



# 131st Fighter Wing

**Air Superiority,  
Anytime, Anywhere**

**10800 Lambert International Blvd.  
St. Louis, Missouri 63044**

Est. 1923




## Points of Discussion

- **Homeland Defense**
  - The Secretary of Defense substantially deviated from final criteria 1 because he did not adequately or accurately address homeland defense. The recommendation to realign Lambert IAP AGS is inconsistent with the National Security Strategy's highest priority for this nation's military.
  
- **BRAC Process**
  - The Secretary of Defense substantially deviated from final criteria 1 through 4 because final Air Force criteria attributes were inadequate and did not accurately measure military value. Military judgment, used routinely, was arbitrary, inconsistent, and poorly documented. The recommendation to realign Lambert IAP AGS is inconsistent with the BRAC law.
  
- **Cost Calculations**
  - The Secretary of Defense substantially deviated from final criteria 4 and 5 because criteria attributes did not accurately measure or reflect the cost of operations, manpower impact, and cost savings. The recommendation to realign Lambert IAP AGS is inconsistent with final criteria.
  
- **131<sup>st</sup> Fighter Wing**
  - A description of the mission, capabilities, and accomplishments of the personnel and aircraft located at Lambert IAP AGS.
  
- **Summary and Recommendations**



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# Shelter Locations




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# HAM



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## Homeland Defense

**The Secretary of Defense substantially deviated from final criteria 1 because he did not adequately or accurately address homeland defense.**

- Numerous Administration documents clearly articulate Homeland Defense as the number one priority.
- BCEG avoids dealing with Homeland defense issues in sub-criteria and Air Force attributes.
- BRAC Red Team questions Air Force BCEG process.
- St Louis is located at a strategic location in the heartland of America with multiple critical assets within range of 131 FW aircraft.
- St Louis was performing the Homeland Defense mission while the BCEG deliberation was on going.
- BCEG was unaware St. Louis is capable of performing the homeland alert defense mission

## Homeland Defense

### **Numerous Administration documents clearly articulate Homeland Defense as the number one priority.**

In our defense strategy, Homeland Defense is clearly the number 1 objective. The National Military Strategic Plan for War on Terrorism (4 March 2005) outlines how we will fight such a war and lists the number one priority as “protect the U.S. Homeland”. One of the assumptions this document uses is that the war on terrorism has no end date or easily defined battlefield. These words have tremendous meaning, as they indicate we will be fighting terrorists at home and abroad with no end in sight. It further defines homeland defense as “the protection of the U.S. sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical defense infrastructure”. **This means the entire country, not merely selected sights.**

The National Military Strategic Plan for War on Terrorism document directly relates to the Strategic Planning Guidance for Fiscal Years 2006-2011 (March 2004). This document provides focused, timely, strategic direction to the resource allocation decisions of the Department of Defense. It re-iterates that we are currently a nation at war, with “an active, forward, yet layered defense of the nation and its interests”. The number one strategic objective outlined in this document is “Secure the United States from direct attack”. Its implementation guidelines promote direct active, forward defense-in-depth using a capabilities based approach. It assumes the pace of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) will continue at its current pace, stating traditional, irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive challenges will all be faced in this war.

The bottom line is that we are a nation at war. That war has no end in sight, and we must be prepared at any time for any type of attack against the United States itself. Defending the United States is the number one objective.

- President quotes
- Paul McHale
  - Testimony House Armed Services March 03'
  - Testimony House Armed Services 04'
- HSPD-7 on Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection, (December 2003) designates DOD as the Sector Specific Agency for the Defense Industrial Base sector.
- National Defense Strategy
- Strategic Planning Guide 2006-2011

## BRAC AND NATIONAL DEFENSE

ORGANIZATION / DOCUMENT	REQUIREMENT	ISSUE
BRAC Law - Authority	§2914(a)...the Secretary shall publish in the Federal Register and transmit to the Congressional defense committees and the Commission, not later than May 16, 2005, a list of military installations inside the United States and that the Secretary recommends for closure or realignment on the basis of the force-structure plan and infrastructure inventory prepared by the Secretary...and the final selection criteria specified...	Closure recommendations must be made on the basis of the force-structure plan and specified final criteria
BRAC Law - Review Standard	§2903(d)(2)(B)...the Commission may make changes in any of the recommendations made by the Secretary if the Commission determines that the Secretary deviated substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria...	Commission changes allowed if substantial deviation from force-structure plan and final criteria
Force Structure Plan - Requirement	§2912(a)(1) PREPARATION AND SUBMISSION.- As part of the budget justification documents for...[FY '05], the Secretary shall submit... (A) A force-structure plan for the Armed Forces based on an assessment by the Secretary of the probable threats to the national security during the [next] 20-year period...	Force-structure plan based upon probable threats to national security - i.e. airborne terrorist attack
Force Structure Plan March 2004 §2912 Report	p. 20 <i>Irregular</i> methods of increasing sophistication-including terrorism...will challenge U.S. security interests to a greater degree than they have in the past...Our ongoing global war on terrorism and our resulting operational experience call for a reorientation of our military capabilities to contend with these challenges more effectively. p. 21 Catastrophic attacks could arrive via...innovative attacks like those undertaken on 9/11...Elements of the U.S. national infrastructure are vulnerable to catastrophic attack. The interdependent nature of the infrastructure creates more vulnerability, because attacks against one sector-the electric power grid for instance-would impact other sectors as well... A single catastrophic attack against the United States is an unacceptable prospect...Thus, new emphasis must be applied to capabilities that enable us to dissuade acquisition of catastrophic capabilities, deter their use, and finally, when necessary, defeat them prior to posing direct threats to us and our partners.	

<p><b>. BRAC Law - Final Criteria §2915</b></p>	<p>(a) Final Selection Criteria.- The final criteria to be used by the Secretary in making recommendations for the closure...shall be the <b>military value and other criteria specified...</b></p> <p>(b) <b>MILITARY VALUE CRITERIA.-</b> The military value criteria are as follows:</p> <p>(1) The <b>current and future mission capabilities</b> and the <b>impact on operational readiness</b> on the total force of the DoD, including impact on joint warfighting, training, and readiness</p> <p>(2) The availability and condition of land, facilities, and associated airspace (including training areas suitable for maneuver by ground, naval, or air forces throughout a diversity of climate and terrain and <b>staging areas for the use of the Armed forces in homeland defense missions</b>) at both existing and potential receiving locations.</p> <p>(3) ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, surge, and future total force requirements at both existing and potential receiving locations to support operations and training.</p> <p>(4) the cost of operations and the manpower implications.</p> <p>(c) <b>OTHER CRITERIA-...</b></p> <p>(1) the <b>extent and timing of potential cost savings</b>, including the number of years, beginning with the date of completion of the closure or realignment, for the savings to exceed the costs.</p>	
<p><b>President Bush</b></p>	<p>"Our country is still the target of terrorists who want to kill many, and intimidate us all - and we will state on the offensive against them, until the fight is won." State of the Union '05</p>	
<p><b>Department of Homeland Security</b></p>		
<p><b>9/11 Commission</b></p>	<p>[Previously,] NORAD, which had been given the responsibility for defending U.S. airspace, had construed that mission to focus on threats coming from outside America's borders. It did not adjust its focus even though the intelligence community had gathered intelligence on the possibility that terrorists might turn to hijacking and even the use of planes as missiles. We have been assured that NORAD has now embraced the full mission. Northern Command has been established to assume responsibility for the defense of the domestic United States.</p> <p><b>Recommendation: The DoD and its oversight committees should regularly assess the adequacy of Northern Command's strategies and planning to defend the U.S. against military threats to the homeland.</b></p>	
<p><b>Secretary of Defense</b></p>		

<p><b>Undersecretary of Defense for Homeland Defense</b></p>	<p>This year we will complete the first strategy for the Department's Homeland Defense mission. This new Homeland Defense and Civil Support Strategy defines strategic goals for the Department's role in Homeland Defense and civil support. By providing strategic goals and objectives, we add coherence and direction to the disparate activities across the Department that include deterring and preventing attacks, protecting critical defense and designated civilian infrastructure, providing situational understanding, and preparing for and responding to incidents.</p> <p><b>On a daily basis, the men and women of the United States Air Force, United States Air Force Reserve, and the Air National Guard secure the skies over major metropolitan areas, and our nation's critical infrastructure.</b></p> <p>The Total Force - Active, Reserve, and National Guard - is even now engaged in activities at home and abroad that promote the security and interests of our nation.</p> <p>The National Guard, in particular, provides unique capabilities in every U.S. State and territory. The modern-day National Guard effectively operates as operational force for military missions at home and abroad.</p> <p>The FY '05 Defense Authorization Act [provides] new authority [which] recognizes bot the truly global nature of the current war and the special capabilities and contributions of the National Guard. Under this new Secretary of Defense authority, <b>National Guard forces will be engaged directly in the defense of the homeland in a manner not seen since the early days of our country.</b></p>	
<p><b>NORAD</b> Keating testimony, 3/15/05</p>	<p>NORAD monitors, validates, and warns of attacks against the U.S. and Canadian homelands by aircraft, missiles and space vehicles. The Command ensures U.S. and Canadian air sovereignty through a network of alert fighters...</p> <p>Operation Noble Eagle - Operation Noble Eagle began immediately after the 9/11 attacks and continues today to protect and defend our nation's airspace. To date, NORAD has flown more than 39,500 sorties and scrambled or diverted fighters more than 1,900 times in response to potential threats. <b>In 2004, Air National Guardsmen and reservists flew 71% of the Operation Noble Eagle Sorties.</b></p>	

<p><b>USNORTHCOM</b></p>	<p><i>Anti-terrorism/Force Protection</i> - On October 1, 2004, <b>USNORTHCOM assumed overall anti-terrorism and force protection responsibilities in the continental United States.</b> USNORTHCOM's force protection responsibilities include assessing the threat and security posture within the USNORTHCOM area of responsibility. We work through existing DoD elements' programs and serve as a bridge among the separate programs to create efficiencies and eliminate vulnerabilities, gaps, and seams in our overall anti-terrorism and force protection posture.</p> <p><i>Critical Infrastructure Protection</i> - USNORTHCOM's area of responsibility includes a great deal of infrastructure critical to military operations and force projection. As a partner in interagency cooperation, we have supported the efforts of the Joint Staff and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense to develop DoD policy for the protection of DoD and non-DoD critical infrastructure. This support includes implementing a comprehensive means of identifying critical infrastructure assets, assessing their vulnerabilities, and planning and implementing mitigation, response, and remediation options. <b>Our operational focus has been on DoD-owned, leased, or managed infrastructure.</b> We are working to ensure DoD policy maximizes the capabilities of the National Guard to enhance USNORTHCOM's homeland defense and support to civil authorities missions.</p> <p>As part of its responsibility for air defense, NORAD has <b>identified a requirement for a number of Air Sovereignty Alert (ASA) sites in the U.S. These sites must meet certain response criteria stipulated by USNORTHCOM.</b> The Air National Guard, flying F-15 and F-16 aircraft, operate most of these sites.</p>	
<p><b>DOD BRAC Policy</b>  <b>USD(ATL) Policy Memo #5</b>  <b>12/10/04</b></p>	<p>The security of our nation, whether expressed as <b>homeland defense, domestic preparedness, homeland security, or fighting the war on terrorism, is an important DoD mission.</b></p> <p>Criterion two of the final BRAC selection criteria specifically requires DoD Components to consider "[t]he availability and condition of land, facilities and associated airspace...and staging areas for the use of the Armed Forces in homeland defense missions" when making closure and realignment recommendations.</p> <p>The Department's homeland defense mission has three major elements: <b>homeland defense against direct attacks to the United States, including in the air...</b></p>	

<p>DOD BRAC Policy (cont.) USD(ATL) Policy Memo #5 12/10/04</p>	<p>In order to ensure that the infrastructure requirements of the diversity of Homeland Defense missions are accommodated in the BRAC process, the Military Departments and JCSGs shall use the most recent coordination draft of the "DoD Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support", pending finalization of that Strategy...to assist them in ensuring we retain the capabilities necessary to support the homeland defense mission.</p> <p>The Military Departments and JCSGs should consult with the ASD(HD) and the CMDRs NORTHCOM and PACOM, as necessary to clarify the information contained in those documents.</p>	
<p>2002 National Security Strategy (as quoted in AF BRAC report)</p>	<p>The National Security Strategy identified protecting the U.S. homeland as the first priority of the U.S. government.</p>	
<p>2001 National Defense Quadrennial Review (as quoted in AF BRAC report)</p>	<p>The 2001 QDR report makes protecting the U.S. homeland the highest priority for the Department of Defense.</p>	
<p>AF BRAC Report Mission</p>	<p>The purpose of Base Realignment and Closure is to divest the Air Force of infrastructure it no longer needs while improving the overall effectiveness of our air forces and the military value of the retained portfolio of infrastructure.</p> <p>As part of its overall BRAC strategy, the Air Force established four goals that support DoD's goals for BRAC...</p> <p>The Air Force goals are:...Transform by realigning Air Force infrastructure with future defense strategy...</p> <p>The strategic objectives of the 2005 National Defense Strategy include defending the U.S. homeland from direct attack...</p> <p>The Air Force recommendations in this report help secure the homeland by providing the required capability to meet NORTHCOM air sovereignty taskings.</p>	
<p>AF BRAC Report (cont.) BRAC Delegation</p>	<p>The SecAF delegated responsibility for the analysis and coordination required to develop Air Force closure and realignment recommendations to the ASAF for Installations, Environment and Logistics.</p> <p>The Air Force principal charged with carrying out the installation analysis and recommendation development was the DAS for Basing and Infrastructure Analysis</p> <p>The SecAF chartered the AF Base Closure Executive Group (BCEG) to serve as the AF's deliberative body for BRAC.</p>	

<p><b>AF BRAC Report (cont.)</b> Homeland Defense Review Process</p>	<p>The Air Force consulted with USNORTHCOM to ensure these recommendations consider the geographic location of our installations and preserve sufficient installations near our borders and near high-value targets to support air sovereignty as part of homeland defense.</p> <p>The Air Force analysis process took this homeland security mission into account when developing recommendations. The need to support ASA requirements was included as one of the five Air Force "imperatives." Additionally, the Air Force BRAC team worked with USNORTHCOM to ensure the Air Force recommendations met USNORTHCOM's requirements.</p>	
<p><b>AF BRAC Report (cont.)</b> Air Force Basing Considerations</p>	<p>To help make consistent, coherent and forward-looking basing recommendations, the Air Force developed a white paper combining historical basing trends, expeditionary tenets, task force CONOPS, homeland defense, and core competencies. As part of the BRAC process, OSD published a list of overarching principles to help focus service analysis. The Air Force in turn established 16 principles to help guide its deliberations. Five of these principles were defined as "imperative"...4. Provide air sovereignty basing to meet the site protection and response time criteria stipulated by USNORTHCOM and USPACOM</p>	
<p><b>AF BRAC Report (cont.)</b> AF Analysis Process</p>	<p>The Secretary of Defense directed the individual services to apply eight criteria to their basing decisions</p>	

**★ HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE ★**

**STATEMENT BY  
MR. PAUL MCHALE  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE**

**BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS  
HOUSE ARMED SERVICE COMMITTEE  
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES**

**MARCH 13, 2003**



## Introduction

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: I appreciate the opportunity to meet with you on the critical subject of our nation's security.

As the President said, on the eve of the standup of the new Department of Homeland Security, "The world changed on September the 11th, 2001. We learned that a threat that gathers on the other side of the earth can strike our own cities and kill our own citizens. It's an important lesson; one we must never forget. Oceans no longer protect America from the dangers of this world. We're protected by daily vigilance at home. And we will be protected by resolute and decisive action against threats abroad."

"We're tracking down terrorists who hate America, one by one. We're on the hunt. We [have] them on the run. And it's a matter of time before they learn the meaning of American justice. We're opposing terror regimes that are arming with weapons of mass destruction to threaten the peace and freedom of this world. And we're taking unprecedented measures to defend the homeland with the largest reorganization of our government in more than a half a century."

At home and abroad, the Department of Defense is a significant contributor in this national effort to secure our nation and its people.

The Department is prosecuting the war on terrorism abroad. The President understands that a terrorist can attack at any time, at any place, using any conceivable technique. He also understands that it is physically impossible to defend against every conceivable threat in every place, at every time.

To successfully defend against terrorism, and other 21<sup>st</sup> century threats, requires that we take the war to the enemy. And the task of the Department is to put pressure on terrorists wherever they are, in Afghanistan, across the globe, to ensure that they have no safe haven, no sanctuary.

With respect to the war abroad, U.S. military forces, when directed by the President, are charged with engaging terrorist forces and the governments or other entities that harbor them. In this effort, the Department works closely with other government agencies, including the departments of State, Treasury, and Justice, and the intelligence community.

At home, all elements of society have a crucial stake in reducing our vulnerability to terrorism; and all have highly valuable roles to play. Protecting our nation requires an unprecedented level of cooperation throughout all levels of government - with private industry and institutions, and with the American people. The federal government has the crucial task of fostering a collaborative environment, and enabling all of these entities to work together to provide the security our nation requires. The new Department of Homeland Security is tasked with the responsibility of leading this national effort to protect our nation

against terrorist attacks.

At home, the Department of Defense plays a valuable role in securing our nation as well and the Secretary of Defense has made a public commitment to work closely with the new Department of Homeland Security in order to coordinate our respective responsibilities.

However, before discussing further the Department's role in helping secure our nation and its people at home, it is important to distinguish the differences between homeland security and homeland defense.

### **Homeland Defense and Homeland Security**

As described by the President in the National Strategy for Homeland Security, **homeland security** is defined as a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism, and minimize the damage and assist in the recovery from terrorist attacks.

On the other hand, the Defense Department defines **homeland defense** as the military protection of United States territory, domestic population, and critical defense infrastructure against external threats and aggression. It also includes routine, steady state activities designed to deter aggressors and to prepare U.S. military forces for action if deterrence fails.

With respect to homeland security, the Defense Department will operate in support of a lead federal agency. While in homeland defense activities, the Defense Department will take the lead and be supported by other federal agencies. In fact, Section 876 of Public Law 107-296, the Homeland Security Act of 2002, recognizes the Department of Defense's lead role in the conduct of traditional military missions by providing that "[n]othing in this Act shall confer upon the Secretary [of Homeland Security] any authority to engage in warfighting, the military defense of the United States, or other military activities, nor shall anything in this Act limit the existing authority of the Department of Defense or the Armed Forces to engage in warfighting, the military defense of the United States, or other military activities." This section clearly delineates the difference between homeland defense activities and homeland security activities - a precision that will be important to keep in our minds and to articulate clearly to the American public.

### **The Department of Defense's Role in the Security of the Nation**

In his testimony before Congress in May of last year, the Secretary of Defense described three distinct circumstances in which the Department of Defense would be involved in activities within the United States:

The first case was **extraordinary circumstances**, which require the Department to execute its traditional military missions. For example, combat air

patrols and maritime defense operations. In these cases the Department plays the lead role and is supported by other Federal agencies. As in the case of combat air patrols where the Federal Aviation Administration provides data to assist the efforts of Air Force fighter pilots in identifying and, if necessary, intercepting suspicious or hostile aircraft.

Also included in the category of extraordinary circumstances are cases in which the President, exercising his Constitutional authority as Commander in Chief, authorizes military action. This inherent Constitutional authority may be used in cases, such as a terrorist attack, where normal measures are insufficient to carry out Federal functions.

The second case was **emergency circumstances** of a catastrophic nature—for example: responding to an attack or assisting in response to forest fires, floods, hurricanes, tornados and so forth, during which the Department may be asked to act quickly to provide or to supply capabilities that other agencies do not have.

Finally, the Secretary noted **temporary circumstances**, where the Department is given missions or assignments that are limited in duration or scope and other agencies have the lead from the outset. An example of this would be security at a special event like the Olympics. Another example is assisting other Federal agencies in developing capabilities to detect chemical/biological threats.

Subsequent to the Secretary's testimony, three significant changes to the Department of Defense have fostered an evolving perspective of our role at home in the security of our nation.

First, the Secretary of Defense, with the approval of the President, changed the Unified Command Plan and stood up, on October 1, 2002, the **U.S. Northern Command**. U.S. Northern Command's mission is to:

- Conduct operations to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression aimed at the United States, its territories, and interests within the assigned area of responsibility; and
- As directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, provide military assistance to civil authorities including incidence management operations.

U.S. Northern Command's area of responsibility includes air, land and sea approaches and encompasses the continental United States, Alaska, Canada, Mexico, and the surrounding water out to approximately 500 nautical miles. It also includes the Gulf of Mexico, Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. The

defense of Hawaii and our territories and possessions in the Pacific remain the responsibility of U.S. Pacific Command. U.S. Northern Command will additionally be responsible for security cooperation and coordination with Canada and Mexico.

In addition to defending the nation, U.S. Northern Command will provide military assistance to civil authorities in accordance with U.S. laws and as directed by the President or Secretary of Defense. Military assistance is always in support of a lead federal agency, such as the Department of Homeland Security. Military civil support includes domestic disaster relief operations that occur during fires, hurricanes, floods, and earthquakes. Support also includes counter-drug operations and consequence management assistance, such as would occur after a terrorist event employing a weapon of mass destruction.

Second, the Fiscal Year 2003 National Defense Authorization Act directed the establishment of an "**Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense.**" I am honored and thankful to have been nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate to serve as the first Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense.

In accordance with Section 902 of Public Law 107-314, the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act of 2003, my principal duty is "the overall supervision of the homeland defense activities of the Department of Defense." My charge, as given to me by law, by the Secretary of Defense, and by the President is to lead and focus the Department's activities in homeland defense and homeland security, ensure internal coordination of DoD policy direction, provide guidance to Northern Command for its homeland defense mission and its military activities in support of homeland security, to include support to civil authorities, and to coordinate with the Homeland Security Council (HSC), the National Security Council (NSC), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and other government agencies. In layman's terms, I am responsible for recommending to the Secretary the roadmap and the "rules of the road" for the Defense Department's future role in securing our nation at home.

Third, the Fiscal Year 2003 National Defense Authorization Act also directed the establishment of an "**Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.**"

The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence will have the primary responsibilities to assure that the senior leadership of the Department and Combatant Commanders receive the warning, actionable intelligence and counter-intelligence support needed to pursue the objectives of our new defense strategy.

The Under Secretary will also enhance Defense Department intelligence-related activities, provide a single point of contact for coordination of national and military intelligence activities with the Community Management Staff and strengthen the relationship between the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence. So, in terms of this forum, the new Under Secretary will define and provide oversight for the Defense Department's participation in national Indications and Warning.

## **The National Guard's Role in the Security of the Nation**

One of the critical elements in DoD's contribution to the security of our nation is the National Guard. Since the terrorist attacks of September the 11<sup>th</sup>, the Defense Department has depended so much on the National Guard that many of our accomplishments at home and abroad would not be possible without them.

In fact, on September 11, 2001, members of the 102nd Fighter Wing, Massachusetts Air National Guard at Otis ANGB, led the first military response to the terrible attack on America. Two F-15 Eagle jets from Otis arrived at the World Trade Center, just minutes after United Airlines Flight 175 sliced into the second tower. While they were unable to alter the course of history on that morning, they stood guard with renewed vigilance. They were the first, but they were not the last.

Clearly, because of where they are located in their relationship to state governments, the National Guard is one of the absolutely critical elements in developing the military's role in responding to attacks on the United States, and that includes response to mass casualty attacks. That is why, of course, that it is no accident that General Eberhart, who is the commander of the new Northern Command has as his chief of staff a National Guard general. His links into the National Guard are absolutely critical.

The National Guard is quite capable of conducting selected homeland defense missions, such as the Air National Guard's important role in continental air defense. However, the National Guard is also combat ready to conduct overseas military operations and is relied upon by combatant commanders as part of a strategic reserve.

In the past, the National Guard was dual-tasked. In wartime, the nation has expected the Guard to go fulfill its mission overseas; in peacetime, the nation has expected the Guard to be available for domestic emergencies. The terrorist attacks of September the 11<sup>th</sup>, have now taught us that the National Guard may be called upon to do both at the same time, not by accident but because our nation's enemies may attack us in both places at once.

Consequently, as DoD reviews how best to deal with the challenge of the new security environment, it is mindful of the need to properly balance the application of the total force to: defend the homeland, contribute to the global war on terrorism, meet military commitments abroad, and, if necessary, participate in a major theater war.

In general, the National Guard can support homeland security in several ways. First, the Guard can operate in state service under the direction of the governors. For example, on September 11, the National Guard of New York, New Jersey and Connecticut responded to the attacks on the World Trade Center.

Second, in state service but performing duties of federal interest, in Title 32

status.

Third, in federal service, in Title 10 status, for example when the National Guard is mobilized to serve under the direction of the President or the Secretary of Defense. The Commander of Northern Command will have authority over the Guard only when it is serving in a Title 10 status. Otherwise, although he can set training and readiness standards for Guard units when they operate in Title 10 status, command authority over the Guard's activities would remain with State governors.

These arrangements have worked well in the past. The challenge today is to translate them into our new security environment. There are many proposals for doing so, and we'll work with the NSC, HSC, DHS, Congress, and the governors to make certain that we have an approach that meets the nation's needs.

### **The Department of Defense-Department of Homeland Security Relationship**

March the 1<sup>st</sup> marked an historic day for the federal government. Over 170,000 employees from more than 20 different agencies officially became part of the Department of Homeland Security, creating a more effective, organized and united defense of our homeland. The Department of Homeland Security is a vital and important step in reorganizing our government to meet the threats of a new era as we continue the work of securing our nation.

The Secretary of Defense has made a public commitment to work closely with the new Department of Homeland Security in order to coordinate the respective responsibilities. DoD and DHS have complementary missions and capabilities. In general, the Department of Defense is responsible for **homeland defense** missions - to defend the land, maritime, and aerospace approaches from external threats - while the Department of Homeland Security will be responsible for major elements of domestic security and civil preparedness. DoD will also provide military assistance to U.S. civil authorities in accordance with U.S. law, as directed by the President and the Secretary of Defense. For example, such assistance could include support for incidence management operations led by the Department of Homeland Security when authorized by the President or the Secretary of Defense. There will be an ongoing requirement for U.S. Northern Command to coordinate plans, exercises and training with the operating components of DHS.

As the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, I will supervise all DoD homeland defense activities, including combatant command capabilities, and will coordinate all requests for assistance and cooperative ventures between the Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security.

### **Conclusion**

In conclusion, the departments and agencies charged with U.S. national security

share a common goal: to assure the security of American citizens, territory, and sovereignty. DoD and DHS have complementary missions and we welcome DHS as a partner. As always, America's men and women in uniform stand ready to defend the nation at home and abroad.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

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House Armed Services Committee  
2120 Rayburn House Office Building  
Washington, D.C. 20515

**★ HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE ★**

STATEMENT BY  
HONORABLE PAUL MCHALE  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
FOR HOMELAND SECURITY

BEFORE THE 108<sup>th</sup> CONGRESS  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL  
THREATS AND CAPABILITIES  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES  
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

March 4, 2004

**Introduction**

Chairman Saxton, Congressman Meehan, distinguished members of this Subcommittee: Thank you for inviting me back to address the critical subject of our nation's security. I appreciate the opportunity to return today to update you on our progress. When I appeared before this Subcommittee a year ago, new Department of Defense (DoD) organizational structures for homeland defense were still under development. With a continuing sense of urgency and focus, DoD has implemented substantial improvements in homeland defense capabilities over the past year, increasing the safety of the nation. At the same time, there is no reason for complacency. We fully recognize that significant challenges lie ahead.

The focus of DoD's efforts to combat terrorism is on bringing the fight to the terrorists abroad through the prosecution of the global war on terrorism. Thus, our first line of defense is abroad -- to confront the enemy where he lives, trains, plans, and recruits, as we are doing today in Afghanistan and Iraq. Since my last appearance, the Global War on Terror has achieved many more successes. U.S. forces toppled Saddam Hussein's vicious regime in Iraq, freeing its innocent population from the grip of tyranny. We have captured or killed nearly two-thirds of al-Qaeda's known senior operatives. We have disrupted terrorist cells throughout the world, likely preventing planned attacks and disrupting the planning of others. The second line of defense also lies beyond the borders of the nation -- the air and maritime avenues of approach - where we will engage terrorists before they reach our borders. Inside our borders, the domestic law enforcement community is responsible for countering terrorist threats; and the Department of Defense stands ready to provide assets and capabilities in support of civil authorities, consistent with U.S. law.

