September 8, 2005

George W. Bush  
President of the United States  
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

The 2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission is proud to present its Final Report for your consideration. As required by law, the Commission thoroughly and objectively reviewed the domestic installation closure and realignment recommendations proposed by the Secretary of Defense on May 13, 2005.

In 2005, the Secretary made more recommendations, with more complexity, than all four previous base closure rounds combined. We held ourselves to a high standard of openness and transparency in all our activities and deliberations as we assessed these recommendations. Over the past four months, the Commission conducted 182 site visits, held 20 legislative and deliberative hearings, hosted 20 regional hearings, and received well over 200,000 written and electronic communications from the public. We publicly sought, and received, expert analysis and commentary from a variety of governmental and non-governmental sources to assist our independent analysis.

We recognize that our final recommendations will have profound effects on many communities and the people who bring them to life as well as on the uniformed men and women embodying our Armed Forces. We are confident that the recommendations contained in our Final Report will positively shape our military for decades to come. The warfighters securing our way of life will depend on the successful implementation of our recommendations to shape the infrastructure supporting their current and future missions.

In addition to the Commission’s assessment of the Secretary’s recommendations, we have addressed issues relevant to future rounds of base realignment and closure.

Chairman: Anthony J. Principi  
Commissioners: The Honorable James H. Bilbray, the Honorable Philip E. Coyle III, Admiral Harold W. Gehman Jr., USN (Ret),  
the Honorable Jim Hansen, General James T. Hill, USA (Ret), General Lloyd Newton, USAF (Ret), the Honorable Samuel K.  
Skinner, Brigadier General Sue Ellen Turner, USAF (Ret)  
Executive Director: Charles Battaglia
Mr. President, it has been an honor and privilege for us to serve on the 2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission.

Respectfully Yours,

[Signatures and names of commissioners]

Anthony J. Principi
Chairman
# 2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission Report

## Table of Contents

### Volume One

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section Name</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Executive Summary</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter One: Commission Findings &amp; Recommendations</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commission Strategic Overview</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy/Marine Corps</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education &amp; Training</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headquarters &amp; Support Activities</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial</td>
<td>229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence</td>
<td>253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical</td>
<td>257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supply &amp; Storage</td>
<td>271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical</td>
<td>281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Two: Issues for Further Consideration</td>
<td>305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Three: Previous Experience with Base Closures</td>
<td>311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Four: The 2005 BRAC Process</td>
<td>315</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE OF CONTENTS

VOLUME TWO

SECTION NAME

Appendix A: Abbreviations
Appendix B: Definitions
Appendix C: BRAC Statute
Appendix D: Force Structure Plan
Appendix E: Final Selection Criteria
Appendix F: Closures and Realignments by State, 1988–1995
Appendix G: Commissioners’ Biographies
Appendix H: Staff List
Appendix I: Hearings Held by Commission
Appendix J: Commissioner and Staff Base Visits
Appendix K: DoD Closure and Realignment Recommendations List
Appendix L: Bases Added by the Commission, 2005
Appendix M: COBRA Analysis of Commission Final Recommendations
Appendix N: COBRA Comparison of BRAC 1988–2005
Appendix O: Economic Impact of Commission Final Recommendations
Appendix P: Selected Environmental Remediation Costs
Appendix Q: Commission’s Final Recommendations
Appendix R: Legislative Proposal
Appendix S: “Life After BRAC” Resource Finder
Appendix T: Maps

Index by State
Index by Recommendation
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Commission assessed the Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) closure and realignment recommendations for consistency with the eight statutory selection criteria and the DoD Force Structure Plan. The recommendations announced by Secretary Rumsfeld on May 13, 2005 comprised, by the Commission’s count, 190 separate DoD recommendations that would produce as many as 837 distinct and identifiable recommended BRAC “close” or “realign” actions. These 837 distinct actions also involved an additional 160 installations that would gain missions or resources due to the proposed closures and realignments. All told, the 2005 BRAC recommendations exceeded the number considered by all prior BRAC Commissions combined. In addition to the unprecedented number, many DoD recommendations were extremely complex, proposing intertwining movements between and among numerous installations. Other DoD proposals consolidated apparently unrelated actions within the same recommendation.

Secretary Rumsfeld was very clear that his primary goal for the BRAC process was military transformation. And, unlike prior BRAC rounds, the Commission evaluated DoD’s recommendations in the context of a stable or increasing force structure, an ongoing conflict in Southwest Asia, and the projected redeployment of 70,000 servicemembers and family members from Europe and Asia to the United States. The 20-year BRAC outlook required the Commission to make allowances for major uncertainties in the military and strategic environment. While acknowledging the importance of savings as a BRAC goal, the Commission went beyond a business model analysis of DoD’s recommendations and weighed the strategic environment within which recommendations would be implemented and their effect on DoD’s transformational goals.

NUMBER OF CLOSURES AND REALIGNMENTS

Of the 190 DoD recommendations, the Commission approved 119 with no change and accepted another 45 with amendments; over 86% of those proposed by DoD. The Commission rejected 13 DoD recommendations in their entirety and significantly modified another 13.

The Commission has forwarded a total of 182 closures or realignment recommendations, including 177 of the 190 recommendations submitted by the Secretary of Defense and five closures or realignment recommendations from the eight installations it considered on its own initiative.

Of DoD’s recommended 33 “major” closures, the Commission approved 21, recommended realignment for seven, and rejected five. In addition, the Commission recommended closure, rather than realignment, for Naval Air Station Brunswick, for a total of 22 major closures. Of DoD’s 29 recommended “major” realignments, the Commission approved 25, closed rather than realigned one (Naval Air Station Brunswick) and rejected three. In addition, it added one major realignment on its own initiative for a total of 33 major realignments, including realignment of the seven installations proposed for closure by DoD.

COSTS AND SAVINGS

Over the next 20 years, the total savings of the Commission’s recommendations are estimated at $35.6 billion rather than $47.8 billion for DoD’s proposals. However, if DoD’s claimed cost avoidances attributable to military personnel actions are excluded, as both the Commission and GAO believe necessary, actual savings to the taxpayer are estimated at $15 billion over 20 years. The Commission estimates that implementation of its recommendations will result in annual savings of $4.2 billion, compared to $5.4 billion for DoD’s proposals. Implementation will require one-time up-front costs of $21 billion compared to the $24.6 billion that would have been required by the DoD proposal.

BRAC AS A VEHICLE FOR JOINTNESS

While the Secretary of Defense described the 2005 BRAC as an opportunity to promote jointness, very few of the hundreds of proposals increased jointness, and some actually decreased or removed joint and cross-service connections. Most of the DoD proposed consolidations and reorganizations were within the Military Departments, not across the Services. “Collocation” is not synonymous with “integration”, and “transformation” is not synonymous with “jointness”. While the Secretary’s recommendations will not move the ball across the jointness goal line, Commission decisions will help move the ball down the field.
Savings due to Military Personnel

DoD frequently credited recommendations with creating “savings” derived from the costs of servicemembers who would be reassigned from a closing or realigning installation to a gaining base or activity. Much of DoD’s claimed “savings” are attributable to the reassignment of 26,830 military personnel positions that would not be eliminated, although military effectiveness would increase as servicemembers are reassigned to higher priority missions.

DoD’s claimed savings (as opposed to cost avoidance) will be significantly reduced by the extent that military personnel costs are not reduced but are instead shifted to another installation or mission. DoD claimed its proposals would produce $47.8 billion in savings after investing $24.6 billion in one-time implementation costs. However, if personnel savings are not realized, DoD’s 2005 BRAC proposal would still incur $24.6 billion in one-time costs while saving only $18.6 billion.

For some Air Force base recommendations, the cost savings due to personnel reductions were over 90% of the total savings. For example, the DoD projected savings due to personnel reductions at Pope AFB, Grand Forks AFB, and Cannon AFB were 97.8%, 94.5%, and 92%, respectively of the total savings claimed. In the case of the Air National Guard, roughly 106,000 military personnel assigned before the 2005 BRAC are retained after the 2005 BRAC. Obviously, no savings will be achieved by moving these positions around the country if the total does not change.

Air National Guard

DoD proposals to close or realign Air National Guard bases nationwide represented one of the most difficult issues faced by the 2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission. Thirty-seven of the 42 DoD Air Force proposals involved the Air National Guard.

As proposed by DoD, 23 Air National Guard units would have lost all their currently assigned aircraft. The proposed realignments or closures threatened the confidence of many Governors that they would have Air National Guard resources if needed for emergencies, natural disasters, or homeland defense missions. Several states have filed law suits to block such moves.

From the outset, the Commission and its staff worked long hours with the U.S. Air Force, with the National Guard Bureau, and with the Adjutants General to fashion recommendations that would achieve DoD’s objectives, conform to the military value BRAC selection criteria and respond to the concerns of the states and the Adjutants General. The result of those efforts was approved unanimously by the Commission during its hearing on August 26, 2005.

Commission process

In accordance with the BRAC statute, three Commissioners were directly nominated by the President and six nominated by the President after consultation with majority or minority leaders of the House and Senate. By law, and by Commission policy, the Commission’s process was open, transparent, apolitical, and fair. In addition to considering certified data provided by DoD, Commissioners sought input from communities and individuals affected by the DoD recommendations. Commissioners made 182 site visits to 173 separate installations. They conducted 20 regional hearings to obtain public input and 20 deliberative hearings for input on, or discussion of, policy issues. Commissioners were accessible to communities, citizens, and to their advocates without regard to party or agenda. Commissioners participated in hundreds of meetings with public officials and received well over 200,000 pieces of mail. All documents provided to the Commission were scanned into an “e-library” and made available through the internet. The Commission’s web site registered over 25 million “hits.”

The 2005 BRAC Commission assessed closure and realignment recommendations of unprecedented scope and complexity while setting a new standard for accessibility to the American people and transparency of deliberations.
STATUTORY BRAC FINAL SELECTION CRITERIA

MILITARY VALUE (given priority consideration)

1. The current and future mission capabilities and the impact on operational readiness of the total force of the Department of Defense, including the impact on joint warfighting, training, and readiness.

2. The availability and condition of land, facilities, and associated airspace (including training areas suitable for maneuver by ground, naval, or air forces throughout a diversity of climate and terrain areas and staging areas for the use of the Armed Forces in homeland defense missions) at both existing and potential receiving locations.

3. The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, surge, and future total force requirements at both existing and potential receiving locations to support operations and training.

4. The cost of operations and the manpower implications.

OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

5. The extent and timing of potential costs and savings, including the number of years, beginning with the date of completion of the closure or realignment, for the savings to exceed the costs.

6. The economic impact on existing communities in the vicinity of military installations.

7. The ability of the infrastructure of both the existing and potential receiving communities to support forces, missions, and personnel.

8. The environmental impact, including the impact of costs related to potential environmental restoration, waste management, and environmental compliance.
MAJOR CLOSURES:

**Army (12)**

- Riverbank Army Ammunition Plant, CA
- Fort Gillem, GA
- Fort McPherson, GA
- Newport Chemical Depot, IN
- Kansas Army Ammunition Plant, KS
- Selfridge Army Activity, MI
- Mississippi Army Ammunition Plant, MS
- Fort Monmouth, NJ
- Umatilla Chemical Depot, OR
- Lone Star Army Ammunition Plant, TX
- Deseret Chemical Depot, UT
- Fort Monroe, VA

**Navy (5)**

- Naval Air Station Atlanta, GA
- Naval Station Pascagoula, MS
- Naval Air Station Willow Grove, PA
- Naval Station Ingleside, TX
- Naval Air Station Brunswick, ME

**Air Force (5)**

- Kulis Air Guard Station, AK
- Onizuka Air Force Station, CA
- Brooks City Base, TX
- General Mitchell ARS, WI
- Cannon Air Force Base, NM*

* Closure recommendation goes into effect if the Secretary of the Air Force does not designate a new mission for the installation by December 31, 2009.
MAJOR REALIGNMENTS:

**ARMY (6)**

- Walter Reed National Military Medical Center (at Bethesda), DC
- Rock Island Arsenal, IL
- Fort Knox, KY
- Army Reserve Personnel Center, St. Louis, MO
- Ft. Eustis, VA
- Red River Army Depot, TX

**NAVY (13)**

- Marine Corps Logistics Base Barstow, CA
- Naval Base Ventura City, CA
- Naval Base Coronado, CA
- Naval Medical Center San Diego, CA
- Naval District Washington, DC
- NAS Pensacola, FL
- Naval Station Great Lakes, IL
- Naval Support Activity Crane, IN
- NAS Corpus Christi, TX
- Naval Medical Center Portsmouth, VA
- NAS Oceana, VA
- Naval Support Activity, New Orleans, LA
- Naval Weapons Station Seal Beach Concord Detachment, CA

**AIR FORCE (12)**

- Eielson AFB, AK
- Elmendorf AFB, AK
- Mountain Home AFB, ID
- Pope AFB, NC
- Grand Forks AFB, ND
- Lackland AFB, TX
- Sheppard AFB, TX
- McChord AFB, WA
- Otis Air National Guard Base, MA
- W.K. Kellogg Airport Guard Station, MI
- Niagara Falls International Airport Air Guard Station, NY
Pittsburg International Airport Air Reserve Station, PA

DEFENSE AGENCIES/MULTIPLE SERVICES (2)

NCR Leased locations, DC
Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) Arlington, VA

PROPOSED CLOSURES REJECTED BY THE COMMISSION:

Hawthorne Army Depot, NV
Naval Support Activity, Corona, CA
Submarine Base New London, CT
Naval Shipyard Portsmouth, ME
Ellsworth AFB, SD

PROPOSED REALIGNMENTS REJECTED BY THE COMMISSION:

NAS Brunswick, ME**
Maxwell AFB, AL
Portland International Airport Air Guard Station, OR
DFAS Cleveland, OH

** Commission recommended closure instead
CHAPTER 1

COMMISSION STRATEGIC OVERVIEW

America’s servicemembers are supported by, but also constrained by, the physical infrastructure of our nation’s defense establishment: the bases where they live and train; the facilities where they maintain their weapons and equipment; the schools where they learn and practice their craft; the laboratories where future weapons and equipment are researched, developed, and tested; the logistics installations that servicemembers count on for the supplies they need to operate; and the depots that refurbish and overhaul their equipment. Today’s defense infrastructure is the collective and tangible legacy of decades—even generations—of decisions on defense installations. Today, the armed forces and the Department of Defense are the stewards of installations ranging from some built originally to defend our harbors during the age of sail to others defending against intercontinental ballistic missiles.

