

PRESENTATION

TO

THE 2005 BASE REALIGNMENT and CLOSURE COMMISSION

**STATEMENT OF: GOVERNOR SONNY PERDUE
GEORGIA**

30 June 2005

**NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL RELEASED
BY THE 2005 BRAC COMMISSION**

**BRAC Commission Regional Hearing
June 30, 2005**

Commissioner Gehman, Commissioner Skinner, Commissioner Bilbray, Commissioner Coyle, commission staff, good morning and welcome to Georgia. I know that the past few months have been busy for you. We appreciate your service and the great responsibility placed on you for assessing the Pentagon's BRAC recommendations and helping meet the future needs of our nation's military.

Georgia is a patriotic state with a strong military tradition.

We consider all of the military personnel based in Georgia to be part of our Georgia family. Active Duty, Reserve and National Guard alike. And we take pride in doing all we can to support and care for this extended family.

You'll soon hear from the individual Georgia communities that host bases affected by the Pentagon's recommendations.

But I want to let you know what Georgia as a whole has been doing to help our men and women in uniform.

Early in my administration it was brought to my attention that military families and their dependents were not eligible for in-state tuition at our state colleges and universities.

I worked with our Board of Regents to correct this inequity. Now our military families are on par with their civilian counterparts.

Through my frequent meetings with Georgia's base commanders, I learned how predatory pay day lending practices were snaring many of our troops into ever-expanding webs of debt.

In response to the concerns, the Legislature passed, and I signed, one of the most comprehensive anti-pay day lending measures in the country.

During the 2005 legislative session several important measures were signed into law to support our troops.

Georgia law now ensures that military spouses who leave a job because their husband or wife has been reassigned to a new duty location are not disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits by that fact alone.

This reform will benefit military families and is a policy for which Georgia has been praised by the Pentagon.

Another measure that passed our legislature and that I signed into law makes a number of changes to state laws and procedures to remove hardships on service members called up for active duty of 90 days or more.

- Provides jury duty exemptions for service members and their spouses
- Provides a grace period for renewing professional licenses that may expire during their deployment.
- Allows service members to more easily terminate a residential lease or mobile phone agreement under certain conditions.
- And provides returning veterans with honorary hunting and fishing licenses for one year.

These are common sense steps that, taken together, will make the lives of our servicemen and women, and their families, just a little easier.

We also amended our tax code to provide service members and National Guardsmen serving more than 90 consecutive days with a tax credit for their qualified life insurance premiums through the Defense Department's Service Members' Group Life Insurance Program.

Our state's business community also has a strong commitment to supporting our troops. The Georgia Chamber of Commerce is leading a \$1 million fundraising effort to help support the families of deployed National Guardsmen who need assistance while their loved ones are away.

In the testimony that follows you will hear much about the capabilities of Georgia's bases.

But I hope you will also hear the deep underlying commitment that Georgia has to doing all we can to uphold the quality of life and support the military mission of our Georgia-based troops and their families. Georgia is a good place – we believe the best place – for the military to call home.

They are part of our family and we're proud of them. On behalf of all Georgians, thank you again for your time and for your service.

PRESENTATION
TO
THE 2005 BASE REALIGNMENT and CLOSURE COMMISSION

STATEMENT OF: SENATOR SAXBY CHAMBLISS
GEORGIA

30 June 2005

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BRAC Talking Points – Military Value

Today, we will review what we Georgians already know: Georgia's military installations have extraordinarily high military value; they all make vital contributions to a strong national defense; they operate at relatively low cost; they have excellent facilities and housing; they have skilled workforces; they provide their personnel with excellent quality of life; and most importantly, keeping them in Georgia is the logical choice.

In this hearing, you will hear a compelling case that Fort McPherson, Fort Gillem, the Naval Air Station in Atlanta, and the Navy Supply Corps School in Athens, have the ability to cost-effectively handle current and future missions while accommodating contingency operations from their world class facilities. These bases continue to play an important role in the war on terrorism, and should remain open and fully operational.

With the ongoing Quadrennial Defense Review's renewed emphasis on Homeland Defense and Security, **Forts McPherson and Gillem** are uniquely postured as interagency platforms for responding to natural disasters or terrorist attacks in the Southeast. In addition to their multiple military headquarters, they host the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Red Cross, the Georgia Emergency Management Agency, and the 52nd Explosive Ordnance Disposal Battalion. Easy access to a network

SENATOR SAXBY CHAMBLISS TESTIMONY TO THE BRAC COMMISSION, JUNE 30, 2005, ATLANTA, GA

of highways, rail lines, and military and civilian airfields makes them ideally located for contingency operations.

The principle decision behind DoD's recommendation to close these forts seems to be based on cost estimates that are flawed because they greatly understate the military construction costs to replace the four world-class headquarters located there. They ignore the cost to relocate the DoD secure telecommunications hub, and they do not consider the value of being next to an airport with unparalleled, quick access to major cities in the US and world-wide.

Other, intangible costs were not considered like the disruption in relocating FORSCOM and its subordinate commands in the middle of the war.

For Naval Air Station Atlanta, there are major flaws in the COBRA analysis of cost estimates. The estimated savings are overstated since they are based on faulty assumptions about the disposition of tenant assets. In reality, the true cost savings would be much lower. Other cost discrepancies exist in the projected personnel savings for deactivating an F/A-18 Squadron and closing the medical facilities. NAS Atlanta benefits from the large number of airline employees who are headquartered in Atlanta. This pool of personnel offers an unmatched recruiting base for

SENATOR SAXBY CHAMBLISS TESTIMONY TO THE BRAC COMMISSION, JUNE 30, 2005, ATLANTA, GA

Navy Reserve pilots and maintenance personnel compared to any other location in the country. This recommendation also ignores the synergy between NAS Atlanta and Dobbins Air Reserve Base which are – effectively – a joint base which rely on each other to operate. Divesting the Navy from this region of the country – which this recommendation does – will have serious and long-term consequences.

The Navy Supply Corps School at Athens is the epitome of a joint-training facility that provides eight different courses for all four military services, the Coast Guard, and the Military Sealift Command. The Chief of Naval Operations personally chose Athens as the ideal location for the Center for Service Support because Athens is a model of efficiency with its operations costs among the lowest of any Navy facility. Athens provides a quality work place that supports “learning and training, and “enhances retention” while allowing its personnel to take advantage of the area’s low cost of living. The Navy takes advantage of its extremely low per diem and housing costs, factors not considered in the COBRA model.

I would be remiss if I did not note that the rest of Georgia’s bases have high military value and are poised to accept new missions.

Kings Bay, for example, ranks third among all Navy facilities for military value. It is the best facility for gaining both submarines and the

SENATOR SAXBY CHAMBLISS TESTIMONY TO THE BRAC COMMISSION, JUNE 30, 2005, ATLANTA, GA

Submarine School. With the past reduction in the number of Trident submarines home-ported at Kings Bay, some support systems are operating at only 40% capacity. Consequently, new operations at Kings Bay can be accommodated with substantially lower costs.

Fort Benning's high military value was recognized with its designation as the Army's Maneuver Center of Excellence, a logical move which the Fort and the City of Columbus can easily accommodate. Fort Benning is also postured to receive additional units from Europe as the Army brings many overseas units home.

Finally, the **Marine Corps Logistics Base at Albany** is also prepared to expand its operation of re-setting Marine Corps' equipment before it is pre-positioned around the world. Albany's implementation of Lean production techniques has made them a model for how depots should conduct cost-effective maintenance operations. It is an efficient operation with room to grow.

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STATEMENT OF: SENATOR ISAKSON
GEORGIA

30 June 2005

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Statement by U.S. Senator Johnny Isakson
BRAC Hearing
June 20, 2005
Atlanta, Georgia

Georgia has a rich and storied history of supporting the Armed Forces of the United States of America, and today thousands of men and women based in Georgia are deployed around the world in defense of freedom and in pursuit of democracy.

I appreciate the importance of the Base Realignment and Closure Commission, and I am pleased to have this opportunity to speak on behalf of our State and its role in support of our Armed Forces in the 21st century.

We are very grateful for the enhancements recommended at Kings Bay, Fort Benning, Dobbins Air Reserve Base, Moody Air Force Base, Marine Corps Logistics Base, and Robins Air Force Base.

It is my hope that the Commission will re-evaluate its recommendations on Fort McPherson, Fort Gillem, NAS Atlanta and the Navy Supply Corps School in Athens. Senator Chambliss, Governor Perdue and I visited each of these bases on the day the BRAC recommendations were released and we pledged our best effort to defend these bases and keep them in our State.

Georgia's strong support for the military has always begun very close to home, right in the very communities where our bases are located.

Organizations such as the 21st Century Partnership at Robins, the Central Savannah River Area (CRSA) Alliance at Fort Gordon, the Camden Partnership at Kings Bay, and the Southwest Georgia Alliance for Progress in Albany are all excellent examples of community leaders working tirelessly together to support our military.

I have seen the same community support in Greater Atlanta for Forts Gillem and McPherson and NAS Atlanta, and in Athens for the Supply School.

The Cobb County Chamber and the Cobb County Commission have always played a key role in support of NAS Atlanta. The Chamber's Honorary Commanders program brings business leaders together in support of the Navy's mission at NAS Atlanta. And the County Commission's protection of Dobbins' perimeter and support of its infrastructure has made it the best urban air facility in the country.

The leadership of the Metro Atlanta Chamber of Commerce has a long record of supporting both Fort Gillem and Fort McPherson, as have the cities of Forest Park and East Point. And the city of Atlanta offers both these bases a transportation system that cannot be matched anywhere in the United States. On any given day Hartsfield Jackson Airport can place the leadership of our Army anywhere in America by midday and almost anywhere in the world by evening. No other location in America can do that.

There is probably no facility in Georgia that enjoys more community support and resources than the Naval Supply School in Athens. The Athens Clarke County government, the Chamber of Commerce and the University of Georgia provide enormous support – including free fire and police protection to the base – and an enriched quality of life for the Navy personnel and their families.

The communities surrounding all of our military bases have done an outstanding job. They are dedicated to their bases and dedicated to our troops and their families. There is absolutely no doubt that the loyalty and hard work of all of these community groups has contributed immeasurably to the success of our military in Georgia. And I have no doubt this will become clear to you today as several of our communities step forward to make the case for the value of each of their bases.

I thank these community leaders for their service to our state and to our military. And I thank the members of the BRAC Commission for your time and your service.

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PRESENTATION
TO
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STATEMENT OF: CONGRESSMAN JOHN LEWIS
GEORGIA

30 JUNE 2005

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Good Morning. First, I'd like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing.

I am pleased to be here along with the Governor, our Senators and my House colleagues. I appreciate the opportunity to speak to you today not only about the military value of Fort McPherson, but also its essential role in shoring up our homeland security.

While I appreciate DoD's goals of decreasing costs and increasing efficiency, I respectfully disagree with the conclusion that closing Ft. Mac advances those goals.

On the contrary, I believe that Ft. Mac's role in supporting our homeland security is more essential in the post-9/11 world. And, closing it based on criteria outlined prior to 9/11 is short-sighted.

As you may know, Ft. Mac is home to four major Army commands that train, mobilize and deploy combat-ready forces engaged in the war on terror. Ft. Mac also serves as the regional headquarters for federal and state agencies which are directly involved in operations that provide homeland security and homeland defense, as well as domestic disaster relief.

And, Ft. Mac's location is pivotal. Located between the heart of Atlanta and Hartsfield-Jackson Airport, it is easy as well as cost-effective and time-efficient to fly to and from, the importance of which cannot be overstated.

Fort McPherson plays an expanded and critical role in providing homeland security and defense. And, its strategic value will only increase over time.

Now I'm pleased to turn things over to my colleague, David Scott, to discuss Fort Gillem.

PRESENTATION
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STATEMENT OF: CONGRESSMAN DAVID SCOTT
GEORGIA

30 June 2005

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*Congressman David Scott
Remarks for BRAC Commission Regional Hearing
Atlanta, Georgia, June 30, 2005*

Thank you. I strongly urge you to keep Fort Gillem open. Closing Gillem would be a blow to our military and national security in this time of war. Remember, we now have soldiers in 140 nations and the closeness of Gillem to the world's busiest airport ensures rapid deployment around the world.

We have an all volunteer army and Fort Gillem is irreplaceable in our ability to recruit, train and deploy our combat ready volunteer army, the backbone of which is the Army Reserves and National Guard, which is the heart and soul of Fort Gillem. Atlanta offers important benefits for our recruitment. Closing Gillem and losing Atlanta would weaken our recruitment when the military is already overextended.

