



Basing of Naval Surface Assets & Strategic Targets Post BRAC '05 Recommendations





South Texas Joint Military & Federal Complex



Naval Air Station Corpus Christi Joint Service and Federal Complex

Joint Aviation Training

Navy – Marine – Air Force – Coast Guard



JPATS Trainer Due In
South Texas by Mid-00s

NAS CC Facility Profile

DCN: 4298


Multi-Mission ♦ Multi-Service ♦ Multi-Agency



- **Joint Navy - Air Force pilot training (Navy Wing 4)**
- **T-34 – Single-engine primary training platform**
- **T-44 – Multi-engine advanced training platform**
- **C-12 – Air Force multi-engine training platform**
- **Chief of Naval Air Training**
- **Commander, Mine Warfare Command**
- **MH-15 Squadron MH-53 Sea Dragon mine warfare helicopter training and operations**
- **Corpus Christi Army Depot (CCAD) infrastructure supports all DOD branches**
- **Customs Service provides essential drug interdiction services through air surveillance**
- **Coast Guard air unit serves southern half of Texas Coast with enforcement, search & rescue, environmental protection**
- **Missions of more than 50 tenants are unique and compatible**
- **City committed to protecting airfields and AICUZs from encroachment**

Corpus Christi Army Depot Facility Profile

Multi-Service ♦ *Multi-National*



- Designated as the Center for Industrial and Technical Excellence for rotary wing aircraft (8-21-01)
- CCAD is a "Purple" depot serving Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines & allied nations rotary wing aircraft, engines and components
- Full service includes overhaul, retrofit, modernization, and hands-on training for military personnel
- Depot teams dispatched worldwide for on-site maintenance, crash damage analysis and support
- 2.2 million square feet of industrial space
- Ideal weather for aircraft testing
- Has overhauled 14,000 aircraft since 1961



MH-60 USAF PAVEHAWK




UH-60 BLACKHAWK



SH-60B NAVY SEAHAWK



AH-1W MARINE SUPER COBRA



CH-47D CHINOOK




AH-64 APACHE



OH-58D KOWA



UH-1N HUEY



Encroachment Is Not An Issue at NAS Kingsville


Naval Air Station Kingsville

NAS Kingsville Facility Profile



- More than 18,000 nautical square miles of unencumbered South Texas airspace owned and controlled by the Navy (twice the size of Maryland)
- Surrounded by more than 3 million acres of ranch land under Military Operations Areas (MOAs)
- Six 8,000-foot runways (2 at Orange Grove OLF)
- McMullen Target Ranges with two separate targets: Yankee (day) and Dixie (day/night)
- T-45 Integrated Training System in place
- Ample ramp & maintenance facilities to support T-45
- Outstanding weather with 25% fewer "down" days than other Navy strike base
- Well situated to support Border Patrol operations in South Texas region
- City committed to protecting airfield and AICUZ from encroachment

Naval Station Ingleside



45' Ship Channel

- 1. Headquarters
- 2. Clinic
- 3. BEQ
- 4. Fitness Center
- 5. Waterfront Ops Building
- 6. Fleet Parking
- 7. Navy Exchange & Fuel
- 8. USO Facility
- 9. Mobile Mine Assembly Unit 15

- 10. EOD Facility
- 11. Mine Warfare Training Center
- 12. Security/Fire Station
- 13. Public Works
- 14. Warehouse
- 15. SIMA
- 16. Steam Plant
- 17. Port Ops
- 18. Available Property

Rodman Photo: Nov. 4, 2004

East Pier

Main Pier
1100'

West Wharf
600'

East Wharf
1800'

HSV 2

Water
Tower

Helipad

Main Gate

Magazines

18

18

18

6

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

15

16

8

7

12

13

14

17

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18


18

18

18

18

18



Lanmon Aerial Photography

NSI Facility Profile

- ◆ Home of Mine Warfare Center of Excellence
- ◆ Located on 45-foot deep federal ship channel
- ◆ Encompasses 483 acres with some currently undeveloped
- ◆ Modern wharf and pier infrastructure
 - East wharf – 1,800 ft. long, 45' depth, 13.5 ft. deck height, utility gallery
 - West wharf – 600 ft. long, 35' depth, 13.5 ft. high
 - Pier – 1,100 ft. long, 90 ft. wide, 45' depth, 23.5 ft. deck height, double deck, steam plant, utility gallery
- ◆ 14 mine countermeasures ships, 12 coastal minehunters
(4 MCMs and 2 MHCs are forward deployed)
- ◆ Support capacity in place for full battle group

Mines: Joint Warfighting Access Threat

During 40 years, mines damaged more U.S. Navy vessels than all other enemy actions combined (14 by mines, 4 by other). Mines are a formidable, low cost, low tech threat.