No institution will remain successful without adapting to its constantly changing environment. Our armed forces must adapt to changing threats, evolving technology, reconfigured organizational structures, and new strategies and structures. Our infrastructure must support that progress, not hinder it. Neither DoD, nor the American taxpayer, can afford to support unneeded infrastructure at the expense of funding for supplies and equipment for our servicemembers. The base closure and realignment (BRAC) process is a systematic, rational process to bring our nation’s military infrastructure into line with the needs of our armed forces, not only by reducing costs and closing unneeded installations, but also by facilitating the transformation of our armed forces to meet the challenges of the new century.

The closure or realignment of a base can have profound effects on the communities hosting our military installations and, more important, on the people who bring those communities and our military to life. The BRAC process created by Congress establishes clear criteria for DoD evaluation of, and recommendations for, the closure of military installations, to be followed by an assessment of those DoD recommendations by an independent commission. The President and then the Congress have the option of accepting or rejecting the Commission’s report, in its entirety. Under law, neither the President nor the Congress can pick and choose from the Commission’s report.

Prior BRAC rounds occurred at the dusk of the Cold War, when military budgets and force structure were shrinking. The 2005 BRAC round occurred in a post-9/11 environment with our armed forces deployed in combat in Iraq and Afghanistan with stable or increasing force structure and defense budgets. During the 2005 BRAC implementation period, the armed forces expect to relocate 70,000 servicemembers from overseas to installations within the United States. Prior BRAC rounds took place in the context of military doctrine and force structure shaped by the Cold War. The 2005 BRAC round occurred during the transformation of military doctrine and force structure to meet the needs of an entirely new threat and security environment.

The Commission’s assessment of the Secretary’s recommendations took numerous factors into account, as discussed below.

THE ROLE OF DEPOTS IN WARTIME AND UNCERTAINTY

In assessing DoD recommendations against the statutory BRAC criteria and the Force Structure Plan, the Commission had to consider the tradeoff between savings attributable to closure of excess depot capacity and the efficiencies attributable to consolidated operations against the value of retaining sufficient surge capacity to sustain our military in a time of war and uncertainty. Scaling back depots and industrial functions reduces the capacity to rapidly increase outputs and could lead to an unacceptable risk of single-point failures in our nation’s capacity to repair and/or modify certain critical weapons systems and platforms. Under the 20-year Force Structure Plan, many major weapons systems and platforms are projected to remain in service for decades. Utilization of these systems in the Global War on Terrorism, including in Afghanistan and Iraq, subjects many vehicles and aircraft to harsh battlefield conditions and extensive and unanticipated operational tempo. The Commission had to assess whether living with slightly higher levels of excess capacity might be preferable than being left with too little capacity.
Reconciling the Principle of Dispersion to BRAC

The Commission had to assess the effect on the statutory BRAC criteria and Force Structure Plan of trade-offs between efficiency and affordability and the strategic values of dispersion and defense in depth. Yet the 2005 BRAC Commission was asked by DoD, in the form of many BRAC recommendations, to agree to the concentration of some types of facilities and systems onto fewer large DoD-owned installations.

Strategic Presence in the United States

The Commission’s assessment of the Secretary’s recommendations’ consistency with the Force Structure Plan and the BRAC selection criteria took place in the context of changing threats to our national security. During the Cold War, the domestic U.S. installation infrastructure focused primarily on projecting power across the Arctic Circle and across the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. In the post-September 11th era when the main threats of the future do not involve Soviet bombers, submarines, or ballistic missiles, a reevaluation of facility infrastructure has turned some Cold War virtues into vices. But in DoD recommendations for shifting assets and investments, Commissioners were required to assess whether the result might be insufficient strategic presence in some parts of the United States. In addition, the Commission addressed a concern about the long-term effects of having little military presence in large regions of the country.

Coordinating Homeland Defense and Homeland Security

In preparing its recommendations, DoD was required by statute to consider the homeland defense implications of its proposals. Additionally, DoD was to consider the costs that might be incurred by non-DoD agencies as a result of closure and realignment actions. Many DoD installations host non-DoD federal tenants, including the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) (e.g., the Coast Guard), the FBI, and the Department of Veterans Affairs. These non-DoD tenants reap significant benefits from their collocation at military bases. In turn, DoD spreads its base operating support costs (BOS) across all of its tenants, and thus these non-DoD entities are frequently bill-payers that help reduce DoD’s installation operating budgets. If DoD proposes to close or downsize these installations, these non-DoD tenants often incur substantial new costs that were not budgeted or anticipated. In many cases, the Commission learned through its investigations and analysis that DoD routinely failed to properly account for the added costs to non-DoD tenants and failed to properly coordinate its decisions with federal tenant organizations. Many tenants learned of DoD’s BRAC recommendations for the first time on May 13, 2005. As a result, Commissioners were required to assess whether certain DoD closure or realignment proposals that posed an unanticipated negative impact on federal tenant organizations might rise to a level where the proposal’s military value and feasibility were cast into doubt.

Compounding this problem has been the combined failure of DoD and DHS to define where DoD’s responsibilities for providing homeland defense ends and where DHS’ homeland security functions begin. A gray area of overlap between these two distinct but related spheres of authority and responsibility persists despite four years’ having elapsed since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. BRAC could have been a prime opportunity to shrink this gray and inherently nebulous boundary—had DoD and DHS actively chose to coordinate with each other. Sadly, this opportunity was not seized by either Department. The Commission, on several occasions, solicited input and feedback from DHS on DoD BRAC recommendations having a direct and immediate impact on DHS’ ability to execute homeland security functions. But in many cases, these inquiries were met with a level of passivity and reluctance to criticize that was out of proportion to the seriousness of the issues at stake. This was particularly true of many Air Force Air National Guard recommendations that stripped units of their flying mission. Commissioners heard numerous protests from governors and state delegations that DoD’s proposed removal of these air assets, and their conversion into Expeditionary Combat Support (ECS) units, could have a direct and immediate negative impact on their ability to perform homeland security missions. Clearly, the presence or absence of such assets as C-130 aircraft, which are routinely tasked by governors to rapidly deploy Civil Support Teams (CSTs) and emergency relief supplies in the event of manmade or natural disasters, was an issue of major significance. DoD proposed significant reallocation of air assets (notwithstanding their retention of expeditionary combat support units) with a direct bearing on the national homeland security network, yet DHS provided little or no guidance, input, or assistance to the Commission on how to objectively evaluate these community homeland security concerns, even when directly asked to do so. As a result, the Commission was forced to assess, by itself, the homeland security and homeland defense implications of many BRAC recommendations.

During the 2005 BRAC process, many Commissioners both heard and expressed concerns about DoD recommendations that would significantly downsize numerous Air National Guard units and radically change their future missions. In many cases, ANG units would lose their flying mission but retain their ECS operations. An extensive volume of evidence and
speculation was presented to Commissioners during their review that the proposed plane-less ECS units and enclaves were not viable over the long term. Commissioners were told by Adjutants General and community representatives that for a variety of reasons the kind of people historically attracted to ANG units will not join in the future if there are no flying assets available. Recruitment and retention in ANG units without aircraft would plummet, according to many communities. Whole regions of the country, it was argued, would be devoid of any significant military or National Guard presence.

**Transformation versus Cost Savings**

In previous rounds of BRAC, the explicit goal was to save money and downsize the military in order to reap a “peace dividend.” It was clear from the Commission’s examination of the DoD 2005 BRAC list that the historical goal of achieving savings through eliminating excess capacity was not always the primary consideration for many recommendations. In fact, several DoD witnesses at Commission hearings made it clear that the purpose of many 2005 BRAC recommendations was to advance the goals of transformation, improve capabilities, and enhance military value. In some cases, accomplishing these new goals meant proposing BRAC scenarios that either never paid off (i.e., resulted in a net increased cost) or had very long payback periods. The Commission’s assessment of the selection criteria and Force Structure Plan took place in the context of a balance between the goals of realizing savings and rationalizing our military infrastructure to meet the needs of future missions.

However, as discussed elsewhere in this Report, the Commission noted in many cases that DoD claimed savings from proposals on the basis of eliminated military personnel. Yet, because total end strength was not being reduced proportionately, these so-called “savings” will not actually reduce total DoD spending levels. Hence, they are not truly savings in the commonly understood sense of the term. No new equipment or increases in operations could be purchased with these “reductions” in military personnel. Because these military personnel would not be eliminated, but merely reassigned to higher-priority tasks, the Commission concluded that DoD’s initial estimates of $49 billion in net savings over a 20-year period were vastly overestimated, although “military value”—the primary selection criterion—might be increased.

**Complex and Interconnected Recommendations**

Among the issues that made the work of the Commissioners more difficult, was the decision by DoD to routinely mingle unrelated proposals under the title of a single “recommendation.” Unlike prior rounds of BRAC where each base was handled by a single integrated recommendation, the 2005 DoD recommendations were scattered throughout its report, often affecting the same facility several times in different proposals. Some installations had ten or more recommendations that had a direct impact on their missions and infrastructure. In many instances, Commissioners had to reconcile whether a substantial deviation in one or more selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan rose to a level that warranted rejecting an entire package of interconnected moving parts. Commissioners struggled to fully understand the net impact on bases that were both gaining and losing missions at the same time, and they knew that rejecting one element of a recommendation could potentially set off a cascade of known and unknown effects rippling across several other proposals. Thus, Commissioners in 2005 not only had to consider each recommendation’s individual merits, but also how the recommendation’s pieces fit together as a whole, and how they related to other recommendations that depended on one another for successful implementation.
Note: The recommendations appear in this report in the exact same order, and using the exact same titles, as they appeared in the Department of Defense report submitted May 13, 2005. Paragraphs titled “Secretary of Defense Recommendations,” and “Secretary of Defense Justification” are from the May 13, 2005, report submitted by the Secretary to the BRAC Commission. Where bases not originally listed by DoD have been “added” by the Commission, they will appear at the end of the relevant Report section.

FORT WAINWRIGHT, ALASKA

RECOMMENDATION # 1 (ARMY 5)

One-time Cost: $0.05M
Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings): ($0.05M)
20-Year Net Present Value: ($0.7M)
Payback Period: 2 YEARS

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Realign Fort Wainwright, AK, by relocating the Cold Regions Test Center (CRTC) headquarters from Fort Wainwright, AK, to Fort Greely, AK.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

This recommendation relocates CRTC headquarters to Fort Greely to improve efficiency of operations and personnel safety. Sufficient capacity exists at Fort Greely. This would not affect Force Structure. This recommendation relocates headquarters closer to the CRTC’s test mission execution on the Bologo Lake Range Complex. This complex, although realigned under Fort Wainwright in BRAC 95, is only 10 miles south of Fort Greely but 100 miles from Fort Wainwright’s cantonment area. This action would improve interoperability and reduce costs by permitting personnel to live closer to their primary work site, thus avoiding a 200-mile round trip between quarters and work sites. It also decreases the risks associated with the required year-round travel in extreme weather conditions and results in more efficient and cost effective monitoring and control of arctic testing of transformational systems. This recommendation did not consider other locations since the CRTC headquarters manages testing at only one site.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

There were no formal expressions from the community.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found that this recommendation would reverse a 1995 BRAC decision realigning Fort Greely by placing the CRTC headquarters at Fort Wainwright. The original proposal essentially mothballed Fort Greely and moved two major activities, the Northern Warfare Training Center and the Cold Regions Test Activity (now the Cold Region Test Center), off the installation.
In 2001, Congress, as part of Public Law 107-20, permitted the use of Fort Greely for missile defense, effectively reactivating the installation. The Commission agrees with DoD’s rationale for moving the CRTC headquarters back to Fort Greely to reduce harsh weather travel demands on headquarters personnel.

**COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS**

The Commission found the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and force structure plan. Therefore, the Commission approved the recommendation of the Secretary.

**FORT GILLEM, GEORGIA**

**RECOMMENDATION # 2 (ARMY 6)**

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**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION**

Close Fort Gillem, GA. Relocate the Headquarters, 1st US Army to Rock Island Arsenal, IL. Relocate the 2nd Recruiting Brigade to Redstone Arsenal, AL. Relocate the 52nd Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Group to Fort Campbell, KY. Relocate the 81st RRC Equipment Concentration Site to Fort Benning, GA. Relocate the 3rd US Army Headquarters support office to Shaw Air Force Base, SC. Relocate the Headquarters US Forces Command (FORSCOM) VIP Explosive Ordnance Support to Pope Air Force Base, NC. Close the Army-Air Force Exchange System (AAFES) Atlanta Distribution Center and establish an enclave for the Georgia Army National Guard, the remainder of the 81st RRC units and the Criminal Investigation Division (CID) Forensics Laboratory.

**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION**

This recommendation closes Fort Gillem, an Army administrative installation and an AAFES distribution center. The recommendation moves the major tenant organizations to Rock Island Arsenal, Redstone Arsenal, Fort Benning, and Fort Campbell. It also moves small components of the Headquarters 3rd US Army and US Army Forces Command to Pope AFB and Shaw AFB. It enhances the Army's military value, is consistent with the Army’s Force Structure Plan, and maintains adequate surge capabilities to address unforeseen future requirements. This closure allows the Army to employ excess capacities at installations that can accomplish more than administrative missions.

The closure of Fort Gillem also enables the stationing of its tenant units at locations that will increase their ability to associate with like units and promote coordination of efforts. Both the 52nd EOD Group and the 2nd Recruiting Brigade have regional missions in the Southeastern United States. The 52nd EOD Group was co-located with operational forces at Fort Campbell to provide training opportunities. The 2nd Recruiting Brigade is recommended to relocate to Redstone Arsenal because of its central location in the Southeast and its access to a transportation center in Huntsville, AL. The Army is converting the 1st US Army Headquarters into the single Headquarters for oversight of Reserve and National Guard mobilization and demobilization. To support this conversion the Army decided to relocate 1st Army to Rock Island Arsenal, a central location in the United States. The 81st RRC Equipment Concentration Site is relocated to Fort Benning, where there are improved training opportunities with operational forces.

**COMMUNITY CONCERNS**

The community emphasized that Fort Gillem and Fort McPherson are linked. They asserted that DoD understated costs, producing projected savings which appear to be the primary basis for the closure decision. They indicated relocation of three major headquarters (1st Army, 2nd Recruiting Brigade and 52nd EOD Group) would adversely affect Reserve Component training readiness, homeland defense, and efficient command and control. They also held that relocation of 1st Army Headquarters would separate it from the many related capabilities offered by homeland security organizations and Reserve Components located at Fort Gillem. They argued that cost, command and control obstacles, loss of Reserve Component
synergies, homeland defense coordination issues, and security challenges for enclaved organizations should persuade the Commission to vote against closure. The community indicated the economic impact will be great on Clayton County and the surrounding community which suffers from high unemployment rates and low per-capita income. The community states that the proposed enclave at Fort Gillem would create security challenges and fragment potential reuse, in addition to challenges of long-term contamination cleanup.

