



Cost Calculations

The Secretary of Defense substantially deviated from final criteria 4 and 5 because criteria attributes did not accurately measure or reflect the cost of operations, manpower impact, and cost savings. The recommendation to realign Lambert IAP AGS is inconsistent with final criteria.

- 131st is the lowest cost provider for F15C coverage - Substantial deviation from MV-4
 - BRAC weighting criteria did not measure a unit's true military value
 - The reserve component is more cost effective than the active duty
 - The 131 FW provides the most experience, for the least cost of any unit in the CAF
- The loss of 131 FW human capital will reduce CAF operational capabilities
 - The 131st Fighter Wing is the most experienced F-15 unit in the CAF
 - 131 FW pilot experience levels in dollar terms
 - Cost associated with transitioning a current F-16 pilot to the F-15
 - Costs associated with reserve component pilots versus active duty pilots
- No return on investment by realigning the 131st Fighter Wing - Substantial deviation from MV-5
 - Slide 1: No payback by closing Lambert-St. Louis IAP AGS
 - Slide 2: Closing Otis ANGB saves \$379M
 - Slide 3: No payback until 2071 by realigning the 131 FW
 - Slide 4 & 5: Bundling 131 FW with Otis ANG hides the \$27 Million cost of realigning the 131 FW
- COBRA makes inaccurate assumptions and underestimates the total cost associated with realigning and closing reserve component bases
 - COBRA assumes people follow manpower position moves
 - COBRA does not factor in SATAF aircraft acceptance costs
 - 131 FW annual recurring costs

Cost Calculations

131st Fighter Wing is the lowest cost provider for F15C coverage – Substantial deviation from MV-4

- BRAC weighting criteria did not measure a unit's true military value
 - Only 2.5% of a unit's military value score was attributed to cost factors. Using more pertinent cost factor questions would have significantly affected the 131st Fighter Wing's military value score.
- The reserve component is more cost effective than the active duty
 - The reserve component is inexpensive compared to the active duty. By 2011, the reserve component portion has not provided any Air Force savings, in fact, is a \$50M cost. After 20 years, only 11% of the total savings is attributed to the 83 reserve component bases (54%) being affected.
- The 131 FW provides the most experience, for the least cost of any unit in the CAF
 - The 131 FW has the lowest cost per flying hour and the smallest yearly budget of all ANG F-15 units. The 131 FW has a lower cost per flying hour than an average ACC unit or an AETC unit. The offset in cost per flying hour negates any savings when another ACC or AETC unit flies the 131st Fighter Wing F-15s.

Realigning the 131st Fighter Wing provides zero cost savings!!

131st Fighter Wing Efficiency

PURPOSE:

The following data defines why St. Louis Air National Guard (ANG) is efficient and gives more bang-for-the-buck than other Reserve Component (RC) and Active Duty (AD) units.

DISCUSSION:

1. Weighting

- a. Out of the 4 criteria used to define military value, cost of operations and manpower (MV-4) only contributed 2.5% to a units total military value score.
- b. Questions asked to determine MV-4 focused on the following
 - i. Area Cost Factor
 - ii. Utilities cost rating
 - iii. Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH) Rate
 - iv. GS Locality Pay Rate
- c. No consideration was given to the following:
 - i. Joint runway use
 - ii. Infrastructure maintenance
 - iii. Cost of operations (ie. Cost per Flying Hour)
- d. Using MV-4 criteria, the United States Air Force Academy's cost of operations was less than the 131 FW. Using a common sense approach can this be possible?

