrorist attack would seriously injure our nation's economy.

2. DoD contravened section 2913(e) of the BRAC law by failing to evaluate the cost efficiency of Pascagoula Naval Station of supporting future missions in the Gulf of Mexico, including homeland defense.
  - a. The Navy erred in not evaluating any scenarios that considered the merit and cost of supporting future missions at the Pascagoula Naval Station in lieu of Key West and Pensacola.

The Infrastructure Steering Group briefing of 8 October 2004, "Department of the Navy Strategy/Initial Scenarios," includes only 1 scenario: (1) Close NAVSTA Pascagoula and relocate ships to NAVSTA Norfolk or NAVSTA Mayport; consolidate shore intermediate maintenance activity with SIMA Norfolk or SIMA Mayport.

The justification for this recommendation is that money would be saved by closing the installation (largely from elimination of military and civilian billets); NAS Key West and Pensacola allow for presence in the Gulf (assuming NAVSTA Ingleside is closed); and Mayport better supports ships' mission in support of JIATF south Operations.

There is no evidence that the Navy considered the cost efficiency of realigning current and future missions to Naval Station Pascagoula – 1 of only 2 "Smart Bases." In addition, it is not evident that the Navy considered the facilities cost of upgrading and/or building-new infrastructure at Key West or Pensacola to allow for continuation of a Gulf Coast presence.

By the Navy's own data, Naval Air Station Key West has no capability to handle ordnance pierside. Further, ship support capability at Naval Air Station Pensacola is extremely limited due to the age and condition of pier facilities, and limited pier services.

- b. The Navy erred in not evaluating the merit and cost of continuing and growing presence at Naval Station Pascagoula to address homeland defense requirements in the Gulf of Mexico, particularly with regard to homeporting LCS.

It is troubling that the Navy has performed no analysis regarding the cost/benefit of its de facto decision to base LCS Flight 1 ships at Little Creek, as compared to other locations, including Naval Station Pascagoula.

LCS was specifically designed to perform a full range of littoral homeland defense missions to address emerging threats in coastal waters, such as the Gulf of Mexico. Emphasizing this point, Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development, and Acquisition) John Young recently noted in an interview with *Defense Daily*, published August 9, 2005:

“The LCS was pushed forward rapidly because it is needed to meet threats in coastal waters, where much of the fighting in the 21<sup>st</sup> century will occur.”

“The three chief LCS missions are hunting enemy submarines, detecting and neutralizing underwater mines, and intercepting and destroying tiny “swarm” boats piloted by terrorists.”

As the 1997 Smart Base demonstrator, it is arguable that Naval Station Pascagoula is tailor made to homeport an LCS squadron. The base is highly efficient, reflecting state of the art and optimally-sized facilities for ships and crew, with minimal manning. In addition, the Naval Station reflects the “city base” concept, effectively leveraging existing infrastructure in the community, industry, and other military installations to provide a full range of mission and family services with no additional overhead cost to the Navy.

- c. The Navy erred in not evaluating the merit and cost of enclaving the “Joint Fires Network Unit,” and only proposes to relocate the system to the Mayport Area.

As an element of Navy Force Net, the Joint Fires Network was specifically located at Naval Station Pascagoula to provide a secure operating environment for focused strategic, asymmetric, counterterrorism, counterintelligence and information fusion efforts in support of homeland defense, maritime analysis, and civil support operations.

The Navy’s analysis did not consider that the Joint Fires Network was purposefully located and centered on the Gulf Coast to support missions of Navy, USCG, and other agencies in the Gulf of Mexico. Further, the Navy did not assess the cost of conducting this critical mission in the Gulf of Mexico from an unspecified location in Mayport, FL.

The Commission should be aware that the Maritime Domain Awareness Asymmetric Warfare Initiative, to be conducted 15-19 August 2005, was designed to demonstrate and refine system capabilities at Pascagoula. Participants include the Navy, Coast Guard, NORTHCOM, FBI, other federal agencies, first responders, and the Mississippi Civil Support Team.

The Commission is strongly urged to receive a classified briefing regarding the Joint Fires Network, including the associated investment for highly secure facilities.

3. DoD contravened section 2913(e) of the BRAC law by failing to assess the value and efficiency of surge capability afforded by robust berthing, industrial, and training capability of Ingalls shipyard which is immediately proximate to the Naval Station.
  - a. The Navy erred in failing to evaluate the cost, merit, and strategic surge value of being located across the channel from Northrop Grumman Ship Systems – Ingalls Shipyard.

Notwithstanding Northrop Grumman – Newport News shipyard, Ingalls is the larger of the 2 remaining shipyards in the United States that builds complex surface ships for the U.S. Navy. In the aggregate, Ingalls has the industrial and waterfront capability to simultaneously build and berth over 15 large surface ships.

In calendar year 2000, Ingalls, with weapons offload and other support provided by Naval Station Pascagoula, repaired the USS COLE, following the US Navy's policy to repair significantly damaged ships at the ship's original building-yard. Ingalls possesses the only US Navy certified drydock in the Gulf of Mexico, and is only 1 of 2 docks east of the Mississippi that can drydock a large deck amphibious ship (LHD or LHA, 900 feet in length, 42000+ tons).

Ingalls offers robust surge capability for the Navy to berth all types of surface ships, excluding aircraft carriers. And, in view of Ingalls former role as builder of nuclear submarines, it is arguable that submarines could at least be berthed at Ingalls if surge requirements warranted.

It is not evident that the Navy assessed the value and efficiency of using Ingalls as proximate surge capability for Naval Station Pascagoula. To the contrary, the military value criteria (*Attachment (1)*), SEA 1 through SEA 9, give preference for CVN capable facilities, nuclear capable shipyards, homeporting of SSBNs, and pierside capability resident only at the Naval Station.

In the aggregate, the Navy afforded little or no military value for world class berthing, docking, repair, training, and maintenance capability that is a mere 100 yards from Naval Station Pascagoula.

### **III. Conclusion**

The nation requires a permanent Naval presence in the Gulf of Mexico to protect over 90% of US offshore oil and gas production, 30% of our gas and oil reserves, more than 50% of our busiest ports, and critical defense infrastructure that builds and supports more than 50% of our Naval Fleet.

Naval Station Pascagoula is the Navy's "Smart Base," the most highly efficient, appropriately sized, cost effective, and geographically proximate base from which the Navy should execute current missions, future missions, and homeland defense in the Gulf of Mexico.

DoD substantially deviated from the BRAC statute in developing the recommendation to close Naval Station Pascagoula by its failure to consider and analyze the implications of abandoning the Strategic Dispersal Homeport Program, future LCS missions in the Gulf of Mexico, and Homeland Defense missions articulated by NORAD and NORTHCOM.

DoD substantially deviated from the BRAC statute by failing to fully assess the cost of maintaining a permanent surface ship presence in the Gulf from remote locations at Mayport and Norfolk.

DoD substantially deviated from the BRAC statute by failing to fully assess the cost of maintaining a permanent surface ship presence in the Gulf of Mexico from Naval Air Station Pensacola and Naval Air Station Key West.

DoD substantially deviated from the BRAC statute by failing to fully assess the cost and readiness implications of losing synergy and robust surge capability afforded by the proximity of the Naval Station to Ingalls shipyard.

In the aggregate, these substantial deviations from the BRAC statute are sufficient and compelling, and serve as a valid basis upon which the BRAC Commission may set-aside DoD's recommendation to close Naval Station Pascagoula.

**Surface / Subsurface Operations**  
**Military Value Evaluation Questions**

Attribute: Operational Infrastructure

Component: Ship Berthing

~~SEA-1. Relative ability to berth multiple naval combatants.~~

SEA-1. What is the maximum combined CG Equivalent (CGE) capacity for your activity's piers / wharves? (CGEs)

Source: *Capacity Data Call*

*Based on largest combined CGE value received from field, analyst will apply a function for zero credit to a maximum credit corresponding to this value.*

~~SEA-2. Relative number of CVNs that can be berthed in cold iron status.~~

SEA-2. How many CVNs can you berth at your activity in cold iron status? (Count)

Source: *Capacity Data Call*

*Based on largest CVN berthing value received from field, analyst will apply a function for zero credit to a maximum credit corresponding to this value.*

~~SEA-3. Infrastructure supports homeporting of SSBNs.~~

SEA-3. Does the installation have the ability to homeport SSBNs to include the ability to meet weapons stowage, transportation, maintenance, and handling requirements?

Source: *Data Call II*

*Binary value*

~~SEA-4. Relative condition of the piers~~

SEA-4. What is the combined total linear feet of berthing for your piers / wharves in the following categories:

Adequate Linear Feet	Substandard Linear Feet	Inadequate Linear Feet

Source: *Capacity Data Call*

*Based on largest Adequate and Substandard (with .5 factor) Linear Feet value received from field, analyst will apply a function for zero credit to a maximum credit corresponding to this value.*

Surface / Subsurface Operations-Military Value Evaluation Questions

Attribute: Operational Infrastructure

Component: *Ship Berthing (continued)*

SEA-5. Relative value of pier modernization.

SEA-5. What is the combined total linear feet of berthing for your piers / wharves which completed construction on or after 1 Jan 1990? (Amplification: Construction includes major overhauls which significantly advanced the functionality of the piers commensurate with modern pier construction.)

*Source: Data Call II*

*Based on largest value received from field, analyst will apply a function for zero credit to a maximum credit corresponding to this value.*

SEA-6. Relative value of pier Internet Protocol (IP) infrastructure.

SEA-6. What is the combined total linear feet of berthing for your piers / wharves which are configured with Internet Protocol (IP) connectivity?

*Based on largest value received from field, analyst will apply a function for zero credit to a maximum credit corresponding to this value.*

*Source: Data Call II*

Surface / Subsurface Operations-Military Value Evaluation Questions

Attribute: Operational Infrastructure

Component: *Ship Maintenance Capability*

~~SEA-7a-b. Relative value of the on-base IM facility in terms of capability and capacity.~~

SEA-7a. (0.6) What is the Maximum Capacity Index for Ship Maintenance for your on-base IM facilities (DLH) divided by the maximum combined CG Equivalent (CGE) capacity for your activity's piers / wharves.