**Commission Findings**

The Commission’s findings supported DoD’s overall recommendation, although the Commission found that DoD failed to adequately define its planned enclave at Fort Gillem, contrary to its agreement with the findings of a 2003 study by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) of prior BRAC enclaves. GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense provide the 2005 BRAC Commission with data clearly specifying the infrastructure needed for any proposed enclaves and the estimated costs to operate and maintain such enclaves. The Commission found merit in community concerns about the adverse effect of multiple enclaves on reuse of the remainder of Fort Gillem, and therefore modified the DoD recommendation to require a contiguous enclave.

The Commission also found that units other than those explicitly stated in the approved recommendation, such as the Military Entrance Processing Station, may need to remain in the enclave, although the Commission strongly believes that the size of the enclave needs to be minimized to give the community maximum opportunities for reuse. The Commission found that the recommendation failed to address the Ammunition Supply Point, the only Army ASP in north Georgia supporting the Federal Transportation Security Administration, Army Reserves, and National Guard. The Commission was advised by the Department that the ASP was not part of the enclave recommendation and that disposition of the ASP will be determined during implementation. The Commission found DoD's economic impact analysis failed to consider significant loss of jobs associated with closing the Army and Air Force Exchange Service Atlanta Distribution Center. The Commission notes that Fort Gillem borders Forest Park, GA, an Historically Underutilized Business (HUB) Zone and that the Garrison provides employment opportunities to a number of individuals with severe disabilities. The Commission strongly urges the Department to proactively work with the community to minimize these economic impacts.

**Commission Recommendations**

The Commission found that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final selection criteria 7 and the force structure plan. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following:

Close Fort Gillem, GA. Relocate the Headquarters, 1st US Army to Rock Island Arsenal, IL. Relocate the 2d Recruiting Brigade to Redstone Arsenal, AL. Relocate the 52d Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Group to Fort Campbell, KY. Relocate the 81st RRC Equipment Concentration Site to Fort Benning, GA. Relocate the 3d US Army Headquarters support office to Shaw Air Force Base, SC. Relocate the Headquarters US Forces Command (FORSCom) VIP Explosive Ordnance Support to Pope Air Force Base, NC.

Close the Army-Air Force Exchange System (AAFES) Atlanta Distribution Center and establish a contiguous enclave for the Georgia Army National Guard, the remainder of the 81st RRC units and the Criminal Investigation Division (CID) Forensics Laboratory.

The Commission found this change and the recommendation as amended are consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. The full text of this and all other recommendations can be found in Appendix Q.
**FORT MCPHERSON, GEORGIA**

**RECOMMENDATION # 3 (ARMY 8)**

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**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION**

Close Fort McPherson, GA. Relocate the Headquarters US Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), and the Headquarters US Army Reserve Command (USARC) to Pope Air Force Base, NC. Relocate the Headquarters 3rd US Army to Shaw Air Force Base, SC. Relocate the Installation Management Agency Southeastern Region Headquarters and the US Army Network Enterprise Technology Command (NETCOM) Southeastern Region Headquarters to Fort Eustis, VA. Relocate the Army Contracting Agency Southern Region Headquarters to Fort Sam Houston, TX.

**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION**

This recommendation closes Fort McPherson, an administrative installation, and moves the tenant headquarters organizations to Fort Sam Houston, Fort Eustis, Pope AFB and Shaw AFB. It enhances the Army’s military value, is consistent with the Army’s Force Structure Plan, and maintains adequate surge capabilities to address unforeseen future requirements. This closure allows the Army to employ excess capacities at installations that can accomplish more than administrative missions. The organization relocations in this recommendation also create multifunctional, multicomponent and multi-Service installations that provide a better level of service at a reduced cost.

The recommended relocations also retain or enhance vital linkages between the relocating organizations and other headquarters activities. FORSCOM HQs is relocated to Pope AFB where it will be co-located with a large concentration of operational forces. The USARC HQs has a mission relationship with FORSCOM that is enhanced by leaving the two co-located. 3rd Army is relocated to Shaw AFB where it will be collocated with the Air Force component command of CENTCOM. The IMA and NETCOM HQs are moved to Fort Eustis because of recommendations to consolidate the Northeastern and Southeastern regions of these two commands into one Eastern Region at Fort Eustis. The ACA Southern Region HQs is moved to Fort Sam Houston where it is recommended to consolidate with the ACA Southern Hemisphere Region HQs, and where it will co-locate with other Army service providing organizations.

**COMMUNITY CONCERNS**

The community argued that cost was the overriding factor in DoD’s decision to close this historic installation, and significant relocation costs were understated. The community maintained that the current co-location of three major Army headquarters (Forces Command, Reserve Command and Third Army) next to an international airport with unparalleled access and point-to-point travel is an important synergy for training readiness and operational planning. Loss of a major military presence in the Atlanta metropolitan area would adversely affect the City of Atlanta, a terrorist target; hinder military recruitment of African Americans; reduce military support to the Department of homeland security; disadvantage a significant number of handicapped employees at Fort McPherson; and adversely affect surrounding communities already suffering high unemployment rates and low per-capita income. It was the community’s judgment that Fort McPherson, Atlanta’s seventh largest employer, is ideally located to take advantage of Atlanta’s major transportation and information technology hubs which they believed will be necessary to meet future military and homeland security command and control challenges. The community maintained DoD substantially deviated from criteria 3 and 4 by dispersal of headquarters which limits command and control at additional cost; criterion 1 by dispersing critical synergy; and criterion 5 by understating costs.

**COMMISSION FINDINGS**

The Commission found that the cost to relocate the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) regional communications hub at Fort McPherson was not accounted for in DoD’s analysis. Subsequent DoD certified data revealed relocation of the hub would cost $17.09M. Moreover, relocating Third Army Headquarters to Shaw Air Force Base could require more
construction funding than anticipated. The Commission confirmed that Fort McPherson has a large number of historic facilities requiring maintenance and consultation with the State Historic Preservation Office. Fort McPherson Garrison supports an 85-acre recreational area at Lake Allatoona, GA, consisting of cabins, boating and outdoor activities, and the Commission found no plan for the disposition of this Morale, Welfare and Recreational Area. The Commission notes that Fort McPherson borders East Point, GA, a Historically Underutilized Business (HUB) Zone. The closure of Fort McPherson will have a negative economic impact on this already economically depressed, predominantly minority community, and because the Garrison provides employment opportunities to a large number of individuals with severe disabilities, the Commission strongly urges the Department to proactively work with the community to minimize these impacts. However, the Commission did not find these issues individually or collectively rose to the level of a substantial deviation.

**COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS**

The Commission found the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and force structure plan. Therefore, the Commission approved the recommendation of the Secretary

**FORT BRAGG, NORTH CAROLINA**

**RECOMMENDATION # 4 (ARMY 10)**

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**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION**

Realignment Fort Bragg, NC, by relocating the 7th Special Forces Group (SFG) to Eglin AFB, FL, and by activating the 4th Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 82d Airborne Division and relocating European-based forces to Fort Bragg, NC.

**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION**

This recommendation collocates Army Special Operation Forces with Air Force Special Operations Forces at Eglin AFB, activates the 4th BCT of the 82nd Airborne Division, and relocates Combat Service Support units to Fort Bragg from Europe to support the Army modular force transformation. This realignment and activation of forces enhances military value and training capabilities by locating Special Operations Forces (SOF) in locations that best support Joint specialized training needs, and by creating needed space for the additional brigade at Fort Bragg. This recommendation is consistent with and supports the Army’s Force Structure Plan submitted with the FY 06 budget, and provides the necessary capacity and capability, including surge, to support the units affected by this action.

This recommendation never pays back. However, the benefits of enhancing Joint training opportunities coupled with the positive impact of freeing up needed training space and reducing cost of the new BCT by approximately $54-$148M (with family housing) at Fort Bragg for the Army’s Modular Force transformation, justify the additional costs to the Department.

**COMMUNITY CONCERNS**

There were no formal expressions from the community.

**COMMISSION FINDINGS**

The Commission found that this recommendation was consistent with DoD’s justification. Specifically, the Commission views that the relocation of the 7th Special Forces Group to Eglin AFB, FL, provides this unit an opportunity to achieve outstanding joint training through its collocation with the Air Force Special Operations Command. Also, the Commission found that this relocation enables the activation of the 4th Brigade Combat Team, 82D Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, NC, and it is consistent with the Army’s transformation efforts and the Force Structure Plan.
COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission found the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and force structure plan. Therefore, the Commission approved the recommendation of the Secretary.

FORT MONMOUTH, NEW JERSEY

RECOMMENDATION # 5 (ARMY 11)

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SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Close Fort Monmouth, NJ. Relocate the US Army Military Academy Preparatory School to West Point, NY. Relocate the Joint Network Management System Program Office to Fort Meade, MD. Relocate the Budget/Funding, Contracting, Cataloging, Requisition Processing, Customer Services, Item Management, Stock Control, Weapon System Secondary Item Support, Requirements Determination, Integrated Materiel Management Technical Support Inventory Control Point functions for Consumable Items to Defense Supply Center Columbus, OH, and reestablish them as Defense Logistics Agency Inventory Control Point functions; relocate the procurement management and related support functions for depot level repairables to Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, and designate them as Inventory Control Point functions, detachment of Defense Supply Center Columbus, OH, and relocate the remaining integrated materiel management, user, and related support functions to Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD. Relocate Information Systems, Sensors, Electronic Warfare, and Electronics Research and Development & Acquisition (RDA) to Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD. Relocate the elements of the Program Executive Office for Enterprise Information Systems and consolidate into the Program Executive Office, Enterprise Information Systems at Fort Belvoir, VA.

Realign Fort Belvoir, VA, by relocating and consolidating Sensors, Electronics, and Electronic Warfare Research, Development and Acquisition activities to Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, and by relocating and consolidating Information Systems Research and Development and Acquisition (except for the Program Executive Office, Enterprise Information Systems) to Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD.

Realign Army Research Institute, Fort Knox, KY, by relocating Human Systems Research to Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD.

Realign Redstone Arsenal, AL, by relocating and consolidating Information Systems Development and Acquisition to Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD.

Realign the PM Acquisition, Logistics and Technology Enterprise Systems and Services (ALTESS) facility at 2511 Jefferson Davis Hwy, Arlington, VA, a leased installation, by relocating and consolidating into the Program Executive Office, Enterprise Information Systems at Fort Belvoir, VA.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

The closure of Fort Monmouth allows the Army to pursue several transformational and BRAC objectives. These include: consolidating training to enhance coordination, doctrine development, training effectiveness, and improve operational and functional efficiencies, and consolidating RDA and T&E functions on fewer installations. Retain DoD installations with the most flexible capability to accept new missions. Consolidate or collocate common business functions with other agencies to provide better level of services at a reduced cost.

The recommendation relocates the US Army Military Academy Preparatory School to West Point, NY, and increases training to enhance coordination, doctrine development, training effectiveness and improve operational and functional efficiencies.

The recommendation establishes a Land C4ISR Lifecycle Management Command (LCMC) to focus technical activity and accelerate transition. This recommendation addresses the transformational objective of Network Centric Warfare.
solution of the significant challenges of realizing the potential of Network Centric Warfare for land combat forces requires integrated research in C4ISR technologies (engineered networks of sensors, communications, information processing), and individual and networked human behavior. The recommendation increases efficiency through consolidation. Research, Development and Acquisition (RDA), Test and Evaluation (T&E) of Army Land C4ISR technologies and systems is currently split among three major sites—Fort Monmouth, NJ, Fort Dix, NJ, Adelphi, MD, and Fort Belvoir, VA, and several smaller sites, including Redstone Arsenal and Fort Knox. Consolidation of RDA at fewer sites achieves efficiency and synergy at a lower cost than would be required for multiple sites.

This action preserves the Army’s “commodity” business model by near collocation of Research, Development, Acquisition, and Logistics functions. Further, combining RDA and T&E requires test ranges, which cannot be created at Fort Monmouth.

The closure of Fort Monmouth and relocation of functions that enhance the Army’s military value, is consistent with the Army’s Force Structure Plan, and maintains adequate surge capabilities. Fort Monmouth is an acquisition and research installation with little capacity to be utilized for other purposes. Military value is enhanced by relocating the research functions to under-utilized and better equipped facilities; by relocating the administrative functions to multipurpose installations with higher military and administrative value; and by co-locating education activities with the schools they support. Utilizing existing space and facilities at the gaining installations maintains both support to the Army Force Structure Plan and capabilities for meeting surge requirements.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The communities surrounding Fort Monmouth, NJ as well as many elected officials, maintained that a significant number of current civilian employees would not move to Aberdeen Proving Grounds, MD, creating a serious “brain drain” for the Land C4ISR mission. They further claim that Aberdeen Proving Grounds has virtually no existing C4ISR mission or capability. Advocates for Fort Monmouth questioned the availability of qualified personnel for technical jobs at other locations. They believed a move would have detrimental effects on all of the programs underway at Fort Monmouth, and could potentially harm soldiers involved in wartime operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The community disputed DoD’s justifications that test and evaluation activities were limited by Fort Monmouth’s small size, and claimed that established and growing relationships with the nearby Fort Dix-McGuire AFB-Navy Lakehurst complex overcame any constraints on future mission activities. Some advocates went further and urged the Commission to consider realigning Fort Monmouth, converting it into an enclave, and merging it with Dix-McGuire-Lakehurst. There was also concern that closure would have a significant negative impact upon the local retiree and veterans’ community, as well as the economy of that portion of NJ.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found that moving the Night Vision and Electronic Sensors Directorate (known as the Night Vision Laboratory) and the Program Manager Night Vision/Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Acquisition (PM NV/RSTA) at Fort Belvoir would add costs and risks to important ongoing programs.

Next, the Commission found that loss of some intellectual capital is a concern and is to be expected in this closure, and agreed with the Department’s view of this as an implementation challenge that must be managed with careful planning and sequencing. The Department pointed out that there is a nationally recognized science and technology workforce in Maryland containing the highest percentage of professional and technical workers (about 24 percent).

The Commission concluded that adverse effects of moving existing programs could be managed over the six-year implementation period by properly sequencing the movement of programs to ensure no loss in service, or by providing temporary redundant or duplicative capabilities as necessary to ensure continuous and uninterrupted program integrity. The Commission was also told by the Secretary of the Army that under no circumstances would the Army permit the move to sacrifice or shortchange ongoing C4ISR support and services to warfighters in the field. While the Commission accepted this pledge, and agreed with the Department’s position, the critically important nature of the missions resulted in the Commission adding modifying language to ensure that the intent of both the Department and the Commission would be clearly understood by future Secretaries and other leadership during the implementation period. A reporting requirement was also added so Congress could exercise the necessary independent oversight to make sure the Commission’s intent was faithfully implemented by the Department. The Commission also believes Congress’ oversight on this issue may benefit from review by the Government Accountability Office.