Today, we live in a world of terrorists and Atlanta is home to the CDC and the world's busiest airport, each are known terrorist targets. Atlanta will be more vulnerable to a terrorist attack if we close Gillem because Gillem coordinates Atlanta's first responders in the event of a terror attack which is why the Criminal Lab, FEMA, Red Cross, and GEMA are at Gillem.

Also, the COBRA cost data used by the Pentagon does not match the data provided by Gillem, especially the costs of moving personnel and reconstructing headquarters elsewhere. Congress has provided \$200 million for construction at Gillem over the last 8 years and it would not be good stewardship of taxpayer dollars to walk away and abandon brand new crime labs, reserve centers, and headquarters buildings. We will save more money by keeping Fort Gillem open than rebuilding the Fort elsewhere.

Commissioners, this is a time of war. We live in a different world following 9/11; we have combat in Iraq and Afghanistan, unknown and serious threats coming out of Iran, Syria, and North Korea and 45% of the combat soldiers are National Guard and Army Reserve, which is the main mission of Fort Gillem. The plans to close bases like Gillem were made prior to 9/11 when we were at peace; now, we are at war. Therefore, I respectfully urge you to please, keep Fort Gillem open. Thank you.

PRESENTATION
TO
THE 2005 BASE REALIGNMENT and CLOSURE COMMISSION
FT MCPHERSON & FT GILLEM, GA



**STATEMENT OF: PHILIP Y BROWNING JR
BRIGADIER GENERAL USA (RETIRED)
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
GEORGIA MIL. AFFAIRS COORDINATING COMMITTEE**

30 June 2005


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FT MCPHERSON & FT GILLEM REGIONAL HEARING TESTIMONY

JUNE 30, 2005

(Header Chart) – (Graphic)

Good morning Mr. Chairman and thank you for the opportunity to articulate the military value of Ft McPherson and Ft Gillem.



We applaud the Army's goal of aligning its infrastructure with transformation objectives and the return of forces from overseas. On balance, we feel their recommendations are sound and will indeed improve our Nation's ability to respond to future threats.

However, like any process of this magnitude, there are likely to be some areas that need reconsideration. In the chart shown above, the Army is proposing to close both Ft McPherson and Ft Gillem.

Today we will present facts that will lead you to the conclusion that both recommendations should be reversed. **(Header Chart Off)**

Pause

FT MCPHERSON

Our position is that Ft McPherson **(Picture of Ft McPherson Front Gate)** represents an installation of significant relevance given the contemporary requirement for command, control, and coordination between international and domestic governmental and non-governmental agencies with combined and joint military forces engaged in the global war on terror. Ft McPherson further leverages active component-reserve component force provider-force user readiness and command and control synergies. Finally, Ft McPherson benefits from a highly skilled civilian executive manpower pool required for mission accomplishment that, we will show, is simply not available if the Army's recommendation is adopted.

Pause

Our discussion today will center on three main points. First that costs appear to be the overriding factor in making the decision to close Ft

McPherson; yet we are not confident that the savings derived from the COBRA analysis are accurate and that other significant costs were not considered; secondly, that not co-locating the 3 major headquarters (Forces Command, US Army Reserve Command, and Third Army) reduces the quality and efficiency of the important synergy between them and detracts from both training readiness and operational planning; and finally, that moving the three headquarters from Atlanta, specifically Ft McPherson, is ill advised.

Pause

To begin the cost discussion, I first want to highlight----in very succinct fashion---- some significant aspects of the Army's military value methodology that appear to us to be relevant to our argument.

First, the Army established 40 attributes to determine an installation's military value. These attributes represented characteristics that were distinguishable between installations, measurable, and derived from certified data sources. Each attribute then was weighted and "mapped" against each of the four major DOD military value criteria. **(Soldier Patrol On)**

The results were that in the Army's view, Criteria # (1) (mission capabilities vs impact on warfighting) should be weighted at 29%; Criteria # (2) (training land and facilities) weighted at 29%; Criteria # (3) (ability to accommodate mobilization and surge) weighted at 32%; and Criteria # 4 (cost) at 10%. In other words, Criteria #4 (Cost) would be less of a discriminator in judging military value than any of the other three.

Pause

(Ft McPherson Front Gate) The Army also applied all 40 attributes against each installation and, as a result, developed a military value rank ordering for each. Ft McPherson qualified to remain in the "Army Portfolio" defined by the Senior Review Group on October 19th 2004 as an "installation required to support Army needs while maintaining maximum military value". However, the Headquarters' and Support Joint Cross Service Group developed scenarios that moved functions off Ft McPherson demonstrating a cost savings in doing so. The Army, then, elected to close the installation.

Given that fact, one could reach the conclusion that cost was the primary reason for closing Ft McPherson regardless of other military value strengths of the headquarters there.

Long Pause

(Cost Slide) Let me continue our discussion by addressing costs in more detail, specifically Criteria #4 “Costs and manpower implications” and Criteria #5 “Extent and timing of potential costs and savings”.

Pause

We believe that the savings generated by the COBRA analysis are overstated. For example, the 2005 COBRA model only uses \$79.4M for military construction costs for the three major headquarters there. However, our understanding is that the actual replacement value of the three headquarters in question is approximately \$277M. We asked the Army to reconfirm this, but in the meantime we did run a COBRA excursion using the military construction costs above. As you would expect, there will be less savings over the 20 year period, higher one time costs, and a longer payback period. We have provided the COBRA excursion summary sheet for the record.

(COBRA Comparison) Finally, we compared the BRAC '05 COBRA results with analysis done by Ft McPherson during BRAC '93.

COBRA COMPARISON				
	FT MCPHERSON		Ft GILLEM	
	1993	2005	1993	2005
ONE TIME COST	\$284M	\$198M	\$350M	\$57M
BREAK EVEN YEAR	39 Years	4Years	Never	3Years
NOTES:				
1.	Analysis done by Ft McPherson; Army '93 data requested but not received			
2.	'93 does not include USARC			
3.	Scenario—FORSCOM and 3d Army to Ft Hood			
4.	Scenario—1st Army to Ft Stewart; remainder to Ft McPherson			

As you can see, there are major differences in the final results. For example, one time costs for Ft McPherson in '93 are 41% higher than in '05 and take 35 years longer to break even. We do recognize that scenarios and assumptions will impact on any calculation, but such deviations are a concern nonetheless.

Given the above, there is skepticism that the COBRA analysis for Ft McPherson reaches a realistic conclusion. That is particularly important if costs appear to be the determinate factor in reaching the Army's recommendation.

(Delta Air Slide - On) One of the distinct cost advantages of positioning the three headquarters in Atlanta is the proximity of Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport. The ability to travel directly to all key metropolitan cities both in CONUS and overseas cannot be underestimated given the large amount of travel generated annually by all three headquarters, \$18.4M in 2004 including per diem. Also, because most of the destinations are point to point, it becomes much easier for headquarters' personnel to conduct business with a one-day turnaround thus avoiding per diem costs. (**Air Travel On)**

Air Travel			
<u>Destination</u>		<u>Hartsfield Jackson</u>	<u>Fayetteville</u>
Washington DC	Direct	25	0
	Rd Trip Cost	\$123	\$193
Norfolk VA	Direct	6	0
	Rd Trip Cost	\$185	\$342
Co Springs	Direct	9	0
	Rd Trip Cost	\$394	\$387
		<u>Hartsfield Jackson</u>	<u>Columbia</u>
Tampa	Direct	15	4
	Rd Trip Cost	\$223	\$163
Fayetteville	Direct	0	0
	Rd Trip Cost	0*	\$263
* Assumes 3d Army remains at Ft McPherson			

As you can see by the figures in the testimony above, this would not be the case in Fayetteville NC, where cost of travel would increase and flying to interconnecting airports would be required to get to key destinations. For example, the cost of traveling to Washington D.C. is 36% higher from Fayetteville and there are no direct flights. Flight availability is worth mentioning again, because it is not only cost that must be considered but also the time lost while traveling. (Pause)

Still, another aspect of this issue is the extensive travel to Ft McPherson by its various subordinate commands.

Continued on next page.

(Air Travel 2 on) As shown below, we took a sample using Ft Hood and Ft Lewis which reflects again the cost disparity between Fayetteville NC and Atlanta.

For example, the price difference coming from Killeen, Texas to Atlanta is 10% less, than flying into Fayetteville, NC. These costs are not considered in the COBRA model.

Air Travel			
<u>Destination</u>		<u>Killeen TX</u>	<u>Seattle WA</u>
Atlanta	Direct	0	1
	Rd Trip Cost	\$397	\$273
Fayetteville	Direct	0	0
	Rd Trip Cost	\$441	\$283

So in summary, from a cost perspective only, we feel that the evidence suggests that the recommended action to close Fort McPherson should be reconsidered.

Long Pause

Next, for argument purposes, we made the assumption that costs were not the overriding factor in the decision to close Ft McPherson, and in so doing,

examined the other DOD military value criteria, particularly Criteria #1 and #3 to determine their significance.

Pause

(Picture of Third Army Hq) We began by asking ourselves if moving Third Army to Shaw AFB and particularly displacing it from FORSCOM and the USARC would improve mission capability. Our conclusion is that it would not, because of the implications for Criterion #1.....as I will explain next.

Pause

Co-locating the Army and Air Force components of Central Command appears logical on its surface and clearly fulfills the DOD objective of joint basing. However, if you look at the functions and interaction required between 9th Air Force and Third Army versus the Third Army interface with FORSCOM and USARC you might reach a different conclusion----- and we have.

Pause

(Picture of Soldier) Third Army is a “Force Requester” continuously asking for specific capability to support on-going planning and making adjustments as the “Force Providers”----Forces Command and the US Army

Reserve Command---- meet or do not meet the Army's various requests. Per LTG Yeosock, Third Army Commander for Desert Storm, this was a planning challenge that was intense, long term and required daily on-site meetings between headquarters. He is convinced that to sever the physical location of Third Army Headquarters from its "force providers" would exacerbate what is already a difficult process.

Pause

(Picture of Fighter - On) In an operational scenario, the Third Army develops war plans and in so doing has 9th Air Force members on its staff, who integrate Air Force mission-assets into the ongoing plans. In other words, there already exists a built-in interface between the Army and its Air Force counterpart. Not so with Forces Command and the USARC. There is no staff augmentation from these headquarters on the Third Army staff; therefore co-location is the better approach.

Pause

(Third Army HQ On) For headquarters organizations, DOD's Criteria # 1 should be considered in the context of the effectiveness and efficiency of command and control. Eliminating the synergy between 3d Army, Forces Command, and the US Army Reserve Command, discussed above, will impact adversely on Third Army's war-fighting functions. From a mission value perspective, it appears to us that the synergy created between the three headquarters must be retained.

Long Pause

(Picture of USARC Hq) At this point we have not mentioned much about the US Army Reserve Command other than to stress the importance of the relationship it has to Third Army. The Pentagon, in its recommendation, stated that the USARC should move with and be co-located with FORSCOM at Pope AFB, NC. We agree with co-location of the two Headquarters, but feel that Ft McPherson is and has proven itself many times to be, the better alternative, as I will explain next.

Pause

(Picture of Business Meeting - On) During the Commission hearings on May 17-19, Commissioner Bilbray expressed concern that moving a facility

from one geographic location to another might be problematic given the need to retain skilled professionals. (Labor Statistics On)

LABOR STATISTICS		
	Fulton Cty GA	N Cumberland Cty NC
▪ Total of all industries	621K	78K
▪ Trade, Transport, Utilities	141K	21K
▪ Information	51K	2K
▪ Financial Activities	67K	4K
▪ Prof and Business	145K	11K

Notes
 US Dept of Labor Bureau of Statistics 2003
 Annual average

As you can see above, the same applies to Headquarters Forces Command and US Army Reserve Command. Their ability to recruit professional, career-oriented, civilian managers and leaders in Fayetteville NC may be problematic. From the chart shown above, there are 8 times more skills available in Atlanta than Fayetteville, NC. Too, Ft Bragg has large, established headquarters already that will be competing from a smaller demographic base than is available in Atlanta. We do understand that this is an issue very difficult to quantify---- but it should be a concern nonetheless.

Pause

(Picture of FORSCOM Hq)

For headquarters organizations, DOD Criteria #3 translates best into the facilities themselves and the capability inherent in those facilities for command and control. Forces Command and other commands at Ft McPherson and Ft Gillem have, without question, the most sophisticated command and control system in the military today.

