

142nd Fighter Wing

priority 1.0

MISSION



goal:


1.1

to

Deploy,
Fight,
Win








142nd Fighter Wing

Dual Mission

- Federal
 - 24/7 NORAD Alert
 - Worldwide Contingencies
 - Ready to deploy!
 - Support Missions People
 - Everyday. Around the globe!
- State
 - Protect Life & Property
 - Peace & Order (Public Safety)
 - Support to Civil Agencies
 - Wildfires, Floods, Mt. St. Helens



142nd Fighter Wing

September 11th, 2001

- **Timeline**
 - Immediate Battle Stations
 - 6 aircraft on alert status within 4.5 hours
 - Entire fleet on status within 12 hours
- **12-30 September, 2001 Operations**
 - Continuous airborne coverage for 48 hours
 - Increased numbers of Home Station Alert
 - Deployed Alert Operations at McChord AFB
- **FY 2002 Wartime Readiness**
 - Maintained 100% Mission Ready



Since 1989

142nd Fighter Wing

142 FW Accomplishments

Over 68,000 Accident Free Flying Hours!

- 100% and Over 100% of Safety Reports

2002 AF Outstanding Unit (5th Oak Leaf)

Worldwide Deployable, part of the Expeditionary Force

- Operation Northern Watch
- Operation Southern Watch
- Operation Enduring Freedom
- Operation Noble Eagle
- Operation Eagle Claw
- Operation Desert Storm
- Operation Desert Shield
- Operation Desert Sabre
- Operation Desert Storm
- Operation Desert Shield
- Operation Desert Sabre
- Operation Noble Eagle
- Operation Eagle Claw
- Operation Desert Storm
- Operation Desert Shield
- Operation Desert Sabre

During Operation NOBLE EAGLE!

William Tell Team

Top Maintenance Team

Top Overall Team

Top in every category


2004 ANG Raytheon Trophy Nominee

- "Best Air-to-Air Unit in ANG"

142nd Fighter Wing

Retention Remains High

142 FW Strength



142nd Fighter Wing

F-15 Unit Comparison FY 03

Unit	MC*	HOURS
142 FW Portland	81.3%	4390.7
125 FW Jacksonville (+)	72.3%	4085.6
102 FW Otis	72.2%	3870.9
131 FW St Louis	71.7%	3529.1
173 FW Kingsley Field	69.7%	3880.0
154 FW Hickam	69.3%	3779.2
159 FW New Orleans (+)	65.6%	3651.2

*Manned for 3660hrs
did 4390 hrs*

MC = Mission Capable

Air National Guard MC Goal: 66%

142nd Fighter Wing

F-15 Unit Comparison FY 04

Unit	MC*	HOURS
142 FW Portland	78.2%	4200.6
102 FW Otis	75.5%	4080.6
173 FW Kingsley Field	75.5%	3963.0
154 FW Hickam	75.2%	3364.1
125 FW Jacksonville (+)	72.4%	4044.7
159 FW New Orleans (+)	69.2%	3342.5
131 FW St Louis	68.8%	3383.1

MC = Mission Capable

Air National Guard MC Goal: 70%

142nd Fighter Wing

142 FW Key Resources

- Personnel
 - 142 FW employ 515 Full Time; 614 Drill Status Guardsmen (DSG)
 - Over 90% live within 50 miles
- Jets: 15 Primary, 4 Reserve
19 Total
- Portland Air National Guard Base Host
 - Employ or support 2500 Base Wide
 - FY04 Federal Expenditures \$87.9m

142nd Fighter Wing

Portland ANG Base (Joint)

- Guard Base with AF Reserve Tenant
- 246 Acres (ANG / AFRES / Army NG)
 - 500K SF Facilities ANG
 - 225K SF Facilities AFRES
 - Plant Replacement Value \$217M
- \$42M Current Reserve Construction Programmed
- Difficult to Reconstitute

facilities
 PANGR great
 stepping off
 point to the
 Pacific
 especially if
 McChord not
 available 6



142nd Fighter Wing

Unparalleled Training Airspace

0-50K feet
Supersonic
AM space

Overland -
Supersonic
is above
30,000 feet

If airport not
used FAA
will take
away

142nd Fighter Wing

Northwest Security Environment

- What's at Risk
- Population Centers
- Airline Traffic
- Maritime Routes

142nd Fighter Wing


What's At Risk...

The collage features several key elements: a map of the Pacific Northwest region with markers for 'Population Centers' and 'Military'; a photograph of a coastline; a photograph of a city skyline; a photograph of an Intel building; and a photograph of a factory. The text 'UNION' is visible on the map, and 'INTEL' is visible on the building image.

142 Fighter Wing

Northwest Population Growth

- By 2030 there will be a increase in population growth within the Pacific Northwest.
- NW states rank 6th, 9th, and 10th for population growth within all 50 states.



*Seattle
#10 AIRBORNE
ON THREAT
ASSESSMENT*

142 Fighter Wing

Incoming International Flights

Portland International Airport

- Monthly

Seattle Tacoma International Airport:

- Monthly

Hundreds of international flights

through the 142 FW Area of

Responsibility (AOR)



142nd Fighter Wing

Pacific Maritime Routes


142nd Fighter Wing

BRAC is Necessary

- Critical in the Current Economic and Political Environment
- The DoD must Transform while Maintaining Homeland Defense and Security as the Most Important Priority

DoD Recommendation for 142 FW Compromises the Top Defense Priority


The Cost Savings DOES NOT Justify the Security Risk



142nd Fighter Wing

“The US Government has no more important mission than protecting the homeland from future terrorist attacks”
-President George Bush

“Since 9/11, the department has a focus on homeland defense”
-Testimony of the SecDef to the BRAC Commission





142nd Fighter Wing

Homeland Defense Not Adequately Factored Into Military Value


DoD Recommendations:

1. Drop Alert Force structure BELOW pre-September 11th posture for the Northwestern United States
2. Place Northwest Alert Force BELOW QDR acceptable risk level
3. Leave the Northwest vulnerable to current and future threats
 - Unable to handle increased alert requirements, defend against multi-axis attack
 - Unable to support contingency plans (CONPLAN 3310)


*MILITARY VALUE
did not consider
HomeLand
Defense*



*16 notes
CONAR + NORAD
Channels Agreed
to this set up*



No public discussion of draw down from 16 to 14 Alert force locations.



AIRCRAFT (Fighters) SITTING IN US

142nd Fighter Wing

Northwest Security *Before and After BRAC*

- Pre-BRAC
 - Organizational Focus on Homeland Defense - Alert
 - 18 (0) Aircraft available on station
 - 18 (0) Pilots Available within 4 hours
 - Full Maintenance, Weapons, and Intelligence Support
- Post-BRAC
 - Organizational Focus on F-15 Student Pilot Training
 - 2 Aircraft available
 - 4 Pilots
 - 25 Maintenance and Weapons Troops, but no Intelligence Support
 - Additional Support over 290 miles away (6 hour drive)



142nd Fighter Wing

Seattle Combat Air Patrol Comparison

(No Tanker / No Alternate Required)

- Home Station vs. Nearest Fighter Base
- Twice the "On Station" Time
- Half the Aircraft Required
- One-Third Fewer Sorties Required
- One-Third Fewer Pilots Required

*16 fewer tankers
in NW
Post BRAC*

142nd Fighter Wing

Seattle Combat Air Patrol Comparison

(No Tanker /)

Home Station vs. Nearest Fighter Base

- Twice the "On Station" Time
- Half the Aircraft Required
- Half the Sorties Required
- Half the Pilots Required

142nd Fighter Wing

priority 1.0

MISSION

to
Deploy
Fight
Win



142 Fighter Wing

The DoD recommendation for the 142FW substantially deviates from:

1. Force Structure Plan
2. Base Re-Alignment and Closure Act of 1990 criteria
3. Most fundamental tenet of the National Defense Strategy *Homeland Defense*



142 Fighter Wing

DoD 20 Year Force Structure

- Armed Forces must provide the President a wide range of options in order to *protect the United States*
- Transformation must *reduce vulnerabilities*
- Future would-be adversaries likely believe the best way to check America's influence abroad is to *threaten the homeland*

142nd Fighter Wing

Homeland Defense and Security

"The US Government has no more important mission than protecting the homeland from future terrorist attacks." *President George W. Bush*

National Security Strategy - 2002



"Establishes homeland security as the *first priority of the nation*.

Highlights the need to retain and improve capabilities to prevent attacks against the United States"

142nd Fighter Wing

Homeland Defense and Security

National Defense Strategy - 2005

FIRST DEFENSE OBJECTIVE - Secure the US from direct attack.

DIRECT US "1-4-2-1" concept

"1" - *Force size will be able to defend the homeland*
AND

"4" - *Deter forward in and from four regions*
AND

"2" - *Conduct two overlapping "swift defeat" campaigns.*
AND

"1" - *Even when committed to a limited number of lesser contingencies, the force must be able to win decisively in one of two campaigns.*

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Homeland Defense and Security

National Military Strategy - 2004

*"First, while protecting the United States we must win the War on Terrorism."
Richard B. Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*

Establishes Three Military Objectives

#1 Objective - Protect the United States against External Attacks and Aggression

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Homeland Defense and Security

National Strategy For Homeland Security - 2002



"One fact dominates all homeland security threat assessments:

Terrorists are strategic actors. They choose their targets deliberately based on the weaknesses they observe in our defenses and our preparedness."

142nd Fighter Wing

Homeland Defense and Security

"The U.S. Government has no more important mission than protecting the homeland from future terrorist attacks." *—Secretary of Defense*

Homeland Defense Not Adequately Factored Into Military Value

142nd Fighter Wing

September 11th Commission Report



Realignment runs counter to the Commission's recommendations:

"Do not give terrorists the impression that potential targets are not defended."

"Beware the failure of imagination, the enemies of the United States are resolute and creative."

142nd Fighter Wing

Asymmetric / Irregular Threats

- Commercial Aviation
 - Charter flights
 - Passenger & Cargo
- Cruise Missiles
 - Widely proliferated



142nd Fighter Wing

Asymmetric / Irregular Threats

- General Aviation
- Crop Dusters
- Drug trafficking
 - Smuggling routes from Canada, Mexico, SE Asia
- UAVs
 - Military & Civilian
 - Minimal training required



142 Fighter Wing

Pacific NW Terrorist Activity



Portland Six

Indicted for plotting to aid Al-Qa'ida and Taliban forces fighting U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan.



Abu Hamza

James Ujaama indicted for aiding the Taliban. Also tried to team with Al-Qa'ida recruiter Abu Hamza to set up terror camp in southern Oregon.



Peta Seda

Linked to Al-Qa'ida organization through non profit organization.



Ahmed Ressay

Millennium bomber arrested at border crossing in Washington.




James Ujaama

142 Fighter Wing

Pacific Rim Nation States

- Force Projection Improvements
 - Naval Force Improvements
 - Aircraft Carriers, Submarines, Surface Combatants
 - Cruise Missile Development
 - Ground, Air, Submarine launched
 - Advanced Aircraft
 - Fighters, Bombers, A A Refueling
- Guam slated as possible location for new Global Strike Task Force





142 Fighter Wing

Additional Conflicting DoD Recommendations

- Increased Aircraft to 24 at other Reserve Component Alert Sites. except for Portland
USAF has identified 18 Aircraft as acceptable
- Additional Aggressor Squadron has been created at the expense of Homeland Defense in the Northwest
- Cost Savings from realignment of 142 FW does not justify increased risk to Northwest!

Probably
Netlis

(JCM A)
JOINT CRUISE
MISSILE
AGGRE


142nd Fighter Wing

Other Significant Realignment Considerations

- Loss of “human capital” is significant
- \$29.2 million in recent upgrades allow the Portland ANG Base to support contingency, surge, mobilization, and support operations
- Existing ramp space can easily accommodate increases in existing mission assets or Joint transformational capabilities
- Primary users of a vast Supersonic Airspace Network

142nd Fighter Wing

Portland ANG Base Training Airspace



142nd Fighter Wing

Homeland Defense Not Adequately Factored Into Military Value

1 - Current / Future Mission	46.00
1 - Operating Environment	11.50
1242 - ATC Restrictions to Operations	5.98
1271 - Prevailing Installation Weather Conditions	5.52
2 - Geo-locational Factors	34.50
1245 - Proximity to Airspace Supporting Mission (ASM)	22.08
1246 - Proximity to Low Level Routes Supporting Mission	7.25
1270 - Suitable Auxiliary Airfields Within 50NM	5.18

Department of The Air Force Analysis and Recommendations *BRAC*
2005 - *Mission Compatibility Index*

MV-1
missing the
center of
gravity
for
homeland
security

142nd Fighter Wing

Oregon ANG Recommendation

- Evaluate the Military Value Index as it pertains to our top DoD priority - *Homeland Defense!*
- Objectively evaluate the true cost savings realized with realigning the 142 FW versus the significant increase in risk to Homeland Security

Estimate .0012% saved of an annual DoD Budget

Guard
flies F-15
2 million
am now cheap
know
like active
unit

142nd Fighter Wing

Oregon ANG Recommendation



- No Change
- Increased Capability
- ACC Alert Detachment
- AETC Alert Detachment

Maintain, at a minimum, the existing F-15 force structure at the Portland ANG base

142nd Fighter Wing



Thank You for Visiting Portland!

Point Paper

“The US Government has no more important mission than protecting the homeland from future terrorist attacks”

- President George W. Bush

“Since 9/11, the department has a focus on homeland defense”

- Testimony of the SecDef to the BRAC commission

We understand the global economic and political environment has forced the nation to transform our military – BRAC is necessary. As the DoD transforms, there remains a need to ensure the homeland is protected. The BRAC recommendations have unintentionally compromised the security of the Pacific Northwest.

