

PUBLIC HEARING  
MILITARY BASE CLOSINGS

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION (BRAC)

Tuesday, May 17, 2005

Hart Senate Office Building, Room SH-216  
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A T T E N D A N C E

COMMISSIONERS:

The Honorable Anthony J. Principi, Chairman  
The Honorable James H. Bilbray  
The Honorable Philip E. Coyle III  
Admiral Harold W. Gehman, Jr., USN (Ret.)  
The Honorable James V. Hansen  
General James T. Hill, USA (Ret.)  
General Lloyd W. Newton, USAF (Ret.)  
The Honorable Samuel K. Skinner  
Brigadier General Sue Ellen Turner, USAF (Ret.)  
Charles Battaglia, Executive Director

WITNESSES:

The Honorable Michael L. Dominguez, Acting Secretary of the  
Air Force  
General John P. Jumper, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force  
Mr. Gerald F. "Fred" Pease, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary  
for Basing and Infrastructure Analysis, Office of the  
Assistant Secretary for Installations Environment and  
Logistics

Major General Gary W. Heckman, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Programs, Headquarters U.S. Air Force

OPENING STATEMENT OF ANTHONY J. PRINCIPI, CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE & REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

Chairman Principi: Good morning. I'm pleased to welcome the Honorable Michael L. Dominguez, Acting Secretary of the Air Force, and General John P. Jumper, Chief of Staff of the Air Force. They are joined by Gerald Fred Pease, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary for Basing and Infrastructure Analysis, and Major General Gary W. Heckman, who is the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Programs.

Today's hearing will help shed more light on the Air Force recommendations for restructuring our nation's defense installations and harnessing this process to advance long-term transformational goals. In support of that objective, we will hear testimony today from several key Air Force leaders, infrastructure decision-makers, and analysts.

I know that the Air Force has poured an enormous amount of time, energy, and brain power into the final product that is the subject of this morning's hearing. It is only logical and proper that our witnesses be afforded this

opportunity to explain to the Commission, to the American public, what they propose to do to the Air Force infrastructure that supports joint military operations.

As I have previously stated publicly, this Commission takes its responsibility very seriously to provide an objective and independent analysis of these recommendations.

We will carefully study each Air Force and Department of Defense recommendation in a transparent manner, steadily seeking input from affected communities to make sure they fully meet the congressionally mandated selection criteria.

And those recommendations that substantially deviate from the criteria, we will either modify or reject, as the facts and circumstances warrant.

I now request our witnesses to stand for the administration of oath required by the Base Closure and Realignment Statute. The oath will be administered by Mr. Dan Cowhig.

[Whereupon, the witnesses were sworn.]

Chairman Principi: Mr. Secretary, you may begin.

TESTIMONY OF HON. MICHAEL L. DOMINGUEZ, ACTING SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE, AND GENERAL JOHN P. JUMPER, CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. AIR FORCE; ACCOMPANIED BY GERALD F. "FRED" PEASE, JR., DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR BASING AND INFRASTRUCTURE ANALYSIS, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT

SECRETARY FOR INSTALLATIONS, ENVIRONMENT AND LOGISTICS;  
AND MAJOR GENERAL GARY W. HECKMAN, ASSISTANT DEPUTY  
CHIEF OF STAFF FOR PLANS AND PROGRAMS, HEADQUARTERS  
U.S. AIR FORCE

Mr. Dominguez: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the Commission.

I am pleased to appear before you today with Air Force Chief of Staff General Jumper and Mr. Pease and General Heckman to explain our Base Closure and Realignment recommendations. We have presented to you a bold program that will reshape the Air Force, improving our ability to defend the nation, and doing so with a smaller, more efficient, effective, and less costly base infrastructure.

We have submitted for your recommendation, or for your consideration, ten base closure and 62 realignment recommendations. As each of these individual recommendations may affect multiple bases, our proposal touches 115 of the 154 Air Force installations we evaluated.

To help you understand our proposal, permit me to describe for you our circumstance today.

First, we are a smaller Air Force today than we were when our base infrastructure was created, and we will become yet still smaller. Even so, we'll be a much more capable force. In World War II, we would launch 1500 B-17s to drop

9,000 bombs to destroy one target. In Vietnam, it took 30 F-4s, with 176 bombs to destroy one target. Today, one B-2 can engage 80 targets with 80 bombs, in all weather, with greatly increased accuracy.

Since our modern aircraft are so much more capable than those they replace, we will replace our aging aircraft with modern ones, generally on a less than one-for-one basis. We will be a smaller force.

Our modern systems are not only more capable in combat, they will also fly longer between major maintenance actions.

To get the most from these very expensive capital assets, we'll need to increase the ratios of crews to aircraft.

But we are, today, an Air Force distributed into many small, inefficiently-sized units. Oftentimes, those units are based in places remote from optimal training areas, far removed from other forces they must support or train with, or surrounded by growing communities competing for space or scarce environmental commodities.

Finally, we are an Air Force at war. Today's Air Force is an expeditionary force whose concept of operations is vastly different from its Cold War predecessor. Over the last ten years, the Air Force evolved the concept of the Aerospace Expeditionary Force, the AEF, to meet the dynamic security demands across this turbulent globe. The AEF draws

small, predefined pieces from different Air Force units and fashions those pieces into provisional or expeditionary squadrons and wings. Those expeditionary wings fight forward, while the units back home sustain their normal peacetime operation and maintain their high state of readiness against defined major contingency operations plans. This innovative AEF concept allows us to package our forces into combat units tailored specifically to the needs of the combatant commanders. But those people remaining at home must cover the gap created by those airmen who have gone forward with the AEF. Small units don't have as much flexibility to adapt to that reality as large ones. And we've seen our peacetime OPTEMPO back home surge over the last several years as we've sourced more and more capability forward with the AEF concept.

This is where we start. A smaller force that will get smaller still, but one that, as it shrinks, will become more capable, a force at war, but fighting forward or defending our homeland through an AEF concept that requires optimally-sized garrison forces to sustain the forward forces without undue strain on those sustaining the mission at home. The bottom line is this. We are at war, and that fact makes this Base Realignment and Closure an imperative.

Now, our Base Realignment and Closure strategy flowed

right from this analysis of our circumstance. Our goal was to increase military value by right-sizing our units onto fewer, better-positioned bases. Units of similar type -- F-15E squadrons, for example -- would be organized into optimally-sized 24-aircraft squadrons. Those squadrons would be near instrumented air/ground training ranges and high-volume aerial ranges. Similarly, tankers would be consolidated into the larger squadrons and positioned near the major air routes through which we deploy to combat theaters. Those are illustrative of the strategy we took.

We recognize that after 9/11 the Air Force had an important mission right here at home, and our BRAC strategy had to preserve our ability to support the air-sovereignty-alert mission.

Next, for decades now, the Air Reserve Components have been full and equal partners with the Active Force in a wide range of Air Force missions. Our strategy recognized the value of that partnership and preserved the Active/Guard/Reserve mix in our flying missions, and positions the Reserve Components for leading roles in a variety of emerging in-demand warfighting missions. Our strategy sought to improve our ability to work with our joint-force partners.

And, finally, we sought to preserve significant surge

capability. When a hurricane threatens our forces in the Gulf Coast, for example, we need space to move them and bed them down elsewhere. We also wanted to preserve enough capacity in our infrastructure to enable us to bed down all our forces now permanently stationed in other countries. Let me emphasize, there are no plans to return these forces to the United States, but we believed it is important to maintain the capability to do so, should that ever be needed.

In sum, our strategy was to right-size our squadrons onto the best bases for each squadron's mission, preserve robust participation of the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve, improve our ability to train and work with our Joint Force partners, and preserve our ability to surge.

Now let me tell you a bit about our process for executing this BRAC strategy.

The first and most important thing about our process is that it's solid -- it is solidly grounded on a reasoned, thoughtful, defensible, quantitative approach to defining military value. The most important thing for you, the Congress, and the public to understand is that military value is a function of an installation's inherent and organic characteristics. It's weather, it's distance to appropriate training space, it's buildable and usable space,

and facility infrastructure that can't easily be reconstituted. Think about Minuteman III silos, for example.

So, military value is not a function of the characteristics of the units currently based at an installation. The skill and esprit of a specific unit can be recreated elsewhere.

Second, all the decisions, all the debate, all the deliberations that led to the results you see before you happened in groups specifically constituted for that purpose. No single individual -- not me, not General Jumper -- could put a base on or off the list. Those actions had to take place in the open, in front of peers. And the military judgment exercised in these forums had to stand the scrutiny of those peers.

Our internal Air Force deliberative body was called the Base Closure Executive Group, or BCEG. The BCEG was comprised of 12 general officers and civilian executives, with a wide variety of functional expertise. Fred Pease and Gary Heckman were the co-chairs of that group. The Active, Guard, and Reserve were represented on the BCEG, and the Air Force Audit Agency was a full participant, ensuring our data collection and analytical processes had the integrity to support the momentous decisions we're asking you to

consider.

Now I want to share you with a brief summary of our results. As I said earlier, we recommend 10 closures and 62 realignments. Together, these proposals affect 115 Air Force installations. Our recommendations right-size our force. Almost 100 percent of our fighter-force structure will be optimally sized 18- to 24-aircraft squadrons, up from about half today. More dramatic gains will be seen in our mobility and airlift force structure.

Our forces are placed in higher military-value settings, closer to appropriate ranges or operational missions. We improve our joint posture by hosting the Army's 3rd Army and CENTCOM's Army Component Headquarters at Shaw Air Force Base, next to CENTCOM's Air Force Component Command. We host the 7th Special Forces group at Eglin Air Force Base and bed down the initial Joint Strike Fighter training unit there. We move A-10s to Moody Air Force Base to be in a position to train with and support the Army's revolutionary Maneuver Warfare Center at Fort Benning. And we turn Pope Air Force Base over to the Army, while retaining a sizeable Air Force presence in skills and capabilities of direct relevance to the 18th Airborne Corps.

These recommendations support an enormous leap forward in military value, posturing the Air Force to better serve

the nation. In so doing, they save net of BRAC implementation costs, about two-and-a-half-billion dollars by 2011, and, from that time on, yield about a billion dollars annually in cost avoidance. And our total estimated net -- or savings, net of costs, over 20 years, discounted back to fiscal year 2006, is over \$14 billion.

Now, these are tough decisions that we've laid in front of you. And the real pain a closure or realignment action will cause was an important consideration in developing our recommendations. I believe, however, the important gains in warfighting effectiveness and the savings that we will be able to reinvest in combat capability outweigh those concerns. And I trust you will come to the same conclusions.

Thank you very much.

Chairman Principi: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

General Jumper?

General Jumper: Mr. Chairman, members of the Commission, it's a pleasure to be here today and to be able to testify before you. We appreciate this opportunity. It's also a pleasure to join the Acting Secretary of the Air Force, Mike Dominguez, along with General Heckman and Mr. Pease, to present to you the Air Force plan that was laid before you on Friday.

In prior BRAC rounds, Base Closures and Realignment, we focused on closing the excess capacity that resulted from Cold War operational bases as we downsized the Air Force. Then, it wasn't a very easy task, because of the close association we formed with our bases around the United States Air Force. And in this round the task is no easier.

We focused on making our infrastructure properly sized for the challenges that we plan to face in the remainder of the 21st century. In those challenges, we attempt to make the most efficient use of our total force -- our Active-Duty Force, our Air National Guard, our Air Force Reserve, and our Air Force civilians -- and to accommodate the new missions that we find more in demand than the traditional missions -- missions including unmanned air vehicles, command and control, space, information operations, and mission support -- and to preserve our limited resources for readiness and modernization, and to save, of course, as much as we can of the taxpayer dollars that go into maintaining the United States Air Force.

As the Secretary just said, we looked at four overarching criteria, and I think our recommendations meet all four of those criteria.