- USS PRINCETON CG-59
- USS TRIPOLI LPH-10
- USS S.B. ROBERTS FFG-58
- USS WESTCHESTER COUNTY LST-1167
- USS BARTON DD-772
- USS MANSFIELD DD-728
- USS WATKINS DD-723
- USS E.G. SMALL DDR-838
- USS BRUSH DD-745
- USS SARSI ATF-111
- USS PARTRIDGE AMS-31
- USS PLEDGE AM-277
- USS PIRATE AM-275
- USS MAGPIE AMS-25

1
USS STARK FFG-31

1
USS LIBERTY AGTR-5

2
USS HIGBEE DD-806
USS LIBERTY AGTR-5


The Navy's Solution: Establish A Mine Warfare Center of Excellence at NSI



- ◆ After Operation Desert Storm CNO Kelso placed renewed emphasis on mine warfare, including the establishment of a Mine Warfare Center of Excellence (Top Gun model)
- ◆ Strong Congressional and OSD interest supported continued improvements in mine warfare
 - Congressional Mine Warfare Caucus, annual Mine Warfare Certification Plan
- ◆ MCM equipment, training and organization proved successful during Operation Iraqi Freedom
- ◆ The Mine Warfare Center of Excellence concept has been responsible for improved MCM capability and is developing training for organic and LCS MCM systems




67 injured personnel
\$30M damage
Explosion cracking frame 277
22 ft hole port side
2000 tons of water onboard



USS Samuel B. Roberts: Mine Impact - April 14, 1988

USS Tripoli – Mine Impact 1991



Threats to Today's Fleet



- 36 Countries Produce Mines
 - 26 of these export mines
- 58 Countries Use/Have Mines in Inventory
- 3 Countries Buy Mines
- More than 400 Recognized Mine Designators
- Over 350,000 Threat Mines Worldwide


Moored Contact

- Inexpensive
- Relatively Simple
- Susceptible to Tide & Current



Bottom Influence

- Tougher MCM Problem
- Loses Effectiveness in Deep Water




Moored Influence

- Advantages of both
- More complex to Build / Operate



Special

- Rocket Propelled
- Mobile
- VSW



Final Selection Criteria

DOD Base Closure and Realignment

P. Law 108-375:

In selecting military installations for closure or realignment, the Department of Defense, giving priority consideration to military value (the first four criteria below), will consider:


Military Value

1. The current and future mission capabilities and the impact on operational readiness of the total force of the Department of Defense, including the impact on joint warfighting, training, and readiness.
2. The availability and condition of land, facilities, and associated airspace (including training areas suitable for maneuver by ground, naval, or air forces throughout a diversity of climate and terrain areas and staging areas for the use of the Armed Forces in homeland defense missions) at both existing and potential receiving locations.
3. The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, surge, and future total force requirements at both existing and potential receiving locations to support operations and training.
4. The cost of operations and the manpower implications.

The recommendation to relocate MH 15 to Norfolk while moving 10 MCMs to San Diego eliminates coordinated training now available in South Texas. This will have a negative impact on training, readiness and joint warfighting, and thus the operational readiness of the total force. Violates "train as we fight". The recommendation thus deviates substantially from Criterion 1.

DOD Base Closure Recommendations


**CLOSE Mine Warfare
Center of Excellence**




Move Ships To



**Naval Station
San Diego**




**Realign
HM-15**



Move HM-15 To



**Naval Station
Norfolk**




Benefits Realized From Single Site Center of Excellence in Texas

- ◆ No U.S. warships damaged by mines
- ◆ Dedicated training
- ◆ Demonstrated successful MCM Force Training and Fleet Exercises
 - Euro '93, Euro '95, Euro '97, Euro '99, WESTPAC '01, Lead Shield '05/Homeland defense exercise
 - Forward deployed MCM forces
 - Persian Gulf (2 MCM, 2 MHC & 4 Helos)
 - Japan (2 MCM)
 - RONEX, GOMEX, FLEETEX integrated training program
- ◆ Increased materiel readiness
- ◆ Increased operational readiness
- ◆ Dedicated maintenance support




Center of Excellence Results: MCM Force Was Ready and Deployed On Time





- ◆ **Operation Iraqi Freedom 2003**
 - **Four surface MCM ships were employed in the Persian Gulf**
 - **Four additional surface MCM ships were deployed to the Med from NSI**
 - **Four more were standing by at NSI**
 - **HM-15 helicopter squadron assets were deployed to Persian Gulf & Med**
 - **All Explosive Ordnance Disposal detachments were deployed**
 - **HSV delivered airborne MCM systems to Persian Gulf**

SUMMARY – The Mine Warfare Center of Excellence Worked


Operation Iraqi Freedom



TUG JUMARIYAH AND BARGE



What Is Wrong With Recommendations? They Separate Key Mine Warfare Assets



What Is Wrong With Recommendations? Ends Key Warfighting Advantage of A Coordinated Mine Warfare Center of Excellence



Gen. Michael W. Hagee
33rd Commandant of
the Marine Corps


The key question about our mine warfare capability was put to Admiral Ryan in July 2003 by General Hagee while touring the South Texas military complex:

Hagee: "How were the mines cleared going into Basra in a week? When we were briefed on the war plan we were told that it could take as much as a month."

