



APPENDIX D

FORCE STRUCTURE PLAN

This appendix is taken verbatim from the Department of Defense Base Closure and Realignment Report, May 13, 2005 (Volume 1, Part 1 of 2, Chapter 2), with the exception of the “Battle Force Ships” statistics, which were subsequently revised by DoD.

INTRODUCTION

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff provided a long-term force structure plan for the Defense Department based on analysis of current and future threats, challenges, and opportunities and on the President’s national strategy to meet such circumstances. In accordance with Section 2912 of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, Public Law 101-510, as amended, the force structure plan for Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 2005 is based on the probable threats to national security for a 20-year period, from 2005 to 2024. In previous BRAC rounds, a similar requirement provided an assessment and projection of force structure for only 6 years into the future. It is important to note that this report focuses on a snapshot of force structure through Fiscal Years 2011 due to security classifications.

An unclassified portion of the force structure plan is included in this report. The entire plan is classified and available through restricted distribution. The force structure plan does not reflect temporary adjustments to the force structure of one or another military service that the Secretary of Defense may make from time to time in response to unique but transient conditions. The Secretary of Defense submitted the force structure plan to Congress in March 2004 and provided a revised submission in March 2005 per Public Law 101-510.

STRATEGY AND FORCE DEVELOPMENT

The President’s National Security Strategy and the Secretary of Defense’s Strategy provide a new focus for U.S. military forces. These strategies require that U.S. forces, by their presence and activities, assure friends and allies of the United States resolve and the ability to fulfill commitments. Military forces must dissuade adversaries from developing dangerous capabilities. In addition, forces must provide the President with a wide range of options to deter aggression and coercion, and if deterrence fails, forces must have the ability to defeat any adversary at the time, place, and in the manner of U.S. choosing.

Based on detailed analysis since the Secretary’s 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, the Department of Defense has updated its strategic thinking, incorporating lessons learned from recent military operations.

The Department’s planning has informed decisions to date on the force’s overall mix of capabilities, size, posture, patterns of activity, readiness, and capacity to surge globally.

Just as strategy is constantly updated to incorporate and account for a changing global security environment, force planning standards also are adaptive and dynamic over time.

The Department’s force planning framework does not focus on specific conflicts. It helps determine capabilities required for a range of scenarios. The Department analyzes the force requirements for the most likely, the most dangerous, and the most demanding circumstances. Assessments of U.S. capabilities will examine the breadth and depth of this construct, not seek to optimize in a single area. Doing so allows decision makers to identify areas where prudent risk could be accepted and areas where risk should be reduced or mitigated.

The defense strategy requires the creation of new forms of security cooperation to support U.S. efforts to swiftly defeat an adversary with modest reinforcement. Specifically, security cooperation will underpin diversified, operational basing access and training opportunities for forward stationed forces, and strengthen U.S. influence with potential partners that could provide coalition capabilities for future contingencies. Security cooperation efforts will focus on activities to build defense relationships that promote U.S. and allied security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and coalition operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access and en route infrastructure.

TRANSFORMATION TO A CAPABILITIES-BASED APPROACH

Continuous defense transformation is part of a wider governmental effort to transform America's national security institutions to meet 21st-century challenges and opportunities. Just as our challenges change continuously, so too must our military capabilities.

The purpose of transformation is to extend key advantages and reduce vulnerabilities. We are now in a long-term struggle against persistent, adaptive adversaries, and we must transform to prevail.

Transformation is not only about technology. It is also about:

- Changing the way we think about challenges and opportunities;
- Adapting the defense establishment to that new perspective; and
- Refocusing capabilities to meet future challenges, not those we are already most prepared to meet.

Transformation requires difficult programmatic and organizational choices. We will need to divest in some areas and invest in others.

Transformational change is not limited to operational forces. We also want to change longstanding business processes within the Department to take advantage of information technology. We also are working to transform our international partnerships, including the capabilities that our partners and we can use collectively.

Derivative of a transformational mindset is adoption of a capabilities-based planning methodology. Capabilities-based planning focuses more on how adversaries may challenge us than on whom those adversaries might be or where we might face them. It focuses the Department on the growing range of capabilities and methods we must possess to contend with an uncertain future. It recognizes the limits of intelligence and the impossibility of predicting complex events with precision. Our planning aims to link capabilities to joint operating concepts across a broad range of scenarios.

The Department is adopting a new approach for planning to implement our strategy. The defense strategy will drive this top-down, competitive process. Operating within fiscal constraints, our new approach enables the Secretary of Defense and Joint Force Commanders to balance risk across a range of areas.

We seek to foster a culture of innovation. The War on Terrorism imparts an urgency to defense transformation; we must transform to win the war.