First is maximizing warfighting capability. The Air Force recommendations maximize warfighting capability by

effectively consolidating older weapons systems into fewer, but larger, squadrons. That allows us to exploit the economies of scale and to make our squadrons more efficient and more operationally effective. We increased fighter squadrons from 15 to 18 aircraft or 24 aircraft. The increase in the mobility squadron sizes go from about eight aircraft to 12 or 16. It makes these flying squadrons more powerful in combat and easier to maintain, while reducing the requirement for support equipment and overhead command structure.

Where it's practical, our recommendations also consolidate like weapons systems at single bases. For example, we are placing the entire B-1 fleet at Dyess Air Force Base in Texas, and the entire Active-Duty C-130 fleet in the continental United States at Little Rock Air Force Base in Arkansas.

For those we cannot centrally base due to operational considerations, such as the F-16s, we have arrayed them to leverage common support requirements, reducing excess costs and duplication. This doesn't just apply to the Active Duty Force. Our recommendations also leverage the inherent strengths and advantage of our Air National Guard and our Air Force Reserve. We have maintained the balance across the Active Duty, Guard, and Reserve Components both in

aircraft and in manpower. And any Reserve or Guard manpower we free up as a result will be reinvested into these emerging Air Force missions that I discussed previously.

And we talked about these -- UAVs, command and control, information operations, et cetera.

Another goal was to meet the future defense strategy, to have the bases where we need them, configured as we need them. Our recommendations to realign our force structure to better support the future defense strategy include accommodations for increasing homeland-defense requirements, requirements in securing strategic access, and retaining the goal of freedom of action of all of our forces. We provide the United States Northern Command the forces it needs to maintain our air sovereignty. We ensure we retain the right bases to support the enduring missions of global strike, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, and mobility, and to ensure unimpeded access to space.

We are also supporting emerging needs, such as the Joint Strike Fighter, the future total force Predator missions, and the joint unmanned common aerial vehicle system.

Another goal was to eliminate physical capacity, excess physical capacity. As the Secretary said, we will eliminate excess physical capacity with 72 closures and realignment

recommendations. Our recommendations will reduce the 142 Air Force installations with operational flying missions by 28, nearly 20 percent. We will reduce our excess flight -- flying infrastructure by 37 percent, but still retain sufficient ramp space for surge, emerging missions, or the potential to return aircraft permanently based overseas. We will also reduce our excess building and facility infrastructure by 79 percent, yet retain sufficient space for future requirements or emerging missions. Though we eliminate this excess, we maximize operational capability and maintain the surge capacity we need.

Another goal was to capitalize on opportunity for joint activities.

Finally, all of the Department of Defense recommendations capitalized on opportunities for joint activity by hosting relevant sister-service combat and combat-support units. For example, the headquarters for the Army Supporting Command for United States Central Command moves to Shaw Air Force Base, South Carolina, as the Secretary said, co-locating it with its equivalent headquarters, which is 9th Air Force.

We established a joint initial training site for Joint Strike Fighter at Eglin Air Force Base, in Florida, providing the Air Force, the Navy, and Marine pilots and

their maintainers a single location, with easy access to necessary ranges and airspace.

Eglin Air Force Base will also host the Army's 7th Special Forces group, pairing this combat unit with Air Force Special Operations forces and Eglin's robust training areas.

We have already begun developing a plan to implement, and a schedule to implement, these recommendations, should they be approved. We will work closely with the Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve and our Active Duty major commands to further develop and refine this schedule.

In prior rounds of BRAC, the Air Force established an excellent record of closing bases as quickly as possible once we had the intent and the authorization to continue.

This aggressive approach provides the quickest savings for the United States Air Force, and it assists the local communities to develop their own plan for economic revitalization following the closure.

Our bases have strong ties to our friends and neighbors outside the gates, and I can attest to this personally. My dad was a wing commander at Cannon Air Force Base, so the closure of Cannon Air Force Base, or the recommendation to close Cannon Air Force Base, strikes personally and at home to me. I have known people there since my dad was stationed

there when I was 18 years old, and I've known them, then, all my life, and continue to consider them close friends.

We've dealt with these issues in the past, and we will do our very best to deal with them with great sensitivity in the future. Change is not easy. We will pledge ourself, as the Secretary of Defense said yesterday, and as Mike Dominguez said this morning, to embrace these communities and do the very best we can to help with any transitions that emerge as final decisions from the deliberations of this Commission and their recommendations.

Sir, I look forward to your questions. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Principi: Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary, General Jumper. Do the other witnesses have testimony --

Mr. Dominguez: No.

Chairman Principi: -- or just questions? Okay, thank you. I'll begin with a few questions.

According to the summary of the Air Force selection process, you established four goals to support right-sizing the force and enhancing its capabilities through this BRAC 2005 process. You highlighted some of those goals in your testimony: transform by maximizing warfighting capability, transform by realigning a U.S. Air Force infrastructure with future defense strategy, and, of course, eliminating a lot

of excess capacity, and the opportunities for joint activity.

Do you believe that the recommendations you've proposed to the Commission have achieved your goals? And where do you believe you may have fallen short? And why?

Mr. Secretary?

Mr. Dominguez: Sir, I'll start, and let General Jumper follow up. But I feel strongly this is a great package of recommendations from that regard. It does achieve our goals. It's an interwoven package. We -- I think, as I described, and General Jumper described, in the opening statements -- we'll be a much, much more effective Air Force. We'll be able to support the AEF concept better, with less stress on the people back home. We're well-postured to meet the demands of air-sovereignty alert. We keep a presence, the United States Air Force, either through the rough the Active, Guard, or Reserve, in virtually every significant geographic area of the United States. We've gone through a litany of the places where we have improved our ability to partner with the joint force, and to partner with the joint force in the continued transformation of warfare.

So, I think this is a fabulous package. I guess I would not -- I don't think that there's a place there where

we fell significantly short of the mark.

Chairman Principi: General Jumper?

General Jumper: Mr. Chairman, I think that we have not fallen short of our mark. In the analysis that will be available, and is available, to you along with the records of all of our deliberations, will reveal, I think, what can only be described as an exhaustive analytical process to bring us to these recommendations.

As painful and personal as some of these decisions are, I think that the recommendations do stand the analytical scrutiny that I know this Commission will give it.

Chairman Principi: Thank you.

I'd like to follow up with a question, a specific question, about the rationale for some of your recommendations. And perhaps when the data is supplied to the Commission, it'll shed more light on it. But you propose realigning Eielson, moving some -- close to 3,000 people and most of the assets out, yet keeping the base open in a "warm" status. I guess you could say the same for Grand Forks. You propose moving about 2700 people, most, if not all, of the assets on a 5500-acre military installation.

Then there are about 18 to 20 Air Guard bases that you're moving most of the people out, most of the assets out, but keeping those bases open, with a shell of a force. Why?

Why are you keeping -- you talked about excess capacity. It costs a lot of money to maintain Eielson, just to keep it warm, and Grand Forks, and -- and, also, I would think it's a drain on the host community. Having moved -- drained -- moved most of the assets out, not allowing for economic redevelopment, if there could be any in some of those areas, but are these really closures, or are they truly realignments? And it just -- what -- perhaps you can explain that.

Mr. Dominguez: I'll cover that, kind of, the high level, and let the pros here take it from there.

You have to remember, we are an expeditionary Air Force. And one of the missions for this expeditionary Air Force is guarding the homeland, so that we leave places that we'll be able to deploy to and operate from. And that's a very, very essential part of our mission. We also have to accommodate the future. We're looking at decisions here that will last for many, many years. And we know, right now, that there's emerging missions, emerging opportunities that we need to prepare for. And so, some of that is a hedging strategy.

And then, in particular, we were thinking about this in the context of our Air Reserve Component partners. Those -- the Air Reserve Components are community-based forces. And,

in particular, the National Guard is a force we share with the governors of the several states. And so, leaving small, but sustainable, units of National Guard capability, particularly in the expeditionary combat support, we thought very carefully about that and tried to leave those viable units with real, relevant wartime missions, that we could tap into as part of the Air Expeditionary Force, and that those units, where we left them, would keep us connected back to the communities, tied in to a valuable recruiting and retention base, and support base, for the National Guard, be ready and relevant for the governors' needs, but also be able to train and sustain their readiness for their federal missions.

So, those -- that lay-down was really carefully thought through.

I'd like General Jumper and --

General Jumper: And also to accommodate these emerging missions that we talked about. And we continue to work with an Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve on how we will sequence and time these emerging missions, and on the training that will be required, and the increase in training capacity that will be needed to train these forces into the emerging missions.

So, what Mr. Dominguez said about the requirement for

mission support, we opened 36 bases during Operation Iraqi Freedom around the world. We still have 14 of those bases open today. We are stretched and in great demand for our combat support.

So, these things, these are functions that are inherent in a community, with police activities and people who are members of engineering and personnel and security units today. Those are in great demand out there. So, to have these available and in the rotational base is very valuable in an expeditionary Air Force and have already -- we've already proven ourselves in those -- that's one of those missions, as I had listed, that are in demand out there today, where we are under-resourced. This puts them more in that mix.

Mr. Dominguez: Can we -- we need to address specifically about Eielson, and I -- Gary, why don't -- you want to deal with that?

General Heckman: As we were deliberating over Eielson, one thing we noted is that they have superb airspace and training areas up there. We have a number of installations that host large-scale training exercises. Nellis is one of those. And we created some capability there at Nellis to be able to continue to accommodate large-scale exercises. Eielson is such a facility in the north.

What we found by downloading, rather than plussing up, the fighter squadrons that were there now, and using up more of that capacity, our judgment was, by pulling those out, we freed up more capacity to -- for Eielson to provide those kinds of capabilities that were most in demand.

Chairman Principi: Do you expect those facilities -- you know, anytime you have an empty military base or an empty attic, you find things to put in it -- do you expect that those bases will -- people will gravitate to them and, before you know it, you're going to be back --

General Jumper: In the case --

Chairman Principi: -- with 25- --

General Jumper: -- in the case --

Chairman Principi: -- 2600 people?

General Jumper: -- in the case of Eielson, what we expect is that the operation -- the exercise Cope Thunder, which they host up there now and take advantage of those ranges, will be able to accommodate more -- actually more people, and will be able to operate 360 days a year, because the hanger space that was normally devoted to the permanent squadrons will now be able to accommodate guest squadrons that come in there.

So, the mission, in addition to the Guard tankers that stay there, will accommodate, we think, a more robust

exercise activity and allow us to take better advantage of the ranges, the magnificent ranges, that exist up there. That's what we -- that's what -- that's our intention in this move.

Mr. Dominguez: Right. And, sir, if you -- on Grand Forks, you can't find a better UAV, you know, location to fly UAVs out of, because of the lack of competing commercial traffic up there. And so -- and it's on the northern tier, up by the border with Canada. And so, there was some real thinking about how to preserve that capability again. And I want to go back -- we will deploy into, and train from, places like Eielson and Nellis and Grand Forks. And so, those -- that expeditionary part, even, you know, works right here in the U.S. of A.

General Jumper: The attractive part of Grand Forks, if I might say, Mr. Chairman, is also its proximity to an Air National Guard unit. So, again, one of these associate relationships can be established to accommodate one of these missions that I list in the future. As the Secretary says, intuitively it looks like a UAV mission, and we want to make sure that -- to cooperate with the governor and be able to create that associate relationship for this future mission. So -- but that was what we had in mind.

Chairman Principi: Thank you.

Admiral Gehman?

Admiral Gehman: Thanks for appearing before us this morning. It's extraordinarily helpful to get the impressions and views personally, rather than through intermediaries.

Going through this report very briefly, without a lot of analysis -- and it may be that all the answers to my questions are in the analysis, but I have a couple of questions that your views would be helpful on. One is, I have a question about how good your crystal ball is. As you know, by law, one of the pillars of the process is the 20-year force-structure plan. My crystal ball doesn't work all that well out beyond a couple of years, but is it your understanding, or is it your intent that the force structure of the Air Force in the future -- and both of you mentioned that you're not going to -- you're going to -- you're not going to replace weapons systems on a one-for-one basis -- so, from a platform point of view, probably the force structure will be smaller in the future.

Now, how does that -- what I'd like to -- you to explain to me is, How does that translate into operational units? In other words, are you going to have your 24- and 18-PAE squadrons with fewer platforms, or are you going to have fewer squadrons?