Last, to ensure that all parties correctly understand which organizations remain at Fort Belvoir and which move to Aberdeen Proving Grounds, the following Unit Identification Code (UIC) level of detail is provided.
1. The following organizations remain at Fort Belvoir under this recommendation as amended:

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<th>UIC</th>
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<td>W4G828</td>
<td>NVESD (Night Vision Lab)</td>
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<tr>
<td>W6DP02</td>
<td>PM NV/RSTA</td>
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2. The following organizations move from Fort Belvoir to Aberdeen Proving Ground under this recommendation as amended:

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<td>W4G875</td>
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**Commission Recommendations**

The Commission found that the Secretary of Defense substantially deviated from final selection criteria 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 7, and the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following:

Close Fort Monmouth, NJ. Relocate the US Army Military Academy Preparatory School to West Point, NY. Relocate the Joint Network Management System Program Office to Fort Meade, MD. Relocate the Budget/Funding, Contracting, Cataloging, Requisition Processing, Customer Services, Item Management, Stock Control, Weapon System Secondary Item Support, Requirements Determination, Integrated Materiel Management Technical Support Inventory Control Point functions for Consumable Items to Defense Supply Center Columbus, OH, and reestablish them as Defense Logistics Agency Inventory Control Point functions; relocate the procurement management and related support functions for depot-level repairables to Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, and designate them as Inventory Control Point functions, detachment of Defense Supply Center Columbus, OH, and relocate the remaining integrated materiel management, user, and related support functions to Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD. Relocate Information Systems, Sensors, Electronic Warfare, and Electronics Research and Development & Acquisition (RDA) to Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD. Relocate the elements of the Program Executive Office for Enterprise Information Systems and consolidate into the Program Executive Office, Enterprise Information Systems at Fort Belvoir, VA.

Realign Fort Belvoir, VA, by relocating and consolidating Sensors, Electronics, and Electronic Warfare Research, Development and Acquisition activities to Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, except the Night Vision and Electronic Sensors Directorate (the Night Vision Lab) and the Project Manager Night Vision/Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Acquisition (PM NV/RSTA), and by relocating and consolidating Information Systems Research and Development and Acquisition (except for the Program Executive Office, Enterprise Information Systems) to Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD.

Realign Army Research Institute, Fort Knox, KY, by relocating Human Systems Research to Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD.

Realign Redstone Arsenal, AL, by relocating and consolidating Information Systems Development and Acquisition to Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD.

Realign the PM Acquisition, Logistics and Technology Enterprise Systems and Services (ALTESS) facility at 2511 Jefferson Davis Hwy, Arlington, VA, a leased installation, by relocating and consolidating into the Program Executive Office, Enterprise Information Systems at Fort Belvoir, VA.

The Secretary of Defense shall submit a report to the Congressional Committees of Jurisdiction that movement of organizations, functions, or activities from Fort Monmouth to Aberdeen Proving Ground will be accomplished without disruption of their support to the Global War on Terrorism or other critical contingency operations and that safeguards exist to ensure that necessary redundant capabilities are put in place to mitigate potential degradation of such support, and to ensure maximum retention of critical workforce.

The Commission found that this change and the recommendation as amended are consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. The full text of this and all Commission recommendations can be found in Appendix Q.
**FORT HOOD, TEXAS**

**RECOMMENDATION # 6 (ARMY 15)**

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**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION**

Realign Fort Hood, TX, by relocating a Brigade Combat Team (BCT) and Unit of Employment (UEx) Headquarters to Fort Carson, CO.

**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION**

This recommendation ensures Army BCTs and support units are located at installations capable of training modular formations, both mounted and dismounted, at home station with sufficient land and facilities to test, simulate, or fire all organic weapon systems.

This recommendation enhances the military value of the installations and the home station training and readiness of the units at the installations by relocating units to installations that can best support the training and maneuver requirements associated with the Army's transformation. This recommendation relocates to Fort Carson, CO, a Heavy BCT that will be temporarily stationed at Fort Hood in FY06, and a Unit of Employment Headquarters. The Army is temporarily stationing this BCT to Fort Hood in FY06 due to operational necessity and to support current operational deployments in support of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). However, based on the BRAC analysis, Fort Hood does not have sufficient facilities and available maneuver training acreage and ranges to support six permanent heavy BCTs and numerous other operational units stationed there. Fort Carson has sufficient capacity to support these units. The Army previously obtained approval from the Secretary of Defense to temporarily station a third BCT at Fort Carson in FY05. Due to Fort Carson’s capacity, the BRAC analysis indicates that the Army should permanently station this third BCT at Fort Carson.

This relocation never pays back because it involves the relocation of a newly activated unit. No permanent facilities exist to support the unit.

**COMMUNITY CONCERNS**

The community argued that realignment of Fort Hood would result in a loss of personnel due to the relocation of approximately 4,100 soldiers to Fort Carson and almost 5,000 personnel to Fort Bliss, based on 2005 data, rather than the 2003 certified data provided to the Commission. The local community has embraced the newly activated BCT and did not consider this unit as temporarily stationed at Fort Hood. They asserted soldiers have already purchased homes and integrated into the community. The community fears housing prices will drop and soldiers forced to sell homes will experience significant financial losses. Also, the community stated that it responded to the so-called temporary increase in soldiers with increased housing, police, fire and municipal services. They argued that realigning Fort Hood, leaving only five Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) permanently stationed there, would forego important existing training facilities and create 15 percent excess capacity. The community proposed retention of 6 BCTs at Fort Hood, believing the base has the capacity to train and support up to 50,000 soldiers and their families.

**COMMISSION FINDINGS**

The Commission’s review and analysis found that moving a Brigade Combat Team (BCT) and Unit of Employment (UEx) Headquarters to Fort Carson would enhance military value and improve future mission capabilities. Fort Hood is a model installation for the Army in terms of its infrastructure, ranges, and power projection capabilities, and its very high overall quantitative military value score reflects those favorable installation characteristics. However, Fort Hood’s constraining variable is maneuver acres and, more specifically, its contiguous maneuver acres. The Commission’s independent and objective analysis showed that, with or without including Piñon Canyon Maneuver Site in the accounting of acreage, Fort
Carson still has more contiguous maneuver acres per brigade combat team than Fort Hood. The Commission views the UEx headquarters relocation to Fort Carson, CO, as important to provide the four planned BCTs with an appropriate-level command and control headquarters. The Commission found in favor of the overall recommendation as providing the necessary balance to the force structure. The Commission took community concerns into account but found them to be offset by the increased military value of DoD’s recommendation.

**Commission Recommendations**

The Commission found the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and force structure plan. Therefore, the Commission approved the recommendation of the Secretary.

**Red River Army Depot, Texas**

**Recommendation #7 (Army 16)**

- **One-time Cost:** $150.9M
- **Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings):** ($22.5M)
- **20-Year Net Present Value:** ($187.7M)
- **Payback Period:** 5 years

**Secretary of Defense Recommendation**

Close Red River Army Depot, TX. Relocate the storage and demilitarization functions of the Munitions Center to McAlester Army Ammunition Plant, OK. Relocate the munitions maintenance functions of the Munitions Center to McAlester Army Ammunition Plant, OK, and Blue Grass Army Depot, KY. Relocate the depot maintenance of Armament and Structural Components, Combat Vehicles, Depot Fleet/Field Support, Engines and Transmissions, Fabrication and Manufacturing, Fire Control Systems and Components, and Other to Anniston Army Depot, AL. Relocate the depot maintenance of Powertrain Components and Starters/Generators to Marine Corps Logistics Base Albany, GA. Relocate the depot maintenance of Construction Equipment to Anniston Army Depot, AL, and Marine Corps Logistics Base Albany, GA. Relocate the depot maintenance of Tactical Vehicles to Tobyhanna Army Depot, PA, and Letterkenny Depot, PA. Relocate the depot maintenance of Tactical Missiles to Letterkenny Army Depot, PA. Disestablish the supply, storage, and distribution functions for tires, packaged Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants, and compressed gases. Relocate the storage and distribution functions and associated inventories of the Defense Distribution Depot to the Defense Distribution Depot, Oklahoma City, OK.

**Secretary of Defense Justification**

This recommendation supports the strategy of minimizing the number of industrial base sites performing depot maintenance for ground and missile systems. The receiving depots have greater maintenance capability, higher facility utilization and greater opportunities for interservice workloading. This recommendation reinforces Anniston’s and Letterkenny’s roles as Centers of Industrial and Technical Excellence for Combat Vehicles (Anniston) and Missile Systems (Letterkenny).

This recommendation decreases the cost of depot maintenance operations by consolidation and elimination of 30 percent of duplicate overhead structures required to operate multiple depot maintenance activities. This recommendation also increases opportunities for interservice workloading by transferring maintenance workload to the Marine Corps.

This recommendation relocates storage, demilitarization, and munitions maintenance functions to McAlester Army Ammunition Plant, and thereby reduces redundancy and removes excess from Red River Munitions Center.

This recommendation allows DoD to create centers of excellence, generate efficiencies, and create deployment networks servicing all Services.

This recommendation relocates the storage and distribution functions and associated inventories to the Defense Distribution Depot Oklahoma City at Tinker Air Force Base. It also contributes to the elimination of unnecessary redundancies and duplication, and streamlines supply and storage processes.
The disestablishment of the wholesale supply, storage, and distribution functions for all packaged POL, tires, and compressed gas products supports transformation by privatizing these functions. Privatization of packaged POL, tires, and compressed gas products will eliminate inventories, infrastructure and personnel associated with these functions and products.

**Community Concerns**

The community stated that the Army must retain all depots to support the warfighter and combatant commanders, disputed DoD's assertion of excess capacity, and claimed the recommendation deviated substantially from the military value criteria. The community focused on the Industrial Joint Cross Service Group’s creation of 2.6 million direct labor hours of capacity at Anniston and Letterkenny Army Depots to justify closure of the Red River Army Depot (RRAD) over Army objections, and the artificial use of a 60-hour work week instead of the DoD 40-hour standard for determining capacity. Also highlighted was the disestablishment of the top-ranked Defense Distribution Red River, TX, center due to the potential closure of the RRAD. The community emphasized that there was no excess capacity to eliminate because Red River was running at twice its 2003 level of effort and pointed to a major backlog of Bradley Fighting Vehicles and High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV) awaiting repair at the depot. They also highlighted that RRAD is the only facility that strips and replaces track pads and manufactures M1 road wheels. The community proposed leaving the Red River Army Depot, Munitions Center, and Defense Distribution Center intact. The community argued that the economic impact from closure would be devastating, creating a projected unemployment rate exceeding 14 percent of the total employment in the seven surrounding rural towns.

**Commission Findings**

The Commission found that many vehicle and weapons systems repaired at Red River are critical to ongoing realtime efforts in Operations Iraqi Freedom/Enduring Freedom, and was unwilling to take the risk of closing a ground vehicle depot-level maintenance facility during a time of war and uncertainty. The Army is already surging its industrial base capacity with the execution of 12 million direct labor hours (DLH) in fiscal year 2004, and goals of 19 million DLH in fiscal year 2005 and 25 million DLH in fiscal year 2006 at the Army's five maintenance depots. The Commission found that Red River is operating at twice its fiscal year 2003 level (when BRAC data-calls were issued) and that there is no current excess capacity within the Army's maintenance depots. The Army's depot level maintenance workload has and continues to increase to respond to several critical Army efforts. Ongoing business process reengineering efforts have also successfully resulted in significant process improvements at each of the maintenance depots. In response to community concerns, the Commission recalculated the economic impact to incorporate increased staffing, and if closure had been approved, it would have resulted in a negative economic impact of 8.3 percent of area jobs. The Commission’s analysis determined that the amended realignment recommendation would best meet the military’s future needs and requirements.

**Commission Recommendations**

The Commission found the Secretary of Defense substantially deviated from final selection criteria 1, 2, 3 and 6 and the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following:

Realign Red River Army Depot, TX. Relocate the storage and demilitarization functions of the Munitions Center to McAlester Army Ammunition Plant, OK. Relocate the munitions maintenance functions of the Munitions Center to McAlester Army Ammunition Plant, OK, and Blue Grass Army Depot, KY. Relocate the depot maintenance of Tactical Missiles to Letterkenny Army Depot, PA. Disestablish the supply, storage, and distribution functions for tires, packaged Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants, and compressed gases.

The Commission found that this change and the recommendation as amended are consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. The full text of this and all other recommendations can be found in Appendix Q.
FORT MONROE, VIRGINIA

RECOMMENDATION # 8 (ARMY 19)

One-time Cost: $72.4M
Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings): ($56.9M)
20-Year Net Present Value: ($686.6M)
Payback Period: 1 Year

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Close Fort Monroe, VA. Relocate the US Army Training & Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Headquarters, the Installation Management Agency (IMA) Northeast Region Headquarters, the US Army Network Enterprise Technology Command (NETCOM) Northeast Region Headquarters and the Army Contracting Agency Northern Region Office to Fort Eustis, VA. Relocate the US Army Accessions Command and US Army Cadet Command to Fort Knox, KY.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

This recommendation closes Fort Monroe, an administrative installation, and moves the tenant Headquarters organizations to Fort Eustis and Fort Knox. It enhances the Army’s military value, is consistent with the Army's Force Structure Plan, and maintains adequate surge capabilities to address unforeseen future requirements. The closure allows the Army to move administrative headquarters to multi-purpose installations that provide the Army more flexibility to accept new missions. Both Fort Eustis and Fort Knox have operational and training capabilities that Fort Monroe lacks, and both have excess capacity that can be used to accept the organizations relocating from Fort Monroe.

