



United States Congress
Washington, D. C. 20510

August 9, 2005

The Honorable Anthony J. Principi
Chairman
Base Realignment and Closure Commission
3521 S. Clark St.
Suite 600
Arlington VA 22202

BRAC Commission

AUG 11 2005

Received

Dear Chairman Principi:

After reviewing the July 25th Commission correspondence sent by Senator Sarbanes, Senator Mikulski, and Congressman Ruppertsberger regarding the proposed closure of Fort Monmouth, we feel compelled to rebut the evident fallacies included in both letters

1. **Moving virtually all of the Army's organizations that develop, acquire, field and sustain C4ISR systems during the war will, without question, negatively impact our war fighters. Any statement to the contrary defies logic.**

Every Army logistician who manages the sustainment /operational readiness of every C4ISR system (over 51,000 stock-numbered items including over 6,200 major end items) is slated to move. Every Army software engineer involved in updating 215 million lines of code in deployed tactical and strategic systems, as well as developing or over-seeing the development of software for new systems, is slated to move. Every Army contracting expert in C4ISR systems and industries, obligating over \$10 billion this year, is slated to move. Every Army program management office responsible for the development and acquisition of C4ISR systems, 98 major defense programs, is slated to move. Every Army scientist and engineer charged with developing, adapting or adopting technology for the next generation of C4ISR systems, and for rapidly bringing technology to bear on immediate threats, is slated to move. To discount the impact of this massive turbulence is to negate the contributions of this community puts forth every day in the current conflict and have been documented for decades.

2. **The assertions regarding the development and fielding of systems to counter Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) are wrong.**

The July 25th letter states that the ARL Survivability and Lethality Analysis Directorate (SLAD) developed the Warlock systems with engineers from New Mexico State University and that Fort Monmouth's role in the process was largely acquisition management, not engineering. SLAD has a contingent of personnel at Fort Monmouth and White Sands, New Mexico. Their mission is to investigate the vulnerabilities of US weapons and communications-electronics devices, Fort Monmouth has often utilized this long-term partnership to protect US systems while improving the ability to counter hostile systems. The ARL SLAD function at Aberdeen is nothing more than a Headquarters function and had no technical capability to offer for countering IED systems. This was confirmed by the Director of the National Defense University's (NDU) Center for Technology and National Security

Policy in his 29 June letter to you where, referring to APG, he stated “there is no core of C4ISR expertise or culture there”.

Before IEDs became a threat, Fort Monmouth engineers modified existing systems to provide capability against unsophisticated IED threats---this was done as a special innovative initiative. This prepositioned capability allowed Fort Monmouth to respond rapidly to a need to protect Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) personnel when they requested a jammer.

The first Warlock systems were modified Shortstop Electronic Protection Systems (SEPS) that were renamed Warlock Green. (The SEPS were also developed at Fort Monmouth.) Fort Monmouth scientists and engineers developed, produced and fielded these systems close to a year before any other systems were available. As the IED threats became more widely utilized and more varied, a more universal countermeasure approach was required. The current Warlock family consists of seven different systems to counter the various IED threats. The ICE, which was developed by SLAD at White Sands, provides jamming capability against some of those threats; however, it is many times larger, heavier, and requires more prime vehicle power. The direction now under Fort Monmouth leadership is to provide a more universal, software-reprogrammable system for use in Iraq, and that next generation system will be provided rapidly to our Forces.

The PM Counter Remotely Controlled Improvised Explosive Device Electronic Warfare (CREW) at Fort Monmouth is the Army organization responsible for all IED jamming, supporting not only Army but also other services and special customers. Over one hundred PM CREW and Fort Monmouth engineers and support personnel are working the program to include R&D, production, maintenance, field support, training, threat exploitation, detection and intelligence operations against this one threat. This team consists of both experienced engineers and a group of young Masters and PhD level engineers.

The Joint IED Task Force designated Fort Monmouth engineers to test all proposed IED jammers. They did this based on the expertise of the Fort Monmouth engineers and their in-depth understanding of the detailed workings of the threat systems. Yuma Proving Ground (not APG) was designated as the official test site location because its soil matched the Iraq environment, and the instrumentation and remote range allowed jamming signals to be transmitted. The Fort Monmouth CERDEC built a unique DOD facility consisting of both an RF chamber outfitted with threat systems and a precision, computer-controlled, jamming technique assessment test bed that can model a wide array of jamming techniques. This facility performs developmental and technical testing on all proposed jammers before they are sent to Yuma Proving Ground for field testing. The facility also provides technical support to numerous customers, to include the White Sands SLAD personnel, providing threat systems, advice on jamming techniques and testing.