I have a couple of -- I want to discuss this a little bit, but if you could --

General Jumper: The objective is to -- is, of course, to right-size the squadrons. And in our experience, going back to 1990, where we actually tried to preserve flags, squadrons, and went down to 18-aircraft squadrons, what we found was, especially in the single-seat fighter business, you very quickly ran out of people to do the right kind of supervision in the squadron, to be able to have somebody on leave and somebody who was sick -- you very quickly ran out of people in these 18-aircraft squadrons. We went back to 24 for that reason. You could deploy a package of six aircraft, you could still have enough left over to accommodate the training demand that's in the Active-Duty unit.

In the Guard and Reserve, it's a little bit different. They don't have the ongoing mission qualification training that we have coming into -- as a constant drumbeat in an Active Duty unit. They have very experienced crews; and, therefore, you can accommodate an 18-UE squadron.

So, in fact, the plan is that the number of squadrons will be reduced as we increase the -- and right-size -- and the same, by the way, is true for mobility -- for the mobility units. The numbers are a little bit different. So

--

And as far as a crystal ball is concerned, Admiral, you're exactly right, none of us have a perfect crystal ball. But the infrastructure that we forecast in our BRAC proposal will accommodate any reasonable limits we would see -- as the Secretary already said, any eventuality, that we'd redeploy from overseas or, in the BRAC -- in the future total force infrastructure, any reasonable changes in that -- in the numbers of platforms we might have, we can well accommodate.

Admiral Gehman: Well, thank you. And I gathered from the justification and the discussion in here that a number of these realignments are to get similar blocks and models and things like that all at one place, and to robust-up the unit so it's big enough to be sustainable. And I gather that that's a theme in here.

General Jumper: That's correct, sir, as well as support equipment.

Admiral Gehman: Right. Now, my next question, then, gets to -- again, following on, on your opening testimony, the Air Force is, and has been for a goodly number of years now, deployed rotationally out of its own bases to an ever -- unprecedented level -- extent. And when you deploy -- and if I have this wrong, I know you'll correct me -- a lot

of times the cops and the doctors and the engineers, they all go, too, which leaves the base back at home in some jeopardy. That would -- not jeopardy; that's a wrong word -- but you leave holes behind, which are sometimes filled by Guard and Reserve units, sometimes not. But, anyway, you leave holes behind. That, it seems to me, would argue for larger facilities, larger bases, such that you can take a squadron and some docs and cops and things like that and not leave the home base quite so impacted. And it would argue, then, that the little -- smaller little posts ought to be rolled up into the big ones, if you think this deployment thing's going to. Yet a brief reading of this, as the Chairman indicated, indicates that a lot of opportunities to close smaller bases were turned into realignments, like you just couldn't quite swallow that pill. And so, I -- as we go through the analysis, as my -- as we work with your staff, I'm going to have to have this apparent dichotomy explained a little bit better, because -- am I off base here? But is the arithmetic not right, that if you're going to be deploying and deploying and deploying, in order that you don't degrade quality of life, security, flying maintenance back home, the more you put onto one base, the better off you are?

General Jumper: In general, that is correct. But when

we deploy, we -- our air expeditionary forces are made up of what we call UTCs, so that we actually avoid stripping a base of its ability to operate. And we draw these UTCs from as many as 100 or 120 bases for each of our AEF pairs that go out to -- on rotation. And what we -- as I said, the intent is to be able to leave behind enough ability to operate. Where we are short, as in mission support capability, we think we can work with these mission support elements that we have accommodated in the Air National Guard to be able to fill in those pieces of our support UTCs that we need for surge and other things, as we have just proven in the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Admiral Gehman: Good.

Mr. Dominguez: Admiral, I want to pile in on that. I mean, your logic is exactly correct. That's the logic that we followed, you know, to -- as you build a larger unit, it has more flexibility to accommodate the AEF demands to keep the unit back home operating. Now, the decision not to close a lot of those little bases where -- that -- particularly Guard and Reserve bases that lost -- well, Guard bases -- that lost their flying mission, because the community and the skills in that community are there to sustain the expeditionary combat support challenge. And, again -- and so, the mission left at that base, as a Guard

base, was different than it had when it was a flying unit. It's now pretty well focused on expeditionary combat support. They can do their training, what little is required for guys in the Guard, who do this kind of full time in their peacetime work, you know, so that remaining base is -- it's not the same thing as trying to support an Active Duty base. And then it had the benefit of leaving, in the state and in the community, a really, really important asset for the governor. We are partners with the Guard in this total force, and that means we're partners with the governors and the communities. And so, wherever we could, we -- that's the strategy we took. And we can still get to those guys in the federal mission without a hiccup.

Admiral Gehman: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Principi: Mr. Coyle?

Mr. Coyle: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Dominguez, General Jumper, gentlemen, thank you for your testimony this morning.

You're proposing significant realignments at a couple of bases that have strategic importance, one of them being Grand Forks, which has been home to strategic forces for decades, and another being Beale Air Force Base, which is important for missile defense. And I think with a base that has a special role like that, it's important to maintain

other activities than simply the strategic activities. The strategic activities may not be the largest effort in the Air Force, but they're vitally important, as you well know, and maintaining other activities at those locations helps to provide a kind of critical mass, helps with quality of life for the people at those bases, helps with -- to provide base support functions, which a smaller, more narrowly-focused base has more difficulty providing.

And so, my question is, about those bases -- and it could apply to other bases on the list -- To what extent are you trying to retain at these strategic bases other functions that, while they're not strategic functions in and of themselves, help to support the overall strategic importance of the base?

General Jumper: Sir, if I might attempt to answer that. In particular, at Beale Air Force Base, we are relocating the tankers that are now there. And might I add that that strategic mission in tankers represents the largest single force structure the United States Air Force has. So, it is, by no means, a trivial part of what we do.

It is a very key and important part of what we do.

But those tankers are being relocated. And the objective of that relocation is to free up manpower in order to do the emerging mission that is at Beale right now, which

is Global Hawk. So we will retain the strategic mission of strategic reconnaissance in the form of the U-2 aircraft and the Global Hawk -- again, taking advantage of the strategic location and the airspace in that part of the United States for that mission.

So, it remains robust, in our estimation.

Mr. Dominguez: Can I -- I want to put a general context around -- that addresses your question. We looked at military value in eight different mission areas. As I said, things like geography and weather and high-volume airspace, those things varied based on the different mission areas. And every base that we looked at was evaluated and scored on each of those eight different missions.

Then we took the force structure, and bedded it down in the highest military value, you know, for each of them -- those missions in that force structure. So, what came out is that we -- when we moved capability, like tankers, out of Beale and out of Grand Forks, we moved those to higher-military-value locations. We are better postured with the moves that we're proposing than leaving the status quo.

So that's the general -- we tried to do that approach all the way across.

Mr. Coyle: Thank you.

There's a relatively small realignment, but I thought

it might be significant, at Holloman Air Force Base. As I understand it, you're proposing to disestablish the high-onset gravitational centrifuge there. And I bring this up, because an issue for quite a number of years now has been a feeling on the part of some that the Air Force has not been sufficiently willing to invest in research to understand the physiology of G-lock. When -- if you are proposing to disestablish that centrifuge, are you going to move it someplace else, or will you no longer have that kind of centrifuge capability?

Mr. Dominguez: Sir, Fred has advised me that that's -- that was dealt with by -- or that proposal was developed by a joint cross-service group, which maybe -- Fred, to you want to explain --

Mr. Pease: That's correct. I believe it's the medical joint cross-service group who's looking at that. They're, I believe -- and I'd have to go back to them to ask the specifics about that -- they're going to -- there are two centrifuges now, and they're going to have one. They feel they can do their work with that one. However, we'll go back to the joint cross-service group and ask them to give you the details of that proposal.

Mr. Coyle: Yeah. Those centrifuges have different capabilities. I guess this raises a question. How did you

work with the joint cross-service groups? Did you -- did the Air Force do the things that it wanted to do separately from the joint cross-service groups, and you really haven't engaged their recommendations?

Mr. Dominguez: Oh, no, not at all. Let me -- I'll deal with that a little, and then Fred maybe will add some more.

But early in the BRAC process, the deliberative bodies developed a -- recommendations for the Secretary about how to organize. And what the Secretary did was, he said, "Look, there are some functions that I want looked at in a joint venue through a joint lens." And so, those functions -- for example, medical, education and training -- those functions were moved off of individual service scopes so that the principal responsibility for addressing or developing recommendations were in the joint arena. And the "joint arena" means joint. We had people on every one of those joint cross-service groups. In my day job, I was actually a participant in the education and training joint cross-service group, as a member of that team.

So there was extensive interaction. All of their recommendations and ideas and concepts were vetted with the individual services. So there was a lot of give and take. But -- so somewhere in the Air Force, there is extensive

knowledge of the -- or the rationale for the one you're asking about; it just isn't right here at this table.

General Jumper: But we will look into it, sir.

Mr. Dominguez: And then --

Mr. Coyle: Thank you.

Mr. Dominguez: -- did I leave anything, Fred, that you wanted --

Mr. Pease: No, that's --

General Jumper: If we lost any capability or capacity as a result of this, I'm not aware of it, for sure.

Mr. Coyle: Thank you.

Chairman Principi: Mr. Bilbray?

Mr. Bilbray: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I guess you saw some of the testimony of Senator -- I mean, Secretary Rumsfeld yesterday and the concern of many on this Commission, including myself, about the Guard and Reserve Components. Our concern is the fact that -- you know, like, for instance, Reno, Nevada, which is -- by the way, it was not in my former district; I'm a southern Nevadan -- but the fact is that the guardsmen in Nevada are saying they're going -- you know, moving these planes to Little Rock, you're going to lose a lot of key people there.

There's mechanics, there's the ground crews, there's pilots. Everybody said, well, the pilots are -- a lot of

them are civilian pilots that can travel to Little Rock to fly their planes, but the -- most of the ground personnel can't. And many on this Commission believe that the recruitment of Guard and Reservists, after the second Gulf War and what's going on today, is going to become more and more difficult. The answer of the Secretary yesterday was, "Well, they might have to travel a little further, but, you know, they'll be there." That's my first question.

Would you give me the rationale on this massive close-down? I mean, almost everything on here, on closures, I'd say 90 percent are Guard and Reserve centers.

Mr. Dominguez: Sir, let me -- I'll start off.

Mr. Bilbray: Yeah.

Mr. Dominguez: We approach this as a total force. The Guard and Reserve were full participants in this effort. General Jumper, General Heckman briefed the adjutant generals, at least on the future total force issue. We couldn't, obviously, share with them the specific BRAC recommendations.

But if you put this in historical context, since 1988 most of the Base Realignment and Closure actions have happened -- were in the Active Force. We tried to preserve -- as General Jumper said earlier, we tried to preserve structure, and we went down to these smaller units. And

those smaller units got distributed all across the United States.

That turns out not to be an effective and efficient way to operate an air -- an expeditionary Air Force in the 21st century with the challenges that we're facing, with the new systems that we're deploying.

So, it's -- an artifact of history that the problem that we were left with, as you matched the -- you know, our strategy of right-sizing squadrons to improve our effectiveness, our ability to deploy an -- expeditionary Air Force wings meant that you had to deal with a lot of dispersed, you know, Guard and Reserve forces.

So, we had to deal with that, and we moved -- and that is a natural result of our strategy and the mil-value calculations, the fight we're in, as opposed to the fight we were in and the legacy of the decisions from the past.

Now, as to recruiting and retention, ARC -- the Air Reserve Component demographics, the ability of communities to support vibrant and robust participation by members of -- citizen airmen in the Air Force mission was a big issue, and it was looked at specifically in every one of these moves. So, when we move C-130s from Reno to someplace else, we're looking at the ability of the Guard and Reserve to sustain that.

The United States Air Force is not experiencing recruiting problems in the -- in our Reserve Components. In fact, the Air Force Reserve is, by far and away, the biggest success story in recruiting in the Department of Defense today.