Ryan: "If we had done it the old way it probably would have taken a month. But because of the training of the surface, aviation and EOD assets, working together, we were able to get it done in a week. We were able to do true combat mine clearing operations with the surface assets working with the aviation assets and EOD."




Rear Admiral Paul J. Ryan
Commander
Mine Warfare Command



DoD Base Closure Recommendations



Naval Station San Diego



Center of Excellence at NSI
CLOSE Mine Warfare



Naval Station Norfolk



HM-15
Realign



Conclusion: The recommendation to relocate MH 15 to Norfolk while moving 10 MCMs to San Diego eliminates coordinated training now available in South Texas. This will have a negative impact on training, readiness and joint warfighting, and thus the operational readiness of the total force. Violates "train as we fight".
COMINELWARCOM comments on this scenario "advised against splitting MIW forces". The recommendation thus deviates substantially from Criterion 1.

Final Selection Criteria

DOD Base Closure and Realignment

P. Law 108-375:

In selecting military installations for closure or realignment, the Department of Defense, giving priority consideration to military value (the first four criteria below), will consider:

Military Value

1. The current and future mission capabilities and the impact on operational readiness of the total force of the Department of Defense, including the impact on joint warfighting, training, and readiness.
2. The availability and condition of land, facilities, and associated airspace (including training areas suitable for maneuver by ground, naval, or air forces throughout a diversity of climate and terrain areas and staging areas for the use of the Armed Forces in homeland defense missions) at both existing and potential receiving locations.
3. The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, surge, and future total force requirements at both existing and potential receiving locations to support operations and training.
4. The cost of operations and the manpower implications.

The recommendation to close Ingleside, realign HM-15, and shift mine warfare assets to fleet concentration areas represents too heavy a reliance on unproven mine warfare systems. This would amount to an undue risk to the operational readiness of the total force, thus deviating substantially from Criterion 1.

Dedicated Support Assets for a Dedicated Mine Warfare Center

336 Acres of dedicated Navy-owned upland dredge disposal capacity provides 50 years

Navy Dry Dock Dedicated Top MCM & MHC Fleet

Private Ship Yard

Ship Channel

Naval Station Ingleside

Electromagnetic Roll Facility

Inner Harbor Private Ship Yard

Electromagnetic Roll Facility

Map labels include: 2725, 1069, 3512, INGLESIDE, National Spel Property, WELDER HEIRS, KEMT OFSHORE SERVICES, DUPONT, INGLESID COOPERATION, OXYCHEM, Municipal, District, Corridor, High School, and National Spel Property.

Growing Risk in Mine Warfare

- ◆ **The Navy has 26 mine countermeasures ships (14 MCM and 12 MHC). By 2008 the Navy will only have 14 MCM ships**
 - **All MHC class ships are proposed for decommissioning between 2006 and 2008 to free up money for the Littoral Combat Ship program. In 2006 the oldest MHC will be 13 years old, the newest will be 7**
 - **Navy is reducing capability – the threat isn't changing**
 - **Congress hasn't approved the plan!**
- ◆ **The Navy is counting on the new Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) to provide future mine warfare capability**
 - **But how much faith can we put in the projected LCS shipbuilding rate in a fiscally challenged shipbuilding budget? The Navy continues to buy fewer ships than it needs**
- ◆ **The fielding of organic mine warfare systems, scheduled for FY05, has slipped at least two years**
 - **Major General Gordon Nash, Director of Expeditionary Warfare in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations, attributed the delay to "technical challenges" (Inside the Navy, March 21, 2005)**

Growing Risk 2

- ◆ **The first LCS mine warfare mission package is supposed to be ready in FY07 but LCS will have little or no mine warfare capability until after 2010, and then only if the organic systems deliver on time and perform to specification**
 - **RMS and AQS-20 sonar IOC: FY07**
 - **ALMDS, AMNS, OASIS IOC: FY08**
 - **RAMICs IOC: FY10**
 - **HAC comments on the FY06 Defense Appropriations bill express concern about both the technologies and cost of the LCS mission packages (House Report 109-119, pg. 146)**
- ◆ **HASC FY06 NDAA (Sect. 218) confirms the requirement for a MHC sustainment plan because of LCS delays**
- ◆ **March 2005 GAO report on LCS states that: "A number of critical mine warfare systems are not mature or will not be ready due to the unavailability or immaturity of the subsystems." There is "risk that the first ships will be of limited utility."**
- ◆ **The Navy is planning on purchasing 20 mine warfare mission packages for LCS**
 - **In a fiscally strapped Navy, can we count on executing the current plan?**
 - **There will be gap in mine warfare capability until at least 2015**