The recommended relocations also retain or enhance vital linkages between the relocating organizations and other headquarters activities. TRADOC HQs is moved to Fort Eustis in order to remain within commuting distance of the Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) HQs in Norfolk, VA. JFCOM oversees all joint training across the military. IMA and NETCOM HQs are moved to Fort Eustis because of recommendations to consolidate the Northeastern and Southeastern regions of these two commands into one Eastern Region at Fort Eustis. The ACA Northern Region is relocated to Fort Eustis because its two largest customers are TRADOC and IMA. The Accessions and Cadet Commands are relocated to Fort Knox because of recommendations to locate the Army’s Human Resources Command at Fort Knox. The HRC recommendation includes the collocation of the Accessions and Cadet Commands with the Recruiting Command already at Fort Knox and creates a Center of Excellence for military personnel and recruiting functions by improving personnel life-cycle management.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community offered a partnership with the Army through the Hampton Industrial Development Agency to construct an office complex and lease-back arrangement with the Army. It was concerned that the BRAC process precluded the Army from talking to the Community about viable alternatives to closure of Fort Monroe. The Community believed that the history and unique nature of the installation necessitates its continued use. This argument was further supported by what the Community believes will be ordnance cleanup costs greatly exceeding any of the Army's estimates. The Community reminded the Army that the main portion of Fort Monroe's property contains a reversion provision and must be returned to the State of Virginia in an environmentally clean condition. It contended that property boundaries are now encumbered with historic facilities that will complicate the reversion and will likely lead to litigation. The Community concluded that because of the large number of historic facilities, historic events, cost of cleanup and title issues, Fort Monroe is most suited for continued military use. If these issues could be resolved, the community concedes that Fort Monroe has a very high reuse potential.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found no reason to disagree with DoD’s overall recommendation but noted that the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) move to Fort Eustis in Newport News, VA, is based on a construction cost estimate that anticipates utilizing facilities to be vacated by the Transportation School. Accordingly, construction of Headquarters, TRADOC at any other location such as Fort Story is not in keeping with the intent of the recommendation. The
Commission found that Fort Monroe is a National Historical Landmark and that some or all of the real property of the landmark contains a reversion to the State of Virginia. The State advised the Commission that property boundaries are now encumbered with facilities in the historic district, complicating the reversion. The Commission urges the Army to begin early consultation with the State Historic Preservation Office and other State officials to ensure preservation of these historic assets. The Commission found that the Secretary of Defense reported to the Commission that a Military Munitions Response Program would likely be required at Fort Monroe but reported no estimate of cost. However, the Commission notes that DoD’s Defense Environmental Programs annual report to Congress for fiscal year 2004 showed an estimated cost of $201 million for cleanup at Fort Monroe. The Commission found that the Joint Task Force-Civil Support, a new major tenant on Fort Monroe, was not identified in the Secretary of Defense’s recommendations and will require relocation during the implementation period.

**Commission Recommendations**

The Commission found the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and force structure plan. Therefore, the Commission approved the recommendation of the Secretary.

**Maneuver Training**

**Recommendation # 9 (Army 20)**

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**Secretary of Defense Recommendation**

Realignment of Fort Knox, KY, by relocating the Armor Center and School to Fort Benning, GA, to accommodate the activation of an Infantry Brigade Combat Team (BCT) at Fort Knox, KY, and the relocation of engineer, military police, and combat service support units from Europe and Korea. Realignment of Fort McCoy, WI, by relocating the 84th Army Reserve Regional Training Center to Fort Knox, KY.

**Secretary of Defense Justification**

This recommendation enhances military value, improves training and deployment capabilities, better utilizes training resources, and creates significant efficiencies and cost savings while maintaining sufficient surge capability to address unforeseen requirements. It properly locates Operational Army units in support of the Army’s Force Structure Plans and modular force transformation.

This recommendation supports the consolidation of the Armor and Infantry Centers and Schools at Fort Benning and creates a Maneuver Center of Excellence for ground forces training and doctrine development. It consolidates both Infantry and Armor One Station Unit Training (OSUT), which allows the Army to reduce the total number of Basic Combat Training locations from five to four.

This recommendation also relocates the 84th ARRTC to Fort Knox and supports another recommendation that relocates Army Reserve Command and Control units to Fort McCoy. These relocations enhance command and control within the Army Reserve and promote interaction between the Active and Reserve Components.

This recommendation directly supports the Army’s operational unit stationing and training requirements by using available facilities, ranges, training land at Fort Knox, KY, (vacated by the Armor Center and School) to effectively and efficiently relocate various Combat Support and Combat Service Support units returning from overseas, and as the installation platform for the activation of a new Infantry BCT. These units are a combination of the relocation of Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy (IGPBS)-related units returning from overseas and the activation of units as part of the Army’s modular force transformation.
COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The Fort Knox, KY, community reluctantly supported the loss of Ft. Knox’s Armor Center and School and the related armor tradition because of offsetting gains at Fork Knox from other DoD BRAC recommendations. However, it questioned whether the same quality of Armor training could be reconstituted at Fort Benning due to its concern that insufficient training land and facilities are available at Fort Benning. Both Fort Knox and Fort Benning communities requested clarification of which Armor Center and School-related activities will relocate to Fort Benning. Fort Knox wanted to retain a museum to preserve its Armor legacy.

The Columbus, GA, and Fort Benning community welcomed the relocation of the Armor Center and School, and indicated full support for this portion of DoD’s recommendation. However, the Fort Benning community was concerned that an additional brigade combat team (BCT), previously planned for Fort Benning, is instead now identified in this recommendation for stationing at Fort Knox. The Fort Benning community felt the Army ought to station additional units at Fort Benning to more fully use its available capacity.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

Although the Fort Benning community was concerned that the Army BRAC proposal revised a pre-BRAC plan to activate a brigade at Fort Benning but did not identify substitute units to be based at Fort Benning, the Commission found that the Army does not currently plan to add major units to Fort Benning as part of BRAC but may do so outside of BRAC. Both the Fort Benning and Fort Knox communities requested clarification from the Army about which specific units would relocate under BRAC from Fort Knox to Fort Benning, and the Commission obtained the needed Army clarification. Last, the Fort Knox community expressed concern that the Armor Center and School functions might not be readily accommodated at Fort Benning, but the Commission found the Army would implement the transfer only as the moves are fully supportable and that Armor student training will not be degraded by BRAC moves. The Commission found that Army BRAC plans relocate the museum portion on the Armor school manning document, and remaining museum issue resolutions can be addressed during implementation.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission found the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and force structure plan. Therefore, the Commission approved the recommendation of the Secretary.

OPERATIONAL ARMY (IGPBS)

RECOMMENDATION # 10 (ARMY 22)

One-time Cost: $3,946.0M
Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings): $294.7M
20-Year Net Present Value: $7,826.7M
Payback Period: NEVER

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Realign Fort Bliss, TX, by relocating air defense artillery units to Fort Sill and relocating 1st Armored Division and various echelons above division units from Germany and Korea to Fort Bliss, TX. Realign Fort Sill by relocating an artillery (Fires) brigade to Fort Bliss. Realign Fort Hood, TX, by relocating maneuver battalions, a support battalion, and aviation units to Fort Bliss, TX. Realign Fort Riley, KS, by inactivating various units, activating a Brigade Combat Team (BCT) and relocating 1st Infantry Division units and various echelons above division units from Germany and Korea to Fort Riley, KS. Realign Fort Campbell, KY, by relocating an attack aviation battalion to Fort Riley, KS.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

This proposal ensures the Army has sufficient infrastructure, training land and ranges to meet the requirements to transform the Operational Army as identified in the Twenty Year Force Structure Plan. It also ensures the Army maintains adequate
surge capacity. As part of the modular force transformation, the Army is activating 10 new combat arms brigades for a total of 43 active component brigade combat teams (BCTs). Including the results of the Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy (IGPBS), the number of BCTs stationed in the United States will rise from twenty-six to forty. Relocating the units listed in this recommendation to Fort Bliss, Fort Riley, and Fort Sill takes advantage of available infrastructure and training land. Fort Bliss and Fort Riley are installations capable of training modular formations, both mounted and dismounted, at home station with sufficient land and facilities to test, simulate, or fire all organic weapon systems. This recommendation enhances home station training and readiness of the units at all installations.

Relocating 1st Armored Division units and echelons above division (EAD) units to Fort Bliss will transform it from an institutional training installation into a major mounted maneuver training installation. This avoids overcrowding and overuse at other installations by stationing them at one of the installations with the greatest capacity. It also creates a potential opportunity for enhanced Operational Testing due to the close proximity of Fort Bliss to White Sands Missile Range.

Relocating an Air Defense Artillery (ADA) unit to Fort Sill supports the establishment of the Net Fires Center, combining the Artillery and ADA schools at Fort Sill and provides a force stabilization opportunity for soldiers in this unit. Relocating the Artillery (Fires) Brigade to Fort Bliss collocates the artillery with the maneuver units at Fort Bliss and vacates space at Fort Sill for the ADA unit.

Realigning Fort Riley by inactivating an Engineer Brigade Headquarters, two other engineer units, two maneuver battalions and other smaller units beginning in FY 06 directly supports the Army’s modular force transformation. It also facilitates activating a BCT in FY 06, and relocating 1st Infantry Division Headquarters, the Division Support Command Headquarters, Aviation Brigade units and other units returning from overseas to Fort Riley. The relocation of an attack aviation battalion from Fort Campbell to Fort Riley supports the formation of a multifunctional aviation brigade at Fort Riley.

The Army obtained approval to temporarily station a BCT at Fort Hood in 2005 and another BCT at Fort Bliss in 2006. This recommendation validates the stationing of that BCT at Fort Bliss and relocates two maneuver battalions, an armored reconnaissance squadron and a support battalion from Fort Hood to support the activation at Fort Bliss. Relocating these battalions will provide the assets necessary to accomplish the activation. Relocating aviation units from Fort Hood supports the activation of a multifunctional aviation brigade.

While this recommendation does not in BRAC terms save money, the costs are mitigated by the non-BRAC savings that will accrue to the Department from the closure or realignment of the overseas locations from which these units come. Those non-BRAC savings amount to $4,400M during the 6-year period and approximately $20,000M of 20-year net present value savings.

**Community Concerns**

Fort Bliss, TX was the only installation to express community issues to the Commission concerning the relocation of an operational air defense artillery (ADA) brigade to Fort Sill, OK. The Fort Bliss community argued relocating an operational ADA brigade to Fort Sill does not sufficiently consider the brigade’s strategic deployment and training requirements. The community also believed that the certified data undervalued the airspace capacity at Fort Bliss. They urged the Commission to retain the ADA missile brigade at Fort Bliss and reject this DoD recommendation.

**Commission Findings**

The Commission found that realignments associated with this recommendation were consistent with the DoD justification. The Commission conducted an independent and in-depth review of the requirements for training and live-fire of these systems. Fort Sill has 42,000 maneuver acres compared with 992,000 maneuver acres at Fort Bliss. While Fort Sill ranges cannot support live fire, and they are not compatible with tank or mechanized infantry unit maneuver requirements, they are compatible with the movement and positioning of artillery units. Field artillery units have trained at Fort Sill successfully for years, and the air defense artillery brigade will be able to accomplish its maneuver training at Fort Sill as well. The Commission’s analysis confirmed that ADA units at Fort Sill will have to deploy to Fort Bliss to live-fire. The Avenger system requirement is to live-fire one missile per platoon every six months. Therefore, this will require additional simulation and deployments to Fort Bliss to meet the requirement. However, the Patriot system live-fire requirement is infrequent, with one missile launch per battery every other year, and only if missiles are available. This can be satisfied through simulation and deployments to Fort Bliss in conjunction with other joint exercises, to include Roving Sands.
The Commission found that relocating this brigade was not optimal, but it was suitable and did not rise to the level of a substantial deviation. It enabled the Net Fires center and concepts at Fort Sill through the collocation of an operational ADA brigade with an institutional ADA brigade, thus creating synergies and force stabilization opportunities between the units.

**COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS**

The Commission found the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and force structure plan. Therefore, the Commission approved the recommendation of the Secretary.

**RC Transformation in Alabama**

**Recommendation # 11 (Army 25)**

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**Secretary of Defense Recommendation**

Realign Birmingham Armed Forces Reserve Center, Birmingham, AL, by relocating Detachment 1, 450th Military Police Company into a new Armed Forces Reserve Center (AFRC) on or near Birmingham Air National Guard Base, Birmingham, AL, if the Army is able to acquire land suitable for the construction of the facility. The new AFRC shall have the capability to accommodate the Alabama National Guard units from the following Alabama ARNG Readiness Centers: Fort Graham, Fort Hanna and Fort Terhune, Birmingham, AL, if the state decides to relocate those National Guard units.

Close the Wright United States Army Reserve Center, Mobile, AL, and relocate units into a new Armed Forces Reserve Center in Mobile, AL, if the Army is able to acquire land suitable for the construction of the facility. The new AFRC shall have the capability to accommodate Alabama National Guard units from the following Alabama ARNG Readiness Centers: Fort Ganey, and Fort Hardeman, Mobile, AL, if the state decides to relocate those National Guard units.

Close the Faith Wing United States Army Reserve Center on Fort McClellan, AL, and relocate units into a new Armed Forces Reserve Center on Pelham Range in Anniston, AL.

Close the Finnell United States Army Reserve Center and the Area Maintenance Support Activity, Tuscaloosa, AL, and the Vicksburg United States Army Reserve Center, Vicksburg, MS, and relocate units into a new Armed Forces Reserve Center and Area Maintenance Support Activity (AMSA) in Tuscaloosa, AL, if the Army is able to acquire land suitable for the construction of the facilities. The new AFRC and AMSA shall have the capability to accommodate the 31st Chemical Brigade from the Northport Alabama Army National Guard Readiness Center and units from the Fort Powell-Shamblin Alabama Army National Guard Readiness Center, Tuscaloosa, AL, if the state decides to relocate those National Guard units.

Close the Screws Army Reserve Center in Montgomery, AL; close the Cleveland Abbot Army Reserve Center, Tuskegee, AL; close the Harry Gary, Jr. Army Reserve Center, in Enterprise, AL; close the Quarles-Flowers Army Reserve Center in Decatur, AL; close the Grady Anderson Army Reserve Center, Troy, AL; and relocate all units to a new Armed Forces Reserve Center (AFRC) at the Alabama Army National Guard Joint Forces Headquarters Complex in Montgomery, AL, if the Army is able to acquire suitable property for the construction of the facilities. The new AFRC shall have the capability to accommodate ARNG units currently located on the Alabama Army National Guard Joint Forces Headquarters Complex in Montgomery, AL, if the state decides to relocate those National Guard units.

**Secretary of Defense Justification**

This recommendation transforms Reserve Component facilities throughout the State of Alabama. The implementation of this recommendation will enhance military value, improve homeland defense capability, greatly improve training and deployment capability, create significant efficiencies and cost savings, and is consistent with the Army’s Force Structure Plans and Army transformational objectives.
This recommendation is the result of a state-wide analysis of Reserve Component installations and facilities conducted by a team of functional experts from Headquarters, Department of the Army, the Office of the State Adjutant General, and the Army Reserve Regional Readiness Command.