*Source: Capacity Data Call (2 values)*

*Ratio of DLH to CGE to normalize capacity to ships berthing ability. Analyst will apply function for zero to maximum credit.*

SEA-7b. (0.2) Is your nearest IM facility nuclear capable? (y/n)

*Source: Capacity Data Call*

*Binary value.*

SEA-7c. (0.2) What is the Maximum Capacity Index for Ship Maintenance for your on-base IM facilities (DLH).

*Source: Capacity Data Call (2 values)*

*Analyst will apply function for zero to maximum credit.*

~~SEA-8a-b. Relative value of the available drydocks in the harbor complex.~~

SEA-8a. (0.25) How many NAVSEA certified floating drydocks are in your natural harbor complex? (Count)

*Source: Data Call II*

*Based on largest value received from field, analyst will apply a function for zero credit to a maximum credit corresponding to this value.*

SEA-8b. (0.75) How many NAVSEA certified graving drydocks are in your natural harbor complex? (Count)

*Source: Data Call II*

*Based on largest value received from field, analyst will apply a function for zero credit to a maximum credit corresponding to this value.*

~~SEA-9. Relative value of proximity to the nearest nuclear capable shipyard.~~

SEA-9. What is the distance (safe navigation route) from your pier / wharf complex to the nearest nuclear capable shipyard? (Distance: nautical miles)

*Source: Data Call II*

*Based responses received, analyst will apply a function for zero credit to a maximum credit corresponding to this value.*

**Surface / Subsurface Operations-Military Value Evaluation Questions**

**SEA-10. Degaussing range available in the natural harbor complex.**

SEA-10. Is there a degaussing range in the natural harbor complex? (y/n)

*Source: Data Call II*

*Binary value.*

**Attribute: Operational Infrastructure**

**Component: Ship Maintenance Capability (continued)**

**SEA-11. Deperming facility available in the natural harbor complex.**

SEA-11. Is there a deperming facility in the natural harbor complex? (y/n)

*Source: Data Call II*

*Binary value.*

**SEA-12. Relative pier-side capable crane lift availability.**

SEA-12. What is the maximum lift tonnage for any individual pier-side capable crane at your activity? (Tonnage)

*Source: Capacity Data Call*

*Based on maximum tonnage received by the field , analyst will apply a function for zero credit to a maximum credit corresponding to this value.*

**Surface / Subsurface Operations-Military Value Evaluation Questions**

Attribute: Operational Infrastructure

Component: Specialized Security / Emergency Services

~~SEA-13. Relative value of specialized security / emergency services capabilities:~~

SEA-13. Does the activity have specialized security / emergency service capabilities: (y/n)

<u>Capability</u>	<u>Yes/No</u>
Nuclear Weapons Security Requirements of Berthed SSBNs (0.25)	
Nuclear Weapons Handling (y/n) (0.25)	
Nuclear Weapons Radiological Accident Response (y/n) (0.25)	
Nuclear Reactor Radiological Accident Response (y/n) (0.25)	

*Source: Data Call II*

*Binary values.*

**Surface / Subsurface Operations-Military Value Evaluation Questions**

Attribute: **Operational Infrastructure**

Component: **Unique or Specialized Capabilities / Missions**

**SEA-14. Relative value of unique capabilities or missions:**

SEA-14. List and describe any unique capabilities or missions performed by your activity. Unique is defined as a capability or mission performed at no other location.

Capability/Mission	Description

Source: *Data Call II*

Based upon responses received, IEG will evaluate and assign credit.

**SEA-15. Relative value of specialized capabilities or missions:**

SEA-15. Does your activity perform any of the following missions?: (y/n)

Capability/Mission	Yes/No	Explanation/Description
Homeland Defense		
Strategic Deterrence Missions		
Special Warfare		
Surveillance / Drug Interdiction		
Mine Warfare		
Landing Craft Capability (displacement or non-displacement)		

Source: *Data Call II*

Based upon responses received, IEG will evaluate and assign credit.

Surface / Subsurface Operations-Military Value Evaluation Questions

Attribute: Operational Infrastructure

Component: *Weapons Handling Capability*

~~SEA-16. Relative value of ordnance handling pier capacity for your waterfront piers/wharves.~~

SEA-16. What is the combined maximum ordnance handling pier capacity for your waterfront piers / wharves?  
(Count) (Amplification: Maximum number of ships that can be moored to conduct ordnance handling evolutions at  
the combined pier / wharf complex.)

*Source: Capacity Data Call*

*Based on responses received, analyst will apply a function for zero credit to maximum credit.*

~~SEA-17. Relative value of on-base ordnance storage capability and capacity.~~

SEA-17. What is the total of current and appropriated ordnance capacity (tons) divided by the maximum combined  
CG Equivalent (CGE) capacity for your activity's piers / wharves?

*Source: Capacity Data Call*

*Ratio of tons over CG Equivalents. Based on responses received, analyst will apply a function for zero  
credit to maximum credit.*

**Surface / Subsurface Operations-Military Value Evaluation Questions**

**Attribute: Operational Infrastructure**

**Component: Operational Staff Facilities**

**SEA-18. Relative capacity of adequate administrative space**

SEA-18. What is the total square footage of adequate administrative space at your activity divided by the maximum combined CG equivalent? (SQ FT)

*Source: Capacity Data Call*

*Ratio of SQ FT to CG Equivalents. Based on responses received, analyst will apply a function for zero credit to a maximum credit corresponding to this value.*

Surface / Subsurface Operations-Military Value Evaluation Questions

Attribute: Operational Training

Component: Training Facilities

SEA-19. Relative value of proximity to the nearest shipboard firefighting training facility.

SEA-19. What is the distance to the nearest shipboard firefighting training facility? (Distance: miles)

Source: *Data Call II*

*Based on responses received, analyst will apply a function for zero to maximum credit.*

SEA-20. Relative value of proximity to the nearest damage control training facility.

SEA-20. What is the distance to the nearest damage control training facility? (Distance: miles)

Source: *Data Call II*

*Based on responses received, analyst will apply a function for zero to maximum credit.*

SEA-21. Relative value of proximity to the nearest submarine training facility.

SEA-21. What is the distance to the nearest submarine training facility? (Distance: miles)

Source: *Data Call II*

*Based on responses received, analyst will apply a function for zero to maximum credit.*

SEA-22. Relative value of unique training capabilities.

SEA-22. List any unique operational training facilities at your activity (defined as facility which exists at no other location).

Facility Title (text)	Specific Location (text)	Training Objective (text)

Source: *Capacity Data Call*

*Based upon responses received, IEG will evaluate and assign credit.*

SEA-23. Relative value of proximity to the nearest ship handling training facility.

SEA-23. What is the distance to the nearest ship handling training facility? (Distance: miles)

Source: *Data Call II*

*Based on responses received, analyst will apply a function for zero to maximum credit.*

**Surface / Subsurface Operations-Military Value Evaluation Questions**

**Attribute:** Operational Training

**Component:** *Training Facilities (continued)*

~~SEA-24. Relative value of throughput for all local "C", "F", and other "pipeline" training schools.~~

SEA-24. What is the annual throughput for all "C", "F", and other pipeline training schools located within 50 miles of your activity?

*Source: Capacity Data Call*

*Based on responses received, analyst will apply a function for zero credit to a maximum credit.*

Surface / Subsurface Operations-Military Value Evaluation Questions

Attribute: Operational Training

Component: OPAREAs / Ranges

SEA-25. Relative value of proximity to the nearest anti-air warfare range.

SEA-25. What is the transit distance (safe navigation route) to the nearest anti-air warfare range? (Distance: nautical miles)

*Source: Data Call II*

*Based on responses received, analyst will apply a function for zero to maximum credit.*

SEA-26. Relative value of proximity to the nearest naval gunnery qualification range.

SEA-26. What is the transit distance (safe navigation route) to the nearest naval gunnery qualification range? (Distance: nautical miles)

*Source: Data Call II*

*Based on responses received, analyst will apply a function for zero to maximum credit.*

SEA-27. Relative value of proximity to the nearest submarine operating area.

SEA-27. What is the transit distance (safe navigation route) to the nearest submarine operating area? (Distance: nautical miles)

*Source: Data Call II*

*Based on responses received, analyst will apply a function for zero to maximum credit.*

SEA-28. Relative value of proximity to the nearest mine warfare training area.

SEA-28. What is the transit distance (safe navigation route) to the nearest mine warfare training area? (Distance: nautical miles)

*Source: Data Call II*

*Based on responses received, analyst will apply a function for zero to maximum credit.*

SEA-29. Relative value of proximity to the nearest submarine training range.

SEA-29. What is the transit distance (safe navigation route) to the nearest submarine training range? (Distance: nautical miles)

*Source: Data Call II*

*Based on responses received, analyst will apply a function for zero to maximum credit.*

Surface / Subsurface Operations-Military Value Evaluation Questions

Attribute: Operational Training

Component: *Small Arms Training*

~~SEA-30. Relative capability of the small arms range.~~

SEA-30. What is the maximum throughput of your activity's small arms range divided by the maximum combined CG Equivalent? (qualifications/year/CGE's)

*Source: Capacity Data Call*

*Ratio of qualifications/year to CG Equivalents. Based on responses received, analyst will apply a function for zero credit to a maximum credit corresponding to this value.*

**Surface / Subsurface Operations-Military Value Evaluation Questions**

**Attribute:** Port Characteristics

**Component:** Operational Location

**SEA-31: Relative value of the transit distance (safe navigation route) to sea.**

SEA-31. What is the channel distance (safe navigation route) to sea? (Distance: nautical miles)

*Source: Capacity Data Call*

*Based on responses received, analyst will apply a function for zero to maximum credit.*

**SEA-32: Relative value of the transit distance (safe navigation route) to the 50 fathom curve.**

SEA-32. What is the transit distance (safe navigation route) to the 50 fathom curve? (Distance: nautical miles)

*Source: Data Call II*

*Based on responses received, analyst will apply a function for zero to maximum credit.*

**SEA-33: Percent of the day the harbor channel allows CV/CVN transits.**

SEA-33. What percent of the day (averaged for FY03) would your harbor channel allow CV/CVN transits? (%)

*Source: Data Call II*

*Analyst will apply a function to answers from zero to 100 percent.*

**SEA-34a-b: Relative impact of local weather on operations.**

SEA-34a. (0.8) In the table below, provide the percent of ship underways and arrivals delayed more than three hours due to weather.