**DoD's Role in the Security of Our Nation**

As you know, following the tragic events of 9/11, at the direction of the

President and with Congressional support, DoD moved quickly to establish new organizations focused on homeland defense and civil support: U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense (ASD(HD)).

At the request of the Secretary of Defense, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense was established by Congress in the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003. I am honored to have been nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate to serve as the first Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense. My office was established in recognition of the need to have a focal point to assist the Secretary improve policy and provide guidance to combatant commanders regarding air, ground, and maritime defense of U.S. territory and the conduct of support to civilian authorities. As provided in the establishing statutory language, I provide overall supervision of the homeland defense activities of DoD.

You will recall that on October 1, 2002, DoD activated NORTHCOM, headquartered in Colorado Springs, Colorado. This is the first combatant command with a primary mission to defend the land, sea, and air approaches to the United States. NORTHCOM conducts operations within its assigned area of responsibility to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression aimed at the United States, its territories, and interests. Accordingly, as directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, NORTHCOM would direct military operations within its area of responsibility, including combat operations. In addition, when directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, NORTHCOM would also provide military assistance to civil authorities to mitigate the results of disasters and catastrophes, including those resulting from a WMD attack.

NORTHCOM's area of responsibility includes the continental United States, Alaska, Canada, Mexico, and the surrounding water out to approximately 500 nautical miles. The defense of Hawaii and U.S. territories and possessions in the Pacific remains the responsibility of U.S. Pacific Command. The commander of NORTHCOM is also the commander of the bi-national U.S.-Canada North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). I am pleased to report that NORTHCOM achieved full operational capability on September 11, 2003 and is fully able to conduct missions assigned to the command in the Unified Command Plan.

**Air domain.** NORAD guards, patrols, and monitors the skies over Canada and the United States. Each and every day the men and women of the United States Air Force, United States Air Force Reserve, and the Air National Guard secure the skies over major metropolitan areas, historic monuments, and our nation's critical infrastructure. Since September 11, 2001, these dedicated professionals have executed over 30,000 air defense sorties and responded to over 1700 requests from the Federal Aviation Administration to intercept potential air threats.

**Maritime domain.** Similarly, the U.S. Navy mans the sea approaches to the United States and works with the U.S. Coast Guard to patrol international waters and our territorial seas. On a daily basis, the U.S. Navy vigilantly monitors the blue water approaches to our nation's territorial seas, operating under new and expanded authority to interdict vessels potentially bearing terrorists or their

weapons before they reach our shores. Further, under Operation NOBLE EAGLE, naval maritime surveillance and engagement forces are designated for transfer to NORTHCOM command and control when directed by the Secretary of Defense.

**Land domain.** The Homeland Security Act of 2002 assigns the Secretary of Homeland Security the responsibility for the security of the nation's borders. That responsibility includes preventing terrorists and instruments of terrorism from penetrating our borders, protecting our ports of entry, immigration enforcement, and ensuring the speedy, orderly, and efficient flow of lawful traffic and commerce. DoD's role in that border security mission is to provide support to civil authorities, principally the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), when appropriate. To that end, DoD is prepared to respond swiftly when required. DoD has established and maintains Quick Reaction Forces and Rapid Reaction Forces, which, when deployed, will operate under NORTHCOM command and control. These highly-trained U.S. Army and Marine Corps personnel are postured to respond to the full range of potential threats to the United States. Additionally, when authorized by the Secretary of Defense, in the case of a WMD attack, Joint Task Force Civil Support headquartered in Norfolk, Virginia, Joint Task Force Consequence Management East headquartered at Fort Gillem, Georgia, or Joint Task Force Consequence Management West headquartered at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, under the command and control of NORTHCOM, would provide consequence management support to civil authorities.

### **Role of DoD and Other Agency Exercises**

DoD is committed to maintaining the readiness of military forces to execute the full spectrum of homeland defense operations and to support civil authorities, when needed. To this end, DoD has hosted or participated in our own exercises and those sponsored by other government entities. Over the last year, these include: Unified Defense (February 2003); TOPOFF 2 (May 2003); Determined Promise (August 2003); Livewire (October 2003); Scarlet Cloud (November 2003); and Unified Defense (February 2004). These exercises addressed a range of potential threats to the United States, from cyber attacks to bioterror attacks, and from radiological attacks to a nuclear detonation. The exercises support the DHS National Homeland Security Exercise Program established by the December 2003 Homeland Security Presidential Directive-8 (HSPD-8) on National Preparedness. Homeland security and homeland defense exercises are critical in identifying gaps and potential weaknesses within each agency and across agencies in responding to terrorist attacks, including multiple, simultaneous challenges.

### **DoD Support of Critical Infrastructure Protection**

Public Law 107-296 (the Homeland Security Act of 2002) assigned DHS the responsibility to develop a comprehensive national plan to protect our nation's critical infrastructure and key assets. The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace (February 2003) and the National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets (February 2003), as well as HSPD-7 on Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection, (December 2003) designate DoD as the Sector Specific Agency for the Defense

Industrial Base sector. This designation recognizes DoD's important role in the protection of the nation's critical infrastructure that sustain our capability to defend our nation and fight its wars. In this capacity, DoD must work closely with private sector owners of critical defense infrastructure to deter, mitigate, or neutralize terrorist attacks in order to sustain military operations.

In September 2003, I was assigned the responsibility for Defense Critical Infrastructure Protection by the Secretary of Defense. Since then, we have consolidated Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) funding within the Office Secretary of Defense into a single program, managed by the newly-established Defense Program Office for Mission Assurance. Under my oversight, this office conducts focused research and development using a systems approach for CIP activities supporting DoD missions. We have also taken steps to protect critical defense installations and facilities from chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats. Pentagon efforts are helping to develop DoD-wide installation protection standards and requirements, which we will apply at 200 other key installations over the next few years.

### **Intelligence and Information Sharing**

DoD works closely with the constituent elements of the intelligence community to maintain maximum awareness of potential attacks against and emerging threats to the United States. My office engages actively with the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)), established in 2003 by Public Law 107-314, on all homeland defense intelligence matters. USDI is charged with ensuring that the senior DoD leadership receives the warning, actionable intelligence, and counter-intelligence support needed to pursue all of the objectives of the updated defense strategy, including defense of the homeland. USD(I) also provides a single point of contact for coordination of national and military intelligence activities with the Community Management Staff under the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and strengthens the relationship between the Secretary of Defense and the DCI.

With the assistance of my office, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, is working with DHS and other federal departments and agencies to fulfill the tasking set forth by Executive Order 13311, "Homeland Security Information Sharing," (July 2003) to establish procedures for the horizontal sharing of information between federal agencies and the vertical sharing of information with authorities at the state and local levels.

Additionally, DoD is a full partner in the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC), a multi-agency joint venture announced by the President in the January 2003 State of the Union address and launched in May 2003. TTIC integrates terrorist-threat related information, minimizing any seams between analysis of terrorism intelligence collected overseas and inside the United States, to form a comprehensive threat picture. On a daily basis, TTIC coordinates terrorist threat assessments with partner agencies, including DoD, DHS, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Department of State.

### **DoD Relationship with the Department of Homeland Security**

DoD focuses on and is responsible for homeland defense, which is the protection of United States territory, domestic population, and critical defense infrastructure *against external threats and aggression*. It also includes routine, steady-state activities designed to deter aggressors and to prepare U.S. military forces for action if deterrence fails. DHS, on the other hand, focuses on homeland security, which is defined in the 2002 National Strategy for Homeland Security as "a concerted national effort to prevent *terrorist attacks within* the United States, reduce the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism, and minimize the damage and assist in the recovery from terrorist attacks."

In simpler terms, the Defense Department provides the military defense of our nation from all attacks that originate from abroad, while DHS protects the nation against, and prepares for, acts of terrorism. DoD is organized and prepared, however, at the direction of the President and the Secretary of Defense, to play a vital role in support of the DHS mission.

As the Secretary of Defense's principal representative to the DHS, I have worked hard to build upon our excellent working relationships throughout the Department of Homeland Security. We have nearly completed a memorandum of agreement with DHS, under which DoD will continue to provide on a detail basis some sixty-four personnel to the Department of Homeland Security to fill critical specialties, principally in the areas of communications and intelligence. We have also established a 24/7 DoD presence in the DHS Homeland Security Operations Center with direct connectivity back to DoD for rapid response. Additionally, we established planning teams to assist the DHS Interagency Incident Management Group - a group of senior interagency officials focused on incident response. This year, we are also enhancing our partnership with DHS by establishing a DoD advisory and liaison office -- called the Homeland Defense Coordination Office -- within DHS headquarters.

In accordance with Section 1401 of Public Law 107-314, I serve as the "senior official of the Department of Defense to coordinate all Department of Defense efforts to identify, evaluate, deploy, and transfer to Federal, State, and local first responders technology items and equipment in support of homeland security." In that capacity, I work closely with the DHS Under Secretary for Science and Technology.

Recent examples of technology transfer initiatives include: information-sharing systems, such as the Disaster Management Interoperability Services; biometrics identification technologies; ground sensors and their application in border security; and unmanned aerial vehicle experimentation. Additionally, new Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) efforts are underway that have the potential to deliver capabilities supporting both DoD missions abroad and DHS missions at home. These include the High Altitude Airship, a prototype untethered platform that could provide wide area surveillance and communications capabilities, and the Air Transportable Cargo screening ACTD, designed to detect explosive threats in pallet cargo loads moving through military transportation systems.

Finally, DoD invests nearly \$100 million yearly in the Technical Support Working Group (TSWG), a U.S. national forum that brings together over 85 federal

agencies to identify, prioritize, and coordinate interagency and international research and development requirements for combating terrorism. The TSWG rapidly develops technologies and equipment to meet the high-priority needs of the combating terrorism community. These technologies typically are also applicable to first responders and other homeland security missions. DHS is now a partner in the TSWG.

### **Homeland Security Council**

The President established the Office of Homeland Security (OHS) and the Homeland Security Council (HSC) on October 8, 2001 to develop and implement a comprehensive national strategy to secure the United States from terrorist threats. The Department of Defense coordinates with the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and staff as appropriate. The Secretary of Defense is, along with the President, Vice President, Secretary of Homeland Security, the Attorney General, and other Cabinet officials, a member of the HSC. DoD worked closely with the OHS from October 2001 to March 2003, and continues to do so with its successor, the HSC staff.

As the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, I am DoD's principal representative to the HSC staff and normally represent DoD at HSC principals and deputies committee meetings. My office represents DoD on the HSC's inter-agency policy coordination committees (PCCs) and subordinate working groups, with the participation of other DoD offices as appropriate. From personal experience, I can attest that the HSC has become an effective forum for interagency communication on homeland security and homeland defense matters, including evaluation of terrorist threats and the development of responses in a crisis environment. As one example, the HSC functioned effectively throughout the tense weeks of Code Orange alert during the December 2003 holiday season.

### **Defense Support to Civil Authorities**

DoD has a long tradition of support to civil authorities, while maintaining its primary mission of fighting and winning the nation's wars. Since my last testimony, DoD has continued to lend necessary assistance to civil authorities when they were overwhelmed or faced with challenges necessitating the Department's unique capabilities. Last year we acted on 75 requests for assistance from more than 20 civilian agencies, including DHS, the Department of Justice, the Department of Health and Human Services, the Department of Transportation, the Department of State, the National Air and Space Administration, the U.S. Marshals Service, and the National Interagency Fire Center.

To provide several brief examples of civil support activities last year, DoD provided emergency support in natural disasters such as Hurricane Isabel in September 2003 and the October 2003 California wildfires. During the January 2004 ricin incident on Capitol Hill, NORTHCOM's Joint Force Headquarters-

National Capitol Region, in its first operational use, provided command and control of U.S. Marine Corps Chemical-Biological Incident Response Force assistance to the U.S. Capitol Police.

### Conclusion

Throughout our history, U.S. military forces - active duty and reserves -- have defended our nation against its enemies on land, at sea, and in the air, adapting continuously to engage threats to our nation.

Today we face a challenge that is equal to or greater than any we have ever faced before. We must cope not only with the threats produced by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missile technology among nation-states, but also with threats posed by individual terrorists and terrorist organizations with global reach.

Throughout DoD we are transforming, increasing our capabilities for warfighting and homeland defense on a daily basis, while continuing a long tradition of support to civil authorities. Homeland defense and homeland security are featured on Secretary Rumsfeld's top priorities list for this year. We intend to develop a comprehensive Homeland Defense Strategy for the 21<sup>st</sup> century. This strategy will support the National Security Strategy, the National Strategy for Homeland Security, and the updated Defense Strategy. It will also provide the framework for pursuing operational capabilities to prepare for tomorrow's challenges.

Mr. Chairman, I commend you and the members of this subcommittee for your continued interest, efforts, and support in the Department's homeland defense mission. The citizens of this nation, its institutions, and our brave men and women in uniform have repeatedly demonstrated the patriotism, toughness, innovation, determination, and resiliency to defeat our enemies while retaining our freedoms. There is no doubt in my mind that those capabilities will be tested against this newest enemy threat - nor is there any doubt that we will prevail.

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House Armed Services Committee  
2120 Rayburn House Office Building  
Washington, D.C. 20515



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For Immediate Release  
Office of the Press Secretary  
December 17, 2003

## December 17, 2003 Homeland Security Presidential Directive/Hspd-7

Subject: Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection

### Purpose

(1) This directive establishes a national policy for Federal departments and agencies to identify and prioritize United States critical infrastructure and key resources and to protect them from terrorist attacks.

### Background

(2) Terrorists seek to destroy, incapacitate, or exploit critical infrastructure and key resources across the United States to threaten national security, cause mass casualties, weaken our economy, and damage public morale and confidence.

(3) America's open and technologically complex society includes a wide array of critical infrastructure and key resources that are potential terrorist targets. The majority of these are owned and operated by the private sector and State or local governments. These critical infrastructures and key resources are both physical and cyber-based and span all sectors of the economy.

(4) Critical infrastructure and key resources provide the essential services that underpin American society. The Nation possesses numerous key resources, whose exploitation or destruction by terrorists could cause catastrophic health effects or mass casualties comparable to those from the use of a weapon of mass destruction, or could profoundly affect our national prestige and morale. In addition, there is critical infrastructure so vital that its incapacitation, exploitation, or destruction, through terrorist attack, could have a debilitating effect on security and economic well-being.

(5) While it is not possible to protect or eliminate the vulnerability of all critical infrastructure and key resources throughout the country, strategic improvements in security can make it more difficult for attacks to succeed and can lessen the impact of attacks that may occur. In addition to strategic security enhancements, tactical security improvements can be rapidly implemented to deter, mitigate, or neutralize potential attacks.

### Definitions

(6) In this directive:

(a) The term "critical infrastructure" has the meaning given to that

term in section 1016(e) of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 (42 U.S.C.

5195c(e)).

(b) The term "key resources" has the meaning given that term in section

2(9) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101(9)).

(c) The term "the Department" means the Department of Homeland Security.

(d) The term "Federal departments and agencies" means those executive departments enumerated in 5 U.S.C. 101, and the Department of Homeland Security; independent establishments as defined by 5 U.S.C. 104(1); Government corporations as defined by 5 U.S.C. 103(1); and the United States Postal Service.

(e) The terms "State," and "local government," when used in a geographical sense, have the same meanings given to those terms in section 2 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101).

(f) The term "the Secretary" means the Secretary of Homeland Security.

(g) The term "Sector-Specific Agency" means a Federal department or agency responsible for infrastructure protection activities in a designated critical infrastructure sector or key resources category.

Sector-Specific Agencies will conduct their activities under this directive in accordance with guidance provided by the Secretary.

(h) The terms "protect" and "secure" mean reducing the vulnerability of critical infrastructure or key resources in order to deter, mitigate, or neutralize terrorist attacks.

#### Policy

(7) It is the policy of the United States to enhance the protection of our Nation's critical infrastructure and key resources against terrorist acts that could:

(a) cause catastrophic health effects or mass casualties comparable to those from the use of a weapon of mass destruction;

(b) impair Federal departments and agencies' abilities to perform essential missions, or to ensure the public's health and safety;

(c) undermine State and local government capacities to maintain order and to deliver minimum essential public services;

(d) damage the private sector's capability to ensure the orderly functioning of the economy and delivery of essential services;

(e) have a negative effect on the economy through the cascading disruption of other critical infrastructure and key resources; or

- (f) undermine the public's morale and confidence in our national economic and political institutions.
- (8) Federal departments and agencies will identify, prioritize, and coordinate the protection of critical infrastructure and key resources in order to prevent, deter, and mitigate the effects of deliberate efforts to destroy, incapacitate, or exploit them. Federal departments and agencies will work with State and local governments and the private sector to accomplish this objective.
- (9) Federal departments and agencies will ensure that homeland security programs do not diminish the overall economic security of the United States.
- (10) Federal departments and agencies will appropriately protect information associated with carrying out this directive, including handling voluntarily provided information and information that would facilitate terrorist targeting of critical infrastructure and key resources consistent with the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and other applicable legal authorities.
- (11) Federal departments and agencies shall implement this directive in a manner consistent with applicable provisions of law, including those protecting the rights of United States persons.

#### Roles and Responsibilities of the Secretary

- (12) In carrying out the functions assigned in the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the Secretary shall be responsible for coordinating the overall national effort to enhance the protection of the critical infrastructure and key resources of the United States. The Secretary shall serve as the principal Federal official to lead, integrate, and coordinate implementation of efforts among Federal departments and agencies, State and local governments, and the private sector to protect critical infrastructure and key resources. (13) Consistent with this directive, the Secretary will identify, prioritize, and coordinate the protection of critical infrastructure and key resources with an emphasis on critical infrastructure and key resources that could be exploited to cause catastrophic health effects or mass casualties comparable to those from the use of a weapon of mass destruction.
- (14) The Secretary will establish uniform policies, approaches, guidelines, and methodologies for integrating Federal infrastructure protection and risk management activities within and across sectors along with metrics and criteria for related programs and activities.
- (15) The Secretary shall coordinate protection activities for each of the following critical infrastructure sectors: information technology; telecommunications; chemical; transportation systems, including mass transit, aviation, maritime, ground/surface, and rail and pipeline systems; emergency services; and postal and shipping. The Department shall coordinate with appropriate departments and agencies to ensure the protection of other key resources including dams, government facilities, and commercial facilities. In addition, in its role as overall cross-sector coordinator, the Department shall also evaluate the need for and coordinate the coverage of additional critical infrastructure and key resources categories over time, as appropriate.
- (16) The Secretary will continue to maintain an organization to serve as a focal point for the security of cyberspace. The organization will facilitate interactions and collaborations between and among Federal departments and agencies, State and local governments, the private sector, academia and international organizations. To the extent permitted by law, Federal departments and agencies with cyber expertise, including but not limited to the Departments of Justice, Commerce, the Treasury, Defense, Energy, and State, and the Central Intelligence Agency, will collaborate with and support the organization in accomplishing its mission. The organization's mission includes analysis, warning, information sharing, vulnerability reduction, mitigation, and aiding national recovery efforts for critical infrastructure information systems. The organization will support the Department of Justice and other law enforcement agencies in their continuing missions to investigate and prosecute threats to and attacks against cyberspace, to the extent permitted by law.
- (17) The Secretary will work closely with other Federal departments and agencies, State and local governments, and the private sector in accomplishing the objectives of this directive.

#### Roles and Responsibilities of Sector-Specific Federal Agencies

(18) Recognizing that each infrastructure sector possesses its own unique characteristics and operating models, there are designated Sector-Specific Agencies, including:

(a) Department of Agriculture -- agriculture, food (meat, poultry, egg products);

(b) Health and Human Services -- public health, healthcare, and food (other than meat, poultry, egg products);

(c) Environmental Protection Agency -- drinking water and water treatment systems;

(d) Department of Energy -- energy, including the production refining, storage, and distribution of oil and gas, and electric power except for commercial nuclear power facilities;

(e) Department of the Treasury -- banking and finance;

(f) Department of the Interior -- national monuments and icons; and

(g) Department of Defense -- defense industrial base.

(19) In accordance with guidance provided by the Secretary, Sector-Specific Agencies shall:

(a) collaborate with all relevant Federal departments and agencies, State and local governments, and the private sector, including with key persons and entities in their infrastructure sector;

(b) conduct or facilitate vulnerability assessments of the sector; and

(c) encourage risk management strategies to protect against and mitigate the effects of attacks against critical infrastructure and key resources.

(20) Nothing in this directive alters, or impedes the ability to carry out, the authorities of the Federal departments and agencies to perform their responsibilities under law and consistent with applicable legal authorities and presidential guidance.

(21) Federal departments and agencies shall cooperate with the Department in implementing this directive, consistent with the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and other applicable legal authorities.

#### Roles and Responsibilities of Other Departments, Agencies, and Offices

(22) In addition to the responsibilities given the Department and Sector-Specific Agencies, there are special functions of various Federal departments and agencies and components of the Executive Office of the President related to critical infrastructure and key resources protection.

(a) The Department of State, in conjunction with the Department, and the Departments of Justice, Commerce, Defense, the Treasury and other appropriate agencies, will work with foreign countries and international organizations to strengthen the protection of United States critical infrastructure and key resources.

(b) The Department of Justice, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation, will reduce domestic terrorist threats, and investigate and prosecute actual or attempted terrorist attacks on, sabotage of, or disruptions of critical infrastructure and key resources. The Attorney General and the Secretary shall use applicable statutory authority and attendant mechanisms for cooperation and coordination, including but not limited to those established by presidential directive.

(c) The Department of Commerce, in coordination with the Department, will work with private sector, research, academic, and government organizations to improve technology for cyber systems and promote other critical infrastructure efforts, including using its authority under the Defense Production Act to assure the timely availability of industrial products, materials, and services to meet homeland security requirements.

(d) A Critical Infrastructure Protection Policy Coordinating Committee will advise the Homeland Security Council on interagency policy related to physical and cyber infrastructure protection. This PCC will be chaired by a Federal officer or employee designated by the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security.

(e) The Office of Science and Technology Policy, in coordination with the Department, will coordinate interagency research and development to enhance the protection of critical infrastructure and key resources.

(f) The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) shall oversee the implementation of government-wide policies, principles, standards, and guidelines for Federal government computer security programs. The Director of OMB will ensure the operation of a central Federal information security incident center consistent with the requirements of the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002.

(g) Consistent with the E-Government Act of 2002, the Chief Information Officers Council shall be the principal interagency forum for improving agency practices related to the design, acquisition, development, modernization, use, operation, sharing, and performance of information resources of Federal departments and agencies.

(h) The Department of Transportation and the Department will collaborate on all matters relating to transportation security and transportation infrastructure protection. The Department of Transportation is responsible for operating the national air space system. The Department of Transportation and the Department will collaborate in regulating the transportation of hazardous materials by all modes (including pipelines).

(i) All Federal departments and agencies shall work with the sectors relevant to their responsibilities to reduce the consequences of catastrophic failures not caused by terrorism.

(23) The heads of all Federal departments and agencies will coordinate and cooperate with the Secretary as appropriate and consistent with their own responsibilities for protecting critical infrastructure and key resources.

(24) All Federal department and agency heads are responsible for the identification, prioritization, assessment, remediation, and protection of their respective internal critical infrastructure and key resources. Consistent with the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002, agencies will identify and provide information security protections commensurate with the risk and magnitude of the harm resulting from the unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of information.

#### Coordination with the Private Sector

(25) In accordance with applicable laws or regulations, the Department and the Sector-Specific Agencies will collaborate with appropriate private sector entities and continue to encourage the development of information sharing and analysis mechanisms. Additionally, the Department and Sector-Specific Agencies shall collaborate with the private sector and continue to support sector-coordinating mechanisms:

(a) to identify, prioritize, and coordinate the protection of critical infrastructure and key resources; and

(b) to facilitate sharing of information about physical and cyber threats, vulnerabilities, incidents, potential protective measures, and best practices.

#### National Special Security Events

(26) The Secretary, after consultation with the Homeland Security Council, shall be responsible for designating events as "National Special Security Events" (NSSEs). This directive supersedes language in previous presidential directives regarding the designation of NSSEs that is inconsistent herewith.

#### Implementation

(27) Consistent with the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the Secretary shall produce a comprehensive, integrated National Plan for Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources Protection to outline national goals, objectives, milestones, and key initiatives within 1 year from the issuance of this directive. The Plan shall include, in addition to other Homeland Security-related elements as the Secretary deems appropriate, the following elements:

(a) a strategy to identify, prioritize, and coordinate the protection of critical infrastructure and key resources, including how the Department intends to work with Federal departments and agencies, State and local governments, the private sector, and foreign countries and international organizations;

(b) a summary of activities to be undertaken in order to: define and prioritize, reduce the vulnerability of, and coordinate the protection of critical infrastructure and key resources;

(c) a summary of initiatives for sharing critical infrastructure and key resources information and for providing critical infrastructure and key resources threat warning data to State and local governments and the private sector; and

(d) coordination and integration, as appropriate, with other Federal emergency management and preparedness activities including the National Response Plan and applicable national preparedness goals.

(28) The Secretary, consistent with the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and other applicable legal authorities and presidential guidance, shall establish appropriate systems, mechanisms, and procedures to share homeland security information relevant to threats and vulnerabilities in national critical infrastructure and key resources with other Federal departments and agencies, State and local governments, and the private sector in a timely manner.

(29) The Secretary will continue to work with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and, as appropriate, the Department of Energy in order to ensure the necessary protection of:

(a) commercial nuclear reactors for generating electric power and non-power nuclear reactors used for research, testing, and training;

(b) nuclear materials in medical, industrial, and academic settings and facilities that fabricate nuclear fuel; and

(c) the transportation, storage, and disposal of nuclear materials and waste.

(30) In coordination with the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, the Secretary shall prepare on an annual basis a Federal Research and Development Plan in support of this directive.

(31) The Secretary will collaborate with other appropriate Federal departments and agencies to develop a program, consistent with applicable law, to geospatially map, image, analyze, and sort critical infrastructure and key resources by utilizing commercial satellite and airborne systems, and existing capabilities within other agencies. National technical means should be considered as an option of last resort. The Secretary, with advice from the Director of Central Intelligence, the Secretaries of Defense and the Interior, and the heads of other appropriate Federal departments and agencies, shall develop mechanisms for accomplishing this initiative. The Attorney General shall provide legal advice as necessary.

(32) The Secretary will utilize existing, and develop new, capabilities as needed to model comprehensively the potential implications of terrorist exploitation of vulnerabilities in critical infrastructure and key resources, placing specific focus on densely populated areas. Agencies with relevant modeling capabilities shall cooperate with the Secretary to develop appropriate mechanisms for accomplishing this initiative.

(33) The Secretary will develop a national indications and warnings architecture for infrastructure protection and capabilities that will facilitate:

(a) an understanding of baseline infrastructure operations;

(b) the identification of indicators and precursors to an attack; and

(c) a surge capacity for detecting and analyzing patterns of potential attacks.

In developing a national indications and warnings architecture, the Department will work with Federal, State, local, and non-governmental entities to develop an integrated view of physical and cyber infrastructure and key

resources.

(34) By July 2004, the heads of all Federal departments and agencies shall develop and submit to the Director of the OMB for approval plans for protecting the physical and cyber critical infrastructure and key resources that they own or operate. These plans shall address identification, prioritization, protection, and contingency planning, including the recovery and reconstitution of essential capabilities.

(35) On an annual basis, the Sector-Specific Agencies shall report to the Secretary on their efforts to identify, prioritize, and coordinate the protection of critical infrastructure and key resources in their respective sectors. The report shall be submitted within 1 year from the issuance of this directive and on an annual basis thereafter.

(36) The Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs will lead a national security and emergency preparedness communications policy review, with the heads of the appropriate Federal departments and agencies, related to convergence and next generation architecture. Within 6 months after the issuance of this directive, the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs shall submit for my consideration any recommended changes to such policy.

(37) This directive supersedes Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-63 of May 22, 1998 ("Critical Infrastructure Protection"), and any Presidential directives issued prior to this directive to the extent of any inconsistency. Moreover, the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs shall jointly submit for my consideration a Presidential directive to make changes in Presidential directives issued prior to this date that conform such directives to this directive.

(38) This directive is intended only to improve the internal management of the executive branch of the Federal Government, and it is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity, against the United States, its departments, agencies, or other entities, its officers or employees, or any other person.

GEORGE W. BUSH

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**National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism unclassified quotes:**

Page F-2, Par D, (1):

(U) The GWOT has no definitive end date, nor an easily defined battlefield.

Page 16, Par b.