The counter IED efforts at Ft Monmouth and supported by the Rapid Equipping Force (REF) at Ft Belvoir were the ground-breaking programs that got thousands of jammers out to the field. The Warlock was in the field before OIF began. The Fort Monmouth team that accomplished all of this included experts, many with over 30 years of jammer experience.

While the IED example is one of the more discussed wartime efforts, there are many other rapid response programs implemented by Fort Monmouth that include programs across the breadth and depth of the Fort Monmouth mission. To not recognize the seriousness of the need to retain this capability will shortchange our joint forces wherever their mission takes them.

3. **Moving C4ISR from Fort Monmouth will result in a loss of intellectual capital from which the Army may never recover.**

We believe our statistics, based on both historical and recent evidence based on survey results, show and that a serious “brain drain” will occur. It takes experts in military-specific technology and systems to mentor and train new college graduates or employees recruited from industry. The closure of Fort Monmouth would be the catalyst that prompts the abrupt retirement of those senior experts and managers – experts and managers who are **NOT** now retiring upon eligibility, but typically remaining until age 61 or 62.

The average age of the Fort Monmouth workforce is 48 years old, many years from the typical retirement age of 61. Hiring and training new employees in C4ISR requires years of hands-on training with equipment and systems – it is not a routine effort. For example, we utilize efforts like the IED initiative as training for our workforce, and those experiences become the foundation of the experienced Fort Monmouth employee. Hiring and training thousands of new employees, in a compressed time period, without seasoned managers and experienced subject matter experts to mentor and guide them, while trying to execute a real and vital mission, is impossible.

The NDU letter supports our belief that there will be a significant loss of intellectual capital and notes that “Though figures vary from location to location, data from the last BRAC round indicate that on average only about 25-30 percent of scientists and engineers assigned to relocate actually do so, and many of those who do relocate subsequently leave the government.” In particular, NDU called the closure of Fort Monmouth “troubling” and concluded that “During this time, again based on past experience, there could be a serious slump in productivity in an area where maintaining a vigorous S&T program is of national importance for combating terrorism as well as for network-centric operations of the Army’s Future Combat System.”

With respect to the move of the Naval Air Systems Command to Patuxent River, the move was approximately 50 miles. In many cases, this actually decreased individuals’ commuting distance. Additionally, the command missions and functions are not comparable to Fort Monmouth. That organization did not have the engineering and scientific talent that exists at Fort Monmouth. The Army’s experience after the closure of Vint Hill Farms Station in BRAC 93, when only a small percentage of the workforce moved with their jobs, supports NDU’s concerns and is more representative of what will occur.

4. **The Department of Defense cost data on relocating C4ISR to Aberdeen Proving Ground is not sound and has many flaws. These errors were pointed out in a recent briefing by our Community to the BRAC Commission’s Army Staff.**

As we noted in a follow-up to our 8 July report to the Commission and in the briefing to Commission staff that using correct cost data extends the payback period for the closure of Fort Monmouth to 33 years. Adding estimated costs to reconstitute the workforce pushes the payback period out to 44 years. Removing the erroneous savings claimed for military personnel that will not be eliminated stretches the payback period to 91 years. It would be unconscionable to proceed with the wholesale disruption of the C4ISR mission in the face of this new cost data.

The Army has obtained recently corrected and certified data, as well as newly developed documents, that over-rule the out-dated cost data upon which the recommendation to close Fort Monmouth was based. The base operations costs submitted during the initial BRAC data collection effort were wrong, simple human error, that almost doubled the costs from

what they actually were. The Army has the military construction documents prepared this summer for Prep School facilities at West Point. These documents establish costs at over ten times the costs estimated in COBRA (\$200 million more). It is apparent, based on a comparison of the space and facilities at APG with the C4ISR facilities that already exist at Fort Monmouth and Fort Belvoir, that the military construction costs at APG will far exceed COBRA estimates.

