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
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
Mr. Anthony J. Principi, Chairman
2005 Defense Base Realignment and Closure Commission
2521 S. Clark St. Ste. 600
Arlington, Virginia 22202

Dear Mr. Chairman,

Enclosed is a brief summary of our comments on specific issues in the area of RDAT&E that we strongly believe should receive further and careful review in finalizing the 2005 BRAC Recommendations.

Sincerely,


Franklin H. Knemeyer


Larry L. Lincicum

Enclosures:

Comments on 2005 BRAC Recommendations.

Chart: Alternative for a separate DOD RDAT&E organization

Comments on 2005 BRAC Recommendations

Background:

Over the past fifty plus years, the Department of Defense (DOD) has invested heavily in developing the world's finest military research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) resources for the acquisition of advanced weapons systems and operational training facilities. These national assets are comprised of numerous and widespread RDT&E Laboratories, T&E ranges and Training facilities encompassing land, sea and air space. Each military Service has controlled those facilities related to its area of warfare. This 'Service-owned' practice has led, however, to significant duplication, cross-Service competition and an excess capacity of resources. This is particularly evident in the area of air warfare where the airborne missions of the Navy, Marines, Army and Air Force often overlap in terms of needs and requirements - a situation that has continued to evolve since the early 1950s.

Forced by a sharply declining military budget in 1990s, DOD addressed the situation by initiating a series of 'acquisition reforms'. Since then, 'acquisition reform' has drastically modified acquisition policies and procedures, produced unprecedented corporate mergers (some subsidized by DOD), and several Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) actions were implemented. These actions have led to DOD essentially abdicating its responsibility and control over weapon system acquisition.

In 2005 BRAC, many of the basic issues of excess and duplication still have not been adequately resolved by DOD - particularly in the RDT&E area. **The primary problem** is that DOD has been reluctant or unable to undertake the task of establishing an effective and efficient RDT&E capability because of **the political shadows of congress and the parochial culture of the respective services**. This situation is perhaps outside of the BRAC 2005 Commission's scope of responsibility. The objective of a BRAC however, can not be adequately achieved until an effective (possibly separate) organizational and management structure for joint service RDT&E is established within DOD to minimize duplication and maximize joint service synergy.

2005 BRAC Recommendation Concerns;

As a step toward achieving this objective, the following critical issues in the 2005 BRAC recommendations for the RDT&E area still warrant a more careful and further review:

1. Air weapons systems. (Weapons & Armament)

Situation: Having two competing RDT&E Centers geographically separated is seriously questionable. Providing adequate funding for competing Centers will become a critical issue. The desire for two geographically separate Centers is not critical, since in any aggressive attack on the USA, RDT&E facilities would not be the primary targets. The location of a single Weapons Center should be determined by where the most capability and complete facilities exist. The issue of inter-service/joint management responsibility must be resolved.

Problem: Political and parochial **inter**-service issues. China Lake, Navy vs Eglin, Air Force.

2. Energetics:

Situation: Consolidate energetic RDT&E where the basic expertise is and existing facilities provide flexibility with maximum safety.

Problem: Political and parochial **intra**-service issues. China Lake, Navy vs Indian Head, Navy


3. JSF Training Base:

Situation: Consolidating JSF basing and training to high degree addresses future joint service pilot training. The base location at Eglin AFB will, however, have serious air space conflicts and restrictions due to the current and future dense commercial airways traffic, in addition to weather limitations.

Consider relocation to Edwards AFB where flying weather is essentially unlimited, adequate restricted airspace is available and is in proximity of China Lake and the western defense complex.

Problem: Political and **intra**-service issues. Eglin AFB vs Edward AFB

Department of Defense Organization



Proposed DOD Organizational Structure