	% Delay CY00	% Delay CY01	% Delay CY02	% Delay CY03
JAN				
FEB				
MAR				
APR				
MAY				
JUN				
JUL				
AUG				
SEP				
OCT				
NOV				
DEC				

*Source: Data Call II*

*Based on responses received, analyst will apply a function for zero credit to a maximum credit.*

**Surface / Subsurface Operations-Military Value Evaluation Questions**

Attribute: Port Characteristics

Component: Operational Location (continued)

SEA-34b. (0.2) In the table below, provide the number of calendar days inport lost due to weather related emergency sorties.

	CY00	CY01	CY02	CY03
# of Days Lost				

Source: Data Call II

Based on maximum value received, analyst will apply a function for zero credit to a maximum credit corresponding to this value.

**SEA-35: Relative value of proximity to the nearest weapons station**

SEA-35. What is the transit distance (safe navigation route) to the nearest weapons station? (Distance: nautical miles)

Source: Data Call II

Based on responses received, analyst will apply a function for zero to maximum credit.

**SEA-36: Relative value of proximity to the nearest Explosive Ordnance Detachment support**

SEA-36. What is the distance to the nearest Explosive Ordnance Detachment support? (Distance: miles)

Source: Data Call II

Based on responses received, analyst will apply a function for zero to maximum credit.

**Surface / Subsurface Operations-Military Value Evaluation Questions**

**Attribute:** *Port Characteristics*

**Component:** *Strategic Location*

**SEA-37:** *Port location is of strategic military value.*

SEA-37. What is the geographic location of the installation?

*Source: Capacity Data Call*

*IEG determines which locations are of strategic military value.*

Surface / Subsurface Operations-Military Value Evaluation Questions

**Attribute:** *Port Characteristics*

**Component:** *Port Restrictions*

~~SEA-38: Relative impact of port/harbor restrictions on operations.~~

SEA-38. What percent of the week (averaged over FY03) was your harbor's operations limited due to dredging or other restrictions? (%)

Restriction	Percentage (%)
Dredging	
Other	

*Source: Data Call II*

*Analyst will apply a function to answers from zero to 100 percent.*

Surface / Subsurface Operations-Military Value Evaluation Questions

Attribute: Port Characteristics

Component: Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection

~~SEA-39a-b. Relative value of buildings which meet structural criteria and/or perimeter standoff criteria?~~

SEA-39a. (0.4) What total square footage of your buildings comply with structural criteria (frame, walls, glazing, etc.) contained in DoD Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for Buildings (UFC 4-010-01)?

Source: Data Call II

Based on responses received, analyst will apply a function for zero credit to a maximum credit.

SEA-39b. (0.6) What total square footage of your buildings meet the minimum perimeter standoff distance distances as specified in DoD Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for Buildings (UFC 4-010-01)?

Source: Data Call II

Based on responses received, analyst will apply a function for zero credit to a maximum credit.

~~SEA-40. Adequate space available for Entry Control points to have vehicle search, holding areas, and rejection lanes.~~

SEA-40. Is adequate space available for all Entry Control Points (ECPs) to have vehicle search, holding areas, and rejection lanes as specified in UFC 4-010-01?

Source: Data Call II

Binary value.

~~SEA-41. Relative value of utility (government or commercial; electric or water) redundancy.~~

SEA-41. Is the installation supported by an electric or water utility (government or commercial) that is a single point source (no redundant capability)?

Source: Data Call II

Installation will receive 0.5 points for each listed utility that has redundancy.

**Surface / Subsurface Operations-Military Value Evaluation Questions**

**Attribute: Port Characteristics**

**Component: Locality Cost**

**SEA-42a-b. Relative value of the locality cost.**

SEA-42a. (0.5) What is the GS Locality Pay percentage for your activity's geographical area? (%)

*Source: Data Call II (Criterion 7)*

*Based on maximum value, analyst will apply a function for zero credit to a maximum credit corresponding to this value.*

SEA-42b. (0.5) What is your host installation's Area Cost Factor (ACF) as described in the DoD Facilities Pricing Guide? (Number)

*Source: Data Call II*

*Based on maximum value, analyst will apply a function for zero credit to a maximum credit corresponding to this value.*

**Attribute: Port Characteristics**

**Component: Supply and Storage**

**SEA-43. Relative value of proximity to the nearest Fleet and Industrial Supply Center.**

SEA-43. What is the distance from your activity to the nearest Fleet and Industrial Supply Center? (Distance: miles)

*Source: Data Call II*

*Based on responses received, analyst will apply a function for zero credit to a maximum credit.*

**Surface / Subsurface Operations-Military Value Evaluation Questions**

**Attribute: Environment and Encroachment**

**Component: Dredging**

**ENV-1a-c. Relative value of known impediments to conducting dredging operations**

ENV-1a. (1.0) Does your harbor/channel require dredging operations?

*Source: Data Call II*

*Binary. If no, full credit is applied. If yes, ENV-1b-c. apply.*

ENV-1b. (0.75) Is a dredge spoil site identified? If so what is the remaining capacity?

*Source: Capacity Data Call*

*Based on percentage of capacity remaining, analyst will apply a function for zero credit to a maximum credit corresponding to this value.*

ENV-1c. (0.25) Is dredging activity impacted because of the known or suspected presence of ordnance in the water?

*Source: Capacity Data Call*

*Binary value.*

Surface / Subsurface Operations-Military Value Evaluation Questions

**Attribute:** Environment and Encroachment

**Component:** Land Constraints

**ENV-2a-g. Relative value of land constraints at the installation and its outlying real property which restrict current operations.**

ENV-2a. (0.2) Do electromagnetic radiation and/or emissions constrain operations?

*Source: Capacity Data Call*

*Binary value. Credit is applied for a "no" response.*

ENV-2b. (0.2) Are explosive safety waivers or exemptions in effect?

*Source: Capacity Data Call*

*Binary value. Credit is applied for a "no" response.*

ENV-2c. (0.2) Can existing Explosive Safety Quantity Distance (ESQD) arcs be expanded by 100 feet or more without encroaching on non-compatible areas and without requiring a special waiver?

*Source: Capacity Data Call*

*Binary value.*

ENV-2d. (0.1) Do any sites with high archeological potential, including sacred, Traditional Cultural Properties, or burial sites used by Native People, constrain current or future construction?

*Source: Capacity Data Call*

*Binary value. Credit is applied for a "no" response.*

ENV-2e. (0.1) Has the accommodation of the installation's missions been limited by existing or proposed activities of other military departments or other federal tribal state or local agencies being located on the installation, range or auxiliary field?

*Source: Capacity Data Call*

*Binary value. Credit is applied for a "no" response.*

ENV-2f. (0.1) Do wetlands result in restrictions on operations?

*Source: Capacity Data Call*

*Binary value. Credit is applied for a "no" response.*

**Surface / Subsurface Operations-Military Value Evaluation Questions**

***Attribute: Environment and Encroachment***

***Component: Land Constraints***

ENV-2g. (0.1) Are there operational testing/training restrictions as a result of the presence of Threatened and Endangered Species (TES), candidate species, biological opinions or sensitive resource areas?

*Source: Capacity Data Call*

*Binary credit. Credit is applied for a "no" response.*

**Surface / Subsurface Operations-Military Value Evaluation Questions**

**Attribute:** *Environment and Encroachment*

**Component:** *Encroachment*

**ENV-3a-c. Relative value of external encroachments which restrict operations:**

ENV-3a. (0.4) Have non-DoD parties (through developers, community organizations, etc.) formally requested transfer of DoD real property or proposed restrictions to operational procedures?

*Source: Data Call II*

*Binary value. Credit is applied for a "no" response.*

ENV-3b. (0.4) Are there hazardous waste contamination sites located off the installation that restrict or could restrict operations?

*Source: Capacity Data Call*

*Binary value. Credit is applied for a "no" response.*

ENV-3c. (0.2) Have noise abatement procedures been published for the installation, range or auxiliary field?

*Source: Capacity Data Call*

*Binary value. Credit is applied for a "no" response.*

**Surface / Subsurface Operations-Military Value Evaluation Questions**

**Attribute: Environment and Encroachment**

**Component: Environmental Costs**

**ENV-4: Relative value of the costs associated with conducting the installation's environmental program.**

ENV-4. Excluding DERA funds, provide the average annual total cost of environmental fees, studies, permits, licenses, projects, etc., over the last 3 fiscal years (FY01-03). Provide the annual installation budget over this same period. Divide the environmental costs by the installation budget.

*Source: Data Call II*

*Based on response received, analyst will apply a function for zero credit to a maximum credit.*

**Surface / Subsurface Operations-Military Value Evaluation Questions**

**Attribute:** *Environment and Encroachment*

**Component:** *Waste Disposal*

**ENV-5a-c: Relative value of the capacity to dispose of solid or hazardous waste**

ENV-5a. (0.4) Does the installation have a permitted hazardous waste Resource Conservation and Recovery (RCRA) Treatment, Storage or Disposal (TSD) facility? (0.2) If so, does the hazardous waste TSD facility permit allow acceptance of off-site waste? (0.2)

*Source: Capacity Data Call*

*Two binary values.*

ENV-5b. (0.4) If the installation has a permitted solid waste disposal facility, what is the remaining capacity?

*Source: Capacity Data Call*

*Based upon maximum capacity remaining, analyst will apply a function for zero credit to a maximum credit corresponding to this value.*

ENV-5c. (0.2) Does the installation have an interim or final RCRA Subpart X permit for operation of an open burning/open detonation facility? (0.1) If so, does the RCRA Subpart X permit allow acceptance of off-site waste (e.g. from other DoD facilities)? (0.1)

*Source: Capacity Data Call*

*Two binary values.*

Surface / Subsurface Operations-Military Value Evaluation Questions

Attribute: Environment and Encroachment

Component: *Potable Water*

~~ENV-6a-b. Relative value of potable water resource constraints.~~

ENV-6a. (0.25) Can the existing water system/treatment facility provide 50% more water than current demand?

*Source: Capacity Data Call*

*Binary value.*

ENV-6b. (0.75) How many days during FY 1999-2003 were restrictions implemented that limited production or distribution?