ADDRESSING CAPABILITIES THROUGH FORCE TRANSFORMATION

The Department's transformation strategy will balance near-term operational risk with future risk in investment decisions. It will invest now in specific technologies and concepts that are transformational, while remaining open to other paths toward transformation. Capabilities will be developed, supported by force transformation, which will allow us to meet the defense strategy while remaining open to explore new and essential capabilities. This force transformation will allow us to create a new/future force structure, which will move from its current platform-centric condition to a more capabilities-based and network-centric philosophy that addresses the full spectrum of conflict. It will allow the U.S. military to create conditions for increased speed of command and opportunities for coordination across the battlespace.

PROBABLE THREATS TO NATIONAL SECURITY

RANGE OF CHALLENGES

Uncertainty is the defining characteristic of today's strategic environment. We can identify trends but cannot predict specific events with precision. While we work to avoid being surprised, we must posture ourselves to handle unanticipated problems—we must plan with surprise in mind.

We contend with uncertainty by adapting to circumstances and influencing events. It is not enough to react to change. We must safeguard U.S. freedoms and interests while working actively to forestall the emergence of new challenges.

The U.S. military predominates in the world in traditional forms of warfare. Potential adversaries accordingly shift away from challenging the United States through traditional military action and adopt asymmetric capabilities and methods. An array of traditional, irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive capabilities and methods threaten U.S. interests.

These categories overlap. Actors proficient in one can be expected to try to reinforce their position with methods and capabilities drawn from others.

Indeed, recent experience indicates that the most dangerous circumstances arise when we face a complex of such challenges. For example, our adversaries in Iraq and Afghanistan presented both traditional and irregular challenges. Terrorist groups like al Qaida pose irregular threats but also actively seek catastrophic capabilities. The government of North Korea at once poses traditional, irregular, and catastrophic challenges. In the future, the most capable opponents may seek to combine truly disruptive capacity with traditional, irregular, and catastrophic forms of warfare.

Traditional challenges come largely from states employing recognized military capabilities and forces in well-known forms of military competition and conflict. While traditional forms of military competition remain important, trends suggest that these challenges will receive lesser priority in the planning of adversaries vis-à-vis the United States. This can be attributed, in part, to U.S. and allied superiority in traditional forms of warfare and the enormous cost to develop, acquire, and maintain conventional capabilities. But it is also explained by the increasing attractiveness of irregular methods, as well as the increasing availability of catastrophic capabilities. Even where adversaries possess considerable capacity in traditional domains, they often seek to reinforce their position with catastrophic, irregular, and disruptive methods and capabilities. Therefore, some strictly traditional or hybrid challenges require the active maintenance of sufficient combat overmatch in key areas of traditional military competition.

Irregular challenges are characterized as “unconventional” methods employed by state and non-state actors to counter the traditional advantages of stronger opponents. Irregular methods of increasing sophistication—including terrorism, insurgency, civil war, and third-party coercion—will challenge U.S. security interests to a greater degree than they have in the past. Our adversaries are likely to exploit a host of irregular methods in an attempt to erode U.S. influence, power, and national will over time.

Two factors in particular have intensified the rapid growth and potential danger of irregular challenges: the rise of extremist ideologies and the erosion of traditional sovereignty. Worldwide political, religious, and ethnic extremism continue to fuel deadly and destabilizing conflicts. Particularly threatening are those extremist ideologies that sanction horrific violence targeted at civilians and noncombatants. Areas in Central and South America, Africa, the Middle East, and South, Central, and Southeast Asia have provided havens for terrorists, criminals, insurgents, and other groups that threaten global security. Many governments in these areas are unable or unwilling to extend effective control over their territory, thus increasing the area available to hostile exploitation. Irregular challenges in and from these areas will grow more intense over time and are likely to challenge the security of the United States and its partners for the indefinite future.

Our ongoing War on Terrorism and our resulting operational experience call for a reorientation of our military capabilities to contend with these challenges more effectively.

Catastrophic challenges involve the acquisition, possession, and use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or methods producing WMD-like effects. A number of state and non-state actors are vigorously seeking to acquire dangerous and destabilizing catastrophic capabilities. States seek these capabilities to offset perceived regional imbalances or to hedge against U.S. military superiority. Terrorists seek them because of the potential they hold for greater physical and psychological impact on targeted audiences.