MCPHERSON COMMUNICATIONS HUB

- **Circuits provide DOD installations in SE with:**
 - **Secure/non-secure internet protocol**
 - **Unclassified VTC support**
- **Defense Info System Network secure video tele-conference system**
 - **Worldwide secure VTC support (1 of 5 Nodes)**
- **Classified DOD wideband communications node**
 - **Connects 90 military-related sites in US, Europe, & Pacific**
- **Defense Red Switch - Classified telecommunications**

Key organizations have the advantage of being interconnected to worldwide and world-class communications networks. The physical security and the intelligence security investment have already been made. We ask ourselves what is the benefit of replicating them somewhere else? In fact, as early as September 14, 2004, the Secretary of the Army expressed concern with the

military construction bills for scenarios that consolidate administrative activities into new facilities.

Why then, are we spending limited military construction dollars on administrative facilities?

Pause

(Ft McPherson Front Gate) A final thought before I summarize the Ft McPherson argument -----and the thought is strategic in nature. We suggest that the Commission reflect on the changing nature of world order and the implications for stationing clusters of national command and control facilities to take advantage of major transportation and information technology hubs. The threat today is diverse and unpredictable and to counter it requires coordination with numerous governmental and non-governmental agencies. In our judgment, Ft McPherson and the command and control headquarters there provide the basis for an expanded capability for homeland defense to include the capability for coordination with international agencies and forces as we prosecute the war on terror.

Pause

In summary, given our concerns with the savings presented by the COBRA model for BRAC 2005; the mission and strategic value benefits of retaining the three headquarters together; the enormous benefits to command and

control offered by the current availability of highly capable infrastructure; the availability of skilled civilian executive manpower in Atlanta; and the close proximity of Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport all mitigate, in our opinion, against closing Ft McPherson and support leaving all headquarters there.

Pause

FT GILLEM

(Picture of Ft Gillem Front Gate) Let me now address Ft Gillem. As with Ft McPherson, our discussion of Ft Gillem will center on three main points. First, cost again appears to be the overriding factor in the Army's decision to close the installation while both the COBRA analysis and other cost factors are a concern. Secondly, moving the three major headquarters (1st Army, 2d Recruiting Brigade, and the 52d EOD Group) will impact adversely on the training readiness of the Reserve Component; detracts from support for homeland defense; and impedes efficient command and control between the headquarters and subordinates units. Finally, the positioning of enclaved organizations there will obviate a security challenge and will make redevelopment planning difficult.

(Cost Slide On) As with Ft McPherson, we examined the COBRA analysis for Ft Gillem and have come to much the same conclusions.

For example, completing all personnel moves and construction of a new headquarters for the 2d Recruiting Brigade in 1 year, start to finish, is unattainable. Again, the disparity between the COBRA modeling done in 1993 and 2005---in this instance, one time cost of \$56M in 2005 compared to \$350M in 1993-----are significant enough to question the validity of the current data. We recognize that models are scenario and assumption dependent, but such large deviations certainly raise questions, and we recommend further examination by your staff.

Pause

(Picture of Hartsfield) Much like the proximity of Ft McPherson with the Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport, organizations at Ft Gillem, too, will be impacted by a less efficient travel environment and increased costs should Ft Gillem close. For all three organizations there, travel time to get to a major transportation hub at their new locations will be extensive. For 1st Army, it is 165 miles to Chicago, IL; for 52d EOD Group, 60 miles to Nashville, TN; and for 2d Recruiting Brigade, 80 miles to Birmingham AL. Cost of travel and / or time spent traveling will be more.

(Air Travel 3 On) To further illustrate this, we compared the cost and availability of flights between a representative sample of the subordinate battalions of the Recruiting Brigade and the EOD Group. Except for the costs of travel to a transportation hub, airline fares are generally the same. However lack of the availability of flights equates to loss of productive work which, again, is not quantified in the COBRA model.

Air Travel (2d recruiting Bde)	
<u>Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport</u>	<u>Huntsville, AL</u>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Jacksonville, FL <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - direct (from/to) -- 7 - Roundtrip cost -- \$213 • Miami, FL <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - direct (from/to) -- 11 - Roundtrip cost -- \$269 • Nashville, TN <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - direct (from/to) -- 11 - Roundtrip cost -- \$283 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Jacksonville, FL <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - direct (from/to) -- 0 - Roundtrip cost -- \$223 • Miami, FL <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - direct (from/to) -- 0 - Roundtrip cost -- \$228 • Nashville, TN <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - direct (from/to) -- 0 - Roundtrip cost -- \$292

Air Travel (52d EOD Group)	
<u>Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport</u>	<u>Nashville, TN</u>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Seattle - Tacoma, WA <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - direct (from/to) -- 2 - Roundtrip cost -- \$283 • San Antonio, TX <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - direct (from/to) -- 6 - Roundtrip cost -- \$223 • Colorado Springs, CO <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - direct (from/to) -- 9 - Roundtrip cost -- \$384 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Seattle - Tacoma, WA <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - direct (from/to) -- 0 - Roundtrip cost -- \$263 • San Antonio, TX <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - direct (from/to) -- 4 - Roundtrip cost -- \$203 • Colorado Springs, CO <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - direct (from/to) -- 4 - Roundtrip cost -- \$375

Setting the issue of cost aside for a moment, the Army states that by moving Headquarters 1st Army, the 52d EOD Group, and 2d Recruiting Brigade, that mission value is enhanced. We question that conclusion.

Pause

(Picture First Army Headquarters -On) Today, 1st Army, a subordinate headquarters to Forces Command, is responsible to FORSCOM for the training and readiness of Reserve and National Guard forces in the eastern United States. Additionally, it serves as an Army coordinator for homeland defense and natural disaster support.

Pause

(Picture Soldier) Since First Army Headquarters will be assuming the Reserve training readiness responsibility for the entire Continental US, moving it to Rock Island Arsenal, IL according to the Army, will locate it more centrally to the forces it will supervise thus improving mission capability. We question that assumption. First, regarding the training and readiness of the reserve component, there is a natural synergy between Forces Command, the US Army Reserve Command, and 1st Army that will be affected by First Army's move. Coordination just won't be timely or effective.

Secondly, in terms of time, given the fact that the major transportation hub is Chicago, 165 miles away, the question is----- is there really any benefit from a mission value perspective to move the headquarters from the immediate availability of Hartsfield Jackson International Airport?

Pause

Consider also the fact that 1st Army has a significant role to play in our Nation's homeland security. It is unfortunate that the Pentagon has recommended displacing the 1st Army, a coordinator for Military Support to Civil Authorities including homeland defense-----and the capability that is offered by FEMA, GEMA, the Red Cross, CDC, the CID laboratory, the US Army Reserve SCIF, and National Guard units on Ft Gillem.

Pause

The move of the 2d Recruiting Brigade and the 52d EOD Group is again based on improving mission capability. By stationing the 52d Group headquarters with one of its units at Ft Campbell, the inference is that it will provide better training or more efficient command and control opportunities for the Group. The Recruiting Brigade move, according to the Army, puts the organization in a more central location to the population it serves.


(Picture of Hummer) To put the 52 EOD Group in perspective, it is a small command and control headquarters that commands 5 battalions, and 39 companies located strategically throughout the United States and overseas. Doctrinally, the companies organize into small teams to render safe, explosive devices and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Training is company-focused. The Group orients primarily on administrative and command & control functions and not as much on training other than to monitor training readiness. A relevant point is that the 52d Group's assets are widely dispersed not only in the Continental US but also overseas. From a command and control perspective, therefore, it would appear to us that placing the Group headquarters on an installation which will make travel more difficult does not make sense.

Long Pause

(2d Bde Hqs) The move of the 2d Recruiting Brigade is questionable as well. Like the others, command and control will be effected given the additional time required to visit subordinate organizations not in Alabama – a product of the ground distance of 80 miles to a major transportation hub. We see no advantage whatsoever in terms of mission efficiency in moving this headquarters.

(Graphic On) It is troublesome to us that a large number of organizations, from both Army and other Federal agencies, are scheduled to be enclaved at Gillem with no rationale for leaving them there and no single military organization charged with providing administrative and logistical support. Again, it appears that the Army's focus was to use cost to close Gillem, and once that threshold was achieved, the remaining organizations were left for some future decisions. Some are cited to be positioned on a so called "Base X"; others are unaccounted for, specifically the 3d Medical Command, the Army Reserve Military Intelligence Center (Secure SCIF), and the Atlanta Military Entrance Processing Station. For certain, what remains is a closed installation with little "enclaves", to use the "Army's terminology", having little semblance of organization or appropriate security for that matter.

Continue on next page.



We have circled in red the organizations that will remain on the installation to better describe the security challenge that will exist and to give you an appreciation for the redevelopment obstacles faced by the community when the property is turned over.

Pause

Finally, I would like to emphasize that Ft Gillem is inextricably linked to Ft McPherson. Setting aside the issue of synergy for the training readiness of the Reserve Component which is important in-and-of itself, one should consider that Ft McPherson provides service, security, and support to Ft

Gillem and visa versa and is linked necessarily to its communications infrastructure.

Pause

Cost, command and control obstacles, lost Reserve Component training readiness synergies, homeland defense coordination inefficiencies, and security challenges for enclaved organizations mitigate against closing the Ft Gillem in our opinion.

Pause

(Conclusion Chart) In consideration of the foregoing, we come to the following conclusion:

- a. That the Army's recommendation to disperse headquarters limits their ability to command and control ---and at additional cost--- substantially deviates from the requirements of DOD BRAC Criteria #3 and #4
- b. That the Army's recommendation to disperse major headquarters whose synergy is critical to mission value deviates substantially from DOD Criterion #1
- c. That costs are understated in the Army's analysis and thus deviate from DOD Criteria #5.

(Header Chart On)

Our recommendations are:

- a. Retain Ft McPherson as an active installation and leave the three headquarters in question positioned there.
- b. Do not close or realign Ft Gillem.

Again Mr. Chairman, thank you for taking the time to listen to my remarks.

It was an honor to be here today. I look forward to your questions.

COBRA REALIGNMENT SUMMARY REPORT (COBRA v6.10) - Page 1/2
 Data As Of 6/19/2005 2:11:16 PM, Report Created 6/19/2005 2:14:57 PM

Department : Army
 Scenario File : C:\PPSG\Clients\1 Current\Georgia\McPherson\GMACC 1.CBR
 Option Pkg Name: GMACC 1
 Std Fctrs File : C:\PPSG\COBRA 2005\Model\COBRA 6.10 April 21 2005\BRAC2005.SFF

Starting Year : 2006
 Final Year : 2008
 Payback Year : 2013 (5 Years)

NPV in 2025(\$K): -696,472
 1-Time Cost(\$K): 391,300

Net Costs in 2005 Constant Dollars (\$K)

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Total	Beyond
	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----
MilCon	26,279	260,173	0	0	0	0	286,452	0
Person	0	25	-31,862	-76,173	-76,173	-76,173	-260,357	-76,173
Overhd	4,348	7,531	-11,948	-18,481	-18,481	-18,481	-55,511	-19,304
Moving	1,652	497	47,639	0	0	0	49,788	0
Missio	0	0	0	7,623	7,623	7,623	22,869	7,623
Other	18,328	59	6,638	4,987	6,638	6,638	43,288	6,638
TOTAL	50,607	268,284	10,467	-82,044	-80,393	-80,393	86,529	-81,216

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Total
	----	----	----	----	----	----	----
POSITIONS ELIMINATED							
Off	0	0	46	0	0	0	46
Enl	0	0	242	0	0	0	242
Civ	0	0	652	0	0	0	652
TOT	0	0	940	0	0	0	940

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Total
	----	----	----	----	----	----	----
POSITIONS REALIGNED							
Off	0	13	1,198	0	0	0	1,211
Enl	0	8	818	0	0	0	826
Stu	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ	0	13	1,313	0	0	0	1,326
TOT	0	34	3,329	0	0	0	3,363

Summary:

 GMACC CHANGES:

1. MILCON for FORSCOM \$132 M - Screen Seven
2. MILCON for USARC \$82 M
3. MILCON for 3rd Army \$59 M

USA-0222: Close Ft. McPherson, GA. Relocate the Headquarters US Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), and the Headquarters US Army Reserve Command to Pope AFB, NC. Relocate the Headquarters 3rd US Army to Shaw AFB, SC. Relocate the Installation Management Agency's Southeastern Region HQs and the NETCOM Southeastern Region HQs to Ft. Eustis, VA. Relocate the Army Contracting Agency Southern Region HQs to Ft. Sam Houston.

Several other Service and DOD offices resident on Ft. McPherson are moved to Base X. These include, a Corps of Engineers South Atlantic District office, an Army Audit Agency office, the 3rd CIDC Region office, a JTF 6 office, an Army veterinary unit, elements of the Army Logistics Management Agency, a military history detachment, the US Army Center for Health & Preventative Medicine, and several other small units.