(U) Ways. DoD achieves these termination objectives and complements other U.S. Government activities by accomplishing six military strategic objectives across the three elements of the GWOT strategy: protect the U.S. homeland; disrupt and attack terrorist networks; and counter ideological support for terrorism.

**Strategic Planning Guidance, FY 2006-2011, March 2004 unclassified quotes:**

Page 1, section 1 DEFENSE STRATEGY OVERVIEW (U), Persistent and Emerging Challenges (U)

(U) The United States is a nation at war, yet we still enjoy an historic position of strategic advantage. In spite of our substantial advantages, we remain vulnerable. We must contend with four persistent and emerging challenges in this new, more uncertain era. There are often no hard boundaries distinguishing one challenge from another. Indeed, the most dangerous circumstances are those where we are facing, or will face, multiple challenges simultaneously. The challenges include:

*Traditional* challenges posed largely by states employing legacy and advanced military capabilities and recognizable military forces, in long-established, well-known forms of military competition and conflict;

*Irregular* challenges arising from the adoption or employment of unconventional methods by non-state and state actors to counter stronger state opponents—terrorism, insurgency, civil war, etc.;

*Catastrophic* challenges involving the surreptitious acquisition, possession, and possible terrorist or rogue employment of WMD or methods producing WMD-like effects; and

*Disruptive* future challenges emanating from competitors developing, possessing, and employing breakthrough technological capabilities intended to supplant our advantages in particular operational domains.

Page R-2-2, Par 4b

b. (U) Military Strategic Objectives. The Military Strategic Objectives are subsidiary objectives that support the Termination Objective. Together with the three elements of the national strategy, *protect the homeland; disrupt and attack terrorist networks; and counter ideological support for terrorism*, the MSOs form the 'ways' by which the Termination Objective is accomplished.

Page L-2, Par 3.

(U) Homeland Defense (HD) is the protection of U.S. sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical defense infrastructure against external threats and aggression. This includes defending the United States against air and missile attacks, terrorism and other direct attacks. DoD is the lead Federal agency for HD.


## Homeland Defense

### **BCEG avoids dealing with Homeland defense issues in sub-criteria and Air Force attributes**

- BCEG Minutes pertaining to Homeland Defense and Military Value (MV)
  - The BCEG minutes show that they had difficulty constructing a quantitative value regarding a base's contribution to homeland defense. By February of 2004, Homeland Defense was going to be a filter to be used after other deliberation. As late as June 2004, filters and questions pertaining to homeland defense were still being looked at. It wasn't until July of 2004 that the Air Force imperatives were developed to accommodate homeland defense. Since WIDGET questions were already to the field and data calls being met, it appears the only way to measure homeland defense was through military judgment using Air Force imperatives.
  
- MV-1 questions and potential questions
  - This section lists the questions that were asked to determine MV-1, and offers alternative questions that may have been a better indicator of a base's Military Value as it relates to homeland defense.
  
  - When Air Sovereignty Alert (ASA) sites were discussed, the 131<sup>st</sup> Fighter Wing was not known to the BCEG as an ASA site. Thus, the 131 FW may have been solely judged based on its *Military Value*. Since September 12, 2001, the 131 FW has flown 102 sorties in support of air sovereignty missions. The 131 FW has built alert facilities, developed procedures, and accomplished 115 days of alert. The 131 FW has directly supported the Air Force imperative to "Provide air sovereignty basing to meet the site protection and response time criteria stipulated by USNORTHCOM and USPACOM".



# Military Value Process






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## ***MV Attributes (BCEG WG)***

---

- **Infrastructure:** Mobilization and Base Operations
- **C4I and Bandwidth:** Capacity, Capability, and Condition
- **Weapons Handling:** Capacity, Capability, and Condition
- **Runway, Ramp, and Space Launch:** Capacity, Capability, and Condition
- **Airspace:** Congestion and Architecture
- **Ranges:** Capacity, Capability, and Access
- **Location:** Encroachment, WX, and Topography



## ***MV Attributes (XO WG)***

### ***“We fight as AEFs”***

---

- AETFs will remain the AF’s warfighting unit
  - AEGs, AEWs, and NEAFs
- Produce 10 equally-capable AEFs as we modernize
- Sqdns will remain the basic building blocks for AETFs
- Must structure sqdns for peak effectiveness (PAA)
  - Fighter numbers lower as we modernize...standard squadron size is 24 PAA for effectiveness
  - For bombers, standard squadron is 12 PAA
  - For intertheater mobility, standard squadron is 12 PAA
  - For C-130s, standard squadron is 16 PAA
  - Certain missions—e.g., homeland defense, special operations—may compel us to exceptions
- Will also drive crew ratio changes for effectiveness



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## ***MV Attributes (XO WG)***

### ***“We fight as AEFs”***


---

- Review wing sizes as well...consolidate/restructure legacy weapon systems
- Keep training units distinct from operational units
- Obviate need to tap other AEFs/ARC out of cycle
- Balance the force:
  - Among Active/ARC/mil/civ/contractor
  - Between CONUS and Overseas
  - Among AEFs
  - With right AC/RC mix and sustainable rotation ratios, accompanied/remote tour ratios

---

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## ***MV Attributes (XO WG)***

### ***“We fight from bases”***

---

- HLD distances to critical sites/joint partners
- Centrally locate bomber bases
- Fighter bases within 150 miles of training
- Lens concept for mobility and power projection
- Geographically or functionally unique installations
  - Polar and equatorial space launch
  - Development, test and evaluation
  - Aerospace medicine, armament/space development
  - National leader travel support
- Ranges
- Encroachment / environmental
- Quality of life




## ***MV Attributes (XO WG)***

### ***“We fight as a Total Force”***

---

- **Optimize AC/RC mix to make squadrons most effective, alleviate PERSTEMPO, enable us to fight early on without non-vol ARC, and accommodate new missions**
- **New paradigms**
  - **Blending and associate must become the norm**
  - **Joint facility use with other services RC**
  - **Facilitate duty across state lines**
  - **Ease active to reserve (and vice versa) transition**
  - **Tie both combat and support forces, Total Force, to ‘fight the base’ (and also the basing constellation)**
- **ARC must invest in new missions to sustain relevance**



## ***Deliberative: MV Attributes***

---


- **Infrastructure:** Mobilization and Base Operations
- **C4I and Bandwidth:** Capacity, Capability, and Condition
- **Weapons Handling:** Capacity, Capability, and Condition
- **Runway, Ramp, and Space Launch:** Capacity, Capability, and Condition
- **Airspace:** Congestion and Architecture
- **Ranges:** Capacity, Capability, and Access
- **Location:** Encroachment, WX, and Topography

BCEG Approve?

Yes No



# Military Value Process





# Installation Attributes


## Military Value "Buckets"

---

- Infrastructure: Mobilization and Base Operations
- Electromagnetic Spectrum and Bandwidth: Capacity, Capability, and Interference
- Weapons Handling: Capacity, Capability, and Condition
- Runway, Ramp, and Space Launch: Capacity, Capability, and Condition
- Airspace: Congestion and Architecture
- Ranges: Capacity, Capability, and Access
- Geographical Factors: Encroachment, Weather, Topography, Proximity to Mission and Joint Operations



# BRAC Analytical Process



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


# BRAC and FTF

## Inextricably Linked

### BRAC "Draft Criteria"

1. Current / future mission reqts. (readiness / training / joint)
2. Land / facilities / airspace
  - Availability & condition
  - Support for HLD
3. Ability of receiving bases to accommodate mobilization, contingencies and future requirements
4. Cost of operations and manpower implications



### FTF "Draft Criteria"

1. Force management
  - Existing basing of experienced personnel
2. Demographics
  - ARC recruiting pools
  - Quality of life
  - "City basing"
3. Unit comparisons
  - Recruiting / retention
  - Participation rates

Focus on:

**MILITARY VALUE**

Focus on:

**RELEVANCE**



# A Common Lexicon

---

- **Capacity:** The capability to receive, contain, conduct, and support military activities. The measurable and quantifiable data about an installation's facilities, real property, range(s), airspace, and environmental factors.
- **Military Value:** Those operational characteristics and infrastructure which, when combined, distinguish one installation from another in terms of its ability to support operations required to execute the National Military Strategy.



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## A Common Lexicon

---

- **Criterion:** One of the eight DoD selection criteria. Used as a standard of judgment, a rule or principle for evaluating something.
- **Attribute:** A quality or characteristic inherent to something or someplace (which the AF has grouped into seven categories).
- **Metrics:** Answer ranges applied to questions which place the responses into operationally relevant, mission-dependent groups.
- **Weight:** An arithmetic value applied to criteria, categories of attributes, questions, and metrics to indicate their relative importance.

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## ***A Common Lexicon***

---

- **Answer set:** All data collected on an installation, as identified by its unique installation code.
- **Template:** A standard basis of measurement in terms of space, support, operational requirements, and environmental impacts. AF unit templates are MDS-based and squadron sized.
- **Filter:** A list of questions which (when applied to an installation's answer set) measure its suitability for a given mission or function. Filters contain questions; questions contain metrics
- **Scenario:** A proposed group of actions related to realignment or closure based on military value criteria, JCSCG recommendations, and other considerations. Templates and filters "screen" scenario development, ruling out impractical options.



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# **Installation Attributes**

## **Military Value "Buckets"**

---

- **Infrastructure:** Mobilization and Base Operations
- **Electromagnetic Spectrum and Bandwidth:** Capacity, Capability, and Interference
- **Weapons Handling:** Capacity, Capability, and Condition
- **Runway, Ramp, and Space Launch:** Capacity, Capability, and Condition
- **Airspace:** Congestion and Architecture
- **Ranges (air/ground):** Capacity, Capability, and Access
- **Geographical Factors:** Encroachment, Demographics, WX, Topography, Proximity to Mission / Joint Users





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# Mission-area Filters

## Mission-area Filters

SOF / Helo / Attack

Fighter

UAV/UCAV

Bomber

ABL

Tanker / C2ISR

Airlift (inter)

Airlift (intra)

Space Launch

Space Control

ICBMs

## Supplementary Filters

Homeland Defense


ARC Unit



# ***MV Questions***

---

- **Should address installation characteristics ... NOT units based there**
- **Have a discrete answer: Yes, no, a number or a range**
- **Should not:**
  - **Be predicated on fungible assets**
    - **Military personnel or portable equipment**
  - **Be based on unit-based plans**
    - **DOC statements, TPFDs, OPORDS, etc—these apply to units, not to bases**
- **Should:**
  - **Things we can't change ... no matter how much money we have**
    - **The WX, the geography and terrain, encroachment, demographics**
    - **Proximity to established training airspace**
    - **Proximity to mission (HLD)**
  - **Things that would be very expensive to replace**
    - **Rocket launch, missile silos**
    - **Bulk logistics: rail, roads, port, fuel delivery**
    - **Basic airfield capabilities: weight bearing, wide-body capable, parking MOC**
    - **Weapons handling**



# A Common Lexicon

---

- **Military Capacity:** The capability to receive, contain, conduct, and support military activities. The measurable and quantifiable data about an installation's facilities, real property, range(s), airspace, and environmental infrastructure.
- **Military Value:** The collection of attributes that determine how well an installation supports force structure functions and or missions.

**MOST REQUIREMENTS RELATE TO CAPACITY  
MOST PRINCIPLES RELATE TO MILITARY VALUE**

---

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# A Common Lexicon

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- **Principle:** An enduring or fundamental tenet which describes an operational or physical characteristic which has or produces military value. Principles guide decisions on the military value of installations.
- **Imperative:** A principle that constitutes a go/no-go installation constraint *vis-a-vis* an installation choice. Basing imperatives should be established prior to realignment and closure analysis.

**MOST PRINCIPLES ARE NOT IMPERATIVES**

---

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
# ***Installation Attributes*** ***Military Value “Buckets”***

---

- **Runway, Ramp, and Space Launch:** Capacity, capability, and condition
- **Weapons Handling:** Capacity, capability, and condition
- **Infrastructure:** Mobilization and operations
- **Airspace:** Congestion and architecture
- **Electromagnetic Spectrum and Bandwidth:** Capacity, capability, and interference
- **Ranges:** Capacity, capability, and access
- **Geographical / Environmental Factors:** Encroachment, weather, topography, proximity to mission and joint operations



# Analytical Framework





# Mission-area Filters

---

<u>Mission-area Filters</u>	
SOF / Helo / Attack	Fighter
UAV/UCAV	Bomber
ABL	Tanker / C2ISR
Airlift (inter)	Airlift (intra)
Space Launch	Space Ops
ICBMs	
<u>Supplementary Filters</u>	
Homeland Defense	ARC Unit



# Criterion 1

## ***Military Value – Current/Future Mission***

---

**The current and future mission capabilities and the impact on operational readiness of the Department of Defense's total force, including impacts on joint warfighting, training, and readiness.**

### **FRN Deliverables:**

- (2e) R&D, engineering, procurement & other tech capabilities are MV (Crit 1- 4)
- (2f) Availability/skill of work force and relationship w/ local institutions (1, 3, 7)
- (2g) Strategic location of DoD facilities (1, 2, 3)
- (2h) Ability to perform a mission and quality of that work—both of which, in turn, capture the willingness to transform and streamline (1, 3)
- (2i) Homeland Defense and security (1, 3)
- (2k) Ability to accommodate current/future force requirements, which includes Federal licensing and permitting requirements (1, 2, 3)



# Criterion 1

## **Military Value – Current/Future Mission**

---

### **USAF Interpretation:**

- **Geographic and/or strategic location?**
- **Operations infrastructure & facilities?**
- **Weather?** Crit 1—VML; Crit 4—Utility Costs
- **Distance to ranges?** Crit 1
- **Quality of ranges?**
- **Access to and type of airspace?**
- **Environmental impacts on ops?**
- **Encroachment impacts?**
- **Quality of local workforce?**
- **Joint training/warfighting suitability?**
- **Recruiting base?**





**HLD**

**Tracking #: H 4**

**Short Question Name: HLD Alert Facilities**

**Question: Does the installation have full service alert facilities that consist of strip alert aircraft parking or hangars, and on base lodging facilities near the strip alert area?**

**Source for the Answer: New Question**

**OPR: AF/XOH**



Question Breakdown	
<input type="checkbox"/> MV?	<input type="checkbox"/> Easily Understood?
<input type="checkbox"/> Measurable?	<input type="checkbox"/> Discriminates?

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# Admin

## Action Items

Complete?			<u>Target Date</u>
Y	N		
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	■ XOO-RA tasked to verify Falcon View as a certifiable source	Complete
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	■ XOO-RA tasked to provide update input to questions C 108, C 150 (Supersonic airspace)	12 Apr 04
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	■ BRAC staff tasked to list OPR / OCR for slides	12 Apr 04
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	■ Mr. Aimone took on task to address HLD with DAS's & OSD	
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	■ XOH tasked to review questions to define HLS filter	12 Apr 04

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# Air Operations

Tracking #: H 4

IQT Ready

**SHORT NAME: Air Operations – HLD Alert Facilities**

**QUESTION: Does the installation have existing infrastructure that can support full service alert facilities to include strip alert aircraft parking or hangars and on-base lodging facilities near the strip alert area?**

**SOURCE: (NEW) DoD#8; DoD#49;**

**OPR: AFXOH**

**OCR: 1AF; AF/ILE**

<input type="checkbox"/> CAF	<input type="checkbox"/> MAF	<input type="checkbox"/> ARC
<input type="checkbox"/> Space	<input type="checkbox"/> ISR	<input type="checkbox"/> HLD



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# Airspace

Tracking #: H 203

IQT Ready

SHORT NAME: Airspace -- Response Time

QUESTION: If the installation has a runway greater than or equal to 8,000' long, what is the installation's response time to the nearest Operation NOBLE EAGLE defined asset?

SOURCE: (NEW) To be answered by MAJCOM or HAF

OPR: AFXOH

OCR: ACC/DOH; 1AF

<input type="checkbox"/> CAF	<input type="checkbox"/> MAF	<input type="checkbox"/> ARC
<input type="checkbox"/> Space	<input type="checkbox"/> ISR	<input type="checkbox"/> HLD

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# Admin

## Action Items

<u>Complete?</u>	<u>Target Date</u>
Y <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Complete
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Complete
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Complete
<input type="checkbox"/>	30 Apr 04
<input type="checkbox"/>	12 Apr 04
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Complete

■ XOO-RA tasked to verify Falcon View as a certifiable source


■ XOO-RA tasked to provide update input to questions C 108, C 150 (Supersonic airspace)

■ BRAC staff tasked to list OPR / OCR for slides

■ Mr. Aimone took on task to address HLD with DAS's & OSD

■ XOH tasked to review questions to define HLS filter

■ AF/DPX provide additional demographics questions




# BCWG Considerations Filters

---

- Delete ICBM and Space Launch filter
- Combine airlift filters

<u>Mission-area Filters</u>	
SOF / Helo / Attack	Fighter
UAV/UCAV	Bomber
ABL	Tanker/C2ISR
Airlift	Space Ops
Homeland Defense	ARC Unit



# Definitions

---

**Principles:** *The top level strategic concepts that foster transformation, embrace change, and avoid capacity reductions that reduce essential military capabilities*


**Imperatives:** *Specific, detailed statements tied to the principles that function chiefly to prevent scenarios from generating specific recommendations that would violate the principles. Imperatives could also require certain outcomes that would enhance military capabilities.*



# Expeditionary AF Imperatives

---

- Cover key sites (homeland defense)
- Provide land-based strategic deterrent—as directed
- Provide missile warning and defense
- Accommodate dual-use (state/federal) of military assets
- Unimpeded access to space
- At least two efficiently-sized mobility hubs on each coast
- At least one additional wide-body capable base per coast
- US-administered mobility-capable bases in the Pacific



# Expeditionary AF Imperatives

## Phase 2 – Process Definition

---

P&I Fully Defined	Process Defined	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	■ Cover key sites (homeland defense)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	■ Provide land-based strategic deterrent—as directed
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	■ Provide missile warning and defense
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	■ Accommodate dual-use (state/federal) of military assets
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	■ Unimpeded access to space
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	■ At least two efficiently-sized mobility hubs on each coast
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	■ At least one additional wide-body capable base per coast
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	■ US-administered mobility-capable bases in the Pacific




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# Expeditionary AF Imperatives

## Phase 2 – Way Ahead

---

- BCWG flesh out the details of:
  - Definition statement for each imperative  
(suspense: 22 Jun 04)
  - Determination of supporting MV questions and/or  
process steps to accomplish  
(suspense: 22 Jun 04)



# Imperatives

---

**XO**

**22. Model: Cover assigned sites / areas (homeland defense) - OPR:  
XOH**

**Clarified Imperative:** Provide air defense to assigned locations within the United States and it's territories.

**Definition and Factors:**

- Ensure at least one alert capable military or civil-use airfield/installation remains within the range of the assigned airframe to reach all assigned locations within prescribed time criteria
- Covered locations are assigned by the NORAD Commander or higher and protected as directed. This level of non-specificity demands general coverage
- "Alert capable" runway is reinforced concrete, at least 8000 feet long by 148 feet wide with parking positions for alert aircraft
- Alert facilities, high-speed taxiways, aircrew billeting / dining facilities, weapons storage are preferred, but temporary accommodations are used when required



# Master Questions

---

- **Example: Stand alone question**

(DoD# 1206) “For installations with an active runway, does the installation have existing infrastructure that can support full service alert facilities?”

- Does the installation have an active alert hangar?
- Does the installation have an active ready crew facility?
- Does the installation have an active high-speed taxiway?
- Are facilities located to permit take-off in the required time?

**“Can installation support fighter alert operations for HLD?”**



# HLD Filter

---

<b>DoD #</b>	<b>Question</b>	<b>Num Wt</b>	<b>Attribute</b>	<b>A. Wt.</b>	<b>Criteria</b>	<b>C. Wt.</b>
	Key site response time (classified)		Geo-locational	100%	1	90%
1206	Ability to support fighter alert operations for HLD		KMI	100%	2	10%

---

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# Recommendation

■ Based on their inclusion as Modeled Imperatives, recommend removing the following filters:

■ ICBM


■ Homeland Defense

Y  N

■ The subsequent filter list is: BCEG Approval?

<u>Mission-area Filters</u>	
SOF / Helo / Attack	Fighter
UAV/UCAV	Bomber
ABL	Tanker/C2ISR
Airlift	Space Ops
	ARC Unit

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


# HLD Filter

DoD #	Question	Nominal Effort	Attribute	A. Wt	Criteria	C. Wt
0	Key site response time (classified)	100%	Geo-locational	100%	1	90%
1206	Ability to support fighter alert operations for HLD	100%	KMI	100%	2	10%

- Supplemental filters are used to overlay other primary filters
- Homeland defense filter results may not reflect the “best constellation of bases” to support all HLD places of interest
- Given Homeland Defense is a Modeled Imperative, then process should be consistent w/ other like filters

**BCWG recommendation is to delete HLD filter**



# HLD Filter

## BCWG Quick Look

**OPR:** IEB      **Status:** Deliberative

DoD #	Question	Normal Effective	Attribute	A. Wt.	Criteria	C. Wt.
0	Key site response time (classified)	100%	90% Geo-locational	100%	1	90%
1206	Ability to support fighter alert operations for HLD	100%	10% KMI	100%	2	10%

- Filter is based on response time to places of interest
- HLD modeled imperative will do the same thing
- HLD filter is not needed

**BCWG Recommendation:  
Delete as supplemental filter**




## Purpose

### Gain BCEG Approval to:

---

- **Combine:**
  - Attainment status (DoD #213)
  - Emission budget growth (DoD #221)
- **Re-bin:**
  - Bandwidth (terrestrial) for space ops (DoD #27)
- **Delete:**
  - ICBM and HLD filters



# Imperatives (6)


## Checklist / Modeled

1. **Unimpeded access to space (in orbits of all inclinations)**
2. **Two air mobility bases and one wide-body capable base on each coast to ensure mobility flow without adverse weather, capacity, or airfield incapacitation impacts**
3. **Sufficient OCONUS mobility bases along deployment routes to potential crisis areas to afford deployment of mobility aircraft**
4. **START land-based strategic deterrent**
5. **Maintain capability within the NCR to support the POTUS, Special Airlift Missions, foreign dignitary visits, and ensure Air Force Continuity of Operations**
6. **Basing to fulfill the air sovereignty protection site and response criteria stipulated by COMNORTHCOM and COMPACOM**

---

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6



# AF Scenario Idea

## Air Sovereignty

<p><b>Drivers/Assumptions</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>■ Principles: Basing to fulfill the air sovereignty protection site and response criteria stipulated by COMNORTHCOM and COMPACOM</li><li>■ Transformational Options: N/A</li></ul>	<p><b>Scenario Proposal</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>■ Determine AF installations best sited to support air sovereignty mission</li></ul>
<p><b>Justification/Impact</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>■ Support GWOT</li><li>■ Defend the homeland</li></ul>	<p><b>Potential Conflicts</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>■ None</li></ul>



## Imperatives (6)

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
1. **Unimpeded access to space (in orbits of all inclinations)**
2. **START land-based strategic deterrent**
3. **Maintain capability within the NCR to support the POTUS, Special Airlift Missions, foreign dignitary visits, and ensure Air Force Continuity of Operations**
4. **Basing to fulfill the air sovereignty protection site and response criteria stipulated by COMNORTHCOM and COMPACOM**
5. **Two air mobility bases and one additional wide-body capable base on each coast to ensure mobility flow without adverse weather, capacity, or airfield incapacitation impacts**
6. **Sufficient sovereign U.S. mobility bases along deployment routes to potential crisis areas to afford deployment of mobility aircraft**



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# AF Scenario Process

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
*Integrity - Service - Excellence*



# Recommendations

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- **If no supportability problems exist, recommend implementation of results computed for critical distances between 104 NM, 108 NM, 112 NM and 117 NM**
  - **Site selection and number depends on Joint Use vs AF Affiliated as well as incorporating into current network configuration**
- **Exclude Type II areas from permanent network due to variability of sites; all sites are binding and cause lower overall network performance**
  - **Continue to deploy resources as needed**



# Recommendations

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- Evaluate areas requiring critical distance relaxation to see if response time is acceptable
  - if unacceptable possible CAP as needed or loosen LOR constraint
- Explore the feasibility of incorporating joint sites into network; results showed solution better with one less site until approx. 126 NM
- Evaluate alert sites in solution for critical distances between 104 NM and 117 NM for infrastructure and supportability; prohibitive costs could make sites undesirable



# Conclusions

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- **Results of model sets demonstrated that solutions in the critical distance range of 104 NM – 117 NM were relatively insensitive to changes in input parameters**
  - **Gives air defense planners a configuration that holds for a variety of launch time and aircraft speed combinations**
  - **Joint Use and Air Force only solutions differed by one site; joint use aggregate network distance lower with one less site until approx 126 NM critical distance is reached**
- **Model robust enough to remove sites and areas from consideration and re-solve to see overall impact on network**

## Military Value As It Relates to Homeland Defense

### PURPOSE:

The following information discusses Military Value (MV), stated as the number 1 priority in the BRAC process; however, the Mission Compatibility Index (MCI) does not reflect the Strategic Defense Strategy's number 1 priority, Homeland Defense.

### DISCUSSION:

1. The Department of Defense's first goal under BRAC is to transform the current future force and its support systems to meet new threats. DOD has mandated *Military Value* as the primary consideration in making closure and realignment recommendations. The Military Departments and the Joint Cross-Service Groups used BRAC principles, one of which specifically covers Homeland Defense, to apply *Military Judgment* in their deliberative processes. Of the Air Force's four BRAC goals, the second goal specifically addresses air sovereignty tasking (Homeland Defense) in support of US Northern Command. In the *Military Value* calculation, Homeland Defense was not a variable included in the equation. Homeland Defense was used solely for *Military Judgment* after the *Military Value* was calculated. The attributes assigned to these Military Value calculations did not address a bases capability to support the homeland defense mission.
2. Lambert St. Louis AGS scored an overall military value of 35.93. There are other bases recommended for BRAC with a worse overall military value. *Military Judgment* assessed that these bases, that have an overall lower military value, are in "a strategic location for Homeland Defense" and will need to acquire newer aircraft to accomplish the Homeland Defense mission. The same *Military Judgment* applied to this particular base was not applied to Lambert St. Louis AGS during initial base closure and realignment considerations. The 131<sup>st</sup> Fighter Wing at Lambert St. Louis AGS provides the strategic location, vastly superior aircraft, and aircrew experience best suited to accomplish the Homeland Defense mission now and for the next 20 years.
3. When Air Sovereignty Alert (ASA) sites were discussed, the 131<sup>st</sup> Fighter Wing was not known to the BCEG as an ASA site. Thus, the 131 FW may have been solely judged based on its *Military Value*. Since September 12, 2001, the 131 FW has flown 102 sorties in support of air sovereignty missions. The 131 FW has built alert facilities, developed procedures, and accomplished 115 days of alert. The 131 FW has directly supported the Air Force imperative to "Provide air sovereignty basing to meet the site protection and response time criteria stipulated by USNORTHCOM and USPACOM".
4. This section lists the questions that were asked to determine MV, and offers alternative questions that may have been a better indicator of a base's Military Value as it relates to homeland defense.
  - a. MV-1 (Current/Future Mission Capabilities), worth 46% of the total MV score.
    - i. The following is the question focus relating to MV-1.
      1. ATC restrictions to operations
      2. Prevailing Installation Weather Conditions
      3. Proximity to Airspace Supporting Mission
      4. Proximity to Low Level Routes Supporting Mission
      5. Suitable Auxiliary Airfields within 50 NM

## Military Value As It Relates to Homeland Defense

- ii. If the #1 defense strategy is to secure the United States from direct attack, wouldn't it make sense to tie Military Value to this? Shouldn't we also be looking at questions like....
  - 1. Base proximity to major metropolitan areas
  - 2. Base proximity to critical infrastructure of the United States
  - 3. Base proximity to Defended Asset List as determined by CONR
  - 4. Scramble/Response times to aforementioned areas
  - 5. Proximity to surrounding alert sites or possible alert sites providing overlapping/complete coverage of the United States
- b. MV-2 (Condition of Infrastructure), worth 41.5% of the total MV score.
  - i. The following is the question focus relating to MV-2.
    - 1. Ramp Area and Serviceability.
    - 2. Runway dimension and Serviceability.
    - 3. Level of Mission Encroachment.
    - 4. Hangar Capability.
    - 5. Sufficient Explosives-sited parking.
    - 6. Sufficient Munitions Storage.
    - 7. Installation Pavements Quality.
  - ii. Shouldn't the questions be tailored to the Defense Strategy?
    - 1. Supporting infrastructure in place to support Air Sovereignty Alert (ASA) detachment or full time contingent?
    - 2. Number of available parking spaces for alert?
    - 3. Response timing to takeoff?
    - 4. Number of available runways for alert?
- c. MV-3 (**Contingency, Mobilization, Future Forces**), worth 10% of the total MV score.
  - i. The following is the question focus relating to MV-3
    - 1. Fuel Dispensing Rate to Support Mobility and Surge
    - 2. Ability to Support Large-Scale Mobility Deployment
    - 3. Attainment / Emission Budget Growth Allowance
    - 4. Buildable Acres for Industrial Operations Growth
    - 5. Buildable Acres for Air Operations Growth
  - ii. Data provide for MV-3 didn't take into account future capabilities
    - 1. i.e. New alert facilities/equipment at Lambert IAP
    - 2. i.e. Lambert IAP's new runway (also an MV-2 issue)

## Homeland Defense

### **BRAC Red Team questions Air Force BCEG process.**

- This section provides a consolidated collection of documents showing the Red Team had some of the same concerns that the 131 FW has addressed, specifically issues relating to Homeland Defense. The Red Team identified, several times, the areas they thought were weak in the realm of Homeland Security. Additionally, the Red Team questioned whether or not NORTHCOM was on board with the final BRAC recommendations.
- In the latter stages of the BRAC analysis, the Department engaged a small group of executive-level former government officials. Called the "Red Team," this group was asked to provide an independent assessment of candidate recommendations.
- The Red Team met with each Military Department and JCSG. It reviewed candidate recommendations, report drafts, and supporting materials. The team's insights provided valuable feedback and suggestions for improving the quality of the candidate recommendation packages relative to the standard by which the Commission may alter the Secretary's recommendations.
- Many documents contained in the files contain headers and footers that describe the documents as "Deliberative Document - For Discussion Purposes Only - Do Not Release Under FOIA." These markings were only applicable during the development of DoD's closure and realignment recommendations. Policy memorandum 1 in DoD's Base Closure and Realignment Report, Volume 1, Part 1 of 2, indicates that these markings are no longer applicable upon the Secretary of Defense releasing his recommendations. Please consider these markings as void.
- The following are the reports and documents from the BRAC Red Team that concern the USAF and ANG:
  - White Papers
  - Briefing Notes
  - Observation of Trends
  - Wynne Talking Paper
  - IEC Talking Paper

25 February 2005

## White Paper

### Integration of Candidate Recommendations across JCSGs and Military Departments

**Observation:** Many of the candidate recommendations will require integration with each other and consolidation into larger recommendations prior to forwarding up the chain. There has been discussion about possible ways of doing this; however, the integration method and schedule for accomplishment is not well understood.