The DOD recommendations to the BRAC Commission concerning re-alignment of assets assigned to the 142FW substantially deviates from the 1) 20 year Force Structure Plan; 2) Base Re-Alignment and Closure Act of 1990 criteria; and 3) fundamental tenet of the National Defense Strategy

1. Critical Reduction in Homeland Defense of Northwest United States (MV1 / MV2):
 - a. Puts alert force structure **below pre-September 11th, 2001** posture for the Northwest United States (MV1)
 - b. Northwest alert force below Quadrennial Defense Review acceptable risk level (MV1)
 - c. Leaves the Northwest vulnerable to current and future threats (MV1)
 - i. Unable to respond to increased alert requirements and defend against multi-axis attack (MV1)
 - ii. Unable to support contingency plans such as CONPLAN 3310 (MV1)
 - iii. Unable to accommodate contingencies, mobilization, surge operations, and future total force requirements (MV3)

2. DoD Recommendations Conflict with Governing DoD Policy (MV1):
 - a. 20 year Force Structure Plan and Base Re-alignment and Closure Act of 1990 criteria (MV1)
 - b. National Security Strategy, 2005 National Defense Strategy, 2004 National Military Strategy, 2002 National Strategy for Homeland Security, 2003 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, 2003 National Strategy for Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets (Air Force Homeland Security Concept of Operations), 2000 Air Superiority Plan, CONPLAN 3310-02, 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (MV2)
 - c. Sept 11, 2001 Commission Report (MV2)
 - d. Threat assessment studies (MV2)
 - e. Patriot Act, 2000 Census (MV2)

3. Additional Conflicting DoD Recommendations (MV1 / MV2):
 - a. Increased reserve component aircraft above USAF stated acceptable levels at the expense of Homeland Defense in the Northwest Region (MV2) – Air defense unit historical standard is 18 aircraft

- b. Standing up a new F-15 Aggressor Squadron at the expense of Northwest Homeland Defense (MV2)


4. Significant Considerations:


- a. Military value selection criteria does not evaluate homeland defense mission (MV1 / MV2)
- b. Loss of “human capital” significant – realignment forces majority of personnel beyond reasonable commute distance (290 miles) (MV4)
- c. The savings identified in the recommendation are an aggregate of 939 ARW and 142 FW operating costs. 142FW costs need to be quantified to properly evaluate the savings generated by placing the Northwest United States at increased risk (MV4)
- d. \$29.2 million recent upgrade and construction allows us to accommodate contingency, mobilization, and support operations and training (MV3)
- e. Primary user of vast unrestricted supersonic airspace and areas – not appropriately weighted in BRAC data call (MV2)
- f. If the 939 ARW leaves, the Military Value of the PANGB increases (MV3 /MV7) – vacant space could easily accommodate increased aircraft, surge capability, new missions, or Joint initiatives at little or no cost

5. Recommendation:

- a. Evaluate military value selection criteria for homeland defense mission
- b. Maintain, *at a minimum*, the existing F-15 force structure at the Portland ANGB – this has proven to be an extremely efficient model for alert mission coverage.







Kingsley Student Production

- Kingsley B-Course Equivalent (BCE)
 - FY-05 - 20
 - FY-06 - 20
 - FY-07 - 20
 - FY-08 - 33

How do you train 65% more students with the same resources?

The way. The traditional way.
NOW MORE THAN EVER

Kingsley Iron

- Currently
 - 15 PAA
 - 18 TAI
 - Accepting 2 more AR jets this year
- FY-08 plan
 - 24 PAA

The way. The traditional way.
NOW MORE THAN EVER

The Numbers

PAA	SORTIES		HOURS	BCE
	Programmed	PFT (85%)		
15	2563	2179	3914	18.4
18	3626	3082	5076	26.1
24	4984	4237	7106	36.5

The way. The traditional way.
NOW MORE THAN EVER

Beyond The Numbers

What plan is in place to train 33 BCE's with 24 PAA on October 1, 2007?

The 2007 National Goal
NOW MORE THAN EVER

Questions?

**Student Production
Iron Flow**

The 2007 National Goal
NOW MORE THAN EVER

F-15

**Student Production Challenges
for FY - 06 / 07**

The 2007 National Goal
NOW MORE THAN EVER

"The Aggressor / Raptor Effect"

- The CAF is short F-15 BCE's in the next two years:
 - FY 06 – 18.4
 - » 10.4 (Aggressor)
 - » 8 (Raptor)
 - FY 07 – 11.2

Now More Than Ever

How to pay the bill

1. Change to course entry requirements for TX student
2. Reduce the number of Track 1 and 3 training quotas
3. Increase PFT loading at FTU
4. Kingsley pushes up programmed production for two years

Now More Than Ever

Option #4

- Background
 - Current TAI = 18
 - August TAI = 20
- Question:
 - *With 2 additional inventoried aircraft, can Kingsley production increase without a significant UTE increase?*

Now More Than Ever

The Numbers

PAA	TAI	SORTIES		HOURS	BCE
		Programmed	PFT		
15	18	2563	2179 (at 85%)	3914	18.4
15	20	3444	3099 (at 90%)	4621	26.2

The 2007 National Guard
NOW MORE THAN EVER

The 80% Solution +

- Option 4 +
- Slight increase in PFT +
- Slight decrease in Track 3 quotas +

= Significant relief on the production shortfall in 06 and complete relief in 07.

The 2007 National Guard
NOW MORE THAN EVER

What about the additional resources required?

The 2007 National Guard
NOW MORE THAN EVER

MX Requirements

- 21 additional personnel for FY-06 / 07:
 - 5 crew chiefs
 - 2 weapons
 - 2 phase
 - 7 back shop
 - Hydraulics, E&E, 2 Munitions, QA, Engine, R&R
 - 2 sheet metal
 - 2 avionics flight line
 - 1 refuel driver

The New Operational Strategy
NOW MORE THAN EVER

Payback

For only a 10% increase in civilian pay, Kingsley provides a 30% increase in student production!

The New Operational Strategy
NOW MORE THAN EVER

Operations Requirements


- ~ 500 more flying hours in FY 06 / 07 than currently programmed
 - Programmed allocation = 4300
 - Current execution = 3915

The New Operational Strategy
NOW MORE THAN EVER

What About...

- Ramp Space
- Airspace

NOW MORE THAN EVER



173 FW Training Airspace

Varnit
AAR

Juniper

Jun Low

Hart

Goose

NOW MORE THAN EVER

Bottom Line

- Temporary (2 year) need for:
 - \$1.36 million in temporary civilian pay per year
 - 4800 hours per year (additional 500 programmed per year)

The 2008 National Guard
NOW MORE THAN EVER

The Good News

The 2008 National Guard
NOW MORE THAN EVER

Killing Two Birds...

- We take a chunk out of the BCE shortfall now
- We are laying the groundwork for a steady 2 year ramp up to FY-08's requirements
 - 24 PAA
 - 33 BCE

The 2008 National Guard
NOW MORE THAN EVER

Conclusion

Kingsley Field is prepared now, to begin ramping up student production.

This begins to solve a short term problem for the Air Force -and- This gets the ball rolling to put Kingsley on track for FY08's iron and production plans!

The Air National Guard
NOW MORE THAN EVER



Points of Contact

- Colonel Tom Schiess
 - 173 MXG/CC, Kingsley Field, OR
 - DSN 830-6393
 - Tom.Schiess@orklam.af.mil
- Colonel John Morawiec
 - 173 OG/CC Kingsley Field, OR
 - DSN 830-6673
 - John.Morawiec@orklam.af.mil

The Air National Guard
NOW MORE THAN EVER

Points of Contact

- Lt Col Rich Kelly
 - 114 FS/CC, Kingsley Field, OR
 - DSN 830-6466
 - Rich.Kelly@orklam.ang.af.mil
- Maj Rick Wedan
 - 114 FS/DO, Kingsley Field, OR
 - DSN 830-6682
 - Rick.Wedan@orklam.ang.af.mil

The Department of Defense
NOW MORE THAN EVER

F-15

Course	Location	Production			Requirements			Shortfall			Negotiated Requirements			MAJCOM			Unfilled		
		FY06	FY07	FY08	FY06	FY07	FY08	FY06	FY07	FY08	FY06	FY07	FY08	FY06	FY07	FY08	FY06	FY07	FY08
B-Course	Total	83	76	73	81	68	54	2	8	19	ALL	83	71	57	0	5	16		
	Tyndall	64	57	49	73	61	47				AD	73	61	47					
	Kingsley	19	19	24	8	7	7				ANG	10	10	10					
IP Qual	Total	24	24	24	28	32	30	-4	-8	-6	ALL	24	30	30	0	-6	-6		
	Tyndall	22	22	22	26	24	22				AD	22	22	22					
	Kingsley	2	2	2	2	8	8				ANG	2	8	8					
TX-1	Total	7	10	10	14	18	16	-7	-8	-6	ALL	7	12	12	0	-2	-2		
	Tyndall	5	8	8	6	8	8				AD	4	6	6					
	Kingsley	2	2	2	8	10	8				ANG	3	6	6					
TX-2	Total	48	58	69	55	55	55	-7	3	14	ALL	48	54	52	0	4	17		
	Tyndall	34	45	45	45	45	45				AD	42	45	45					
	Kingsley	14	13	24	8	8	8				ANG	5	8	6					
SOC	Total	14	20	25	27	29	29	-13	-9	-4	ALL	14	17	17	0	3	8		
	Tyndall	12	16	16	25	27	27				AD	14	15	15					
	Kingsley	2	4	9	2	2	2				ANG	0	2	2					

Pee Wee's Math:

One B-Course Equivalent (BCE) = 118.45 Student Sorties Required (SSR)

Total FY07 BCE

Class #	SSR	Total
B	19	118.45
IP	2	43.20
TX1	2	97.75
TX2	13	42.00
SOC	4	11.55
Grand Total SSR		3125
Grand Total BCE		26.37849

Note: This includes student and direct support sorties.

Total FY08 BCE

Class #	SSR	Total
B	24	118.45
IP	2	43.20
TX1	2	97.75
TX2	24	42.00
SOC	9	11.55
Grand Total SSR		4237
Grand Total BCE		35.76741 (a 36% increase over FY07)

At 85% programmed flying training (PFT), 4273 SSR requires the following total programmed:

Sorties	4984.294
Hours	6978.012

History of Portland BRAC Scenario

- 14 Feb 05, Recommendation S432, Close Portland AGS
 - "tabled pending further financial analysis"
 - 1 time costs = \$69M
 - Net Savings = \$.2M/year
 - Payback Period = 345 Years simple math
- 24 Feb 05, Recommendation S432.1, Close Portland AGS
 - "agreed by consensus, to forward S432.1 as a Candidate Recommendation
 - 1 time costs = \$47M
 - Net Savings = \$.5M/year
 - Payback Period = 94 Years simple math
- 19 Apr 05, Recommendation S432.1C2, Close Portland AGS
 - "determined by consensus should be moved forward to ISG"
 - 1 time costs = \$86M
 - Net Savings = \$14M/year
 - Payback Period = 6 years

Gave to ~~Wade~~ Kristen to give to Coyte

IS/ACD = 1MIS is the WFC we need to follow-up for C. Coyte



HEADQUARTERS, 142 Fighter Wing
142 FW
6801 N. E. Cornfoot Road
Portland International Airport
Portland, Oregon 97218-2797

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Col Bradley Applegate: 503-335-4142
 Col Steven Gregg: 503-335-4021

**DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE****142 FIGHTER WING (ACC)
PORTLAND, OREGON 97218-2797**


24 June 2005

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BRAD MCREE

FROM: 142 FW/CC

SUBJECT: Follow-Up BRAC Data

1. Enclosed are the three iterations of scenario 432 (the realignment of the Portland Air National Guard Base). Versions 432 (14 Feb 05) and 432.1 (24 Feb 05) show only costs, no savings. Version 432.1c2 (19 Apr 05) shows \$14 million per year net savings.
2. After exhaustive analysis of the COBRA data using both the COBRA and Adder programs to digest the COBRA database, the only conclusion we can draw is that cost savings of the Portland Realignment are realized only in the elimination of 239 full-time positions and 201 drill status positions from the Reserve Force Manpower Pool.
3. We enclose policy guidance stipulating no change in Reserve Component Manpower. If Reserve Component Manpower remains steady, there will be zero cost savings with this recommendation. In fact, we have identified numerous costs (enclosed) in this proposal that are not accounted for. Overall, the Portland recommendation will generate considerable costs.
4. The cost savings of the Portland Realignment proposal appears to be a misrepresentation of the facts.



BRADLEY J. APPELATE, Colonel, ORANG
Commander

Attachments:

1. Realignment Summary
2. S432 Proposal
3. S432.1 Proposal
4. S432.1c2 Proposal
5. Portland Scenario Personnel Comparison
6. Annual Recurring Savings
7. One-time Scenario Cost Comparison
8. MILCON Comparison
9. Payback Comparison
10. COBRA Manpower Calculation Memo
11. Air Force 2005 Base Closure and Realignment Recommendation Memo

Portland ANGB Realignment Summary

On February 14, 2005 the Base Closure Executive Group (BCEG) met and discussed Scenario 432, the realignment of the Portland Air National Guard Base. The final conclusion was to table the decision pending further financial analysis. The one time cost of \$69 million with an annual savings of \$200,000 would never pay back and was annotated as a payback of 100+ years.

On February 24, 2005 the BCEG met again to discuss the realignment of the Portland Air National Guard Base, under a modified Scenario 432.1. The final conclusion was to forward the realignment of the Portland Air National Guard Base as a Candidate Recommendation. The one time costs associated with this version were \$47 million with an annual savings of \$500,000. This cost analysis would again never repay itself, and was annotated as a payback once again of 100+ years.

The final version of the realignment scenario was released as 432.1c2 on 19 April 5, 2005. We were never able to find a version 432.1c1.

Version 432.1c2 had one time costs of \$85 million and annual savings of \$14 million, with a payback period of 7 years.

All three versions of Portland's Realignment Proposal (432, 432.1, 432.1C2) moved essentially the same number of personnel out of Portland, leaving the base with approximately 174 full time positions and 735 drill status positions at an "Enclaved" Portland ANG Base (142 ECS, 244 CCS, and 272 CCS). The unit manning documents of these organizations support the 174 full time positions and 735 drill status positions.

Here's a summary of the Significant Differences in the Proposals:

432:

- All Realignment is conducted in FY 2007
- 9 F-15 move to New Orleans LA
- 6 F-15 move to Atlantic City NJ
- 4 KC-135 move to Tinker AFB OK
- 4 KC-135 move to Back Up Inventory
- Moves Base Fire Fighters to Fairchild AFB WA
- Moves 304 RQS to Davis Monthan AFB AZ
- Realigns the majority of the 939 ARW to an undetermined Future Mission at Vandenberg AFB CA
- Significant military construction costs at Tinker AFB (\$30 million) and Davis Monthan (\$8.6 million)

432.1:

- **All Realignment is conducted in FY 2008**
- **Leave Base Fire Fighters at Portland ANG Base**
- **Moves 304 RQS to McChord AFB WA instead of Davis Monthan AFB**
- **Sends Residual 142 Ops and Maintenance personnel to "ANG Base X"**
- **Reduces military construction costs at Tinker AFB OK to \$11.1 million**
- **Shifts military construction from Davis Monthan AFB to McChord AFB for the 304 RQS move (\$8.9 million)**
- 9 F-15 move to New Orleans LA
- 6 F-15 move to Atlantic City NJ
- 4 KC-135 move to Tinker AFB OK
- 4 KC-135 move to Back Up Inventory
- Still realigns the majority of the 939 ARW to an undetermined Future Mission at Vandenberg AFB CA

432.1c2:

- **3 KC-135 move to Forbes Field KS**
- **Eliminates all Future Mission assignments and any residual moves**
- **Significantly increases Civilian moving costs by \$4.5 million**
- **Significantly increases one time unique costs by \$5.4 million**
- **Reduces military construction at Tinker AFB OK by \$3.2 million**
- **Military construction at Vandenberg AFB CA increases to \$26.5 million.**
- **Total elimination of 239 full time positions and 201 drill status positions (no movements to Base X for ANG, AFRES, or AF, or "unidentified FTF")**
- All Realignment is conducted in FY 2008
- 9 F-15 move to New Orleans LA
- 6 F-15 move to Atlantic City NJ
- 4 KC-135 move to Tinker AFB OK
- 1 KC-135 move to Back Up Inventory
- Leaves Base Fire Fighters at Portland ANG Base
- Moves 304 RQS to McChord AFB WA
- Military construction at McChord AFB still \$8.9 million

The only significant cost savings generated throughout the Portland ANG Base Realignment Proposal process is in the last iteration. In version 432.1c2, the recurring cost savings are entirely due to the elimination of 7 Officers, 31 Enlisted, 201 Civilian, and 201 Drill Status positions. Although these positions are identified to be realigned against an "unidentified future mission" or assigned to "Base X", they are eliminated from the ANG and Reserve Force Manpower Pool, there is no addition to Base X in the COBRA documentation. This seems to contradict Acting Secretary of the Air Force Mr Dominguez statement **"The Air Force will reinvest any reserve component manpower made available as a result of BRAC realignments or closures into other high priority Air Force missions, including emerging missions"** (Air Force 2005 Base Closure and Realignment Recommendations memo, dated 9 May 2005). Referring to the COBRA Manpower Calculations memo from Mr. Gerald F. Pease, dated 15 Apr 2005:

"This memorandum provides guidance for entering manpower data into Air Force Cost of Base Realignment Actions (COBRA). This guidance is necessary to ensure consistency of approach and proper accounting of manpower impacts resulting from Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) developed scenarios. **The primary tenet to follow in all entry actions is that Air Force manpower identified as savings in COBRA will be retained and reinvested within the Air Force to accommodate other priority mission requirements.**

COBRA users will enter manpower data using these instructions. Enter manpower authorization costs and savings calculated and identified by AFIDPMP in the appropriate COBRA screen. Enter mission and associated base operating support (BOS) manpower authorizations realigning to a specified location in Screen 3 as movement to the new location(s). **Because Air Force authorizations identified as going to "BASE X" will be considered a savings, enter the data in COBRA Screen 6 as an "elimination" (-) from the losing location. Enter in Screen 6 manpower identified as moving from "BASE X" into a location as an "addition" (+) at the gaining installation."**

The fact is that the 440 positions eliminated in the Portland AGS Recommendation 432.1c2 are not entered into COBRA Screen 6 as BASE X additions (nothing but zeros entered). As far as we can determine, these positions are not re-invested. COBRA credits the scenario 432.1c2 with an annual recurring savings of 18.3 million by eliminating these positions. This a significant deviation from Mr. Pease guidance on COBRA data entry and calls into question the validity and fairness of USAF BRAC cost accounting.