Actual Values used for MV-4 calculation (higher score = more expensive)				
	Eglin AFB	McEntire AGS	USAFA	131 FW
<i>1250 - Area Cost Factor</i>	0.80	0.83	1.11	1.09
<i>1269 - Utilities Cost Rating (U3C)</i>	0.93	1.16	0.91	1.18
<i>1402 - BAH Rate</i>	\$1,001	\$1,080	\$1,166	\$1,251
<i>1403 - GS Locality Pay Rate</i>	10.9	10.9	10.9	11.27

MV-4 Cost Factors (Lower score = more expensive)					
	Eglin AFB	McEntire AGS	USAFA	131 FW	Effective % Max Points
<i>1250 - Area Cost Factor</i>	1.21	1.15	0.61	0.64	1.25
<i>1269 - Utilities Cost Rating (U3C)</i>	0.10	0.08	0.10	0.08	0.13
<i>1402 - BAH Rate</i>	0.70	0.64	0.58	0.53	0.88
<i>1403 - GS Locality Pay Rate</i>	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.24	0.25
Totals	2.26	2.12	1.54	1.49	2.51
Table summary - Out of 2.5 points, the 131 FW has the lowest score and, therefore, is considered the most expensive base. Using the suggested criteria (e.g. CPFH or yearly flying budget) would change the MV-4 score and the overall "military value" score					

131st Fighter Wing Efficiency

2. Value of the Guard

- a. The guard is cheap relative to the Active Duty. Out of 154 bases affected, 83 were Reserve Component (RC) bases (54%). AF BRAC data reflects the following....

	AF (154 bases)	RC (83 bases)	%
<i>One Time Cost</i>	\$-1.86B	\$-666M	35%
<i>Cost savings/loss by 2011</i>	\$2.66B	\$-50.9M	----
<i>Annual Recurring Savings</i>	\$1.24B	\$177M	14%
<i>NPV (Net Present Value)</i>	\$14.5B	\$1.64B	11%
Table Summary			
1. By 2011 – Reserve component savings still in the red			
2. Annual RC savings – For 54% of the bases, only 14% of savings			
3. After 20 years (NPV), for 54% of the bases, only 11% of the savings			

- b. In fact, by closing one Cannon AFB (NPV=2.7 billion), the savings far exceed the realigning/closing of 83 reserve component bases.

3. Value of STL

- a. 131st Fighter Wing provides a Homeland Defense capability

	AF (154 bases)	131 FW realignment costs	%
<i>One Time Cost</i>	\$-1.86B	-13.9M	.75%
<i>Cost savings/loss by 2011</i>	\$2.66B	-1.9M	----
<i>Annual Recurring Savings</i>	\$1.24B	3.3M	.26%
Table Summary			
1. Zero savings for moving F-15C's out of St. Louis until after 2012			
2. Assuming no force structure changes for the next 20 years, the annual cost savings for moving 131 FW F-15C's will only amount to \$3.3M			
3. This data reflects the only COBRA data posted on the BRAC website regarding Lambert realignment – earlier COBRA data showing Lambert closure cost information was not available to analyze			
Summary: Moving St. Louis F-15C's provides minimal cost savings at the expense of defending the country			

131st Fighter Wing Efficiency

- b. 131st Fighter Wing is the least expensive, most experienced combat capable F-15 unit to serve the country.
- i. Cost per flying hour (CPFH). 131 FW CPFH vs all ANG F-15 units

Unit	644	609	699	Total
131 FW (St. Louis)	\$4,004	\$810	\$2,361	\$7,175
125FW (Jacksonville)	\$3,976	\$826	\$2,521	\$7,323
142FW (Portland)	\$5,172	\$562	\$2,144	\$7,878
154FW (Hawaii)	\$5,862	\$985	\$2,019	\$8,866
173FW (Kingsley)	\$6,223	\$840	\$2,136	\$9,199
159FW (New Orleans)	\$6,613	\$808	\$2,367	\$9,788
102FW (Otis)	\$8,735	\$646	\$2,219	\$11,600

644 is money to buy rebuilt parts
 609 is money to buy new parts
 699 is money for fuel (AVPOL)

- ii. 131 FW Cost per flying hour (CPFH) vs. ACC & AETC.




Chart Summary: Taking our jets and giving them to an Active Duty unit (ie Nellis AFB) to fly a 3500 hour program would cost the AD \$10,500,000 more per year (3500 hrs x \$3000).