Growing Risk 3

- ◆ In the midst of this uncertainty the Navy is proposing to BRAC the Mine Warfare Center of Excellence and combine mine warfare and Anti-Submarine Warfare into a new Undersea Warfare Center of Excellence, increasing risk and churn in this small but vital warfare area
- ◆ What if the Navy inactivates the MHC class, then truncates the LCS program because of fiscal pressure on the shipbuilding budget?
 - What if technical risk continues to delay the full suite of organic mine countermeasure systems?
 - What is the impact on training and readiness of moving the Mine Warfare Center of Excellence?




Are we willing to live with less mine countermeasure capability than we have today?

Navy Plan Ignores Lessons of First Gulf War

The recommendation would mean the disestablishment of the Mine Warfare Center of Excellence as a stand-alone entity. This would have a profoundly negative impact on mine warfare training and readiness, for the following reasons:

- The recommendation would combine the Mine Warfare Command with the Fleet Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) Command in Point Loma, California. However, the ASW Command itself is only a year old, having been established in April 2004. It has been struggling to carry out its training and readiness mission and establish its own identity.
- Anti-submarine warfare and mine warfare have very little in common with respect to operations and training. This forced merger would hinder, rather than help, each of the separate missions.



Conclusion: The recommendation to close Ingleside, realign HM-15, and shift mine warfare assets to fleet concentration areas represents too heavy a reliance on unproven mine warfare systems. This would amount to an undue risk to the operational readiness of the total force, thus deviating substantially from Criterion 1.

Final Selection Criteria

DOD Base Closure and Realignment

P. Law 108-375:

In selecting military installations for closure or realignment, the Department of Defense, giving priority consideration to military value (the first four criteria below), will consider:

Military Value

1. The current and future mission capabilities and the impact on operational readiness of the total force of the Department of Defense, including the impact on joint warfighting, training, and readiness.
2. The availability and condition of land, facilities, and associated airspace (including training areas suitable for maneuver by ground, naval, or air forces throughout a diversity of climate and terrain areas and staging areas for the use of the Armed Forces in homeland defense missions) at both existing and potential receiving locations.
3. The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, surge, and future total force requirements at both existing and potential receiving locations to support operations and training.
4. The cost of operations and the manpower implications.

The selection criteria for determining military value was applied unfairly and inaccurately to Naval Station Ingleside causing the recommendation to substantially deviate from criterion 1.

The Ranking for NS Ingleside Was Unrealistically Low

NSI Was Given No Credit for Having a Unique & Specialized Warfighting Mission

- ◆ **NSI's military value ranking was 42.23, compared with a maximum among 16 active bases of 74.50 and minimum of 30.82. The median was 48.21.**
- ◆ **The most heavily weighted of the five military value components is operational infrastructure (38.5%). NS Ingleside received a score of only 5.32, compared to a high of 26.61 (Norfolk) and low of 2.42 (NSA Panama City, FL).**
- ◆ **Two questions under operational infrastructure that would have benefited NS Ingleside were deleted without explanation by the Department of the Navy Analysis Group (DAG) on Sept. 7, 2004. They are:**
 - **SEA 14: "List and describe any unique capabilities or missions performed by your activity. Unique is defined as capability or mission performed at no other location."**
 - **SEA 15: "List and describe any specialized (not unique) capabilities or missions performed by your activity. Examples of specialized capabilities or missions include but are not limited to: Homeland Defense, Strategic Deterrence Missions, Special Warfare, Mine Warfare, Landing Craft Capability, etc."**

Navy Military Value Criteria Biased Against Small Bases

- ◆ **SEA-3: NSI can berth a carrier but not provide power for cold iron startup without modification**
 - No credit although power could be provided
- ◆ **SEA-4 changed from "relative condition of the piers" to "combined total linear feet in 3 categories."**
 - Biased against small bases and reinforces SEA-1, CG equivalents. All NSI piers were built since 1990
- ◆ **SEA-9: Distance to nearest nuclear capable shipyard**
 - What difference does it make to minesweepers?
- ◆ **SEA-10 and SEA-11: No credit given for Electromagnetic Roll Facility, the NSI equivalent of degaussing/deperming facility**
- ◆ **SEA-13: Does the activity have nuclear weapons security, nuclear weapons handling, nuclear weapons and radiological accident response**
 - Not applicable to minesweepers, no credit.
- ◆ **SEA-21, 27, 29: Distance to nearest submarine training facility, submarine operating area, submarine training range**
 - Minesweepers aren't submarines and there are no submarines in the Gulf.
- ◆ **SEA-35: Distance to nearest weapons station**
 - Minesweepers' ordnance can be handled locally