*Source: Capacity Data Call*

*Based on responses received, analyst will apply a function for zero credit to a maximum credit.*

Surface / Subsurface Operations-Military Value Evaluation Questions

**Attribute:** Environment and Encroachment

**Component:** Natural Resource Considerations

**ENV-7a. c. Relative value of restrictions to in-water operations or testing/training activities conducted at the installation or at ranges that the installation manages due to environmental laws/regulations**

ENV-7a. (0.4) Do current Endangered Species/Marine Mammal Protection Act restrictions affect shore or in-water operations or testing/training activities conducted at the installation or at a range that the installation manages?

*Source: Capacity Data Call*

*Binary value. Credit is applied for a "no" response.*

ENV-7b. (0.4) Does the existence of marine sanctuaries restrict operations, testing or training activities conducted on the installation or on ranges the installation manages?

*Source: Capacity Data Call*

*Binary value. Credit is applied for a "no" response.*

ENV-7c. (0.2) Has the presence of coral reefs, marine mammals, Essential Fish Habitat, Marine Protected Areas or other sensitive marine zones resulted in restrictions on operations, testing or training activities?

*Source: Capacity Data Call*

*Binary value. Credit is applied for a "no" response.*

Surface / Subsurface Operations-Military Value Evaluation Questions

Attribute: Environment and Encroachment

Component: Air Quality

~~ENV-8a-g. Relative value of air quality control issues due to current or proposed regulations.~~

ENV-8a. (0.2) Have operations, testing or training been restricted as a result of air quality requirements?

*Source: Capacity Data Call*

*Binary value. Credit is applied for a "no" response.*

ENV-8b. (0.2) Has the installation been required to implement emission reduction procedures through special actions?

*Source: Capacity Data Call*

*Binary value. Credit is applied for a "no" response.*

ENV-8c. (0.1) Are there critical air quality regions within 100 statute miles of the installation that restrict operations?

*Source: Capacity Data Call*

*Binary value. Credit is applied for a "no" response.*

ENV-8d. (0.2) Is the installation, range, or auxiliary field located in an area currently designated non-attainment or maintenance for any criteria pollutant?

*Source: Capacity Data Call*

*Binary value. Credit is applied for a "no" response.*

ENV-8e. (0.1) Is the installation, range, or auxiliary field located in an area proposed to be designated non-attainment for the new 8-Hour ozone or the PM2.5 standard?

*Source: Capacity Data Call*

*Binary value. Credit is applied for a "no" response.*

ENV-8f. (0.1) Are emission credits owned by the installation or available for purchase in the area?

*Source: Capacity Data Call*

*Binary value.*

ENV-8g. (0.1) Do the Clean Air Act (CAA) operating permits have any unused capacity?

*Source: Capacity Data Call*

*Binary value.*

Surface / Subsurface Operations-Military Value Evaluation Questions

Attribute: Personnel Support

Component: *Medical*

PS-1. Located within the medical catchment area of an in-patient military medical treatment facility.

PS-1. Is your activity within the medical catchment area of an in-patient military medical treatment facility?  
(yes/no)

*Source: Data Call II*

*Binary.*

Surface / Subsurface Operations-Military Value Evaluation Questions

Attribute: Personnel Support

Component: Housing

PS-2. Relative value of family housing availability, affordability and proximity.

PS-2a (0.25) What is the community rental vacancy rate?

*Source: Data Call II (Criteria 7 question)*

*Based on responses received, analyst will apply a function for zero to maximum credit.*

PS-2b. (0.25) What is the BAH (E-5 with dependents) for the locality as of 1 Jan 2004?

*Source: Data Call II (Criteria 7 question)*

*Based on responses received, analyst will apply a function for zero to maximum credit.*

PS-2c. (0.25) What was the average wait time (in months) for family housing, including Public Private Venture (PPV) units, at your installation as of 30 September 2003?

$$\text{Avg Wait Time} = \frac{(\text{List}_1 \text{ Wait Time} \times \text{List}_1 \text{ Units}) + (\text{List}_2 \text{ Wait Time} \times \text{List}_2 \text{ Units}) + \dots}{\text{Total Housing Units}}$$

*Source: Data Call II*

*Based on responses received, analyst will apply a function for zero to maximum credit.*

PS-2d. (0.25) What is the average commute time for those living off base (source: Census Bureau)? (Time: minutes)

*Source: Data Call II*

*Based on responses received, analyst will apply a function for zero to maximum credit.*

PS-3. Relative availability of unaccompanied and transient housing.

PS-3a. (0.25) What is the total number of adequate Bachelor Quarters (combined officer and enlisted; both current and budgeted) at your installation divided by the total military population as of 30 Sep 2003?

*Source: Capacity Data Call*

*Ratio of number of rooms per active duty population. Based on responses received, analyst will apply a function for zero to maximum credit.*

PS-3b. (0.75) What was the total number of non availabilities issued over the past five years (1999-2003) divided by the total number of transient rooms as of 30 Sept. 2003 at your installation?

*Source: Capacity Data Call*

*Ratio of number of non-availabilities per total number of transient rooms. Based on responses received, analyst will apply a function for zero to maximum credit.*

**Surface / Subsurface Operations-Military Value Evaluation Questions**

**Attribute: Personnel Support**

**Component: Non-Military Education**

**PS-4: Relative value of dependent primary and secondary education opportunities in the local community.**

PS-4a. (0.4) What was the average SAT/ACT score for high school students in your community last testing year? (numeric)

*Source: Data Call II (Criterion 7)*

*Based on responses received, analyst will apply a function for zero credit to a maximum credit.*

PS-4b. (0.3) What is your community's student/teacher ratio? (Amplification: Local Community is defined as the Military Housing Area (MHA)).

*Source: Data Call II (Criterion 7)*

*Based on responses received, analyst will apply a function for zero credit to a maximum credit.*

PS-4c. (0.3) What percent of classroom teachers in your community (MHA) are certified in their subject/core area? (%)

*Source: Data Call II (Criterion 7)*

*Analyst will apply a function to answers from zero to 100 percent.*

**PS-5: Relative availability of dependent and member post-secondary education in the local community.**

PS-5a. (0.4) Does your state offer in-state tuition for higher education for military members/military family members? (yes/no)

*Source: Data Call II (Criterion 7)*

*Binary value.*

PS-5b. (0.2) How many vocational/technical schools are available off base in your community (MHA)? (count)

*Source: Data Call II (Criterion 7)*

*Based on responses received, analyst will apply a function for zero credit to a maximum credit.*

PS-5c. (0.4) How many undergraduate or graduate colleges/universities are available off-base in your community (MHA)? (count)

*Source: Data Call II (Criterion 7)*

*Based on responses received, analyst will apply a function for zero credit to a maximum credit.*

**Surface / Subsurface Operations-Military Value Evaluation Questions**

**Attribute: Personnel Support**

**Component: Employment**

**PS-6. Relative opportunity for dependent/off-duty employment.**

PS-6a. (0.5) What was the average number of persons unemployed as a percent of the civilian labor force, seasonally adjusted from 1995-2003? (%)

*Source: Data Call II (Criterion 7)*

*Based on responses received, analyst will apply a function for zero credit to a maximum credit.*

PS-6b. (0.5) What was the percentage change in job growth from 1995-2003? (%)

*Source: Data Call II (Criterion 7)*

*Based on responses received, analyst will apply a function for zero credit to a maximum credit.*

Surface / Subsurface Operations-Military Value Evaluation Questions

Attribute: Personnel Support

Component: Fleet and Family Services

PS-7: Relative availability of base services

PS-7. Which Support Services facilities are located at your installation? (y/n)

<u>FACILITY</u>	<u>Available (yes/no)</u>	<u>Value</u>
Exchange		0.3
Commissary		0.3
Package Store		0.1
Family Service Center		0.1
Chapel		0.1
FSC Classroom/Auditorium		0.1

Source: *Capacity Data Call*

Binary values.

PS-8a-c: Relative availability of child care support

PS-8a. (0.5) What is the average wait to enroll (in days) for on-base child care? (Count: days)

Source: *Data Call II*

Based on responses received, analyst will apply a function for zero credit to a maximum credit.

PS-8b. (0.5) How many licensed and/or accredited child care centers do you have in your community (MHA)?

Source: *Data Call II (Criterion 7)*

Based on responses received, analyst will apply a function for zero credit to a maximum credit.

Surface / Subsurface Operations-Military Value Evaluation Questions

Attribute: Personnel Support

Component: MWR

PS-9. Relative availability of MWR facilities

PS-9. Which MWR facilities are located at your installation? (y/n)

FACILITY	Available (yes/no)	Value
Gymnasium		0.1
Fitness Center		0.1
Pool (indoor)		0.1
Pool (outdoor)		0.1
Golf Course		0.1
Youth Center		0.1
Enlisted Club		0.1
Officer Club		0.1
Softball Fld		0.02
Swimming Ponds		0.02
Library		0.01
Theater		0.01
ITT		0.01
Museum/Memorial		0.01
Wood Hobby		0.01
Bowling		0.01
Beach		0.01
Tennis CT		0.01
Volleyball CT (outdoor)		0.01
Basketball CT (outdoor)		0.01
Racquetball CT		0.01
Driving Range		0.01
Marina		0.01
Stables		0.01
Football Fld		0.01
Soccer Fld		0.01

Source: Data Call II

Binary value.

**Surface / Subsurface Operations-Military Value Evaluation Questions**

**Attribute: Personnel Support**

**Component: Follow-on Tour Opportunities**

**PS-10. Relative opportunity for follow-on tour in the homeport**

PS-10. For the top five sea intensive ratings in the principle warfare community your base supports, provide the following: (Text: Counts)

Rating	# of Sea Billets in Local Area	#of Shore Billets in Local Area

*Source: Data Call II*

*Based on responses received, analyst will apply a function for zero credit to a maximum credit.*

**Surface / Subsurface Operations-Military Value Evaluation Questions**

**Attribute:** Personnel Support

**Component:** Metropolitan Area Characteristics

**PS-11: Relative proximity to a population center/city that has a population greater than 100,000.**

PS-11. What is the distance in miles to the nearest population center/city that has a population greater than 100,000?