In its July 2005 Analysis of DOD's 2005 Selection Process and Recommendations for Base Closures and Realignment, GAO reported that "much of the projected net annual recurring savings (47 percent) is associated with eliminating jobs currently held by military personnel. However, rather than reducing end-strength levels, DOD indicates the positions are expected to be reassigned to other areas, which may enhance capabilities but also limit dollar savings available for other uses." In the case of Fort Monmouth, GAO reported that 26.55% of the 20-year net present value "savings" are due to such counting. Furthermore, analysis of the COBRA run indicates that the bulk of these jobs were for reservists who had been serving as security guards that were replaced by contract guards over a year ago.

Annual savings reported by DOD include many reimbursable base operations and support costs that DOD would continue to incur at APG even if Fort Monmouth were closed. The cost of duplicating the Joint SATCOM Engineering Center at APG prior to shutting down the JSEC at Fort Monmouth was not considered in the DOD analysis. These costs are estimated to be over \$300 million.

As documented in the NDU letter mentioned above, there would be a need to recruit and train a substantial new workforce. While the exact costs for doing so are debatable, there can be no doubt that these costs will be significant and should be considered in DOD's analysis.

Moving Fort Monmouth to Aberdeen will be an enormously expensive proposition fraught with serious, unnecessary impact to our C4ISR capability. We have done our homework on the cost issues and have provided our core data to your analysts and are comfortable that it will replicate our results

5. The creation of a regional "mega-base" to include Fort Dix, McGuire AFB, Lakehurst NAES, and Fort Monmouth promises to increase C4ISR synergies that already exist.

The DOD BRAC recommendation includes the proposal to establish Fort Dix, McGuire AFB, and Lakehurst NAES as a Joint Base, and we agree with that recommendation. Our recommendation to add Fort Monmouth to that Joint Base as an enclave is to: recognize that Fort Monmouth already utilizes considerable facilities at the Joint Base; reduces Fort Monmouth's operating cost; and potentially reduces the Fort Monmouth footprint.

The synergy of Fort Monmouth utilizing the Joint Base has already been proven. We believe DOD can utilize this synergy to promote more effective Joint Experimentation utilizing assets that already exist. We recognize that the C4ISR development mission does not extend to Dix, McGuire, or Lakehurst but their facilities are conducive to C4ISR Joint Experimentation and have already been utilized by the services in this context. This is an opportunity to more effectively put a Joint aspect to this BRAC recommendation.


Next month, Team C4ISR will be conducting an experiment at the Joint Base aimed at evaluating Future Combat System and Expeditionary Force Concepts. Fort Monmouth has a direct experiment connection with the FCS contractor (Boeing) and is funded to conduct risk reduction experiments for FCS. The Expeditionary Force experiment, once completed at Fort

Dix, will move to Fort Benning (with Fort Monmouth engineers) to be further tested as new concepts for the Infantry of the future. While there is Joint participation in all these experiments, we suggest it could be expanded and improved as part of a formal Joint mission and provide enormous benefit to the DOD. It must be emphasized this is not about test and evaluation – it is about experimentation to help define future directions and how future systems can interact seamlessly with current systems. This type of experimentation is essential to DOD Transformation.

The Army currently has a C4ISR Land Warfare Center of Excellence, in place at Fort Monmouth, with a life cycle capability to generate technology, develop and produce systems, field systems, and support those systems in the field. **Why break something that is working well?**

We recognize the over-whelming task with which you are faced and the voluminous amount of data you must assess. The information we have provided on Fort Monmouth centers on the focal point of the BRAC recommendation. Thank you for considering it and for your efforts to protect the interest of the war fighters, the DOD employees and the communities impacted by these BRAC recommendations.

With best regards,



Jon S. Corzine
US Senator




Frank R. Lautenberg
US Senator



Rush Holt
Member of Congress



Frank Pallone
Member of Congress



James Saxton
Member of Congress



Christopher Smith
Member of Congress

CC: The Honorable James H. Bilbray, Member, BRAC Commission
The Honorable Philip Coyle, Member, BRAC Commission
Admiral (USN ret) Howard W. Gehman, Jr., Member, BRAC Commission
The Honorable James V. Hansen, Member, BRAC Commission
General (USA ret) James T. Hill, Member, BRAC Commission
General (USAF ret) Lloyd W. Newton, BRAC Commission
The Honorable Samuel K. Skinner, Member, BRAC Commission
Brigadier General (USAF ret) Sue Ellen Turner, Member, BRAC Commission