The Guard -- we're confident about the Guard's ability to sustain its recruiting. And, again, as I said, when we moved squadrons around, we were careful about the ability of that local community to sustain that.

The last thing I wanted to point out is something I said in my opening statement. While it'll be tough, the human aspects of military value can be moved and reconstituted. Right? The skills in those Guard units, which -- are world-class, but we can recreate them. We can recreate those. Those are -- it just takes some time, it takes some commitment, it takes some dedication, it takes some perseverance, but we can do that. The mil value of where that -- the geography, the weather, and then the size of the unit that you're able to create -- you know, those things are the important imperatives for the 21st century.

We are going -- and, as I said, we were very, very conscious about leaving in states important missions for the Guard and Reserve, important capabilities, and very conscious about preserving a governor's ability to have a

well-trained and well-organized militia to deal with state emergencies. And between what we've done in BRAC and our future total force effort, which is a parallel to that, you know, we'll make sure that's done well. And people who want to serve, even when their airplane's moved, we'll be bending over backwards to find new opportunities for them to serve.

General Jumper: And might I add, sir, that the Nevada Air National Guard are one of the units that raised their hand early on and volunteered to go over to Nellis Air Force Base and be a part of the growing unmanned aerial vehicle mission, the Predator mission, at Nellis. And they are taking part in that today. So, those -- again, not part of BRAC, but it's a future opportunity that they're participating with the Active in.

Mr. Bilbray: I have another question about -- when you determine the closing of Ellsworth and Cannon, to what extent did you take into consideration that economic impact in the area?

Mr. Dominguez: Sir, that was a major consideration. We pulled it out specifically -- you know, we -- General Jumper and I asked for a list of the top ten actions that we were taking, in terms of economic impact, numbers of jobs lost. And the staff here, the pros, gave us that. Then we had a discussion about metropolitan statistical areas, you

know, and how the things were drawn. And we said, "Look, you know, the economic impact here may be masked because they drew a circle that included some other big area, so just look at the local community, just look at the -- and then tell us what it is." I mean, so we probed, and we asked, and, you know, we dove in and thought hard about it, and we then raised that up in the deliberative body that General Jumper and I belong to. Okay? And we wrestled with that collectively.

And, you know, that's one of those things where, you know, the benefits that we're gaining, in terms of military value, in terms of being able to support the national security, are -- just dominate. And the financial resources from these closures, in excess of \$2 billion, for example, in a closure of Ellsworth -- I don't remember the exact number, but it's just too hard to walk away from, in spite of the fact that we know the impact on that community is going to be really hard. Same at Cannon.

And then we explored, okay, what do we have to do? What can we do about that? You know, do we make sure that there is a -- you know, that, in this BRAC process, there's an ability for the Federal Government to reach out and help transition that community? So, we satisfied ourselves that those things were in place. Didn't make it easy. Doesn't

make it pretty. I wish I didn't have to do that. But it was something that we had to do, and the numbers show you that pretty clearly.

Mr. Bilbray: All right, thank you.

Chairman Principi: Mr. Hansen?

Mr. Hansen: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank the witnesses for excellent testimony.

You know, when these bills are written, Congress always has an intent that they want to come up with. And usually that's just said in broad terms, because the specifics are left up to the agency, so to speak, and that's where the old saying, "And the devil's in the details," you know, someone has to put it together.

But you look back, and you say, "Was the intent of this legislation followed?" And it's hard to say. History is the best teacher of that.

Be that as it may, with that in mind, and having said that, I definitely feel that it was a really strong intent to see more -- I don't know if I like the word "jointness," but that's a word that's tossed around all the time -- "interservicing," in the military. You folks and others, I've heard this ad nauseam for years and years about capacity, excess capacity. I've often wondered, as I look at the way the things we have today are built, why there

isn't more that? A classic example would be the F/A-18 Hornet and your F-15. I don't think most people in this room could tell the difference between the two. And you just see one goes down one line and one goes down another. So, really, to fix them is about -- I guess you folks don't work with tailhooks, but, other than that, you could fix everything else on the thing. So, it comes down, the idea, you just wonder, Why don't we do more of that? When you see -- especially in the depots -- you see that every one of them has a little more capacity than they need.

I agree, and concur, there's a certain amount of overcapacity that's probably helpful; on the other side of the coin, it just seems to me that interservicing's got a long way to go. I have no problem with defending the beauties and the rights of each service, and I know how you folks feel about that, but I would wonder why that wasn't in the legislation a little more from all of the services as, if you go back and you read the congressional record on a lot of this stuff, that basically was a lot of the intent behind this.

Then you've also talked about the idea of defending the homeland. And in your deliberations on BRAC, can you give us any examples at all on what you have done to do that? And then, if I may respectfully say so, is, protecting your

test and training ranges is really a big deal, in my mind. And I'm more sensitive to it than others, I guess, because I constantly got bills on my desk to turn them into wilderness areas, terminate military activity in them, use them for other areas. Out in the Utah test and training range, for example, private fuel storage, want us to take a big whack out of that for these obsolete rods that our folks from the East want to put out in our area. But, be that as it may, I would appreciate it if you could respond to those three questions.

Mr. Dominguez: Sir, let me take a stab at it to start with.

First is you're going to have a whole afternoon of jointness tomorrow afternoon, I think, as you meet with the chairs of the joint cross-service groups, so -- for example, in the depots, that was one of those functions that the Secretary set aside and said, "Hey, I want this dealt with jointly." The industrial functions of the Department were analyzed, and recommendations developed in a joint group. They were not developed in a service-specific realm. They were removed from Fred and Gary's work. Just education and training was developed jointly. Medical was developed jointly. So, you're going to get a whole afternoon of proposals that weave together in more powerful ways some of

the, kind of, back-shop, but important, functions of the Department of Defense, weave them together in a real joint tapestry.

For us, in terms of the stuff that was left in our domain, which was largely that warfighting core business of the Air Force, I think we did a superb job, and -- in thinking and relating to our joint-force partners. And we've gone through some of that, and I can't emphasize how much how excited I am about the things that are going into Moody Air Force Base, expressly because Fort Benning, Fort Stewart, and Fort Polk are right there in an arc around that base, where we will be able to work, on a day-to-day basis, with the Army as it evolves the concept of maneuver warfare from what used to be armored and infantry. That's huge stuff. We'll be with them as a joint partner in their transformation of the -- of what it means to do land warfare. So, I can't say enough about that.

In terms of the homeland defense, I guess I'd better -- I'll leave that for some of the experts. And the world's greatest expert on ranges, for your test and training ranges, is Fred Pease here.

General Jumper: Let me just add a couple of examples, if I might, sir. The Joint Strike Fighter, we'll put in joint training at Eglin Air Force Base if the proposals are

approved. That will put the Joint Strike Fighter training for the Air Force, the Marine Corps, and the United States Navy in one place. And it's conducive to that, because it has several auxiliary fields for the Marines to do their vertical takeoff-and-landing stuff, multiple runways for the Navy to practice its multiple circuits, as it does, and for training in large strike packages. All of it is accommodated in that one place. It is unique in its structure, and we're lucky we had it, but we're able to accommodate it there.

We've located C-17s in close proximity to Stryker units, future Stryker units, so that as we develop this plan, we'll have the mobility for those Stryker units in close proximity to those ground forces.

And Moody Air Force Base. While Moody Air Force Base retains it self as an Air Force base, it is put there right there with the Army Maneuver School and the other Active Duty units that are right around that local area for the A-10 to be able to accommodate all of them.

So, the idea of trying to put all of that at one place wasn't very practical, but to put it in a central place became then essential to joint training, even though the base itself, when you look at it, may not look joint.

The headquarters at Shaw Air Force Base, as Fort

McPherson closes and the Army headquarters for U.S. Central Commands joins the Air Force headquarters of U.S. Central Command at Shaw Air Force Base, now you have a synergy of these two headquarters which represent the operational level of war in United States Central Command. They're together for the first time. I think it's going to be of tremendous benefit.

Pilot training. We already have joint pilot training. It's not a part of BRAC. It's not already -- it's not visible. We've already done that, joint pilot training between the Air Force, the Navy, and the Marine Corps.

And, of course, in the future, we will see the joint unmanned conventional air system, the JUCAS station, that is a part of the changes at Holloman Air Force Base, which will be a joint system again. And those are a few examples, as we think into the future, that I think are robust examples of how we are probably more joint, in many ways, than we appear; certainly more joint than we have ever been, by order of magnitude. We're watching these improvements take place, sir.

Mr. Dominguez: Gary, why don't you deal with some homeland defense, and then we'll let Fred talk about the test and training ranges.

General Heckman: As far as the relationship with

homeland defense, we work directly, at the classified level, with USNORTHCOM, Northern Command, and asked them what their specific areas of interest were. And based on those, we made sure that we included their requirements in that best combination of bases that we ended up with in our recommendations. We had them look at it, grade our paper after they were finished, and they were quite satisfied with it.

There was an earlier question on enclaves. Part of the reason that we would leave small elements at bases that we're leaving, they're losing their flying mission, is because of the dual role that the Secretary pointed out -- The state role and the federal role. And that way, by leaving those small enclaves there, into a smaller footprint on those installations, we maintain the relationship with the community, we retain in the state some dual-use forces, which we use in the AEF and that the governors can use for their Title 32 responsibilities. Two examples from homeland defense.

Mr. Dominguez: And ranges?

Mr. Pease: There was a joint cross-service group, the education and training joint cross-service group, that was chartered to look at all ranges, both test and training. I will tell you that we believe, in the Air Force, that the

term "test and training range" -- because there are two stovepipes there -- is probably outdated. Testing and training are activities; they shouldn't be ranges. In other words, you have ranges where you conduct certain activities.

The Air Force's analytical process took a look at not only the quality of the range -- in other words, the way the range can support a particular type of mission -- but also the proximity of that range to the mission itself. So, if you were closer, that was better because of normal OPTEMPO, et cetera.

We worked really very closely with the joint cross-service group to make sure that we were not piling activities on each other, and also with the other services, especially areas like the Gulf of Mexico, the eastern coast of the United States, and in some parts of the western part of the United States.

But we took the ranges very seriously. You will see -- and the airspace, also -- potential to use places like the White Sands range, I will call it, for JUCAS in the future, as the Chief said, potential to link up places like Fallon and the Utah test and training range, and an east and west access to interoperate.

Many people are focusing on joint basing. And as Mr. Dominguez and General Jumper were saying, we also looked at

proximity for joint operations. Just having another service on your base does create some efficiencies. But having those forces, if you will, in operational proximity, one to another, allows you to interoperate on a day-to-day basis. We've been doing that in a lot of places already, and we have been for years. Oceana and Langley always train together. But we looked specifically this time to make sure we had that capability in this new lay-down.

Chairman Principi: General Hill?

General Hill: Thank you. I ought to know how to do this after doing this for so long, but I forget.

[Laughter.]

General Hill: Thank you, Mr. Dominguez and General Jumper and gentlemen.

A couple of questions. And I'd like to go to the Cannon issue and cover that in some detail and hear the rationale for the movement of the three squadrons in -- and also -- I'm going to beg my infantryman's -- ex-infantryman's mentality and ask you what the difference is between the blocks and why that was important to move those to other unit -- block units, rather than, say, combining them into a larger organization there and keeping Cannon open. Can you go into that a little bit for me, please?

General Jumper: Well, again, this is the product of

the analysis, and you'll be able to see the exact analysis.

And what the analysis showed us, as painful as it was at Cannon Air Force Base, is that the combination of factors there just made it not score as high as other bases for not only the F-16 mission, but for everything else that we analyzed. And it's a combination of environmental factors and other factors that go into the analysis.

So, the light blocks are just a matter of -- like you have with the Abrams tank, for instance, you've got different modification levels on that. And so, if you have a block 25, block 30, block 40-42, block 50 and 52 F-16s, just the subtle differences with regard to maintenance make it worth consolidating those as much as you possibly can just for ease of maintenance, not duplicating support equipment. In some cases, they have different kind of engines, so it's the difference between one-engine shop and two-engine shops. Those sorts of considerations go into it.