COBRA REALIGNMENT SUMMARY REPORT (COBRA v6.10) - Page 2/2
 Data As Of 6/19/2005 2:11:16 PM, Report Created 6/19/2005 2:14:57 PM

Department : Army
 Scenario File : C:\PPSG\Clients\1 Current\Georgia\McPherson\GMACC 1.CBR
 Option Pkg Name: GMACC 1
 Std Fctrs File : C:\PPSG\COBRA 2005\Model\COBRA 6.10 April 21 2005\BRAC2005.SFF

Costs in 2005 Constant Dollars (\$K)

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Total	Beyond
	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----
MilCon	26,279	260,173	0	0	0	0	286,452	0
Person	0	241	25,857	16,400	16,400	16,400	75,297	16,400
Overhd	8,132	11,411	17,921	12,587	12,587	12,587	75,224	12,587
Moving	1,652	564	53,964	0	0	0	56,180	0
Missio	0	0	0	11,798	11,798	11,798	35,394	11,798
Other	18,328	59	6,638	6,638	6,638	6,638	44,939	6,638
TOTAL	54,391	272,447	104,380	47,423	47,423	47,423	573,487	47,423

Savings in 2005 Constant Dollars (\$K)

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Total	Beyond
	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----
MilCon	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Person	0	216	57,719	92,573	92,573	92,573	335,654	92,573
Overhd	3,784	3,880	29,869	31,068	31,068	31,068	130,735	31,891
Moving	0	67	6,325	0	0	0	6,392	0
Missio	0	0	0	4,175	4,175	4,175	12,525	4,175
Other	0	0	0	1,651	0	0	1,651	0
TOTAL	3,784	4,163	93,912	129,467	127,816	127,816	486,958	128,639

PRESENTATION

TO

THE 2005 BASE REALIGNMENT and CLOSURE COMMISSION

**STATEMENT OF: CONGRESSMAN PHIL GINGREY
GEORGIA**

30 June 2005

**NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL RELEASED
BY THE 2005 BRAC COMMISSION**

Gentlemen thank you for coming today and thank you for giving me this opportunity to explain why Naval Air Station Atlanta should remain open. I would also like to introduce you to one of our nation's leading authorities on reserve force structures, Major General Larry Taylor.

There are three key points that we hope you take away from today's presentation:

#1, The City of Atlanta and Hartsfield-Jackson Airport provide the installation with unmatched demographics that cannot be replicated anywhere else. Companies like Delta, AirTran, Lockheed and others provide NAS Atlanta with an endless supply

of experienced military trained pilots and maintainers and recruiting and retention will inevitably suffer without the population base the city provides.

#2, The assets at NAS Atlanta and the subsequent personnel WILL NOT GO AWAY, they will simply be moved. This means that the only true cost savings is for the headquarters personnel and the maintenance of the installation, which is less than half of what the original COBRA model claims.

And #3, NAS Atlanta is a joint installation in the true sense of the word and is wholly interdependent with Dobbins Air Reserve Base and Lockheed Martin.

The properties are literally interwoven and each

installation relies on the other for different functions like medical facilities, wastewater treatment, fire protection and family support.

Gentlemen, this is an incredibly cost-effective base.

Military value is high. Like the golden rule of real estate, reserve installations rely on location, location, location, and should this land be forfeited, the Navy will never be able to get it back.

I'd like to introduce you now to the true authority.

Major General Larry Taylor has commanded at every level and has long been a champion of the reserve component.

He was most recently the Commanding General of the Fourth Marine Aircraft Wing where he was responsible for the recruiting, equipping and training of all Marine reserve aviation forces. After his retirement, General Taylor was called back to active duty after September 11, 2001 to command the Marine Corps Mobilization Command. NO ONE is more qualified to share the importance of the Reserve's roll in support of our National Command Authority, as well as the inherent challenges associated with poor recruitment and demographics.

Thank you again for your consideration and I appreciate this opportunity to testify.

PRESENTATION
TO
THE 2005 BASE REALIGNMENT and CLOSURE COMMISSION

STATEMENT OF: LARRY TAYLOR
GEORGIA

30 June 2005

NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL RELEASED
BY THE 2005 BRAC COMMISSION

**Naval Air Station Atlanta
Statement of Major General Larry Taylor, ret. before the BRAC Commission**

30 June 2005

Thank you, Congressman Gingrey, and thank you for this opportunity to address the Commission. I appreciate having the opportunity to make the case for Naval Air Station Atlanta and detail why the Department of Defense was shortsighted in making the recommendation for closure, an act that we believe would negatively affect the readiness of our reserve forces.

I am here today to discuss three key points:

- Reserve combat readiness is about demographics
- The DoD numbers are flawed
- There are better alternatives

First, let's address the key issue of demographics. What makes our reserve forces strong? Being able to recruit and retain the best and brightest our country has to offer, allowing them access to key job opportunities, occupational advancement, great schools, affordable housing and a great quality of life for their family – all while serving their country.

The Atlanta area achieves all of this and more. Atlanta has the second largest population of aviation-related occupation fields in the United States. That is supported by the world's busiest airport, Hartsfield-Jackson, Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Company and hundreds of high tech companies.

I have two examples from personal experience as Commanding General of the 4th Marine Aircraft Wing that demonstrates the benefit of superior access to trained, prior service reservists.

One of 4th MAW's helicopter squadrons, HMM-764 (in Iraq as we speak), then based at Marine Corps Air Station El Toro, had given themselves the call sign "Moonlight." They were very proud of the fact that in the few years preceding they had accumulated a higher percentage of flight hours on night vision goggles than any other non-deployed squadron in the Marine Corps. They were able to do this by regularly scheduling multi-aircraft tactical training flights on weeknights. Keep in mind that some people still think the reserves are "weekend warriors." Not true. These Marines, most of whom lived near the base, were able to take care of their work and family obligations and train regularly throughout the month with their squadron. As you know, many of our combat missions these days take place during the hours of darkness. HMM-764 was combat-ready.

Then BRAC closed El Toro and realigned HMM-764 to Miramar. No problem, we thought. Miramar, near San Diego, also has a reserve-friendly demographic profile. However, once the move of this squadron actually began, we discovered there wasn't enough room for them all at Miramar. So they were redirected to Edwards AFB – a 3 1/2 hour drive into the Mojave Desert. The Air Force has been an excellent landlord to the Marines at Edwards, but that weeknight training that "Moonlight" had done so much of when the squadron was near their homes and workplaces was dramatically reduced and frequently involved administratively pre-positioning aircraft closer to where the crews

lived and worked, costly in time and dollars. Similarly, should DoD's recommendations be approved, the highly trained and combat-ready helicopter squadron at NAS Atlanta will inevitably suffer the same fate.

There was another redirect that took place at about the same time. The NAS Atlanta-based fighter squadron, the one presently in Iraq, used to be based at NAS Cecil Field, FL. BRAC closed Cecil and directed this squadron to Beaufort, SC. After many lengthy discussions, the message that we had been trying to send finally sunk in. It was difficult to recruit and retain reservists to the South Carolina low country. The redirect of the squadron was ordered to NAS Atlanta and the rationale was "superior demographics." This is a direct quote from the 1995 BRAC report to the President "...recognition of the superior demographics for the Navy and Marine Corps reserves by relocation of reserve assets to Atlanta." **We must ask, "What has changed?"**

And, all this I add, at a time when we are relying far more than ever before on the reserve components of our armed forces. About 40 percent of our warfighters deployed into harm's way in the Global War on Terror are from the reserve or National Guard.

The Total Force works. It works because in the past we have placed our reserve component capabilities in locations where recruiters and the personnel required to man these capabilities have relatively easy access. When I talk to civic groups I often use the old cliché about the three most important things about a piece of property being location, location, location. Similarly, the three most important things about a reserve site are demographics, demographics, demographics. This demographics issue is inherently tied to BRAC Criteria Number 1 – operational readiness. Navy and Marine readiness will suffer if the Navy divests itself from Atlanta – which this recommendation does.

The savings claimed from the proposed closing of NAS Atlanta are substantially incorrect. Specifically, it would appear that the savings projection of \$60 million in labor costs are incorrect and will be substantially lower. For example, one of the tenant squadrons, VFA-203 with 129 personnel, left more than a year ago, but is included in the calculations.

Also in error was the manning of the to-be-closed medical clinic. The data said closing the clinic would save 111 personnel; the actual number is 40.

The bottom line is 307 fewer personnel would be eliminated due to closure than the original COBRA model estimated.

Moreover, if the recommendations are implemented, the tenant commands do not cease to exist; rather they become tenants at other bases like New Orleans, **which presently has the lowest reservist manning percentage of all NAS reserve bases**, Robins AFB, 120 miles from NAS Atlanta and Dobbins, or Fort Worth.

The actual savings, that is the savings associated with the elimination of the administrative and other overhead of the NAS itself, is \$35 million versus the \$60 million contained in DoD's original COBRA model (\$25 million less than claimed). **The number of those positions slated to leave here only to operate elsewhere is 598.**

I also must point out that the model fails to take into account the NAS Atlanta Facilities Condition Index of .7 percent, which is much better than the criteria of 5 percent to be

considered excellent by the Navy. This is relevant to BRAC Criteria Number 2 (Condition of Facilities).

The key point here is that, notwithstanding hard-to-quantify claims of cost savings, there can be little doubt that NAS Atlanta has been not only efficient but extraordinarily effective in doing what any reserve base is supposed to do. This is relevant to BRAC Criteria Number 4 (Cost of Operations, Manpower Implications). A base is supposed to facilitate the recruiting, organizing, equipping and training of operational units to mobilize, deploy and be employed in combat. The proof is in combat as we speak.

The analysis also ignores the joint use of the Dobbins runway, which is no additional cost to the Navy because it is fully owned and operated by the Air Force. It seems ironic that BRAC, intended to promote jointness, has essentially ignored the decades-long inherent jointness of NAS Atlanta/Dobbins.

Late in 2004, not long after VMFA-142, our F-18 fighter squadron, was mobilized and deployed to Iraq, and before HMLA-773 our helicopter attack squadron, had returned from Afghanistan, a very prominent local political figure visited NAS Atlanta. He commented how "sleepy" the place seemed. I mention this because it seems to me that it dramatically illustrates how efficient and effective NAS Atlanta has been and continues to be.

That sleepy impression in that politician's mind was not because the base was Beetle Bailey's Camp Swampy with General Halftrack waiting in vain for a call from the Pentagon. On the contrary; he saw little activity precisely because the Pentagon has called and continues to call – early and often.

I've already mentioned the helicopter squadron, just back from 18 months in Afghanistan, and the fighter squadron in Iraq as we meet here today. There is also the Navy's transport squadron, VR-46, which sends detachments overseas for 28 weeks a year. There also is the airborne early warning squadron, VAW-77, heavily involved with our counter-narcotics efforts and with NASA.

Now these young men and women are being told thank you very much for the sacrifices you and your families and employers have made. We plan to move your squadron to Fort Worth, New Orleans, a recruiting and retention black hole, or Warner Robins. If you wish to continue to participate after being mobilized for so long, you're going to have to explain to your families and employers that even more days and hours will need to be spent just getting to and from your squadron, even when not mobilized.

Is there any doubt what this will do to the retention of their critical and combat-tested skills? Is there any doubt how much more difficult it will be to recruit such skills to new sites which lack the aviation-skills intensive demographic makeup of Atlanta?

My final point is that there are workable alternatives that will provide cost savings while not having a negative effect on the readiness of our forces.

We have long advocated further increasing the joint relationship of NAS Atlanta and Dobbins by relocation or conveyance, but regardless, **NAS Atlanta should be the model, not the target.**

Increased jointness also would spare DoD some of the challenges, not to mention money and countless man-hours of previous BRAC rounds, and their subsequent redirects when mistakes were discovered. Some of these discoveries, in my personal experience, were actually simple admissions that previous BRAC recommendations had ignored the expert testimony and warnings of the on-scene commanders. I have already talked about the Moonlight experience on the West Coast and the superior demographics quote referring to a 1995 redirect to NAS Atlanta.

To some degree, NAS Atlanta is a victim of its own success. It's a remarkably efficient base with very low overhead, due in part to the joint relationship with Dobbins. Notwithstanding this efficiency, however, it is relatively easy to close in the lense of the COBRA model. No matter how many times you run the model, however, COBRA will fail as long as it does not factor in the intangible strength of NAS Atlanta's demographics, demographics, demographics.

We understand that you are wrestling with incredibly difficult issues, not only pertaining to saving taxpayer dollars, but lives affected. You are trying to determine, as Admiral Gehman put it, "Is the pain worth the gain?" I'm here to testify that the pain to the taxpayers of losing the military value of NAS Atlanta is not worth the gain of \$35 million.