If the eliminated positions are, in fact, rolled into other "high priority Air Force missions," the realignment proposal will cost, rather than save money.

We are researching to determine if the technique used to accrue manpower savings from eliminated positions was applied consistently across 'losing' organizations. As an example - Portland, St. Louis, and Otis are all losing 15 aircraft. It would follow that each unit would have the same number of positions eliminated in their cost savings equation. We expect to have the data available by next Wed.

In all three scenarios, even though the "Enclaved" units at Portland Air National Guard Base were assigned to support a NORAD Homeland Defense Alert Commitment, there were no costs charged against the scenarios for an Alert Detachment. Because of the unique nature of this new Alert Detachment (no local USAF flying unit to support day to day operations of the Detachment), this Alert Detachment will incur additional expenses. We've estimated the cost of an Unsupported Alert Detachment to be \$5.4 million annually.

In the final version, 432.1c2, there is a recurring cost savings for moving a Geographically Separated Unit from off base New Orleans NAS onto the base. This action would probably save money independently of the Portland realignment and should not be in the Portland Realignment cost savings.

Using the data of version 432.1c2, we can use the \$85 million one time cost and subtract the \$5.4 million for the Alert Detachment manning and \$156K for the GSU move at New Orleans from the "annual recurring savings" of \$14 million to come to an adjusted annual recurring savings of \$8.4 million, and an adjusted 15 year payback period (using 2.8% interest noted in the Adder Report).

**ADJUSTED FINANCIAL ANALYSIS
 COBRA USAF 0079V2 (432.1c2)**

Description:	Potentially Overlooked Costs:	Adjustments:	Adjusted Values:
COBRA "Total Net One Time Costs"			\$(85,358,751¹)
Total Recurring Savings:			
COBRA "Total Recurring Savings"			\$13,986,000²
New Orleans GSU Move onto Base <small>Annual savings not related to the Portland Realignment</small>		\$(153,000)	
Air Sovereignty Alert Detachment <small>Annual recurring cost</small>		\$(5,445,206)	
Total Adjusted Recurring Savings:			\$8,387,794

**Potentially Overlooked Costs
 And Misrepresented Savings:**

Personnel:			
Misc Recurring Savings:		\$(2,814,000)	
<small>(201 drill positions x \$14k¹)</small>			
7 Officer Positions		\$(874,803)	
31 Enlisted Positions		\$(2,554,371)	
201 Civilian Positions		\$(12,051,795)	
<small>Annual recurring costs</small>			
Total Annual Cost With Pay:		\$(18,294,969)	
Atlantic City Conversion:	Maintenance	\$(6,467,500)	
	Pilots	\$(60,000,000)	
Potential Portland Early Military Retirements		\$(9,009,362)	
Total One Time Costs with Conversion		\$(166,280,819)	

¹ COBRA ONE-TIME COST REPORT

² COBRA REALIGNMENT SUMMARY REPORT, Net Costs in Constant Dollars

³ COBRA INPUT DATA REPORT, Footnotes for Screen Five, Portland

	<u>COBRA Figures</u>	<u>Adjusted Figures</u>
COBRA Net One Time Cost	\$85,358,751	\$85,358,751
Adjusted Annual Recurring Savings	<u>\$13,986,000</u>	<u>\$8,387,794</u>
Net Present Value	\$100,233,049	\$22,263,995
Repayment (2.8% Interest - Adder)	7 Years	15 Years
Repayment (simple math)	6 Years	10 Years

**Adjusted Net Present Value
 Calculated at 2.8%
 Using the COBRA Model**

Year	Cost	Adjusted Cost	NPV
2006	\$4,956,847	\$4,956,847	\$4,956,847
2007	\$47,350,814	\$47,350,814	\$52,307,661
2008	\$27,269,000	\$27,269,000	\$79,576,661
2009	(\$6,745,794)	(\$6,040,329)	\$73,536,332
2010	(\$8,387,794)	(\$7,306,042)	\$66,230,289
2011	(\$8,387,794)	(\$7,107,045)	\$59,123,244
2012	(\$8,387,794)	(\$6,913,468)	\$52,209,776
2013	(\$8,387,794)	(\$6,725,163)	\$45,484,613
2014	(\$8,387,794)	(\$6,541,988)	\$38,942,625
2015	(\$8,387,794)	(\$6,363,801)	\$32,578,824
2016	(\$8,387,794)	(\$6,190,468)	\$26,388,356
2017	(\$8,387,794)	(\$6,021,856)	\$20,366,500
2018	(\$8,387,794)	(\$5,857,837)	\$14,508,663
2019	(\$8,387,794)	(\$5,698,285)	\$8,810,378
2020	(\$8,387,794)	(\$5,543,079)	\$3,267,300
2021	(\$8,387,794)	(\$5,392,100)	(\$2,124,800)
2022	(\$8,387,794)	(\$5,245,233)	(\$7,370,034)
2023	(\$8,387,794)	(\$5,102,367)	(\$12,472,400)
2024	(\$8,387,794)	(\$4,963,392)	(\$17,435,793)
2025	(\$8,387,794)	(\$4,828,202)	(\$22,263,995)



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S432 Realign Portland IAP AGS, Portland, OR

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Candidate #USAF-0079 / S432 Close Portland IAP AGS, Portland, OR

Candidate Recommendation: Close Portland IAP AGS. The 939th Air Refueling Wing (AFRC) will be realigned. The wing's KC-135R aircraft will be distributed to the 507th Air Refueling Wing (AFRC), Tinker AFB, Oklahoma (4 PAA) and to backup aircraft inventory (4 PAA). Firefighters move to Fairchild AFB, Washington. The 142d Fighter Wing (ANG) will inactivate. The wing's F-15 aircraft will be distributed to the 177th Fighter Wing (ANG), Atlantic City IAP AGS, New Jersey (6 PAA) and 159th Fighter Wing (ANG), NAS JRB New Orleans, Louisiana (9 PAA). The 939 ARW's operations and maintenance manpower to support 4 PAA will realign to Tinker AFB; remaining 939 ARW manpower, to include ECS, will move to Vandenberg AFB, California to support emerging missions. The 304th RQS (AFRC) will realign to Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona as part of the 305 RQS (AFRC). The 147th Fighter Wing's ECS elements, along with the 244th and 272d Combat Communications Squadrons (ANG), will enclave. The ANG enclave will also support a Homeland Defense alert commitment.

<p style="text-align: center; font-size: small;"><u>Justification</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Enables Future Total Force transformation ■ Consolidates tanker fleet ■ Consolidates fighter force 	<p style="text-align: center; font-size: small;"><u>Military Value</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Fighter realignment supports NORTHCOM alert ■ Retains intellectual capital at three locations ■ Retains aerial refueling assets in proximity to their missions 										
<p style="text-align: center; font-size: small;"><u>Payback</u></p> <table style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td style="width: 60%;">■ One Time Cost:</td> <td style="text-align: right;">\$69M</td> </tr> <tr> <td>■ Net Implementation Cost:</td> <td style="text-align: right;">\$69M</td> </tr> <tr> <td>■ Annual Recurring Savings:</td> <td style="text-align: right;">\$.2M</td> </tr> <tr> <td>■ Payback period:</td> <td style="text-align: right;">100+</td> </tr> <tr> <td>■ NPV Costs:</td> <td style="text-align: right;">\$64M</td> </tr> </table>	■ One Time Cost:	\$69M	■ Net Implementation Cost:	\$69M	■ Annual Recurring Savings:	\$.2M	■ Payback period:	100+	■ NPV Costs:	\$64M	<p style="text-align: center; font-size: small;"><u>Impacts</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Criterion 6: Total Job Change -540 (direct: -311, indirect: -229) ROI: -0.04% ■ Criterion 7: A review of community attributes indicates no issues regarding the ability of the infrastructure of the communities to support missions, forces and personnel ■ Criterion 8: No natural infrastructure issues affecting candidate recommendation
■ One Time Cost:	\$69M										
■ Net Implementation Cost:	\$69M										
■ Annual Recurring Savings:	\$.2M										
■ Payback period:	100+										
■ NPV Costs:	\$64M										

✓ Strategy ✓ Capacity Analysis / Data Verification ✓ JCSG/MiDep Recommended ✓ Deconflicted w/JCSGs
 ✓ COBRA ✓ Military Value Analysis / Data Verification ✓ Criteria 5-8 Analysis ✓ Deconflicted w/MiDeps

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Scenario S432 Manpower

Source of Sept 03 UMD	23	118	807	750	2041	25	124	809	758	2047
Source MALCOM-Current/Projected 31 Sep 04	24	128	867	718	2010	27	128	874	738	2005
(432) Reassign 304 RQS (AFRC) to Davis-Monthan						-7	-29	-7	-43	-66
(432) Reassign 939 ARW (AFRC) to Vandenberg (ECS)						0	0	-18	-18	-331
(432) Reassign 939 ARW (AFRC) to Vandenberg (FTP) New Mission - Non BRAC Programmatic						8	-2	-378	-381	-478
(432) Minus 9 F-15C Ops and Mx to New Orleans (ANG)						-1	-13	-38	-52	-261
(432) Minus 9 F-15C BOS to ANG Base X (ANG)						0	-5	-5	-10	0
(432) Minus 6 F-15C Ops and Mx to Atlantic City (ANG)						-5	-10	-41	-56	-137
(432) Minus 6 F-15C BOS to Atlantic City (ANG)						-1	-3	-2	-6	0
(432) Minus 6 F-15C to Atlantic City, Ops and Mx to ANG Base X (ANG)						-3	0	-77	-80	0
(432) Minus 6 F-15C to Atlantic City, BOS to ANG Base X (ANG)						0	-3	-3	-6	0
(432) Minus Regt/F Personnel to Base X (AD)						-7	-23	-8	-39	0
(432) Move Five to Fairchild (ANG)						0	0	-1	-1	-27
						0				0
Adjusted Baseline	24	128	867	718	2010	27	128	874	738	2005
COBRA Data	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

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Scenario S432 One-Time Costs

Category	Cost	Sub-Total
Construction		
Military Construction	44,260,000	
Total - Construction		44,260,000
Personnel		
Civilian RIF	712,318	
Civilian Early Retirement	198,379	
Unemployment	53,412	
Total - Personnel		964,109
Overhead		
Program Management Cost	1,318,443	
Mothball / Shutdown	137,700	
Total - Overhead		1,456,143
Moving		
Civilian Moving	6,213,101	
Military Moving	901,168	
Freight	385,339	
Information Technologies	3,804,800	
One-Time Moving Costs	431,000	
Total - Moving		11,735,409
Other		
Environmental Mitigation Costs	795,000	
One-Time Unique Costs	10,315,000	
Total - Other		11,060,000
Total One-Time Costs		69,475,662

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S432.1
Close Portland IAP AGS, Portland, OR

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Candidate #USAF-0079 / S432.1
Close Portland IAP AGS, Portland, OR

Candidate Recommendation: Close Portland IAP AGS. The 939th Air Refueling Wing (AFRC) will be realigned. The wing's KC-135R aircraft will be distributed to the 507th Air Refueling Wing (AFRC), Tinker AFB, Oklahoma (4 PAA) and to backup aircraft inventory (4 PAA). The 142nd Fighter Wing (ANG) will inactivate. The wing's F-15 aircraft will be distributed to the 177th Fighter Wing (ANG), Atlantic City IAP AGS, New Jersey (6 PAA) and 159th Fighter Wing (ANG) NAS JRB New Orleans, Louisiana (9 PAA). The 939 ARW's operations and maintenance manpower to support 4 PAA will realign to Tinker AFB; remaining 939 ARW manpower, to include ECS, will move to support emerging missions. The 304th RQS (AFRC) will realign to McChord AFB, Washington. The 142nd Fighter Wing's ECS elements, along with the 244th and 272d Combat Communications Squadrons (ANG), will enclave. The ANG enclave will also support a Homeland Defense alert commitment.