#### **Concerns:**

- There are several gaining sites have had their excess capacity over subscribed by different JCSG and Military Department groups.
- De-conflicting these overlaps can have the effect of unraveling other actions that were dependent on the first action.
- New COBRA runs and criteria 6,7, and 8 need to be redone for the final site configurations. (Not difficult to do, but very time consuming)
- Numerous initial candidate recommendations are still pending.
- End-game process and detailed schedule has not been provided to Military Departments.
- Time remaining in which to do the integration and final candidate scrubbing is very short.
- A great deal of effort still needs to be expended in order to build the kind of detail and consistency into the overall package as is normal with any submission to Congress.

#### **Possible Action:**

After IEC approval of each JCSG candidate recommendation, provide them to the Military Departments and direct their integration into the property owner's recommendation.

- A process for obtaining IEC approval for any deviations needs to be provided as well in order to deal with conflicting candidate recommendation actions that can not be resolved.
- A method for quickly elevating intra-military department coordination candidate recommendation conflicts needs to be identified so that decision makers can move quickly to resolve them.
- This process needs to start quickly in order to give the Military Departments as much of the time that is left as possible in order to accomplish this task.

11 March 2005

## White Paper

### **Main Issues to Discuss:**

- Integration of Military Department recommendations with JCSG recommendations and with each other has yet to begin. This process will be time consuming and the overall DoD story needs to be pulled together.
- Universe – the entire process is undermined, if the Department cannot say confidently and convincingly that all installations, functions, and activities were considered.
- Measure of success – PRV does not capture everything. Amount of lease space eliminated, infrastructure capacity reduced, etc. need to be included.
- Definitions
  - Enclaves -- Size of enclaves differ. How small is small? (ECS-Expeditionary Combat Support units)
  - Transformational – groups are using this as justification in very different ways. Some are using “transformational” to support new mission development or recapitalization vice enabler of excess capacity reduction.
- Consistency of Approach
  - There is no consistency in approach taken in military value analysis.
    - USAF does military value analysis by platform rather than by installation mission or function.
    - USA did not calculate military value of Guard and Reserve or perform COBRA analysis on them.
  - There is no consistency in approach taken in capacity analysis.
    - USAF defines capacity based on the difference between actual squadron size and optimum squadron size.
  - There is no consistency in approach taken to determine surge requirements.
  - Transformational options -- groups are citing these as guidelines and they seem to be in a draft form never to go final. Are groups supposed to follow or incorporate them or not?
- Documentation: Some additions and deletions of candidate recommendations are being done outside of the deliberative process before submission to ISG.
- Misuse of BRAC (i.e. never or 100+ year paybacks)
  - Standing-up new BCTs
  - JSF bed-down
  - Bed-down of returning overseas troops
  - Guard/Reserve Center reconstruction
- Intelligence JCSG

25 March 2005

**White Paper****Main Issues to Discuss:**

- Sec 2914 requires the Secretary to: "...publish a list of the military installations inside the United States that the Secretary recommends for closure or realignment on the basis of force structure plan and infrastructure inventory...and the final selection criteria..."
- Almost all candidate recommendations are not in the correct format for submission. Ensure that all candidate recommendations are in the following format:

<b>BRAC Action</b>	<b>where</b>	<b>by what</b>	<b>to where</b>	<b>and retaining what</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Close</li> <li>• Realign</li> <li>• Inactivate</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• losing installation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• moving</li> <li>• relocating</li> <li>• consolidating</li> <li>• privatizing</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• gaining installation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• enclaves</li> <li>• functions</li> <li>• activities</li> </ul>

- Justification phrases should be removed from candidate recommendation statements.
- Actions that are independent of each other should not be lumped together into the same candidate.
- During the integration process, need to add retained actions (if any) at each losing installation.
- Since transformation is not one of the final selection criteria, transformational justifications have no legal basis and should be removed. These candidate recommendations should be justified in terms of military value or the force structure plan.
- Candidate recommendations should be organized in presentation in the following order:
  - Tier I: Traditional BRAC -- Military value applied, net savings, capacity reduction.
  - Tier II: Strategy Driven -- Military judgment applied, net savings, capacity reduction.
  - Tier III: Operationally Driven -- Military judgment overrides, net savings.
  - Tier IV: Transformationally Driven -- No military value justification, military judgment sole rationale, not cost effective, long paybacks.

18 April 2005

## White Paper

### **Main Issues to Discuss:**

- The BRAC Red Team believes the Air Force presentations give the perception that in many cases the Air Force is using BRAC only to move aircraft and gain MILCON funding rather than reducing excess infrastructure.
- Discussion within the Red Team has produced several potential routes to dispel such a perception and gain a more favorable reception for the Air Force package.

### **Causes of the Perception:**

- Air Force goals for BRAC 2005 appear to focus on operational requirements rather than reduction of excess infrastructure capacity under the BRAC Law.
  - Military value analysis has uniquely been done by platform as opposed to by installation or supporting function----which results in multiple military values for the same installation and the need to override military value results.
  - Military capacity has been redefined to be the difference between current and optimum squadron sizes rather than functional support capabilities.
  - Proposals appear to use BRAC to determine where FYDP aircraft changes should be implemented and use BRAC funds to make the changes without including associated savings under BRAC.
  - Many of the aircraft changes are already reflected in the FYDP and any resulting savings have been taken.
    - BRAC actions should result in savings in installation and personnel costs.
    - As currently reflected, most Air Force actions do not result in savings and do not require the BRAC provisions.
- Proposals show personnel position savings while allegedly not reducing overall end strength.
- Even though number of aircraft is coming down, Expeditionary Combat Support (ECS) groups are left almost everywhere with no defined mission.
  - Perception supported by answers to questions: ECS groups are used to maintain "end strength" in search of missions.
- In many cases, military value is being overridden by Air Sovereignty Alert requirements, Active Reserve Component (ARC) mix, and recruiting demographics—need to show how these are tied to the Force Structure Plan and/or the Final Selection Criteria.

### Potential Solutions:

- Given that each installation has multiple military value rankings, it is imperative that recommendations that are inconsistent with the ranking of installations for the platform in question be fully justified.
- The underlying rationales for the Air Force's method of determining military value and capacity (including optimal squadron sizes) need to be carefully articulated and well supported.
- If the moves are accomplished under BRAC, all savings and costs must be reflected under BRAC—other mission and personnel requirements should be paid for outside BRAC (can use BRAC savings).
- Provide better explanation of the role of Expeditionary Combat Support (ECS) units.
  - All savings must be part of BRAC—savings can then be applied to other missions.
  - Create a chart that shows:
    - what functions or MOSs ECSs cover,
    - how an ECS is allocated,
    - when they deploy,
    - what mission the ECS is charged with,
    - how ECSs support Homeland Defense,
    - and explains why DoD needs to have ECSs at numerous bases.
- Provide better explanation for need for Homeland Defense Air Sovereignty Alert (ASA) Facilities.
  - Explain what the ASA sites are and why BRAC is required to make changes—why are they a new mission?
  - Create a chart that lays out the requirements for coverage.
  - Ensure that NORTHCOM agrees with sites and are on the same page.
- Recommendations citing maintenance of ARC mix need to be supported by documentation that explains why the ARC mix is important and how maintaining the proper mix supports the Force Structure Plan and/or Final Selection Criteria.
- Recommendations citing more suitable recruiting demographics in one location over another need to be linked to a supporting document with recruiting data across all installations.
- Closing leased facilities could improve Air Force story—recommend including these facilities on your closure list. Plus, by doing so, you will be consistent with other Services since they are including leased facilities on their closure lists.
- Justifications for Ellsworth AFB, SD and Grand Forks AFB, ND need to be stronger as these are closures in close proximity to each other with little other regional military presence. There also needs to be stronger rationales for other associated realignments.

14 March 2005

**Air Force Briefing Notes**

**Date:** Wednesday, March 9, 2005

**Time:** 08:00-09:30

**Place:** 3E808

**Chairman:** Mr. Pease, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, Basing and Infrastructure Analysis

**Executive Secretary:** Lt Col Johansen

**Key Attendees:**

- Mr. Pease, DASAF, Basing and Infrastructure Analysis
- MG Heckman, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Force, Plans and Programs
- Col Kapellas, Division Chief, Air Force BRAC Office
- Lt Col Laffey, Division Chief, Air Force BRAC Office
- Lt Col Milam
- Lt Col Johansen

**Red Team Attendees:**

- Honorable H.T. Johnson
- Honorable Robin Pirie
- General Leon Salomon
- Mr. John Turnquist

**Subject:** Candidate Recommendation Briefing by the United States Air Force to BRAC Red Team

**Presenter:** Mr. Fred Pease

**Items of Import:**

- BRAC 2005 Goals were to maximize warfighting capability by optimizing squadron size, increasing crew ratios and adjusting Active/ARC mix, to realign infrastructure to meet future defense strategy by sustaining air superiority and air sovereignty and accomplishing mobility basing, to maximize operational capability by eliminating excess capacity, and to capitalize on joint activity opportunities.
- USAF liaisons to JCSGs were less effective than an actual Air Force representative JCSG member may have been.
- Air Force reduces capacity by about 17.8 percent but there are still recommendations coming in that need to be knitted together.
- Did not take savings for military personnel.
- MILCON is overestimated -- there is a 20% fudge factor.

**Questions that arose:**

- Where in your organization were JCSG recommendations deconflicted? *Resolutions started at the DAS level and may have generated other recommendations. We also had bi-lateral conversations to resolve issues.* (Salomon)
- Why is 24 the optimal squadron size for fighters? (Salomon)
- What is a Center for Excellence? What did the JCSGs recommend with respect to Indian Springs? *E&T JCSG had a candidate recommendation, but did not send it forward. Air Force decided to go ahead with the recommendation.* (Johnson)

- Where is Indian Springs? *Nevada, near Ft. Irwin, CA and Nellis AFB, NV.* (Salomon)
- Why isn't a receiver considered a realignment (e.g. MacDill)? (Salomon)
- How was capacity defined? *The difference between actual squadron size and optimum squadron size. Excess capacity exists where a squadron can be added at no cost (Slide 18).* (Johnson)
- Did the Air Force Audit Agency validate capacity? *Yes, they are present at all deliberative meetings.* (Johnson)
- Do your military value weights really have the precision to the hundredths place (e.g. 3.92%)? (Salomon)
- Were the "Mission Essential Bases" (Slide 31) analyzed at all? *Yes, but only as receivers.* (Salomon)
- What happened to the OSD principles (they aren't explicit on Slide 35)? *We will relate ours to theirs.* (Salomon)
- Is the Guard on board? *Absolutely, we are freeing up manpower for new roles.* (Johnson)
- Why leave numerous ECS enclaves? *The ECS units are tasked separately from the fighter squadron and don't go with the mission. They provide general support – CSS.* (Johnson)
- What is the status of Los Angeles AFB? *JCSG took it off the table because it had highest military value. We had an enabling scenario.* (Johnson)
- Why move plans out of Indian Springs if you have capacity there? (Salomon)
- How do you define realignment? *If more than one-third of non-mission personnel is left, then it is a realignment. If remaining non-mission personnel is less than one-third, then that is considered an enclave. Did you excess the rest of the base? Yes, and reducing the footprint sometimes created a cost.* (Johnson)
- What are "quantifiable benefits" (Slide 49)? (Pirie)
- Where do you stand with your recommendations? *None have briefed to the IEC. We are all done with them, except a couple of recommendations that are "follow the fleet" type recommendations.* (Johnson)

**Informal observations provided at briefing:**

- The Red Team has found it difficult to track goals, principles, imperatives, strategies, etc. and the application of military judgment. Be prepared to describe the dependencies or interrelationships between goals, principles, your strategy, and your military judgment. The candidate recommendations are supposed to be strategy-drive, data-verified and this needs to be apparent in your presentation and articulation.
- The decision process needs to be well documented and when you present to the Commission, you should have a chart that explicitly demonstrates how decisions were made.
- Make a chart that displays and rationalizes (with data support) optimum squadron sizes. For those recommendations where you do not reach the stated optimum, you need to explain why not in your justification. Failing to give such an explanation undermines your entire process.
- Review argument for increased crew ratios to be consistent. Ensure reliability data supports argument.
- The point of slides 7-9 is unclear. Add bullet point to the slide so that it is obvious what audience is to take away from the slide.

- To not look at ranges is a missed opportunity -- need to have supporting justification for taking ranges off the list.
- Check with OSD to determine whether you need separate candidate recommendations for receiver sites.
- Create a slide similar to Slide 13 that shows receiver sites.
- Show, on Slide 13, the reduction in capacity due to BRAC 2005 actions.
- Put development of goals and principles (i.e. your strategy) at the beginning of your process slide (Slide 14).
- Help DoD develop a DoD-wide metric for success.
- Rename Imperatives (Slide 27) and connect them not only to the OSD principles, but also to your stated goals (Slide 3) and principles (Slide 35) – create an explicit hierarchy.
- Typographical error on Slide 36 - # 5 was modeled and was not an imperative.
- Numerous candidate recommendations, like the sample on Slide 38, used the justification that the action “enables future total force transformation”. This requires further explanation.
- May want to incorporate a before and after type slide into presentation that demonstrates which bases have new types of planes, which is significant from a maintenance perspective.
- Create a backup chart that demonstrates how many pilots are affected by C-130 movements (Slide 45), how many pilots are assigned to a new base and how many have a new mission.
- Make UAV Group movement slide (Slide 47) consistent with other similar slides.
- Review recommendations with large MILCON and “Never” paybacks. Perhaps add a quad chart that links enablers (from other services and/or from JCSGs) together so that all savings can be counted. Use the Navy’s “Fenceline Closures Chart” as an example or a template.
- Help DoD define realign and show savings – there needs to be consistency across DoD.
- Have a crisp example prepared to explain “quantifiable benefits” (Slide 49).
- The purpose of BRAC is to reduce excess capacity. Strengthen rational and justification of all recommendations by explicitly linking actions to the Air Force’s overall strategy, to the Force Structure Plan, and/or to BRAC Selection Criteria. This is necessary to avoid the appearance of using BRAC money for new MILCON to get Air Force situated and to overcome the Commission’s potential hostility surfacing from small political actions.
- Many of the recommendations include leaving expeditionary combat support (ECS) elements in an enclave. For many of them, they cite the need to “retain intellectual capital” as the justification for retaining an enclave. We need an explanation as to why these elements cannot be moved allowing for a total base closure. Especially as in the case of USAF-0033V2 (Slide 66) – where receiving location is 12 miles from losing location, and yet, an enclave is left behind.
- For those recommendations that involve the movement of aircraft from an installation with a high military value to one with a lower military value (e.g. USAF-0037 – Slide 72), we need a better explanation as to why this movement fits into the overall strategy. If “military judgment” was used, we need to know which aspect of military judgment.

- Be careful when stringing recommendations together – commission will look at the recommendations individually.

**Additional observations to consider:**

- Box top scenario development and top down driven comments imply non-data driven candidate recommendations. Change wording to better describe scenario development process.
- Need to solidify/disentangle your strategy, goals, imperatives, and principles. Statements on the bottom of Slides 3 and 11 really seem to be your strategy – as opposed to the reduction of capacity or to save money. If this is true, Slides 48 and 49 are irrelevant as your stated goal was not to save money.
- Military value analysis is distinct from all other groups who determined military value by mission or function of an installation. USAF appears to do military value analysis by warfighting platform rather than by installation mission or function. Since military value is not based on installation value in support of the total force structure, there are several military values for a base depending on which platform one is using.
- Several of the recommendations include the movement of aircraft that seem to be tangentially related (at best) to the core of the recommendation. Why are these movements rolled up as part of a candidate recommendation? Can't they be done outside of the BRAC process?
- For the most part, the AF candidate recommendations seemingly do not involve the disposal of property. If property is excessed, it needs to be apparent in quad charts or at least in the one-page recommendation description. If property is not excessed, why not?
- Some quad charts say the base is being "realigned," but the one-pager describes it as a closure or vice versa. You need to be consistent.
- USAF-0035: Recommendation is to close, but the documentation shows units remaining (to fulfill Air Sovereignty Alert mission). Quad sheet says no natural resources infrastructure issues, but one-pager says there could be wetlands issues that restrict additional operations. What is the MILCON for?
- USAF-0039: The wing is inactivating and all the aircraft are retiring, but there is MILCON, why? Why do the ECS elements remain? Why are Sioux Falls, SD and Gulfport-Biloxi, MS part of the community impact sheet when there is no mention of anything moving from/to those locations?
- USAF-0051: What will the AF do to solve the potential housing shortage at Mt. Home? Moves F-15s from the base ranked #1 in mil value to the base ranked #23, in part because the weather is more predictable in ID than in NC. Can this be documented?
- USAF-0052: Follows from DON-0067 and DON-0084. Why does the Engineering Squadron remain as an enclave? What is the cumulative effect (costs/savings) of the recommendations involving Willow Grove?
- USAF-0053 & USAF-0114: Why include movement of Singapore F-16s (Block 52) from Cannon to Luke as part of these recommendations? Clarify that "B52" means "Block 52" vice the aircraft.
- USAF-0055: The one-pager states that environmental impacts at Nellis need to be evaluated, but there is no explanation regarding how Nellis is part of the scenario.
- USAF-0081: Review the legality of "realigning in place".

- USAF-0086: What is the real rationale for moving out a ANG wing, and then transferring its aircraft to another wing at the same base? "Enables Future Total Force Transformation" is insufficient justification.

19 April 2005

**Second Air Force Briefing Notes**

**Date:** Monday, April 18, 2005

**Time:** 08:30-10:30

**Place:** 5C279

**Chairman:** Mr. Pease, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, Basing and Infrastructure Analysis

**Executive Secretary:** Lt. Col. Johansen

**Key Attendees:**

- Mr. Pease, DASAF, Basing and Infrastructure Analysis
- MG Heckman, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Force, Plans and Programs
- Col Kapellas, Division Chief, Air Force BRAC Office
- Lt Col Johansen

**Red Team Attendees:**

- Honorable H.T. Johnson
- Honorable Robin Pirie
- General Leon Salomon
- Mr. John Turnquist

**Subject:** *Second* Candidate Recommendation Briefing by the United States Air Force to BRAC Red Team

**Items of Import:**

- Since the first meeting with the Red Team the United States Air Force (USAF) has attempted to utilize BRAC language and terminology.
- USAF is completed with the bulk of its “laydown” in terms of candidate recommendations to be submitted, although further refinements are being made.
- USAF had not originally taken savings for people in the same way the other groups and services were, but we have since gone back and recalculated savings associated with manpower and personnel to be more consistent with the other groups.

**Questions that arose:**

- What do you mean by infrastructure? *Operational areas as well as buildings connected to an installation.* (Salomon)
- What does the red, blue, or shading indicate on this map (Slide 5, middle map)? *White is a high speed area, shaded is where we are authorized to turn off the lights and operate. Red is ranges? Yes. How many ranges did you close? One, at Cannon AFB. There are 30 ranges that USAF uses, but most of these have other missions as well.* (Salomon/Johnson)
- Are all the Services in agreement with having a Joint Center of Excellence at Indian Springs? *No, we are pulling that candidate recommendation. That UAV Center of Excellence was originally Education and Training JCSG responsibility and they decided it was really a RD&A matter, so they passed it on to the Technical JCSG. We only had an enabling scenario to move stuff out of Indian Springs, which without the Center of Excellence is not necessary.* (Johnson)
- What point do you want the audience to take away from this slide (Slide 6)? Do you follow-up on these later in your briefing? *There are recommendations going forward for all these.* (Salomon)

- You have a lot of “Red” in the Northeast -- losing sites or bases being closed -- have you discussed this with NORTHCOM? *Absolutely, NORTHCOM is on board.*
- What does cumulative mean (Slide 46, USAF-1006V2 -- EIT Summary)? *It is the total for the implementation period, but we can take it off this chart as it may be confusing.* (Salomon)

**Informal observations provided at briefing:**

- Be careful when discussing people vs. billet savings vs. authorized positions. If you take savings for eliminated billets or authorized positions, should show that these positions go off the books or reprogrammed.
- Be careful with your wording -- the use of “infrastructure” on Slide 2 seems to be referring to aircraft, but later in your brief (Slide 9) “infrastructure” is used to mean installations and operating areas.
- “AF Goals for BRAC 2005” are not obviously linked to DoD BRAC goals (Slide 2). Make sure your subsequent slides are consistent with the “AF BRAC 2005 Goals” bullet points. (E.g. - The title of Slide 4 is more loosely linked to the second bullet point on Slide 2 than the titles of Slides 3 or 5 are linked to the first and third bullet points, respectively.)
- Add a legend for maps on Slide 5 so that the meaning of the color coding and shading is clear.
- BRAC is about reducing excess capacity -- your AF Installation map will look about the same after BRAC, which will open you and DoD up to criticisms.
- Closing ranges -- closed Cannon, but according to your explanation of your map, Cannon has one of the best locations. Other 30 ranges that are used by the AF have other associated missions. Similarly, if you overlay the civilian air traffic map on your AF Installations map -- it would tell you to move everything to the Northwest, yet you close Ellsworth, SD and Grand Forks, ND. The story you would like to tell with these maps is really about tactical air, so consider highlight tactical aviation bases.
- Be consistent. If you are not going forward with the UAV Center of Excellence remove it from the “Joint Opportunities” slide (Slide 6) and from the “emerging needs” section of slide 4.
- Consider using BRAC terminology on your “Summary” slide (Slide 9) (I.e. -- Discuss closures, realignments, and associated cost savings).
- Bullet two on your “Summary” slide (Slide 9) is really the only BRAC action— but these reductions are already programmed to take place in the FYDP. Explain up front that you are using BRAC to determine action for aircraft disposal in compliance with the Force Structure Plan. However, aircraft retirements really do not need to be BRAC actions.
- Justifications for the closure of Cannon AFB, NM Ellsworth AFB, SD and Grand Forks, ND need to be strengthened as well as the justifications for any associated realignments.
- Include the closure of any leased facilities on your closure list (Slide 10).
- Check military value of every site on lists on Slides 10 and 11. You want to make sure that you are not moving from installations with higher military value to lower ranked installations. Given that each installation has multiple military value rankings, it is imperative that recommendations that are inconsistent with the ranking of installations for the platform in question be fully justified.
- The underlying rationales for the Air Force’s method of determining military value and capacity (including optimal squadron sizes) need to be carefully articulated and well supported.
- Expeditionary Combat Support (ECS)

- Need chart explaining
  - what functions or MOSs ECSs cover,
  - how an ECS is allocated,
  - when they deploy,
  - what mission the ECS is charged with,
  - how ECSs support Homeland Defense,
  - and explains why DoD needs to have ECSs at numerous bases.
- If these are already programmed changes -- why are they being done under BRAC? Need to explain up front that Military Value analysis done in BRAC aides the determination of where programmed reductions in aircraft occur. But also need an explanation for why people reductions are not occurring under BRAC.
- Air Sovereignty Alert (ASA)
  - Explain what the ASA sites are and why BRAC is required to make changes----why are they a new mission?
  - Create a chart that lays out the requirements for coverage.
  - Ensure that NORTHCOM agrees with sites and are on the same page.
- Recommendations citing more suitable recruiting demographics in one location over another need to be linked to a supporting document with recruiting data across all installations.
- Recommendations using maintenance of ARC mix need to be supported by documentation that explains why the ARC mix is important and how maintaining the proper mix supports the Force Structure Plan or Final Selection Criteria.
- “Capturing Intellectual Capital” is unusual terminology, use more descriptive wording.
- Add statement to candidate recommendation that ECS is remaining at Louis Munoz Marin IAP AGS (USAF-0069).

**Additional observations to consider:**

- Should have a reason for why USAF is not reducing endstrength as part of BRAC.
- Ensure that savings for FYDP actions completed as part of BRAC are accounted for in accordance with the BRAC statute and/or OSD policy.
- Some candidate recommendations are not in the correct format for submission. Ensure that all candidate recommendations are in the following format:

BRAC Action	where	by what	to where	and retaining what
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Close</li> <li>● Realign</li> <li>● Inactivate</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● losing installation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● moving</li> <li>● relocating</li> <li>● consolidating</li> <li>● privatizing</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● gaining installation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● enclaves</li> <li>● functions</li> <li>● activities</li> </ul>

- Justification phrases should be removed from candidate recommendation statements.
- Candidate recommendations should be organized in presentation in the following order:
  - Tier I: Traditional BRAC – Military value applied, net savings, capacity reduction.
  - Tier II: Strategy Driven – Military judgment applied, net savings, capacity reduction.
  - Tier III: Operationally Driven – Military judgment overrides, net savings.
  - Tier IV: Transformationally Driven – No military value justification, military judgment sole rationale, not cost effective, long paybacks.

25 February 2005

## BRAC 2005 Discussion Topics

### **Observations of Trends:**

- Seems to be no plan as to how to present to the Commission
  - Need to operate under a “One BRAC” concept:
    - How to develop the final product? Offer a common approach for briefings -- consistency is key.
    - Need to go over all little decisions so no one can say “I don’t know anything about that”...everyone needs to be on same page.
    - Resolution of conflicting CRs
    - Tough questions are dodged -- need to prepare more for commission presentation
  - Different JCSGs use different terminology.
  - There is no overall measure of success being tracked or reported.
  - Overall, DoD needs to build the presentation with the same level of detail and consistency as any other presentation for Congress.
- Recommendations are not consistently tied back to strategy.
  - There needs to be obvious link between overall BRAC 2005 goals, JCSG and MilDep strategies and guiding principles.
  - Justifications on quad-chart are weak and generic.
  - Supporting explanation for use of military judgment, especially over-rides of military value, are consistently weak. There is a lot of hand-waving going on when it comes to military judgment. “Military judgment” is that judgment involving subjects that are peculiarly within the expertise of military professionals. Subjects such as cost and “buildable acreage”, therefore, cannot be subjects of “military judgment” such as to overcome military value quantitative analytical determinations, since they are within the expertise of other professionals too.
- Weights determining military value are inconsistent – and mix function value with installation value - will there be an overall ranking?
- Military Judgment is used frequently to override military value results. However, majority of judgment factors used are economic and business related rather than military unique. Need more guidance on what military judgment includes.
- Surge capabilities requirements are inconsistent and have no common definition.
  - Commission needs to be briefed on why JCSGs were allowed individually to define surge and how they subsequently did so.
- Under Threshold Actions:
  - Justifications for including under threshold actions within program are lacking or very weak.
  - Others are dropping from consideration some under threshold activities, while including others.
- Informal policy was established to exclude some ranges from consideration. Policy needs to be documented, or better yet, all ranges considered.
- Need a consistent definition for privatization. Currently there is a mixing of privatization of functions and privatization of installations. Should apply careful legal review to each privatization candidate recommendation to ensure proper terminology is used.
- Databases are still being changed and/or updated after CRs developed. No policy published on when to lock base data and gain specific ISG approval for corrections.