So, we were consolidating down to two operational F-16 bases at Shaw Air Force Base and at Hill Air Force Base, and you'll see the analysis, you'll see the deliberations, you'll see it all, but it was an analytically-based decision that came out the way it did.

Mr. Dominguez: Can I -- let me -- it goes back to what I said earlier about military value, right? And what we --

we looked at military value, and military value is driven by inherent attributes of a location, its physical plant. So geography, its proximity to high-volume airspace that you can use in the fighter business, for example, for aerial combat training. If it was looked at in terms of mobility base, it would be looked at as being, Are you close to a bunch of F-16s that you need to tank? Are you close to one of the deployment routes over the pond to get into the theaters of operation? So, these characteristics and attributes of the base -- weather, geography, et cetera -- were looked at.

Now, Cannon would score very high on weather, but the airspace that it has available to train in is not the best high-volume airspace available. And -- you know, so on -- in terms of fighters, when you did the mil-value calculation, it didn't score well. And, as General Jumper pointed out, well, then we evaluated across a whole different other -- of other missions, and it -- and where it scored is where it scored. You'll see that. And then when we poured the force structure in and bedded it down at the highest mil-value basis, and that's where Cannon emerged as the -- as a candidate for closure, because of that.

General Jumper: It's not that it's not good.

Mr. Dominguez: Right.

General Jumper: It's just in competition with everything else out there that --

General Hill: What were the environmental issues, General Jumper that you talked about?

General Jumper: Sir, I -- we will have to get into the analysis on that to get into the specifics. If you would take that for the record, I'd appreciate it.

General Hill: Okay.

General Jumper: I don't want to get anything wrong when I answer the question.

General Hill: Okay. Can I go back, then, to the issue of airspace and training value? Mr. Pease had just talked about linking different airspaces up together. And in my geographical mind, I can see that being right in the middle of all of those airspaces -- White Sands, the -- out at Hill, all of those together. Talk to me about that a little bit.

Mr. Pease: Absolutely. If -- as Mr. Dominguez said, we have two -- in this lay-down, we have two operational F-16 bases, one at Hill Air Force Base and one at Shaw, in South Carolina. Both of those -- and also looking at Cannon. Cannon has very good airspace. It's a good base. We don't have any bad bases, really; just too many bases right now. But if you look at the volume of airspace,

especially over-water airspace that you have in -- at Shaw Air Force Base, the fact that they also have 9th Air Force, and you'll have ARSA headquarters there, also, and you look at the volume of airspace associated with the Utah test and training range, two million acres of land and all the airspace associated with it, the two volumes of airspace that they have, by comparison, shows that Cannon's is relatively small. Although Cannon's is excellent, it's small compared to those other two.

Mr. Dominguez: And then, you know, by building large concentrations of these forces, we ran out of force structure, you know, to -- we can bed 'em down in two bases.

General Hill: Okay. Assuming that the idea to combine the B-1 force into one base is correct -- and I don't have any problem with that -- why Dyess and not Ellsworth?

Mr. Pease: Same thing. They wouldn't -- if we were looking at consolidating -- we looked at both. Ellsworth couldn't accommodate the entire fleet. Second thing, although Ellsworth has a very good operating area, it's further away than Dyess's operating area. And, because of that, Dyess scores higher when you look at those two bases for that mission.

General Hill: In that same regard, does the repositioning and the consolidation of the tanker fleet also

play into that decision on putting them at Dyess?

General Jumper: No. I think we have enough distributed tanker infrastructure so that leaping off out of Dyess, depending on whether you're going east or west, remains a very manageable thing to do with the tanker bridges that are available.

General Hill: Okay. I have two other points. One point is that -- on the issue of combining Pope and Bragg into one, Lewis and McChord into one -- I had commanded Lewis. I always thought, at the time, "Gosh, I ought to have McChord, too." It was just a fence line between us. We could never get -- we could never bridge the cultural issues. We kind of tinged -- we touched on this a little bit with General Myers yesterday, and I'm sure this came up in your deliberations. How will we begin to get past those cultural issues? I think it's a long time overdue, but I also know that it's going to be some issues out there.

General Jumper: Well --

General Hill: Will you discuss it a little bit?

General Jumper: -- as we all know, there are many different uniforms represented at the table that -- we're all proud of the uniforms that we wear, and it's sometimes for different reasons. But we also have to make sure that our people understand that, especially on missions like

getting a maneuver unit deployed quickly, these are intricate operations that require daily practice. It's not something that you -- as we have proven many times -- that you go do on an ad hoc basis. It's the proficiency in the mission and being able to rapidly deliver maneuver forces wherever they have to be that has to take priority.

There are jokes, of course, about -- the standards of U.S. Air Force bases tend to be rather high. And, of course, we are proud of that, because we think it's very important to be able to retain, have a very high retention level in the United States Air Force. Why? Because we spent a whole lot of money to train very specialized people.

And so, there will be discussions, of course, on what joint standards will be, and the Air Force, as you can expect, will be trying to push the high end of that, and we think our colleagues will join us in that argument, because everybody likes -- seems to like the quality-of-life initiatives that are available to us, and we think we should all be to the same standard.

General Hill: Just -- and one other discussion point.

Yesterday and today, the Commissioners have -- and it's -- and I -- I think it's a growing discussion we'll continue to have, and it comes down to this issue. As you realign a base, and you bring that base down to essential bare bones,

you now have a community left with an installation and a base that they simply can't use. It would have been probably better for the community, intuitively, for it to close so that now I can begin to retool it, make something out of it, rather than, I've got it sitting there, but I can't deal with it.

The Congress, in -- what I'm saying to you is, I think we all need to begin to look for ways to effect that -- the Congress, in 1992, enacted a bill called the Armament Retooling and Manufacturing Support Initiative. And what that was, was the ability to privatize parts of munitions plants. While the plant was still going on, you could have parts of it, underutilized, retooling. I think that we'll probably need to do some of that to better help these communities and the bases.

Mr. Dominguez: Sir, let me make a point. In these realignments, we've moved flying units out. We moved the fence line back. I mean, so that, in most of the cases, the airfield is now turned over to the local community. So, we retreat, in terms of the federal footprint, into a small area with adequate concerns for force protection, but we're not hanging onto ramp space and flight line that we don't need.

Now, we have plans and arrangements in place to be able

to get back into places that we need to -- you know, to fly air sovereignty alert, but we do that, in fact, today from commercial airports in some parts of the country.

So, we are bringing back the fence line to be able to cede real property -- usable, real property, to the local communities.

Is that right?

Mr. Pease: Yes, absolutely, sir. And you will see, as we go through the details of this with your staff, that many of the costs associated with bringing the footprint down are associated with getting away from those facilities and allowing those facilities for more beneficial reuse, especially as it -- for Guard units and Reserve units that are on public airports, that are operating out of public airports.

General Hill: Okay. I'm sorry, I do have one more, Mr. Chairman. Can I do one more?

And it goes to the Guard issue. As you developed your recommended lists, you solicited information and advice from the TAGs, but you did not tell the TAGs the final scoring, nor the -- what was going to be closed, until they found out, like we found out.

General Jumper: That's correct.

General Hill: Have you already gotten calls from some

of the TAGs that said, "I'm not so sure that that was good idea"?

General Jumper: I have not personally talked to any of the TAGs, but General Danny James and General Blum have, I know, talked to TAGs, and I can tell you that certainly not all of them are happy. But we also want to point out that many of the TAGs and the Guard units out there have raised their hand to participate in this transition of missions to the things that are more in demand than those that are less in demand. And we have -- so, I think that we're marching along on the road to progress here, and, as I -- as we said before, as we draw these down, and we get our timetables right, we're going to have to make sure that the emerging missions blend properly with those who are drawing down, so that we keep that balance between Air Force Reserve, Air National Guard, and Active Duty that we have, that is a part of this plan.

Chairman Principi: General Newton?

General Newton: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And to the Secretary and Chief, to the other staff, thank you very much for sharing this time with us this morning.

As you can see, because we don't have that detailed data that you speak of, we -- our questions are probing some areas that we are concerned about, and we are hoping that we

can get that data pretty quickly here, as well as have the opportunity to engage with your staff, who went through this detail analysis, so that we can better understand that, as well.

Following on with the line of questioning that we had referenced, the Guard and Reserve, it is our understanding, from previous testimony also, that even though we are making some changes at various Guard and Reserve locations, that you're planning to -- that very few of these will actually be closed down, because you will bring additional missions back to those units. Can you comment on that? Do we have that about right?

Mr. Dominguez: Well, about right, but let me -- maybe a different spin. General Jumper and I are committed to try and preserve the end strength, the manpower levels, in the Guard and Reserve as a result of BRAC actions. So, when you move a C-130 squadron out of a unit, and you collapse it into one location so there's larger units, and you get efficiencies, and part of those efficiencies are some manpower savings. It's our intent to work with the TAGs, and the governors, and the leaders in the Congress, to re-mission those Guard and Reserve assets. And, particularly, that's a part of our homeland defense strategy, as General Heckman was -- pointed out. Those dual-use forces are

critical to the governors' ability to defend the homeland. So, we needed to make sure that the governors had viable, robust, well-trained state militias, state forces, the National Guard, available to them.

Now, when we -- going back to this idea of enclaves, we're going to turn facilities over to the local communities, and we're going to get back into a smaller footprint at places where we've sited a mission. But, in other cases, it's up to the governor and TAGs, working with us, and the nature of the new mission, again, about where they put those forces.

So, the recommendations you have, where we're realigning a base, we're moving the fence line back, we're turning that other stuff over to the community -- new missions, new problem -- the governors are involved in where those things go.

Is that -- did I answer your question?

General Newton: Yes. Yes. Thank you.

You just shared with us how there are certain parts of the joint discussion that were taken off of the service -- the specific service plates and put into the joint integration group, but there are other parts that you worked on directly from an -- in this case, an Air Force standpoint, and then brought that to the joint level for

some type of integration. Can you comment on that a little bit? And are you comfortable and satisfied that you got maximum jointness out of that -- during that process?

Mr. Dominguez: Yeah, I'm -- I think probably I'd let Fred or Gary deal with that, but I'm very comfortable with the joint product that we have here.

General Heckman: There were several levels in the corporate structure. There was an infrastructure steering group on which the vice chief of staff of the Air Force, the other vice chiefs, and the installation chiefs sat. They were the reporting body for the joint cross-service groups.

But as the services, we also got to sit in on that and have that interchange of ideas.

The chairman of the infrastructure steering group, the ISG, Mr. Wynne, who was here yesterday, was the secretariat for the next-higher level group on which the Secretary and the Chief, their counterparts, sat, chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense. The chairman was also in on that. So, there was a lot of rigor for the joint cross-service groups as it moved up through our filter. There was a lot of rigor in our process as it moved up the joint filter.

General Newton: Okay.

General Jumper: And I think that the result is quite satisfactory. I mean, I think you can always argue that you

could do more, but what we tried to do is make sure that we were doing what was truly transformational, like at Eglin Air Force Base, and not venturing into what was novel that might be counterproductive to training and the like. And so, I think we got that balance pretty well. And when you see the data, you'll be able to reach your own conclusions. But I think -- I'm satisfied that we did a good job.

General Newton: In your opening statement, you spoke quite a bit about these emerging missions, as well as forces in the future that may be returning; and, therefore, you left and added in some reserve infrastructure for that. Is there a way to quantify that, just for that piece? Particularly, I'm concerned and maybe interested in how you would determine what may be possibly becoming back from overseas. And is there a way to quantify how much infrastructure you left to do that with?

Mr. Dominguez: Yes, sir. I think Fred, here, can do that for you. I want to make clear we're not -- there aren't any plans to bring Air Force forces back.

General Newton: Got that.

Mr. Dominguez: And so, we didn't do that, you know, kind of a specific action of: How do I bed down this unit from USAFE? But what we did do is leave -- we didn't fill up every parking space, you know, and every ramp across the

United States Air Force. So, I think it's about 20 percent surplus.