<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Justification</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Enables Future Total Force transformation ■ Consolidates tanker fleet ■ Consolidates fighter force 	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Military Value</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Fighter realignment supports NORTHCOM alert ■ Retains intellectual capital at three locations
<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Payback</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ One Time Cost: \$47M ■ Net Implementation Cost: \$45M ■ Annual Recurring Savings: \$.5M ■ Payback period: 100+ ■ NPV Cost: \$39M 	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Impacts</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Criterion 6: Total Job Change : -538 (direct -310, indirect -228) ROI-0.04% ■ Criterion 7: A review of community attributes indicates no issues regarding the ability of the infrastructure of the communities to support missions, forces and personnel ■ Criterion 8: No natural infrastructure issues affecting candidate recommendation

Strategy Capacity Analysis / Data Verification JCSG/MiIDep Recommended Deconflicted w/JCSGs
 COBRA Military Value Analysis / Data Verification Criteria 6-8 Analysis Deconflicted w/MiIDeps

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Scenario S432.1 Manpower

Scenario 20 Sept 05 USD	25	119	802	744	2002	26	119	807	750	2007	27	135	574	744	2005	28	135	574	750	2005
Scenario MAJCOM (Current) Proposed 20 Sep 04	24	128	567	719	2010	27	129	872	728	2005	27	135	574	736	2005	28	135	574	736	2005
(S432.1) Reassign 93B AFHQ (AFHQ) to Vandenberg (EC)																-7	-39	-7	-43	-46
(S432.1) Reassign 93B AFHQ (AFHQ) to Vandenberg (EC)																0	0	-18	-18	-301
(S432.1) Reassign 93B AFHQ (AFHQ) to Vandenberg (EC)																0	-2	-279	-281	-470
(S432.1) Minus 9 F-15C Ops and Mi to New Orleans (ANG)																1	-13	-38	-42	-261
(S432.1) Minus 9 F-15C BOS to ANG Base X (ANG)																0	5	5	-10	0
(S432.1) Minus 6 F-15C Ops and Mi to Atlantic City (ANG)																-5	-10	-41	-55	-137
(S432.1) Minus 6 F-15C to Atlantic City, Ops and Mi to ANG Base X (ANG)																-1	-3	-2	-6	0
(S432.1) Minus 6 F-15C to Atlantic City, BOS to ANG Base X (ANG)																-3	0	-71	-80	0
(S432.1) Minus RegAF Personnel to Base X (AD)																0	3	-3	6	0
																-7	-25	8	-38	0
Adjusted Baseline	24	128	567	719	2010	27	129	872	728	2005	27	135	574	744	2005	28	135	574	750	2005
DOBRA Data	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-24	-45	-200	-310	-782

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Scenario S432.1 One-Time Costs

(All values in 2005 Constant Dollars)

Category	Cost	Sub-Total
Construction		
Military Construction	24,356,000	
Total - Construction		24,356,000
Personnel		
Civilian RIF	712,318	
Civilian Early Retirement	198,379	
Unemployment	53,412	
Total - Personnel		964,109
Overhead		
Program Management Cost	1,199,171	
Mothball / Shutdown	124,650	
Total - Overhead		1,323,821
Moving		
Civilian Moving	6,162,467	
Military Moving	501,822	
Freight	339,871	
Information Technologies	1,669,800	
One-Time Moving Costs	2,991,000	
Total - Moving		11,604,960
Other		
Environmental Mitigation Costs	808,000	
One-Time Unique Costs	7,468,000	
Total - Other		8,276,000
Total One-Time Costs		46,424,890

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Candidate #USAF-0079V2 / S432.1c2 Realign Portland IAP AGS, Portland, OR

Candidate Recommendation: Realign Portland IAP AGS. The 938th Air Refueling Wing (AFRC) will realign. The wing's KC-135R aircraft will be distributed to the 507th Air Refueling Wing (AFRC), Tinker AFB, Oklahoma (4 PAA), the 190th Air Refueling Wing (ANG), Forbes Field AGS, Kansas (3 PAA), and to backup aircraft inventory (1 PAA). The 142d Fighter Wing (ANG) will be recommended for inactivation. The wing's F-15 aircraft will be distributed to the 177th Fighter Wing (ANG), Atlantic City IAP AGS, New Jersey (8 PAA) and 159th Fighter Wing (ANG), NAS JRB New Orleans, Louisiana (8 PAA). The 938 ARW's ECS will realign to Vandenberg AFB, California. The 304th RQS (AFRC) will be realigned to McChord AFB, Washington. The 142nd Fighter Wing's ECS elements, along with the 244th and 272d Combat Communications Squadrons (ANG), will remain in place and support a Homeland Defense alert commitment. The 214th EIS geographically separated unit at Jackson Barracks, New Orleans, Louisiana, will be closed and consolidated into available space at NAS New Orleans.

- Justification**
- Tinker and Forbes PAA increase improves unit capability
 - Establishes ANGI/AFRC KC-135 association at Tinker with emphasis on Total Force participation
 - Establishes optimal-sized fighter squadrons (24 PAA) at both New Orleans and Atlantic City
 - Portland enclave retains garrison to support expeditionary units and Homeland Defense role

- Military Value**
- Aligns Portland's (71) KC-135s to higher tanker mil val locations, Tinker (4) and Forbes (35)
 - Aligns Portland (77) fighters to higher military value location, Atlantic City (51)
 - Mil Judgment: Transfer fighters from Portland (77) to New Orleans (79) supports critical Air Sovereignty role

Payback

■ One Time Cost:	\$86M
■ Net Implementation Cost:	\$36M
■ Annual Recurring Savings:	\$14M
■ Payback period:	7 Yrs/2015
■ NPV Savings:	\$100M

- Impacts**
- Criterion 6: Total Job Change: -1,018 (direct: -564, indirect: -454) ROI: -0.08%
 - Criterion 7: A review of community attributes indicates no issues regarding the ability of the infrastructure of the communities to support missions, forces and personnel
 - Criterion 8: No natural infrastructure issues affecting candidate recommendation

- ✓ Strategy
- ✓ Capacity Analysis / Data Verification
- ✓ JCSG/MilDep Recommendation
- ✓ Deconflicted w/JCSGs
- ✓ COBRA
- ✓ Military Value Analysis / Data Verification
- ✓ Criteria 6-8 Analysis
- ✓ Deconflicted w/MilDep

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Candidate #USAF 0079V2 / 432.1c2 Portland Manpower

3-Apr-05

Scenario	20	19	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017		
Scenario 1: AFRIC BRAC Base II	24	133	387	718	2010	37	126	372	726	2005	27	126	374	726	2005	2	47	95	144	180
Scenario 2: AFRIC BRAC Base II	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Scenario 3: AFRIC BRAC Base II	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Scenario 4: AFRIC BRAC Base II	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Scenario 5: AFRIC BRAC Base II	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Scenario 6: AFRIC BRAC Base II	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Scenario 7: AFRIC BRAC Base II	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Scenario 8: AFRIC BRAC Base II	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Scenario 9: AFRIC BRAC Base II	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Scenario 10: AFRIC BRAC Base II	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Scenario 11: AFRIC BRAC Base II	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Scenario 12: AFRIC BRAC Base II	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Scenario 13: AFRIC BRAC Base II	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Scenario 14: AFRIC BRAC Base II	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Scenario 15: AFRIC BRAC Base II	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Scenario 16: AFRIC BRAC Base II	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Scenario 17: AFRIC BRAC Base II	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Scenario 18: AFRIC BRAC Base II	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Scenario 19: AFRIC BRAC Base II	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Scenario 20: AFRIC BRAC Base II	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Scenario 21: AFRIC BRAC Base II	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Scenario 22: AFRIC BRAC Base II	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Scenario 23: AFRIC BRAC Base II	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Scenario 24: AFRIC BRAC Base II	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Scenario 25: AFRIC BRAC Base II	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Scenario 26: AFRIC BRAC Base II	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Scenario 27: AFRIC BRAC Base II	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Scenario 28: AFRIC BRAC Base II	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Scenario 29: AFRIC BRAC Base II	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Scenario 30: AFRIC BRAC Base II	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Scenario 31: AFRIC BRAC Base II	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Scenario 32: AFRIC BRAC Base II	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Scenario 33: AFRIC BRAC Base II	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Scenario 34: AFRIC BRAC Base II	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Scenario 35: AFRIC BRAC Base II	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Scenario 36: AFRIC BRAC Base II	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Scenario 37: AFRIC BRAC Base II	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Scenario 38: AFRIC BRAC Base II	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Scenario 39: AFRIC BRAC Base II	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Scenario 40: AFRIC BRAC Base II	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Scenario 41: AFRIC BRAC Base II	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Scenario 42: AFRIC BRAC Base II	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Scenario 43: AFRIC BRAC Base II	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Scenario 44: AFRIC BRAC Base II	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Scenario 45: AFRIC BRAC Base II	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Scenario 46: AFRIC BRAC Base II	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Scenario 47: AFRIC BRAC Base II	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Scenario 48: AFRIC BRAC Base II	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Scenario 49: AFRIC BRAC Base II	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Scenario 50: AFRIC BRAC Base II	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Scenario 51: AFRIC BRAC Base II	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Scenario 52: AFRIC BRAC Base II	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Scenario 53: AFRIC BRAC Base II	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Scenario 54: AFRIC BRAC Base II	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Scenario 55: AFRIC BRAC Base II	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Scenario 56: AFRIC BRAC Base II	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Scenario 57: AFRIC BRAC Base II	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Scenario 58: AFRIC BRAC Base II	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Scenario 59: AFRIC BRAC Base II	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Scenario 60: AFRIC BRAC Base II	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Scenario 61: AFRIC BRAC Base II	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Scenario 62: AFRIC BRAC Base II	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Scenario 63: AFRIC BRAC Base II	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Scenario 64: AFRIC BRAC Base II	0	0																		

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Candidate #USAF 0079V2 / 432.1c2
One-Time Costs

(All values in 2005 Constant Dollars)

Category	Cost	Sub-Total
Construction		
Military Construction	48,882,000	
Total - Construction		48,882,000
Personnel		
Civilian RIP	2,137,140	
Civilian Early Retirement	458,793	
Eliminated Military PCS	197,297	
Unemployment	160,236	
Total - Personnel		2,953,466
Overhead		
Program Management Cost	1,826,223	
Mothball / Shutdown	124,650	
Total - Overhead		1,950,873
Moving		
Civilian Moving	10,777,835	
Civilian FPP	1,455,336	
Military Moving	396,650	
Freight	1,273,896	
Information Technologies	1,902,000	
One-Time Moving Costs	2,809,000	
Total - Moving		18,614,717
Other		
Environmental Mitigation Costs	283,000	
One-Time Unique Costs	12,837,000	
Total - Other		13,120,000
Total One-Time Costs		85,521,056

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Candidate #USAF 0079V2 / 432.1c2
MILCON Summary

All values in 2005 Constant Dollars

Base Name	Total MilCon*	Milcon Cost Avoidance	Total Net Costs
Portland IAP AGS	528,000	0	528,000
Tinker AFB	7,856,000	0	7,856,000
Forbes Field AGS	0	0	0
NAS New Orleans ARS	1,816,000	0	1,816,000
Atlantic City IAP AG	3,346,000	0	3,346,000
McChord AFB	8,809,000	0	8,809,000
BASE X (AIR FORCE)	0	0	0
Vandenberg AFB	26,527,000	0	26,527,000
Totals:	48,882,000	0	48,882,000

* All MilCon Costs include Design, Site Preparation, Contingency Planning, and SIOH Costs where applicable.

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Total Annual Recurring Savings Due to Personnel Elimination

	Standard Values	x	Positions Eliminated	=	Annual Savings
Officer	\$124,971.93	x	7	=	\$874,803.51
Enlisted	\$82,399.09	x	31	=	\$2,554,371.79
Civilian	\$59,959.18	x	201	=	\$12,051,795.18
Drill Status	\$14,000.00	x	201	=	\$2,814,000.00

Total Annual Savings: \$18,294,970.48

Drill Status Position Savings are denoted in "Misc Recurring Savings \$2.814 Million" in Footnote to Input Data Report for Screen Five and verified in Input Data Report Screen 5 as a recurring Misc Savings \$2.814 Mil
Total Positions Eliminated verified in Adder Document for Officer, Enlisted, and Civilian Positions
Total Positions Eliminated verified in Input Data Document, Footnotes Screen Five, for Drill Status Positions
Standard Values Established in "Standard Factors Screen One - Personnel" Input Data Report
Standard Values for Drill Status Position Established in Footnote to Input Data Report for Screen Five

One Time Scenario Cost Comparison					
Category					
Construction:					
	Military Construction	44,260,000	24,356,000	49,882,000	48,682,000
	Total - Construction	44,260,000	24,356,000	49,882,000	48,682,000
Personnel:					
	Civilian RIF	712,318	712,318	2,137,140	
	Civilian Early Retirement	198,379	198,379	458,793	
	Eliminated Military PCS Move			187,297	
	Unemployment	53,412	53,412	160,236	
	Total - Personnel	984,109	984,109	2,853,466	
Overhead:					
	Program Management Cost	1,318,443	1,199,171	1,828,223	
	Support Contract Termination	0	0	0	
	Mothership / Shutdown	137,700	124,000	124,650	
	Total - Overhead	1,456,143	1,323,171	1,952,873	
Moving:					
	Civilian Moving	6,213,101	6,162,467	10,777,835	
	Civilian PPP	0	0	1,455,835	
	Military Moving	901,188	501,822	398,650	
	Freight	395,339	339,871	1,273,896	
	Information Technologies	3,604,800	1,669,800	1,902,000	
	One-Time Moving Costs	431,000	2,931,000	2,809,000	
	Total - Moving	11,354,408	11,604,960	18,615,216	
Other:					
	HAP / RSE	0	0	0	
	Environmental Mitigation Costs	745,000	808,000	283,000	
	Msn Contract Start-up & End	0	0	0	
	One-Time Unique Costs	10,315,000	7,488,000	12,837,000	
	Total - Other	11,060,000	8,276,000	13,120,000	
Total One-Time Costs		69,475,860	46,524,240	85,521,555	
One-Time Savings					
	Military Construction Cost Avoid	0	0	0	
	Military Moving	0	0	162,305	
	One-Time Moving Savings	0	0	0	
	Environmental Mitigation Savings	0	0	0	
	One-Time Unique Savings	0	0	0	
	Total One-Time Savings	0	0	162,305	
Net One-Time Costs		\$69,475,860.00	\$46,524,240.00	\$85,359,250.00	

MILCON Comparison

Location

Portland IAP OR	541,000	541,000	528,000
Tinker AFB OK	30,934,000	11,156,000	7,856,000
Forbes Field AGS KS	0	0	0
NAS New Orleans ARS LA	0	0	1,816,000
Atlantic City IAP NJ	3,427,000	3,427,000	3,346,000
Davis Montham AFB AZ	8,602,000	0	0
McChord AFB WA	0	8,693,000	8,609,000
Base X (Air Force)	0	0	0
Vandenberg AFB CA	339,000	339,000	26,527,000
Fairchild AFB WA	417,000	0	0
Total Milcon	\$44,260,000	\$24,356,000	\$48,882,000

Pay Back Comparison

Net Implementation Costs	\$69,475,660	\$46,524,240	\$85,359,250
Annual Recurring Savings	\$200,000	\$500,000	\$13,985,785
Payback Period	Never	Never	7 Years
Net Present Value Costs	\$64,000,000	\$39,000,000	\$72,931,602
1st year Interest expense (2.8%):	\$1,792,000	\$1,092,000	\$2,042,084



HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON DC

Office of the Assistant Secretary

MEMORANDUM FOR AF/DPM
AFCAA/TD

APR 15 2005

SUBJECT: COBRA Manpower Calculations

References: (a) COBRA User Manual

This memorandum provides guidance for entering manpower data into Air Force Cost of Base Realignment Actions (COBRA). This guidance is necessary to ensure consistency of approach and proper accounting of manpower impacts resulting from Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) developed scenarios. The primary tenet to follow in all entry actions is that Air Force manpower identified as savings in COBRA will be retained and reinvested within the Air Force to accommodate other priority mission requirements.