The good news is that we have shown you a way to save DoD dollars while retaining the military value resident in NAS Atlanta. Jointness is the key, and, in that regard, NAS Atlanta should be your model, not your target.

At a time when we rely more heavily than ever on the reserve components of our armed forces and at a time when we lament the large and growing cultural and knowledge gap between our military and the society it serves, we are involved in a process that, if we're not careful, will continue the trend of the military to withdraw even further into the insulated and isolated "Fort Apaches" of a few large bases. Cut the fat. But when you do, please remember that much of our military "muscle" is the assurance that when America must go to war places like Broken Arrow, OK, Yakima, WA, Garden City, NJ and Atlanta, GA must go as well, both in person and in spirit – the personnel of the reserve units based here with the spiritual support of their friends, families, employers, co-workers and fellow citizens.

Gentlemen, I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you today. We look forward to meeting with you and your staff in Washington to discuss these ideas and numbers in more detail. Thank you.

PRESENTATION

TO

THE 2005 BASE REALIGNMENT and CLOSURE COMMISSION

**STATEMENT OF: CONGRESSMAN JOHN BARROW
GEORGIA**

30 June 2005

**NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL RELEASED
BY THE 2005 BRAC COMMISSION**

Given only two minutes to speak, I intend to keep my introductory remarks short and to the point.

Fortunately, since the case for keeping the Navy Supply Corps School open and operating in Athens, Georgia is as clear cut as it is, two minutes should be more than enough time.

On May 25th of this year, approximately two weeks after the initial BRAC list was announced, a member of this commission toured the Supply Corps School in Athens - the first time that anyone representing BRAC had toured the facility.

On that day, I believe you saw first hand what the rest of us have known for quite some time now:

The Navy Supply Corps School is a model in 21st Century military efficiency - a cost effective, MULTI-function, logistical think tank that provides state-of-the-art training to all branches of our nation's armed forces.

It performs its core capabilities smarter, faster, and cheaper than any other Department of Defense school.

Moving the NSCS to Newport, Rhode Island will prove a logistical and strategic mistake that will not only increase the school's operating costs, but will substantially decrease the military value of the school's training capabilities.

Over previous BRAC rounds, the NSCS has acquired additional assignments and personnel because of the school's military value, cost effectiveness, superior facilities, and unparalleled reputation for training excellence.

Local fire and police services are provided to the school free of charge and the Athens area offers NSCS students and faculty an exceedingly low cost of living.

Naval Station Newport, on the other hand, has lost activities and commands over the past three BRAC rounds. Its facilities are far from being equipped to house NSCS's training capabilities or provide adequate living quarters for the school's students.

In addition, Newport's cost of living is one of the most expensive anywhere that Navy currently resides - dramatically higher than Athens, Georgia - even higher than Washington, DC.

The presentation to follow my remarks will clearly show that the Secretary of Defense's May 13th recommendation to close and relocate the Athens Navy Supply Corps School substantially deviated from the military criteria listed in BRAC.

With that said, it's my pleasure to introduce Mr. George Huban.

PRESENTATION

TO

THE 2005 BASE REALIGNMENT and CLOSURE COMMISSION

**STATEMENT OF: GEORGE HUBAN
GEORGIA**

30 June 2005

**NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL RELEASED
BY THE 2005 BRAC COMMISSION**

BRAC TESTIMONY

Navy Supply Corps School Athens, Georgia

Navy Task Force Presentation 6/30/05

(1. TITLE SLIDE)

Mr. Chairman- I, too, want to add my thanks to you, your fellow Commissioners, and the Commission staff for answering the President's call to take on this important task. Your decisions will not only affect the fate of citizens and communities that have supported these military installations for decades, but most importantly, the military readiness of our armed forces.

I am here today to discuss the Navy Supply Corps School. The Pentagon justification for this closure recommendation is that: it closes a "single function installation " -- This is INCORRECT -- it can support the training of officers in Newport with the "existing infrastructure" --This is INCORRECT -- and finally, this relocation to Newport is "desirable and cost efficient and supports a ... Navy initiative to create a center for officer training at...Newport" - - This is also INCORRECT.

I will discuss how each of these justifications are wrong, how the Pentagon deviated substantially from the BRAC selection criteria, and will end by recommending the Commission reject the recommendation to close the Navy Supply Corps School.

(2. "THREE" COMMAND SLIDE)

Before I address the Pentagon's substantial deviation from the BRAC selection criteria, let me first address a significant misunderstanding of the role the Athens base plays in logistics warfare training. The BRAC justification called the Navy Supply Corps School a "single-function installation". Nothing can be further from the truth.

Perhaps the Pentagon was thinking that the only course taught was the Navy Supply Corps Officers' Basic Qualification Course, the first course young officers take after commissioning to qualify as a Supply Corps Officer. This is the course originally brought to Athens in 1954. At that point the school was a single-function installation with this course representing approximately 90% of student throughput. Today, the Naval Support Activity, Athens hosts three military commands – the Center for Service Support, the Navy Supply Corps School, and the U.S. Marine Corps Detachment. The Basic Qualification Course now represents only 3% of the annual throughput of the Navy Supply Corps School.

(3. TRAINING SLIDE #1)

The Athens base has evolved into a joint- training logistics “University”, teaching not only Naval officers and enlisted, but also Army, Air Force, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, Military Sealift Command, international military, as well as Department of Defense civilian personnel. The Supply Corps School teaches 36 courses on campus and 13 via Mobile Training Teams and Video Tele-Training. Course topics include supply, materiel management, hazardous material, transportation management, Marine Corps aviation and Naval Reserve expeditionary logistics. In addition, the state-of-the-art technology infrastructure built into the Athens base allows it to be a test facility for DoD training innovation.

(4. TRAINING SLIDE #2)

To stay current with logistics innovation in the 21st Century, the Navy Supply Corps established, in 2001, the Tench Francis School of Executive training in Athens. This course provides executive training to mid and senior grade officers in a state-of-the-art conference center located adjacent to an award-winning Bachelor Quarters.

Additionally, in a long-standing partnership with The University of Georgia, selected Navy Supply Corps officers finishing their tour of duty at the Navy Supply Corps School receive orders to attend the M.B.A. Program at the prestigious Terry College of Business.

This partnership not only allows the Navy to send officers to UGA at an in-state tuition rate, but also saves valuable Permanent Change of Station funds --- one move to Athens – 2 sets of orders.

(5. BRAC CRITERIA SLIDE)

Having highlighted significant misunderstandings on the role of the Athens base, we will now examine how the Pentagon deviated substantially from their criteria. Military Value Selection Criteria #1, the most important criteria is “the impact on joint war fighting, training and readiness”. As noted previously, Athens has evolved into a joint training logistics “University” producing recognized outstanding military readiness improvement in the training environment. Its reputation for training excellence has made it a “magnet” for 21st century logistics warfare training. This proposed move to Newport does not fully appreciate the student mix and synergy of this training facility. Currently, only 7% of the over 5,500 students trained are Naval officers. This move to Newport appears to be driven by a very small percentage of student throughput.

In addition, for new Supply Corps officers requiring a “saltwater orientation,” training is conducted in Mayport, Florida – a distance of approximately 350 miles from Athens.

In accomplishing the same training in Newport, Rhode Island, the nearest ships to Newport are in Norfolk, Virginia, a distance of approximately 570 miles. There are no active duty ships homeported in Newport.

We strongly question the Pentagon’s justification that this closure would create Newport as THE center for Officer Training. Research has uncovered no Secretary of Navy Instruction, Directive or Policy creating such a concept or center. If Newport is to be the center for follow-on officer training, why wouldn’t other officer communities be affected? To the contrary, in recognition of the Athens’ facility’s cost-effective training excellence, the Chief of Naval Operations, in 2002 , chose Athens as the ideal location for the Center for Service Support. This new command is responsible for the training oversight and career development of 46,000 Sailors across 17 separate enlisted ratings and 5,000 Officers in 10 communities.

Based on our review, the question remains: What is the military value of this BRAC relocation?

Military Value Selection Criteria #2 is “the availability and condition of land, facilities at both existing and... receiving locations”. Athens is a state-of-the-art facility with one the lowest maintenance backlogs of any Navy base in the Department of Defense. This 58 acre, pristine installation has received numerous DoD awards for its superior facilities. In addition, since 1954 the City of Athens has provided the base with fire and police protection at no cost. In this age of developing “innovative partnerships” to reduce base operating expenses, this special partnership with the City of Athens has set the standard for over 50 years.

To support training in Newport with “existing infrastructure”---- the COBRA model includes \$15 million for military construction commencing in 2008 to refurbish outdated Newport buildings. This estimate does not include the millions of dollars necessary to bring Newport’s maintenance backlog to the Athens level. More troubling than the cost to upgrade Newport classroom facilities, is the BRAC treatment of transient student and support personnel housing.

The Newport bachelor quarters occupancy rate is so high, the COBRA model assumes that transient students and support personnel will not live on base, but will live on the Newport economy. The cost, per diem rate, to live off-base in Newport is one of the highest in the country. A \$4.3 million annual increase in transient student and support personnel costs to live off-base in Newport was provided in BRAC scenario data. However, this cost was not loaded into the COBRA model, as this \$4.3 million additional annual cost will be paid by Navy's travel budget. We believe, therefore, the recommendation to close Athens clearly deviates substantially from BRAC Military Value Selection Criteria #2 in ignoring the cost of transient student and support personnel.

Military Value Selection Criteria #4 is the "cost of operation" and the Other Considerations Criteria #5 is "the extent and timing of projected cost and savings". The BRAC data projects the annual recurring savings will be \$3.5 million, but data also indicates that the COBRA model did not take into account the \$4.3 million annual increase in cost for transient students and support personnel in Newport. When this cost is added in, there is an annual cost not an annual savings to this proposed closure and relocation.

No reasonable business would invest \$24 million (the BRAC investment number) for the privilege of paying at least \$800,000 annuallyALL COSTS NO SAVINGS.

The other troubling aspect of the BRAC \$3.5 million annual recurring savings projection is that it is based on arbitrary personnel reductions called “efficiencies”. In order to project an annual savings, one had to make the efficiencies cut big enough to overcome the fact that Newport’s civilian locality pay scale is significantly higher than Athens.

In fact, Newport ranks in the top ten most expensive locations in the United States for military and civilian personnel and is even higher than Washington, D.C. In regard to permanently assigned personnel, Newport has approximately \$800 per month higher officer housing allowance cost, and approximately \$700 per month higher enlisted housing allowance cost. In addition, these “efficiencies” ignore the streamlining that the Navy Supply Corps School has undertaken in the past twelve years and continues to achieve annually. Even though the student throughput has doubled, the Navy Supply Corps School has used technology to reduce its staff of instructors by over 20%.

Not allowing the COBRA model to account for Newport's increased annual cost of transient student and support personnel housing, and making what we believe are arbitrary "efficiency" cuts, the BRAC analysis clearly deviated substantially from Military Value Selection Criteria #4 and Other Considerations, Selection Criteria #5.

(5. SLIDE....100,000 GRADUATES)

In summary, we believe that the BRAC's savings projections are in fact WRONG when all costs are considered. The Navy will spend \$24 million for a move that will cause them to LOSE at least \$800,000 annually.

A COBRA Model Excursion, which further elaborates cost implications of this move, was provided to BRAC Commission analysts for their review on June 28, 2005. I have also submitted a copy for the record.

Not only is this is a BAD investment, but most importantly there is no clear military value payback. We believe that after the Commission examines all the facts, you will conclude this recommendation to close the Navy Supply Corps School deviated substantially from BRAC selection Criteria.

**Thank you for your time and attention. We look forward to working
with your staff in the coming weeks.**

PRESENTATION

TO

THE 2005 BASE REALIGNMENT and CLOSURE COMMISSION

**STATEMENT OF: CONGRESSMAN JACK KINGSTON
GEORGIA**

30 June 2005

**NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL RELEASED
BY THE 2005 BRAC COMMISSION**

**PRESENTATION TO
THE 2005 BASE REALIGNMENT and CLOSURE COMMISSION
STATEMENT OF: REPRESENTATIVE JACK KINGSTON (GA-1)**

Good morning, I'm Jack Kingston, representing the First District of Georgia. Today, my message is simple. Based on solid data, the Navy made the right choice by adding new missions to Kings Bay.

There has been a lot of confusion lately about a possible, smaller, Submarine force in the future – that is a debate for another day – for this BRAC Commission we should be clear – **the combination of Kings Bay and Norfolk recommended by the Navy can accommodate all of the submarines in today's force structure with significant room to expand if that is required.**

Kings Bay was built for a larger SSBN fleet and even with the SSN moves recommended by the Navy – we will not reach the high water mark of personnel that Kings Bay has already accommodated.