- Transformation rationale, when used, is consistently vague and unsupported. Need more explanation of how transformational options were developed, used, and how they fit into strategy.
- Many consolidations have long paybacks and high MILCON requirements for new construction with weak justifications for receiving site selection and clear exclusion of other service potential receiving site consideration.
  - A payback of Never or 100+ years without a very strong argument/justification will threaten the credibility of the BRAC process.
  - Many realignments lack ties to force structure requirements or military value improvement and appear to only justify new MILCON.
- There seems to be limited interaction among groups – especially when they have contingent/enabling/following CRs.
- Joint Basing recommendations need more backup in terms of implementation
  - Funding: Who pays for what?
  - How will different service standards be reconciled?
- Overseas unit relocations
  - Need better justification of need for realignments that make room for returning overseas units.
  - Should be following actions rather than driving requirements.
  - Different people are interpreting Nicole Bayert's 06 December 2004 finding differently.
- Have not been able to get the Intelligence JCSG presentation scheduled. We have requested an unclassified version of the presentation.

**Possible Actions:**

- Commission Presentation
  - Create working group to put presentation standards together.
  - Develop strategy for presentation to commission: Who and what.
  - Develop common approach and consistent briefing format.
  - Standardize terminology in presentations.
- Strategy Linkage to Recommendations
  - Put strategy development block on common process chart.
  - Create consistent format for strategy presentation.
  - Require explanation of strategy links in quad justification block.
- Military Value
  - Develop common matrix for all military value determinations with weights and approve for use.
- Military Judgment
  - Provide legal guidance as to what can be included in consideration factors when groups are exercising military judgment.
- Surge Requirements
  - Request groups to tie surge requirements to 1-2-4-1 strategy and develop matrix to align surge requirements and approve for use.
  - DoD should issue overarching discipline on how groups should be using common terms and approaches to surge.
- Thresholds
  - DoD should not use term “under threshold” in recommendation language.

- If groups consider some “under threshold” activities or functions, then, for consistency, they ought to consider all “under threshold” activities or functions.
- Database
  - Lock changes to database and require ISG approval for necessary corrections.
  - Date for locking should be established soon.
- Overseas unit relocations
  - Overseas actions should inform BRAC.
  - Need strong, well understood rules on what BRAC can pay for in the moves.
    - Any cost or savings from outside U.S. Territory are not covered in BRAC.
    - All realignments from an U.S. base to another location are covered under BRAC.
    - Should be clear on whether BRAC funds can be used to build new facilities for overseas units.

14 March 2005

## BRAC 2005 Discussion Topics

### **Observations of Trends:**

- Integration of Military Department recommendations with JCSG recommendations and with each other has yet to begin. This process will be time consuming and the overall DoD story needs to be pulled together. (DoD strategy plus group strategies plus BRAC rules gives results).
- Universe – the entire process is undermined, if the Department cannot say confidently and convincingly that all installations, functions, and activities were considered.
- Measure of success – PRV does not capture everything. Need an overall score card. Amount of lease space eliminated, infrastructure capacity reduced, etc. need to be included.
- Definitions
  - Enclaves – Size of enclaves differ. How small is small? (AF ECS-Expeditionary Combat Support units)
  - Transformational – groups are using this as justification in very different ways. Some are using “transformational” to support new mission development or recapitalization vice enabler of excess capacity reduction.
- Consistency of Approach
  - There is no consistency in approach taken in military value analysis.
    - Overall, some groups imbed military judgment within the military value calculation, while others apply military judgment to the results of military value calculation (i.e. – *ex ante* vs. *ex post* application of military judgment.)
    - USAF does military value analysis by platform rather than by installation mission or function. Since military value is not based on installation value for support of total force structure, there are several military values for a base depending on which platform one is examining. USAF would have been more consistent by using installation functions and/or missions.
    - USA did not calculate military value of Guard and Reserve or perform COBRA analysis on them.
  - There is no consistency in approach taken in capacity analysis.
    - USAF defines capacity based on the difference between actual squadron size and optimum squadron size.
  - There is no consistency in approach taken to determine surge requirements.
  - Transformational options – groups are citing these as guidelines, but they seem to be available only in a draft form. Some guidance should be put out on the use of these options.
- Documentation: It appears that some additions and deletions of candidate recommendations are being done outside of the deliberative process before submission to ISG.
- Misuse of BRAC (i.e. never or 100+ year paybacks)
  - Standing-up new BCTs
  - JSF bed-down
  - Bed-down of returning overseas troops
  - Guard/Reserve Center reconstruction

- Examination of Range Capacity
  - No one is really looking at reducing excess range capacity.
  - Current candidate recommendations imply that “DoD does not have any excess ranges”.
- Intelligence JCSG Presentation

**Possible Actions:**

- Definitions
  - Send out common definition of an enclave and limit the size without higher approval. The groups need to have a benchmark such as “less than 31 people” to help them define small.
  - Send out criteria to be satisfied for an action to be considered transformational in accordance with SecDef guidance.
- Differing Approaches
  - Surge – capture different approaches into on DoD matrix.
  - Military Value Analysis – Include military judgment as qualitative portion of military value analysis
  - Capacity Analysis – carefully review Air Force use of capacity analysis and ensure it is converted to mission or function support capacity.
  - Transformational Options
    - Either decide on a formal list and publish it or take them off the table and direct groups to stop citing them.
- Misuse of BRAC
  - Consolidate candidate recommendations to eliminate negative NPVs and extremely long paybacks. Ensure candidate recommendations meet BRAC requirements for period of accomplishment, reduce overall excess capacity in line with the Force Structure Plan, and raise average military value.

31 January 2005

### Talking Paper

**Subject:** BRAC Red Team Kickoff meeting with Acting USD (AT&L) Mr. Michael Wynne  
(Room 3E1006, 1100 -- 1200, Tuesday, 1 February 2005)

**Attendees:** Phil Grone, Pete Potochney, HT Johnson, Leon Salomon, Robin Pirie, John Turnquist, Sam Kleinman, Burt Streicher, Jen Atkin, Dana Samuelson, Paul Anir

**Background:** The purpose of the meeting is to initiate the work of the 2005 BRAC Red Team and ensure that the charter, work products, and schedule for the group are understood by everyone. Significant issues are: team review of DoD policy compliance by working groups, scope of working group reviews (universe), process for coordinating functional recommendations with services, and final resolution process of Red Team recommendations.

### Talking Points

- **Task at hand**
  - First and foremost, we want to help DoD be successful in this process.
  - To that end, our goal is to look for inconsistencies (violations of policy or unsubstantiated exclusions or recommendations) and questionable areas that the Department can adjust before the process becomes public.
- **Role of Red Team**
  - Red Team is to take a Commission viewpoint and to review adherence to DoD Policy and Directives.
  - Red Team will NOT make any new or alternative candidate recommendations.
- **Reporting Feedback**
  - Red Team will provide informal verbal feedback during briefings to the presenters.
  - Red Team will then follow up with a formal feedback report with improvement recommendations to both Mr. Wynne and the presenting group chairman.
  - Red Team will monitor the resolution of its recommendations.
  - And lastly, any unresolved or pending issues will be given to Mr. Wynne and the IEC at the end of our process. Ideally, this list will be empty.
- **Schedule**
  - It is imperative that the Red Team proceedings commence quickly. The earlier the Red Team provides improvement recommendations, the more time will be available for the Department to consider them.
  - We understand, however, that the working groups' results are not yet final, thus we expect to meet with the groups more than once.

6 April 2005

### Talking Paper

**Subject:** BRAC 2005 Red Team Meeting with the IEC (Infrastructure Executive Council),  
(Room 3E928, 1630 – 1815, Wednesday, 6 April 2005)

**Background:** The purpose of the meeting is to summarize the findings of the 2005 BRAC Red Team to date for the IEC. Significant overarching issues are: working group inconsistency of strategies, military value and capacity approaches; process for combining functional and service recommendations into BRAC recommendations; and DoD integrated story and report development.

### **Talking Points**

- BRAC Red Team asked to look at evolving recommendations from a BRAC commission and DoD policy perspective
  - We did not attempt to judge recommendations from military standpoint
  - Inevitably, our “process questions” may have influenced the recommendations
- As you expected this BRAC is more about the “R” Realignments than the “C” Closures
- Joint Cross Service Groups and Military Departments have looked at parts of DoD previously un-reviewed
  - JCSGs have done well but have also taken differing approaches
  - Desperately need to integrate their efforts by installation and style with consistent justifications
- In past four rounds, DOD has:
  - Closed – 97 bases
  - Realigned – 86 bases
  - However, the non-installation infrastructure has been largely untouched
- Size of BRAC 05
  - Much smaller number of base closures
  - Non-installation infrastructure has been looked at very hard -- with large results
- Transformation
  - Was very much a part of everyone’s thinking and played a huge role in strategic analysis
  - However in the report to the Commission, DoD must cast all recommendations and justifications in BRAC terms consistent with the law
- Military Value
  - Not consistently used (applied to installations, functions, and weapon platforms)
  - Quantitative
  - Qualitative
    - Military judgment is part of military value calculations in some cases and applied after military value calculations in other cases
    - Military judgment is sometimes used without adequate substantiation to justify overriding the quantitative military value (based on business/economic factors rather than military requirements)
    - Since military value is the preeminent criteria for closure or realignment, any military judgment based decision that is not within the purview of the particular skills and expertise of military professionals should be scrutinized carefully

- Integration
  - JCSG integration goes beyond knitting together. Each group has used different strategy, guiding principles, surge requirements, capacity measures, military value, and military judgment approaches
  - Need to boil down to BRAC language recommendations

BRAC Action	where	by what	to where	and retaining what
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Close</li> <li>• Realign</li> <li>• Inactivate</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• losing installation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• moving</li> <li>• relocating</li> <li>• consolidating</li> <li>• privatizing</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• gaining installation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• enclaves</li> <li>• functions</li> <li>• activities</li> </ul>

- Metrics
  - Traditional: Plant Replacement Value (PRV) does not properly reflect changes in infrastructure
  - Annual Recurring Savings is better measure
  - NPV savings amounts are inflated over the past due to discount rate reductions
  - Civilian positions eliminated
  - Military billets eliminated or converted to warfighting roles
  - Capture new capacity requirements as result of surge, Army end-strength increases, returning overseas units, homeland security, etc. that reduced excess capacity pool to work with
  - Reduction of annual lease costs is another possible “good news” metric
- Role of BRAC Commission
  - Remove by simple majority vote, those recommendations that “substantially deviate from the force structure plan and/or final selection criteria”
  - Add to list with 7 of 9 votes super majority
  - Initial Commission reaction to presentation is very important
- Potential Weaknesses
  - Strategy – Lack of consistency among DoD, Military Departments, and Joint Cross-Service Group approaches
  - Integration, consistency, strategy linkage, ties to capacity reduction, strong story
  - Surge capacity policy – Should state that policy was for each Service/JCSG to determine surge capacity based on requirements unique to each group’s mission
  - Many candidate recommendations do not need BRAC authority to implement
    - BRAC military construction and environmental restoration costs could be greatly reduced thereby increasing NPV savings if these actions were accomplished outside of BRAC
    - We understand why these actions were included under BRAC
  - All candidate recommendations that have payback periods greater than 20 years could be considered substantially deviating from the final selection criteria in that the COBRA model only evaluates up to 20 years
    - With careful review after “roll up” most (if not all) will have shorter payback periods
  - Have all issues been addressed
    - BRAC law requires all military installations in the U.S. to be considered equally (beware of statements such as “removed from further review due to...)

- Re-look at candidate recommendations removed from list before IEC review
- Possible Political Issues
  - *(Provide Examples)*
- Deal Breakers
  - *(Provide Examples)*
- BRAC 2005 Story
  - Story approach is crucial with respect to commission and public perception
    - Strong DoD overview of transformation and infrastructure objectives
    - Opportunity to take critical review
    - Modernize through transformational thinking
    - Overseas moves included in BRAC deliberations so as to properly determine location and integrate returning units
    - Past BRACs looked primarily at bases – 2005 BRAC looked at supporting infrastructure
    - Strong role for Joint Cross Service Groups
  - Presentation of Results
    - Use various very positive measures of success
    - Anecdotally take credit for facilities, bases and areas freed up for returning units and resources freed up for homeland security and GWOT
  - Recommendations must be tied to installations


## Homeland Defense

**St Louis is located at a strategic location in the heartland of America with multiple critical assets within range of 131 FW aircraft.**

- Pre/Post BRAC power point briefing
- Talking points to the power point slides
  - This power point briefing outlines what the Air Reserve Component (ARC) force structure looks like before BRAC and after BRAC. St Louis is located in a strategic location for Homeland Defense as evidenced by the amount of surrounding critical infrastructure.



# Proposed Post-BRAC ARC F-15 or F-16 Operational Units with BRAC identified Alert sites



F-15 Units (light color are training units)  
F-16 Units (light color are training units)  
Yellow areas are BRAC identified ASA Detachments




Ring represents 20 Minute response time  
(BRAC assumed 8 minute launch, .9 Mach  
airspeed to edge of ring)

3 Military Facilities


1 Defense Contractor

9 Metropolitan Areas

Mississippi River Lock and Dams



# LOCK 27




3 Military Facilities


1 Defense Contractor

9 Metropolitan Areas

Mississippi River Lock and Dams

13 Nuclear Facilities





3 Military Facilities

1 Defense Contractor

9 Metropolitan Areas

Mississippi River Lock and Dams


13 Nuclear Facilities

4 Defense Arsenals

Des Moines


Omaha

National Atlas of the United States



- 3 Military Facilities
- 1 Defense Contractor
- 9 Metropolitan Areas
- Mississippi River Lock and Dams
- 13 Nuclear Facilities
- 4 Defense Airports
- 6 Hydroelectric Plants

Missouri is the "Gateway to the West" and the crossroads of America







# NUCLEAR WASTE ROUTES




## *Nuclear Waste Shipment Routes*




# NUCLEAR WASTE ROUTES




# COTTON PRODUCTION



# HARVESTED CROPLAND



# St Louis fills the Gap in America's heartland today




F-15 Units (light color are training units)  
F-16 Units (light color are training units)  
Yellow areas are BRAC identified ASA Detachments



Ring represents 20 Minute response time  
(BRAC assumed 8 minute launch, .9 Mach  
airspeed to edge of ring)

# Who Defends America's Heartland When The 131st Is Gone!



F-15 Units (light color are training units)  
F-16 Units (light color are training units)  
Yellow areas are BRAC identified ASA Detachments



Ring represents 20 Minute response time  
(BRAC assumed 8 minute launch, .9 Mach  
airspeed to edge of ring)

Talking Paper On ASA Sites  
(PowerPoint Briefing)

PURPOSE:

This unclassified briefing contains information on bases by location and military value, which provides a visual depiction of the coverage these bases provide throughout the United States. In addition, provides information on key infrastructure that are likely targets for a terrorist attack, taken off the World Wide Web (Nuclear sites, Arsenals, Dams, Hydro-electric power plants, Military bases, and Major Metropolitan areas).

DISCUSSION:

1. Slide 1:

- a. This slide represents each ARC base with fighters.
- b. Blue are F-15 bases.
- c. Green are F-16 bases.
- d. The circle is a 20 minute representation from the initial notification to scramble to get the edge of the ring.
- e. All bases are depicted, although not all of them normally sit alert
- f. The hatched bases are training units. Although capable of sitting alert, they do not normally do so.

2. Slide 2:

- a. This slide represents the ARC F-15 and F-16 post-BRAC layout. Note that St. Louis is gone. Other F-15 bases affected by BRAC are Otis and Portland. Atlantic City converts to the F-15. Note the increased gaps across the country
- b. The yellow circles now represent detachments without aircraft. Post BRAC Bradley becomes an alert detachment to replace OTIS. Duluth, Portland, and Ellington become detachments. BRAC report states that it is undetermined who will fill those commitments.
- c. **The most important thing to note is the large gap of coverage in the heartland of the country within the states of MO, IL, KY, TN, and AR.**

3. Slide 3:

- a. This map depicts the area around St Louis. Metropolitan areas are depicted.
- b. The ranking of cities of concern by population are as follows:
  - 3 = Chicago (9.2M)
  - 8 = Detroit (5.5M)
  - 15 = Minneapolis/St Paul (3.0M)
  - 16 = Cleveland (2.9M)
  - 18 = St Louis (2.6M)**
  - 24 = Cincinnati (2.0M)**
  - 26 = Kansas City (1.8M)**
  - 27 = Milwaukee (1.7M)
  - 29 = Indianapolis (1.6M)**
  - 33 = Columbus, OH (1.5M)
  - 39 = Nashville (1.2M)**
  - 44 = Memphis (1.1M)**
  - 50 = Louisville (1.0M)**
  - 59 = Tulsa (800K)**
  - 61 = Omaha (716K)**
  - 91 = Des Moines (456K)**

Talking Paper On ASA Sites  
(PowerPoint Briefing)

- c. St Louis is a major crossroads for the Missouri and Mississippi river. The Mississippi river traffic relies on a lock and dam system to allow river traffic. The blue banners on the Mississippi represent these lock and dams. Of particular interest is Lock 27. If that specific lock was rendered unusable or if the bridges across the Mississippi were crippled, the economic loss to the nation and region could be catastrophic.
  - d. St Louis is also home to the Boeing manufacturing plant. Among the many products and services provided to global Air Force customers are fighters, bombers airlifters, expendable launch vehicles, aerial tankers, unmanned aircraft, weapon systems, strategic systems, military satellites and Network Centric communications. Key programs include: F-15E strike Eagle, F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, AV-8 Harrier, Next generation 737 Airborne Early Warning and Control, Airborne, Maritime/Fixed Station Joint Tactical Radio System, C-17 Globemaster III, Combat Survivor Evader Locator, Delta II and Delta IV rockets Global Positioning Systems, Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM), Joint-Unmanned Combat Air Systems (J-UCAS) X-45, Small Diameter Bomb (SDB), Transformational SATCOM Space Segment, Wideband Gapfiller Satellite, Harpoon Block II, Standoff Land Attack Missile, T-45, V-22
  - e. Whiteman AFB is located 146 miles to the west. It is the only B-2 base in the world.
  - f. Scott AFB is located 27 miles away and is the headquarters for the Air Forces' Air Mobility Command.
  - g. The rings on the slide depict 20 minute scramble times (108 NM as used in the BCEG meeting minutes). In addition, there is a 30 minute scramble ring and a 40 minute scramble ring.
4. Slide 4:
- a. Lock 27
5. Slide 5:
- a. Nuclear sites are now added to the map.
  - b. Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant at Paducah, KY is the only Uranium enrichment plant in the country.
  - c. Calloway Point nuclear plant is located at Calloway, MO. **As a matter of fact, on Sept 12, 2001, the 131 FW scrambled to protect this very plant.**
6. Slide 6:
- a. The Green stars represent Arsenals that are currently operating.
  - b. The Arsenal in Crane, IN is the only operational white phosphorous demilitarization conversion plant in North America (Extracts deadly white phosphorous from old munitions and converts it to relatively harmless phosphoric acid).
  - c. The Rock Island Arsenal is located next to the Quad Cities. It is the largest government-owned weapons manufacturing arsenal in the western world.
  - d. The Lake City Arsenal is next to Kansas City. It is the largest small-arms (5.56-20mm) manufacturing plant in the world.
  - e. The Iowa Army Ammo plant is located in the southeast corner of Iowa. It is a one of a kind natural resource that provides "total munitions solutions" for the

Talking Paper On ASA Sites  
(PowerPoint Briefing)

Defense industrial base, including Research and Development, production, inspection, testing, assembly, packing and demilitarization.

7. Slide 7:

- a. Major Hydro-electric plants are depicted on this slide.
- b. The closest one to St Louis is located at Paducah, KY. The rest are in the Tennessee Valley area
- c.

8. Slide 8:

- a. St Louis is the crossroads of America
- b. The red lines across the country represent major highways or interstates used for transportation of goods by America's shipping companies
- c. Note how the majority of these cross-roads intersect at St Louis
- d. St Louis is a major transportation hub for goods

9. Slide 9:

- a. Missouri a major cross-roads for shipment of nuclear waste.
- b. Note that blue are interstates and Red are railways

10. Slide 10:

- a. The rings again depict 20, 30 and 40 minute scramble times.

11. Slide 11:

- a. Info slide on the cotton production in the United States. Note the Key for amount of acres in cotton.
- b. Important for Bio attacks against our agricultural industry.

12. Slide 12:

- a. This is a visual depiction of the harvested cropland in the Midwest.
- b. Note the key in the upper right hand corner.
- c. Missouri is on of the leading states in harvested cropland.
- d. A chemical attack to this cropland would have devastating effects on the regions agricultural industry.

13. Slide 13: St Louis fills the gap in America's heartland today.

14. Slide 14: Who defends America's heartland when the 131 FW is gone!

## Homeland Defense

**St Louis was performing the Homeland Defense mission while the BCEG deliberation was ongoing.**

- Operation Noble Eagle (ONE) orders
  - Orders authorizing pilots to fly ONE missions
- 131 FW Maintenance Alert Guidance
  - This guidance dated September of 2004 was used by the 131<sup>st</sup> Maintenance Group to perform the alert mission.
- Man-day Authorizations
  - These documents were tracking spreadsheets which assigned Unit Line Numbers for ONE mobilization for 131 FW home station alert.
- E-mail traffic
  - This section has supporting data and e-mail traffic stating that 1<sup>st</sup> Air Force is interested in St Louis performing the homeland defense mission and St Louis was actually performing the mission.
- ONE tasking summary
  - This section contains an excel spreadsheet containing the dates and times the 131 FW responded to official tasking by 1AF to perform ONE tasking. The actual document from 1AF is classified SECRET.
- Excel spreadsheet outlining infrastructure improvements undertaken by the 131 FW to perform the homeland defense mission
  - This spreadsheet shows in detail each base improvement project undertaken and the cost of the improvement. In addition, it highlights improvement projects that were funded by 1AF
- Power Point slides of the Base infrastructure improvements
  - This section is a visual depiction of the 131 FW alert facilities
  - There are also pictures of a munitions storage area at Scott AFB, IL. The 131 FW uses this location for long-term permanent storage of extra air-to-air missiles. When the 131 FW does not have tasking for ONE missions, the missiles are kept at Scott AFB. Scott AFB is approximately 35 minutes away, so the 131 FW has quick access to missiles at any time.
- Talking points to the power point slides

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Personnel Data-Privacy Act of 1974 (5 USC 552a)

SPECIAL ORDER  
AZ - 109

20 JUL 04

1. Relating to Special Order AZ-46 (AGR TOUR) OF 02 MAY 02
2. Addressing:

F81CFMCP, 110 FS

3. AMENDED TO INCLUDE:

UPON EXECUTION OF AN AIR SOVEREIGNTY ALERT (ASA) MISSION ORDER,  
AUTHORITY/TITLE 32 USC 502(F) STATUS CONVERTS TO TITLE 10 USC 12301(D)  
STATUS ANAD WHEN RELIEVED BY COMPETENT AUTHORITY, STATUS/AUTHORITY  
REVERTS BACK TO TITLE 32 USC 502(F).

4. FUND CITES:  
P&A: 5723850 562 4156 54301 XXXXXF 380100

OFFICIAL - Certifying Official: /S/MSgt Eric Ray/S/

5. AUTHENTICATION:

FOR THE COMMANDER

/S/OFFICIAL/S/

RANDALL E. WATSON, CW3, MoARNG  
AGR Manager

DISTRIBUTION : G

SO AZ - 109

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SPECIAL ORDER  
AZ - 108

20 JUL 04

1. Relating to Special Order AZ-46 (AGR TOUR) OF 26 JUN 98
2. Addressing:

F81CFMCP, 110 FS

3. AMENDED TO INCLUDE:

UPON EXECUTION OF AN AIR SOVEREIGNTY ALERT (ASA) MISSION/ORDER,  
AUTHORITY/TITLE 32 USC 502(F) STATUS CONVERTS TO TITLE 10 USC 12301(D)  
STATUS AND WHEN RELIEVED BY COMPETENT AUTHORITY, STATUS/AUTHORITY  
REVERTS BACK TO TITLE 32 USC 502(F).

4. FUND CITES:  
P&A: 5783850 568 4156 54301 XXXXXF 380100

OFFICIAL - Certifying Official: /S/MSgt Eric Ray/S/

5. PREVIOUSLY AMENDED BY SPECIAL ORDER:

AZ - 15  
AZ - 33

6. AUTHENTICATION:

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SPECIAL ORDER  
AZ - 110

20 JUL 04

1. Relating to Special Order AZ-93 (AGR TOUR) OF 11 SEP 00
2. Addressing:

F81CFMCP, 110 FS

3. AMENDED TO INCLUDE:

UPON EXECUTION OF AN AIR SOVEREIGNTY ALERT (ASA) MISSION/ORDER,  
AUTHORITY/TITLE 32 USC 502(F) STATUS CONVERTS TO TITLE 10 USC 12301(D)  
STATUS AND WHEN RELIEVED BY COMPETENT AUTHORITY, STATUS/AUTHORITY  
REVERTS BACK TO TITLE 32 USC 502(F).

4. FUND CITES:

F&A: 5703850 560 4156 54301/11 KXXXXF 380100

OFFICIAL - Certifying Official: /S/MSgt Eric Ray/S/

5. PREVIOUSLY AMENDED BY SPECIAL ORDER:

AZ - 16  
AZ - 21  
AZ - 44  
AZ - 95

6. AUTHENTICATION:

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Personnel Data-Privacy Act of 1974 (5 USC 552a)

SPECIAL ORDER  
AZ - 113

20 JUL 04

1. TYPE OF DUTY: AGR Tour
2. PURPOSE: TO PERFORM FULL-TIME DUTY
3. ADDRESSING:

F81CFMCK, SECRET BAS: R ; BAQ: Y

12 JUL 04 - 25 AUG 04

4. AUTHORITY/TITLE: You are to perform indicated duty.  
(32 USC 502(F) & ANGI 36-101)

5. REMARKS:

Member(s) are on AGR status and are required to have in their possession at all times a copy of the special order for their current AGR tour. FAFSC: 1W051A ; DAFSC: 1W051A ; CAFSC: 1W051A . AUTHORITY: 32 USC 502(f). Unless sooner relieved by competent authority. UMD PAS: F81CFMCK , FAC: 34A100 , Position #: 0132013 Position Title: WEATHER APPRENTICE , Auth Gr: SSGT , SPMD PAS: F81CFMCM , FAC: 16E100 , Position #: 774648 , Position Title: HUMAN RESOURCES SPECIALIST (MILITARY INFO SYSTEMS) , Auth Mil Gr on SPMD: MSG , Auth Civ Gr: GS-09 , Mil Duty Code: U TRANSPORTATION OF DPEN AND HNG NOT AUTH. LEAVE ACCUMULATED DURING MILITARY DUTY STATUS WILL BE TAKEN AND NOT HELD FOR END OF TOUR CASH PYMT. BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE, ANG AGR MEMBERS WILL AUTOMATICALLY CONVERT TO TITLE 10 USC 12301(D)/TITLE 10 12302 STATUS (AS APPROPRIATE) WHEN PERFORMING DUTY, OCONUS OR CONUS. MEMBER(S) WILL REVERT TO THEIR ORIGINAL TITLE 32 USC 502 (F) STATUS UPON RELEASE FROM OR COMPLETION OF THIS PERIOD OF DUTY. DUTY PERFORMED UNDER TITLE 10 USC 12301(D) WILL NOT EXCEED 179 DAYS WITH POSSIBLE EXTENSION TO 270 DAYS. DUTY PERFORMED UNDER TITLE 10 USC 12302 IS LIMITED TO 12 MONTHS WITH POSSIBLE EXTENSION TO 24 MONTHS, UNLESS RELEASED BY PROPER AUTHORITY. The verbal order of the Comdr on 12 JULY 2004 is confirmed, circumstances prevented written orders in advance. THIS IS A TEMPORARY AGR TOUR.