This recommendation closes nine Army Reserve Centers and one Area Maintenance Support Activity throughout the state of Alabama and constructs five multicomponent/service, multifunctional Armed Forces Reserve Centers, and one Area Maintenance Support Facility capable of accommodating National Guard and Reserve units. This recommendation reduces military manpower and associated costs for maintaining existing facilities by collapsing fifteen geographically separated facilities into five modern Armed Forces Reserve Centers. The Department understands that the State of Alabama will close ALARNG Readiness Centers: Fort Graham, Fort Hanna, Fort Terhune, Fort Ganey, Fort Hardeman and Fort Powell-Shamblin and realign the Northport Alabama Army National Guard Readiness Center by relocating the 31st Chemical Brigade to the new AFRC. The Armed Forces Reserve Centers will have the capability to accommodate these units if the state decides to relocate the units from these closed facilities into the new AFRCs.

This recommendation considered feasible locations within the demographic and geographic areas of the closing facilities and affected units. The site selected was determined as the best location because it optimizes the Reserve Components’ ability to recruit and retain Reserve Component soldiers and to train and mobilize units affected by this recommendation.

This recommendation provides the opportunity for other Local, State, or Federal organizations to partner with the Reserve Components to enhance homeland security and homeland defense at a reduced cost to those agencies.

Although not captured in the COBRA analysis, this recommendation avoids an estimated $72.8M in mission facility renovation costs and procurement avoidances associated with meeting AT/FP construction standards and altering existing facilities to meet unit training and communications requirements. Consideration of these avoided costs would reduce costs and increase the net savings to the Department of Defense in the 6-year BRAC implementation period and in the 20-year period used to calculate NPV.

**Community Concerns**

There were no formal expressions from the community.

**Commission Findings**

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense. In addition, the Commission notes that the Army's process was well thought-out and inclusive of the leadership of the Reserve Components and the State.

**Commission Recommendations**

The Commission found the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and force structure plan. Therefore, the Commission approved the recommendation of the Secretary.

**Reserve Component Transformation in Arizona**

**Recommendation # 12 (Army 28)**

- **One-time Cost:** $31.1M
- **Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings):** ($5.9M)
- **20-Year Net Present Value:** ($51.7M)
- **Payback Period:** 5 Years

**Secretary of Defense Recommendation**

Close the United States Army Reserve Center, Allen Hall near Tucson, AZ, and the Area Maintenance Support Activity 18 on Fort Huachuca, AZ by relocating all units from the closed facilities to an Armed Forces Reserve Center and maintenance facility on the Arizona Army National Guard Silverbell Army Heliport/Pinal Air Park in Marana, AZ, if the Army is able to acquire suitable land for the construction of the facilities. The new AFRC shall have the capability to accommodate the
Arizona National Guard 860th MP Company and the 98th Troop Command from Papago Park Readiness Center if the state of Arizona decides to relocate those units.

Close the Deer Valley United States Army Reserve Center (#2) in Phoenix and relocate units to a new Armed Forces Reserve Center on the Arizona Army National Guard Buckeye Training Site. The new AFRC shall have the capability to accommodate units from the Army National Guard Phoenix Readiness Center if the state of Arizona decides to relocate those units.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

This recommendation transforms Reserve Component facilities throughout the State of Arizona. The implementation of this recommendation will enhance military value, improve homeland defense capability, greatly improve training and deployment capability, create significant efficiencies and cost savings, and is consistent with the Army’s Force Structure Plans and Army transformational objectives.

This recommendation is the result of a statewide analysis of Reserve Component installations and facilities conducted by a team of functional experts from Headquarters, Department of the Army, the Office of the State Adjutant General, and the Army Reserve Regional Readiness Command.

This recommendation closes two Army Reserve centers, closes an Army Maintenance Support Activity and constructs two multicomponent, multifunctional Armed Forces Reserve Centers (AFRCs), in the State of Arizona, capable of accommodating National Guard and Army Reserve units. This recommendation reduces military manpower and associated costs for maintaining existing facilities by collapsing units from six geographically separated facilities into two modern Armed Forces Reserve Centers. These joint-use facilities will significantly reduce operating costs and create improved business processes. Relocating units to Buckeye will allow them to utilize a large local training area while maintaining a reasonably close commuting distance from Phoenix. The Department understands that the State of Arizona will close the Army National Guard Reserve Center and Organizational Maintenance Shop Phoenix, AZ, and realign the Papago Park Army National Guard Readiness Center by relocating the 860th Military Police Company and the 98th Troop Command. The Armed Forces Reserve Centers will have the capability to accommodate these units if the state decides to relocate the units from these closed facilities into the new AFRCs. This recommendation provides the opportunity for other Local, State, or Federal organizations to partner with the Reserve Components to enhance homeland security and homeland defense at a reduced cost to those agencies.

Although not captured in the COBRA analysis, this recommendation avoids an estimated $1.8M in mission facility renovation costs and procurement avoidances associated with meeting AT/FP construction standards and altering existing facilities to meet unit training and communications requirements. Consideration of these avoided costs would reduce costs and increase the net savings to the Department of Defense in the 6-year BRAC implementation period and in the 20-year period used to calculate NPV.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

There were no formal expressions from the community.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense. In addition, the Commission notes that the Army’s process was well thought-out and inclusive of the leadership of the Reserve Components and the State.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission found the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and force structure plan. Therefore, the Commission approved the recommendation of the Secretary.
RESERVE COMPONENT TRANSFORMATION IN ARKANSAS

RECOMMENDATION # 13 (ARMY 30)

**One-time Cost:** $118.9M

**Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings):** ($5.8M)

**20-Year Net Present Value:** $38.2M

**Payback Period:** 31 years

**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION**

Close the United States Army Reserve Center, Arkadelphia, AR, and re-locate units into a new Armed Forces Reserve Center in Arkadelphia if the Army is able to acquire suitable land for the construction of the facilities. The new AFRC shall have the capability to accommodate Arkansas National Guard units from the Arkansas Army National Guard Readiness Center, Arkadelphia if the state of Arkansas decides to relocate those units.

Close the United States Army Reserve Center, Camden, AR, and relocate units into an Armed Forces Reserve Center by converting the Arkansas Army National Guard Readiness Center, Camden, if the state decides to alter their facility.

Close the United States Army Reserve Center, El Dorado, AR, and re-locate units into a new Armed Forces Reserve Center in El Dorado if the Army is able to acquire suitable land for the construction of the facilities. The new AFRC shall have the capability to accommodate Arkansas National Guard units from the Arkansas Army National Guard Readiness Center, El Dorado if the state decides to relocate those National Guard units.

Realign the Army Reserve Center, Darby, AR, by relocating the 341st Engineer Company and elements of the 75th Division (Exercise) from buildings #2552-2560, 2516, and 2519, Fort Chaffee, AR, into a new Armed Forces Reserve Center, on Fort Chaffee, AR. The new AFRC shall have the capability to accommodate Arkansas National Guard units from the following Arkansas National Guard Readiness Centers: the Arkansas Army National Guard Readiness Center, Charleston, AR, the Arkansas Army National Guard Readiness Center, Van Buren, AR, and the Arkansas Army National Guard Readiness Center, Fort Smith, AR, if the state decides to relocate those National Guard units.

Close the Army Reserve Equipment Concentration Site (ECS), Barling, AR, and relocate units to a new Joint Maintenance Facility on Fort Chaffee, AR. The new Joint Maintenance Facility shall have the capability to accommodate Arkansas National Guard units from the Arkansas Army National Guard Combined Support Maintenance Shop (CSMS) on Fort Chaffee if the state of Arkansas decides to relocate those units.

Close the United States Army Reserve Center, Hot Springs, AR, and the United States Army Reserve Organizational Maintenance Activity (OMS), Malvern, AR, and relocate units to a new Armed Forces Reserve Center on property located in Hot Springs, AR, if the Army is able to acquire suitable land for the construction of the facilities. The new AFRC shall have the capability to accommodate Arkansas Army National Guard units from the Arkansas Army National Guard Readiness Center in Hot Springs, AR, if the state decides to relocate those units.

Close the United States Army Reserve Center, Jonesboro, AR, and relocate units into a new Armed Forces Reserve Center and Field Maintenance Site in Jonesboro, AR, if the Army is able to acquire suitable land for the construction of the facilities. The new AFRC shall have the capability to accommodate Arkansas National Guard units from the Arkansas Army National Guard Readiness Center, Jonesboro, AR, the Arkansas Army National Guard Readiness Center, Paragould, AR, and the Field Maintenance Site (FMS), Jonesboro if the state decides to relocate those National Guard units. Close the Pond United States Army Reserve Center, Fayetteville, AR, and relocate units into a new Armed Forces Reserve Center in Northwest Arkansas if the Army is able to acquire suitable land for the construction of the facilities. The new AFRC shall have the capability to accommodate Arkansas Army National Guard units from the Arkansas Army National Guard Readiness Centers in Fayetteville, Springdale, Rogers and Bentonville, AR, if the state of Arkansas decides to relocate those units.

Close the Stone United States Army Reserve Center, Pine Bluff, AR, and relocate units into a new Armed Forces Reserve Center on Pine Bluff Arsenal, AR. The new AFRC shall have the capability to accommodate Arkansas National Guard units from the Arkansas Army National Guard Readiness Center, Pine Bluff if the state decides to relocate those National Guard units.
This recommendation transforms Reserve Component facilities throughout the State of Arkansas. The implementation of this recommendation will enhance military value, improve homeland defense capability, greatly improve training and deployment capability, create significant efficiencies and cost savings, and is consistent with the Army's Force Structure Plans and Army transformational objectives.

This recommendation is the result of a state-wide analysis of Reserve Component installations and facilities conducted by a team of functional experts from Headquarters, Department of the Army, the Office of the State Adjutant General, and the Army Reserve Regional Readiness Command.

This recommendation closes seven Army Reserve centers, one Equipment Concentration Site and one Organizational Maintenance Site. It also constructs eight multicomponent, multifunctional Armed Forces Reserve Centers (AFRCs) and one multicomponent, maintenance facility throughout the State of Arkansas, capable of accommodating National Guard and Reserve units. This recommendation reduces military manpower and associated costs for maintaining existing facilities by collapsing twenty-six geographically separated facilities into nine modern, multicomponent facilities. These joint-use facilities will significantly reduce operating costs and create improved business processes. The Department understands that the State of Arkansas will close fifteen Arkansas Army National Guard Readiness Centers: Charleston, Van Buren, Fort Smith, Jonesboro, Paragould, El Dorado, Pine Bluff, Arkadelphia, Fayetteville, Springdale, Rogers, Bentonville, and Hot Springs, the Fort Chaffee Combined Support Maintenance Shop and the Jonesboro Field Maintenance Shop. The Armed Forces Reserve Centers will have the capability to accommodate these units if the state decides to relocate the units from these closed facilities into the new AFRCs. This recommendation considered feasible locations within the demographic and geographic areas of the closing facilities and affected units. The sites selected were determined as the best locations because they optimize the Reserve Components' ability to recruit and retain Reserve Component soldiers and to train and mobilize units affected by this recommendation.

This recommendation provides the opportunity for other Local, State, or Federal organizations to partner with the Reserve Components to enhance homeland security and homeland defense at a reduced cost to those agencies.

Although not captured in the COBRA analysis, this recommendation avoids an estimated $63.3M in mission facility renovation costs and procurement avoidances associated with meeting AT/FP construction standards and altering existing facilities to meet unit training and communications requirements. Consideration of these avoided costs would reduce costs and increase the net savings to the Department of Defense in the 6-year BRAC implementation period and in the 20-year period used to calculate NPV.

**Community Concerns**

There were no formal expressions from the community.

**Commission Findings**

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense. In addition, the Commission notes that the Army's process was well thought-out and inclusive of the leadership of the Reserve Components and the State.

**Commission Recommendations**

The Commission found the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and force structure plan. Therefore, the Commission approved the recommendation of the Secretary.
Reserve Component Transformation in California

Recommendation # 14 (Army 33)

One-time Cost: $78.7M
Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings): ($8.9M)
20-Year Net Present Value: ($46.0M)
Payback Period: 10 Years

Secretary of Defense Recommendation

Close the United States Army Reserve Center, Moffett Field, CA, the George Richey United States Army Reserve Center, San Jose, CA, and the Jones Hall United States Army Reserve Center, Mountain View, CA, and relocate units to a new armed Forces Reserve Center with an Organizational Maintenance Shop on existing Army Reserve property on Moffett Field, CA. The new AFRC shall have the capability to accommodate California National Guard Units from the following California ARNG Readiness Centers: Sunnyvale, San Lorenzo, Redwood City, and the Organizational Maintenance Shop, San Jose, if the state decides to relocate those National Guard units.

Close the Desiderio United States Army Reserve Center, Pasadena, CA, the Schroeder Hall United States Army Reserve Center, Long Beach, CA, the Hazard Park United States Army Reserve Center, Los Angeles, CA, and relocate units to a new Armed Forces Reserve Center on property being transferred to the Army Reserve from the General Services Administration at Bell, CA. The new AFRC shall have the capability to accommodate California National Guard Units from the following California ARNG Readiness Centers: Bell, and Montebello, if the state decides to relocate those National Guard units.

Secretary of Defense Justification

This recommendation transforms Reserve Component facilities throughout the State of California. The implementation of this recommendation will enhance military value, improve homeland defense capability, greatly improve training and deployment capability, create significant efficiencies and cost savings, and is consistent with the Army’s Force Structure Plans and Army transformational objectives.

This recommendation is the result of a state-wide analysis of Reserve Component installations and facilities conducted by a team of functional experts from Headquarters, Department of the Army, the Office of the State Adjutant General, and the Army Reserve Regional Readiness Command.

This recommendation closes six Army Reserve centers, two Naval Reserve Centers, and one Marine Corps Reserve Center throughout the State of California and constructs two multicomponent, multifunctional Armed Forces Reserve Centers (AFRCs) capable of accommodating National Guard and Reserve units. This recommendation reduces military manpower and associated costs for maintaining existing facilities by collapsing fifteen geographically separated facilities into two modern Armed Forces Reserve Centers. These joint-use facilities will significantly reduce operating costs and create improved business processes. The Department understands that the State of California will close five California Army Guard Armories: Sunnyvale, San Lorenzo, Redwood City, Bell, and Montebello, and the Organizational Maintenance Shop, San Jose. The Armed Forces Reserve Centers will have the capability to accommodate these units if the state decides to relocate the units from these closed facilities into the new AFRCs.

The implementation of this recommendation and creation of these new AFRCs will enhance military value, improve homeland defense capability, greatly improve training and deployment capability, create significant efficiencies and cost savings, and is consistent with the Army’s Force Structure Plans and Army transformational objectives.

This recommendation considered feasible locations within the demographic and geographic areas of the closing facilities and affected units. The sites selected were determined as the best locations because they optimize the Reserve Components’ ability to recruit and retain Reserve Component soldiers and to train and mobilize units affected by this recommendation.