*Source: Data Call II (Criterion 7)*

*Based on responses received, analyst will apply a function for zero credit to a maximum credit.*

**PS-12: Relative proximity to the nearest commercial airport that offers regularly scheduled service by a major airline carrier.**

PS-12. What is the distance in miles to the nearest commercial airport that offers regularly scheduled service by a major airline carrier?

*Source: Data Call II (Criterion 7)*

*Based on responses received, analyst will apply a function for zero credit to a maximum credit.*

**PS-13: Relative local crime rate.**

PS-13. What is the FBI Crime Index for your activity's location (MHA)? (source: FBI Crime Index 2002; <http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/ucr.htm>) (Numeric)

*Source: Data Call II (Criterion 7)*

*Based on responses received, analyst will apply a function for zero credit to a maximum credit.*



# Surface/Subsurface Ops

- **Principle Metric – The Cruiser Equivalent (CG-E)**
  - “The pier space, power, dredge depth and other resource requirements to berth a CG-47 class ship.”
  - **Primary Ship Berthing Factors**
    - Linear Feet of Berthing
    - Pier and Slip Width
    - Other hotel/support services (Steam, Potable Water, CHT, etc.)
    - Normalized by the use of the Cruiser Equivalent (CG-E)
  - **Other Factors**
    - Normal Pier Loading and Max Capacity
    - Maintenance Support (IMAs, Drydocks)
    - Ordnance Handling
    - Non-Availability due to Pier Maintenance/Slip Dredging
  - **Need to determine percent inport paradigm based on ship type**
    - Based on historical loading?
    - Impact of Fleet Response Plan?



**NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND  
AND  
UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND**



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9999 Joint Chiefs of Staff Pentagon  
Washington DC 20318-9999

Dear Dick

We believe that DoD BRAC recommendations should consider homeland defense and homeland security requirements identified in the emerging DoD Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support. We want to ensure that impacts to our missions and possible unintended consequences to our capabilities are taken into account in any BRAC adjustments. An initial list of NORAD-USNORTHCOM considerations is attached in order to help identify BRAC changes that may be problematic.

We request the opportunity to work with the DoD BRAC team to ensure that homeland defense and homeland security missions receive appropriate attention in BRAC-recommended adjustments and scenario development. We would also like to provide a Commander's assessment of the final BRAC proposal prior to SECDEF decision.

Thank you for your consideration of these requests. We look forward to working with you and the Services to reconfigure our current infrastructure in order to maximize warfighting capability and efficiency without generating undue risk to our operations in defense of the homeland.

Sincerely

RALPH E. EBERHART  
General, USAF

Attachment:  
Point Paper, BRAC Considerations for NORAD and USNORTHCOM

## POINT PAPER

### ON

#### BRAC CONSIDERATIONS FOR NORAD AND USNORTHCOM

- The following considerations reflect an initial analysis of NORAD and USNORTHCOM critical capabilities to assist the BRAC process in making informed recommendations.
- NORAD and USNORTHCOM are prepared to work with the appropriate BRAC teams to develop more defined metrics
- NORAD and USNORTHCOM require installations that support:
  - Air patrols in support of Operation Noble Eagle (N/J3)
  - Ground-based midcourse missile defense, to include missile interceptor assets and associated radar locations (NC/J3)
  - Maritime homeland defense to include maritime patrol aircraft--affects on collocated US Coast Guard Stations must be considered (NC/J3 and NC/J5)
  - Aerospace warning, aerospace control, aerospace defense, Integrated Tactical Warning/Attack Assessment (ITW/AA), and integrated air defense of the National Capital Region (N/J3 and N-NC/J6)
  - CBRNE consequence management response forces, including the deployment of the Joint Task Force Civil Support (JTF-CS) initial entry force (NC/J3, N-NC/J4 and JTF-CS)
  - Homeland defense-related intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, to include over the horizon radar sites (N-NC/J2)
  - Quick reaction force, rapid reaction force, and JTF-CS responses (NC/J3 and N-NC/J4)
  - The deployment of Standing Joint Forces Headquarters-North for operations in the USNORTHCOM AOR (N-NC/J4 and SJFHQ-N)
  - Continuity of operations, and support provision of homeland defense command and control functions (N-NC/J2, NC/J3 and N-NC/J6)
  - Key C4ISR communications nodes, gateways, teleport/step sites (N-NC/J6)
  - Sites which are part of the Global Information Group-Bandwidth Expansion program or which provide redundant communications connectivity (N-NC/J6)

- 
- Joint national training capability aligned with OSD's training transformation initiative (N-NC/J1 and N-NC/J7)
  - Department of Homeland Security's provision of homeland security (NC/J3)
  - Future basing for an epidemiological analysis and event detection center for the purpose of integrated early warning (N-NC/SG)
  - CBRN detection, identification, analysis, and health risk mitigation capabilities to include medical and environmental surveillance, clinical diagnosis, psychological preparedness, and mass prophylaxis distribution (N-NC/SG)
  - Providing definitive medical treatment, medical command and control on a regional basis, proximity to ground and air evacuation assets, proximity to strategically capable air and sea ports, and a federal coordinating center (N-NC/SG)
  - Designated defense health sector critical infrastructure (N-NC/SG)
  - Providing a secure operating environment for focused strategic, asymmetric, counterterrorism, counterintelligence and law enforcement sensitive intelligence and information fusion efforts in support of homeland defense, maritime analysis, and civil support operations (N-NC/J2)
  - Civil support, to include responsive effective logistics to support Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Territory Logistics Centers and FEMA mobilization centers (N-NC/J4)

## Congressional Testimony

**Testimony of James F. Jarboe, Special Agent in Charge, Tampa Division, FBI  
Before the U.S. House of Representatives, Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs and  
International Relations  
August 5, 2002**

### **"Homeland Security: Facilitating and Securing Seaports"**

Good afternoon Chairman Shays, and members of the subcommittee. I am pleased to have the opportunity to appear before you to discuss seaport security. Ever present in everyone's mind are the threats of terrorist violence against US interests "anywhere in the world" that have been issued by international terrorist Usama bin Laden, his organization Al-Qaeda, and sympathetic groups. The FBI and other components of the US Intelligence Community, as well as foreign intelligence services, are currently tracking a large volume of threats emanating from these sources. The Al-Qaeda network continually refines its operational capabilities by experimenting with variations on suicide bombing techniques to inflict mass casualties, including vehicle bombings against embassies, maritime attacks against naval vessels, and hijacking of commercial airliners. These attacks and capabilities illustrate the range of threats posed by extremists affiliated with international terrorist organizations like Al-Qaeda.

Intelligence bulletins have been issued in relation to the potential of a broad range of attack scenarios including acts involving weapons of mass destruction, plots to attack bridges and financial institutions and fuel refineries, plots to use small aircraft for suicide attacks, and possible interest in crop dusting capabilities, commercial drivers licenses with hazardous material endorsements, and an offensive SCUBA diver capability.

Domestic extremist groups continue to pose a threat. In fact, domestic terrorists have committed the majority of terrorist attacks in the United States. Between 1980 and 2000, the FBI recorded 335 incidents or suspected incidents of terrorism in this country. Of these, 247 were attributed to domestic terrorists, while 88 were determined to be international in nature. The domestic terrorist threat is divided into three general categories--left-wing, right-wing, and special interest (or single issue). Right-wing terrorism activity in Central Florida is diffuse and uncoordinated, thanks in part to the arrest of Donald Beauregard, the leader of the Southeastern States Alliance, by the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force. Beauregard was involved in a conspiracy to commit acts of terror that included raids of National Guard Armories for the purpose of stealing weapons to further use in attempts to disable energy facilities, communication centers and law enforcement offices. Environmental extremists and anarchists could pose a threat to port security. Further, terrorists have an increasingly sophisticated array of weapons and capabilities available to them. Weapons of mass destruction (WMD)--explosive, chemical, biological, or radiological in nature--represent a real-world threat to ports. Information regarding these types of weapons is disseminated through such means as the World Wide Web.

The Tampa Division of the FBI encompasses 18 central Florida counties from the Gulf of Mexico to the Atlantic coast. Central Florida is a focal point for travelers and tourists within the State of Florida offering a complete range of transportation systems including major seaports. Central Florida encompasses several theme parks and beaches along Florida's central coast on both the Atlantic and Gulf coasts. Since Walt Disney World in Orlando is the number one tourist destination in the country, it impacts the total population of the entire region. Additionally, there were more than 40 million visitors in Orange County in 2000 and more than 15.7 million in the Tampa Bay area. The Tampa Bay area is a secondary focal point for travelers within the State of Florida offering a wide variety of tourist attractions and numerous large-capacity venues hosting international, professional, and collegiate sporting events. In addition, the associated supporting transportation systems have their own set of particular security concerns.

There are six commercial international airports within Central Florida located in Melbourne, Orlando, Tampa, St. Petersburg, Sarasota and Fort Myers. There is one non-international commercial airport in Naples. There are six major railway stations located in Orlando, Tampa, St. Petersburg, Sarasota, Fort Myers and Naples. The numerous rail lines traversing Central Florida predominantly carry freight versus passengers. The four seaports include the facilities at Tampa, Manatee, and Saint Petersburg on the Gulf and Port Canaveral on the Atlantic seaboard. The Port of Tampa is the largest seaport in Florida and the tenth largest in the nation. The consequence of the varied transportation networks within Florida is high volume truck, rail, and maritime traffic, an increased mobility of transient population, the flow of international commodities, and a parallel increase in being susceptible to criminal enterprise.

Trent Lott Memo 8/10/05  
ATTACHMENT 4

The Port of Tampa is centrally located in downtown Tampa within 10 miles of MacDill Air Force Base. The Port of Tampa is the busiest port in Florida in terms of raw tonnage and stores approximately 50% of the extremely hazardous chemicals in the State of Florida. Of major significance is that the Port of Tampa is non-contiguous property, encompassing more than 2,500 acres of land. Generally, the port represents an appealing target of opportunity for would be terrorists. The port is immense, accessible from land, sea and air. The port is adjacent to a large population of civilians and vital regional and national infrastructure, including power facilities, water facilities, and Headquarters of United States Central Command and United States Special Operations Command at MacDill Air Force Base. The port contains such hazards as liquid propane gas, anhydrous ammonia, and chloride.