6. CERTIFICATION: TEMPO: H  
Fund Cite: P&A: 5743850 564 4156 54311 KXXXXF 380100 F012105  
Tvl: 5743850 564 41F2 54355 208491 525700 P572237

OFFICIAL Certifying Official: /S/M' - Ray/S/

7. AUTHENTICATION:

FOR THE COMMANDER

/S/OFFICIAL/S/

RANDALL E. WATSON, CW3, MoARNG  
AGR Manager

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SPECIAL ORDER  
AZ - 114

20 JUL 04

1. Relating to Special Order AZ-46 (AGR TOUR) OF 07 FEB 03
2. Addressing:

F81CFMCP, 110 FS

3. AMENDED TO INCLUDE:

UPON EXECUTION OF AN AIR SOVEREIGNTY ALERT (ASA) MISSION/ORDER,  
AUTHORITY/TITLE 32 USC 502(F) STATUS CONVERTS TO TITLE 10 USC 12301(D)  
STATUS AND WHEN RELIEVED BY COMPETENT AUTHORITY, STATUS/AUTHORITY  
REVERTS BACK TO TITLE 32 USC 502(F).

4. FUND CITES:

P&A: 5743850 564 4156 54301 380100

OFFICIAL - Certifying Official: /S/MSgt Eric Ray/S/

5. AUTHENTICATION:

FOR THE COMMANDER

/S/OFFICIAL/S/

RANDALL E. WATSON, CW3, MoARNG  
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SPECIAL ORDER  
AZ - 112

20 JUL 04

1. Relating to Special Order AZ-24 (AGR TOUR) OF 12 JAN 01
2. Addressing:

F81CFMCP, 110 FS

3. AMENDED TO INCLUDE:

UPON EXECUTION OF AN AIR SOVEREIGNTY ALERT (ASA) MISSION/ORDER,  
AUTHORITY/TITLE 32 USC 502(F) STATUS CONVERTS TO TITLE 10 USC 12301(D)  
STATUS AND WHEN RELIEVED BY COMPETENT AUTHORITY, STATUS/AUTHORITY  
REVERTS BACK TO TITLE 32 USC 502(F).

4. FUND CITES:

P&A: 5713850 561 4156 54301/11 XXXXXF 380100

OFFICIAL - Certifying Official: /S/MSgt Eric Ray/S/

5. PREVIOUSLY AMENDED BY SPECIAL ORDER:

AZ - 43

6. AUTHENTICATION:


FOR THE COMMANDER

/S/OFFICIAL/S/

RANDALL E. WATSON, CW3, MoARNG  
AGR Manager

DISTRIBUTION : G

SO AZ - 112



**MOGAR  
MAINTENANCE ALERT GUIDANCE**

**Nov 04  
CHANGE 1**

**1. General.** Tasking for ONE is a critical responsibility the 131FW incurs that can range from protection of the President of the United States (POTUS), to prominent landmarks, to Air Defense of the CONUS. The governing instruction for tasking is WBI 10-007. The purpose of this document is to amplify/clarify or provide more detail than the WBI provides. This document is to be kept unclassified.

**2. Assumptions.**

- a. Alert tasking is for 24/7.
- b. Alert tasking is for a 2-ship or 4-ship IAW the ATO.
- c. ATO taskings are the number one priority. Local flying is secondary.

**3. Scheduling and "On Call" vs. "Standby"**

- a. The respective squadrons are responsible to schedule APG and weapons personnel to sit alert. These people have the option to sit either in technician status or on orders.
- b. All shops other than APG and Weapons will designate someone to be "On Call". They will then notify the MOC of the name to call in the event they are needed to work on an aircraft. If a higher level of readiness is required, the shop will be notified to put someone on "Standby". Standby procedures will be as outlined in the Missouri Technician Agreement.

**4. Responsibilities.**

**a. JOKER responsibilities.** An alert maintenance supervisor will be designated for each shift, using the call sign "Joker".

- (1) Accomplish a face to face briefing with the on-duty MOC person for an update on the ATO/flying schedule.
- (2) Ensure the tasked aircraft are kept in a state of readiness as tasked by higher headquarters. He is the supervisor for all maintenance tasks on the aircraft.
- (3) Ensure assigned APG and Weapons personnel are available and ready to perform alert launches and recoveries
- (4) Ensure no one enters the cockpit of jets that are on status without the permission of the alert pilots.
- (5) Ensure the aircraft are configured IAW WBI 10-007, par. 4.6.6.1 for GDCA launches.
- (6) Coordinate with the Pro Sup for any aircraft tail number swaps that will occur in the tasked line-up.

(7) During normal duty hours, JOKER will coordinate with the Pro Sup for alert aircraft maintenance actions.

(8) During off-duty hours, JOKER is the deciding authority (after consultation with the lead alert pilot) on what maintenance will be done on the aircraft. He will be responsible to contact the MOC to bring in back shop support if required.

(9) Coordinate any operational issues with the lead alert pilot. In the absence of the lead alert pilot (I.E. He is flying), coordinate operational issues with the Ops Squadron Top3/SOF. If after hours and the lead alert pilot and TOP3/SOF is not available, JOKER will call the Standby SOF for coordination. The Standby SOF phone number is 314-308-4666.

(10) Ensure aircraft are properly coded for M-4, FDL, and KY-58. M-4 and FDL will be keyed at 0001Z each day. KY-58 will be keyed at 0001Z on the first of the month.

(11) Call in chock times to the MOC for tasked aircraft returning to the chocks. "CHOCK TIME" is the time the second chock is placed under the aircraft following the rollover check post flight.

(12) Once a pilot declares a jet on status, JOKER will call the MOC with the on-status time.

(13) Be intimately familiar with these procedures and WBI 10-007.

(14) Ensure the alert log kept in the maintenance alert trailer is kept up to date with the latest information on the alert aircraft, and pertinent information for the next JOKER is recorded.

**b MOC responsibilities** (Above normal day to day responsibilities)

(1) Continuously monitor weather conditions, and use standard MOC notification procedures when a Lightning Warning (Lightning with 5) occurs.

(2) Ensure Command Post is notified when Lightning within 5 occurs and when the base returns to a lightning watch.

(3) Ensure Alert pilots are notified when Lightning within 5 occurs, and when the base returns to a lightning watch, EXCEPT between the hours of 2200 and 0600. Between those hours pilots will be in crew rest and should not be disturbed.

(4) Ensure Command Post is notified when less than the tasked aircraft are on status.

(5) Ensure Alert pilots are notified when less than the tasked aircraft are on status, except between the hours of 2200 and 0600.

(6) Ensure an up to date "On Call" or "Standby" list (as appropriate) is on hand.

(7) Call the appropriate "On Call" or "Standby" maintainer in at the direction of the Pro Sup or JOKER.

(8) Use whatever means are available (SIPRNET, Command Post, etc) to check for daily changes to the ATO. Ensure JOKER is notified of ATO changes. Also, during normal duty hours notify AMXS CC, MXS CC , MXG CC, JOKER and PRO SUP of ATO changes.

(9) Ensure JOKER is kept up to date on the latest ATO/flying schedule. JOKER and MOC will perform a face to face briefing each time a new JOKER arrives on duty.

**c Alert Personnel responsibilities**

(1) Ensure they are readily available to perform an alert launch within the time constraints of the ATO.

(2) APG and WEAPONS personnel need to be located in Hanger 1, the flight line, Building 12, Fire Station, Fuel Barn, or in the alert area during alert duty hours.

(3) If outside the alert area, personnel will carry a working FM brick tuned to the maintenance net. Personnel will only perform duties that will allow an immediate response to an alert launch.

(4) Be intimately familiar with these procedures and WBI 10-007.

**5. Alert Procedures.**

a. Procedures are outlined in WBI 10-007. The procedures below are for correction, clarification, or reiteration of established and approved procedures.

b. ALERT COFGURATION: (REPEATED FROM WBI 10-007).

IAW T.O. 1F-15A-33-1-2, the following are the commanders option, which will be executed.

(1) Gun electrical safety pin and holdback tool removed

(2) LAU-106 safety pins removed (if station is loaded)

(3) Pylon and MAU-12 electrical safety pins removed

(4) AIM-9 TD cover removed

(5) All arming handle safety pins removed

(6) ALE-45 DSA electrical safety pins removed

c. A power on pre-flight will be performed every 72 hours. This power-on may be omitted if the pilot runs the aircraft as described in WBI 10-007.

d. LOX servicing will normally be performed directly on the aircraft. LOX servicing will be documented in the aircrafts 781, and a new ER will be performed.

e. IAW T.O. 1F-15A-2-05JG-00-1, S/S/S/N 05-00-05, page 5-1, external power may be applied to alert aircraft, and missiles may remain connected for the following: **Fuel and LOX checks, LOX servicing and crypto keying.** However, all pylon pin, launcher safety pins, chaff and flare pins, and gun safety switch pin will be installed. Pilots may exercise the option to be in the cockpit for these checks. Either way, maintenance will not enter the cockpit without notifying the alert pilot and installing seat pins.

f. KY-58 keying will normally be accomplished the first day of each month at 0001Z. **NOTE: this is the first ZULU day. For example, Novembers KY key will occur on the evening of 31 October, 1800 Local time.** MX will inform the alert pilots as soon as possible of the time it will be accomplished. Normally it will be accomplished on one aircraft at a time. The pilot will sit in the cockpit for the power on and power off, and will re-configure the cockpit switches after the keying is accomplished. If the pilot does not sit in the cockpit, the keying may still be accomplished, but the pilot will need to re-accomplish his cockpit setup when the power is taken off the aircraft.

f. If pilots are directed to "Battle Stations", the pilot will get in to the cockpit and strap in. Alert launch personnel will be at their designated posts next to the aircraft in preparation for a scramble. In this situation, pilots may not hear the Big Voice Scramble notification. It is the JOKER's responsibility to monitor the FM brick for the notification, and tell the pilots to scramble appropriately.

g. If pilots are directed to "Scramble", alert personnel will perform their respective alert launch procedures.

h. Once the scramble is launched and off the ramp, JOKER will reset the Fire Station alarms.

i. Arming for active scrambles will occur in the chocks. When utilizing alert RPI jets for fragg missions, arming will occur in the chocks also.

j. Fragg missions not utilizing alert aircraft will arm in the back door. If utilizing the front door (i.e. back door closed) aircraft will arm in the delta pad pointing approximately 330 degrees.

k. Dearming. Primary dearm for ALL missions will be on the delta pad pointing approximately 330 degrees. Alternate Dearm will be on the Charlie Pad pointing approximately 300 degrees.

l. Mode 4/FDL rekey- Aircraft will be rekeyed at 0001Z.

m. During weekends and holidays, the Pro Sup and JOKER may elect to put a weapons load on an additional aircraft above what was tasked. This aircraft will be parked in the spots 8-12, but will remain in a safe and pinned condition. This aircraft will not be required to be run or hot-cocked unless the lead alert pilot elects to do so, or a prime or spare aircraft comes off alert.

## **6. Miscellaneous Subjects**

- a. The jets do not come off status for power on checks or crypto keying. Refer to the assumptions page of this document.
- b. Par 4.3 of WBI 10-007 is N/A. Use procedures described in this document.
- b. Par 4.6.1.6 from WBI 10-007 is N/A. We now have 2 crew chiefs, 2 weapons, and 1 Joker on the alert rotation.
- c. Par 4.6.3.5 from WBI 10-007 is N/A. Number of aircraft is as tasked.
- d. Par 4.6.8.2, .3, .4, and .5 from WBI 10-007 are N/A. Use established procedures as directed in attach 2 to this document.
- e. Par 4.6.9.4 from WBI 10-007 is N/A. Use procedures as described in this document.

## **7. Maintenance actions to keep aircraft on alert.**

- a. If an aircraft lands Code 3, JOKER will work with Pro Sup on what maintenance will be performed on the aircraft. JOKER may elect to bring another jet on status, or work the code 3 jet to bring it back on status.
- b. JOKER will keep the alert pilots informed of the status of the jets and ETIC if working the code 3 jet.
- c. Whether or not the code 3 jet is worked, be prepared to move the spare into a prime line, at the discretion of the alert pilots.

**Attachment 1**  
**131<sup>ST</sup> MAINTENANCE GROUP**  
(RePrint from Wing Base Instruction 10-7)

**1. RAMP CONFIGURATION:**

1.1. Tasked aircraft will be parked in spots 8 through 12. The Production Supervisor (PRO SUP) **or JOKER** will determine exact parking location for the aircraft order. For GDCA (Ground DCA –Aka Alert) attempt to have the #1 aircraft parked in spot 12 with the rest of the aircraft parked in sequential order from spots 11 to 8. Aircraft will be parked facing a northwest direction so the bore-sight of the aircraft points away from populated areas.

1.2. Barrier configuration will not change unless Marine 1 is utilizing our ramp. In this case, barriers will be moved to provide Marine 1 a clear taxi flow to the front door. The barriers will be moved west on the ramp to provide a line of protection from the crew chief room to the blast fence, dissecting spot 21. The red line will not change.

**2. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATION:**

2.1. Normal aircraft configuration (minus ordnance) will be:

- Two Wing tanks
- No Centerline tank (Modify A/R based on tasking)
  - If no Centerline tank is required, centerline pylon may be either on or off.
- MASTER ARM safety wired to the SAFE position
- FDL keyed IAW local procedures using crypto as designated by Operations
- KY-58 and M-4 keyed IAW local procedures
- Ensure Apache light battery pack is installed

2.2. Ordnance. Aircraft ordnance load will be IAW Higher Headquarters tasking. If left to the discretion of the unit, normal ordnance load will be:

- AIM-9-on Stations 2A and 8B
- AIM-120 on Stations 2B and 8A
- 940 rounds of 20MM TP
- 2 DSAs of Chaff and 6 DSAs of MJU-10 (desired) Flare

**3. AIRCRAFT LAUNCH – NON ASA LAUNCH:**

- Aircraft last chance and arming will occur in the throat going out the back door, facing a 330 degree heading.
- Arming crews will hook up a comm. cord during arming. Aircraft may be armed without direct communications if a working comm. cord is not available.
- Each aircraft will have the following equipment stowed in the VTR cavity.
  - Dome and TD covers for each AIM-9 missile.
  - All required launcher and missile accessories
  - All required weapons safety pins
  - Arming key diaper pins for each AIM-7 loaded

- Clearing sector holdback tool
- Gear pins and tail hook pin.
- If utilizing the front door (back door closed), aircraft will arm in the Delta Pad on a 330 degree heading.

#### 4. MAINTENANCE ON GENERATED AIRCRAFT.

4.1. For aircraft on GDCA tasking, an Alert Preflight inspection IAW 1F-15A-6WC-3-1 will be accomplished daily. Entry into the cockpit is not required for this inspection. The aircraft will be accepted by a pilot. The inspection and acceptance will be annotated in the 781.

4.2. Maintenance Personnel will notify MOC and the Lead Alert Pilot prior to performing maintenance or servicing actions that would prevent an aircraft launch.

4.3. A power-on pre-flight will be accomplished every 72 hours. Maintenance will perform the appropriate notifications prior to performing the pre-flight. The missiles will be configured IAW Paragraph G below. Maintenance will re-configure the aircraft after the pre-flight is accomplished, and the pilot will re-accept the aircraft.

4.4. M-4, KY-58 and FDL crypto keys will be accomplished **IAW MOGAR ALERT GUIDANCE**

4.5. An aircraft flown while on alert status will have an Alert Thru-flight inspection done prior to being returned to Alert status.

4.6. If not flown on alert, an aircraft will be run every 48 to 72 hours, or at the discretion of the alert pilot.

4.7. External power may be applied to alert aircraft, and missiles may remain connected for the following: Fuel and LOX checks and crypto keying. However, all pylon pin, launcher safety pins, and gun safety switch pin will be installed. Maintenance will not enter the cockpit without notifying the alert pilot and installing seat pins.

5. AIRCRAFT SCRAMBLE/LAUNCH. The following procedures are amplifying guidance for a scramble launch. The launch will be conducted IAW 1F-15A-6WC-3-2. Crew chiefs will be designated as "A-man" and "B-man". Their actions during the scramble launch are broken down as such.

5.1. **Crew chiefs will get a scramble brief from the pilots.**

5.2. **Deleted. See Attch 2**

5.3. **Deleted. See Attch 2.**

5.4. **Deleted. See Attch 2.**

5.5. **Deleted. See Attch 2**

5.6. Safety will not be compromised during launch. All players must know the exact actions they will take. All maintainers will take precautions to stay away from aircraft intakes and not step in front of the landing gear during launch.

5.7. The A-man will watch the pilot for the taxi signal. The A-man will hold taxi until all weapons personnel are out of the way with their duties done, and it is safe to taxi.

## 6. AIRCRAFT RECOVERY.

6.1. Aircraft will taxi to the Delta pad and face a 330 degree heading.

6.2. Maintenance will perform a normal de-arm of all aircraft systems and weapons.

6.3. If aircraft are to be turned and put back on GDCA, the following procedures will be used.

- Code 1 and 2 aircraft will be "Hot Cocked" prior to shutdown and turned to be put back on GDCA.
- Code 3 aircraft will park in one of the spots 8-12. At the Pro Sup's discretion, the aircraft will either be worked to put back on status, or missiles downloaded and put on trailers so the aircraft may be towed away to make room for the spare aircraft.

6.4. Maintenance will notify the following when the assigned aircraft is back on status:

- Command Post
- OPS
- MOC
- Alert pilots

6.5. External power may be applied to alert aircraft, and missiles may remain connected for the following: Fuel and LOX checks and crypto keying. However, all pylon pin, launcher safety pins, and gun safety switch pin will be installed. Maintenance will not enter the cockpit without notifying the alert pilot and installing seat pins.

**ATTACHMENT 2: ALERT LAUNCH/RECOVERY PROCEDURES**

# ASA Launch

T.O. 1F-15A-6WC-3-2, 6WC3-3, & 1F-15A-33-1-2CL-17  
T.O. 1F-15A-6WC-3-2 & 6WC3-3, 33-1-2CL-17 & 05JG-20-1

As of 1 Oct 04

1	A-Man		Start JFS
2		B-Man	Disconnect Grounding Wire From Aircraft
3		B-Man	Stand-by Fire Bottle until signaled by A-Man to perform tasks below
4	<b>A-Man</b>		Establish Communication with Pilot (Pri Comm Cord, Sec Hand Signals)
5	A-Man		<b>Start #2 Engine</b>
6	A-Man		Check secondary heat exchanger inlet for suction
7	A-Man		Reset ASP panel
8	A-Man		Remove NLG pin and show pilot
9	A-Man		Start #1 engine (be sure JFS decelerates and shuts down)
10	A-Man		Signal B-Man to Start Tasks
11	A-Man		Ensure left and right primary heat exchanger inlets are open. Check exhaust duct for positive air flow.
12	A-Man		Flight control check
13	A-Man		Take off trim check
14	A-Man		EEC – Nozzle checks
15	A-Man		Brake check
16		B-Man	Disconnect Comm Cord and Secure Panel AFTER signal from A-Man.
17		B-Man	Arm missiles on station 8 (remove dome cover, pull and rotate SAFE/ARM handle into ARM position)
18		B-Man	Remove Right MLG pin and pull chock.
19		B-Man	Arm missiles on station 2 (remove dome cover, pull and rotate SAFE/ARM handle into ARM position)
20		B-Man	Remove Left MLG pin and pull chock.
21		B-Man	Show A-Man Left and Right MLG pins
22	A-Man		Check for Left and Right MLG pins removed
23		B-Man	Clear aircraft for launch
24	<b>A-Man</b>		Launch aircraft.

## CAUTION

When installing the fuel tube into P & D valve in Door's 113 L/R, Gloves and goggles are required to prevent exposure of fuel onto skin.

## WARNING

“FOR JFS FIRE”

To prevent injury to personnel discharge short burst of fire extinguishing agent while facing aft into JFS inlet. Go to JFS from front, not side or rear of inlet.

# ASA Recovery

T.O. 1F-15A-6WC-3-2, 6WC3-3, & 1F-15A-33-1-2CL-17  
 T.O. 1F-15A-6WC-3-2 & 6WC3-3, 33-1-2CL-17 & 05JG-20-1

NOTE: Accomplish at Delta Pad, then Charlie Pad, then back door at a 330 degree heading)

As of 1 Oct 04

1	A-Man		Marshall Aircraft to First Chalk
2		B-Man	Chock Lt MLG wheel.
3	A-Man		Observe B-Man while safeing aircraft.
4		B-Man	Install Ground wire.
5		B-Man	Safe all installed Armament IAW 1F-15A-33-1-2CL-17
6		B-Man	Inspect Lt. and Rt MLG tires for cuts and wear.
7		B-Man	Pull Lt. MLG chock and clear aircraft
8	A-Man		Ensure A/C is clear and marshal aircraft to 2 <sup>nd</sup> chock.
9	A-Man		Observe B-Man while chocking aircraft.
10		B-Man	Chock Lt and Rt MLG wheel.
11	A-Man		Observe B-Man installing Lt. and Rt. MLG and tail hook pin
12		B-Man	Install Lt. and Rt. MLG pins and tail hook pin.
13		B-Man	Hook up Comm cord.
14	A-Man		Establish communication with pilot. (verbal)
15		B-Man	Give NLG pin to A-Man
16	A-Man		Receive NLG pin from B-Man
17		B-Man	Clear Aircraft.
18	A-Man		Verify Speed brake positioning. (up then down)
19	A-Man		Verify Flap Position. (down)
20	A-Man		Clear all Flight Controls and verify flight controls.
21	A-Man		Verify flight control take off position. (Approx 1 in. below the bottom of the Empennage)
22	A-Man		Cycle EECs (Nozzles) Closed then opened.
23	A-Man		Verify brakes for operation and leaks.
24	A-Man		Verify bleed air loop checks
25		B-Man	Install fuel tube into #1 Engine P&D valve. (Door 113L.) GLOVES & GOGGLES REQUIRED.
26		B-Man	Clear Aircraft
27	A-Man		Instruct Pilot to shut down #1 engine.
28	A-Man		Install NLG Pin
29		B-Man	Install fuel tube into #2 Motor P&D valve. (Door 113R) GLOVES & GOGGLES REQUIRED.
30		B-Man	Clear Aircraft.
31	A-Man		Instruct Pilot to shut down #2 engine.
32	A-Man		Accomplish 241 card.
33		B-Man	Empty Fuel tube into approved container.

1G48F							
LNR	AFSC	Name	AFSC	Start	Original Stop	New Stop	
016	3E051	Wilson, Derrick		01-Nov-04	31-Dec-04	8-Dec-04	E
017	3E052	Hays, David		01-Nov-04	31-Dec-04	31-Dec-04	E
018	3E052	Carr, William		1-Nov-04	31-Dec-04		E
019	3E051	Willers, Robert		01-Nov-04	31-Dec-04		E
024	3E151	Meyer, Dennis		01-Nov-04	31-Dec-04		E
025	3E151	Mosley, Charles		01-Nov-04	31-Dec-04		E
033	3E271	Wacker, Daniel		01-Nov-04	31-Dec-04		E
034	3E271	Wiseman, Matthew		01-Nov-04	31-Dec-04		E
1GP93							
LNR	AFSC	Name	AFSC	Start	Stop	New Stop	
002	1N051	Motz Michelle		04-Oct-04	31-Dec-03		E
1GQ96							
LNR	AFSC	Name	AFSC	Start	Stop	New Stop	
001	3P031	Beasley, Carl		16-Aug-04	31-Dec-04		E
002	3P031	Parsons, Robert		16-Aug-04	31-Dec-04		E
003	3P031	Catchings, Marquita		16-Aug-04	31-Dec-04		E
004	3P051	Christopher, Jamie		16-Aug-04	31-Dec-04		E
005	3P051	Goldsborough, David		16-Aug-04	31-Dec-04		E
006	3P051	Graham, Devonna		16-Aug-04	31-Dec-04		E
007	3P051	Allerson, Bonita		01-Oct-04	31-Dec-04		E
008	3P051	Perkins, Kevin		16-Aug-04	31-Dec-04		E
009	3P051	Keitt, Christopher		24-Aug-04	31-Dec-04		E
010	3P051	Williams, Craig		24-Aug-04	31-Dec-04		E
011	3P051	Jackson, Gary		23-Aug-04	31-Dec-04		E
012	3P051	Poole, Travis		23-Aug-04	31-Dec-04		E
013	3P071	Aubuchon, David		16-Aug-04	31-Dec-04		E
1GH94							
LNR	AFSC	Name	AFSC	Start	Stop	New Stop	
136	2W071	Weidinger, Vince	2W171	13-Sep-04	31-Dec-04	30-Nov-04	E
137	2A373						E
138	2A373	Barkho, George	2R071	19-Aug-04	31-Dec-04	31-Dec-04	E
139	2A373	Tyler, Robert	2A353A	23-Aug-04	31-Dec-04	8-Dec-04	E
141	2A373	Robinson, Tim	2A353A	27-Sep-04	31-Dec-04	31-Dec-04	E
142	2A373	Hobbs, Jason	2W151	23-Aug-04	31-Dec-04	8-Dec-04	E
143	2A373	Irvin, Simon	2W151	16-Aug-04	31-Dec-04	8-Dec-04	E
144	2A373	Myers, Garth	2W131	13-Sep-04	31-Dec-04	8-Dec-04	E
145	2A373	Weiss, Matthew	2W131	13-Sep-04	31-Dec-04	8-Dec-04	E
146	2A373	Koval, Jedadiah	2W151	20-Sep-04	31-Dec-04	8-Dec-04	E
147	2A373	Kaber, Robert	2W171	20-Sep-04	31-Dec-04	8-Dec-04	E
148	2A373	Houberg, Ryan	2A353A	23-Aug-04	31-Dec-04	31-Dec-04	E
149	2A373						E
151	2A676	Barks, Melvin	2W171	01-Nov-04	31-Dec-04	8-Dec-04	E
152	2A772	Haynes, Jonathan	2A353A	01-Nov-04	31-Dec-04	8-Dec-04	E
153	2A773					31-Dec-04	E
154	2A671A	Walker, James	2W071	13-Sep-04	31-Dec-04	8-Dec-04	E
155	2A671A	Doerhoff, Jeffrey	Avionics	08-Nov-04	31-Dec-04	8-Dec-04	E
159	2A672	Hainer, Lance	2A353A	30-Oct-04	20-Dec-04	8-Dec-04	E
160	2A371	Hembrae, Jackson	2A353A	30-Oct-04	31-Dec-04	8-Dec-04	E
161	2A371	Bonagurio, Matt	2A353A	28-Sep-04	31-Dec-04	8-Dec-04	E
162	2W171	Dupree, John	2W171	23-Aug-04	31-Dec-04	8-Dec-04	E
163	2W171	Maschemeyer, Greg	2W171	23-Aug-04	31-Dec-04	8-Dec-04	E
164	2W171	Miles, Dale	2W171	23-Aug-04	31-Dec-04	8-Dec-04	E
165	2W171	Werk, Michael	2W171	13-Sep-04	31-Dec-04	30-Nov-04	E
166	2W171	Ryan, Bradley	2W171	13-Sep-04	31-Dec-04	8-Dec-04	E
167	2W171	Herron, Daniel	2W151	23-Aug-04	31-Dec-04	8-Dec-04	E
168	2A353A	Faltman, Edwin	2A353A	23-Aug-04	31-Dec-04	17-Oct-04	E
169	2A353A	Blackmon, Lawrence	2A353A	23-Aug-04	31-Dec-04	8-Dec-04	E
1G994							
LNR	AFSC	Name	AFSC	Start	Stop	New Stop	
002	3C371	Sloan, Bill		09-Aug-04	31-Dec-04		E
1G993							
LNR	AFSC	Name	AFSC	Start	Stop	New Stop	
001	1C351	Gupton, Rebecca		17-Aug-04	31-Dec-04		E
002	3C371	Haigler, John		09-Aug-04	31-Dec-04		E
003	1C371	Hedley, Jill		23-Aug-04	31-Dec-04		E
1G482							
LNR	AFSC	Name	AFSC	Start	Stop	New Stop	
003	3E751	Fish, Fred		30-Sep-04	31-Dec-04		E
004	3E751	Botson, Bernie		23-Aug-04	11-Feb-05		E
005	3E751	Blunk, Robert		04-Oct-04	31-Dec-04		E
006	3E771	Tarranova, Michael		30-Sep-04	31-Dec-04		E
1G381							
LNR	AFSC	Name	AFSC	Start	Stop	New Stop	
011	3A051	Ruckwardt, Alvin		16-Aug-04	31-Dec-04		E
1G390							
LNR	AFSC	Name	AFSC	Start	Stop	New Stop	
001	3A051	Rauss, Denise		09-Aug-04	31-Dec-04		E
002	C011F3F	Hurley, James		01-Oct-04	31-Dec-04		O
005	011F3F	Verville, Jeffrey		01-Oct-04	31-Dec-04		O
006	011F3F	Barritt, Darrin		01-Oct-04	31-Dec-04		O
007	011F3F	DeLong, Ryan		01-Oct-04	31-Dec-04		O
010	K011F3F	McComas, James		01-Oct-04	31-Dec-04		O
011	S011F3F	Demilliano, Steven		01-Oct-04	31-Dec-04		O
018	048G3	Votinelli, Theresa		01-Oct-04	31-Dec-04		O
021	4N071	Conrey, Molly		04-Oct-04	31-Dec-04		E