Adding new missions to Kings Bay is the right move from both a national security and economic standpoint. The military value of Kings Bay is one of the highest in the Department of Defense. The synergy created by locating all 3 submarine platforms, (SSBN, SSGN and SSN) near a major Naval Fleet Concentration Area will provide enhanced wartime readiness and surge capability.

Additionally, co-locating the submarine school at an operational base with three weapons systems enhances training for our sailors, and ultimately, their ability to work together when deployed.

Kings Bay has the space and access to easily support future missions and growth while minimizing cost.

The high level of current investment at Kings Bay, coupled with one of the lowest base operating costs in the Department, makes growing missions at Kings Bay is a smart decision.

Right-sizing from three East Coast submarine bases to two, will result in a more capable submarine force and one that maintains growth potential. As you know, the DoD 20 year force structure plan was one input for BRAC planning. But under the current plan, **the Navy can accommodate all of the existing submarine force with room to grow.**

As a member of the House Appropriations Committee on Defense, I am keenly aware of the future year's acquisition strategy for submarines. The current acquisition plan of one submarine per year through 2012, followed by two subs per year through 2025, when coupled with retirement plans for existing subs, will leave us with a smaller force in the future. But the point I want to leave with you is that even with two East Coast Submarine homeports the Navy will still have the capacity to expand beyond the size of the predicted 20 year Force Structure Plan.

Whether tomorrow's submarine force is 40, 55, or some larger number of boats – the combination of Kings Bay and Norfolk is the highest military value option while achieving the maximum savings from this final round of BRAC.

I'd like to introduce retired Navy Captain Walt Yourstone, former Commanding Officer of Kings Bay, to offer some further remarks about our community.

30 June 2005

PRESENTATION
TO
THE 2005 BASE REALIGNMENT and CLOSURE COMMISSION

STATEMENT OF: WALTER H. YOURSTONE
CAPTAIN USN (RETIRED)
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, CAMDEN PARTNERSHIP

30 June 2005

NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL RELEASED
BY THE 2005 BRAC COMMISSION

Camden County, Georgia Naval Submarine Base Kings Bay Regional Hearing; Atlanta, Georgia

Slide #1

Good morning. I am here to address concerns that have been raised about Camden County, GA's ability to accommodate the growth associated with Department of Defense recommendations presented to your Commission, to realign missions to Kings Bay, GA.

These concerns are UNFOUNDED!

In addressing our capability to accommodate growth, I would like to stress that the Community is experienced in managing smart growth. Throughout the 1980's and 90's Camden County sustained an average annual population growth of 11 to 13%.

Despite the double digit growth driven by establishment of the Naval Submarine Base, the Community sustained a high quality of life as evidenced by an excellent public school system; local post secondary education academic and technical programs; affordable and available housing; accessible health services; recreational activities that highlight the area's natural beauty and historical resources; and strong Military-Community Partnerships.

I would like to stress three points with the Commission this morning:

First, past performance clearly shows Camden County can support the anticipated growth, based on DoD BRAC Recommendations.

Secondly, present community support capability in many areas could handle this growth today.

And finally, the Community is embracing the future in its strategic planning. Camden County is part of a growing coastal region. We are addressing future infrastructure needs with current county-wide comprehensive planning and resource management. Where additional infrastructure is required, planning and execution schedules are well within the timing of BRAC related transition phasing plans.

In other words, Camden County is, and will remain, ready to welcome new service members and their families to a community with a high quality of life, and low cost of living, without placing a burden on current residents or overstressing community services and programs.

To illustrate these points I will address three areas: Naval Submarine Base manning; public education system facilities; and the availability and affordability of housing.

Slide #2: Kings Bay Installation Manpower

With establishment of Naval Submarine Base, Kings Bay, the population of Camden County grew from about 10,000 in 1978; to over 45,000 today.

The left hand side of this chart shows approximately 4,000 billets added to Kings Bay over a three year period. Our understanding of Kings Bay related DoD BRAC recommendations is that roughly 3,300 billets will be added over a six year period.

The rate and magnitude of growth associated with DoD BRAC recommendations are less than that experienced in the 1980's when the County's infrastructure was much less than it is today.

Peak manning at Kings Bay occurred in 1995 when a total of 11,692 personnel were assigned. Since then, a submarine tender has departed; and Trident force restructuring resulted in 3 of 10 submarines being transferred from Kings Bay to Bangor, WA. As a result, as of June 2005 Base manning is 8,071.

Slide #3: Kings Bay Installation Manpower, BRAC Impact on Manning

The roughly 3,300 billets from BRAC actions still results in a number below the 1995 peak. Base and community capacity can once again support this level of manning.

Slide #4: Education: Most schools built in last 10 years

Residents of Camden County enjoy high quality educational opportunities as a result of an effectively managed expansion program. With the arrival of the Navy, student population has grown from 2,800 students in 1978 to 9,500 students this past school year; and the system has grown from a single elementary and high school -- to nine elementary schools, two middle schools, a separate ninth grade center, and one high school serving grades 10-12.

Instructional facilities are in outstanding condition, with most being built in the last ten years.

The over \$30 Million dollars in bonds issued to fund this initial growth have all been retired.

Slide #5: Education: St Marys Middle School

Current building programs include a brand new middle school, and expansion of the ninth grade center. These projects will be paid in full upon completion. Balances in the capital investment accounts will be sufficient to fund the next anticipated building project in the 2008 timeframe; a new elementary school to meet anticipated needs of future development projects.

Existing Camden County facilities have a capacity of 10,600 students. Current enrollment suggests 1,100 new students could be assimilated without any advance planning. Growth beyond this number will require expansion of existing facilities or construction of new buildings to meet demand.

However, it takes the school system only two years from identifying the need for a new school, to design and construction, to school opening.

Anticipated growth associated with the DoD BRAC recommendations can be handled within the timelines of normal planning processes.

Slide #6: Housing

Housing availability receives much consideration and attention from community leaders. A Community Housing Team, in partnership with the Georgia Initiative for Community Housing, has begun work to ensure our strategic plan for affordable housing matches current needs and meets future population trends.

New housing construction over the past several years has averaged 3.75% growth. Compared with a 1.7% population growth, the new housing market is expanding, and when considered with an overall occupancy rate of 86.7%, it is clear that housing remains available.

Housing is also affordable in Camden County. Of the 1404 homes sold in 2004, over half of them, 723, were priced less than \$120K. Home ownership remains affordable to assigned enlisted personnel.

Slide #7: The Greater Kings Bay – Jacksonville Area

A complete housing picture should include our Neighboring Georgia counties, as well as Northeast Florida. On average 20% of personnel assigned to Kings Bay reside outside Camden County.

With a 40 minute commute to downtown metropolitan Jacksonville and a 25 minute drive to the Jacksonville airport, another diverse and expansive housing market is available to those assigned to Kings Bay.

Slide #8: Ready for Growth

To summarize, DoD BRAC recommendations concerning relocation of activities to Submarine Base Kings Bay will give Camden County the opportunity to integrate the Navy's growth with our own community planning for the future, and to continue and expand the strong partnerships that exist between the community and the Naval Base.

Our message remains that the base has the capacity to accommodate growth; and that the County has either the capacity or plans in place to grow with the base. We welcome the opportunity to integrate community growth with the Base's growth; to strengthen the Military-Community partnerships that already exist; and continue to provide a welcoming, safe environment for all of our residents. Through Leadership, Partnership and Community Support we are an area that is ready for growth!

PRESENTATION
TO
THE 2005 BASE REALIGNMENT and CLOSURE COMMISSION

STATEMENT OF: CONGRESSMAN LYNN WESTMORELAND
GEORGIA

30 June 2005

NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL RELEASED
BY THE 2005 BRAC COMMISSION

I would like to thank the BRAC Commissioners for coming to Atlanta today to discuss the importance of these bases in the states of Georgia and Alabama; and the affect that they have on each of these states; but most of all, the affect that they have on the U.S. Military and the defense of our nation.

I am here today representing the Army Installation, Fort Benning, the "Home of the Infantry." As a Training and Doctrine Command installation, Fort Benning's vision is to be "First in training, First in readiness, and First in quality of life. The base provides the best training to Infantrymen and other soldiers who pass through their school system. Fort Benning's mission is to "provide the world's best Infantry Soldiers and trained units; to provide a power projection platform that can deploy soldiers and units anywhere in the world on short notice; and to provide the Army's premier installation and home for soldiers, families, civilian employees, and military retirees."

Fort Benning leadership always has their focus on the most important items in the Army, the individual soldier and their families. One such example of this focus is the improvements to the living quarters of the single soldier and family living quarters, both of which I have witnessed first hand on many visits to the base. A critical aspect of supporting our soldiers is the confidence they have when the U.S. Congress works with the Department of Defense to provide them with proper housing. With an additional gain of 10,000 soldiers and their family members, I pledge to you as a member of the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee in the House of Representatives I will continue to push for additional funding to uphold the Fort Benning vision of "first in quality of life."

Fort Benning is fortunate in its unique relationship with what is fondly called the "Tri-Community." This consists of Fort Benning; Columbus, Georgia and Phenix City, Alabama. Not only do the local communities fully support Fort Benning, my Congressional colleagues who are here with me today from both the states of Georgia and Alabama have shown their support for Fort Benning in the past and will continue to do so in the future!

PRESENTATION

TO

THE 2005 BASE REALIGNMENT and CLOSURE COMMISSION

**STATEMENT OF: COL (Ret) JOHN MITCHELL
CHAIRMAN OF THE MILITARY AFFAIRS COMMITTEE
AND THE FORT BENNING FUTURES PARTNERSHIP
VICE PRESIDENT, MILITARY BANKING
COLUMBUS BANK AND TRUST
CITY OF COLUMBUS
GEORGIA**

**STATEMENT OF: COL (Ret) MAYO A. "BIFF" HADDEN
SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
AND MILITARY AFFAIRS
MILITARY AFFAIRS COMMITTEE
FORT BENNING FUTURES PARTNERSHIP
THE GREATER COLUMBUS CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
CITY OF COLUMBUS
GEORGIA**

30 June 2005

**NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL RELEASED
BY THE 2005 BRAC COMMISSION**

Good morning. I am John Mitchell, chair of the Military Affairs Committee and the Fort Benning Futures Partnership, a community action group focused on preparing our community for growth opportunities for Fort Benning. We appreciate the opportunity to appear before the Base Realignment and Closure Commission, to explain how our installation and the surrounding community are prepared for growth. We acknowledge the importance of the Commission's work to the future of our nation's defense, and thank each member of the Commission for their selfless and conscientious work on behalf of this country. Recognizing that growth for any DoD installation may come from several different sources, whether Transformation of our Armed Forces, or restationing of forces from overseas, today we are focused on the proposed changes that would come from the recommendations of the Secretary of Defense and the decisions of the BRAC Commission.

Recommendations Impacting Fort Benning


1. Consolidate the Armor & Infantry Centers and Schools to create a Maneuver Center at Fort Benning, GA
2. Drill Sergeants Training is realigned from three locations (Fort Benning, GA; Fort Jackson, SC; and Fort Leonard Wood, MO) to one location (Fort Jackson)
3. Relocate the 81st RRC Equipment Concentration Site to Ft. Benning, GA.
4. Close the United States Army Reserve Center, Columbus, Georgia and relocate and consolidate those units together with Army Reserve Units currently on Fort Benning into a new United States Army Reserve Center on Fort Benning, Georgia.

State of Georgia BRAC Regional Hearing




As regards Fort Benning and our community in particular, these are the Secretary's recommendations that directly affect us. Let me say up front that the "senior leadership" of Fort Benning and our community are fully supportive of these recommendations. The best evidence of this is the manner in which the staffs of both installations have partnered in the 47 days since the Secretary's May 13 announcement. Already, a contingent from the Armor Center and Fort Knox has visited Ft Benning for preliminary fact-finding and just last week, members of the staff at Ft Benning reciprocated. Add to that the visit of a BRAC Commission analyst, the constant exchange of information with affected

parties, and the fulltime task force now in place at Ft Benning to advance the planning effort, and you get a sense for the momentum that is building to properly implement these recommendations, should they become law.



Since you have these slides in your packet, I will not speak to every minute point on them. The timeline shows the major milestones overlaid on the statutory BRAC timeline. As the BRAC process runs its course in what remains of calendar year 2005, Ft Benning's planning effort will proceed. Once the recommendations of this Commission become law, the required Environmental Impact Study can begin, with an 18-month window for completion.