Central Florida also has some of the richest phosphate deposits in the world. The western counties are dependent on this phosphate-based industry. Fifty percent of the Florida's hazardous materials are stored within Hillsborough County and 25% within Polk County. Major storage of extremely hazardous substances (EHSs) and other chemicals are located in this industrialized area and are vulnerable to accidental, malicious, and acts-of-nature releases. In 1993, the United States EPA conducted chemical audits of the three anhydrous ammonia terminals located on Tampa Bay - CF Industries, located on Hooker's Point, Farmland Hydro, L.P. and IMC-Agrico, both located on Port Sutton Road on Port Sutton Channel. The audit revealed that the three terminals represent nearly 92.5 percent of Hillsborough County's total amount of anhydrous ammonia (NH3) inventories.

Individually, each of the three ammonia terminals pose a risk to the surrounding community and the effect of three facilities, in close proximity with such massive quantities, pose even greater risk. A 1998 survey showed that these three facilities had outstanding safety records. Safety standards have undergone continual improvement with each passing year.

In addition, many hazardous materials shipments originate in the Port of Tampa and move through Hillsborough County and beyond. A large volume of hazardous material travels through the area via railroads, highways, waterways, and pipelines on a daily basis. In particular, ammonia is transported by tank truck, rail car, and pipeline to fertilizer plants in Polk County. Chlorine is primarily transported by tank trucks and barges to waste water treatment plants. Residents throughout the county are vulnerable to the release- intentional or accidental, of transported hazardous materials.

South Florida, in particular, is ideally located to serve as the US gateway to and from the Americas. The nearness of the US Gulf Coast to Latin America makes it an obvious entry point for maritime traffic. Most of the cargo headed to ports in the Gulf originates from source and transit nations in Latin America, especially Mexico, Venezuela and Colombia. In addition, an extensive network of rail and truck lines allow for fast and efficient delivery of all types of goods, both legitimate and illegitimate, to markets throughout the US and Canada.

The coast of the Gulf of Mexico has hundreds of miles of relatively open shoreline that separate the major ports - Houston, Texas; New Orleans, Louisiana; and Tampa, Florida. While these major ports have a major presence of law enforcement and security, the open shoreline and smaller ports leaves the Florida coast open to a variety of criminal activity.

The high volume of maritime traffic in the large ports, both commercial and noncommercial, provide ample cover for the movement of illicit goods. Eleven of the top 15 ports in trade volume in the United States and 6 of the top 10 ports in volume of foreign trade are located on the Gulf of Mexico. It is a concern that terrorist organizations could take advantage of well-established, well-known criminal patterns to further their own objectives, such as concealing money laundering operations, transport and distribution of explosives and/or hazardous materials, or illegal entry into the United States. Specifically, bulk and containerized cargo freighters, fishing vessels, recreational boats and tugs, and cruise ships, all of which operate from Florida coasts, each provide unique potential for exploitation by terrorists as well as other criminal organizations.

Large bulk and containerized cargo pose a smuggling risk in the major ports of the Eastern and Gulf coasts. Most container traffic along the Gulf Coast consists of perishable goods like fruits and vegetables. Although Tampa and Port Manatee's container traffic is considerably less than the ports of Houston, New Orleans and Gulfport, Mississippi, Tampa is ranked fifth among Gulf ports receiving significant quantities of non-liquid bulk imports. Non-liquid bulk imports into the Port of Tampa are led by shipments of sand and gravel from Mexico, Canada and the Bahamas; sulfur from Mexico and Chile; and cement and concrete from Colombia, Venezuela and Europe.

The fishing industry represents a major presence along Florida's coastline. Fishing vessels at the numerous fishing ports of all sizes constitute a secondary risk in the region. The Gulf of Mexico is home to one of the largest fishing fleets in the United States. Moreover, the region contains 5 of the top 10 U. S. fishing ports in terms of total catch. More than 18,000 commercially documented fishing vessels operate from numerous bayous inlets, rivers and bays along the Gulf Coast. Many of these vessels travel back and forth throughout the Gulf between fishing ports, large and small, following the seasonal migrations of fish as permitted by fishing regulations. The transient nature of the industry and the abundance of vessels provide ample occasion for boats engaged in smuggling activity to blend in, either transporting drugs (or explosives), directly from overseas or participating in transfers offshore.

Recreational boating and tugs and barges operating near the border are additional risks. Although there are over 750,000 private vessels registered in the state of Florida, these small private vessels generally receive less law enforcement attention. The numerous recreational vessels and sailboats travel freely along the southern Gulf Coast of Florida. Foreign tugs usually transfer barges to local tugs, giving the impression that a barge entering a Gulf port is local.

The primary home of the cruise ship industry in the United States is South Florida. Port Canaveral is among the nation's top five cruise ports in terms of revenue and on the Gulf Coast. Vessels depart from Port Canaveral and the Port of Tampa for destinations throughout the Caribbean and Central and South America.

To address the concerns expressed above, the law enforcement community together with private industry and multi-disciplinary agencies such as fire/rescue, HAZMAT operations, and Florida Emergency Management has made concerted efforts in educating, training, practicing, and preparing for contingency scenarios. Through combined actions of a host of agencies preventive measures have been carefully considered and implemented. Not the least of these has been the development of several anti-terrorism task forces and specifically focused working groups and intelligence exchange forums. Participants in the working groups have been carefully selected by each represented agency for their subject matter knowledge and experience, and jurisdictional roles.

The Tampa FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force is not a recent development but was formed in the mid-90s. Over the past several years, they have developed an aggressive outreach program comprised of four distinctive components of the terrorism preparedness program. It is important to note that the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force and Special Agent/WMD coordinators in the Tampa Division are experienced and knowledgeable focal points for all terrorism and WMD investigative matters. In addition to contingency plan development (1), the program includes training seminars (2), tabletop and field exercises (3), and threat assessments (4). From January 1999 through September 2000, Tampa Division has provided terrorism training for many first responders from all safety and law enforcement disciplines. Agents have conducted approximately 60 WMD and terrorism presentations and participated in 17 tabletop and full-field exercises. Furthermore, threat assessments have been researched and prepared for 12 special counter-terrorism preparedness events, such as the NHL Hockey All-Star Game at the Tampa Ice Palace (near the Port); Super Bowl XXXV including the Gasparilla Pirate's Parade/Super Bowl Sunday pre-game events along Bayshore Boulevard; the USS LASSEN ship commissioning ceremony, and US Central Command and US Special Operations Command change of command ceremonies at the Marriott Waterside.

Specifically, in June 99, the State of Florida Division of Emergency Management hosted a statewide WMD Terrorism Summit through a grant from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) at which FBI Special Agents gave presentations on the threat potential to Central Florida. The purpose of this Summit was to solicit input from first responders prior to drafting a statewide terrorism response strategy. This forum was an excellent opportunity to connect with Federal agency counterparts on both crisis management and consequence management. Since attending the Summit, FBI Special Agents have assisted in writing and reviewing WMD Incident Response Plans for numerous agencies and large capacity entertainment complexes, ensuring consistent response and coordination with the FBIHQ WMD Incident Contingency Plan. Furthermore, the FBI Special Agent/WMD Coordinators have made specific efforts to establish productive liaison with the emergency management community at the state and county level by visiting county Emergency Operations Centers (EOC) and including the Directors of each in working groups and training programs. Florida EOCs are pro-active in planning for response to incidents of the use of WMD by preparing annexes to their frequently implemented hurricane response plans.

Of particular note in the exercise arena, in March 2000, the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force coordinated a major 17-agency countywide field exercise involving a terrorist takeover of an anhydrous ammonia industrial facility at

the Port of Tampa. This scenario was chosen to incorporate a response from sea and air assets as well as traditional law enforcement and fire rescue/emergency teams. The exercise was preceded by a one-day seminar for mid-level crisis managers and supervisors. Evaluations of the exercise were incorporated in later threat assessments, contingency plans, and grant requests.

Law enforcement personnel from throughout the greater Tampa Bay area participate in several formal terrorism working groups that address both domestic and international terrorism matters and WMD response issues. The FBI regularly participates in the State of Florida Regional Domestic Security Task Force (RDSTF), the Central Florida Statewide Terrorism Intelligence Networking Group (STING), the Florida Intelligence Unit (FIU), the Tampa Bay Area Intelligence Unit (TBAIU), the MacDill Air Force Base Counter Intelligence/Counter Terrorism Working Group, the Tampa Bay Harbor Safety Committee, the Tampa Bay Metropolitan Medical Response System Steering Committee and the Port Security Working Group. These forums are composed of a broad spectrum of law enforcement investigators and intelligence analysts, military intelligence and command personnel, and also include professionals from the security departments of major private enterprises such as electric power companies, railways, and industry representatives when appropriate. The joint approach to intelligence sharing, investigation and crisis management has served Central Florida extremely well. Thanks to recent efforts undertaken by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, FBI intelligence analysts now have access to a statewide terrorism database called THREATNET. The establishment of this database will be key to coordinating pertinent elements of pending investigations, for example patterns of activity, vehicle tags, subject names and aliases, as well as common meeting areas.

The Tampa Bay Port Security Working Group, led by the US Coast Guard, was established in April 2000 as a result of the Interagency Commission on Crime in US Seaports and has five sub-committees that report on a bi-monthly basis. The FBI regularly participates in the Port Security Working Group meetings and heads the Terrorism Sub-Committee. The FBI's role in these committees is to provide threat analyses and to disseminate intelligence that affects safe operation of the port facilities. Somewhat unique to this forum is the integration of private industry and Fire/Hazmat chiefs of both City of Tampa and Hillsborough County as members of the FBI JTTF. Input provided by the emergency management and fire/safety sectors of our community is essential to successful preparedness.

The FBI has encouraged state, county, and local response community leaders to conduct an appropriate needs and vulnerability self-assessment to determine which federal domestic training courses and programs would be of value. The State of Florida conducted a statewide vulnerability assessment of seaports. Although this assessment was funded by the State Office of Drug Control and primarily focused on drug countermeasures, it also assessed port access, credentialing, and security. Issues raised through this assessment are being addressed through the Port Security Working Group. The interagency cooperation is evident in the daily coordination between management staff, investigators, and intelligence personnel of each agency on issues where we have common interests.