Manning: 131 FW uses 43% of the manpower of an Active Duty unit. To employ the remaining 57% (231 people) would cost \$13,860,000 (231 people x \$60,000).

Summary: Over 10 years = \$ 243,600,000 savings by keeping the 131 FW. (Far exceeds \$3.3M COBRA computed annual recurring savings)

131st Fighter Wing Efficiency

- iii. Yearly flying cost. 131 FW has the least yearly flying hour cost for all ANG F-15 units (4 year average)

Unit	644 / 609	699 / AVPOL	Total
131 FW (St. Louis)	\$16,118,775	\$6,449,900	\$22,568,675
125FW (Jacksonville)	\$19,562,007	\$6,525,075	\$26,087,082
142FW (Portland)	\$19,979,875	\$6,597,575	\$26,577,450
154FW (Hawaii)	\$18,291,790	\$8,391,825	\$26,683,615
173FW (Kingsley)	\$21,379,305	\$7,199,650	\$28,578,955
159FW (New Orleans)	\$21,874,663	\$7,120,475	\$28,995,138
102FW (Otis)	\$23,890,078	\$6,096,900	\$29,986,978

- iv. Annual Budget. 131 FW has the lowest yearly budget of all ANG F-15 bases.

Unit	Total
131 FW (St. Louis)	\$55,102,835
125FW (Jacksonville)	\$58,406,542
173FW (Kingsley)	\$62,283,352
159FW (New Orleans)	\$62,702,000
142FW (Portland)	\$64,356,091
102FW (Otis)	\$93,019,387
154FW (Hawaii)	\$100,780,600

1. 131 FW Leased land = 2 cents per year (51 year lease).

- v. Future facilities. Negotiations currently in progress with city of St. Louis to build new facilities for the 131 FW.
- c. 131 FW is more cost effective than the 2 units forecast to receive 131 FW F-15Cs (Nellis AFB, Atlantic City AGS)
- i. Using MV-4 criteria, 131 FW had a better score than either Nellis AFB or Atlantic City AGS.
 - ii. Using MV-4 criteria, Atlantic City will be the most expensive F-15 ANG base post-BRAC. (Mainly due to Basic Allowance for Housing and GS locality pay rate)
- d. 131st Fighter Wing's joint use runway with St. Louis IAP is cost effective
- i. MV-4 criteria did not take into account joint runway use. As a joint use runway, St. Louis does not incur any cost for the following items.
 1. Fire protection
 2. ATC facilities and personnel
 3. Runway maintenance
 4. Arresting cables maintenance
 5. Airfield lighting
 6. Infield upkeep

Cost Calculations

The loss of 131 FW human capital will reduce CAF operational capabilities

- The 131st Fighter Wing is the most experienced F-15 unit in the CAF
 - The 131st Fighter Wing pilot cadre has amassed over 78,000 total flying hours, 439 years of aviation experience, and almost 3,700 hours of combat time.
- 131 FW pilot experience levels in dollar terms
 - Calculating all basic training, flying hours, and specialty training the 131st Fighter Wing's pilot core is worth \$20M per pilot.
- Cost associated with transitioning a current F-16 pilot to the F-15
 - The cost associated with retraining 30 Atlantic City AGS F-16 pilots to the F-15 amounts to \$22.5M (\$750K per pilot)
- Costs associated with reserve component pilots versus active duty pilots
 - When comparing the costs of training a reserve component pilot to an active duty pilot, it cost more than 3 times as much to have a far less experienced pilot.

The costs associated with attaining 131 FW experience may never be able to be reproduced

Loss of Human Capital

PURPOSE:

The following data describes the loss of human capital for the Air Force if the 131st Fighter Wing is realigned.