Military Value Ranking Unrealistically Low

NSI Given No Advantage For Having Dedicated Mine Training Ranges

- ◆ The second most heavily weighted military value component is operational training (24.5%). Again, NS Ingleside score of 12.71 was near the low end, with a high of 23.03 (NAS North Island) and low of 10.12 (NAVWPST Seal Beach).
- ◆ In this category, Ingleside was given no comparative advantage for having a large and excellent complex of six dedicated mine warfare training ranges in the Gulf of Mexico. These ranges have a selection of permanently installed exercise mines and mine shapes. They are at various depths – surf, shallow, mid-depth and deep – and are intended to simulate various zones in which mines might be encountered.
- ◆ None of the operational training questions asked about the qualitative nature of ranges. Rather, question SEA 28 stated; “What is the transit distance (safe navigation route) to the nearest mine warfare training area?”
- ◆ Although NS Ingleside received the highest score (3.15), so did nine other installations, most of which use mine warfare ranges that cannot compare to those in South Texas. Navy team stated on June 22nd that all training areas were credited as mine warfare training areas!

Conclusion: For the reasons stated above, the military value ranking was largely based on a quantitative, clinical approach, with no value for the distinctive operational and training advantages of the Mine Warfare Center of Excellence and its supporting mine warfare training ranges, plus its proximity to NWDC Panama City. As a result, NS Ingleside’s current and future contributions to the operational readiness of the total force is understated, thus rendering the recommendation a substantial deviation from Criterion #1.

Final Selection Criteria

DOD Base Closure and Realignment

P. Law 108-375:

In selecting military installations for closure or realignment, the Department of Defense, giving priority consideration to military value (the first four criteria below), will consider:

Military Value

1. The current and future mission capabilities and the impact on operational readiness of the total force of the Department of Defense, including the impact on joint warfighting, training, and readiness.
2. The availability and condition of land, facilities, and associated airspace (including training areas suitable for maneuver by ground, naval, or air forces throughout a diversity of climate and terrain areas and staging areas for the use of the Armed Forces in homeland defense missions) at both existing and potential receiving locations.
3. The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, surge, and future total force requirements at both existing and potential receiving locations to support operations and training.
4. The cost of operations and the manpower implications.

Dedicated training areas are essential for effective joint warfighting, training, and readiness as recognized in Criterion 2. This recommendation results in the loss of dedicated mine warfare training areas and the movement of mine warfare assets to areas where replacement ranges that meet requirements are not available within the implementation period resulting in a deviation from Criterion 2.

Irreplaceable Asset: State of Texas Owns 9 Miles Out Into Gulf -- Mine Warfare Training Ranges Already Established

DCN: 4298 34

HSV Can Be Used For Mine Warfare Command & Control Plus Development of Concept For High Speed Lift and Support of Army Stryker Brigades and Joint Special Operations

Existing Mine Warfare Training Ranges Located on State-Owned Lands

Landing Site

Fort Worth NAS JRB

Fort Hood

Lackland AFB

Naval Station Ingleside

Corpus Christi NAS


Kingsville NAS

NAS

Sled Launch From Mustang Island Beach South of Port Aransas

Mine Countermeasure Assets Clear Fleet Operations Area, Channels, Harbors and Shorelines

Lease Agreements in Place Since 1994



***The Navy & the State of Texas Signed
A 10-Year Lease Agreement in 2004***

The US Navy has a large complex of dedicated mine warfare training ranges located in the Gulf of Mexico in the vicinity of Naval Station Ingleside. These ranges are used extensively by the Mine Countermeasures ships stationed in Ingleside and the MH-53E Airborne Mine Countermeasures helicopters stationed in Corpus Christi. The loss of these unique training assets has not been accounted for in the BRAC process.

There is a large complex of mine warfare training ranges off Mustang Island and Padre Island in vicinity of Naval Station Ingleside and NAS Corpus Christi. These ranges include a surf-zone range, a very shallow water range, mid-depth ranges and deep-water ranges. They are intended to simulate all the various "zones" in which mines need to be hunted, swept and neutralized in support of Navy littoral and Marine Corps amphibious assault operations.

These ranges have a selection of permanently installed exercise mines and mine shapes and are used extensively by the mine countermeasure ships homeported at Ingleside and the MH53E airborne mine countermeasure helicopters stationed at NAS Corpus Christi. Because of their proximity to the ships and aircraft they support, a ship can leave NSI and be on a range conducting mine countermeasure training missions one hour after exiting the harbor channel. Helicopters can take off from NAS Corpus Christi and be on the range in less than 15 minutes.