This recommendation provides the opportunity for other Local, State, or Federal organizations to partner with the Reserve Components to enhance homeland security and homeland defense at a reduced cost to those agencies.

Although not captured in the COBRA analysis, this recommendation avoids an estimated $6.3M in mission facility renovation costs and procurement avoidances associated with meeting AT/FP construction standards and altering existing facilities to meet unit training and communications requirements. Consideration of these avoided costs would reduce costs
and increase the net savings to the Department of Defense in the 6-year BRAC implementation period and in the 20-year period used to calculate NPV.

**Community Concerns**

There were no formal expressions from the community.

**Commission Findings**

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense. In addition, the Commission notes that the Army's process was well thought-out and inclusive of the leadership of the Reserve Components and the State.

**Commission Recommendations**

The Commission found the Secretary's recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and force structure plan. Therefore, the Commission approved the recommendation of the Secretary.

**Reserve Component Transformation in Connecticut**

**Recommendation # 15 (Army 35)**

- **One-time Cost:** $128.6M
- **Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings):** ($5.8M)
- **20-Year Net Present Value:** $47.5M
- **Payback Period:** 36 Years

**Secretary of Defense Recommendation**

Close Turner US Army Reserve Center, Fairfield, CT; close Sutcovey US Army Reserve Center, Waterbury, CT; close Danbury US Army Reserve Center Danbury, CT, and relocate units to a new Armed Forces Reserve Center and Maintenance Facility in Newtown, CT if the Army is able to acquire land suitable for the construction of the facilities adjacent to the existing Connecticut Army National Guard Armory in Newtown, CT. The new AFRC and OMS shall have the capability to accommodate units from the following facilities: Connecticut Army National Guard Armories in Naugatuck, Norwalk and New Haven, CT, if the state decides to relocate those National Guard units.

Close the US Army Reserve Center, Middletown, CT, the Organizational Maintenance Shop, Middletown, CT; the SGT Libby US Army Reserve Center, New Haven, CT; the Organizational Maintenance Shop, New Haven, CT; the Army Reserve Area Maintenance Support Activity #69, Milford, CT, and relocate units to a new Armed Forces Reserve Center, Organizational Maintenance Shop and Army Maintenance Support Activity in Middletown, CT, if the Army is able to acquire land suitable for the construction of the facilities. The new AFRC, OMS and AMSA shall have the capability to accommodate units from the following facilities: Connecticut Army National Guard Armories in Putnam, Manchester, New Britain and the CTARNG facility in Newington, CT, if the state decides to relocate those National Guard units.

**Secretary of Defense Justification**

This recommendation transforms Reserve Component facilities throughout the State of Connecticut. The implementation of this recommendation will enhance military value, improve homeland defense capability, greatly improve training and deployment capability, create significant efficiencies and cost savings, and is consistent with the Army's Force Structure Plans and Army transformational objectives.

This recommendation is the result of a state-wide analysis of Reserve Component installations and facilities conducted by a team of functional experts from Headquarters, Department of the Army, the Office of the State Adjutant General, and the Army Reserve Regional Readiness Command.
This recommendation closes five US Army Reserve Centers, one Army Maintenance Support Activity and two Organizational Maintenance Shops throughout the state of Connecticut and constructs two Armed Forces Reserve Centers and collocated Organizational Maintenance Shops and one Army Maintenance Support Activity capable of accommodating National Guard and Reserve units. The Department understands that the State of Connecticut will close six Connecticut Army National Guard Centers: Naugatuck, Norwalk, Putnam, Manchester, New Berlin and Newington, CT. The Connecticut Army National Guard will realign New Haven Armory, moving the 192nd Chemical Battalion to the facility. The Armed Forces Reserve Centers will have the capability to accommodate these units if the state decides to relocate the units from these closed facilities into the new AFRCs.

The implementation of this recommendation will enhance military value, improve homeland defense capability, greatly improve training and deployment capability, create significant efficiencies and cost savings, and is consistent with the Army’s force structure plans and Army transformational objectives.

This recommendation considered feasible locations within the demographic and geographic areas of the closing facilities and affected units. The sites selected were determined as the best locations because they optimize the Reserve Components’ ability to recruit and retain Reserve Component soldiers and to train and mobilize units affected by this recommendation.

This recommendation provides the opportunity for other Local, State, or Federal organizations to partner with the Reserve Components to enhance homeland security and homeland defense at a reduced cost to those agencies.

Although not captured in the COBRA analysis, this recommendation avoids an estimated $52.1M in mission facility renovation costs and procurement avoidances associated with meeting AT/FP construction standards and altering existing facilities to meet unit training and communications requirements. Consideration of these avoided costs would reduce costs and increase the net savings to the Department of Defense in the 6-year BRAC implementation period and in the 20-year period used to calculate NPV.

**Community Concerns**

There were no formal expressions from the community.

**Commission Findings**

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense. In addition, the Commission notes that the Army’s process was well thought-out and inclusive of the leadership of the Reserve Components and the State.

**Commission Recommendations**

The Commission found the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and force structure plan. Therefore, the Commission approved the recommendation of the Secretary.

**Reserve Component Transformation in Delaware**

**Recommendation # 16 (Army 37)**

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**Secretary of Defense Recommendation**

Close the Major Robert Kirkwood United States Army Reserve Center and its organizational maintenance shop in Newark, DE, and relocate units to a new Armed Forces Reserve Center and organizational maintenance support facility in Newark, DE, if the Army is able to acquire suitable land for the construction of the facilities. The new AFRC shall have the capability to accommodate Delaware Army National Guard units from the William Nelson Armory in Middletown, DE, if the state decided to relocate those units.
This recommendation transforms Reserve Component facilities in the State of Delaware. The implementation of this recommendation will enhance military value, improve homeland defense capability, greatly improve training and deployment capability, create significant efficiencies and cost savings, and is consistent with the Army's force structure plans and Army transformational objectives.

This recommendation is the result of a state-wide analysis of Reserve Component installations and facilities conducted by a team of functional experts from Headquarters, Department of the Army, the Office of the State Adjutant General, and the Army Reserve Regional Readiness Command.

This recommendation closes an Army Reserve Center in Newark, DE and relocates units to a new Armed Forces Reserve Center and organizational maintenance support facility capable of accommodating Delaware Army National Guard units. This recommendation reduces military manpower and associated costs for maintaining existing facilities by collapsing two facilities into one. The Department understands that the State of Delaware will close the William Nelson Armory in Middletown, DE. The Armed Forces Reserve Center will have the capability to accommodate these units if the state decides to relocate the units from the closed facilities into the new AFRC.

The implementation of this recommendation will enhance military value, improve homeland defense capability, greatly improve training and deployment capability, create significant efficiencies and cost savings, and is consistent with the Army's force structure plans and Army transformational objectives.

This recommendation considered feasible locations within the demographic and geographic areas of the closing facilities and affected units. The site selected was determined as the best location because it optimized the Reserve Components' ability to recruit and retain Reserve Component soldiers, and to train and mobilize units affected by this recommendation.

This recommendation provides the opportunity for other Local, State, or Federal organizations to partner with the Reserve Components to enhance homeland security and homeland defense at a reduced cost to those agencies.

Although not captured in the COBRA analysis, this recommendation avoids an estimated $10.9M in mission facility renovation costs and procurement avoidances associated with meeting AT/FP construction standards and altering existing facilities to meet unit training and communications requirements. Consideration of these avoided costs would reduce costs and increase the net savings to the Department of Defense in the 6-year BRAC implementation period and in the 20-year period used to calculate NPV.

**Community Concerns**

There were no formal expressions from the community.

**Commission Findings**

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense. In addition, the Commission notes that the Army's process was well thought-out and inclusive of the leadership of the Reserve Components and the State.

**Commission Recommendations**

The Commission found the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and force structure plan. Therefore, the Commission approved the recommendation of the Secretary.
Reserve Component Transformation in Georgia

Recommendation # 17 (Army 39)

One-time Cost: $21.4M
Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings): ($5.0M)
20-Year Net Present Value: ($44.8M)
Payback Period: 5 Years

Secretary of Defense Recommendation

Close the United States Army Reserve Center, Columbus, GA, and relocate and consolidate those units together with Army Reserve Units currently on Fort Benning into a new United States Army Reserve Center on Fort Benning, GA.

Secretary of Defense Justification

This recommendation transforms Reserve Component facilities in the State of Georgia. The implementation of this recommendation will enhance military value, improve homeland defense capability, greatly improve training and deployment capability, create significant efficiencies and cost savings, and is consistent with the Army’s force structure plans and Army transformational objectives.

This recommendation is the result of a state-wide analysis of Reserve Component installations and facilities conducted by a team of functional experts from Headquarters, Department of the Army, the Office of the State Adjutant General, and the Army Reserve Regional Readiness Command.

This recommendation closes one United States Army Reserve Center in Columbus, GA, and relocates units together with United States Army Reserve units currently on Fort Benning into a new United States Army Reserve Center on Fort Benning, GA. This recommendation reduces military manpower and associated costs for maintaining existing facilities by reducing the number of separate DoD installations and by relocating a US Army Reserve Center to an existing base. This recommendation supports the recommendation to close Fort Gillem by providing a relocation site for the vehicles and equipment stored at the Army Reserve Equipment Concentration Site (ECS).

This recommendation considered feasible locations within the demographic and geographic areas of the closing facilities and affected units. The site selected was determined as the best location because it optimizes the Reserve Components’ ability to recruit and retain Reserve Component soldiers and to train and mobilize units affected by this recommendation.

This recommendation provides the opportunity for other Local, State, or Federal organizations to partner with the Reserve Components to enhance homeland security and homeland defense at a reduced cost to those agencies.

Although not captured in the COBRA analysis, this recommendation avoids an estimated $52.8M in mission facility renovation costs and procurement avoidances associated with meeting AT/FP construction standards and altering existing facilities to meet unit training and communications requirements. Consideration of these avoided costs would reduce costs and increase the net savings to the Department of Defense in the 6-year BRAC implementation period and in the 20-year period used to calculate NPV.

Community Concerns

There were no formal expressions from the community.

Commission Findings

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense. In addition, the Commission notes that the Army’s process was well thought-out and inclusive of the leadership of the Reserve Components and the State.
**Commission Recommendations**

The Commission found the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and force structure plan. Therefore, the Commission approved the recommendation of the Secretary.

**Reserve Component Transformation in Hawaii**

**Recommendation # 18 (Army 40)**

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**Secretary of Defense Recommendation**

Close the United States Army Reserve Center, Hilo (SFC Minoru Kunieda), HI, and relocate units to a new Armed Forces Reserve Center on Keaukaha Military Reservation if the Army can acquire suitable land for the construction of the new facilities. The New AFRC shall have the capability to accommodate Hawaii National Guard units from the following Hawaii ARNG Armories: Keaau and Honokaa if the state decides to relocate those units.

**Secretary of Defense Justification**

This recommendation transforms Reserve Component facilities in the State of Hawaii. The implementation of this recommendation will enhance military value, improve homeland defense capability, greatly improve training and deployment capability, create significant efficiencies and cost savings, and is consistent with the Army’s force structure plans and Army transformational objectives.

This recommendation is the result of a state-wide analysis of Reserve Component installations and facilities conducted by a team of functional experts from Headquarters, Department of the Army, the Office of the State Adjutant General, and the Army Reserve Regional Readiness Command.

This recommendation closes one Army Reserve Center in Hilo, HI, and constructs a multicomponent, multifunctional Armed Forces Reserve Center (AFRC) on Keaukaha Military Reservation, HI. The Department understands that the State of Hawaii will close two Hawaii Army National Guard Armories: Keaau and Honokaa, HI. The Armed Forces Reserve Center will have the capability to accommodate these units if the state decides to relocate the units from the closed facilities into the new AFRC.

This recommendation considered feasible locations within the demographic and geographic areas of the closing facilities and affected units. The sites selected were determined as the best locations because they optimize the Reserve Components’ ability to recruit and retain Reserve Component soldiers and to train and mobilize units affected by this recommendation.

This recommendation provides the opportunity for other Local, State, or Federal organizations to partner with the Reserve Components to enhance homeland security and homeland defense at a reduced cost to those agencies.

Although not captured in the COBRA analysis, this recommendation avoids an estimated $17.4M in mission facility renovation costs and procurement avoidances associated with meeting AT/FP construction standards and altering existing facilities to meet unit training and communications requirements. Consideration of these avoided costs would reduce costs and increase the net savings to the Department of Defense in the 6-year BRAC implementation period and in the 20-year period used to calculate NPV.

**Community Concerns**

There were no formal expressions from the community.
COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense. In addition, the Commission notes that the Army’s process was well thought-out and inclusive of the leadership of the Reserve Components and the State.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission found the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and force structure plan. Therefore, the Commission approved the recommendation of the Secretary.

RESERVE COMPONENT TRANSFORMATION IN ILLINOIS

RECOMMENDATION # 19 (ARMY 42)

One-time Cost: $42.6M
Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings): ($3.5M)
20-Year Net Present Value: ($6.5M)
Payback Period: 14 Years

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Close the United States Army Reserve Center in Marion, IL, and relocate units to a new Armed Forces Reserve Center in Carbondale, IL, if the Army is able to acquire suitable land for the construction of the facilities. The new AFRC shall have the capability to accommodate Illinois National Guard Units from the following Army National Guard Readiness Centers: Cairo, IL, and Carbondale, IL, if the state of Illinois decides to relocate those units.

Close the United States Army Reserve Center in Centralia, IL, and the United States Army Reserve Center in Fairfield, IL, and relocate units to a new Armed Forces Reserve Center in Mt. Vernon, IL. The new AFRC shall have the capability to accommodate Illinois National Guard Units from the following Army National Guard Readiness Centers: Mt. Vernon (17B75), IL, Mt. Vernon (17B73), IL, and Salem (17C65), IL, if the state of Illinois decides to relocate those units.

Close the Armed Forces Reserve Center in Waukegan, IL, and relocate units into a new Armed Forces Reserve Center in Lake County, IL, if the Army is able to acquire suitable land for the construction of the facilities. The new AFRC shall have the capability to accommodate Illinois National Guard Units from the Army National Guard Readiness Center in Waukegan, IL, if the state of Illinois decides to relocate those units.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

This recommendation transforms Reserve Component facilities in the State of Illinois. The implementation of this recommendation will enhance military value, improve homeland defense capability, greatly improve training and deployment capability, create significant efficiencies and cost savings, and is consistent with the Army’s force structure plans and Army transformational objectives.