Thereafter we will begin three Phase transition plan which will activate the Maneuver Center and transition the load over a two year time period. This proposed timeline is coordinated with Ft Knox and the Armor Center.




Here we depict the key events to execute the Secretary's recommendation that the Drill Sergeant School be consolidated with others at Ft Jackson, SC. Ft Jackson's staff will plan for the remainder of calendar year 2005. Once the recommendation becomes law, the Environmental Assessment can begin and thereafter, any required construction. Coordination between the two installation staffs leads us to conclude this process can be complete in FY 07.

Implementation Timelines


81st RRC Equipment Concentration Site Move to Fort Benning



Relocate & Consolidate Reserve Component Units on Fort Benning



Fort Benning is fully engaged with the Army Reserve in planning for the recommendation to relocate the 81st Regional Readiness Command's Equipment Concentration Site to Ft Benning. Potential sites for this activity have been identified and will be included in the Environmental Impact Study.



This graphic depicts the land mass (green) that is Ft Benning, with major ranges and maneuver areas shown in (blue) geometric shapes and impact areas in (red). It's important to note that this initial look at how the Secretary's recommendations might be implemented on the installation. To orient you in the simplest terms, Ft Benning is bisected by U.S. Highway 27/Georgia Highway 280 (indicate with laser pointer), running generally northwest to southeast. Most of the "heavy" vehicle maneuver areas and livefire ranges are located north of this highway, while most of the light infantry and wheeled vehicle training areas are south. It's important to remember that Ft Benning and

the Infantry Center are no strangers to dealing with the training and maintenance requirements of the M1 Abrams main battle tank, as we have for many years had an armor battalion as part of the deployable brigade now designated the 3rd BCT of the 3rd Infantry Division (Mech), and currently on their second deployment to Iraq in 4 years. Accordingly, this plan reflects what results from overlaying the requirements of the Armor School programs of instruction on what already exists at Ft Benning to meet the needs of the Infantry School's training and that of the various deployable units stationed here.

And now, to discuss the positioning of our 9-county region to accommodate the growth implicit in the Secretary's recommendations, here is Col Biff Hadden.

Introduction


Good morning. I am honored to be able to speak on behalf of the Fort Benning region and would like to express our appreciation for the tremendous work being done by the Commission.

The Fort Benning Futures Partnership is a public-private, regional community action group designed to put in place the tools needed to support and promote

expanded activity at Fort Benning. Our leadership support comes from six Georgia counties and three Alabama counties.


The primary areas impacted by Fort Benning are Columbus GA, population of approximately 190,000 and Phenix City, AL pop 35,000. Our cities are led respectively by Mayor Bob Poydasheff, a former infantryman, and Mayor Jeff Hardin.

Our entire congressional delegation of four senators, and five house members, and our two governors, are well versed on the issues surrounding Fort Benning and have been a part of our planning for future growth. They have made extraordinary commitments to our soldiers and their families and we look forward to continuing our work with them.




We are here today to let you know that we are excited about receiving the Armor Center and School from Fort Knox. We have the ability to support this growth. The military is a historic part of our community, and has been since 1917. As we have done in the past, we will welcome our new residents with open arms and unwavering support.

We have worked in partnership to support ongoing growth surrounding army transformation and have developed a vision for our region's growth.




A key part of our planning for the last 18 months has been family housing. We are in a position to construct an abundant quantity of quality, affordable housing, lofts, upscale apartments, and single family homes, to accommodate all new soldiers, and civilian employees, and their families assigned to Fort Benning.




Housing

This housing is being constructed in every one of the partnering counties and all have extensive capacity to increase housing construction without encroaching on Fort Benning and its missions, now and into the future.



Education

Our second focus is public education and schools. We have analyzed each of the six principal school systems for expansion and with the help of both states we will be able to add schools and classrooms to accommodate all additional children as the population in our region grows.




Workforce

In addition, spouses, family members and civilians who are assigned to Fort Benning, and living in Georgia, will be eligible for Georgia Hope Grants and Hope Scholarships. These can be used for earning teaching certificates or developing special work skills that will help prepare them for positions within our business community including Fortune 500 companies like AFLAC, Synovus, TSYS, and Blue Cross/Blue Shield. Georgia citizens in our region are granted Alabama instate tuition with local colleges and Auburn University.




Medical

Our communities have four full service Hospitals and another under construction. These provide full service, cardiac and orthopedic specialty care, and a regional Cancer Center has just been opened, offering the latest in treatment capabilities. These are available to soldiers and their families.



Utilities

We also assessed our utilities capabilities and determined that we have sufficient capacity of all types to accommodate current growth and additional future growth. We currently have more than 25,000,000 gallons a day of excess available water supply, and 15,000,000 gallons a day of excess capacity in sewer treatment.



Quality of Life

Finally, we have a diverse and outstanding quality of life. Our communities have raised over \$200,000,000 through one penny local options sales taxes and applied it toward improving the quality of life for all citizens.

Conclusion

We are prepared, excited and committed to supporting the growth of Fort Benning now and into the future as it becomes the Army's "Maneuver Center of Excellence" and flagship training and strategic deployment installation for our military.

On behalf of the Fort Benning Futures Partnership and all of our communities and their leaders-we thank you for your time and attention; and most of all your service to our country.

PRESENTATION
TO
THE 2005 BASE REALIGNMENT and CLOSURE COMMISSION

STATEMENT OF: CONGRESSMAN SANFORD BISHOP
GEORGIA

30 June 2005

NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL RELEASED
BY THE 2005 BRAC COMMISSION

Good Afternoon, I am Congressman Sanford Bishop, proud representative from the Second Congressional District of Georgia, which currently spans across 27 counties in Southwest Georgia, but which more importantly includes two of our nation's finest military bases: Fort Benning and the Marine Corps Logistics Base Albany. MCLB is the heart of Dougherty County in the center of my district. At 326 square miles, Dougherty County is the home to more than 96,000 people including the city of Albany, which is really the regions retail and cultural hub.

It is an honor for me to introduce a group of people that have been instrumental in making Albany what it is today: the Mayor of Albany, Dr. Willie Adams; Chairman of the Dougherty County Commission, Jeff "Bodine" Sinyard; Chairman of the Southwest Georgia Alliance for Progress and CEO of Phoebe Putney Memorial Hospital Joel Wernick; A former Commander of Marine Corps Bases Albany, retired General Edward Cassity; Kay Read Editor of the Albany Herald; Tim Martin, President of the Albany Area Chamber of Commerce and finally retired Colonel James Taylor, who was formerly Commander of the Maintenance Center in Albany, responsible for maintenance and policy for both MC Repair Centers and was the former.

Now, I will turn the floor over to Colonel Jim Taylor who will present brief remarks about the Albany Community and MCLB. After hearing this presentation, I am confident you will conclude that the Secretary's recommendations relative to MCLB, Albany are entirely sound and should be implemented without modification.

Thank you for your service, and now, Colonel Taylor

PRESENTATION

TO

THE 2005 BASE REALIGNMENT and CLOSURE COMMISSION

**STATEMENT OF: JIM TAYLOR
GEORGIA**

30 June 2005

**NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL RELEASED
BY THE 2005 BRAC COMMISSION**

Southwest Georgia Alliance for Progress

Testimony Before BRAC Commission

June 30, 2005

Atlanta, Georgia

Members of the Commission

I come before you today to speak as a representative of the Albany community and the Southwest Georgia Alliance for Progress. I appreciate this opportunity to provide you with information about our community and our Marine Corps Logistics Base.

It is important for you to know that Albany and the Southwest Georgia region are vibrant and growing. Our area has the residential, educational, transportation and health-care resources to easily accommodate the additional personnel recommended for re-assignment to Marine Corps Logistics Base. We are particularly proud of the capabilities of our technical colleges, which respond quickly to workforce development requirements.

My experience as a previous Maintenance Center Commander and my knowledge of workload capabilities leaves no doubt in my mind that the planned increase in mission is well within the Depot's capacity and can be accommodated and sustained. The Maintenance Center is a quality facility, performing joint workload, with over 1200 dedicated, highly skilled artisans and technicians, who are on the leading edge of business standards and process improvements, such as ISO, Lean, Theory of Constraints, C.I.T.E., and others. Additionally, there is no environmental, encroachment, or union issues that impede Marine Corps Logistics Base operations. This Secretary of Defense recommended-mission growth has the added benefit of driving down the already attractive cost of doing business, which will in turn enhance competitiveness and increase an already robust inter-servicing and private-industry environment. In 2002, the General Accounting Office ranked public-private partnerships at MCLB, Albany in the top four of 14 Department of Defense depots.

Albany is also home to the Headquarters of the Marine Corps Logistics Command, the single, centralized control of maintenance and logistics for the entire Marine Corps. This worldwide asset visibility, coupled with a flexible, rapid

response, multi-commodity maintenance capability, is also vital to support of the Maritime Prepositioning Ships program at Blount Island Command, Florida. These coordinated functions have time and again proven successful in support of combat and humanitarian operations. Our sustainment of the longest logistics tail in modern warfare during the initial invasion of Iraq, our production of sizeable numbers of vehicle armor kits for Marine and Army units in Iraq, and our support of Tsunami victims are but a few recent examples of this effective level of accomplishment.

To summarize, in Albany we have a community devoted to Country, Faithful to the Corps and proud and honored to have been chosen to serve. We also have a Base with significant military value. Both the community and base are fully able and eager to accept and sustain this recommended mission increase, as well as additional ones should the need arise.

This concludes my remarks. Thank you for your time and attention. Also, thank you for your service in this important work.

PRESENTATION

TO

THE 2005 BASE REALIGNMENT and CLOSURE COMMISSION

**STATEMENT OF: SAXBY CHAMBLISS
UNITED STATES SENATOR
GEORGIA
(CONCLUDING STATEMENT)**

30 June 2005

**NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL RELEASED
BY THE 2005 BRAC COMMISSION**

Thank you all for your testimony, and Commissioners, thank you once again for your willingness to be part of this process and the seriousness with which you take this responsibility. We appreciate you being here.

This morning you have heard from several Georgia communities, some of whom will be negatively affected, and others whom will be positively affected if DoD's BRAC recommendations are accepted.

As you've heard from our previous testimony, DoD's recommendation regarding Ft McPherson and Ft Gillem over-states the cost savings of closing those two facilities, fails to consider the value of locating headquarters next to a major transportation and communications hub, and fails to consider the military risk of dispersing command and control functions, which currently operate synergistically, across the United States.

DoD's recommendation regarding NAS Atlanta significantly overstates the cost savings, includes personnel from units that left NAS Atlanta 18 months ago, and – if followed – will divest the Navy and Marine Corps from the 2nd most aviation-intensive metropolitan area in the United States.

And finally, DoD's recommendation regarding the Navy Supply School projects a cost reduction, when in reality there will be a cost increase if this recommendation is followed.

Costs are not the only factor in the BRAC process. However, unless DoD can show that the cost savings, if there are any, are significant enough to overcome the disruption of moving functions to another base; and unless DoD can show that there is a reasonable increase in military value to justify the move, the recommendations should be seriously questioned. We believe DoD's recommendations for closures in the State of Georgia merit serious questioning on both of these grounds and should be disapproved.

You have also heard testimony which clearly illustrates what the military means to Georgia and Georgians. Georgia has passed laws directly aimed at improving the quality of life and protecting military personnel in the State. Every community represented here today has a proud support group back home that treats military personnel as part of the community, not temporary residents.

You've heard testimony from several communities today whose bases will be gaining personnel and missions if DoD's recommendations are followed. These communities will do whatever it takes to accommodate

these gains smoothly. As you've seen, each affected community - Camden County, Columbus, and Albany - has a plan, is prepared, and is readily able to accept new residents and missions.

Mr. Chairman, I have served in the United States Senate for 2 ½ years, and previous to that served 4 terms representing Middle Georgia in the U.S. House of Representatives. During my entire tenure in the U.S. Congress I have supported BRAC and voted every time not to delay or cancel this BRAC round. There is no doubt about it – your Commission's job is to close bases, and I support you in that very difficult and sensitive task because I agree with Secretary Rumsfeld – our military needs to get rid of excess infrastructure and use every dollar we can to buy better weapon systems, support our men and women in uniform, and fight the Global War on Terrorism.

We have done our best during these two hours to provide our response to DoD's BRAC recommendations for the State of Georgia, and I trust we have been effective in that effort. We want what's best for the U.S. military and our country, and I know you do also. I hope that our input into this

process will make it easier for you to make the best decisions for our country and our men and women in uniform.

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate you and your fellow commissioners taking the time to be here today and we look forward to your questions.