Training Areas

BRAC 2005 proposes to close NSI, relocate the remaining MCM ships to San Diego, and relocate MH-15 and all its helicopters to Norfolk. There are no dedicated MCM or AMCM training ranges in either place. There is a Southern California Offshore Range in the vicinity of San Clemente Island, 68 miles from San Diego. This has a small, occasionally used, mine range. However, this range does not cover all the "zones" that the existing Ingleside ranges cover, and exercise mines and mine shapes have to be put into the water and removed from the water after each mine exercise, raising the expense of mine warfare training. In the Norfolk area, AMCM helicopters utilize a small, shallow range, barely adequate for dedicated AMCM training. The expansion of these training areas, placement of permanent mine shapes and exercise mines, and utilization of explosive mine neutralization charges will require the submission of detailed and time consuming environmental impact statements.

Naval Surface Warfare Center, Panama City, maintains mine test and evaluation areas in the vicinity of Panama City, FL, however these areas will be of no use to MCM ships if Naval Station Ingleside is closed and the ships are relocated to San Diego.

Conclusion: Dedicated training areas are essential for effective joint warfighting, training, and readiness as recognized in Criteria 2. This recommendation results in the loss of dedicated mine warfare training areas and the movement of mine warfare assets to areas where replacement ranges that meet requirements are not available within the implementation period resulting in a deviation from Criterion 2.

Final Selection Criteria


DOD Base Closure and Realignment

P. Law 108-375:

In selecting military installations for closure or realignment, the Department of Defense, giving priority consideration to military value (the first four criteria below), will consider:


Military Value

1. The current and future mission capabilities and the impact on operational readiness of the total force of the Department of Defense, including the impact on joint warfighting, training, and readiness.
2. The availability and condition of land, facilities, and associated airspace (including training areas suitable for maneuver by ground, naval, or air forces throughout a diversity of climate and terrain areas and staging areas for the use of the Armed Forces in homeland defense missions) at both existing and potential receiving locations.
3. The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, surge, and future total force requirements at both existing and potential receiving locations to support operations and training.
4. The cost of operations and the manpower implications.



Flexibility for Multiple Missions

What Needs Protection




**8 of the 10 Busiest
U.S. Ports in Terms of Tonnage
Are on the Gulf**




***Commercial Shipping
Lanes and Ports***

***Gulf Ports Handle Most
Of The USA's Crude Oil Imports
And Many Other Cargos***





What Needs Protection





What Needs Protection

Offshore Oil & Gas Production

*Gulf of Mexico Wells
Account for
27% of the Natural Gas
And 28% of the Crude Oil
Produced Annually
In the United States*





**Strategic Military Ports
at Corpus Christi &
Beaumont**


What Needs Protection

Strategic Importance: Ingleside is Navy Homeport For U.S. Southern Coast

"For the first time the United States Navy has the capability to support an aircraft carrier battle group in the Gulf of Mexico with a Gulf base complex (ie. NSI, NAS/CC, NAS/Kingsville). While this has nothing to do with the mine warfare mission at Naval Station Ingleside, it is a capability we do not want to give up."

- Aug 1993: VADM Steve Loftus USN, Deputy Chief Naval Operations, Readiness & Logistics (N-4)

Corpus Christi & Beaumont Are the Strategic Deployment Ports in the Gulf



What Needs Protection

Offshore Oil & Gas Production

Commercial Shipping Lanes

Refining and Chemical Industries


NAFTA Overland Trade

Gulf of Mexico Wells Account for 27% of the Natural Gas And 28% of the Crude Oil Produced Annually In the United States

Gulf Ports Handle Most Of The USA's Crude Oil Imports And Many Other Cargos

Gulf Coast Refineries Have 7.7 million barrels/day Capacity, Half the Nation's Total

Interruptions In Overland Trade From Northern Mexico Would Have Major Economic Impacts




If NSI was too strategically important to give up in 1993 - before Sept. 11th - then it is even more important today when the enemy is terrorism.

Naval Assets & Strategic Targets Post BRAC '05

Source for Naval Assets: US Navy / www.navy.mil

**Bremerton
Everett
8 Ships**



**Norfolk/
Little Creek
64 Ships**

**Mayport
20 Ships**

**San Diego
53 Ships**

During an Expeditionary Warfare Conference in October '04, Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, said the nation started out thinking that fighting terrorism was an "away game" fought by DOD and a "home game" handled by the Department of Homeland Security. He said the reality is that there is only one game and that we need a layered defense of the United States. Based on DOD BRAC '05 recommendations, where is the layered defense of the United States Southern Coast?