DISCUSSION:

1. The most experienced F-15 squadron in the U.S. Air Force
 - a. 78,667.9 Total Flying Hours
 - b. 439 Years of Aviation Experience
 - c. Average pilot has 3025.7 hours over 16.9 years
 - d. 23 of 26 current or previous instructor pilots
 - e. 11 Graduates of Air Force Weapons Instructor Course
 - f. 26 of 26 combat pilots with experience in Vietnam, Desert Storm, Northern/Southern Watch
 - i. 3693.2 Hours of Combat
 - ii. 142.0 per pilot

2. Cost in Dollar terms
 - a. \$440,000,000 in flying training
 - i. Calculated @ \$5600/hour (Cost of F-15 flight hour)
 - ii. 78,667.9 (110th FS total flight time)
 - iii. $\$5600 \times 78,667.9 = \$440,540,240$ (flight hour training cost)
 - b. \$92,000,000 in initial SUPT/FTU training (Source: usmilitary.about.com based on info courtesy of U.S. Air Force)
 - i. Specialized Undergraduate Pilot Training (Primary)- \$179,973
 - ii. Specialized Undergraduate Pilot Training (Bomber/Fighter)- \$682,295
 - iii. Introduction to Fighter Fundamentals- \$141,348
 - iv. F-15 Follow-on Training Unit- \$2,532,705
 - v. $\$179,973 + \$682,295 + \$141,348 + \$2,532,705 = \$3,536,321$ /pilot
 - vi. 26 pilots x \$3,536,321 = \$91,944,346 (initial flight costs for 110th FS pilots)
 - vii. Cost in FY2002 dollars
 - c. \$11,000,000 in WIC training
 - i. Calculated @ \$1,000,000/pilot (cost of Weapons Instructor Course)
 - ii. 11 graduates
 - iii. $\$1,000,000 \times 11 = \$11,000,000$ (cost to training our 11 WIC grads)
 - d. Total Cost Lost Due to BRAC
 - i. \$543,000,000
 1. $\$440,000,000 + \$92,000,000 + \$11,000,000 = \$543,000,000$
 - ii. \$20.9 Million per pilot
 1. $\$543,000,000 / 26$ (pilots) = \$20,884,615

3. Addition Costs in Human Capital (New Jersey ANG)
 - a. \$22,500,000 in additional FTU costs
 - i. Calculated @ \$.75 Million
 - ii. Training 30 Atlantic City pilots from F-16s to F-15s
 - iii. $750,000 \times 30 = \$22,500,000$
 - iv. Loss of F-16 experience as pilots retrain to new aircraft

Loss of Human Capital

4. Cost in Experience terms
 - a. Wartime experience may never be recovered
 - b. At least 17 years to retrain 26 similar pilots

5. Cost to keep Active Duty vs. Air National Guard Pilots
 - a. Air National Guard
 - i. 3025.7 Hours and 16.9 Years of experience
 - ii. \$25,000 a year
 1. Salary
 2. Retirement (reduced)
 - b. Active duty
 - i. 800 Hours and 6 Years of experience
 - ii. \$80,000 a year
 1. Salary
 2. Housing
 3. Medical
 4. Retirement
 5. Base Support
 - c. Bottom line- It costs more than three times as much to have a far less capable pilot!

6. 95% of the pilots will not move with aircraft
 - a. 14 will not be asked due to rank structure
 - i. 10 (O-5), 4 (O-6)
 - ii. Of 12 remaining, few will move for various reasons

Cost Calculations

No return on investment by realigning the 131st Fighter Wing – Substantial deviation from MV-5.