COBRA users will enter manpower data using these instructions. Enter manpower authorization costs and savings calculated and identified by AF/DPMP in the appropriate COBRA screen. Enter mission and associated base operating support (BOS) manpower authorizations realigning to a specified location in Screen 3 as movement to the new location(s). Because Air Force authorizations identified as going to "BASE X" will be considered a savings, enter the data in COBRA Screen 6 as an "elimination" (-) from the losing location. Enter in Screen 6 manpower identified as moving from "BASE X" into a location as an "addition" (+) at the gaining installation.

Enter non-Air Force manpower authorizations (such as DECA, Army, Navy, USMC) as movements to the specifically identified location unless identified by the owning agency or MILDEP as a savings. Enter other AF non-BRAC programmatic changes and savings in Screen 6 as required.

These data entry procedures will ensure the Air Force manpower savings are identified and allocated as accurately as possible and are consistent with OSD policy and COBRA procedures.

The SAF/IEBB action officer points of contact are Col Christopher Kapellas, DSN 222-9510 and Mr. Paul Freund, DSN 227-2995.

Gary W. Heckman
GARY W. HECKMAN
Major General, USAF
Assistant DCS, Plans and Programs (BRAC)

Gerald F. Pease, Jr.
GERALD F. PEASE, JR.
Deputy Assistant Secretary
(Basing & Infrastructure Analysis)

cc:
AFAA/FSS
AF/DPMZ
SAF/IEBB
SAF/IEBJ

Draft Deliberative Document—For Discussion Purposes Only
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SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON

09 MAY 2005


MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Air Force 2005 Base Closure and Realignment Recommendations

Attached please find the Air Force recommendations for installations to be closed or realigned under the 2005 BRAC process. As required by Section 2903 (c) (5) of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, I certify that the information contained in the Air Force report and the supporting data are accurate and complete to the best of my knowledge and belief.

The Air Force has taken bold steps to re-shape the force and institutionalize the changes needed to transform the Air Force, including adjusting to substantial force structure changes and leveraging the inherent strengths and advantages of our National Guard and Reserve forces. The Air Force will reinvest any reserve component manpower made available as a result of BRAC realignments or closures into other high priority Air Force missions, including emerging missions. Replacing older missions with emerging missions required by the new defense strategy helps ensure our reserve components remain relevant and engaged parts of the Total Force while providing the Air Force with an efficient and effective means to meet these new challenges.

The Air Force BRAC recommendations take a comprehensive, 20-year view, giving us the ability to reset our forces in a strategic way and create innovative organizational and basing solutions, capitalizing on joint opportunities where it makes sense, reducing inefficiencies, and freeing valuable resources. I look forward to working closely with you as our recommendations proceed through the BRAC process.


Michael E. Dominguez
Acting Secretary of the Air Force


Certification

The Base Closure Executive Group was chartered by the Secretary of the Air Force to advise and assist him in selecting bases for realignment or closure under the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990. The Base Closure Executive Group (BCEG) oversaw the process of collecting, verifying, and analyzing data for the Air Force. The BCEG ensured all levels of the Air Force complied with the Internal Control Plan and the Secretary's guidance.

The undersigned certify that the information contained in the Air Force Report (and supporting data) is accurate and complete to the best of his / her belief.



Mr. Gerald F. Pease, Jr.
Co-Chairman



Maj Gen Gary W. Heckman
Co-Chairman




Brig Gen William L. Holland




Mr. Fredolin W. Kuhn



Brig Gen Hanferd J. Moen, Jr.



Ms. Kathleen I. Ferguson




Brig Gen R. Anthony Haynes




Ms. Maureen T. Koetz




Mr. William H. Booth



Mr. Jay H. Jordan



Mr. Matthew M. Mleziva



Mr. Steven Rogers

FY 04 Comparative Data (BRAC)

Summary of Total Personnel (DSG, AGR, Tech)		Authorized		
142 FW	991		46.0%	\$ 6,435,065
939 ARW	1,165		54.0%	\$ 7,564,935
	2,156		100.0%	14,000,000

Total Savings \$ 14,000,000

Summary of Personnel Lost (DSG, AGR, Tech)		Authorized		
142 FW	680		36.9%	\$ 5,159,892
939 ARW	1,165		63.1%	\$ 8,840,108
	1,845		100.0%	14,000,000

Total Savings \$ 14,000,000

*\$14M Dollars
between
939 ARW &
142 FW*

Summary of Assigned Personnel

Unit: 939ARW Portland IAP, OR. 97218-2797

State of Residence	Number of Personnel			Civilians (Including ARTs)
	AGRs	^{Reserve Job} TRs	IMAs	
AK		1		
AZ		4		
CA		5		
CO		3		1
ID		2		
IL		1		
KS		2		
KY		1		
LA		2		
MO		1		
MS		2		
MT		1		
ND		3		
NV		5		
OR	12	532		136
TX		1		
VA		1		
WA	3	309		136
Total	15	876		274
Grand Total				1165
Note	IMA's are paid by this office but are not assigned to this location.			

Kent, John E

Subject: FW: CPFH**Importance:** High

Sir,

Here's what I got from our active duty counterparts as far as execution rates for the F15 C/D and below that further analysis provided.

ACC

EEIC 644 \$ 7327

EEIC 609 \$ 754

EEIC 699 \$ 2246

Total CPFH Rate \$10327

AETC

EEIC 644 \$ 6032

EEIC 609 \$ 772

EEIC 699 \$ 2292

Total CPFH Rate \$9096

Reimbursable rates:

ABIDES Factor Set 77 F15 C & D

EEIC 644 \$ 8030

EEIC 609 \$ 468

EEIC 699 \$ 2308

Total CPFH Rate \$10806

F15 C/D ANG Execution Rate, 173rd.

EEIC 644 \$6223

EEIC 609 \$ 840

EEIC 699 \$ 2136

Total CPFH Rate \$ 9199

Hope this helps.

Bob St.Clair

ANG/LGYR

SAIC Corporation

3500 Fetchet Ave

Andrews AFB, Md. 20762

DSN 278-8338 Comm. 301-836-8338

Fax 278-8955 Comm 301 836-8955

Cell 703-801-7102

Kent, John E

Subject: FW: CPFH

Sir,

Factor set 77, from ABIDES, has the F15A/B rate for EEIC 64410 at \$7573.00 an hour. Add in EEIC 60902 at \$615.00, EEIC 61952 at \$22.00 and EEIC 69900 at \$2249.00 and you have a total rate of \$10,459.00. This is the rate we receive reimbursement at when we fly contingency missions on behalf of the Air Force. Now is that the actual execution rate of our active duty counterparts? Probably not. It certainly is not the rate we execute at for our Guard F15A/B units. Using the BER II, which is on our web page if you want to review, I was able to average our F15A/B units and I get the following rates.

EEIC 64410,	\$6083.00,
EEIC 60902	\$765.00
EEIC 69900	\$2254.00
Total	\$9102.00.

I will contact our counterparts at ACC, AETC, PACAF and USAFE and inquire as to their execution rates. More to come.

Bob St.Clair
ANG/LGYR
SAIC Corporation
3500 Fetchet Ave
Andrews AFB, Md. 20762
DSN 278-8338 Comm. 301-836-8338
Fax 278-8955 Comm 301 836-8955
Cell 703-801-7102

Kent, John E

From: Staricka, Whisper B
Sent: Thursday, May 19, 2005 3:43 PM
To: Silver, Jeffrey M; Thompson, Gary W; Harris, Joe R; Kent, John E
Cc: Marshall, Michele D; Adams, Michael G; Ryan, Michael E; Smith, Rodney R (AMXS); Rasmussen, John W
Subject: Weekly Financial Status current as of 16 May

142 FW Cost Per Flying Hour

EEIC 644 (DLR)	\$ 5081.38
EEIC 609 (FLY SUPPLY)	\$ 564.64
EEIC 699 (AVPOL)	\$ 2567.24
TOTAL CPFH	\$ 8213.26

142nd Fighter Wing



priority 1.0

MISSION

goal:

1.1

to

Deploy,
Fight,
Win

Skinner



United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

August 3, 2005

The Honorable Samuel K. Skinner, Commissioner
The Base Realignment and Closure Commission
The Polk Building, Suite 600 & 625
2521 South Clark Street
Arlington, VA 22202

Dear Commissioner Skinner:

We were honored to testify before the Defense Base Closure and Realignment (BRAC) Commission on June 17 in Portland, Oregon. The testimony from military professionals and elected officials at the hearing clearly illustrated the risks presented by the Department of Defense's proposed realignment of the Oregon National Guard's 142nd Fighter Wing. While we were disappointed that you could not join us, we would like to present the enclosed packet of information to provide you with an overview of the information presented to your colleagues that day.

In this era of heightened threats from terrorists and rogue nations, the first priority of the federal government, and particularly the Department of Defense, is to ensure the safety of our fellow citizens from conventional and unconventional threats. The 142nd Fighter Wing plays a crucial role in protecting the entire Pacific Northwest region. Realigning the 142nd Fighter Wing would leave the citizens of the Pacific Northwest vulnerable. In addition, a close analysis of the Pentagon's accounting reveals that the realignment would actually cost the government money instead of saving it.

In short, the proposed realignment of the 142nd Fighter Wing would not accomplish either of the goals of the BRAC process: eliminating inefficiency and waste while maintaining America's defenses.

Thank you for taking the time to review this information as you consider the Pentagon's recommendations. Should you need any further information or have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact us.

Sincerely,



Gordon H. Smith
United States Senate



Ron Wyden
United States Senate



THEODORE R. KULONOSKI
Governor

August 2, 2005

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear Mr. Secretary:

In my May 25, 2005 letter, I wrote to you expressing my deep concerns with the Department of Defense's recommendations to the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commission to relocate and transfer F-15 fighter aircraft and personnel from the 142nd Fighter Wing at Portland Air National Guard Base, Portland, Oregon. Given Oregon's geographic location and unquestionable need for air superiority in the Pacific Northwest, this recommendation places the entire region at risk if it is accepted.

I am writing to advise you officially that, as Governor of Oregon, I do not consent to the deactivation, relocation or withdrawal of the 142nd Fighter Wing. Further, pursuant to 10 U.S.C. §18238 and 32 U.S.C. §104(c), my consent is necessary for the Department of Defense to implement the recommended actions regarding the 142nd Fighter Wing.

Accordingly, pursuant to the above-referenced statutes, the actions proposed by the Department of Defense cannot proceed. It is my present intention to file a lawsuit in Oregon's federal district court seeking injunctive and declaratory relief to stop the proposed actions.

Sincerely,

THEODORE R. KULONOSKI
Governor

TRK:LCC:mb

cc: Chairman Anthony J. Principi, BRAC

STATE CAPITOL, SALEM 87201-4047 (503) 378-3111 FAX (503) 378-4863 TTY (503) 378-4858
WWW.GOVERNOR.STATE.OR.US

Portland Air National Guard (ANG) Base Point Paper

The Department of Defense recommendations to the BRAC Commission concerning re-alignment of assets assigned to the 142 Fighter Wing, Portland Air National Guard Base, Oregon,:

- 1) *compromise the security of the Pacific Northwest by failing to consider Homeland Defense,*
- 2) *do not save money*
- 3) *stem from a flawed criteria development and military value analysis process*

1. Security of Pacific Northwest compromised by failing to consider Homeland Defense:

- DoD recommended realignment **below pre-September 11th, 2001** posture and readiness for Northwest United States (See *"Alert Posture"* Tab)
- Homeland defense CONOPS was not a base selection focus area; Focus areas only included Space and C4ISR CONOPS, Global Response/Strike CONOPS, and Global Mobility CONOPS
- Unable to meet CONPLAN 3310-02 alert requirements with a 2 aircraft detachment:
 - Unable to defend against multi-axis attacks
 - No immediate operational surge capability
- Leaves Pacific Northwest vulnerable to cruise missile and unmanned aerial vehicle threat (See *"Threat"* Tab)
- Homeland Defense not considered in Military Value analysis (See *"Military Value"* Tab)
 "There is no consistency in approach taken in military value analysis . . . USAF does military value analysis by platform rather than by installation mission or function."

- USAF BRAC Red Team, White Paper, 11 March 2005

- Consolidation of reserve component F-15 units (from 18 aircraft units to 24 aircraft units) eliminates aircraft otherwise available for the Northwest homeland defense mission
- Establishment of an F-15 Aggressor Squadron at Nellis AFB, Nevada eliminates 18 aircraft otherwise available for Northwest homeland defense missions
- Violates United States Code Title 10 and reduces manpower available to state governors for regional emergencies and homeland defense

2. Cost Analysis:

- According to publicly released cost analysis information, closing Portland ANG Base costs money (see *"Cost Analysis"* Tab)
 - No net dollar savings for military personnel
 "... 47% of the estimated total dollar savings are attributable to military personnel cost reductions. However, rather than reducing end-strength, DoD indicates that the positions are expected to be reassigned to other areas . . ."

- SECDEF Response to Commission, 1 July 2005 Letter, GAO BRAC Analysis Report

- Alert detachment cost modeling was not included in analysis
- Closing Portland ANG Base will cost taxpayers \$5.4 million


- BRAC #1 principle of effective recruiting and training does not consider the ANG human capital loss
 - Nearest Oregon ANG facility greater than a 6 hour drive
 - Loss of human capital at Portland ANG Base = \$140 million
 - Cost to train replacements = \$67 million

3. Air Force BRAC criteria development and military value analysis flawed:

- Only one Air Force criteria used to analyze all components (Active Duty, Guard, and Reserve)
- Military Value assessment criteria are partial to active duty bases and biased against ANG city basing; ANG is penalized for being cost effective, right-sized, and efficient (See "*Military Value*" Tab)
- No measurement of reserve component recruiting and retention

Recommendation: Maintain, at a minimum, the existing F-15 force structure at Portland ANG Base and sufficient and appropriate sovereign air defense protection for all regions in the United States

Pre-Sept 11th Alert Forces



Portland

Riverside

Otis

Langley


Homestead

Tyndall

Ellington

Home Station
Alert Detachment •


Today's Operation NOBLE EAGLE Alert Forces




Home Station
Alert Detachment

Operation NOBLE EAGLE


Post-BRAC Alert Forces




Post-BRAC USAF Fighter Forces




2 on Alert / 138 Available




12 on Alert / 327 Available



8 on Alert / 368 Available



10 on Alert / 418 Available




• Training/Non Air Defense Dedicated


• 250 mile radius around population centers = 2 hrs on-station without tanker

**Pre-BRAC USAF Fighter
Aircraft Dedicated to Air
Defense of the Northwest:
15**

**Post-BRAC USAF Fighter
Forces Dedicated to Air Defense
of the Northwest:
2**



**USAF Fighter Aircraft in
Europe:
146**



Cruise Missile Threats to the NW



“By 2015, the CIA estimates that up to two dozen nations will be able to pose a serious cruise missile threat . . .”

- CRS Report for Congress, *Cruise Missile Defense*, 2 May 2005




“ . . . The threat is real and is quite serious and will probably get more serious in the future.”