Military Value of Gulf Deep Water Port Ignored

- ◆ NS Ingleside is capable of accommodating deep-draft warships in homeland defense missions in the Gulf of Mexico. With its 45-foot operating depth it can accommodate any ship in the fleet including aircraft carriers. The Corpus Christi Ship Channel serving NSI is authorized by Congress for deepening to 52 feet. The only DOD expense of going to 52 feet would be deepening of berths at the Navy docks.
- ◆ The DOD recommendation states that a Gulf Coast surface presence can be maintained with NAS Key West and NAS Pensacola. At best, this is a problematic concept, for the following reasons:
 - There are no ships homeported at either Key West or Pensacola, and no known plans for such homeporting.
 - At Key West the Navy shares its facilities with private cruise liners.
 - The ship channel at NAS Pensacola is currently 44 feet, although there is a mound near Buoy 11 resulting from Hurricane Ivan last year that will require \$5 million in dredging maintenance to clear away. Estimated costs to dredge the channel to 46 and 50 feet to accommodate a carrier are \$12 million and \$66 million, respectively.

Conclusion: Criterion 2 specifically includes “staging areas for use of the Armed Forces in homeland defense missions.” The loss of a permanent Naval presence on the Gulf Coast creates a strategic vulnerability to our national military and economic interests thus deviating from criterion 2.

Final Selection Criteria

DOD Base Closure and Realignment

P. Law 108-375:


In selecting military installations for closure or realignment, the Department of Defense, giving priority consideration to military value (the first four criteria below), will consider:

Military Value

1. The current and future mission capabilities and the impact on operational readiness of the total force of the Department of Defense, including the impact on joint warfighting, training, and readiness.
2. The availability and condition of land, facilities, and associated airspace (including training areas suitable for maneuver by ground, naval, or air forces throughout a diversity of climate and terrain areas and staging areas for the use of the Armed Forces in homeland defense missions) at both existing and potential receiving locations.
3. The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, surge, and future total force requirements at both existing and potential receiving locations to support operations and training.
4. The cost of operations and the manpower implications.

Inadequate scoring of Naval Station Ingleside for its ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, surge, and future total force requirements to support operations and training is a substantial deviation from Criterion 3.

Ingleside Can Accommodate Growth



Land for Expansion at NSI

- ◆ Two parcels of land adjacent to NS Ingleside totaling approximately **1,800 acres** are available for expansion to accommodate contingency, mobilization, surge, and future total force requirements to support operations and training.
- ◆ One of these, directly to the west of the base and totaling 421 acres, has been held by the Port of Corpus Christi for possible Navy expansion and is available immediately. Additionally, the local community has indicated to DOD that it is prepared to purchase for DOD use a separate 1,400-acre undeveloped site to the east and north of NS Ingleside.
- ◆ Either or both sites would allow rapid expansion of NS Ingleside to support future operations and training requirements, e.g., training on the LCS mine warfare module or joint expeditionary warfare training.
- ◆ Military value evaluation did not consider expansion potential required in criteria

Conclusion: Neither NS San Diego nor NS Norfolk has the same level of expansion potential as NS Ingleside to accommodate contingency mobilization, surge, and future total force requirements. The recommendation represents a substantial deviation from Criterion 3.

Final Selection Criteria

DOD Base Closure and Realignment

P. Law 108-375:


In selecting military installations for closure or realignment, the Department of Defense, giving priority consideration to military value (the first four criteria below), will consider:

Military Value


1. The current and future mission capabilities and the impact on operational readiness of the total force of the Department of Defense, including the impact on joint warfighting, training, and readiness.
2. The availability and condition of land, facilities, and associated airspace (including training areas suitable for maneuver by ground, naval, or air forces throughout a diversity of climate and terrain areas and staging areas for the use of the Armed Forces in homeland defense missions) at both existing and potential receiving locations.
3. The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, surge, and future total force requirements at both existing and potential receiving locations to support operations and training.
4. The cost of operations and the manpower implications.

The failure to consider contingency, mobilization, surge, and future total force requirements is a substantial deviation from Criterion 3.

Corpus Christi Strategic Deployment Port



Army Reserve Storage Facility Not Considered



- Storage improves deployment readiness & reduces maintenance
- Ingleside is an ideal site for CHS
- of limited use equipment
- Strategic location for world-wide deployment



Army Reserve on Hold

- ◆ **The Army Reserve has plans and funding for 1 million square feet of Controlled Humidity Storage (CHS) and funding for a portion of that has been provided in the current fiscal year to support mobilization thru the Port of Corpus Christi.**
- ◆ **Location needs security and access to sea-going transport.**
- ◆ **A site on land at NSI and the adjacent port-owned property has received a site visit by representatives of the Army Reserve.**
- ◆ **Site location is on hold pending BRAC decision.**
- ◆ **NSI received no military value credit for this mission which would make NSI multi-mission, multi-service and support the Army's critical deployment mission (see attached).**
- ◆ **The Navy was notified on 12/3/04 that NSI site was the "best site alternative."**

NSI is strategically located to protect and thus help accommodate mobilization and surge requirements. This is because the nearby Port of Corpus Christi since 1998 has been a designated Strategic Deployment Port. The 4th Infantry Division from Fort Hood deployed through the Port of Corpus Christi in 2003. Since the proposed shutdown of NSI would preclude such accommodation in the future, and the Army Reserve mission was not considered in evaluation of NSI, the recommendation represents a substantial deviation from Criterion 3.