## Gulf of Mexico Caucus

ALABAMA · FLORIDA · LOUISIANA · MISSISSIPPI · TEXAS

*Chairwoman:* Rep. Katherine Harris (R - 13<sup>th</sup> Florida)



# GULF OF MEXICO CAUCUS *BACKGROUND*

## *Mission Statement*

The Gulf of Mexico has earned the nickname the "Mediterranean of the Americas" due to its strategic importance to the Western Hemisphere. The waters of the Gulf possess a wealth of critical natural resources, while providing vital commercial and transportation links between the nations of North America, Latin America, and the Caribbean. Moreover, as one of the most prosperous regions in the world, the eleven U.S. and Mexican states that border the Gulf confront numerous opportunities and challenges – such as economic development, homeland security, and environmental protection -- which arise uniquely as a consequence of their shared water boundary.

The Gulf of Mexico Caucus strives to heighten awareness of this collective destiny and its impact upon America's future while influencing the major public policy debates that continue in Congress and across the nation regarding fair trade, foreign aid, immigration, port security, environmental stewardship, and energy independence. Specifically, the Caucus disseminates research and crafts legislation, while engaging elected officials, constituents, businesses, and community leaders in a unified effort to promote prosperity and security throughout the Gulf region.

The Caucus focuses its endeavors in three core areas:

- ***Economic Development:*** The Caucus endeavors to improve the socioeconomic conditions in the five U.S. Gulf states through transportation and infrastructural improvements, the promotion of tourism, faster, cleaner, and cheaper cargo transportation, and the expansion of U.S. exports.
- ***Homeland Security:*** The Caucus seeks to enhance the protection of America's southern border, placing a particular spotlight upon port security.

- **Environmental Protection:** The agenda of the Caucus places a premium upon the conservation of the Gulf's precious natural resources, shorelines, and estuaries.

## **I. Economic Development**

### **A. Feeding the Nation**

**1. Harvesting the Sea:** The Gulf of Mexico's estuaries constitute one of the most productive natural systems on earth. These estuaries produce more food per acre than the most prolific Midwestern farmland. The National Marine Fisheries Service reported a yield of **more than 1.8 billion pounds** of fish and shellfish in the five U.S. Gulf states worth **over \$991.3 million** in 2000, as compared to a one billion pound harvest in the Pacific states (excluding Alaska), which generated less than half that income.

**Four of the top five fishing ports** in the United States (as measured by weight) are located in the five Gulf states.

- The Gulf's commercial fisheries produced ***1.8 billion pounds of fish and shellfish*** in 2000, with a dockside value of ***\$991.4 million***. Gulf landings of shrimp led the nation in 2000 (288 million pounds worth \$656 million), which accounted for approximately ***80 percent of the national total***.
- The Gulf produced the largest volume of oysters in 2000 (20.7 million pounds valued at \$44 million), which amounted to ***60 percent of the national total***.
- Gulf recreational fishing garners almost ***30 percent*** of U.S. saltwater fishing expenditures;
- ***23 percent*** of all U.S. saltwater recreational jobs are located in the five Gulf states.

#### **Breakdown by state:**

- **Alabama** – over 30.59 million pounds of fish and shellfish worth more than \$64.0 million.
- **Florida** – over 75.4 million pounds of fish and shellfish worth more than \$156.1 million.
- **Louisiana** – over 1.4 billion pounds of fish and shellfish worth more than \$418.9 million.
- **Mississippi** – over 217.7 million pounds of fish and shellfish worth more than \$58.7 million.
- **Texas** – over 110 million pounds of fish and shellfish worth more than \$293.6 million.

**2. Agriculture:** According to the U.S. Department of Agriculture's statistics, agricultural production (crops, livestock, and associated products) in Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas totaled nearly \$28 billion in 1997.

### **Breakdown by state:**

- **Alabama** -- \$ 3.098 billion
- **Florida** -- \$ 6.004 billion
- **Louisiana** -- \$ 2.031 billion
- **Mississippi** -- \$ 3.127 billion
- **Texas** -- \$ 13.766 billion

## **B. Meeting America's Energy Demand**

The Minerals Management Service (MMS) found that in September 2001, 119 exploration wells were under construction in Gulf waters, 47 of which were being drilled in water depths that exceeded 1,000 feet. MMS also reported that in 2001:

- The Gulf contained 4,021 producing platforms and 156 active operators;
- The Gulf accounted for 93 percent of U.S. Offshore oil production and approximately 98 percent of U.S. gas production;
- The Gulf's deepwater oil production had increased by almost 1,200 percent from 1985 to 2001 while the Gulf's deepwater gas production had improved by about 2,850 percent during that same period; and
- More than 21,000 producing company jobs existed as a direct result of oil and gas activities in the Gulf's outer continental shelf.

## **C. Gulf Ports – The On-Ramps of a Trade Superhighway**

- **Seven of the nation's top 10 ports and two of the world's top seven ports** (as measured by tonnage or cargo value) are located in the Gulf of Mexico.
- The Port of Houston is **ranked first** in the United States in foreign waterborne commerce, second in total tonnage, and sixth in the World.
- The Greater Baton Rouge Port is Gulf of Mexico's farthest inland deep-water port.

## **D. The Gulf of Mexico Region – A Popular Place to Live and Play: Tourism and Quality of Life**

- Census Bureau estimates show a 14.5 percent population increase in the five U.S. Gulf states between 1990 and 1999 (from a combined total of 40.8 million in 1990 to an estimated 46.7 million in 1999).
- The Gulf of Mexico supports a tourist industry that encompasses thousands of businesses and tens of thousands of jobs, worth over \$20 billion annually.
- During 2000, destinations in the Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana welcomed more than 25 million visitors and handled more than 1.1 million qualified inquires. These visitors spent as estimated \$16 billion.
- The Gulf of Mexico serves as an ideal location for water sports such as skiing, boating, jet skiing – and, of course, swimming and tanning.

## ***II. Homeland Security***

The Gulf Coast possesses 7 of the 12 busiest ports in the United States – thus, one terrorist attack or devastating natural disaster affecting a Gulf port would seriously injure our nation’s economy. Accordingly, enhancing port security constitutes an indispensable component of our homeland security strategy. Moreover, as we justifiably focus upon the integrity of our land border, we must not forget that the Gulf’s water border comprises two-thirds of the southern U.S. boundary.

In order to protect our homeland and ensure the continued vitality of our economy, we must direct our nation’s attention to the Gulf’s security needs -- while constantly balancing this imperative with our economy’s reliance upon the dependable, free flow of shipping and other commerce.

### **A. Key Facts about U.S. Ports**

- U.S. ports create more than 13 million domestic jobs, many of which are located in the five Gulf states.
- U.S. ports serve as the point of entry or exit for 95% of our nation’s overseas international trade.
- U.S. ports also accept 25% percent of our nation’s domestic trade.
- Each year, U.S. ports handle 9 million containers, 9,500 container ships, 140 million passengers, and 12 million registered recreational boats.
- U.S. ports generate \$800 billion a year for our nation’s economy.

### **B. Disaster Preparedness and Response**

During the summer and fall of 2004, the U.S. Gulf Coast endured a series of hurricanes that wrought misery and destruction on a scope that was unprecedented in U.S. history. In addition to the tragic loss of life they caused, these storms destroyed homes, livelihoods, and vital infrastructure.

Hurricanes, flooding and other natural disasters strike the Gulf region every year. Yet, many of the federal agencies responsible for manning the front lines of recovery remain at odds with state and local governments regarding how to ensure that money, supplies, and other critical resources reach the people who need them the most. The Gulf of Mexico Caucus can – and must -- lead a reform movement which will adjust how disaster relief grants are awarded, allocated, and distributed.

### **C. First Responders**

As they constitute our first line of defense against the ravages of terrorism and natural disaster, first responders receive millions of dollars per year in homeland security grants. The Gulf of Mexico Caucus remains dedicated to helping these heroes obtain the resources they need and deserve. In particular, the Caucus focuses upon ensuring that the Gulf region’s first responders

receive the full attention of Congress. Moreover, from fire training academies in Louisiana to bio-terror research centers in Florida, the Caucus seeks to transform the Gulf region into the model for homeland security training and initiatives. The discovery, development, and implementation of pilot projects can play a critical role in enhancing the Gulf region's security while bolstering the excellence of its higher education and research institutions.

### ***III. Environmental Protection***

The population explosion along the U.S. Gulf Coast continues to raise public health concerns – both on land and in the water. Coastal counties are experiencing the second fastest rate of growth in the United States, but basic services such as wastewater treatment remain inadequate in many areas.

- More than **50 percent** of the Gulf's shellfish growing waters are under harvest restrictions due to water quality concerns.

#### **A. Habitat Loss**

Important habitats and their functions have declined.

- **50 percent** of Gulf inland and coastal wetlands have been lost.
- Up to **80 percent** of Gulf sea grasses have been decimated in some areas.
- The Gulf provides diverse habitats that support **thousands** of species of coastal and marine wildlife.
- About **98 percent** of Gulf fish species depend upon wetlands during some stage of their life cycle.

#### **B. Environmental Damage**

Among other sources, fertilizers, human sewage, animal waste, landscape changes, and fossil fuels result in the presence of too many nutrients in the Gulf of Mexico.

The incidence of harmful algal blooms has increased from 200 in the 1970s to 700 in the 1990s. Since 1991, these algal blooms have cost Gulf state economies nearly \$300 million, primarily due to fish kills, public health problems, and lost tourism revenue.

More of the Gulf's estuaries are experiencing or are likely to experience excessive nutrients and low dissolved oxygen levels, which directly impacts the health of fisheries.

The largest area of low-dissolved oxygen in the western Atlantic occurs on the Texas-Louisiana continental shelf region, which stems from the Mississippi River's nitrogen pollution and man-made physical changes, as well as from the natural layering of salt and fresh water as the Mississippi River enters the Gulf.

## C. Invasive Species:

Non-indigenous plants and animals can wreak havoc upon the Gulf's environment. In 1991 alone, U.S. ports received an estimated **79 million metric tons of ballast water from foreign ports** (the equivalent of 2.4 million gallons per hour), which has provided a significant pathway for the introduction of invasive species.

