



# 131st Fighter Wing

**Air Superiority,  
Anytime, Anywhere**

**10000 Lambert International Blvd.  
St. Louis, Missouri 63044**

Est 1923

## Executive Summary

## **Introduction**

The Base Closure and Realignment (BRAC) process was intended to reduce capacity and save money. Realigning Lambert IAP does not accomplish either one of these objectives. Moving 131st Fighter Wing F-15Cs from their strategic location risks critical resources, wastes valuable human capital, and eliminates the world's most capable F-15 unit.

The following is an executive summary of the research data provided to the BRAC Commission on 21 June 2005. Other information gathered after this date is also included. Substantial deviations are as follows:

### **Homeland Defense**

The Secretary of Defense substantially deviated from final criteria 1 because he did not adequately or accurately address Homeland Defense. The recommendation to realign Lambert IAP AGS is inconsistent with the National Security Strategy's highest priority for this nation's military.

### **BRAC Process**

The Secretary of Defense substantially deviated from final criteria 1 through 4 because final Air Force criteria attributes were inadequate and did not accurately measure military value. Military judgment, used routinely, was arbitrary, inconsistent, and poorly documented. The recommendation to realign Lambert IAP AGS is inconsistent with the BRAC law.

### **Cost Calculations**

The Secretary of Defense substantially deviated from final criteria 4 and 5 because criteria attributes did not accurately measure or reflect the cost of operations, manpower impact, and cost savings. The recommendation to realign Lambert IAP AGS is inconsistent with final criteria.

## Homeland Defense

The [National Military Strategic Plan's number one priority](#) is to protect the homeland. When defining the attributes to determine a unit's military value, the [Department of Defense](#) did not incorporate any questions to define Homeland Defense capabilities. The Secretary of Defense substantially deviated from final criteria 1, current and future missions.

Military judgment is quoted numerous times as the overriding factor in BRAC decision-making. This does not appear to be the case when the decision to realign the 131FW was made. The [heartland is home](#) to numerous lucrative targets and vital resources. The [131FW is currently tasked](#) with the Homeland Defense mission and provides a strategic location for the protection of these assets. Additionally, unknown to the Base Closure Executive Group (BCEG), the [131FW has been tasked](#) to stand 24/7 alert and built [facilities](#) to meet that tasking. The recommendation to realign Lambert IAP AGS is inconsistent with the National Security Strategy.

- [Homeland Defense Summary](#)
- [Homeland Defense is the Number 1 Priority](#)
  - [BRAC Homeland Quotes](#)
  - [McHale Statements](#)
  - [Homeland Security Presidential Directive-Hspd-7](#)
  - [National Strategies](#)
- [BCEG Avoids Homeland Defense Issues](#)
  - [BCEG struggles with MV and HLD](#)
  - [Military Value As It Relates To Homeland Defense](#)
- [Red Team Summary](#)
  - [Red Team White Papers](#)
- [St. Louis Strategic Location](#)
  - [ASA in the Midwest](#)
  - [Talking Paper on ASA in the Midwest](#)
- [St. Louis Homeland Defense Mission](#)
  - [Title 10 Orders](#)
  - [Maintenance Alert Guidance](#)
  - [Current Lines and Days Authorizations - 13 Sep 04](#)
  - [ASA E-mail Trail](#)
  - [131FW Homeland Defense Support](#)
  - [131FW Alert Cost Breakdown](#)
  - [ASA facilities at Lambert](#)
  - [Talking Paper ASA facilities at Lambert](#)
- [BCEG unaware](#)
  - [BCEG unaware 131st FW performing Homeland Defense](#)
  - [BCEG Unaware of 131FW Role in Homeland Defense](#)
  - [BRAC Vol 5 process relating to BCEG awareness of St Louis Alert](#)
- [Why the F-15 is Best Suited for the ONE Role](#)
- [Al Qaida Remains Interested in Aviation Attacks](#)
- [Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support \(Mar 05 draft\)](#)

## BRAC Process

Although the BRAC process may be an accurate and efficient tool when used with the active duty, it has numerous flaws and biases when attempting to apply the same principles and processes to the Air National Guard. Calculating [military value \(MV\)](#) using Air Force criteria is an inappropriate tool for Air National Guard units. [Final results](#) consistently placed Air National Guard units toward the bottom of the list.

Most of the Air Force attributes used in calculating the four [final criteria](#) did not measure a unit's true military value. For instance, MV-1 was intended to provide a score to the BCEG regarding a unit's current and future mission capability. However, questions such as proximity to low-level routes, location of divert fields, etc. do not measure this capability. MV-3, Surge capability, was biased toward very large bases, providing little opportunity for ANG bases to score well. MV-4, Cost of Operations, calculated a base's cost of operation using locality rates and housing allowances in the local area. Questions did not address wing efficiencies like cost of land, lease rates, etc. Since these questions centered on the base's cost of operations, individual units were not evaluated and were not given credit for operating efficiencies.

Capacity information was also gathered by the BCEG. [Lambert IAP AGS hangar](#) space was assessed incorrectly and appears to have possibly caused the 131FW installation to be a "[show stopper](#)". Lambert IAP AGS currently has facilities to support 40 F-15Cs.

The BRAC process did not consider [ANG basing strategies](#). ANG units using civilian joint use airfields provide a force dispersal advantage for homeland defense and an alternate facility for emergencies. Bases must also be near population centers to facilitate recruiting. The Total Force basing strategy must find the proper balance between the preferred demographics for ANG recruiting and retention and the unit's operational responsibilities to support AEF.