- Defense Science Board 2003 Summer Study, *DoD Roles and Missions in Homeland Security*, May 2004

Asymmetric / Irregular Threats

“In response to continued and repeated enemy violations of Lebanese airspace, a Mirsad 1 drone carried out a recon flight over several Zionist settlements . . . Hezbollah warned . . . that the planes could carry explosives to strike targets deep inside Israel”



- SpaceWar, Hezbollah UAV Drone Flies Over Northern Israel, 11 Apr 2005



MILITARY VALUE

“In selecting military installations for closure or realignment, the Department of Defense, giving priority consideration to military value (the first four criteria below) will consider:

1. The current and future mission capabilities and the impact on operational readiness of the total force of the Department of Defense, including the impact on joint warfighting, training and readiness.
2. The availability and condition of land, facilities, and associated airspace (including training areas suitable for maneuver by ground, naval, or air forces throughout a diversity of climate and terrain areas and staging areas for the use of the Armed Force3s in homeland defense missions) at both existing and potential receiving locations.
3. The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, surge, and future total force requirements at both existing and potential receiving locations to support operations and training.
4. The cost of operations and manpower implications.

-- Final Selection Criteria, Military Value, 12 Feb 2004

Homeland Defense, the DoD's #1 priority, WAS NOT considered in BRAC's military value analysis.

- Congressional and public calls for developing base selection criteria were ignored:
 - Senator Hutchison's "Comments on BRAC Selection Criteria", 21 Jan 2004 (Page 3)

“The DoD should also consider homeland security issues and how closing or realigning installations affects our national security. The current draft criteria, very similar to the criteria proposed in three previous BRAC rounds, do not fully reflect the national security issues our country faces in the wake of September 11, 2001.”

- DoD memo on Final Selection Criteria, Analysis of Public Comments, 12 Feb 2004
- Base final selection quantitative analysis did not include Homeland Defense factors
 - Slides accompanying SAF/IEB memo on Military Value, 9 Oct 03: Focus areas only included Space and C4ISR CONOPS, Global Response/Strike CONOPS and Global Mobility CONOPS
 - Emphasis clearly shifted to global operations
 - Only 2 of 1800 questions from the BRAC Data Call concerned Homeland Defense
 - Question 4.1206
 - Question 21.1013
 - BRAC "Data Call" did not create questions to include proximity or ability to protect:
 - Major urban centers
 - Vital national assets (Nuclear/Biological/Chemical Plants, Dams, etc.)
 - Transportation facilities
 - International Borders
 - Military Compatibility Index (MCI) analysis was deficient:
 - Portland did not receive any credit for munitions storage to complete its Homeland Defense mission
 - Airspace (40% of MCI rating value) was not adequately considered
 - Airspace congestion was not adequately considered

- Training airspace was the single most important fighter MCI measurement
- No credit was given for access to airspace (only owning airspace)
- Air-to-ground airspace was evaluated for homeland defense fighter units
- US Air Force Strategic Planning Directive for FY 2006 – 2011
 - MAJCOMS must define current AF force structure's capability to meet Defense Strategy requirements, including capabilities for Air Defense Levels 1-5.
 - Military Value did not consider a Military Base's ability to meet the requirements of Air Defense Levels 1, 2, 3, or 4.
- Air Sovereignty/Air Defense scenario *specifically addressing command established air defense response criteria* inexplicably deleted by the Base Closure Executive Council
 - Scenario #3 of 127 registered USAF scenarios
 - Description: Determine airfields and installations sufficient to support air sovereignty/air defense mission
 - Imperative: Basing to fulfill the air sovereignty protection site and air defense response criteria stipulated by COMNORTHCOM and COMPACOM

OPR: Maj J. Baenen
142FW/DOW

JAN. 21. 2004 10:58AM
KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON
TEXAS

SENATOR HUTCHISON

NO. 8476 P. 2/2

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-4304

January 21, 2004

COMMITTEES:
APPROPRIATIONS
COMMERCE, SCIENCE,
AND TRANSPORTATION
RULES AND ADMINISTRATION
VETERANS' AFFAIRS

Mr. Peter Potochney
Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations & Environment)
Director, Base Realignment and Closure
Room 3D814
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C., 20301-3300

Comments on BRAC Selection Criteria
OSD BRAC Office Tracking #0020

Page 1 of: 2

Date Received in 3D814: 1/21/2004
FAX

Dear Mr. Potochney:

As outlined in the Federal Register Volume 68/Number 246 by the Department of Defense (DOD), an installation's military value is the most important factor for assessing the future viability of a base. Military value is defined by the draft Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) criteria as follows:

- The current and future mission requirements and impact on operational readiness of the DOD's total force
- The availability and condition of land, facilities and associated airspace.
- The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, and future total force requirements
- The cost and manpower implications

While military value is important in assessing the criticality of installations, the DOD should also conduct a comprehensive study of U.S. military facilities abroad and assess whether existing U.S. base structures and locations meet the needs of current and future missions. It would be unwise to close or realign domestic bases that may be needed for troops returning from outdated facilities abroad. Criteria to assess the value of overseas bases is vital to better management of our military infrastructure.

The DOD should also consider homeland security issues and how closing or realigning installations affects our national security. The current draft criteria, very similar to the criteria proposed in three previous BRAC rounds, do not fully reflect the national security issues our country faces in the wake of September 11, 2001.

Several times in past years, the military has closed a base only to later realize its costly mistake. Now is the time for a fair, honest and non-political BRAC, and I urge the DOD to weigh all issues in developing the 2005 BRAC criteria.

Sincerely,


Kay Bailey Hutchison

BRAC -- At What Cost?


Portland Personnel Reductions:	\$ 19.1 M
Atlantic City Payroll Increase:	\$ () M
New Orleans Payroll Increase:	<u>\$ () M</u>
Base X Manpower Savings:	\$ 3.8 M

Alert Detachment at Portland: \$5.4 M

Net COST to taxpayer: \$ (1.6) M

PORTLAND

PORTLAND, O'



DEFENDING THE NORTHWEST


142d Fighter Wing Mission

- Federal
 - 24 / 7 NORAD Alert
 - Worldwide Deployable
 - 72 Hour Notice
- State
 - Protect Life & Property
 - Peace & Order (Public Safety)
 - Support to Civil Agencies
 - Wildfires, Floods, Mt. St. Helens



Portland ANG Base (*Joint*)

- Guard Base with AF Reserve Tenant
- 246 Acres (ANG / AFRES / Army NG)
 - 500K SF Facilities ANG
 - 225K SF Facilities AFRES
 - Plant Replacement Value \$217M
- \$42M Current Reserve Construction Programmed



Current as of 04 January 2005

Corp of Engineers
Trailer #00086

PORTLAND INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AIR NATIONAL GUARD BASE

142 FW Accomplishments

Over 68,000 Accident Free Flying Hours!

First and Only! 15 years of Safe Flying

2002 AF Outstanding Unit (5th Oak)

2004 ANG William Tell Tee

- Top Maintenance Team
- 2nd Overall Tee
- 1st Overall

2004
During Operation Noble Eagle
 Theon Trophy Nominee
 Best Air-to-Air Unit in ANG

LET'S GET IT!



F-15 Unit Comparison FY 03

Unit	MC*	HOURS
142 FW Portland	81.3%	4390.7
125 FW Jacksonville	72.3%	4085.6
102 FW Otis	72.2%	3870.9
131 FW St Louis	71.7%	3529.1
173 FW Kingsley Field	69.7%	3880.0
154 FW Hickam	69.3%	3779.2
159 FW New Orleans	65.6%	3651.2

*MC = Mission Capable

Air National Guard MC Goal: 66%

F-15 Unit Comparison FY 04


Unit	MC*	HOURS
142 FW Portland	78.2%	4200.6
102 FW Otis	75.5%	4080.6
173 FW Kingsley Field	75.5%	3963.0
154 FW Hickam	75.2%	3364.1
125 FW Jacksonville	72.4%	4044.7
159 FW New Orleans	69.2%	3342.5
131 FW St Louis	68.8%	3383.1

*MC = Mission Capable

Air National Guard MC Goal: 70%

Retention Remains High

142 FW Strength



Unparalleled Training Airspace





DoD Recommendation For Portland ANG Base

- Homeland Defense Aircraft
 - ANG F-15's sent to Louisiana and New Jersey
- Personnel
 - Loss of 249 Full Time and 398 and Guardsmen
- A NORAD Fighter Alert Detachment will remain
 - A typical Alert Detachment is equipped with two aircraft and a skeleton maintenance crew

Northwest Security Environment

- What's at Risk
- Population Centers
- Airline Traffic
- Maritime Routes
- Threats to the Northwest


What's At Risk...



Northwest Population Growth

- By 2030 there will be a increase in population growth within the Pacific Northwest.
- NW states rank 6th, 9th, and 10th for population growth within all 50 states.

NW Population Growth by 2030



Incoming International Flights

Portland International Airport:

- Monthly:


Seattle-Tacoma International Airport:

- Monthly:


Vancouver BC International Airport:

- Monthly:

Hundreds of international flights
transit through the Northwest




Pacific Maritime Routes



Asymmetric / Irregular Threats

- Commercial Aviation
 - Charter flights
 - Passenger & Cargo
- Cruise Missiles
 - Widely proliferated



Cruise Missile Threats to the NW



Asymmetric / Irregular Threats

- General Aviation
 - Smuggling routes from Canada, Mexico, SE Asia
- Crop Dusters
- Drug trafficking
- UAVs
 - Military & Civilian
 - Minimal training required



Pacific NW Terrorist Activity

Indicted for plotting to aid Al-Qa'ida and Taliban forces fighting U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan.



Abu Hamza


James Ujaama indicted for aiding the Taliban. Also tried to team with Al Qa'ida recruiter Abu Hamza to set up terror camp in southern Oregon.

Linked to Al-Qa'ida organization through non profit organization.



James Ujaama

Millennium bomber arrested at border crossing in Washington.



Portland Six




Peta Seda



Ahmed Ressam

Pacific Rim Nation States

- Force Projection Improvements
 - Naval Force Improvements
 - Aircraft Carriers, Submarines, Surface Combatants
 - Cruise Missile Development
 - Ground, Air, Submarine launched
 - Advanced Aircraft
 - Fighters, Bombers, A/A Refueling




September 11th, 2001

- Timeline
 - 6 aircraft on alert status within 4.5 hours
 - Entire fleet on status within 12 hours
- 12-30 September, 2001 Operations
 - Continuous airborne coverage for 48 hours
 - Deployed Alert Operations at McChord AFB
- FY 2002 Wartime Readiness
 - Maintained 100% Mission Ready



Pre-Sept 11th Alert Forces



Portland

Riverside

Home Station
Alert Detachment

Ellington


Tyndall

Otis


Langley

Homestead

Today's Operation NOBLE EAGLE Alert Forces



Operation NOBLE EAGLE *Post-BRAC Alert Forces*



Increased Capability ○

Alert Detachment ●

No Change

Ellington

New Orleans

Atlantic City


Andrews

Langley

Shaw

Homestead

Post-BRACUSAF Fighter Forces




- Training/Non Air Defense Dedicated

○ 250 mile radius around population centers = 2 hrs on-station without tanker

“The US Government has no more important mission than protecting the homeland from future terrorist attacks”

-President George W. Bush



Pre-BRAC USAF Fighter Aircraft Dedicated to Air Defense of the Northwest:


15

Post-BRAC USAF Fighter Forces Dedicated to Air Defense of the Northwest:

2

USAF Fighter Aircraft in Europe:

146



Northwest Security

Before and After BRAC

- Pre-BRAC
 - 15 (+) Aircraft available on station
 - 15 (+) Pilots available within 4 hours
 - Full Maintenance, Weapons, and Intelligence Support
- Post-BRAC
 - 2 Aircraft available
 - 4 Pilots, 25 Maintenance and Weapons Troops, no Intelligence Support
 - Closest additional support over a 6 hour drive away

Seattle Combat Air Patrol Comparison

(No Tanker / No Alternate Required)

- Home Station vs. Nearest Fighter Base
 - Twice the "On Station" Time
 - Half the Aircraft Required
 - One-Third Fewer Sorties Required
 - One-Third Fewer Pilots Required

Homeland Defense and Security

“The US Government has no more important mission than protecting the homeland from future terrorist attacks.” *President George W. Bush*

**National Security
Strategy - 2002**



“Establishes homeland security as the first priority of the nation”

Highlights the need to retain and improve capabilities to prevent attacks against the United States”

Homeland Defense and Security

National Defense
Strategy - 2005



FIRST DEFENSE OBJECTIVE - Secure the US from direct attack.

DIRECTS "1-4-2-1" concept

"1" - Force size will be able to defend the homeland

AND

"4" - Deter forward in and from four regions

AND

"2" - Conduct two overlapping "swift defeat" campaigns.

AND

"1" - Even when committed to a limited number of lesser contingencies, the force must be able to win decisively in one of two campaigns.

Homeland Defense and Security

National Military
Strategy - 2004



“First, while protecting the United States we must win the War on Terrorism.”

Richard B. Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Establishes Three Military Objectives


#1 Objective - Protect the United States against External Attacks and Aggression

Homeland Defense and Security

National Strategy For Homeland Security - 2002

“One fact dominates all homeland security threat assessments:

Terrorists are strategic actors. They choose their targets deliberately based on the weaknesses they observe in our defenses and our preparedness.”



September 11th Commission Report

Realignment runs counter to the
Commission's recommendations:

*"Do not give terrorists the impression that
potential targets are not defended."*

*"Beware the failure of imagination, the
enemies of the United States are resolute and
creative."*

Copyrighted Material

THE

9/11

COMMISSION
REPORT

FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES



AUTHORIZED EDITION

DoD Recommendation Compromises the Top Defense Priority of Homeland Security for the Northwest

DoD Recommendations:

- Drop Alert Force structure BELOW 9/11 posture for the Pacific Northwest
- Leave the region vulnerable to current and future threats
 - Can not defend against multi-axis attacks
 - Unable to handle increased alert requirements
 - Unable to support war plans

History of Portland BRAC Scenario

- 14 Feb 05, Recommendation S432, Close Portland AGS
 - “tabled pending further financial analysis”
 - 1 time costs = \$69M
 - Net Savings = \$2M/year
 - Payback Period = 345 Years simple math
- 24 Feb 05, Recommendation S432.1, Close Portland AGS
 - “agreed by consensus, to forward S432.1 as a Candidate Recommendation
 - 1 time costs = \$47M
 - Net Savings = \$5M/year
 - Payback Period = 94 Years simple math
- 19 Apr 05, Recommendation S432.1C2, Close Portland AGS
 - “determined by consensus should be moved forward to ISG”
 - 1 time costs = \$86M
 - Net Savings = \$14M/year
 - Payback Period = 6 years

BRAC – At What Cost?