Porous international borders, weak controls over weapons-related materials and expertise, and ongoing revolutions in information technology are increasingly enabling this trend. Particularly troublesome is the nexus of transnational terrorists, WMD proliferation, and rogue states. Unchecked, this confluence raises the prospect of direct WMD employment against the United States or our allies and partners. Indeed, many would-be adversaries likely believe the best war to check American reach and influence is to develop the capability to threaten the U.S. homeland directly. Catastrophic attacks could arrive via a number of delivery means ranging from rogue use of WMD-armed ballistic missiles to surreptitious delivery through routine commercial channels to innovative attacks like those undertaken on 9/11.

Elements of the U.S. national infrastructure are vulnerable to catastrophic attack. The interdependent nature of the infrastructure crests more vulnerability because attacks against one sector—the electric power grid for instance—would impact other sectors as well. Parts of the defense-related critical infrastructure are vulnerable to a wide range of attacks, especially those that rely on commercial sector elements with multiple single points of failure.

The continuing illicit proliferation of WMD technology and expertise makes contending with catastrophic challenges an enduring necessity. A single catastrophic attack against the United States is an unacceptable prospect. The strategic effect of such an attack transcends the mere economic and social costs. It represents a more fundamental, existential threat to our nation, our institutions, and our free society. Thus, we must apply new emphasis to capabilities that enable us to dissuade acquisition of catastrophic capabilities, deter their use, and finally, when necessary, defeat them prior to their posing direct threats to us and our partners.

Disruptive challenges are those posed by competitors employing breakthrough technology that might counter or negate our current advantages in key operational domains. In doing so, competitors seek to provide new military options that offset our advantages in niche areas and threaten our ability to operate from the strategic commons—space, international waters and airspace, and cyberspace. Such developments will afford opponents only temporary advantage. In a few instances, however, the United States could confront technological breakthroughs that would fundamentally alter our approach to security. These might include, but are not limited to, breakthroughs in biotechnology, cyber operations, space, directed energy, and other emerging fields. Although such developments are unpredictable, we must be attentive to the consequences that such possibilities hold, and plan and invest accordingly.

The goal of our transformation is to contend effectively with these challenges and channel future security competition in ways favorable to the United States and its international partners. We accomplish this by assuring our allies and friends—demonstrating our resolve to fulfill defense commitments and protect common interests; dissuading potential adversaries from adopting threatening capabilities and ambitions; and deterring aggression and coercion by maintaining capable and rapidly deployable military forces. Finally, at the direction of the President, we will defeat adversaries at the time, place, and in the manner of our choosing—setting the conditions for future security.

THE UNCLASSIFIED FORCE STRUCTURE PLAN

The following table shows the programmed force structure, manning, and funding for the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force for Fiscal Years 2005, 2007, 2009, and 2011. When reviewing this plan, it should be noted that it depicts only Service force units; that is, not all of the force structure is identified. For example, the unclassified version does not account for Army non-divisional units including its associated assets like aviation and special operations; Navy non-carrier-based aircraft and construction battalions; and Air Force airlift, special operation, tankers, and missiles.

SERVICE FORCE UNITS

	FY 2005	FY 2007	FY 2009	FY 2011
ARMY UNITS OF EMPLOYMENT				
ACTIVE	6	11	13	13
RESERVE	1	5	8	8
ARMY DIVISIONS				
ACTIVE	5			
RESERVE	7	3		
AIRCRAFT CARRIERS	12	11	11	11
CARRIER AIR WINGS				
ACTIVE	10	10	10	10
RESERVE	1	1	1	1
BATTLE FORCE SHIPS	324	324	336	341
AIR FORCE AEFs				
	10	10	10	10
USMC DIVISIONS				
ACTIVE	3	3	3	3
RESERVE	1	1	1	1

END STRENGTH (K)

		FY05	FY07	FY09	FY11
USA*	AC	482	482	482	482
	RC	555	555	555	555
USN	AC	366	345	345	345
	RC	83	71	70	70
USMC*	AC	175	175	175	175
	RC	40	40	40	40
USAF	AC	360	356	350	350
	RC	183	182	182	183

*The Army projects it will end FY05 with end strength of 511,800 or 29,400 above the baseline of 482,400. The Marine Corps projects it will end FY05 with end strength of 177,675 or 2,675 above the baseline of 175,000. The FY05 Supplemental request includes \$1.7 billion to support these overstrengths. In FY06, the Army and Marine Corps plan to exceed the funded end strength levels by at least 30,000 and 3,000 end strength, respectively. Both Services plan to seek Supplemental funding for any additional end strength above the baseline in support of the Global War on Terrorism.

ANTICIPATED LEVEL OF FUNDING (\$B)

	FY05	FY07	FY09	FY11
USA	115.0	110.1	120.3	125.6
USN	103.7	110.5	122.7	131.5
USMC	18.9	18.5	20.6	21.9
USAF	119.6	133.3	138.7	146.8