PRESENTATION

TO

THE 2005 BASE REALIGNMENT and CLOSURE COMMISSION

**STATEMENT OF: MAYOR PATSY JO HILLIARD
CITY OF EAST POINT
GEORGIA**

30 June 2005

**NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL RELEASED
BY THE 2005 BRAC COMMISSION**

MAYOR'S OFFICE
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Patsy Jo Hilliard
MAYOR

Dear Members of the (BRAC) Base Realignment and Closure Commission:

It is with deep appreciation that we greet you and recognize the awesome task you have in filling this obligation given to you by the Department of Defense (DoD). We respectfully urge your consideration of our testimony. As you make your decision.

The City of East Point was established in 1887. Two years later, Fort McPherson celebrated its official opening, and the City of East Point and the base have been inextricably linked ever since. The closing of Fort McPherson will have serious adverse impacts on the citizens of East Point and the base.

The City of East Point

The loss of Fort McPherson to the City of East Point would result in an estimated negative economic impact of \$592.8 million to an already economically depressed, predominantly minority community. In fact, approximately \$315 million in payroll, including over \$120 million in civilian payroll, will be removed from the local economy if the base is closed. The Federal Reserve Bank will also be impacted by the loss of an active and significant military payroll. As a consequence in the loss of those funds and the personnel, the impact on the housing market, including homeownership and rental revenue, will be serious. Patronage at

area parks and other facilities will drop. The loss of the children of the military and civilian personnel at local schools will greatly impact the diversity, quality and parental involvement of the schools.

There are roughly 3,000 businesses within the surrounding area of Fort McPherson that will be adversely impacted by the base closure. But the most serious economic impact will be on local businesses in the City of East Point and South Atlanta, particularly East Point's downtown area. Many businesses, such as drycleaners and restaurants, will face a dramatic decline in income and may be forced to close. For example, restaurants in the downtown area of East Point would lose 20 to 40 percent of their lunchtime business if Fort McPherson closes. That historic area is just now undergoing a rebirth and the loss of such significant business could force some establishments to close, which will threaten the revitalization of the downtown.

Retail outlets at the new Camp Creek Marketplace, located just minutes from Fort McPherson, is heavily supported by military personnel and their families, as well as military retirees, visiting personnel and troops with layovers at Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport. The city is fortunate to have a Small Business Association's Historically Underutilized Business Zone (HUB Zone) Vendors. This program was designed to enhance opportunities for business growth in areas that meet certain income, unemployment and other demographic criteria. Through this program several businesses have qualified for special contract privileges with Federal agencies, including military in the downtown area of East Point.

The community surrounding Fort McPherson has low per capita income, and suffers high unemployment rates. The unemployment rate for the City of East Point is 8.7 percent. The base closing will increase that rate. As a consequence, East Point's already high rate of vacant

housing will also increase and that will lead to increased neighborhood blight and crime. The loss of Fort McPherson will directly and negatively seriously affect the quality of life for all of East Point's citizens.

The City of East Point supplies wholesale water to Fort McPherson for its operations and facilities. The loss of that revenue to the city will have a significant impact on our small city.

East Point and Fort McPherson have over 20 cooperative partnership activities where citizens and staff interact. This includes the Memorandum of Agreement for Fort McPherson to be first responders and to assist in emergencies such as the release of biological or chemical materials. Recently, on December 16, 2004, Fort McPherson answered the call and offered their services during a chemical spill and evacuation in East Point.

East Point and areas surrounding Fort McPherson are home to over 90,000 military retirees and their families. Without Fort McPherson, they will no longer have access to support facilities and services, such as commissaries, exchanges and the Army Health Clinic within the local area.

Fort McPherson volunteers assist in community projects with countless hours contributed to schools, the elderly and civic organizations, such as Habitat for Humanity. Last year, Fort McPherson had 982 individual volunteers in the both East Point and Atlanta, providing more than \$1.3 million in valuable services. That work has enhanced the quality of life for all citizens.

Fort McPherson military and civilian personnel also actively participate in over fifty special event activities at area schools. Base personnel have provided 150 mentors to our school

children. Those mentors **are** critical to the lives of the students and they have come to admire the military and civilian volunteers. In addition, Fort McPherson provides a unique educational forum for civic organizations and schools through its Army in Atlanta Museum on post.

Fort McPherson is **located** in of the country's most accessible transportation hubs, which include Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport, light, and heavy rail service, three major interstates and a hub for the trucking industry. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority ("MARTA") has established a rail station directly across the street from Fort McPherson's front gate and provides both bus and rail services throughout the Atlanta area. MARTA's system provides a low-cost and low-stress commuting alternative for military and civilian employees, particularly for those enrolled in the Federal Government Mass Transportation Program. This program helps to improve air quality and reduces the chances of high ozone alerts in the City of East Point.

Communication systems for the armed forces are also critical for its operations. Our city has provided Fort McPherson via BellSouth substation with a full array of the latest in communication networks. Metropolitan Atlanta is the tenth largest media center in the nation and that gives the military easy and ready access to national news networks.

Employment for spouses and families of military and civilian employees is vital to the economic well being of personnel. The base has partnered with local employers for mutually beneficial business relationships. Home Depot, for example, has the Spouse Employment Task Force that provides training, placement an outreach services to the spouses of military personnel. This important partnership with the East Point Community underscores how the relationship has evolved over time to meet the needs of Fort McPherson personnel.

Affordable housing has become a premium throughout the nation. The City of East Point recognizes this serious problem for all residents and is working diligently to begin to address this need. This is evidenced by the numerous new developments that are becoming more affordable and available in our downtown and surrounding area. We will continue to find solutions to the affordable housing shortage that will benefit all citizens.

Fort McPherson is an integral part of the East Point community. The impact of the loss of the base will seriously harm East Point and south Atlanta. We urge the Commission to consider our testimony and remove Fort McPherson from the base closure list.

If you have any questions or need any further information, please do not hesitate to contact us. Thank you for your consideration.

Respectfully submitted,

Patsy Jo Hilliard
Mayor

PJH/d

CC: East Point City Council Members
Lisa Gordon, City Manager
Chris Hummer, Chairman-Mayor's Redevelopment & Planning Task Force

PRESENTATION

TO

THE 2005 BASE REALIGNMENT and CLOSURE COMMISSION

**STATEMENT OF: MAYOR CHUCK HALL
MAYOR
CITY OF FOREST PARK**

30 June 2005

**NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL RELEASED
BY THE 2005 BRAC COMMISSION**

Forest Park, Georgia is home to Fort Gillem. As the Mayor of the City of Forest Park, I am honored to briefly discuss my City's enduring relationship with the Fort, our largest neighborhood and a historical partner. Like those who have testified before you today, I consider it in Our Nation's National and Homeland Security interests to retain Fort Gillem as an active military installation.

Fort Gillem was established in 1941 as the Atlanta Army Depot. It maintained a depot service status until 1973 at which time it was changed to Fort Gillem and new missions added.

The City and Fort Gillem have maintained a long and mutually beneficial relationship as evidenced through numerous partnerships and agreements signed and maintained over the years.

Location – Location – Location

Fort Gillem meets all three of these –

- Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport is located 15 minutes from Fort Gillem and provides cost efficient and effective air transport for troop movements, personnel reassignments and **rapid** command and control capabilities to subordinate units deployed world-wide.
- Norfolk Southern Rail Line leases a railhead on Fort Gillem and provides rail access to move equipment in and out as needed. Fort Gillem is bordered on three sides by interstate highways which facilitates easy movement of equipment by freightliners or units moving from one location to another. These interstates, and upgraded state and local roads (for the '96 Olympics), also provide more effective and excellent POV transportation options.
- The current planning for a Commuter Rail with a Station located in Forest Park will give easy access for Fort Gillem personnel to Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport.

Fort Gillem is the home to the southeastern regional disaster mobilization site for FEMA, GEMA and the Red Cross. These agencies use Fort Gillem for storage and deployment as needed to meet the emergency needs from hurricanes, tornadoes or other natural disasters. By utilizing Fort Gillem as their staging and storage area, FEMA, GEMA and the Red Cross are able to maximize allocated funding for emergency uses.

Forest Park and Fort Gillem have maintained partnerships in many areas over the past years. These partnerships have included fire safety training, hazmat training and operations and also Operation Stand Down, a partnership among Forest Park, Fort Gillem and the Veterans of Foreign Wars. Operation Stand Down, held over a three day period, assisted over 375 homeless Vietnam era veterans by providing opportunities for medical check-ups and screening by VA Hospital staff on the scene at Fort Gillem, with resume services and other services to meet the veteran's needs.

Fort Gillem plays a vital link in our national defense in that the command and control of all reserves and National Guard units (east of the Mississippi) is executed from Fort Gillem. Many of these units are currently serving in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Homeland Security is vital to all citizens. Fort Gillem is home to certain very specialized command and control headquarters whose missions are vital to homeland security. For example:

- a. The 52nd Ordnance Group (EOD) has 1 of 5 EOD Battalions and 1 of 39 companies co-located at Fort Gillem. It provides command and control of all EOD units in CONUS and in SW Asia and other parts of the world. In the age of WMD these specialty EOD units play a vital role in the rapid assessment and render safe of WMDs and other explosive hazards --- in conjunction with other military units **and** with civilian law enforcement agencies of the USA and other countries.
- b. The 3rd Military Police Group (CID), theater signal, and medical commands located at Fort Gillem provide similar command and control functions for their specialized support to the warfighters.

PRESENTATION
TO
THE 2005 BASE REALIGNMENT and CLOSURE COMMISSION

STATEMENT OF: COMMISSIONER CARL RHODENIZER
CLAYTON COUNTY
GEORGIA

30 June 2005

NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL RELEASED
BY THE 2005 BRAC COMMISSION

Fort Gillem is located solely within Clayton County, Georgia. As with Mayor Hall of Forest Park, I too am here to defend the military presence of Clayton County's third largest employer.

General Browning and Mayor Hall have explained, in great detail, the overwhelming **military value** that the Greater Atlanta Metro area brings to both Forts --- to enable its major commands and the specialized supporting commands to help accomplish the Army's missions of national defense and homeland security.

So I won't waste your time being repetitive. I will simply add to their statements that Clayton County's unemployment rate is already hovering at a terribly high 6%, and has about 278 thousand citizens --- the majority of whom are classified as minorities. Though I clearly understand that local economic impact **must** fall low in the priority list when compared with military value; Clayton County **does** offer that same high military value, but unfortunately will suffer proportionately much more than many other Atlanta area communities if Fort Gillem is closed.

For years Clayton County has been in various partnerships with Fort Gillem --- as has the City of Forest Park. For example, the Commuter Rail Passenger Service will run from Atlanta, **through** Clayton County with stations in several of its cities, to include Forest Park.

Thank you.

LETTER

TO

THE 2005 BASE REALIGNMENT and CLOSURE COMMISSION

**STATEMENT OF: CHAIRMAN SAM OLENS
COBB COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS**

30 June 2005

**NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL RELEASED
BY THE 2005 BRAC COMMISSION**



**COBB COUNTY
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS**

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Samuel S. Olens
Chairman

June 28, 2005

Base Realignment and Closure Commission:

On behalf of the citizens of Cobb County and the Board of Commissioners, we welcome and appreciate this opportunity to provide information on the important role that the Naval Air Station (NAS) Atlanta plays in our community.

As you are aware, NAS Atlanta is part of a larger joint-use military installation which includes both the Dobbins Air Force Reserve Base and Lockheed-Martin aircraft manufacturing facility. The entire base supports some 10,000 guardsmen and reservists from the Army, Navy, Marines and the Air Force. It is home to nearly 50 aircraft assigned to different flying units and boasts more than 7,000 take-offs and landings each month.

NAS's long history in our community began over fifty years ago. In 1951, Lockheed reopened the Bell Bomber Plant which had closed at the end of World War II, and at the same time, NAS Atlanta was added to the campus.

We are proud of the contributions the Sailors and Marines from NAS Atlanta have made, and continue to make, in the defense of our country. Clearly, the success of this facility rests with its ability to attract and retain military personnel seeking the excellent quality of life offered by the community in the form of superior public education for their children, a wide array of workforce/affordable housing options, and valuable job/career opportunities for spouses. It is our feeling that these factors, along with the close and effective public-private partnerships within the community, such as the Honorary Commanders program with over 500 alumni, clearly demonstrate our community's support of the National Command Authority.

Many of the facilities that you will evaluate during this process will not have the competitive advantages we have presented and we are hopeful you will take this into account as you finalize your decision. Thank you for your time and consideration.

Sincerely,

Samuel S. Olens
Chairman

xc: Board of Commissioners
David Hankerson, County Manager

Virgil Moon, Support Services Agency
Michael Hughes, Economic Development