### [-BRAC Process Summary](#)

#### [-AF Military Value Selection Criteria & Associated Weights](#)

##### [--Attributes Point Paper](#)

##### [--Mission Compatibility Index Detail](#)

#### [-Scoring & Sub-criteria Errors](#)

##### [--131FW MCI, and Military Value Discrepancies from MCI Data Scores](#)

##### [--MCI Compatibility Index \(Fighters\)](#)

##### [--Fighter MCIs](#)

##### [--BRAC Fighter MCI Ranking - Adjusted](#)

##### [--BRAC Fighter MCI Ranking -- Unadjusted](#)

#### [-Lambert Facility Data Was Incorrect](#)

##### [--Hangar Size](#)

##### [--Hangar Space Support](#)

#### [-Enclave](#)

##### [--Letter to Commission Regarding Enclaves](#)

##### [--Red Team](#)

#### [-Air Force Organizational Principles - White Paper](#)

## Cost Calculations

BRAC failed to meet its objective of cost savings because of four cost analysis flaws. First, BRAC has deficiencies when determining return on investment. Second, unit efficiency is not taken into account. Third, the loss of human capital is never determined when bases are realigned/closed. Last, the Cost of Base Realignment Actions (COBRA) model has deficiencies when analyzing Reserve Component actions.

The most significant argument of why the 131FW should not be realigned is highlighted in the United States [Government Accountability Office \(GAO\) Report](#). As the report points out, Lambert IAP AGS results in a 20-year net present value cost (not savings) of \$22 million and a [63-year payback period](#). However, by combining Lambert IAP with the closure of Otis ANGB and the realignment of Atlantic City IAP AGS, the Air Force was able to mask the cost of Lambert IAP AGS in overall savings of \$336 million and a 3-year payback period. The savings at Otis ANGB are also being questioned.

As already mentioned in the BRAC process section, a unit's efficiency is never taken into consideration. Reserve Component squadrons are more cost effective than active duty units. The 131FW has the [lowest operating budget](#) and the lowest [cost per flying hour](#) of any F-15C unit in the Combat Air Forces (CAF). These details were never taken into consideration when deciding which bases to realign/close.

BRAC also does not take into account the loss of [human capital](#) that will occur with the realignment of the 131FW or the ANG as a whole. Although the BRAC report recognizes the importance of ANG experience level (24 versus 18 Primary Aircraft Assigned, and the [Air Force Organization Principles White Paper](#)), it makes poor assumptions that ANG personnel will follow realigned aircraft. This may be an accurate assumption with active duty personnel; however, Air National Guard members generally are local civilians with jobs and families and are unwilling to relocate.

Lastly, [COBRA](#) makes inaccurate assumptions and underestimates the total cost associated with realigning and closing reserve component bases. As one example, the cost associated with retraining pilots from one aircraft to another is not ever calculated in the COBRA model.

- [Cost Summary](#)
- [131FW Cost Summary](#)
  - [131FW Cost Summary Point Paper](#)
- [Loss of Human Capital Summary](#)
  - [Loss of Human Capital Point Paper](#)
- [Return on Investment Summary](#)
  - [BCEG Slides - Hidden Cost](#)
- [COBRA Summary](#)
  - [COBRA Point Paper](#)
- [Primary Assigned Aircraft \(PAA\) Point Paper](#)
- GAO Information
  - [GAO Report Talking Paper](#)
  - [GAO-05-785 BRAC Assessment \(Excerpt\)](#)

## Summary and Recommendations

The Department of Defense (DoD) recommendation to realign Lambert-St Louis AGS results in a reduced capability to perform the Homeland Defense mission. This recommendation was based on a flawed BRAC process that inaccurately assigned military value and fails to achieve any cost savings. Through this process, the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from four of the eight final criteria.

Lambert-St Louis AGS plays an important role in the nation's Homeland Defense strategy. The 131FW provides a Homeland Defense capability in the midwest United States defending some of our nation's most vital resources. Removing the 131FW from Lambert-St Louis AGS will result in a gap in the nation's air defense network.

The BRAC process failed to properly assess the military value of Lambert-St Louis AGS. The choice of attributes that the Air Force applied did not evaluate Lambert-St Louis' current mission of Homeland Defense. Flaws in the collection and application of data resulted in Lambert-St Louis AGS being assigned an incorrect military value ranking.

The realignment of Lambert-St Louis fails to achieve any cost savings over the 20-year period of BRAC 2005. In fact, according to the GAO, this realignment will be at the cost of \$22 million and have a payback period of 63 years. In addition, the loss of human capital is significant and the cost of recapturing it has not been addressed in the COBRA model. The 131FW at Lambert-St Louis AGS has the lowest operating budget and the lowest cost per flying hour of any F-15C unit in the CAF. The realignment of this unit is not cost effective and is contrary to the primary goal of BRAC.

Recommend the following changes to the Lambert-St Louis AGS portion of the DoD proposals:

1. Do not realign Lambert-St Louis AGS. The 131FW should remain a 15 PAI F-15C wing. The 157AOG and the 218EIS should remain at Jefferson Barracks.
2. Do not close Otis ANGB. The 102FW should remain a 15 PAI F-15C wing.
3. Do not construct an ASA site at Bradley AGS. The 102FW will sit Air Sovereignty Alert (ASA) at Otis ANGB alleviating the need for an ASA site at Bradley AGS.
4. Do not realign Atlantic City AGS. The 177FW should remain 15 PAI F-16C wing. The 177FW retains 15 F-16s (Block 25).
5. The 158FW at Burlington AGS should remain a 15 PAI wing.
6. The USAF aggressor squadron at Nellis AFB should programmatically receive ANG F-15As. The F-15A provides an outstanding platform for threat replication and should serve the CAF well in this role. In addition, the F-15A is well equipped for the Homeland Defense mission should the need arise at Nellis AFB.