Portland Personnel Reductions:	\$ 19.1 M
Atlantic City Payroll Increase:	\$ () M
New Orleans Payroll Increase:	<u>\$ () M</u>
Base X Manpower Savings:	\$ 3.8 M

Alert Detachment at Portland: \$5.4 M

Net COST to taxpayer: \$ (1.6) M

Homeland Defense and Security


“The US Government has no more important mission than protecting the homeland from future terrorist attacks.” *President George W. Bush*

Homeland Defense Was Not Factored
Into BRAC Military Value

BRAC Military Value Issues

- SAF/IEB Included all CONOPS Champions EXCEPT Homeland Defense (9 Oct 2003)
- DoD Military Value Final Selection Criteria Ignored “proximity to and ability to protect vital national assets” etc. (2 Feb 2004)
- Public comments ignored (Sen Hutchison) (21 Jan 04)
- BCEG Deleted the Air Sovereignty/Air Defense Scenario (18 Mar 2005)
 - Imperative: Basing to fulfill the air sovereignty protection site and air defense response criteria stipulated by COM/NORTHCOM and COM/PACOM
- Fighter Index did NOT measure Homeland Defense
- Air Force Analysis ranked all bases in eight key mission areas:
 - Homeland Defense WAS NOT one of these missions even though it is an Air Force imperative and the DoD’s #1 priority

Recommendation



No Change
Increased Capability
ACC Alert Detachment

Maintain, at a minimum, the existing F-15 force structure at the Portland ANG base



Military Value

- Homeland Defense, the DoD's #1 priority, was not adequately considered in BRAC's military value analysis
 - Congressional and public calls for developing base selection criteria, as well as national military strategy were ignored
 - Air Sovereignty / Air Defense scenario specifically addressing command established air defense response criteria inexplicably deleted by the Base Closure Executive Group
 - Base final selection quantitative analysis did not include Homeland Defense factors

2005 BRAC MILITARY VALUE

“In selecting military installations for closure or realignment, the Department of Defense, giving priority consideration to military value (the first four criteria below) will consider:

1. The current and future mission capabilities and the impact on operational readiness of the total force of the Department of Defense, including the impact on joint warfighting, training and readiness.
2. The availability and condition of land, facilities, and associated airspace (including training areas suitable for maneuver by ground, naval, or air forces throughout a diversity of climate and terrain areas and staging areas for the use of the Armed Forces in homeland defense missions) at both existing and potential receiving locations.
3. The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, surge, and future total force requirements at both existing and potential receiving locations to support operations and training.
4. The cost of operations and manpower implications.

-- Final Selection Criteria, Military Value, 12 Feb 2004

Homeland Defense, the DoD's #1 priority, *was not* adequately considered in BRAC's military value analysis.

- Congressional and public calls for developing base selection criteria, as well as national military strategy were ignored
 - Senator Hutchison's "Comments on BRAC Selection Criteria", 21 Jan 2004
 - "The DoD should also consider homeland security issues and how closing or realigning installations affects our national security. The current draft criteria, very similar to the criteria proposed in three previous BRAC rounds, do not fully reflect the national security issues our country faces in the wake of September 11, 2001."
 - Supplemental Information, DoD memo on Final Selection Criteria, Analysis of Public Comments, 12 Feb 2004
- Air Sovereignty/Air Defense scenario *specifically addressing command established air defense response criteria* inexplicably deleted by the Base Closure Executive Council
 - Scenario #3 of 127 registered USAF scenarios
 - Description: Determine airfields and installations sufficient to support air sovereignty/air defense mission
 - Imperative: Basing to fulfill the air sovereignty protection site and air defense response criteria stipulated by COMNORTHCOM and COMPACOM
- Base final selection quantitative analysis did not include Homeland Defense factors
 - Slides accompanying SAF/IEB memo on Military Value, 9 Oct 03: Focus areas only included Space and C4ISR CONOPS, Global Response/Strike CONOPS and Global Mobility CONOPS
 - Emphasis clearly shifted to global operations

Final Selection Criteria
Department of Defense Base Closure and Realignment

In selecting military installations for closure or realignment, the Department of Defense, giving priority consideration to military value (the first four criteria below), will consider:

Military Value

1. The current and future mission capabilities and the impact on operational readiness of the total force of the Department of Defense, including the impact on joint warfighting, training, and readiness.
2. The availability and condition of land, facilities, and associated airspace (including training areas suitable for maneuver by ground, naval, or air forces throughout a diversity of climate and terrain areas and staging areas for the use of the Armed Forces in homeland defense missions) at both existing and potential receiving locations.
3. The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, surge, and future total force requirements at both existing and potential receiving locations to support operations and training.
4. The cost of operations and the manpower implications.

Other Considerations

5. The extent and timing of potential costs and savings, including the number of years, beginning with the date of completion of the closure or realignment, for the savings to exceed the costs.
6. The economic impact on existing communities in the vicinity of military installations.
7. The ability of the infrastructure of both the existing and potential receiving communities to support forces, missions, and personnel.
8. The environmental impact, including the impact of costs related to potential environmental restoration, waste management, and environmental compliance activities.

COORDINATION DRAFT

Page 6 of 10

criteria that were applied to operations, training and maintenance facilities serving very different functions. DoD highly values its research, development, test and evaluation, engineering, procurement, and technical facilities. The Department believes that research, development, engineering, procurement and other technical capabilities are elements of military value captured within criteria one through four. The Department will consider military value in a way that incorporates these elements.

(f) Several commentors also raised concerns that the criteria did not take into account the availability of intellectual capital, critical trade skills, a highly trained work force, allied presence, and the synergy among nearby installations and between DoD facilities and nearby industrial clusters and academic institutions. DoD appreciates the importance of having an available pool of intellectual capital and critical trade skills that make up, and allow us to recruit and retain, a highly trained and experienced work force, as well as the synergy provided by nearby facilities. DoD believes that, to the extent that the availability of highly skilled civilian or contractor work forces and relationships with local institutions and other installations influence our ability to accomplish the mission, they are captured in criteria one, three and seven.

(g) Some commentors urged DoD to consider strategic location and irreplaceable properties and facilities as part of military value. DoD agrees that the availability and condition of land and facilities are an integral part of military value and believes these issues are covered under criterion two. Furthermore, the strategic location of DoD facilities informs criteria one and three.

(h) Some commentors said that an installation's demonstrated ability to transform, streamline business operations, and manage successful programs should be considered as part of military value. In some instances commentors praised the outstanding work of a particular installation or group of installations. DoD recognizes and appreciates the outstanding work done by its installations. We believe that criteria one and three capture both the ability to perform a mission and the quality of that work – both of which, in turn, capture the willingness to transform and streamline.

(i) Some commentors recommended that DoD consider an installation's role in homeland defense, security, domestic preparedness, and the war on terrorism as a part of military value. Some suggested that an installation's proximity to and ability to protect vital national assets, transportation facilities, major urban centers and international borders was a key consideration, while others indicated that geographic diversity or complete isolation should be the real objective in order to enhance security. The security of our nation, whether expressed as homeland defense, domestic preparedness, or fighting the war on terrorism, is an important DoD mission. Both the BRAC legislation and DoD's implementation of it ensure that homeland defense and security are considered in the BRAC process. Specifically, criterion two requires DoD Components to consider "[t]he availability and condition of land, facilities and associated airspace . . . as staging areas for the use of the Armed Forces in homeland defense missions." Additionally, as a mission of DoD, all of these issues are captured by the requirements of criteria one and three.

(j) Some commentors noted that, in some areas of the country, expanding civilian use of adjacent lands is encroaching upon military properties and has impacted critical training



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON DC

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY

9 Oct 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR AF/XPP, AF/XOR, SAF/AQQ, SAF/AQP, SAF/USA

FROM: SAF/IEB

SUBJECT: Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Analysis: Military Value

The Air Force BRAC 2005 office is developing data collection tools and processes for use during the next round of base closures and unit realignments. The first of our two data calls (focused on installation capacity) is nearly complete. We are beginning work on the second data call, which will focus on military value. As functional experts, I need your organization's support and active participation in this process to ensure our success.

The law authorizing the Department of Defense to conduct a round of closures and realignments in 2005 specifically directs that decisions be made primarily on the basis of military value. Our military value assessment must be based on our planned force structure, the approved BRAC 2005 selection criteria, the attributes of major weapons systems involved and our future concept of operations (CONOPS). The Base Closure Executive Group (BCEG), through its working group, needs assistance from the Air Staff experts--the force programmers, CONOPS Champions, and acquisition professionals closest to these issues.

I've asked my staff to create several groups of AO-level experts from your organizations (see attach.1). Assisted by my staff, these groups will help develop questions based on attributes associated with the weapons systems in the Air Force's future force structure plan. Answers to these questions will be used by the BCEG to analyze basing alternatives.

Your support of this effort will ensure the Air Force makes the right decisions for our future base structure. Col Tom Fleming, Chief, BRAC Division (SAF/IEBB), and his team will work through your BCEG Working Group representatives to select and train these individuals. Col Fleming can be reached at 692-9515.

//signed//

MICHAEL A. AIMONE, P.E.
Deputy Assistant Secretary
(Basing & Infrastructure Analysis)

1. Mission Compatibility Index Detail

1.1 Fighters

1.1.1 Effective Weights (Fighter MCI)

Bold rows indicate OSD military value selection criteria and associated effective weights. Shaded rows indicate Air Force military value attributes and associated effective weights. Rows with no enhancement indicate individual questions with the leading numeric indicating the question number. Question effective weights sum to the attribute above them and attribute effective weights sum to the criterion above them. The criteria (**bold**) sum to 100.

Name	Eff. Wt.
1 - Current / Future Mission	46.00
1 - Operating Environment	11.50
1242 - ATC Restrictions to Operations	5.98
1271 - Prevailing Installation Weather Conditions	5.52
2 - Geo-locational Factors	34.50
1245 - Proximity to Airspace Supporting Mission (ASM)	22.08
1246 - Proximity to Low Level Routes Supporting Mission	7.25
1270 - Suitable Auxliary Airfields Within 50NM	5.18
2 - Condition of Infrastructure	41.50
8 - Key Mission Infrastructure	22.83
8 - Ramp Area and Serviceability	2.97
9 - Runway Dimension and Serviceability	2.28
1207 - Level of Mission Encroachment	2.28
1221 - Hangar Capability - Small Aircraft	3.88
1232 - Sufficient Explosives-sited Parking	3.65
1233 - Sufficient Munitions Storage	4.79
1235 - Installation Pavements Quality	2.97
4 - Operating Areas	18.68
1203 - Access to Adequate Supersonic Airspace	6.72
1266 - Range Complex (RC) Supports Mission	11.95
3 - Contingency, Mobilization, Future Forces	10.00
5 - Mobility/Surge	4.40
1214 - Fuel Dispensing Rate to Support Mobility and Surge	2.64
1241 - Ability to Support Large-Scale Mobility Deployment	1.76
6 - Growth Potential	5.60
213 - Attainment / Emission Budget Growth Allowance	1.68
1205.1 - Buildable Acres for Industrial Operations Growth	1.96
1205.2 - Buildable Acres for Air Operations Growth	1.96
4 - Cost of Ops / Manpower	2.50
7 - Cost Factors	2.50
1250 - Area Cost Factor	1.25
1269 - Utilities cost rating (U3C)	.13
1402 - BAH Rate	.88
1403 - GS Locality Pay Rate	.25

DRAFT 4.0 -- INTERNAL AIR FORCE ONLY WORKING DOCUMENT

result of QDR 2001, the new Defense Strategy defined a construct that directs the Air Force to size and shape its forces to:

- Defend the United States;
- Deter aggression and coercion forward in critical regions;
- Swiftly defeat aggression in overlapping major conflicts while preserving for the President the option to call for a decisive victory in one of those conflicts - including the possibility of regime change or occupation;
- Conduct a limited number of smaller-scale contingency operations; and
- Concurrently, the DoD will maintain sufficient force generation capability and a strategic reserve to mitigate risks.

This 1-4-2-1 force sizing strategy places greater stress on our force structure requirements. For the first time since the end of the Cold War, homeland defense is explicitly expressed as the Departments primary mission and *forces to defend the homeland are additive* to our other force requirements. Compared to the "2 MTW" strategy to *conduct two occupations/regime changes* nearly simultaneously, the construct directs the Services to provide capabilities to support *two overlapping swiftly defeats* with the option to *win decisively in one* of those conflicts. Additionally, the construct explicitly addresses post-Cold War rotational base issues by stressing the need to sustain rotational forward deterrence while continuing deployments limited to small-scale contingencies in critical regions concurrent with major combat operations. In total, Air Force requirements to support the new Defense Strategy are more stressing than the old "2 MTW" construct.

The continuing challenge for Air Force planners is to develop the portfolio of capabilities to accomplish the Defense Strategy for a wide range of possible scenarios. Air Force strategic planners must ensure our nation is provided with the air and space forces needed to meet the demands of our strategy, now and in the future. Collaboration between warfighter and acquirer is vital to a robust strategic planning process, especially where materiel alternatives are concerned. Furthermore, Air Force plans must address enabling technologies in developing innovative concepts of operation and organizational structures.

In support of the Defense Strategy, AF/XP, AF/XO, and SAF/AQ, in conjunction with the Deputy Chiefs of Staff and MAJCOMs as appropriate, will lead an effort to define:

- ***Current AF force structure's capability to meet Defense Strategy requirements, including capabilities for Air Defense Levels 1-5, missile defense and rotational base requirements;***
- ***Mid- to far-term AF force structure projections in terms of AEFs baselined on the current program;***
- ***Mid- to far-term AF alternative capabilities and force structures that incorporate promising future concepts and technologies to meet future challenges. These alternatives will address our most likely funding constraints, and seek to optimize potential investments in:***
 - ***Force Structure Mix -- manned aircraft/UCAVs, long-, short-range and persistent strike capabilities, new and legacy SLEP programs, missile defense, counterair, and potential space-based systems;***
 - ***ISR and C2 Enabling Capabilities -- space-based/airborne and manned/unmanned platform mixes;***
 - ***Advanced Munitions -- smart, stealth, range/time dynamics, and directed energy options;***
 - ***Mobility (including combat support); and***
 - ***Special Operations Capabilities.***



Cost Analysis

• Air Sovereignty Alert Detachment unfunded \$5.4 M

• “The Air Force will reinvest any reserve component manpower made available as a result of BRAC realignments or closures into other high priority Air Force missions”

• Personnel

- Civilian Employees (Net Loss = 173) \$10.3 M
- Drill Status Guardsmen (Net Loss = 201) \$2.8 M
- Military Early Retirements \$9.0 M

• Unrelated Savings \$153K



Mission Compatibility Index

(Methodology, Comparison, and Analysis)

- **Homeland Defense was ignored in the BRAC data call, and not used in computing the MCI**
- **Airspace (40% of the MCI score) was not evaluated appropriately**
- **Munitions storage capability scoring was biased to large conventional munitions**
 - **Air-to-Air only munitions storage facilities received no credit**

Point Paper for Discrepancies in the BRAC Mission Compatibility Index (MCI)

Several questions within the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Data Calls did not adequately capture true military mission compatibility.

