



DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

DCN 5545

2521 South Clark Street, Suite 600
Arlington, VA 22202
Telephone: 703-699-2950

July 21, 2005

Lieutenant General Stephen Wood
Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Force for Plans and Programs
1070 Air Force Pentagon
Washington, D.C., 20330

Dear General Wood:

I would like to thank you for your testimony before the Commission on July 18, 2005. I would also like to express my appreciation for the valuable testimony presented by your colleagues.

During your testimony, you agreed to respond expeditiously to any questions for the record that the Commission might devise. Enclosed please find a list of these questions for the record. I would appreciate your response no later than July 28, 2005.

Thank you again for your cooperation in this regard. Your continued assistance is critical as the Commission strives to create a fair, open, and constructive deliberative process.

Sincerely,

Anthony J. Principi
Chairman

Enclosure.

Chairman: Anthony J. Principi

Commissioners: The Honorable James H. Bilbray, The Honorable Philip E. Coyle III, Admiral Harold W. Gehman Jr., USN (Ret), The Honorable Jim Hansen, General James T. Hill, USA (Ret), General Lloyd Newton, USAF (Ret), The Honorable Samuel K. Skinner, Brigadier General Sue Ellen Turner, USAF (Ret)

Executive Director: Charles Battaglia

Questions for the Record
Base Closure and Realignment Commission

Department of Defense Panel II

The Honorable Lieutenant General Stephen Wood, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Force
for Plans and Programs;
Major General Gary W. Heckman, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Force for
Plans and Programs;
Major General Scott Mayes, Commander, 1st Air Force and Commander, Continental
U.S. North American Aerospace Command Region; and
Lieutenant General Daniel James, III, Director, Air National Guard
July 18, 2005

1. Please help the Commission understand the relationship of the often mentioned "emerging missions" as they apply to the Air National Guard recommendations presented to the Commission. Specifically, how and when do you intend to fund, program, develop and deploy the Unmanned Aerial Vehicles such as the UAV/predator and even the recently discussed new light cargo aircraft.
2. How viable will enclaves be over the next several years without a weapons system attached to them?
3. Are the Expeditionary Combat Support packages, as outlined in several ANG recommendations, actually funded?
4. What is the likelihood of the enclaves getting a future mission?
5. The Commission has heard from numerous governors and adjutants general over their concern with the lack of Air Force and Air National Guard communication and collaboration with the states in the development and finalization of the BRAC ANG recommendations to the Commission. What has the Department of Defense or the Department of the Air Force done to rectify this situation, or more importantly, what do you plan to do?
6. A recent Air Force PR release indicated an initiative to supplement the Air National Guard mission with the establishment of a future "light cargo aircraft", a presumably shortened C-130 type cargo carrier that could be deployed to Army and Air Guard units.
 - a. What role do you foresee this aircraft will play in future missions of the Air National Guard or in support of Homeland Security.
 - b. Where is the development and deployment of the future light cargo aircraft in your funding plan?
 - c. Is new light cargo aircraft, along with the potential of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), one of the "emerging missions" you have mentioned as a potential for the ANG?

- d. Is the F-22 another such "emerging mission"?
7. Given the concern expressed by a great number of state governors and adjutants general regarding redeployment Air National Guard assigned aircraft to other components and states, do you envision taking any remedial action to make more aircraft available to support Air National Guard requirements over a broader number of states than provided in the BRAC recommendations?
8. In the Adjutants General (TAG) hearing 30 Jun in Atlanta, an ANG speaker noted that "the ANG provides 40% of the [combat] coverage for 7.3% of the budget."
 - a. Are these figures substantiated by Air Force budget data? If not, what is an approximate operational use to cost ratio?
 - b. Including missions flown while on federalized missions or in support of contingency missions such as Noble Eagle, Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, do the costs incurred by ANG forces to support the missions included in ANG budgets (the 7.3%), or are they sourced elsewhere within DOD budgets?
 - c. While activated, or flying in support of federal missions, how do ANG and AFRC costs to execute a given mission compare to those of the Active Duty?
9. Were utilization rates of aircraft considered and/or weighted in any Mission Compatibility Index (MCI) calculation comparing installations? Did utilization rates differ between Active Duty, Reserve, and Guard installations flying a given model-design (F-16A/B/C/D), KC-135D/E/R/T)? If so, how?
10. Many States and TAGs have raised concerns on the BRAC recommendations with respect to the Air National Guard on their impact on the Homeland Security or Air Sovereignty Alert mission.
 - a. Were U.S. Northern Command and its component command, the First Air Force, involved in the BRAC decision making process? If so, how?
 - b. What is Northern Command's and the First Air Force's assessment of the impact of the Guard recommendations, particularly the ones involving Air Sovereignty Alert sites, on the Homeland Security mission?
11. A key question a Commissioner likes to ask is: "Is the pain worth the gain?" Understanding that Military Value is the primary consideration, economics play a part too. What are the projected NPV 20 year savings to the DoD for the closures and realignments affecting ANG units only?
12. A review of the BCEG minutes leaves us to believe that Candidate Recommendations were intentionally "bundled" in order to get the money savers to "carry" other individual base closures or realignments that were on their own a cost, or offered little savings. Is this true?