Mr. Pease: But, sir, we -- at the beginning of BRAC, as the Secretary of Defense said yesterday, it's kind of hard to give you a single number to try to categorize excess in a lot of different areas. But just to give you a couple of numbers, we started with about eight and a half million square yards of excess ramp space. That's down to about five and a half million now. So, we reduced almost 40 percent the excess ramp space that we had. By the same token, we had about 45 million square feet of excess space. We're down to nine and a half million now, square feet.

General Newton: In buildings.

Mr. Pease: In buildings. And we also took a look at -- it wasn't just a -- again, like I said before, it wasn't just about having the ramp space available, the buildings available; we also had to operate our forces, too, so we took -- made sure that there was that -- we captured that symbiotic relationship between the training infrastructure, the testing infrastructure that was out there, and the bases, themselves. And we looked at all that together and measured that together.

General Newton: Okay, thanks.

Chief, with reference to these emerging missions that

you spoke about -- and particularly the combat-support side of the business -- if we took the -- and watched the headlines today, obviously we see a lot that's going on in the war areas and the combat areas with reference to our ground forces, and naturally so. We don't say -- may not see a whole lot about what's going on with the Air Force, for instance. Can you share with us how this relationship of those emerging missions that you see relate to specifically what the Air Force may be doing in places like Iraq and Afghanistan today.

General Jumper: Correct. Well, we have just under 30,000 airmen deployed today in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. And, in that, we have, today, 14 bases. It's 13 or 14 bases that we have open in support of that mission, and each one of those requiring some certain level of mission support. We're supporting about 150 missions a day over Iraq, and some 50 to 75 over Afghanistan, as well as the ongoing mobility effort, which is hundreds of sorties of day, internationally, and all of the air refueling and global support that goes along with those, as well, each one of those requiring some level of mission support that heretofore has largely been done within the Active Duty.

One of the lessons learned from Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom is this need for us to be able to robust our

mission-support capability, and that's what we're going to -- that's one of the emerging missions on my list there, that we need to participate with the total force in robusting that capability, and that's what part of this plan is.

General Newton: Thank you.

Mr. Dominguez: Let me jump in, too, with -- on the emerging missions; in particular, as it relates to the Guard and Reserve. We're seeing a lot of -- there's -- there are all kinds of UAVs flying in Iraq and Afghanistan today. And one of the interesting things about UAVs is, you don't have to be there to fly 'em. Okay? So, you can actually do the work back home. So this is a great mission to look at, in terms of our Reserve Component people, because they can fight from where they live. They don't have to deploy, we don't have to mobilize them, they can work schedules to be able to sustain the ops. You can do the same thing with about -- a lot of the intelligence, that it's collected there, it's piped back to ground stations back here in CONUS we can figure out what it tells us and get that stuff back to the commander with the same speed as if you were there. So those kind of missions -- now, there are a bunch of missions that we need our partners in the Guard and Reserve engaged in that's an emerging mission.

I mean, the tanker air bridge -- there have been tanker air bridges up across the globe continuously since late September of 2001. I mean, that is just amazing. I mean, it -- the United States Air Force, in partnership -- the total force, is doing that, and nobody even notices it. But the capability that's represented there is just awesome, and the achievement of the men and women in the Air Force total force who are doing that is just astounding. They have enabled, through that quiet, selfless service, this entire joint fight across the globe. And that mission -- so that's one of the critical enabling missions that we'll have in the future.

General Newton: Very fine. Thank you very much, gentlemen.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Principi: Mr. Skinner?

Mr. Skinner: Thank you very much.

I have several questions. One is your approach to -- and I'm not -- I guess it seems to make a lot of sense, but you're getting out of a lot of lease space with a lot of command facilities, and you're moving them to Andrews. Do you need a BRAC to do that? Why couldn't you just do that as part of the normal authorization or appropriation process?

Mr. Dominguez: Sir, I think the answer to your question is that --

Mr. Skinner: Put aside the political considerations of what might be involved.

Mr. Dominguez: No, I don't think that we required a BRAC to do that; but certainly the BRAC, because of --

Mr. Skinner: I understand.

Mr. Dominguez: -- intellectual --

Mr. Skinner: I understand.

Mr. Dominguez: -- capital assembled, helped us think through that in a --

Mr. Skinner: Yeah. No, I understand why the BRAC process might facilitate that, but I just was questioning that.

As I understand it, moving the B-1 fleet, it's your position or your -- the results at Ellsworth does not have the structure to handle a consolidated B-1 wing. Is that correct?

Mr. Dominguez: Right. Fred --

Mr. Skinner: I think I -- that's what I heard. Is that right?

Mr. Dominguez: They couldn't -- you can't bed down the whole force --

Mr. Skinner: That's what I --

Mr. Dominguez: -- at Ellsworth.

Mr. Skinner: All right. And Dyess, you can, by moving out the other aircraft that are there?

Mr. Dominguez: Yes.

Mr. Skinner: By my count -- and this is with limited information -- you're retiring 87 or more F-15s, sixteen F-16s, thirty-nine 130s, a few 135s and some Warthogs. What are you going to replace those aircraft with? Or is it -- and --

Mr. Dominguez: Well, the -- in the fighter recapitalization plan, F/A-22 and the Joint Strike Fighter -

Mr. Skinner: Okay.

Mr. Dominguez: -- are the platforms. Now, we'll be maintaining F-15Es through the -- this period. You know, so -- but the modern platforms, the ones that are on the books now --

Mr. Skinner: Okay. So these phase-outs and retirements are over a period of time as those aircraft come online, is that correct?

General Jumper: That's correct. And they're not all replaced on a one-for-one basis.

Mr. Skinner: That's what I --

General Jumper: But, yes, sir.

Mr. Skinner: But the -- so the -- it would be your idea that the squadrons that you've now assigned and consolidated, the F-15s and the F-16s, in particular, but particularly the F-15s, the Guard and Reserve squadrons you've assigned those to would then take over those new strike aircraft, the JSF and the 22?

General Jumper: The missions that would be assigned to them could be one of those or one of these emerging missions that I talked about --

Mr. Skinner: All right.

General Jumper: -- not necessarily a flying mission.

Mr. Skinner: Okay.

General Jumper: Yes, sir.

Mr. Skinner: And then the emerging missions and the unmanned would be assuming that.

When you look at the cost savings, does that include -- are you including in there the fact that you're reducing the flying hours and maintaining -- the maintenance cost of over a hundred aircraft, or is that not in there? In other words, if I took out the fact that you could reduce in place, to some degree, how much of a savings that you're proposing is directly related to the savings for not maintaining, crewing, and flying the aircraft that you're reducing?

General Heckman: If it is retired in -- well, the short answer is zero -- if it is a retirement dictated to us by the force-structure plan, we can claim neither the cost nor the savings of doing those, and we --

Mr. Skinner: Okay.

General Heckman: -- do not, in our recommendations.

Mr. Skinner: So, all of these savings are basically in addition to what savings you would gather by implementing the force-structure plan that is currently in place, or will be in place shortly.

General Heckman: That is correct.

Mr. Skinner: And the force-structure plan that will be in place -- that is in place now, and will be modified somewhat once the Quadrennial is done, is -- that's pretty consistent with what -- do you believe that'll be pretty consistent with what we have here in your basing requirements?

General Heckman: That's correct, sir. With enough latitude in the basing requirements to be able to accommodate any reasonable changes to that force structure.

Mr. Dominguez: And that force-structure plan was worked through the joint staff and the office of the Secretary of Defense, so it's not just an Air Force plan.

Mr. Skinner: No, I understand.

And, finally, I'm interested in the structuring of the Air Force as it relates to the Reserves -- and maybe, Mr. Secretary, this goes to your area of direct responsibility, or General Jumper's -- of the Air Guard versus Reserve squadrons, and the balance between the two. It looks to me like, in some cases, you're reducing Air Force Reserve squadrons, and the Guard continues to pick up the bulk. Is there -- what are the balances and decision points, versus how many Reserve squadrons you have, versus -- and, by the way, that may not relate directly -- as you look at the other support, you have the Reserves doing 130s and things like that the Guard doesn't do. But I thought that they basically did a little bit of both. You -- both the Reserves and the Guard squadrons -- and the Air Guard squadrons both man most of your aircraft, in one form or another. What's the balance you draw as to whether this should be a Reserve squadron versus a Air Guard squadron?

It would appear to me as -- having been both in the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard -- that the -- it would be easier, from -- to have Air Reserves, rather than Air Guard. And I'd be interested in -- putting aside that the Air Guard has, obviously, a great tradition of serving our nation in four wars now, what are your thoughts on that?

Because it looks to me like you've -- you're -- the balance

has swing a little bit in favor of the Air Guard squadrons.

But I guess -- I see General --

General Heckman: I'll be glad to reply.

Mr. Skinner: All right.

General Heckman: In the Air Force, our Guard and Reserve train to the same standards we are. If you're getting refueled in the air, chances are it's an Air Guard or Air Reserve squadron that's doing that. When we look at the before-picture and the after-picture of the manpower mix among the components, it's virtually the same. It's within one or two percentage points. What you will find is, in the weapons systems that the Guard now flies, primarily the fighter weapons systems and the C-130s, those are the ones that are most in need of resizing; whereas, the Reserve units tend to be affiliated with our large mobility aircraft, like the C-17 and the C-5, which are, to a greater extent, right-sized today.

Mr. Dominguez: So, that was -- remember, I had talked about a legacy of decisions from the past. And so, a lot of this was dealing with that, cleaning it up. Now, I -- but I think -- now, you guys correct me if I'm wrong -- but that within the combat Air Force and the mobility Air Force, we retained essentially the same mix -- Active, Guard, and Reserve -- the balance in those --

Mr. Skinner: Okay. So, the fact that what -- your force structure is requiring more restructuring in the Guard than it does in the Air Reserve, probably, as far as this BRAC.

Mr. Dominguez: Right. But we ended up with the same percentage --

Mr. Skinner: Okay.

Mr. Dominguez: -- of Guard flying fighters as the -- as we started with.

Mr. Skinner: Okay.

Mr. Dominguez: So, the percentage distribution of our fighter force structure into Guard, Reserve, and Active stayed the same --

Mr. Skinner: Okay. Is it --

Mr. Dominguez: -- pre-BRAC and post-BRAC.

Mr. Skinner: -- is it not more -- and maybe I'm -- I'll rephrase the question. It would appear to me that having Reserve and Guard as two different structures and with two different reporting structures, an ideal situation would be to have a -- especially as it relates to the Air Force -- you know, one structure. You train to the same. If we're really going to jointness, why aren't we going to, really, a joint command and one -- just -- either one Reserve or one Guard, and get rid of double -- in fact, it's

50 infrastructures, plus one Reserve structure -- 51 infrastructures. I -- you may not want to wade into this, unless your --

Mr. Dominguez: No, that's fine.

Mr. Skinner: -- appropriation bill has already been passed, but --

Mr. Dominguez: No, the National Guard is a constitutional force. The governors --

Mr. Skinner: All right.

Mr. Dominguez: -- have the ability to raise a militia to defend -- to do their mission within the state.

Mr. Skinner: And that was formed -- and that history goes back into the 1800s and the state militias, where -- you know, and I think that would have been maybe more -- even more relevant as it relates to the Army. But I'm now looking at -- you know, state militia requirements, generally, do not require F-16s and Warthogs.

Mr. Dominguez: Right. But the -- and the governors don't use the F-16 mission, but they use the trained, capable people. These are leaders, these are, you know, high-value assets that they can turn to in a time of crisis, and they can do, you know, virtually anything that governor asks them to. They train to do those kind of things that the governor asks them to. And we felt, in the Air Force,

that it was important for us to stay a part of that.

The homeland defense is part of our mission, and partly how we're going to deal with it is by making sure that there are trained, ready, capable --

Mr. Skinner: Okay.

Mr. Dominguez: -- air assets, airmen, available to governors in time of need.

Mr. Skinner: Okay. Well, as you -- we'll take that as a -- we could delve into it further, but we're not going to do that today.