- **“Proximity to Airspace” does not capture utility of that airspace:**
 - 22.08% weight of total score
 - The ranking methodology imposes an arbitrary 50 nm cutoff, for maximum credit, but does not take into account other important factors such as availability of the airspace when being utilized by numerous installations.
 - For example, Langley AFB, VA was ranked the highest value in this sub-category. While they have excellent airspace, there are numerous users sharing that airspace which significantly reduces the true availability (training opportunities) of that airspace. Portland ANGB has unfettered access to excellent airspace.
 - See OSD questions 1245, 1266, and 1274
- **“Access to Adequate Supersonic Airspace” was grossly misrepresented:**
 - 6.72% weight of total score
 - Installations were only given credit for the airspace if they “schedule or control” the airspace, and NOT if they have “access” to it (like the question stipulates)
 - Portland ANGB was given no credit even though it has unfettered access to world-class supersonic airspace.
 - See OSD questions 1203, and 1276
- **“Proximity to Low Level Routes Supporting Mission” miss-represented:**
 - 7.25% weight of total score
 - Provides credit for nearby Low Level Routes to an installation without regard to usage by type aircraft, or necessity for supporting current/future mission.
 - See OSD question 1246
- **Homeland Defense Considerations were not used to compute the Mission Compatibility Index**
 - There were only 2 questions in the entire BRAC data call which pertained directly to the Air Defense Mission
 - Neither of these questions were used to compute the Mission Compatibility Index
 - See questions 21.1013 and 4.1206
- **Summary**
 - At least 34% of the MCI scores do not accurately reflect true military compatibility
 - The Portland ANG Base MCI score did not accurately reflect its access to supersonic airspace
 - Air defense considerations were not used in the computation of the MCI

Point Paper on Mission Compatibility Index (MCI)

1. The "Fighter MCI" values were determined by extracting and calculating information collected during the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) "Data Call" process. These MCI values were assigned specific weights / percentages to provide an overall ranking for every USAF fighter base. The resultant information (value) was integral to the Department of Defense's recent BRAC recommendations. *See attachment 1 for a cross-section of USAF fighter installations and their associated MCI values.*
2. Numerous discrepancies, in both the methodology of the BRAC data collection process and the subsequent calculations, are apparent.
 - a. The "Current / Future Mission" category of the MCI, which accounted for 46% of the total weight, focused primarily on the installations proximity to Special Use Airspace and Low-Level routes supporting the mission.
 - i. While "proximity" to adequate airspace is important, "availability" to use that airspace is paramount (see attachment 2).
 - ii. Also, while this category/metric captures "Current/Future 'Training' Mission" data, it ignores "Current/Future 'Real-world' Mission" data (i.e. those installations with Air Defense and Air Sovereignty Alert responsibilities.
 1. A grand total of two questions remotely addressed installation alert capabilities, neither of which were utilized in the MCI calculations.
 - a. BRAC question 4.1206: "For installations with an active Runway, does the installation have an existing infrastructure that can support full-service alert facilities - does the facility have: an active alert hanger, active high-speed taxiway, active ready-crew facility, and are facilities located to permit takeoff in required time?" Not evaluated in the MCI values.
 - b. BRAC question 21.1013: "List and describe any specialized (not unique) capabilities or missions performed by your activity. Capability/Mission: Homeland Defense, and Description: NORAD fighter alert site. Also, not addressed in MCI values.
 2. Proximity of an installation's current location to it's Areas of Responsibility (AOR), or the ability to respond to other critical areas (i.e. military/industrial complexes, crucial infrastructure, and population centers), was NOT considered in the data collection process, despite the fact that this is a "Current AND Future Mission".
 3. While "training" airspace received a considerable amount of attention and consideration, real-world airspace, and the unit's tasked with "Current Missions", received no credit.
3. The following pages examine the MCI areas of greatest concern, and identify several discrepancies discovered therein. The MCI does not accurately reflect the true compatibility of the Portland Air National Guard to it's on-going mission.

Mission Compatibility Index

Section I Current / Future Mission

1. Section I was the most heavily weighted section counting for 46% of the total score.
2. Within this section, "proximity to airspace supporting mission" alone counted for 22.08% of the total MCI, making it the single most important factor in the MCI calculation.
3. The formula used to compute the value assigned to "proximity to airspace supporting mission" gives tremendous weight to those bases which are within 50 miles of their primary training airspace. When a base has training airspace just outside this arbitrary 50 mile range it can only get a fraction of the score in this section.
4. The formula used to compute the value assigned to "proximity to airspace supporting mission" gives a large weight to air-to-ground capable ranges. There is a 30% penalty in this formula for not having air-to-ground capability.
5. The formula used to compute the value assigned to "proximity to airspace supporting mission" does not take into account how many users share the same airspace for training. While a base may have airspace very close by, it is common to have difficulty gaining access if many different users are competing to use it.
6. The prime example of this error in methodology is Langley Air Force Base. It received the highest score for "Proximity to Airspace Supporting Mission" of any fighter base. This significantly contributed to its being ranked number 2 overall. Presumably the logic is that physical proximity to airspace is equivalent to good access to that airspace. In fact, Langley has some of the worst access to training airspace in the country because they share it with at least 10 other fighter bases amounting to hundreds of fighter aircraft.
7. Note that Portland's airspace is shared with only one other user (Klamath Falls) and is 73 miles away (23 miles past the 50 mile cutoff or about 3 minutes at fighter speeds)
8. See attached breakdown of shared training airspace for other bases. This problem crops up at Atlantic City and at New Orleans.

Mission Compatibility Index

Section II Condition of Infrastructure

1. Section II was the second most heavily weighted counting for 41.5% of the total score.
2. Within this section, "Range Complex Supports Mission" counted for 11.95% of the total MCI "Access to Adequate Supersonic Airspace" counted for 6.72% of the total MCI, and "Sufficient Munitions Storage" counted for 4.79% of the total MCI.
3. The formula used to compute the value assigned to "Range Complex Supports Mission" weights air-to-ground capability heavily. If an airspace does not have air-to-ground capability, 30% of the "Range Complex Supports Mission" score is lost. F-15's do not require ranges with air-to-ground capability. The training ranges near Portland support the Homeland Defense Mission very well, but do not have air-to ground capability.
4. It is unclear if the formula used to compute the value assigned to "Access to Adequate Supersonic Airspace" gives credit to a base if it doesn't own and schedule its airspace. A base may still have very good access to supersonic airspace and not actually own and schedule it. Further, a base may actually have very poor access to supersonic airspace which they own due to sharing it with multiple users. Portland does not own or schedule its airspace, but has unfettered access to it.
5. The formula used to compute the value assigned to "Sufficient Munitions Storage" gives no credit to a base if it cannot store enough bombs to support a full squadron of F-117 or F-22 strike aircraft. The formula gives no credit to a base for being able to perfectly support its air-to-air Homeland Defense Mission.
6. Portland ANGB has adequate munitions storage to support the Air Defense of the Northwestern United States, but received no credit for this capability.

Mission Compatibility Index

Section III Contingency, Mobilization, Future Forces

1. Section III counted for 10% of the total MCI score.
2. In order to get maximum points in this section, a base must be very large now with the ability to expand and become enormous. There are no ANG fighter bases which could receive the maximum score in this section.
3. Because many ANG bases including Portland are embedded in population centers and/or share facilities with civilian airports, they do not have unconstrained growth potential. The MCI is weighted against this.
4. The Homeland Defense Mission by definition requires proximity to large population centers. Portland is well positioned to accomplish this mission.
5. To insist upon large size and essentially unlimited growth potential makes the current community basing concept of the ANG (with all of the commensurate support and human capital) obsolete.

Mission Compatibilty Index

Section IV Cost of Ops / Manpower

1. Section IV counted for 2.5% of the total MCI score.

Portland ANG Base			
	Points Possible	Points Awarded	Raw Data
Current and Future Mission	46	17.51	38.07
Condition of Infrastructure	41.5	23.32	56.19
Contingency, Mobilization, Future Forces	10	3.62	36.22
Cost of OPS / Manpower	2.5	1.50	60.13
Total	100	45.96	
Ranking		77 / 154	

Langley			
	Points Possible	Points Awarded	Raw Data
Current and Future Mission	46	40.29	87.59
Condition of Infrastructure	41.5	33.41	80.51
Contingency, Mobilization, Future Forces	10	7.21	72.12
Cost of OPS / Manpower	2.5	1.93	77.2
Total	100	82.85	
Ranking		2 / 154	

Atlantic City			
	Points Possible	Points Awarded	Raw Data
Current and Future Mission	46	24.58	53.44
Condition of Infrastructure	41.5	20.84	50.22
Contingency, Mobilization, Future Forces	10	3.77	37.74
Cost of OPS / Manpower	2.5	1.03	41.33
Total	100	50.23	
Ranking		61 / 154	

New Orleans			
	Points Possible	Points Awarded	Raw Data
Current and Future Mission	46	21.27	46.23
Condition of Infrastructure	41.5	20.73	49.96
Contingency, Mobilization, Future Forces	10	1.72	17.2
Cost of OPS / Manpower	2.5	1.82	72.63
Total	100	45.53	
Ranking		79 / 154	

Jacksonville			
	Points Possible	Points Awarded	Raw Data
Current and Future Mission	46	34.02	73.95
Condition of Infrastructure	41.5	22.70	54.71
Contingency, Mobilization, Future Forces	10	3.13	31.25
Cost of OPS / Manpower	2.5	1.95	77.87
Total	100	61.79	
Ranking		24 / 154	

AIRSPACE COMPARISON CHART

"Access" to Airspace does not convey "Availability"

Langley

Primary Airspace

W386

USAF fighter units that share Airspace (less than 200 NM)

Langley
Atlantic City
Richmond
Andrews
Willow Grove
Seymour Johnson
Pope

*Navy: NAS Oceana, NAS Norfolk, NAS Patuxent River Also Primary Users

W50

Langley
Richmond
Andrews
Seymour Johnson
Atlantic City
Pope

*Navy: NAS Oceana, NAS Norfolk, NAS Patuxent River Also Primary Users

Atlantic City

Primary Airspace

W107

USAF fighter units that share Airspace (less than 200 NM)

Atlantic City
Langley
Shaw
Willow Grove
Andrews
Bradley
Richmond
Otis

*Navy: NAS Oceana, NAS Norfolk, NAS Patuxent River Also Primary Users

New Orleans

Primary Airspace

W453

USAF fighter units that share Airspace (less than 200 NM)

New Orleans
Eglin
Tyndall
Dannely

Navy: NAS New Orleans, NAS Pensacola are also Primary Users

W59B

New Orleans
Ellington

Navy: NAS New Orleans, NAS Pensacola are also Primary Users

Portland

Primary Airspace

W570

USAF fighter units that share Airspace (less than 200 NM)

Portland
Klamath Falls
Navy: None



Red Team

(Independent Assessment and Feedback)

- BRAC law requires all military installations in the U.S. to be considered equally
- The entire process is undermined if the Department cannot say confidently and convincingly that all installations, functions, and activities were considered
- Some additions and deletions of candidate recommendations were done outside of the deliberative process before submission to ISG
- Military value is the preeminent criteria for closure and realignment
- Military judgment is sometimes used without adequate substantiation to justify overriding the quantitative military value
- A payback of Never or 100+ years without a very strong argument/justification will threaten the credibility of the BRAC process

BULLET BACKGROUND PAPER
ON
BRAC 2005 RED TEAM DISCOVERIES

PURPOSE

The Red Team was assembled to provide an independent assessment of BRAC 2005 candidate recommendations. It reviewed the candidate recommendations, report drafts, and supporting materials. The team's insights provided valuable feedback and suggestions for improving the quality of the candidate recommendation packages relative to the standard by which the Commission may alter the Secretary's recommendations.

DISCUSSION

- *"BRAC law requires all military installations in the U.S. to be considered equally."*¹
- *"The entire process is undermined if the Department cannot say confidently and convincingly that all installations, functions, and activities were considered."*²
- *"Some additions and deletions of candidate recommendations are being done outside of the deliberative process before submission to ISG (Infrastructure Steering Group)."*³
- Military Value
 - *"Military value is the preeminent criteria for closure or realignment."*⁴
 - *"Military value not consistently used (applied to installations, functions, and weapon platforms)."*⁵
 - *"There is no consistency in approach taken in military value analysis."*⁶
 - *"Weights determining military value are inconsistent."*⁷
 - *"USAF does military value analysis by platform rather than by installation mission or function. Since military value is not based on installation value for support of total force structure, there are several military values for a base depending on which platform one is examining. USAF would have been more consistent by using installation functions and/or missions."*⁸
- Military Judgment
 - *"Military judgment cannot be 'I believe this.' Judgment has to have supported rationale."*⁹
- Military Value vs. Military Judgment
 - *"Military judgment is used frequently to override military value results."*¹⁰
 - *"Military judgment is sometimes used without adequate substantiation to justify overriding the quantitative military value."*¹¹
 - *"Military judgment is part of military value calculations in some cases and applied after military value calculations in other cases."*¹²
 - *"Supporting explanation for use of military judgment, especially over-rides of military value, are consistently weak. There is a lot of hand-waving going on when it comes to military judgment."*¹³

-- *"Overall, some groups embed military judgment within the military value calculation, while others apply military judgment to the results of military value calculation."*¹⁴

-- *"Seems like military judgment overruled military value in about half of these recommendations."*¹⁵

- Cost Payback

-- *"A payback of Never or 100+ years without a very strong argument/justification will threaten the credibility of the BRAC process."*¹⁶

-- *"Misuse of BRAC (i.e. never or 100+ year paybacks)."*¹⁷

-- *"All candidate recommendations that have payback periods greater than 20 years could be considered substantially deviating from the final selection criteria in that the COBRA model only evaluates up to 20 years."*¹⁸

-- *"Review recommendations with large MILCON and "Never" paybacks. Perhaps add a quad chart that links enablers (from other services and/or from JCSGs) together so that all savings can be counted."*¹⁹

-- *"Be careful with daisy chain connections."*²⁰

SUMMARY

The independent evaluation of the BRAC candidate recommendations by the Red Team illustrates inconsistencies within the selection process. Their underlying concerns involved the objectivity of the military value criteria versus the subjectivity of military judgment. The Red Team believed the weighting of military value to be inconsistent even though it was deemed the preeminent criteria for closure or realignment. They also noted that military judgment was used frequently to override military value results without adequate substantiation to justify the decision.

¹ BRAC 2005 Red Team Meeting with the Infrastructure Executive Council, Talking Paper, 6 Apr 05

² White Paper, 11 Mar 05

³ Ibid.

⁴ BRAC 2005 Red Team Meeting with the Infrastructure Executive Council, Talking Paper, 6 Apr 05

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ White Paper, 11 Mar 05

⁷ BRAC 2005 Discussion Topics, 25 Feb 05

⁸ BRAC 2005 Discussion Topics, 14 Mar 05

⁹ Technical JCSG Briefing Notes, 24 Mar 05

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² BRAC 2005 Red Team Meeting with the Infrastructure Executive Council, Talking Paper, 6 Apr 05

¹³ BRAC 2005 Discussion Topics, 25 Feb 05

¹⁴ BRAC 2005 Discussion Topics, 14 Mar 05

¹⁵ Technical JCSG Briefing Notes, 24 Mar 05

¹⁶ BRAC 2005 Discussion Topics, 25 Feb 05

¹⁷ White Paper, 11 Mar 05

¹⁸ BRAC 2005 Red Team Meeting with the Infrastructure Executive Council, Talking Paper, 6 Apr 05

¹⁹ Air Force Briefing Notes, 14 Mar 05

²⁰ Technical JCSG Briefing Notes, 24 Mar 05