- Slide 1: Dated 10 Feb 2005 (Candidate #USAF-0041 / S133)
 - According to our research, this is the first candidate recommendation involving Lambert-St. Louis IAP AGS. This slide shows the one time cost to close Lambert is \$25M. With an annual recurring cost of \$0, the realignment cost is never paid back.
- Slide 2: Dated 12 Apr 2005 (Candidate #USAF-0042V2 / 142c2)
 - This candidate recommendation shows the 20-year savings of closing OTIS ANGB is \$379M.
- Slide 3: Dated 19 Apr 2005 (Candidate #USAF-0041V2 / S133c2)
 - This candidate recommendation shows Lambert's 20-year realignment cost as \$22M and the payback not occurring until 2071.
- Slide 4 & 5: Dated 28 Apr 2005 (Candidate #USAF-0044V3 / S142c3)
 - This candidate recommendation shows Lambert being bundled with Otis ANGB. By including Lambert-St. Louis IAP AGS in this candidate recommendation, the realignment costs are hidden and the actual savings associated with Otis ANGB are reduced (From \$379M to \$336M).

Realigning the 131 FW does not save the taxpayers money, now or in the future!!



Candidate #USAF-0041 / S133

Close Lambert-St Louis IAP AGS, St Louis , MO

Candidate Recommendation: Close Lambert-St. Louis IAP AGS. The 131st Fighter Wing (ANG) will inactivate. The wing's F-15 aircraft (15 PAA) will distribute to the 57th Fighter Wing, Nellis AFB, Nevada (9 PAA) and 177th Fighter Wing (ANG), Atlantic City IAP AGS, New Jersey (6 PAA). The 177th Fighter Wing's F-16 Block 25 aircraft will be distributed to the 158th Fighter Wing (ANG), Burlington IAP AGS, Vermont (3 PAA) and retire (12 PAA). The wing's ECS elements will remain as an enclave. Firefighter positions move to Scott AFB, IL.

Justification

- Enables Future Total Force transformation
- Increases efficiency of operations
- Consolidates F-15C ANG fleet

Military Value

- Robusts ANG squadrons to standard USAF size
- Force structure distributed to bases of higher mil value and air sovereignty role (Atlantic City AGS, NJ)
- Frees resources for Future Total Force investment

Payback

- One Time Cost: \$25M
- Net Implementation Cost: \$27M
- Annual Recurring Cost: \$0M
- Payback period: Never
- NPV Cost: \$27M

Impacts

- Criterion 6: Total Job Change: -500 (direct -244, indirect -256) ROI -0.03%
- Criterion 7: A review of community attributes indicates no issues regarding the ability of the infrastructure of the communities to support missions, forces and personnel
- Criterion 8: No natural infrastructure issues affecting candidate recommendation

- ✓ Strategy ✓ Capacity Analysis / Data Verification ✓ JCSG/MilDep Recommended ✓ Deconflicted w/JCSGs
- ✓ COBRA ✓ Military Value Analysis / Data Verification ✓ Criteria 6-8 Analysis ✓ Deconflicted w/MilDeps

Integrity - Service - Excellence



Candidate #USAF-0041V2 / S133c2

Realign Lambert-St Louis IAP AGS, St Louis, MO

Candidate Recommendation: Realign Lambert-St. Louis IAP AGS. The 131st Fighter Wing's (ANG) F-15 aircraft (15 PAA) will distribute to the 57th Fighter Wing, Nellis AFB, Nevada (9 PAA) and 177th Fighter Wing (ANG), Atlantic City IAP AGS, New Jersey (6 PAA). The 177th Fighter Wing's F-16 Block 25 aircraft will be distributed to the 158th Fighter Wing (ANG), Burlington IAP AGS, Vermont (3 PAA) and retire (12 PAA). The wing's ECS elements will remain in place. Firefighter positions move to Scott AFB, IL. ANG ops and maintenance manpower will associate with the active duty aggressor unit at Nellis.