ULN	UTC	LNR	O	E	AFSC	AFSC TITLE	SHRED	FAC	RDD	ETL	CMAS Auth
1G390	3FQB10	013			1T151	AIRCREW LIFE SUPPORT JOURNEYMAN		31C1	20040805		
1G390	3FQB10	015			1T171	AIRCREW LIFE SUPPORT CRAFTSMAN		31C1	20040805		
1G390	3FQB10	016			1C052	AVIATION RESOURCE MGT JOURNEYMAN		31D1	20040805		
1G390	3FQB10	017			1C052	AVIATION RESOURCE MGT JOURNEYMAN		31D1	20040805		
1G390	3FQB10	019			4N051	AEROSPACE MEDICAL SERVICE JOURNEYMA		5310	20040805		
	LINES		11	4							
	DAYS		1276	464						1740	
1G391	3FQB20	010			1T151	AIRCREW LIFE SUPPORT JOURNEYMAN		31C1	20040805		
	LINES		3	2							
	DAYS		348	232						580	
1G492	4F9FP0	001			3E731	FIRE PROTECTION APPRENTICE		44EF	20040805		
1G492	4F9FP0	002			3E731	FIRE PROTECTION APPRENTICE		44EF	20040805		
	LINES		0	4							

ULN	UTC	LNR	O	E	AFSC	AFSC TITLE	SHRED	FAC	RDD	ETL	CMAS Auth
	DAYS		0	464						464	
	LINES		0	3							
	DAYS		0	348						348	
1G994	9ACP30	001			1C351	COMMAND POST JOURNEYMAN		135A	20040809		
1G994	9ACP30	002			1C371	COMMAND POST CRAFTSMAN		135A	20040809		
1G994	9ACP30	003			1C371	COMMAND POST CRAFTSMAN		135A	20040809		
	LINES		0	0							
	DAYS		0	0						0	

ULN	UTC	LNR	O	E	AFSC	AFSC TITLE	SHRED	FAC	RDD	ETL	CMAS Auth
1GH94	HFOB10	162		1	2W171	AIRCRAFT ARMAMENT SYS CRAFTSMAN	Dupree, John	2G13	20040805	116	451865
1GH94	HFOB10	163		1	2W171	AIRCRAFT ARMAMENT SYS CRAFTSMAN	Maschemeyer	2G13	20040805	116	451865
1GH94	HFOB10	164		1	2W171	AIRCRAFT ARMAMENT SYS CRAFTSMAN	Miles, Dale	2G13	20040805	116	451865
1GH94	HFOB10	165		1	2W171	AIRCRAFT ARMAMENT SYS CRAFTSMAN	Werk, Michael	2G13	20040805	116	451865
1GH94	HFOB10	166		1	2W171	AIRCRAFT ARMAMENT SYS CRAFTSMAN	Ryan, Bradley	2G13	20040805	116	451865
1GH94	HFOB10	167		1	2W171	AIRCRAFT ARMAMENT SYS CRAFTSMAN	Herron, Daniel	2G13	20040805	116	451865
1GH94	HFOB10	168		1	2A353A	TACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINT JOURNEYMAN	Fattiman, Edwin	2M51	20040805	116	451865
1GH94	HFOB10	169		1	2A353A	TACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINT JOURNEYMAN	Blackman, Lawrence	2M51	20040805	116	451865
	LINES		0	34							
	DAYS		0	3944						3944	
1GH95	HGQB10	011			2W071	MUNITIONS SYS CRAFTSMAN		2526	20040805		
1GH95	HGQB10	014			2W071	MUNITIONS SYS CRAFTSMAN		2E37	20040805		
	LINES		0	0						0	
	DAYS		0	0							
1GQ96	QFEB20	001		1	3P031	SECURITY FORCES APPRENTICE		4390	20040805	116	451859
1GQ96	QFEB20	002		1	3P031	SECURITY FORCES APPRENTICE		4390	20040805	116	451859
1GQ96	QFEB20	003		1	3P031	SECURITY FORCES APPRENTICE		4390	20040805	116	451859
1GQ96	QFEB20	004		1	3P051	SECURITY FORCES JOURNEYMAN		4390	20040805	116	451859
1GQ96	QFEB20	005		1	3P051	SECURITY FORCES JOURNEYMAN		4390	20040805	116	451859
1GQ96	QFEB20	006		1	3P051	SECURITY FORCES JOURNEYMAN		4390	20040805	116	451859
1GQ96	QFEB20	007		1	3P051	SECURITY FORCES JOURNEYMAN		4390	20040805	116	451859
1GQ96	QFEB20	008		1	3P051	SECURITY FORCES JOURNEYMAN		4390	20040805	116	451859
1GQ96	QFEB20	009		1	3P051	SECURITY FORCES JOURNEYMAN		4390	20040805	116	451859
1GQ96	QFEB20	010		1	3P051	SECURITY FORCES JOURNEYMAN		4390	20040805	116	451859
1GQ96	QFEB20	011		1	3P051	SECURITY FORCES JOURNEYMAN		4390	20040805	116	451859
1GQ96	QFEB20	012		1	3P051	SECURITY FORCES JOURNEYMAN		4390	20040805	116	451859
1GQ96	QFEB20	013		1	3P071	SECURITY FORCES CRAFTSMAN		4390	20040805	116	451859
	LINES		0	13							
	DAYS		0	1508						1508	
1GH9F	4F9EW0	016			3E051	ELECTRICAL SYS JOURNEYMAN		44EO	2041031		
1GH9F	4F9EW0	017			3E052	ELECTRIC POWER PRODUCTION JOURNEYMAN		44EO	2041031		
1GH9F	4F9EW0	018			3E052	ELECTRIC POWER PRODUCTION JOURNEYMAN		44EO	2041031		
1GH9F	4F9EW0	019			3E051	ELECTRICAL SYS JOURNEYMAN		44EO	2041031		
1GH9F	4F9EW0	024			3E151	HEATING, VENTING, AIR CONDITIONING		44EO	2041031		
1GH9F	4F9EW0	025			3E151	HEATING, VENTING, AIR CONDITIONING		44EO	2041031		
1GH9F	4F9EW0	033			3E271	PAVEMENTS & CONSTRUCTION EQUIPMENT		44EO	2041031		

ULN	UTC	LNR	O	E	AFSC	AFSC TITLE	SHRED	FAC	RDD	ETL	CMAS Auth
1GH9F	4F9EW0	034			3E271	PAVEMENTS & CONSTRUCTION EQUIPMENT		44EO	2041031		
	LINES		0	0				44EO	2041031		
	DAYS		0	0						0	
1GP93	PFF150	001			014N3	INTELLIGENCE	04	35A1	20040805		
1GP93	PFF150	002			1N051	OPERATIONS INTEL JOURNEYMAN		35A1	20040805		
	LINES		0	0							
	DAYS		0	0						0	

**From:** Tieman, Edwin, SMSgt, 131LGM  
**Sent:** Friday, October 22, 2004 1:10 PM  
**To:** Smith, Keith, LtCol, 131LGS  
**Cc:** Chaney, Terri, LtC, 131 MSS; Kessinger, Lisa, CMSgt, 131LRS; Voyles, Mike , MSgt, 131LGS; Bruns, Henry, CMSgt, 131LGS; Hruska, Joe, LtCol ,131MXS, 6264; Indelicato, James, CCM, 131LGM  
**Subject:** RE: Big Top shelters

Sir,

I have given the ammo people at Scott AFB a heads up on what we have planned for the 5th of Nov. I told them I will get back with them next week when we get all the particulars worked out. I can provide radios and placards for the tractor trailer. Obviously we want to use a flat bed trailer (probably the 25 footer will work) and map the route out. I would suggest going the 270 route versus going through downtown. What do you think? Will talk to you on the 26th.

Sincerely,  
 Ed Tieman

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Smith, Keith, LtCol, 131LGS  
**Sent:** Friday, October 22, 2004 10:43 AM  
**To:** Bruns, Henry, CMSgt, 131LGS; Voyles, Mike , MSgt, 131LGS  
**Cc:** Tieman, Edwin, SMSgt, 131LGM; Chaney, Terri, LtC, 131 MSS; Smith, Keith, LtCol, 131LGS; Kessinger, Lisa, CMSgt, 131LRS  
**Subject:** FW: Big Top shelters

Chief, Mike:

We will plan to move this cargo on 131 FW Transportation flat beds.

Mike - please provide Chief Bruns the shipping requirements to include:

- Placard requirements
- Confirm that two-way communication is required
- Get Scott AFB contacts from Ed Tieman
- Will need to advise Scott AFB personnel of our departure/arrival
- Any other requirements that Chief, Ed or you can think of.

Please brief me on Tuesday, 26 Oct 04. Thanks.

*Keith A. Smith, Lt Col, MoANG  
 131st FW Logistics Readiness Squadron Commander / LGD  
 314-527-6157 Commercial  
 824-6157 DSN  
 keith.smith@mostlo.ang.af.mil*

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Hruska, Joe, LtCol ,131MXS, 6264  
**Sent:** Friday, October 22, 2004 8:44 AM  
**To:** Brandt, Mike, Col, 131FW; Champagne, Gregory, Col, 131FW, 6276; Kelk, Jon, Col, 131OG/CC; Mohr, Moss, LtC, 110FS; Beck, Mark, LtCol, 131LG; Rolwes, Steven , CMSgt, 131LGM; Dubois, Charles, CMSgt, 131LG; Stewart, Edward , CMSgt, 131LG,; Pingleton, Richard, CMSgt, 131LGM; Indelicato, James, CCM, 131LGM; Rackhaus, Joseph, CMSgt, 131LGM; Chaney, Terri, LtC, 131 MSS; Baker, Stephan, Lt. 131SFS; Endicott, Lane, Maj, 131CES; Vomund, Darian, MSgt, 131LGC; Eaves, Ken , Maj 131FW/SE; Tieman, Edwin, SMSgt, 131LGM; Smith, Keith, LtCol, 131LGS; Hurley, Jim, FS, 6310  
**Cc:** Leeker, Bob, Col, 131FW  
**Subject:** Big Top shelters

All,

With the cancellation of the New Orleans LFE, we will be doing local flying during the week of 15-19 November. I've asked the shelter contractor to move his construction date up to a start date of 8 November. This would mean no use of the middle row from 8 Nov to 15 Nov.

The contractor is checking to see if he can do that, and we should know something today or tomorrow. I'll let you know if I hear anything.

Ed Tieman, this means we need to clean out the HAM on 5 November and get the munitions to Scott. There are several implications to this.

1. Col Brandt/Wagner, We are going to keep only three aircraft loaded on the ramp. If we need to plus up, it would take a little while to get the aircraft loaded. I would recommend not loading more than 3 jets, and telling NEADS we'll fly a longer cap as opposed to bringing up two additional jets. We should be back to normal ops by 16 November.

2. Keith, can you set up transportation for the missiles from here to Scott AFB for 5 November. You can work with Ed Tieman on the exact numbers. I believe we can use our own transportation folks for this.

The contractor is going to send me a list of names of who will be here working on the shelters. I will forward that to Lt Baker when I get it.

The contractor will be working a day shift. If we have some preferred hours, let me know.

Thanks  
LtCol Joe "Corn" Hruska  
MXS Commander  
DSN 824-6264 Comm (314) 527-6264

This Email and any attachments may contain information that is For Official Use Only or is subject to the Privacy Act of 1974, and needs to be protected IAW the AF Sup to DOD 5400.7-R and AFI 33-332.

**From:** Matthews Roy Lt Col ANG/LGMW [Roy.Matthews@ang.af.mil]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, June 08, 2004 10:14 AM  
**To:** Champagne, Gregory, COL, 131LG/CC, MO-ANG; 'joe.hruska@mostlo.ang.af.mil'  
**Cc:** Knaak Christopher TSgt ANG/LGMW  
**Subject:** FW: ST. Louis ANG Stoarge  
Gentlemen:

I just wanted to introduce myself, and let you know that we're aware of your issue with storage of live missiles supporting the Noble Eagle Alert/CAP tasking (1 CONR). Storing the items via courtesy storage arrangement at Scott AFB is a much better option, than trying to enter a support agreement with a non-DoD entity (Boeing)-I'm sure that your Weapons Safety has made that point clear. We're actively engaged with POCs in the safety/logistics communities (XOS/AMC A4) to ensure you get the support needed to continue meeting the mission.

Pls let me know if we can do anything for you here in LGMW.

**ROY A. MATTHEWS JR., Lt Col, USAF**

**Chief, Armament Branch**

ANG/LGMW  
3500 Fetchet Ave  
Andrews AFB, MD 20762-3500  
BB: (571) 243-9904  
DSN: 278-8507/Commercial: (301) 836-8507  
Fax: DSN 858-1336/Commercial (301) 836-1336

---

**From:** Knaak Christopher TSgt ANG/LGMW  
**Sent:** Tuesday, June 08, 2004 10:29 AM  
**To:** christopher.hall2@scott.af.mil  
**Cc:** Matthews Roy Lt Col ANG/LGMW; Noll Todd M TSgt AMC/A44JM; Hayworth Michael SMSgt AMC/A44JM; Tieman, Edwin, SMSGT, 131FW, LGM, 36255, MO-ANG; Brown, Donald, MSgt, 131FW; Porter, James, SSgt, MXS, 36225, MO-ANG; Knaak Christopher TSgt ANG/LGMW; Sheppe, Elizabeth M., ANG/XOS; Abraham, Steven P. Mr., ANG/XOS  
**Subject:** ST. Louis ANG Stoarge

Mr. Hall,

ANG/LGMW doesn't see a problem with the 131<sup>st</sup> FW storing a limited quantity of missiles in your Munitions Storage Area (MSA) at Scott AFB for rapid response/alert.

When can we expect to see a Support Agreement between Scott AFB and the 131<sup>st</sup> FW?

If you have any questions, just let me know.

Thanks for the heads up,

**Chris**

**CHRISTOPHER C. KNAAK, TSgt, ANG**  
**Munitions Manager**

ANG/LGMW

DSN: 278-8489 COMM: (301) 836-8489

FAX: 858-1336 COMM: (301) 981-1338

E-mail: [christopher.knaak@ang.af.mil](mailto:christopher.knaak@ang.af.mil)

Website: <https://logistics.ang.af.mil/LGM/LGMW/MAG/>

**From:** Matthews Roy Lt Col ANG/LGMW [Roy.Matthews@ang.af.mil]

**Sent:** Wednesday, July 21, 2004 5:21 PM

**To:** 'Hruska,Joe, LtCol ,131MXS, 6264'

**Cc:** Sheppe, Elizabeth M., ANG/XOS; Knaak Christopher TSgt ANG/LGMW

**Subject:** RE: Storage of munitions at Scott AFB.

Sounds great Joe... I feel bad because we really didn't have to do anything. I don't believe that we'll need anything further. I'll look over what you sent me closely and let you know if we do. Congratulations.

Hi Liz - hope things are going well with you. Just a little info (you probably have it already)... sounds like things are progressing with the 131st munitions realignment into Scott storage. Pls review and let us know if you see any issues on the horizon from your perspective.

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Hruska,Joe, LtCol ,131MXS, 6264 [mailto:joe.hruska@mostlo.ang.af.mil]

**Sent:** Wednesday, July 21, 2004 6:05 PM

**To:** 'roy.matthews@ang.af.mil'

**Subject:** Storage of munitions at Scott AFB.

Roy,

We are getting close to the point of storing munitions at Scott AFB. They almost have their facility certified, and all the hurdles/logistics of making it happen are about done. Do you need anything from us to make this happen? I've attached the current Courtesy Storage agreement for your information. Let me know if we're good to go on this, or you need something else for this. Thanks

Joe

LtCol Joe Hruska

MXS Commander

DSN 824-6264 Comm (314) 527-6264

This Email and any attachments may contain information that is

For Official Use Only or is subject to the Privacy Act of 1974,

and needs to be protected IAW the AF Sup to DOD

**From:** Hruska,Joe, LtCol ,131MXS, 6264  
**Sent:** Monday, April 25, 2005 7:20 AM  
**To:** Dasuta, Stephen, Lt Col, 110FS, 6310; Kelk, Jon, Col, 131OG/CC; Mohr, Moss, LtC, 110FS; Champagne, Gregory, Col, 131FW, 6276; Young, Christopher, O-4, 110FS, 6310  
**Subject:** RE: AIM 9X Shipment for ANG

Guys,

Any more thought to how you will want the live 9X's loaded for ONE missions once we have the go ahead to load them?

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Hruska,Joe, LtCol ,131MXS, 6264  
**Sent:** Friday, April 08, 2005 10:30 AM  
**To:** Dasuta, Stephen, Lt Col, 110FS, 6310; Kelk, Jon, Col, 131OG/CC; Mohr, Moss, LtC, 110FS; Champagne, Gregory, Col, 131FW, 6276; Young, Christopher, O-4, 110FS, 6310  
**Subject:** RE: AIM 9X Shipment for ANG

That could be an issue. We only have 4 live rounds. We will end up with the two primes loaded 9X, and the spare 9M's. If the pilot goes to the spare, or we launch more than 2 jets for an ONE, you will have jets loaded differently.

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Dasuta, Stephen, Lt Col, 110FS, 6310  
**Sent:** Friday, April 08, 2005 10:14 AM  
**To:** Hruska,Joe, LtCol ,131MXS, 6264; Kelk, Jon, Col, 131OG/CC; Mohr, Moss, LtC, 110FS; Champagne, Gregory, Col, 131FW, 6276; Young, Christopher, O-4, 110FS, 6310  
**Subject:** RE: AIM 9X Shipment for ANG

I called CONR about this. They don't care as long aa the jets are loaded the same, i.e no 9Ms on one and 9Xs on another.

Daihatsu

**LtC Steve DaSuta**  
131 XP  
DSN 824-6310

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Hruska,Joe, LtCol ,131MXS, 6264  
**Sent:** Friday, April 08, 2005 9:41 AM  
**To:** Kelk, Jon, Col, 131OG/CC; Mohr, Moss, LtC, 110FS; Champagne, Gregory, Col, 131FW, 6276; Young, Christopher, O-4, 110FS, 6310; Dasuta, Stephen, Lt Col, 110FS, 6310  
**Subject:** FW: AIM 9X Shipment for ANG  
**Importance:** High

All,

We have 4 live 9X's heading to McConnell. Should be there already. Ed Tieman is going to give me a date when we are capable of loading the missiles in the event we are tasked for ONE. (They need to finish the training we have scheduled for May).

Do we need to contact 1AF to have them change the ATO, or do they care if we have 9X's loaded vs 9M's.

LtCol Joe "Corn" Hruska  
MXS Commander  
DSN 824-6264 Comm (314) 527-6264

This Email and any attachments may contain information that is For Official Use Only or is subject to the Privacy Act of 1974, and needs to be protected IAW the AF Sup to DOD 5400.7-R and AFI 33-332.

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Tieman, Edwin, SMSgt, 131LGM  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 07, 2005 10:07 AM  
**To:** Hruska, Joe, LtCol, 131MXS, 6264  
**Cc:** Indelicato, James, 131LGM  
**Subject:** FW: AIM 9X Shipment for ANG  
**Importance:** High

Sir,

For your info.

Ed T.

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Adams Eric M Civ WRALC/LMMM [mailto:Eric.Adams@robins.af.mil]  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 07, 2005 9:17 AM  
**To:** 'Brown, Donald, SMSgt, 131FW'; 'Skala, Thomas M, SMSgt, 184 MXS/MXMW'; 'Tieman, Edwin, SMSGT, 131FW, LGM, 36255, MO-ANG'  
**Cc:** Schnable William R Contr WRALC/LMMM  
**Subject:** AIM 9X Shipment for ANG  
**Importance:** High

Gentlemen,

1. 4 Tacticals (BG00620, BG00621, BG00622 & BG00623) departed Wednesday for McConnell AFB, KS for the St Louis ANG. Carrier is "FFHS" TCN EY968050960015XXX, Bill of lading #S0302A0015376, Container #382.

V/R,

Eric M. Adams

AIM-9X SSM

WR-ALC/LMMM Logistics  
DSN 468-9696  
COML (478) 926-9696  
FAX - 5914

eric.adams@robins.af.mil

## 131<sup>st</sup> Fighter Wing Homeland Defense Support

### PURPOSE:

The following data describes the amount of support that the 131<sup>st</sup> Fighter Wing has provided for Homeland Defense.

### DISCUSSION:

#### 1. Table description.

- a. The number of days the 131<sup>st</sup> Fighter Wing was tasked with ground alert (GDCA - Ground Defensive Counter Air) in support of Homeland Defense.
- b. The number of actual missions flown (includes DCA - Defensive Counter Air, number of A/C - aircraft flown, and number of tot hrs - total hours flown)

Date	GDCA	DCA	A/C	Tot Hrs	Notes
12-Sep-01	X	X	3	4.4	
13-Sep-01	X				
2-Sep-03					Verbal Approval for Live Munitions (ANG/XOSW)
4-Sep-03		X	2	9.6	
5-Sep-03		X	2	8.4	
23-Sep-03					Verbal Approval of ONE Site Plan (ANG/XOSW)
6-May-04					Holding Area for Munitions (HAM) Operational
7-May-04		X	2	11.0	
14-May-04		X	3	7.8	
20-Jul-04		X	2	9.8	
21-Jul-04		HHQ CNX			President trip cut short
22-Jul-04		X	2	7.8	
30-Jul-04		X	2	8.0	
5-Aug-04		X	2	13.4	
6-Aug-04	X				
7-Aug-04	X				
8-Aug-04	X				
9-Aug-04	X	X	2	10.8	
10-Aug-04	X				
11-Aug-04	X				
12-Aug-04	X				
13-Aug-04	X	X	2	4.8	
14-Aug-04	X	X	2	4.2	
15-Aug-04	X	X	2	10.8	
16-Aug-04	X	X	2	5.4	
17-Aug-04	X				
18-Aug-04	X				
19-Aug-04	X				
20-Aug-04	X	X	2	3.8	
21-Aug-04	X				
22-Aug-04	X	X	2	5.2	
23-Aug-04	X	X	2	5.6	

131<sup>st</sup> Fighter Wing Homeland Defense Support

Date	GDCA	DCA	A/C	Tot Hrs	Notes
24-Aug-04	X				E-mailed approval for ONE Site Plan (ANG/XOSW)
25-Aug-04	X	X	2	4.2	
26-Aug-04	X				
27-Aug-04	X	X	2	4.8	
28-Aug-04	X	X	2	9.8	
29-Aug-04	X	X	2	10.6	
30-Aug-04	X				
31-Aug-04	X	X	2	8.0	
1-Sep-04	X				
2-Sep-04	X				
3-Sep-04	X	X	2	9.8	
4-Sep-04	X				
5-Sep-04	X	X	2	4.4	
6-Sep-04	X				
7-Sep-04	X	X	2	8.8	
8-Sep-04	X	X	2	10.0	
9-Sep-04	X				
10-Sep-04	X				
11-Sep-04	X				
12-Sep-04	X	X	2	10.6	
13-Sep-04	X	X	2	3.6	
14-Sep-04	X				
15-Sep-04	X				
16-Sep-04	X				
17-Sep-04	X	X	2	10.4	
18-Sep-04	X	X	2	5.0	
19-Sep-04	X				
20-Sep-04	X				
21-Sep-04	X	X	2	10.4	
22-Sep-04	X				
23-Sep-04	X				
24-Sep-04	X	X	2	10.2	
25-Sep-04	X				
26-Sep-04	X				
27-Sep-04	X	X	2	7.8	
28-Sep-04	X				
29-Sep-04	X	X	2	9.9	
30-Sep-04	X				
1-Oct-04	X				
2-Oct-04	X				
3-Oct-04	X	X	2	10.2	
4-Oct-04	X	X	2	9.8	
5-Oct-04	X				
6-Oct-04	X				
7-Oct-04	X				

131<sup>st</sup> Fighter Wing Homeland Defense Support

Date	GDCA	DCA	A/C	Tot Hrs	Notes
8-Oct-04	X				
9-Oct-04	X				
10-Oct-04	X				
11-Oct-04	X				
12-Oct-04	X				
13-Oct-04	X				
14-Oct-04	X				
15-Oct-04	X	X	2	7.0	
15-Oct-04	X				
17-Oct-04	X				
18-Oct-04	X				Written approval for ONE Site Plan (ANG/XOSW)
19-Oct-04	X	WX CNX			Weather cancelled
20-Oct-04	X				
21-Oct-04	X				
22-Oct-04	X				
23-Oct-04	X				
24-Oct-04	X	X	2	9.8	
25-Oct-04	X	X	2	8.2	
26-Oct-04	X				
27-Oct-04	X				
27-Oct-04	X				
28-Oct-04	X				
29-Oct-04	X				
30-Oct-04	X				
30-Oct-04	X				
31-Oct-04	X				
1-Nov-04	X	X	2	13.4	
2-Nov-04	X				
3-Nov-04	X				
4-Nov-04	X				
5-Nov-04	X				
6-Nov-04	X				
7-Nov-04	X				
8-Nov-04	X				
9-Nov-04	X				
10-Nov-04	X				
11-Nov-04	X				
12-Nov-04	X				
13-Nov-04	X				
14-Nov-04	X	X	2	3.8	
15-Nov-04	X				Alert Shelters Operational
16-Nov-04	X				
17-Nov-04	X				
18-Nov-04	X				

131<sup>st</sup> Fighter Wing Homeland Defense Support

Date	GDCA	DCA	A/C	Tot Hrs	Notes
19-Nov-04	X				
20-Nov-04	X				
21-Nov-04	X				
22-Nov-04	X				
23-Nov-04	X				
24-Nov-04	X				
27-Dec-04					Pilot / Maintenance Living Facilities Operational
7-Jan-05		X	2	8.6	
4-Feb-05		X	2	7.8	
4-Mar-05		X	2	12.4	
10-Mar-05		X	2	7.6	
30-Mar-05		X	2	10.4	
15-Apr-05		X	2	13.6	
19-Apr-05		X	2	7.8	
6-May-05					Claxon System Operational
2-Jun-05		X	2	7.2	
2-Jun-05		X	2	6.0	

2. Totals derived from table above.

- a. 115 - Total Number of Days Spent on Ground Alert
- b. 50 - Total Number of Homeland Defense Missions Flown (not sorties)
- c. 102 - Total Number of Homeland Defense Sorties Flown
- d. 412.7 - Total Number of Homeland Defense Hours Flown
- e. 127 - Total Days of Support

## 131FW Alert Cost Breakdown

**PURPOSE:**

The following data describes the effort (time and money) that the 131<sup>st</sup> Fighter Wing has done to support Homeland Defense.