The air defense and your work with homeland security -- and you've talked about a deployment in here of aircraft to meet -- for example, you're moving aircraft out of Richmond, you're moving them to Langley, but you're also moving them to the West. I think you're moving them over to Des Moines or somewhere in the Midwest. Is that plan -- is this plan consistent? And does that consistency require deployment of cap-cover aircraft all over the United States, versus high metropolitan areas, if you know?

Mr. Dominguez: Sir, we have sized and looked at our structure to be able to support the air sovereignty alert missions that NORTHCOM said, "This is what you guys have to be positioned to cover." We don't have to do that with a permanent party -- full-time-stationed squadron around every

one of those sites. We just have to be able to get there, have something nearby. And we've looked at that lay-down very carefully. And I want to point out, again, that today we routinely move units from one part of the country and deploy them as -- you know, to another part of the country to pull alert there. So, we can move the airplanes around as long as we have a place to operate from. That's -- again, that's part of the expeditionary Air Force, and it's being expeditionary inside the continental United States.

Mr. Skinner: And one final question. I think it's the 130J that was up for cancellation and is now, as of last week, I guess, from the supplemental, back on the -- but if you can -- if you assume that -- this plan you have -- assume that the 130J's in here, or not in here, or -- if you want to answer.

General Heckman: We updated with the latest program budget decision. I will point out, in the case of the C-130s, the vast majority of that new force structure is to replace force structure that is wearing out, rather than adding to it.

Mr. Skinner: Yeah. But the aircraft that's adding to it is the 130J, right?

Mr. Dominguez: Right.

Mr. Skinner: And that's the aircraft that -- the

debate still goes on.

Mr. Dominguez: Right, but if --

Mr. Skinner: I'd love to get into it, but I'm not.

Mr. Dominguez: Yeah. The number of C-130s is static. It's the mix inside of that that will change.

Mr. Skinner: Okay. Thank you.

Chairman Principi: General Turner?

General Turner: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And good morning, again, gentlemen.

While there are some very interesting things underway to modernize military medicine, and I can certainly appreciate that, there's some pretty dramatic changes in most, if not all, of your designated medical centers. And we are going to see the medical joint service -- joint cross-service group tomorrow, and I will have some questions for them, as well, but -- and I probably should allow as how I've served in many of those medical centers, been the chief nurse at Wilford Hall Medical Center, the flagship of the Air Force medical service, and also previously served as the director of nursing services for the Air Force.

That aside, today I'm very interested in getting your take on the recommended San Antonio Regional Medical Center concept on the BAMC campus in San Antonio, which pulls in a major portion of the existing inpatient workload and staff

over to the new expanded BAMC campus.

My questions -- I have a number of them -- but my real question is, Will this new entity ever really be viewed as anything more than a bigger and better BAMC? Please share your views on this.

And I would also be interested in knowing, was this recommendation wholeheartedly endorsed? And what will you, as the Air Force leadership, do to ensure that this really is a joint military medical operation in this new entity?

Mr. Dominguez: Well, let's see, let me -- I'll start it, and I hope I get -- or I address your question.

One of the areas within the Department of Defense in which we are -- we have surplus capacity is in our hospitals, in our inpatient medical treatment facilities. We were a much larger force when that infrastructure was built, and we're much smaller today. And so, the carrying costs of operating those hospitals is quite significant. And the -- we're not able to use them efficiently, because we can't get the patient throughput for those things.

So, this BRAC allowed us to be more efficient, to collapse surplus capacity and put our medical treatment facilities where the population is available to it and -- so that you can get to the kind of throughput that will generate efficient operations in those areas.

We've been on that journey, actually, for a while in the Air Force, trying to move to communities -- or to clinics from hospitals where we don't have population that can support the hospital anymore.

And the other thing that's happened is, we've -- in the last several years, tremendous partnerships with the communities outside of our gates, so that a lot of the more sophisticated treatment that we can't do in our clinics, that used to be hospitals and it was too prohibitively costly for us to maintain, you know, we can now do that downtown in very novel and innovative arrangements between the medical communities in the Armed Forces and those in the surrounding communities. It's a fabulous partnership.

And so, that experience and those kind of concepts were taken into by the joint cross-service group as they realign.

Now, as we were going through this journey, as with every part of the Department of Defense since the enactment of Goldwater-Nichols, we have become, every day, more a joint force and more of a joint team. And the medics are no exception to that. There's a lot of crosstalk, a lot of dialogue, a lot going on there, of those people working together.

You know, I participate in that as often as I'm able, as the Assistant Secretary for Manpower and Reserve Affairs,

supporting increasing jointness in our ability to service. Because, again, if you look at the situation we had in San Antonio and the situation we have here in the D.C. metro area, too much facility, because we each maintained our own; but, if you put those together, we can get a real world-class operation out of it. So we'll have one up here in the northern -- or in the National Capital Region, and we'll have a world-class joint medical facility, which airmen will be stationed inside that facility, working inside that facility, as coequal partners with our joint -- with the joint-service teams.

I'm very optimistic about what we're going to be able to do.

General Jumper: We will have to defer to the joint cross-service group to -- as to the quality of care that's going to be available. And I have every reason to believe that we're not going to suffer in that regard. I go to Wilford Hall and to the Brooks Army Medical Center to visit our wounded, and I see them being transferred back and forth, where you have a different -- you have eye-care specialists at Wilford Hall, and more of a burn specialty over at BAMC, and they are going back and forth. It -- when you see it, it strikes you as rather inefficient, when, indeed, the BAMC facility is really newer, it's got plenty

of space. If we want to keep our teaching capacity that we already have, it's hard to justify doing it in both places because of the rest of the infrastructure that goes along with the teaching facility. And so, it seems to me this makes sense. And we'll be watching this closely.

My mother is at Air Force Village, too. She will not return my phone calls. She's not very happy about this, but --

[Laughter.]

General Jumper: -- we're -- this, again, is a tough decision, but the right thing to do.

General Turner: I don't disagree with anything that you said. I think, in the general sense, beneficiaries in San Antonio are very used to the notion of traveling back and forth, depending on what their particular need is.

Probably the biggest issue that's come up in the San Antonio area, though, has been the loss of the level-one trauma capability at Wilford Hall Medical Center, which is on the south side of town. And in this particular town, for those of you who are not familiar with it, they've enjoyed the luxury of three level-one trauma centers in the city, thanks to Wilford Hall and BAMC, as well as University Hospital.

Most towns are lucky to have one trauma center, you

know, and they know that. But this seems to have come as a great shock to the community. And that's probably the thing that I hear the most outrage about, or at least that's been expressed directly to me, and a lot of people have my e-mail address. So, I'm hearing similar things as you're hearing from your mom.

The BAMC Trauma Center will be -- that capacity will be expanded, and people will find ways, I suspect, to get there and utilize it.

One of the things that I have found really interesting about the relationship in the military medical community in the San Antonio area, in particular, but it's not unique to there, has been the interchange of ideas, of staff, good cooperation, and all of the things that you've mentioned. I think that one of the questions that people serving currently, and probably those of us who have served in prior years, would have as they watch this scenario unfold, as we are -- and the cooperation probably, among the medics, might be better than any other group -- but the question that they're beginning to ask is, Is this the first step to going beyond working together and becoming one military medical service?

Mr. Dominguez: We still have different missions. As you well know, the Air Force medics, you'll find them on

airplanes bringing back the critically wounded -- as part of small teams that are taking care of the critically wounded as they are air-evac'd across the ocean. As you well know, the soldiers that are injured in the field might wake up 24 hours later and find themselves at one of the hospitals here in this area or all the way even back to San Antonio, depending on their injury. So, the missions that we have that go along with expeditionary rapid evacuation, those skills are still pretty unique airmen skills, as well as our ability to deploy forward in the expeditionary medical hospitals, as we have in Bilad, and to be able to take that first stage of trauma and wounded and do what we do so very well. Matter of fact, when I was over there in February, most of the people there were from Wilford Hall that -- there were Air Force people doing that mission. It's a different mission than the Navy -- I'm sorry -- the Army and the Marine medics are doing in the forward locations.

So, the sets of skills, I think, are still quite unique, but the ability to train for them is something that we have to pay attention to and make sure that those skills don't atrophy. But I think that there's still quite a difference there, and we're taking advantage of the things like -- again, as you well know, look at how many pharmacists we have in the Air Force versus how many you

need for an expeditionary Air Force. We need to take advantage of those overages, those overages where people in uniforms that evolved over the years to take care of very large stateside requirements, but we're well in excess of what we need for expeditionary requirements. So, some of those skills can transfer to people not in uniform. We pay attention to those skills that have to be in uniform. We trade them for the uniqueness that airmen bring to the fight. And I don't -- I think we can do that with this existing structure. But we'll have to pay attention to it, I agree.

General Turner: As they used to say on TV, General Jumper, good answer.

[Laughter.]

General Turner: Thank you very much.

Chairman Principi: I thank you.

As several of my colleagues have noted, I believe that when we receive the Air Force volume, we'll be able to see your military-value calculations so to have a better analytical idea or basis for some of your decisions -- Ellsworth, Cannon, and some of the others.

And I'd like to ask a question about Cannon. I notice that, General Jumper, you've testified in the past about the ever-increasing demand for supersonic airspace, both

vertically and horizontally, the relationship to where the aircraft are to where the supersonic airspace is. And I believe that -- I think it's called, in New Mexico, training initiative is pretty close to obtaining that supersonic airspace and whether that was part of your consideration.

Also, I know, Mr. Secretary, you testified about the important environmental considerations that go into this analysis on BRAC decisions. You know, at Cannon you have wide-open space, you don't have any encroachment. Luke, you have a base that's being squeezed in. You fly over large metropolitan areas with, I'm sure, heavy bomb loads. Just curious as to -- how were those two factors -- those kinds of factors taken in and making the decision that we should close Cannon and send a squadron to Shaw, where, as you indicated, Mr. Pease, they fly over water and train? Well, is it more important to be training over water or is it more important to be training over supersonic airspace in a place like over New Mexico, over Cannon? Can you kind of comment?

General Jumper: Well, let me just start and say, first of all, we have no bad bases. That's the first enduring principle. Second of all, this is an extremely tough personal blow to me, just like it is to the community.

And it's -- the data that we use was certified and auditable data that was of a date certain, and that's the

data that everybody had to use for all calculations. So, future supersonic airspace was -- even though we are aware, and we have been aware, for a long time, of the efforts that are ongoing, the volume of supersonic airspace that is available today, which, I think I have it right, is essentially above 30,000 feet, was in the calculation, but not the expanses of supersonic airspace or the increases that might be available in the future.

And in the kind of supersonic airspace that we're talking about that are over-the-water ranges, we're talking about hundreds of miles that you're able to set up with supersonic setups and very high closure rates and go supersonic all the way down, if you need to, and you don't have to be in a position where you're keeping one eye on your mach meter and another eye on your altitude to make sure that you're -- because when these airplanes go supersonic that we fly these days, you can't tell unless you're looking at the airspeed indicator.

So, it's a -- it becomes a training artificiality, then, to have to pay close attention to that as you come out of the space or the altitude or across a boundary or a border where you're no longer allowed to be supersonic, becomes more of a consideration than than the tactics and the training techniques you're trying to impart on your

students.

And when you compare what is at Cannon, which is good, with what you have over some of our over-water ranges, which is expansive and not limited, that's where the competition of analysis favors the larger ranges.

Chairman Principi: The New Mexico training initiative was taken into consideration, if -- or was not?

General Jumper: It was not, sir. It was --

Chairman Principi: Was not.

General Jumper: -- it was certified data. You all have --

Chairman Principi: All right.

Mr. Pease: That's an initiative that we're very well aware of, but it was not completed, as General Jumper said.

At a certain point in time, we had to measure everything, because we have ongoing operations all the time. So, we froze a datapoint, if you will, and measured from that. And although the supersonic airspace that does exist in and around Cannon was taken into consideration, this new initiative was not.

Chairman Principi: Was the encroachment issue taken into consideration at other bases?

General Jumper: Yes, sir.

Chairman Principi: That was all analyzed as part of --

okay.

General Jumper: It's all part of the analysis you'll be able to see, sir, and examine in great detail.