Failure to consider Layberthing of Military Sealift Command Ships



NSI Meets All the Technical Requirements Set By the MSC for basing of any class of MSC ship:

- ✓ Pier
- ✓ Water depth
- ✓ Port characteristics

The failure to consider contingency, mobilization, surge, and future total force requirements is a substantial deviation from Criterion 3.

Final Selection Criteria

DOD Base Closure and Realignment

P. Law 108-375:

In selecting military installations for closure or realignment, the Department of Defense, giving priority consideration to military value (the first four criteria below), will consider:

Military Value

1. The current and future mission capabilities and the impact on operational readiness of the total force of the Department of Defense, including the impact on joint warfighting, training, and readiness.
2. The availability and condition of land, facilities, and associated airspace (including training areas suitable for maneuver by ground, naval, or air forces throughout a diversity of climate and terrain areas and staging areas for the use of the Armed Forces in homeland defense missions) at both existing and potential receiving locations.
3. The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, surge, and future total force requirements at both existing and potential receiving locations to support operations and training.
4. The cost of operations and the manpower implications.


Errors in COBRA data overestimate recurring savings thus resulting in substantial deviation from Criterion 4.

COBRA Data Errors

- ◆ **Pre-BRAC savings for MHC decommissioning was limited to ship crew only**
 - **No calculation given for reduction in maintenance requirement or base operations**
 - **Initial Navy response: 50% ship reduction = 0% manpower reduction**
 - **22 June Navy response: 50% ship reduction = ~3.5% manpower reduction (48 billets)**
 - **Navy has agreed the data is inconsistent and needs further analysis including re-run of COBRA**
- ◆ **Result is inflation of Post-BRAC savings**

Errors in COBRA data overestimate recurring savings thus resulting in substantial deviation from Criterion 4.

Roles for South Texas Military Complex in the 21st Century



- **Mine Warfare Center of Excellence**
- **LCS Training**
- **Homeland Defense**
- **Military Sealift Command**
- **Aviation Maintenance**
- **Pilot Training**
- **Expeditionary Warfare & Fleet Training**

Potential LCS Support

◆ Ideal training site


- Centrally located for LCS ships and crews from both coasts
- Easy access to the Gulf of Mexico
 - Rights to local sea and air MCM training ranges granted by State of Texas (and NOT considered in BRAC analysis)
- Mine Warfare Training Center already exists
- Headquarters for all 3 deployable MCM squadron staffs
- New COMINWARCOM headquarters under construction

◆ Ideal MCM mission package storage and refurbishment site

- Large laydown areas
- Convenient truck, rail and air access (NAS Corpus Christi or Corpus Christi International Airport)
- Regional Support Group Ingleside available for refurbishment work


◆ High speed LCS reduces transit time to/from other fleet operating areas

Flexibility for Multiple Missions




2007-2011

Coast Guard
PC-170s




Lockheed LCS Design

- 8 Mine Countermeasures
- 2 Littoral Combat Ships
- 1 HSV Command Vessel
- 3 Coast Guard 87' Cutters
- 3 Coastal Patrol Craft




New Training Opportunities: Gulf Beach Amphibious Landing Site



March 17, 2004
Letter to Adm. William Fallon
 The State of Texas will make
 five miles of state-owned
 beachfront available to DOD for
 amphibious training from Oct. 1
 to March 31 of each year.
 This area will be available
 to DOD free of charge.

Jerry Patterson, Commissioner
Texas General Land Office

Strategic Importance of South Texas: Fleet Training in Area That Replicates Persian Gulf



Summary

- ◆ **Mine Warfare is an under-valued warfare specialty**
 - Only appreciated when there are mines in the water
- ◆ **Navy wants to move Mine Warfare forces to a fleet concentration area**
 - But mine warfare forces operate ahead of the fleet, not with the fleet
- ◆ **Navy says MCM ships can't get to the fight fast enough**
 - Moving to San Diego doesn't solve this problem
- ◆ **Proposal to BRAC NSI assumes MHC decommissioning**
 - Part of FY06 budget proposal, not yet approved by Congress
- ◆ **Navy military value criteria biased against special purpose bases**
- ◆ **Some Navy data inaccuracies**
- ◆ **Mine Warfare Command moved to NSI in 1993**
 - What's the long-term impact of moving again?
 - How long will it take to reconstitute training infrastructure and ranges?
- ◆ **What are the homeland defense implications of the Navy pulling out of the Gulf of Mexico?**
 - Once you give up a base you won't get it back



The Navy is Being Short-Sighted