**Discussion:**

Note: all items paid for by 131FW except where noted

Item	Qty	Cost/Unit	Total
Blast-guard windows North side (paid for by 1AF)	1	\$40,570.75	\$40,570.75
New Doors for Hangar 1 (paid for by 1AF)	1	\$5,000.00	\$5,000.00
HAM construction (paid for by 1AF)	1	\$51,127.00	\$51,127.00
Lightning protection for HAM	1	\$7,215.00	\$7,215.00
Big Top Shelters	1	\$285,870.00	\$285,870.00
Lightning protection for Shelters	1	\$16,245.00	\$16,245.00
Utility work for pilot and MX trailers	1	\$113,387.24	\$113,387.24
Trailer cost	1	\$159,304.00	\$159,304.00
Equipment for trailers	1	\$42,000.00	\$42,000.00
Alarm/Claxon equipment and installation	1	\$144,446.00	\$144,446.00
Removal of old Taxi lines	1	\$2,370.00	\$2,370.00
<b>COMM Expenditures</b>			
Hot lines, phones, cable and parts	1	\$825.31	\$825.31
Fiber, Cat 5, Wall jacks and connectors	1	\$1,312.99	\$1,312.99
Coax cable, connectors and parts	1	\$386.88	\$386.88
Computers (5), Laser Printers (3), Siprnet Terminal (1 MOC)	1	\$14,827.97	\$14,827.97
Base Stations	2	\$2,600.00	\$5,200.00
<b>COMM Equipment provided -- already on hand</b>			
Comdial Key systems, Patch panels, racks, UPS, Antennas, switches	1	\$3,615.00	\$3,615.00
UHF Antenna, Calbes, Pwer strips, PA wire and parts	1	\$1,075.00	\$1,075.00
<b>Pilot Trailer Computers</b>			
LAN accessible computers with 17 inch monitors	2	\$1,280.39	\$2,560.78
SIPRNET computer w/removeable hard drive w/17" monitor w/APC 1400	1	\$1,161.39	\$1,161.39
KIV-7, Cisco Router and Rack for SIPRNET Terminal (See Note Below)	1	\$15,000.00	\$15,000.00
Universal Power Supply (UPS)	1	\$1,000.00	\$1,000.00
Classified shredder	1	\$1,195.00	\$1,195.00
Classified printer for SIPRNET computer	1	\$807.91	\$807.91
Secure capable Facsimile (FAX) machine	1	\$3,160.00	\$3,160.00
<b>Pilot Trailer Telephones</b>			
Secure Telephone (STE) & Fortezza Cards (one extra STE as a spare)	2	\$3,500.00	\$7,000.00
ES-500 UPS for the STE	1	\$70.00	\$70.00
Phone in each bedroom	2	\$0.00	\$0.00
Phone in the office	1	\$0.00	\$0.00

131FW Alert Cost Breakdown


Item	Qty	Cost/Unit	Total
<b>Land Mobile Radios (LMRs)</b>			
XTS-3000 Motorola LMR with encryption capability	6	\$3,900.00	\$23,400.00
6-bay LMR battery charger	1	\$1,000.00	\$1,000.00
Spare LMR batteries	6	\$100.00	\$600.00
Motorola Base Station	1	\$4,000.00	\$4,000.00
<b>Overall TOTAL</b>			<b>\$955,733.22</b>



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# Aircraft Shelters



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# Aircraft Shelters




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
# Living Quarters for 24/7 Alert



FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY



# Living Quarters for 24/7 Alert




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# Alarm Components



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# Marquee Located in trailers





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# Klaxon System on Ramp




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# Light System on Ramp



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# Scott AFB Long Term Missile Storage utilized by the 131st



Talking Paper On Infrastructure For ONE  
(PowerPoint Briefing)

**PURPOSE:**

This briefing is a pictorial explanation of the current alert capabilities of Lambert Field and the 131<sup>st</sup> Fighter Wing. Since the spring of 2003, the 131<sup>st</sup> Fighter Wing has steadily built alert facilities to accommodate a 24/7 alert posture. The 131<sup>st</sup> Fighter Wing has spent over \$800,000.00 in this effort, with some of the funding coming from 1<sup>st</sup> Air Force.

**DISCUSSION:**

1. Slide 1:
  - a. This slide depicts the location of the Holding Area for Munitions (HAM) on our ramp.
  
2. Slide 2:
  - a. This holding area is located on our flight line.
  - b. It provides "Long-Term" temporary storage for air-to-air missiles.
  - c. When there is no current or imminent ONE tasking, the missiles are stored at Scott AFB.
  
3. Slide 3:
  - a. The circled positions on this slide represent the locations we are cleared to park aircraft loaded with live munitions.
  - b. These spots have shelters on them to prevent incimate weather from stopping alert operations.
  
4. Slide 4:
  - a. A photo of the five parking spots with shelters.
  - b. The HAM is at far end behind the last shelter.
  
5. Slide 5:
  - a. Head on view of the shelters.
  - b. Note the lighting system in the shelter. This allows work to go on day or night, in all weather.
  
6. Slide 6:
  - a. This slide has a photo of the facility constructed for the pilots to sit alert 24/7.
  - b. It has living quarters for 9 pilots to live in indefinitely, complete with office space, kitchen, living and sleeping quarters.
  - c. It also has the connectivity required of an alert facility including STU-III phones, UHF radio, Air Force Mission Support System Computer, and hot lines.
  
7. Slide 7:
  - a. This picture depicts the living quarters for our maintenance contingent to sit alert 24/7.
  - b. It can accommodate 13 maintainers living in it indefinitely.
  - c. It has complete living quarters to include office space, kitchen, living and sleeping quarters.

Talking Paper On Infrastructure For ONE  
(PowerPoint Briefing)

8. Slide 8:

- a. This slide depicts the layout of the ramp with all associated alarm components.
- b. Note there are multiple locations for the klaxons to give complete coverage on our ramp.
- c. These have been operationally checked with several F-15's running at once, and the warning can be heard at all locations on the ramp.
- d. Each living facility has a marquee display to give a visual representation to the pilots and maintainers of the scramble order.
- e. Each living facility also has a warning klaxon that goes off inside the facility.
- f. The facilities are located on the map as green boxes.
- g. On the flight line there is also a light tree to give a visual cue of the scramble order.

9. Slide 9:

- a. This marquee is located in every trailer

10. Slide 10:

- a. Examples of two of the klaxons on the ramp.

11. Slide 11:

- a. The light tree that gives a visual cue of the scramble order.
- b. Once a scramble is commanded from the base command post, the appropriate light will illuminate and the klaxons will sound off.
- c. At the sound of the klaxons, the maintenance personnel and the pilots scramble to the aircraft. They can read the marquee or look at the light tree for the type of scramble to be accomplished.

12. Slide 12:

- a. This photo is of the igloos utilized at Scott AFB for long-term storage of a portion of our munitions.
- b. The 131<sup>st</sup> Fighter Wing is located approximately 35 minutes driving time from Scott AFB. This allows quick access to the munitions at any time.
- c. The 131<sup>st</sup> Fighter Wing currently "rents" 3 igloos for storage of air-to-air missiles.

## Homeland Defense

### **BCEG was unaware St. Louis is capable of performing the homeland alert defense mission**

- BRAC Report, Volume 1, Part 2.
  - There are numerous instances in this BRAC report where homeland defense was cited either for keeping a base open, or keeping an alert detachment at the site. In several cases, a base with a low military value was kept open explicitly for homeland defense. We can only assume the BCEG was unaware of the fact the 131 FW was also performing the homeland defense mission.
- BCEG meeting minutes
  - We could find no evidence in the BCEG minutes that the committee was aware of St Louis performing the Homeland Defense mission.
- BCEG unaware of St. Louis participation in the Homeland Defense mission
  - From careful study of the BRAC report, it would appear St Louis was a re-alignment candidate early in the process, possibly after the first look.

BCEG unaware of the 131 FW role in homeland defense as evidenced by BRAC Vol 1 Part 2 report

PURPOSE:

The following information discusses information gathered that indicates the BCEG was unaware of the 131 FW role in homeland defense.

DISCUSSION:

There are numerous instances in this BRAC report where homeland defense was cited either for keeping a base open, or keeping an alert detachment at the site. In several cases, a base with a low military value was kept open explicitly for homeland defense. We can only assume the BCEG was unaware of the fact the 131 FW was also performing the homeland defense mission.

1. On page 9 of the report (Ft Smith Air Guard Station, AR, and Luke Air Force Base, AZ), discusses the move of Fort Smith's F-16s to Fresno, it states in the justification section "Military value played the predominant role coupled with homeland defense".
2. Page 14 and 25 of the report states a need for an alert Detachment at Barnes AGS, MA when Otis closes.
3. This same page makes no mention of St Louis performing the homeland defense mission when describing the re-alignment of the F-15s to Atlantic City and Nellis AFB. Had the BCEG known the 131 FW has a role in the homeland defense mission, it is quite doubtful they would have moved combat coded aircraft from a homeland defense mission to become an aggressor simulator at Nellis AFB. Surely there are other aircraft that could perform the aggressor simulator mission that do not affect the number one strategic objective of homeland defense.
4. Page 30 has a good example of a base with low military value remaining open for the homeland defense mission. It concerns moving Great Falls F-16s to Des Moines, IA. Des Moines ranks 137 in MV, and Great Falls MV is 117. F-16's are downsizing, so it would appear one of the bases would lose its aircraft. Using the BRAC guide of going with a better military value (as the BCEG did with Barnes and Bradley), one would assume Great Falls would remain flying F-16s. However, the report states "Although Des Moines was somewhat lower in military value ranking that (sic) Great Falls, the realignment to Des Moines creates a more effective unit of 18 aircraft". This in itself does not justify keeping Des Moines flying, since it would appear putting 18 aircraft at Des Moines would override military value. However, on page 40 of this document, it states "While not currently tasked with a Homeland Defense role, Des Moines (137) is located within the specified response timing criteria of a Homeland Security site of interest." This would infer that Des Moines' *potential* for homeland defense actually overrode MV in this decision. If merely having potential for homeland defense overrides MV, what should be done with a base that is actually performing the homeland defense mission?

personnel from Kulis AGS. This recommendation also distributes a portion of the F-15C/Ds at Elmendorf Air Force Base (36-fighter) to Langley Air Force Base (2-fighter). Elmendorf retains one squadron (18 aircraft) for air sovereignty missions and distributes the remaining 24 F-15Cs to Langley Air Force Base.

**Payback:** The total estimated one-time cost to the Department of Defense to implement this recommendation is \$81.4M. The net of all costs and savings to the Department during the implementation period is a savings of \$20.6M. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$17.3M, with payback expected in 4 years. The net present value of the cost and savings to the Department over 20 years is a savings of \$146.7M.

**Economic Impact on Communities:** Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 1,470 jobs (848 direct jobs and 622 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Anchorage, AK, Metropolitan Statistical economic area, which is 0.7 percent of economic area employment. The aggregate economic impact of all recommended actions on this economic region of influence was considered and is at Appendix B of Volume I.

**Community Infrastructure Assessment:** A review of the community attributes indicates no issues regarding the ability of the infrastructure of the communities to support forces, missions and personnel. There are no known community infrastructure impediments to implementation of all recommendations affecting the installations in this recommendation.

**Environmental Impact:** Langley Air Force Base is in a National Ambient Air Quality Standards nonattainment area for ozone (8-hr, marginal). A preliminary assessment indicates that a conformity determination may be required to verify that positive conformity can be achieved. Costs to mitigate this impact have been included in the payback calculation and this is not expected to be an impediment to the implementation of this recommendation. There are also potential impacts to air quality; cultural, archeological, or tribal resources; land use constraints or sensitive resource areas; noise; waste management; water resources; and wetlands that may need to be considered during the implementation of this recommendation. There are no anticipated impacts to dredging; marine mammals, resources, or sanctuaries; or threatened and endangered species or critical habitat. Impacts of costs include \$1.5M in costs for environmental compliance and waste management. These costs were included in the payback calculation. There are no anticipated impacts to the costs of environmental restoration. The aggregate environmental impact of all recommended BRAC actions affecting the installations in this recommendation have been reviewed. There are no known environmental impediments to the implementation of this recommendation.

### **Fort Smith Air Guard Station, AR, and Luke Air Force Base, AZ**

**Recommendation:** Realign Fort Smith Municipal Airport (MAP) Air Guard Station (AGS), AR. Distribute the 188th Fighter Wing's (ANG) F-16s to the 144th Fighter Wing (ANG) Fresno Air Terminal AGS, CA (seven aircraft) and retirement (eight aircraft). The 144th Fighter Wing's F-16s (15 aircraft) retire. The wing's expeditionary combat support (ECS) elements remain in

place. Fire fighter positions realign to Tulsa, OK, and the Home Station Training Site moves to Savannah, GA. Realign Luke Air Force Base, AZ. The 56th Fighter Wing, Luke Air Force Base, AZ, distributes its F-16 Block 25s (13 aircraft) and F-16 Block 42s (24 aircraft) to retirement. The 944th Fighter Wing distributes its F-16s to the 144th Fighter Wing at Fresno (11 aircraft).

**Justification:** Military value played the predominant role coupled with homeland defense. The Air Force recommendation realigns 15 aircraft from Fort Smith (110) to Fresno (87), which supports the homeland defense Air Sovereignty Alert mission. Additionally, this recommendation helps align the eight different F-16 models across the Air Force. Finally, this recommendation makes experienced Airmen available to support the new ANG flying training unit created at Little Rock Air Force Base, AR.

**Payback:** The total estimated one-time cost to the Department of Defense to implement this recommendation is \$17.6M. The net of all costs and savings to the Department during the implementation period is a cost of \$12.4M. Annual recurring savings to the Department after implementation are \$1.4M with a payback expected in 16 years. The net present value of the costs and savings to the Department over 20 years is a savings of \$2.0M.

**Economic Impact on Communities:** Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 134 jobs (78 direct jobs and 56 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Fort Smith, AR-OK, Metropolitan Statistical economic area, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment.

Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 386 jobs (184 direct jobs and 202 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ, Metropolitan Statistical economic area, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment.

The aggregate economic impact of all recommended actions on these economic regions of influence was considered and is at Appendix B of Volume I.

**Community Infrastructure Assessment:** A review of community attributes indicates no issues regarding the ability of the infrastructure of the communities to support missions, forces and personnel. There are no known community infrastructure impediments to implementation of all recommendations affecting the installations in this recommendation.

**Environmental Impact:** There are potential impacts to air quality; cultural, archeological, or tribal resources; land use constraints or sensitive resource areas; marine mammals, resources, or sanctuaries; noise; threatened and endangered species or critical habitat; and wetlands that may need to be considered during the implementation of this recommendation. There are no anticipated impacts to dredging; waste management; or water resources. Impacts of costs include \$0.3M in costs for environmental compliance and waste management. These costs were included in the payback calculation. There are no anticipated impacts to the costs of environmental restoration. The aggregate environmental impact of all recommended BRAC

**Bradley International Airport Air Guard Station, CT, Barnes Air Guard Station, MA,  
Selfridge Air National Guard Base, MI, Shaw Air Force Base, SC,  
and Martin State Air Guard Station, MD**

**Recommendation:** Realign Bradley International Airport Air Guard Station, CT. The A-10s assigned to the 103d Fighter Wing will be distributed to the 104th Fighter Wing, Barnes Municipal Airport Air Guard Station, MA (nine aircraft) and retirement (six aircraft). The wing's expeditionary combat support (ECS) elements will remain in place at Bradley and Bradley will retain capability to support a Homeland Defense mission. Realign Barnes Air Guard Station, MA; Selfridge ANGB, MI; Shaw Air Force Base, SC; and Martin State Airport Air Guard Station, MD, by relocating base-level TF-34 engine intermediate maintenance to Bradley, establishing a Centralized Intermediate Repair Facility (CIRF) at Bradley for TF-34 engines.

**Justification:** Barnes (97) and Bradley (98) are located approximately 12 miles apart. The Air Force placed one full squadron at Barnes because it ranked higher in military value. By combining the two units into one squadron the Air Force retains the trained A-10 pilots and maintenance technicians in the area and creates an optimum-sized and more effective squadron. The recommendation to close Otis ANGB, MA, generated a requirement to build an air sovereignty alert (ASA) site in the region. The Air Force priced an alert facility at both Barnes and Bradley, and chose Bradley on the basis of lower cost. The Bradley ECS elements remain in place to support the ASA mission.

Establishing a CIRF at Bradley for TF-34 engine maintenance compliments the realignment of the A-10 fleet. The CIRF at Bradley will consolidate TF-34 engine maintenance for ANG A-10 aircraft from Barnes, Selfridge, Martin State and active duty aircraft at Spangdahlem, Germany. Establishing this CIRF at Bradley rather than at Barnes avoids relocation of a hush house facility at an estimated cost of \$3.5M, and avoids construction of additional 18,000 square feet of maintenance facilities already existing at Bradley and that will be available.

**Payback:** The total estimated one-time cost to the Department of Defense to implement this recommendation is \$3.2M. The net of all costs and savings to the Department during the implementation period is a savings of \$6.1M. Annual recurring savings to the Department after implementation are \$2.0M with a payback expected in two years. The net present value of the costs and savings to the Department over 20 years is a savings of \$25.2M.

**Economic Impact on Communities:** Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 154 jobs (92 direct jobs and 62 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Hartford-West-East Hartford, CT, Metropolitan Statistical economic area, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment.

Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 7 jobs (4 direct jobs and 3 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Warren-Farmington Hills-Troy, MI, economic area, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment.

are \$8.7M, with payback expected in one year. The net present value of the cost and savings to the Department over 20 years is a savings of \$97.1M.

**Economic Impact on Communities:** Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 229 jobs (119 direct jobs and 110 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Baltimore-Towson, MD, Metropolitan Statistical economic area, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment. The aggregate economic impact of all recommended actions on this economic region of influence was considered and is at Appendix B of Volume I.

**Community Infrastructure Assessment:** A review of community attributes indicates no issues regarding the ability of the infrastructure of the communities to support missions, forces, and personnel. There are no known community infrastructure impediments to implementation of all recommendations affecting the installations in this recommendation.

**Environmental Impact:** There are potential impacts to air quality; cultural, archeological, or tribal resources; land use constraints or sensitive resource areas; noise; threatened and endangered species or critical habitat; water resources; and wetlands that may need to be considered during the implementation of this recommendation. There are no anticipated impacts to dredging; marine mammals, resources, or sanctuaries; or waste management. Impacts of costs include \$0.09M in costs for environmental compliance and waste management. These costs were included in the payback calculation. There are no anticipated impacts to the costs of environmental restoration. The aggregate environmental impact of all recommended BRAC actions affecting the installations in this recommendation have been reviewed. There are no known environmental impediments to the implementation of this recommendation.

#### **Otis Air National Guard Base, MA, Lambert St. Louis International Airport Air Guard Station, MO, and Atlantic City Air Guard Station, NJ**

**Recommendation:** Close Otis ANGB, MA. The 102d Fighter Wing's F-15s will be distributed to the 125th Fighter Wing, Jacksonville International Airport Air Guard Station, FL (three aircraft), and 177th Fighter Wing, Atlantic City International Airport Air Guard Station, NJ (12 aircraft). The 253d Combat Communications Group, and 267th Communications Squadron will remain in place at Otis, with 104th Fighter Wing at Barnes providing administrative support as the parent wing. An air sovereignty alert (ASA) facility will be constructed at Bradley International Airport Air Guard Station, CT. Firefighter positions from Otis will move to Barnes Municipal Airport Air Guard Station, MA.

Realign Lambert-St. Louis International Airport Air Guard Station, St. Louis, MO. The 131st Fighter Wing's F-15s (15 aircraft) will distribute to the 57th Fighter Wing, Nellis Air Force Base, NV (nine aircraft), and 177th Fighter Wing, Atlantic City International Airport Air Guard Station, NJ (six aircraft). Realign Atlantic City International Airport Air Guard Station, NJ. The 177th Fighter Wing's F-16s will be distributed to the 158th Fighter Wing, Burlington International Airport Air Guard Station, VT (three aircraft), and retire (12 aircraft). The wing's expeditionary combat support (ECS) elements will remain in place. Firefighter positions move

to Scott Air Force Base, IL. The 157 Air Operations Group (AOG) and the 218th Engineering Installation Group (EIG) will relocate from Jefferson Barracks geographically separated unit (GSU) into space at Lambert International. Jefferson Barracks real property accountability will transfer to the Army.

**Justification:** The Air Force distributed reserve component F-15C force structure to bases with higher military value than Otis (88) and Lambert-St. Louis (127). The F-15C aircraft are realigned to Nellis (13), Jacksonville Air Guard Station (24), and Atlantic City Air Guard Station (61). The Nellis bound aircraft will help form an enhanced aggressor squadron for Operation RED FLAG and the Atlantic City bound aircraft will provide expanded capability for the Homeland Defense mission.

**Payback:** The total estimated one-time cost to the Department of Defense to implement this recommendation is \$103.0M. The net of all costs and savings to the Department during the implementation period is a savings of \$12.2M. Annual recurring savings to the Department after implementation are \$33.6M with a payback expected in three years. The net present value of the costs and savings to the Department over 20 years is a savings of \$336.1M.

**Economic Impact on Communities:** Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 827 jobs (505 direct jobs and 322 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Barnstable Town, MA, Metropolitan Statistical economic area, which is 0.6 percent of economic area employment.

Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 510 jobs (249 direct jobs and 261 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the St. Louis, MS-IL, Metropolitan Statistical economic area, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment.

The aggregate economic impact of all recommended actions on these economic regions of influence was considered and is at Appendix B of Volume 1.

**Community Infrastructure Assessment:** A review of community attributes indicates no issues regarding the ability of the infrastructure of the communities to support missions, forces and personnel. There are no known community infrastructure impediments to implementation of all recommendations affecting the installations in this recommendation.

**Environmental Impact:** Nellis Air Force Base is in a National Ambient Air Quality Standards nonattainment area for carbon monoxide (serious), particulate matter (PM10, serious), and ozone (8-hr, subpart 1). A preliminary assessment indicates that a conformity determination may be required to verify that positive conformity can be achieved. Costs to mitigate this potential impact have been included in the payback calculation and this is not expected to be an impediment to the implementation of this recommendation. There are also potential impacts to air quality; cultural, archeological, or tribal resources; land use constraints or sensitive resource areas; noise; threatened and endangered species or critical habitat; waste management; and wetlands that may need to be considered during the implementation of this recommendation. There are no anticipated impacts to dredging; marine mammals, resources, or sanctuaries; or

## Great Falls International Airport Air Guard Station, MT

**Recommendation:** Realign Great Falls International Airport Air Guard Station, MT. Distribute the 120th Fighter Wing's F-16s to the 187th Fighter Wing, Dannelly Field Air Guard Station, AL (three aircraft); the 132d Fighter Wing, Des Moines International Airport Air Guard Station, IA (three aircraft); and retire (nine aircraft). The wing's expeditionary combat support (ECS) elements remain in place.

**Justification:** Great Falls (117) ranked low in military value. The reduction in F-16 force structure and the need to align common versions of the F-16 at the same bases argued for realigning F-16s out of Great Falls. The F-16s realign to Dannelly (60) and Des Moines (137). Although Des Moines was somewhat lower in military value ranking than Great Falls, the realignment to Des Moines creates a more effective unit of 18 aircraft. The wing's ECS will remain in place to support the Air Expeditionary Force and to retain trained, experienced Air National Guard personnel.

**Payback:** The total estimated one-time cost to the Department of Defense to implement this recommendation is \$9.3M. The net of all costs and savings to the Department during the implementation period is a savings of \$0.7M. Annual recurring savings to the Department after implementation are \$1.8M with a payback expected in four years. The net present value of the costs and savings to the Department over 20 years is a savings of \$18.1M.

**Economic Impact on Communities:** Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 174 jobs (107 direct jobs and 67 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Great Falls, MT, Metropolitan Statistical economic area, which is 0.4 percent of economic area employment. The aggregate economic impact of all recommended actions on this economic region of influence was considered and is at Appendix B of Volume I.

**Community Infrastructure Assessment:** A review of community attributes indicates no issues regarding the ability of the infrastructure of the communities to support forces, missions, and personnel. There are no known community infrastructure impediments to implementation of all recommendations affecting the installations in this recommendation.

**Environmental Impact:** There are potential impacts to air quality; cultural, archeological, or tribal resources; land use constraints or sensitive resource areas; noise; and wetlands that may need to be considered during the implementation of this recommendation. There are no anticipated impacts to dredging; marine mammals, resources, or sanctuaries; threatened and endangered species or critical habitat; waste management; or water resources. Impacts of costs include \$0.4M in costs for environmental compliance and waste management. These costs were included in the payback calculation. There are no anticipated impacts to the costs of environmental restoration. The aggregate environmental impact of all recommended BRAC actions affecting the installations in this recommendation have been reviewed. There are no known environmental impediments to the implementation of this recommendation.

is 0.7 percent of economic area employment. The aggregate economic impact of all recommended actions on this economic region of influence was considered and is at Appendix B of Volume I.

**Community Infrastructure Assessment:** A review of community attributes indicates no issues regarding the ability of the infrastructure of the communities to support missions, forces and personnel. There are no known community infrastructure impediments to implementation of all recommendations affecting the installations in this recommendation.

**Environmental Impact:** There are potential impacts to air quality; cultural, archeological, or tribal resources; land use constraints or sensitive resource areas; noise; waste management; water resources; and wetlands that may need to be considered during the implementation of this recommendation. There are no anticipated impacts to dredging; marine mammals, resources, or sanctuaries; or threatened and endangered species or critical habitat. Impacts of costs include \$0.2M in costs for environmental compliance and waste management. These costs were included in the payback calculation. There are no anticipated impacts to the costs of environmental restoration. The aggregate environmental impact of all recommended BRAC actions affecting the installations in this recommendation have been reviewed. There are no known environmental impediments to the implementation of this recommendation.

### **Springfield-Beckley Municipal Airport Air Guard Station, OH**

**Recommendation:** Realign Springfield-Beckley Municipal Airport Air Guard Station, OH. Distribute the 178th Fighter Wing's F-16 aircraft to the 132d Fighter Wing, Des Moines International Airport Air Guard Station, IA (nine aircraft); the 140th Wing (ANG), Buckley Air Force Base, CO (three aircraft) and 149th Fighter Wing (ANG), Lackland Air Force Base, TX (six aircraft), but retain The wing's expeditionary combat support (ECS) elements, the 251st Combat Communications Group (ANG) and 269th Combat Communications Squadron (ANG) in place, and relocate the wing's firefighter positions will move to Rickenbacker Air Guard Station, OH.

**Justification:** The decision to realign Springfield-Beckley's F-16s and not replace force structure at Springfield-Beckley is based on considerations of military value and all other available information. Buckley (64) and Lackland (47) have higher military value than Springfield-Beckley (128), and Buckley has a role in the Homeland Defense mission. This recommendation optimizes the squadron size at Lackland, the only ANG F-16 Flying Training Unit. While not currently tasked with a Homeland Defense role, Des Moines (137) is located within the specified response timing criteria of a Homeland Security site of interest. The 132d Fighter Wing, Des Moines International Airport Air Guard Station will assume a role in the air sovereignty mission.


**Payback:** The total estimated one-time cost to the Department of Defense to implement this recommendation is \$11.4M. The net of all costs and savings to the Department during the implementation period is a cost of \$8.4M. Annual recurring savings to the Department after

## BCEG Unaware Of St Louis Participation In The Homeland Defense Mission

### PURPOSE:

The following information discusses the BRAC deliberative process and why we felt the 131 FW may have been eliminated during the “first look”. The 131 FW believes its capacity analysis and MCI rating may have been incorrectly calculated (see the BRAC Process section of this report for a more detailed discussion) and that the BCEG did not realize St Louis was performing the homeland defense mission, which is one of the Air Force imperatives.

### DISCUSSION:



1. As we know, the process started with a capacity analysis being done for each base in the current force structure. Additionally, each base supplied WIDGET data to measure specific attributes that determine MCI ratings with a military value ultimately being assigned. Lastly each base was compared to specific AF imperatives to identify mission essential bases. Once these three sets of data were accounted for, the deliberation process began.
2. As can be seen, if a base did not meet the desired capacity analysis, was ranked low in military value, and did not meet an imperative, it subsequently became a candidate for realignment or closure.
3. Data was not available to determine exactly where the 131 FW came into play in these scenarios. It can only be surmised that due to our low military value, low capacity calculations, and our inability to meet the AF imperative to provide air sovereignty basing to meet the site protection and response time criteria stipulated by

## BCEG Unaware Of St Louis Participation In The Homeland Defense Mission

USNORTHCOM and USPACOM, the 131 FW was not considered for the deliberative process.

4. Knowing this, it is suspected that the 131 FW was considered a candidate for re-alignment or closure during the first look.
5. Overall, this should not have occurred. We feel the 131 FW did not get credit for all its capacity as stated in the "BRAC Process" section of this document. Additionally, miscalculations of military value were caused by incomplete or incorrect data entered into the WIDGET program. If the BCEG had known the 131 FW contributes to the homeland defense mission, we feel we would not have been recommended for re-alignment since this would have overridden the capacity and the military value issues.