- A recent report estimates that invasive species on land and in water cause more than \$137 billion in economic damages in the United States each year.
- More than 4000 species of invertebrates, algae and fishes are transported in ballast tanks every day.

## IV. General Background on the Gulf Region

### A. Basic Overview

The five U.S. Gulf states – Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi and Texas – boast a total population of 50 million and a combined Gross State Product of \$1.6 trillion. This region possesses 10 United States Senators, five governors, and 75 members of the United States House of Representatives.

All five states of the Gulf region share common interests as well as similar opportunities and challenges. As regional and international trade progress, the homeland security, trade, economic development, and environmental protection issues will multiply in scope and complexity. Yet, without a concerted political effort, the federal government's habit of neglecting the Gulf region in the allocation of funding and other resources appears likely to continue.

By coordinating the efforts of members of Congress with other organizations and individuals who possess a stake in critical region's future, the Gulf of Mexico Caucus will exert significant political influence – leveraging unity to produce greater prosperity and security. The Gulf of Mexico Caucus will achieve its goals by hosting workshops, field events, and media opportunities.

### B. Quick Facts on the Five U.S. Gulf States

- **Seven** of the United States' 12 busiest ports are located in the five U.S. Gulf states.
- **56%** of the United States' imported oil passes through this region.
- Total population of more than **50 million**.
- Combined Gross State Product of **\$1.6 trillion**.
- Gulf Coast ports are served by the Gulf Intra-coastal Waterway, which extends **1,200 miles** from Brownsville, Texas to Carrabelle, Florida. Approximately 80 million tons of cargo is transported via the Waterway each year.

### C. Historic and Ecological Notes

- The Gulf of Mexico wetlands are famous for their large populations of wildlife – which includes shorebirds, colonial nesting birds, and *75 percent* of the migratory waterfowl traversing the United States.
- More than *400 species* of shells can be found in the Gulf of Mexico. Gulf beaches are recognized as the best shelling beaches in North America.
- The Gulf Islands National Seashore is a wild 150-mile stretch of barrier islands and coastal mainland in Mississippi and Florida. The warm waters of the Gulf of Mexico nourish 11 separate units, which include bayou, salt marsh, live oak and southern magnolia forests, as well as snow-white beaches.
- The Mobile-Tensaw Delta comprises one of the largest watersheds in the world, which begins in Tennessee and ends at Alabama's Gulf coast.
- The Gulf of Mexico Coast line boasts a unique array of flora and fauna, which provides a habitat for endangered species such as the Perdido beach mouse, the cotton rat, the white-topped pitcher plant, the red-cockaded woodpecker, the piney woods rooster, and the Louisiana nutria.
- The world's longest man-made beach (26 miles long) is located on the Mississippi Gulf Coast.
- The Mississippi River deposits more than 3.3 million gallons of water into the Gulf of Mexico every second.
- The Gulf of Mexico possesses the largest population of bottle nose dolphins in the world, the largest concentration of which live in the Mississippi Sound.
- Indian mounds, which exist on the campus of Louisiana State University in Baton Rouge, were built 450 years before the first Egyptian pyramid.
- Historic Spanish Point in Osprey, Florida was settled over 4,000 years ago and included tools artifacts and burials mounds from early humans.
- The Friendship Oak on the Mississippi Gulf Coast is more than 500 years old. Legend holds that those individuals who stand beneath its shade "remain friends through all their lifetime no matter where fate may take them in after years."
- In 1703, Mardi Gras was first celebrated in the French colony of Mobile. Years later this pre-Lenten carnival moved to New Orleans, which often receives credit for its origination.
- The name "Mississippi" means "father of waters." The name "Biloxi" means "first people."

- The Lake Pontchartrain Causeway Bridge (24 miles long) is the second longest continuous over-water bridge in the world.
- The city of New Orleans exists 10 to 15 feet below sea level. Huge levees protect the city from the waters of the mighty Mississippi.
- On a 1699 expedition, Pierre le Moyne and his brother, Jean Baptiste le Moyne, discovered an area on high bluffs along the Mississippi River. In their diaries, they record evidence of a pole at this location, which was stained with the blood of fish and animals, and which served as the dividing line between two Native American tribes - the Bayougoula and the Houmas. The blood-stained pole gave the town of Baton Rouge its name, which means "red stick" in French.
- America's largest rocket propulsion testing complex, which tests all space shuttle main engines, is located at the John C. Stennis Space Center on the Mississippi Gulf Coast. With NASA as the lead agency, this federal city hosts 30 additional agencies engaged in space, environmental programs, and national defense.

*The Gulf of Mexico Caucus builds "Unity, Prosperity and Security" for the five U.S. states that border the Gulf of Mexico by promoting a collective approach by political, business, and community leaders in addressing homeland security, trade, economic development, environmental protection, and related issues*

AUG 15 2005

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August 12, 2005

Honorable Anthony J. Principi, Chairman  
2005 Defense Base Realignment and Closure Commission  
2521 S. Clark St., Suite 600  
Arlington, VA 22202**Re: Implications of Buster Welch, et al. v. USAF, et al. to the Closure Recommended by BRAC of Ellsworth AFB, South Dakota**

Dear Chairman Principi:

The Defense Base Realignment and Closure Commission is aware of the successful challenge to the Realistic Bomber Training Initiative (RBTI) associated with Dyess AFB, Texas. That challenge was undertaken by separate groups of ranchers, landowners and others in two separate cases. I represent a group of plaintiffs who live principally near or under the Lancer, MOA of the RBTI. A few are impacted by the flights along IR-178 as are all of the Davis Mountain Trans Pecos Heritage Association (DMTPHA) plaintiffs represented by Mr. Murray Feldman and with whom your staff has had significant contacts.

My clients formed an organization called the Heritage Environmental Protect Association (HEPA) to review and comment upon the RBTI modifications proposed for the airspace. Through me, HEPA ultimately filed an action entitled, Buster Welch, et al. v. United States Air Force, et al., Civil Action No. 5:00CV0392-C, USDC Texas, Northern District, Lubbock Division. The parties in both cases participated in the scoping meetings where literally hundreds of people made comments at each location in West Texas and New Mexico.

As Mr. Feldman explained to your staff, eventually the two cases were heard simultaneously by U.S. District Court Judge Cummings, but they were never consolidated. The HEPA plaintiffs challenged on some similar grounds and several different issues, the most notable of which was our emphasis on the several noise issues. In both cases, Judge Cummings' rulings ignored a faulty Administrative Record on the subject. In the end, Judge Cummings separately issued two lengthy decisions for the cases in favor of the United States Air Force.

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HEPA filed a separate appeal to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. For purposes of efficiency and judicial economy, the HEPA and DMTPHA plaintiffs did agree to consolidated briefing and oral argument on appeal. Previously, we had joined DMTPHA as a petitioner-intervenor to challenge separately the FAA's decision approving the RBTI airspace modifications based on a faulty NEPA analysis. As you know, the Fifth Circuit vacated both decisions issued by Judge Cummings, the Air Force's record of decision (ROD) on the final EIS, and the FAA's non-rulemaking decision document (ROD equivalent) approving the RBTI airspace modifications. The Court remanded the final EIS to the Air Force to prepare a supplemental EIS (SEIS) to evaluate the impact of wake vortex and to assess the impact of the RBTI on civil and commercial aviation.

Mr. Feldman has evaluated the wake vortex issues for your staff. I just wish to emphasize that the Fifth Circuit did not limit the evaluation to impacts on buildings and structures. In its order, the Court said simply the Air Force must evaluate the impact of wake vortex. Consequently, we strongly believe that means evaluation on buildings and structures of course, but also on livestock management, wildlife, recreational hunting, general recreation, and on direct overflight of humans. If the Air Force properly evaluates the spectrum of issues, then the SEIS will not be issued for some considerable time.

The evaluation of the impact on civil and commercial aviation is equally important as Lubbock International Airport has to modify its flight routes to the southeast to accommodate the Lancer MOA. Those modifications extend commercial flying times. Therefore, the Air Force must reconsider the impact to Lubbock, as well as the civil aviation employed by ranchers and others in the SEIS.

Lubbock was not consulted during the first NEPA scoping. The city considered litigating against the Air Force, but after the fact (issuance of the ROD), the Air Force met with Lubbock officials and made a deal to control airspace from the Lubbock airport with new equipment. Yet significant airspace remains closed to commercial traffic for long periods and this will only be exacerbated by the Ellsworth B-1s using the same airspace. After a proper SEIS evaluation, the Air Force and FAA may conclude that the impact to Lubbock is severe enough to modify substantially the lancer MOA.

Finally, the Fifth Circuit ordered Judge Cummings to set the RBTI operating conditions pending the completion of the SEIS. Mr. Feldman has explained that the Air Force is not operating below 12,000' MSL in the Lancer MOA, and nothing below 500' AGL along IR-178. These were offered voluntarily by the Air Force. Please note that we continue to be puzzled how the Air Force can continue to train in unapproved airspace. Consequently, Judge Cummings' operating conditions are appealable by both groups of plaintiffs and an appeal is being considered as the judge completely ignored the wake vortex evaluations prepared by the experts.


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The Air Force may be disingenuous to the BRAC by not revealing that the Air Force needs to do a NEPA evaluation on the cumulative impact of the B-1s shifted from Ellsworth to Dyess. Because of the number and size of aircraft, we believe the Air Force will need to do a full EIS. It is not enough to do an environmental assessment (EA) as the cumulative impact will be magnified substantially and the number of training flights may exceed the authorized sortie numbers. Now is the time to do a full cumulative impact analysis while the SEIS is being prepared because the move of the B-1 wing from Ellsworth is foreseeable. To do a mere EA later is the piecemeal approach abhorred by NEPA.

The report that Ellsworth B-1s are being moved to Dyess was not good news to my clients. They already believe they live in a war zone. The Ellsworth B-1 wing exacerbates the real impact on these people. And it seems clear to us that, for the most part, the B-1s will not fly from Dyess to train in the already approved airspace near Ellsworth AFB.

Please contact me if I can answer questions or provide you with more explanation of the HEPA plaintiffs' position on the RBTI.

Sincerely yours,

  
Frank M. Bond

FMB/gdg

cc: HEPA Litigation Committee  
Mr. Murray Feldman, Counsel for Davis  
Mountains Trans-Pecos Heritage Assoc.