Justification

- Eliminates excess infrastructure
- Consolidates F-15C fleet
- Creates Optimum sized squadron at Atlantic City and Burlington
- Enclave retains expeditionary mission capability

Payback

- One Time Cost: \$44M
- Net Implementation Cost: \$39M
- Annual Recurring Savings: \$1.4M
- Payback Period: 63 yrs/2071
- NPV Cost: \$22M

Military Value

- Lambert (127) distributes F-15Cs to Nellis (12) and Atlantic City (61)
- Atlantic City (61) distributes F-16s to Burlington (102)
- Mil Judgment: Atlantic City is a strategic location for homeland defense (air sovereignty) and is converting to F-15Cs

Impacts

- Criterion 6: Total Job Change: -500 (direct: -244, indirect: -256) ROI: -0.03%
- Criterion 7: A review of community attributes indicates no issues regarding the ability of the infrastructure of the communities to support missions, forces and personnel
- Criterion 8: No natural infrastructure issues affecting candidate recommendation

Strategy
 Capacity Analysis / Data Verification
 JCSG/MilDep Recommended
 Deconflicted w/JCSGs
 COBRA
 Military Value Analysis / Data Verification
 Criteria 6-8 Analysis
 Deconflicted w/MilDepts

Integrity - Service - Excellence



Candidate #USAF-0044V3 / S142c3 Errata

1. Bundle S133 and S142 due to common receiver base.



Candidate #USAF-0044V3 / S142c3 Close Otis ANGB, Falmouth, MA

Candidate Recommendation: Close Otis ANGB. The 102d Fighter Wing's (ANG) F-15 aircraft will be distributed to the 125th Fighter Wing, Jacksonville IAP AGS, Florida (3 PAA) and 177th Fighter Wing (ANG), Atlantic City IAP AGS, New Jersey (12 PAA). The wing's expeditionary combat support elements, 253d Combat Communications Group (ANG), and 267th Communications Squadron (ANG) will remain in place. An ASA facility will be constructed at Bradley IAP AGS, CT. Firefighter positions from Otis will move to Barnes Municipal Airport AGS, Massachusetts. The 131st Fighter Wing's (ANG) F-15 aircraft (15 PAA) will distribute to the 57th Fighter Wing, Nellis AFB, Nevada (9 PAA) and 177th Fighter Wing (ANG), Atlantic City IAP AGS, New Jersey (6 PAA). The 177th Fighter Wing's F-16 Block 25 aircraft will be distributed to the 158th Fighter Wing (ANG), Burlington IAP AGS, Vermont (3 PAA) and retire (12 PAA). The wing's expeditionary combat support elements will remain in place. Firefighter positions move to Scott AFB, IL. The 157AOP Group and the 218th EIG will relocate from Jefferson Barracks into space at Lambert International. Air Force real property responsibility at Jefferson Barracks may be transferred to the Dept of Army.

Justification

- Realigns F-15C fleet
- Creates 2 optimum sized Homeland Defense squadrons (Jacksonville and Atlantic City)
- Enclave retains expeditionary mission capability

Military Value

- Otis (88) distributes F-15Cs to Jacksonville (24) and Atlantic City (61)
- Lambert (127) distributes F-15Cs to Nellis (13) and Jacksonville (24)

Payback

- | | |
|-------------------------------|-----------|
| ■ One Time Cost: | \$103M |
| ■ Net Implementation Savings: | \$12M |
| ■ Annual Recurring Savings: | \$34M |
| ■ Payback period: | 3 yr/2011 |
| ■ NPV Savings: | \$336M |

Impacts

- Criterion 6—Total Job Change : -827 (direct -505, indirect -322) ROI: -0.6%
- Criterion 7: A review of community attributes indicates no issues regarding the ability of the infrastructure of the communities to support missions, forces and personnel
- Criterion 8: No natural infrastructure issues affecting candidate recommendation

- | | | | |
|------------|---|---------------------------|--------------------------|
| ✓ Strategy | ✓ Capacity Analysis / Data Verification | ✓ JCSG/MilDep Recommended | ✓ Deconflicted w/JCSGs |
| ✓ COBRA | ✓ Military Value Analysis / Data Verification | ✓ Criteria 6-8 Analysis | ✓ Deconflicted w/MilDeps |

Cost Calculations

COBRA makes inaccurate assumptions and underestimates the total cost associated with realigning and closing reserve component squadrons.