Chairman Principi: Just one quick question on the Reserve/Guard issue. Mr. Secretary, you testified that recruitment should not be an issue at these receiving stations. However, are you willing to sacrifice retention of the existing Guard and Reserve personnel? I mean, you have a lot of air crews and -- I think, as Mr. Bilbray rightfully pointed out -- and maintenance people, technicians, who may not be able to go from Reno to Little Rock. Are you prepared to lose a lot of these people in the Guard and Reserve? I know you can recruit new people, but it seems that you've got a great talented base out there, and -- you know, pilots can move, because they can jump in a -- I guess, get in a jumpseat aboard a commercial airline and get to their base for training, but how does an E-3, E-4, E-5 do that, and what kind of message does that send? And are you prepared to -- are you assuming a decrease in your end strength?

Mr. Dominguez: Our plan that -- General Jumper and I both committed to try and preserve the end strength in the Guard and Reserve -- our plan is that people -- spaces -- separate the faces from the spaces -- the spaces that are

surplus as a result of our BRAC actions are then spaces we're going to try and fill with emerging missions. We're committed to doing retraining of people to get them ready for these new skills. And so, there's a big retraining cost associated with some of these things, which has been included into the BRAC costing.

But where new and emerging missions get sited is a dialogue we'll have with Congress, with the TAGs, with the governors. It may or may not go to the place that lost it.

So, we do -- we are aware that a consequence of Base Realignment and Closure actions may be some individuals -- that's the faces part -- actually being left in a location where they are unable or unwilling, you know, to retrain or move to a place where there is a job. That's hard. It's painful. It's -- I wish it weren't so. But it is one of the inevitable consequences of this kind of action. And you have to weigh that cost on those individuals, along with everything we're doing to try and minimize and mitigate that, against the very, very real and substantial gains in military value, in operational readiness, in posturing the United States Air Force for the 21st century. I mean, those gains are real and substantial.

Chairman Principi: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

I'll open it up to my colleagues.

Admiral Gehman?

Admiral Gehman: Thank you, sir.

Two quick questions to follow up on the comments that were made here. Nellis Air Force Base. Nellis Air Force Base probably has a military value which is off the scale. And I notice that Nellis Air Force Base is a gainer, a rather substantial gainer -- 1450 people, and I didn't even count up the weapon systems. But the ramp at Nellis Air Force Base is very heavily encroached on the south and east sides. Does the cost of your plan here include any mitigation for how close the community is creeping into the fence line there?

Mr. Pease: No, sir. We have put things into place in the past to mitigate the -- especially the eastern departure -- those additions that you -- you're seeing are additions to make sure that Nellis is postured for follow-on fighter kind of activity, especially as it relates to aggressors and the capability of that base. But there are no costs, if you will, associated with the actions that we've already taken, put in place to mitigate those concerns.

Admiral Gehman: Thank you.

The second question is having to do with a statement earlier about excess capacity at medical treatment facilities. I assume that -- when you're talking about

excess capacity, that you're talking about your expeditionary requirements for the -- for your uniformed force, and not counting retirees and dependents. Because if you take a look at a 500-bed hospital, and you said we've only got a hundred beds filled -- of course, that's not how medicine is delivered today. Medicine is delivered in the outpatient world, and there are fairly long lines down there. But could you tell me a little bit about -- for the statement that you have excess capacity at medical treatment facilities?

Mr. Dominguez: It -- the excess capacity deals with all our beneficiaries. So at military treatment facilities you enroll a population, and the commander of that facility is responsible for the healthcare of that population. And so, if the -- if you've got labs, you know, nuclear radiology and MRIs and, you know, all that kind of thing, with your enrolled population, which is the Active Duty, the retired, and their families, and other people entitled -- like the Guard and Reserve, when they're mobilized -- right? -- just look at, you know, Can you maintain the throughput?

Can you keep the patients going through that facility sufficiently to defray the capital investment of those labs and that footprint and those beds. And that's a function of the healthcare need of the population where the hospital is

and the other things around it. So, like Brook and Wilford Hall, you know, sited together -- it's too much when you add the two of them together. Right? So that we're not using that stuff efficiently, so we downsize it.

Clinics? As you said, a lot of healthcare is now outpatient stuff, so you see a lot of movement to clinics in trying to shed this physical plant, which costs a bucket a month if we're not using it efficiently. So we need to get rid of it to be able to focus resources into the clinics and get the lines down.

General Jumper: And what you see in excess capacity is mostly inpatient excess capacity, and it's also net of what's available in the community, so that, again, this goes along with a standard set of rules. And, of course, when you get the medical people here, they'll be able to answer you in much more detail. But those are the high-level considerations.

Admiral Gehman: But your algorithm did not include pushing more people onto TRICARE.

Mr. Dominguez: No, sir.

Admiral Gehman: Okay. Thank you.

Chairman Principi: Mr. Coyle?

Mr. Coyle: Thank you.

Your -- between the Air Force and the joint cross-

service groups, you're making some important changes at Eglin Air Force Base, which, connected with Tyndall, is important for testing and training. Could you just describe what your thinking was behind those changes?

General Jumper: There again, that's -- the technical joint cross-service group will have the precise answers to that, but our objective is mainly a training mission at Eglin, and some of the testing capacity there does shift around to other places. And I believe Fred can probably help us with the details.

Mr. Pease: I'm not sure what -- all the details of that. The technical joint cross-service group can give you the details of the technical piece. As far as the JSF training -- is that what you were talking about?

Mr. Coyle: It's one of --

General Jumper: Well, the training ranges at Eglin.

Mr. Coyle: Yeah.

Mr. Pease: The education and training group proposed to bed down the initial Joint Strike Fighter training unit at Eglin. A lot of bases were looked at. Eglin had not only a very large range, as you know, in the East -- it's the largest one in the East, actually, about 400,000 acres -- but a large over-water hunk of airspace, if you will. It's close to the water, so the Navy can get the training

that they need, and close to other operations there, too.

We looked at it very closely, because we, as the service-member, wanted to make sure we could accommodate those joint cross-service group actions that were taking place, whether they were on our ranges or on our installations. And we believe that the synergy of that training, along with the possibility of being able to train as the Navy comes and conducts annual training, as they do in the Eglin area, also, they special operations that were also in that area have an awful lot of synergy.

We looked at capacity, and believe that that area is -- can easily accommodate that kind of training and testing activity.

Mr. Coyle: Thank you.

Chairman Principi: Mr. Hansen?

Mr. Hansen: I wonder if you could give me the rationale of the realignment of Mountain Home?

General Heckman: We were looking at Mountain Home. In the past, there had been a number of different weapons systems there. What we were looking for is for the most -- some of the most enduring fighter weapons systems -- where are the best places to place these F-15Es? When we did our analysis, we found those two locations to be Mountain Home and also Seymour Johnson Air Force Base, in North Carolina.

What we tried to do then is to clear out those other aircraft that were there that had different engine types, go to a more homogenous mix at Mountain Home to take advantage of the great training areas there and the relative lack of encroachment. We think there is room to grow there, and I think it'll be an excellent candidate for future weapons systems.

Mr. Hansen: You feel that's a great training range, when they're limited on when they can fly because of the slimy slug in the river? I've had more complaints from pilots on Mountain Home than anything in my years in Congress.

General Heckman: That is information that is not in the certified information on the availability of those ranges and the quality of those ranges. It's something -- certainly something we can explore during these hearings. Hadn't bumped into slimy slugs.

General Jumper: I've flown up there, sir. I -- maybe there's something new, but we'll certainly check in on that. That would be new news.

Mr. Hansen: I would be happy to furnish you with some information, if that's all right, General.

General Heckman: Yes, sir.

Chairman Principi: General Hill?

General Hill: One other final question. In the testimony today, and yesterday from General Myers, the Pope/Bragg consolidation came together. But in the report that we have, there's -- under -- listed under joint bases, there are seven distinct bases listed. Pope and Bragg is not one of them. Is it just a mistake, or what?

General Heckman: The joint cross-service group was looking at joint bases. And, in the beginning, Fort Bragg and Pope were going to be those joint bases. As we worked closely with the Army on this, we found out that the best course of action would be to actually sign over the real property at Pope Air Force Base to Fort Bragg, to the Army. And so, that joint-basing recommendation became moot, because it was a single base. It'll be Fort Bragg.

General Jumper: Just take the fence down. Take the fence down.

General Hill: Then explain the distinction to me, then, between Lewis and McChord. What's the difference between what you're doing on a joint basing with Lewis and McChord and what you just did at Pope and Bragg?

General Heckman: We will defer to the headquarter's joint cross-service group to correct our work, correct this to 100 percent, but what you find that's different is that at Pope Bragg you actually sign over the real property. The

joint-basing concept that applies to the others is taking advantage of those economies you could have with contracting services, utilities, and those things; primarily a contracting function, not so much making one base from two or three.

General Jumper: Sir, our command structure for the airlift mission stays there, because they do a lot more than just with the Army right there. A difference without a distinction, perhaps. I don't know.

General Hill: It certainly is to me.

[Laughter.]

General Hill: But we'll explore that with those guys, then. All right, thank you.

Chairman Principi: Mr. Skinner?

Mr. Skinner: I just have some questions about -- following up on the Chairman's questions about these Air National Guard stations where we've moved the aircraft and the crews out. And we don't have the information yet on what they started with, what was taken out, what was added, what was left. So, until we really get that information -- and that's not just from the Air Force, that's from everybody -- hopefully, we'll have that so we can see what's left.

But I just had a -- take Duluth, for instance. We've

moved the -- all the F-16s out of there, and we've left -- we've said we're going to use it on a, you know, conditional basis, aircraft -- you've left some support functions there.

I think that's also true at the facility at the Great Falls facility in Montana and a few others. Can you tell us what you've left behind? When you move these aircraft out of these Air Guard facilities, what facilities and the kind of people are left behind, and why it makes sense to leave them there, rather than moving them and consolidating them, as you are with the aircraft?

General Heckman: We have two situations with the National Guard bases. One is where the force-structure plan actually retires the aircraft that are going to be there. That is the case at Duluth. In the case of the BRAC, it is not a BRAC decision; we are allowing those to retire, as programmed. That manpower remains here, available for future uses in a programmatic way to follow onto BRAC.

Mr. Skinner: So --

General Heckman: In other --

Mr. Skinner: -- so the reason Duluth wasn't on the list, but it's in your book, is, you're retiring the aircraft, but you're keeping all of the people that were there, there, including, I assume, the pilots.

General Heckman: We are keeping all the manpower slots

there, that's correct, and correctly stated that they are being used right now as pilots.

Mr. Skinner: Right. But, I mean -- so, you're keeping the headcount there -- let's use headcount for --

General Heckman: Yes, sir.

Mr. Skinner: -- you're keeping the headcount there, but you're -- you don't -- you're keeping it there for future use.

General Heckman: That is correct.

Mr. Skinner: And you don't want to close that Air Guard facility in Duluth because of the northern -- I assume, as part of a defense posture, that that's a good staging area for the northern defense perimeter of the United States. But, you know --

General Heckman: In fact, Duluth does have an air sovereignty site located there. Now, in the case of the expeditionary combat support --

Mr. Skinner: Right. And there's a -- two or three facilities that that was left behind. How big is that? And what is their function? And why wouldn't it make sense to consolidate it with the others?

General Heckman: What we tended to do is, we had to consolidate the aviation. In most cases, at the Guard locations, there was expeditionary combat support that had

enduring missions as part of our deployments. They don't always deploy with the folks from Duluth. They would support Active, Guard, and Reserve units all over.

Mr. Skinner: So, those are really unrelated to the --

General Heckman: That's correct.

Mr. Skinner: -- squadrons or wings --

General Heckman: And so, what we --

Mr. Skinner: -- that are there.

General Heckman: -- tended to do was leave enclaves of those expeditionary combat support people, because they're fully trained, fully equipped, and fully engaged in our --

Mr. Skinner: Okay, thank you.

Chairman Principi: There being no further questions, I thank you, Mr. Secretary, General Jumper, gentlemen. Appreciate your testimony this morning.

[Whereupon, at 11:50 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]