13. BRAC is about reducing excess base infrastructure and not about moving aircraft. Hundreds of aircraft are proposed to move with your recommendation, affecting 80% of the ANG installations in the country, yet the installation map looks about the same. Your proposal seems essentially "Programmatic." Why are you wanting us to approve this under BRAC?
14. With respect to the Mission Capability Index, or MCI, the matrix tool you used to justify your recommendations... We have these comments from the field: (Please respond after each issue.)
 - a. Why were the ANG units measured up against the same criteria as the active component? Other services did it differently. They said the NGB imposes limits on how big a Guard installation can be.
 - b. The MCI questions – especially with respect to routes and ranges, do not reflect the way we fight today.
 - c. There was not enough opportunity for similar smaller installations to be measured against each other.
 - d. In some cases, erroneous data was used – or new information such as recently completed hangers or additional ramp space was not factored in.
 - e. Some units interpreted the questions differently and answered accordingly.
15. Even after the MCI scores were computed, some of the decisions cited "Military Judgment," and favored bases with lower MCI scores. Why?
16. The GAO reports that 60% of the net annual recurring savings are cost avoidances from military personnel eliminations. How can you claim manpower savings if net end strength of the ANG remains the same?
17. Active/ARC Mix: In testimony on May 17, Acting Sec Dominguez said "We have maintained the balance across the Active Duty, Guard, and Reserve Components both in aircraft and manpower." Yet, in a meeting on 1 July, Maj Gen. Heckman (co-chair of the BCEG said): The force structure is going down. The balance is planned to change also. For C-130s: Before BRAC: (400) C-130s with 31% of the balance Active; Post – BRAC plan: (373) C-130s with 43% of the balance Active.
 - a. If the C-130 mix is changing, what else changes such that the secretary's statement holds true with respect to the overall mix?
 - b. Enclaves: How big is an enclave?
 - c. Of what types of units does it consist?
18. Don't you think it might be hard to recruit for an Air Guard unit that has no "air?" Also, how does one recruit against an unknown mission for these units which are awaiting emerging missions?
19. "Reducing the Footprint"... It is unclear to many units destined to become enclaves as to where their new fence-line will be. Will excess property be disposed of or mothballed?

20. Our sense is that the loss of experienced personnel related to these proposals will be huge. Few aircrew will follow the aircraft, and even fewer maintenance and support personnel. There could be unanticipated training costs. The training "pipeline" would only seem to be so big. On top of that the combat status of a unit could degrade. Do any of these issues cause concern?
21. Future aircraft: With the accelerated retirement of F-15s and F-16s there is concern that the follow-on aircraft will not be on line in time to cover the threat. Your thoughts?
22. Dissimilar Aircraft: In reassigning and combining certain aircraft at different bases, there is concern that versions of aircraft such as C-130 H2s and H3s would be placed together. Were the operational and maintenance impacts considered in this case?
23. Unit Strength: In some cases units with over 100% strength are losing aircraft to units with less than 90% overall strength. If the low-strength units cannot fill the billets they currently have, how can they be expected to fill even more when their authorized aircraft total increases?
24. We understand there is a "City Basing" experiment in the works in Vermont. Please tell us about it and elaborate on the future of City Basing.
25. Isn't the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) the "supported" department and DoD the "supporting" one? If this is the case, why wasn't DHS consulted by the Air Force in the development of these recommendations?