- COBRA assumes people follow manpower position moves
 - COBRA does not factor in the costs associated with retraining a new pilot or crew chief when people don't follow the manpower position move.
- COBRA does not factor in SATAF aircraft acceptance costs
 - 131 FW recent experience with accepting aircraft shows the cost associated with accepting one aircraft amounts to \$41,500. Accepting 24 aircraft will amount to over \$1M.
- 131 FW annual recurring costs
 - 99% of the annual recurring savings payback from Candidate #USAF-0044V3 / S142c3 is attributed to closing Otis ANGB

COBRA

PURPOSE:

The following data describes why COBRA does not properly analyze costs associated with realigning Reserve Component (RC) wings.

DISCUSSION:

1. Scenario S142v3 COBRA cost estimates account for moving 225 positions (7 officers, 18 enlisted, and 200 civilians) and assume all 131 FW personnel will follow these jobs. This assumption is hypothetical at best since a large portion of 131 FW are native Missourians and will not transfer to Atlantic City or Nellis AFB.
2. COBRA does not take into account any costs associated with undergraduate pilot training or F-15 training.
 - a. Sending one Atlantic City F-16 pilot to F-15 training = \$750,000. If all 30 Atlantic City pilots elect to retrain the cost will equal \$22.5M
 - b. For each experienced pilot that leaves the force a new pilot will have to be trained. Undergraduate pilot training cost amounts to approximately \$1.5M, with a Replacement Training Unit (RTU) cost of \$1M for a total of \$2.5M.
3. COBRA does not account for SATAF Aircraft Acceptance costs when moving aircraft from one base to another. Recent experience shows the cost amounts to \$41,500 per aircraft. 24 aircraft (plus 2 attrition reserves) moving to Atlantic City equals over \$1,000,000.
4. COBRA One-Time Costs (Candidate Recommendation Scenario S142v3)

One Time Cost (\$K)						
	Milcon	Personnel	Overhead	Moving	Other	Total
Burlington	0	0	0	255	1,294	1,549
Otis	1,562	3,632	2,645	15,893	1,150	24,882
Nellis	16,836	0	0	919	6,643	24,398
Scott	480	0	0	69	78	627
Bradley	16,276	0	0	716	176	17,168
Barnes	301	0	0	45	78	424
Jax	0	0	0	387	1,159	1,546
Atl City	10,157	242	177	2,465	5,366	18,407
131 FW	1,854	1,047	608	9,251	1,216	13,976
	\$47,466	\$4,921	\$3,430	\$30,000	\$17,160	\$102,977
Summary: Moving aircraft from the 131 FW to Nellis and Atlantic City incurs excessive costs						

COBRA

5. COBRA Recurring Costs (Candidate Recommendation Scenario S142v3)

Recurring Costs (\$K)						
	O & M				Mil Pers	Total
	Sustain	Recap	BOS	Civ Salary		
Burlington	0	0	49	0	32	81
Otis	2	13	0	0	0	15
Nellis	104	139	644	199	336	1,422
Scott	4	4	0	0	0	8
Bradley	121	134	15	8	150	428
Barnes	3	2	1	0	0	6
Jax	0	0	12	0	22	34
Atl City	41	84	184	576	331	1,216
131 FW	0	15	0	0	0	15

6. COBRA Payback (Candidate Recommendation Scenario S142v3)

Payback (\$K)				
	Recurring Cost	Recurring Save	Total	%
Burlington	81	140	59	0%
Otis	15	33,260	33,245	99%
Nellis	1,422	44	-1,378	-4%
Scott	8	0	-8	0%
Bradley	428	0	-428	-1%
Barnes	6	0	-6	0%
Jax	34	0	-34	0%
Atlantic City	1,216	0	-1,216	-4%
131 FW	15	3,345	3,330	10%
	\$3,225	\$36,789	\$33,564	100%
Summary: Otis accounts for 99% of the payback.				