This recommendation is the result of a state-wide analysis of Reserve Component installations and facilities conducted by a team of functional experts from Headquarters, Department of the Army, the Office of the State Adjutant General, and the Army Reserve Regional Readiness Command.

This recommendation closes four United States Army Reserve Centers and constructs three multicomponent, multifunctional Armed Forces Reserve Centers (AFRCs) throughout the State of Illinois capable of accommodating National Guard, Army Reserve, Naval Reserve and Marine Corps Reserve units. This recommendation reduces military manpower and associated costs for maintaining existing facilities by collapsing ten geographically separated facilities into three modern Armed Forces Reserve Centers. These joint-use facilities will significantly reduce operating costs and create improved business processes. The Department understands that the State of Illinois will close six Illinois Army Guard Armories: Cairo, IL, Carbondale, IL, Mount Vernon, IL, Mount Vernon, IL, Salem, IL, and Waukegan, IL. The Armed Forces Reserve Centers will have the capability to accommodate these units if the state decides to relocate the units from these closed facilities into the new AFRCs.
This recommendation considered feasible locations within the demographic and geographic areas of the closing facilities and affected units. The sites selected were determined as the best locations because they optimize the Reserve Components’ ability to recruit and retain Reserve Component soldiers and to train and mobilize units affected by this recommendation.

This recommendation provides the opportunity for other Local, State, or Federal organizations to partner with the Reserve Components to enhance homeland security and homeland defense at a reduced cost to those agencies.

Although not captured in the COBRA analysis, this recommendation avoids an estimated $29.8M in mission facility renovation costs and procurement avoidances associated with meeting AT/FP construction standards and altering existing facilities to meet unit training and communications requirements. Consideration of these avoided costs would reduce costs and increase the net savings to the Department of Defense in the 6-year BRAC implementation period and in the 20-year period used to calculate NPV.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

There were no formal expressions from the community.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense. In addition, the Commission notes that the Army’s process was well thought-out and inclusive of the leadership of the Reserve Components and the State.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission found the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and force structure plan. Therefore, the Commission approved the recommendation of the Secretary.

RESERVE COMPONENT TRANSFORMATION IN INDIANA

RECOMMENDATION # 20 (ARMY 44)

One-time Cost: $47.6M
Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings): ($2.7M)
20-Year Net Present Value: $6.1M
Payback Period: 22 Years

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Close Lafayette United States Army Reserve Center in Lafayette, IN, and relocate units into a new Armed Forces Reserve Center (AFRC) on the site of the existing Indiana Army Guard Armory (18B75) Lafayette, IN, if the Army is able to acquire land suitable for the construction of the facility. The new AFRC shall have the capability to accommodate the Indiana National Guard units from the following Indiana ARNG Readiness Centers: Boswell, IN, Attica, IN, Delphi, IN, Remington, IN, Monticello, IN, and Darlington, IN, if the state decides to relocate those National Guard units.

Realign Charles H. Seston United States Army Reserve Center by relocating the 402nd Engineer Company and Detachment 1 of the 417th Petroleum Company into a new Armed Forces Reserve Center in the vicinity of Greenwood and Franklin, IN, if the Army is able to acquire land suitable for the construction of the facility. The new AFRC shall have the capability to accommodate the Indiana National Guard units from the Camp Atterbury Army National Guard Readiness Center (building #500), and the 219th Area Support Group Readiness Center (Building #4), Camp Atterbury, IN, if the state decides to relocate those National Guard units.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

This recommendation transforms Reserve Component facilities throughout the State of Indiana. The implementation of this recommendation will enhance military value, improve homeland defense capability, greatly improve training and
deployment capability, create significant efficiencies and cost savings, and is consistent with the Army’s force structure plans and Army transformational objectives.

This recommendation is the result of a statewide analysis of Reserve Component installations and facilities conducted by a team of functional experts from Headquarters, Department of the Army, the Office of the State Adjutant General, and the Army Reserve Regional Readiness Command.

This recommendation closes one Army Reserve Center in the state of Indiana and constructs two multicomponent, multifunctional Armed Forces Reserve Centers capable of accommodating National Guard and Reserve units. This recommendation reduces the number of separate DoD installations by relocating to an existing base. The Department understands that the State of Indiana will close the following INARNG Readiness Centers: Boswell, IN, Attica, IN, Delphi, IN, Remington, IN, Monticello, IN, Darlington, IN, and Camp Atterbury, IN. The Armed Forces Reserve Centers will have the capability to accommodate these units if the state decides to relocate the units from these closed facilities into the new AFRCs.

This recommendation considered feasible locations within the demographic and geographic areas of the closing facilities and affected units. The site selected was determined as the best location because it optimizes the Reserve Components’ ability to recruit and retain Reserve Component soldiers and to train and mobilize units affected by this recommendation.

This recommendation provides the opportunity for other Local, State, or Federal organizations to partner with the Reserve Components to enhance homeland security and homeland defense at a reduced cost to those agencies.

Although not captured in the COBRA analysis, this recommendation avoids an estimated $34.7M in mission facility renovation costs and procurement avoidances associated with meeting AT/FP construction standards and altering existing facilities to meet unit training and communications requirements. Consideration of these avoided costs would reduce costs and increase the net savings to the Department of Defense in the 6-year BRAC implementation period and in the 20-year period used to calculate NPV.

Community Concerns

There were no formal expressions from the community.

Commission Findings

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense. In addition, the Commission notes that the Army’s process was well thought-out and inclusive of the leadership of the Reserve Components and the State.

Commission Recommendations

The Commission found the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and force structure plan. Therefore, the Commission approved the recommendation of the Secretary.

Reserve Component Transformation in Iowa

Recommendation # 21 (Army 46)

One-time Cost: $68.9M
Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings): ($19.4M)
20-Year Net Present Value: ($201.7M)
Payback Period: 3 years

Secretary of Defense Recommendation

Close the Recruiting Battalion Headquarters and Military Entrance Processing Station (MEPS) leased facilities in Des Moines and relocate units into a new Armed Forces Reserve Center and MEPS at Camp Dodge, IA. The new AFRC shall
have the capability to accommodate units from the Army National Guard Readiness Center located at Camp Dodge, IA, if
the state decides to relocate those National Guard units.

Close the United States Army Reserve Center and the Area Maintenance Support Activity in Middletown, IA, and relocate
units into a new Armed Forces Reserve Center (AFRC) with an Organizational Maintenance and Vehicle Storage Facility on
Iowa Army Ammunition Plant, IA. The new AFRC shall have the capability to accommodate units from the Burlington
Army National Guard Readiness Center located in Burlington, IA, if the state decides to relocate those National Guard
units.

Close the United States Army Reserve Center in Muscatine, IA, and relocate units into a new Armed Forces Reserve Center
(AFRC) in Muscatine, IA, if the Army is able to acquire land suitable for the construction of the facility. The new AFRC
shall have the capability to accommodate units from the Muscatine Army National Guard Readiness Center located in
Muscatine, IA, if the state decides to relocate those National Guard units.

Close the Armed Forces Reserve Center in Cedar Rapids, IA, and relocate units into a new Armed Forces Reserve Center
(AFRC) with an Organizational Maintenance Facility (OMF) in Cedar Rapids, IA, if the Army is able to acquire land suitable
for the construction of the facility. The new AFRC shall have the capability to accommodate units from the Cedar Rapids
Army National Guard Readiness Center and its Organizational Maintenance Facility located in Cedar Rapids, IA, if the state
decides to relocate those National Guard units.

**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION**

This recommendation transforms Reserve Component facilities throughout the State of Iowa. The implementation of this
recommendation will enhance military value, improve homeland defense capability, greatly improve training and
deployment capability, create significant efficiencies and cost savings, and is consistent with the Army’s force structure plans
and Army transformational objectives.

This recommendation is the result of a state-wide analysis of Reserve Component installations and facilities conducted by a
team of functional experts from Headquarters, Department of the Army, the Office of the State Adjutant General, and the
Army Reserve Regional Readiness Command.

This recommendation closes three Army Reserve Centers, one Area Maintenance Support Activity, one Recruiting
Battalion, and one Military Entrance Processing Station throughout the State of Iowa and constructs three multicomponent,
multifunctional Armed Forces Reserve Centers, two Organizational Maintenance Facilities, and one MEPS capable of
accommodating National Guard and Reserve units. This recommendation reduces military manpower and associated costs
for maintaining existing facilities by collapsing eight geographically separated facilities into four modern Armed Forces
Reserve Centers. This recommendation reduces the number of separate DoD installations by relocating to an existing base.
The Department understands that the State of Iowa will close IAARNG Readiness Centers: Camp Dodge, IA, Burlington,
IA, Muscatine, IA, and Cedar Rapids, IA. The Armed Forces Reserve Centers will have the capability to accommodate these
units if the state decides to relocate the units from these closed facilities into the new AFRCs.

This recommendation provides the opportunity for other Local, State, or Federal organizations to partner with the Reserve
Components to enhance homeland security and homeland defense at a reduced cost to those agencies.

Although not captured in the COBRA analysis, this recommendation avoids an estimated $20.5M in mission facility
renovation costs and procurement avoidances associated with meeting AT/FP construction standards and altering existing
facilities to meet unit training and communications requirements. Consideration of these avoided costs would reduce costs
and increase the net savings to the Department of Defense in the 6-year BRAC implementation period and in the 20-year
period used to calculate NPV.

**COMMUNITY CONCERNS**

There were no formal expressions from the community.

**COMMISSION FINDINGS**

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense. In addition, the
Commission notes that the Army’s process was well thought-out and inclusive of the leadership of the Reserve Components
and the State.
The Commission found the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and force structure plan. Therefore, the Commission approved the recommendation of the Secretary.

**Reserve Component Transformation in Kentucky**

**Recommendation # 22 (Army 48)**

- **One-time Cost:** $25.3M
- **Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings):** ($4.2M)
- **20-Year Net Present Value:** ($34.1M)
- **Payback Period:** 6 Years

**Secretary of Defense Recommendation**

Close the Richmond US Army Reserve Center, Maysville US Army Reserve Center and relocate and consolidate those units with Army Reserve units currently on Bluegrass Army Depot into a new Armed Forces Reserve Center (AFRC) and Field Maintenance Facility (FMS) on Blue Grass Army Depot, KY. The new AFRC shall have the capability to accommodate Kentucky National Guard units located on Bluegrass Army Depot, KY, if the state decides to relocate those National Guard units.

Close the Paducah Memorial United States Army Reserve Center and the Paducah #2 United States Army Reserve Center and relocate units into a new Armed Forces Reserve Center (AFRC) and Field Maintenance Shop (FMS) adjacent to the Paducah Airport, Paducah, KY, if the Army is able to acquire land suitable for the construction of the facilities. The new AFRC and FMS shall have the capability to accommodate units from the Paducah Army National Guard Readiness Center and the Kentucky Army National Guard Organizational Maintenance Shop (OMS) #2, Paducah, KY, if the state decides to relocate those National Guard units.

**Secretary of Defense Justification**

This recommendation transforms Reserve Component facilities throughout the State of Kentucky. The implementation of this recommendation will enhance military value, improve homeland defense capability, greatly improve training and deployment capability, create significant efficiencies and cost savings, and is consistent with the Army’s force structure plans and Army transformational objectives.

This recommendation is the result of a statewide analysis of Reserve Component installations and facilities conducted by a team of functional experts from Headquarters, Department of the Army, the Office of the State Adjutant General, and the Army Reserve Regional Readiness Command.

This recommendation closes four Army Reserve Centers throughout the state of Kentucky and constructs two multi-component, multifunctional Armed Forces Reserve Centers, and two Field Maintenance Shops capable of accommodating National Guard and Reserve units. This recommendation reduces military manpower and associated costs for maintaining existing facilities by collapsing seven geographically separated facilities into two modern Armed Forces Reserve Centers. This recommendation reduces the number of separate DoD installations by relocating to an existing base. The Department understands that the State of Kentucky will close the Blue Grass Station and the Paducah Army National Guard Readiness Centers and the Kentucky Army National Guard Organizational Maintenance Shop, Paducah, KY. The Armed Forces Reserve Centers will have the capability to accommodate these units if the state decides to relocate the units from these closed facilities into the new AFRCs.

This recommendation considered feasible locations within the demographic and geographic areas of the closing facilities and affected units. The site selected was determined as the best location because it optimizes the Reserve Components’ ability to recruit and retain Reserve Component soldiers and to train and mobilize units affected by this recommendation.

This recommendation provides the opportunity for other Local, State, or Federal organizations to partner with the Reserve Components to enhance homeland security and homeland defense at a reduced cost to those agencies.
Although not captured in the COBRA analysis, this recommendation avoids an estimated $5.8M in mission facility renovation costs and procurement avoidances associated with meeting AT/FP construction standards and altering existing facilities to meet unit training and communications requirements. Consideration of these avoided costs would reduce costs and increase the net savings to the Department of Defense in the 6-year BRAC implementation period and in the 20-year period used to calculate NPV.

**Community Concerns**

Only one community comment was received for all of the 39 RC Transformation recommendations. A political leader argued that the Maysville USAR Center in Maysville, KY, should not be closed on the grounds that closure would increase commuting time and distance for soldiers assigned to that unit.

**Commission Findings**

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense. In addition, the Community concerns were carefully weighed and considered, but the Commission found they did not rise to the level of a substantial deviation.

**Commission Recommendations**

The Commission found the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and force structure plan. Therefore, the Commission approved the recommendation of the Secretary.

**Reserve Component Transformation in Louisiana**

**Recommendation # 23 (Army 50)**

- **One-time Cost:** $30.7M
- **Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings):** ($13.6M)
- **20-Year Net Present Value:** ($147.6M)
- **Payback Period:** 2 YEARS

**Secretary of Defense Recommendation**

Close the Roberts United States Army Reserve Center Baton Rouge, LA, and the Navy-Marine Corps Reserve Center, Baton Rouge, LA, and relocate units to a new Armed Forces Reserve Center and Field Maintenance Shop on suitable state property adjacent to the Baton Rouge Airport (State Property). The new AFRC shall have the capability to accommodate Louisiana National Guard Units from the Army National Guard Readiness Center located in Baton Rouge, LA, and the Army National Guard Organizational Maintenance Shop #8 located in Baton Rouge, LA, if the state of Louisiana decides to relocate those National Guard units.

Close United States Army Reserve Center, Shreveport, LA, and the United States Army Reserve Center, Bossier City, LA, and relocate all Reserve Component units to a new Armed Forces Reserve Center that will be constructed on or adjacent to the Naval-Marine Corps Reserve Center, Shreveport in Bossier City, LA, if the Army is able to acquire suitable property for construction of the facilities.

**Secretary of Defense Justification**

This recommendation transforms Reserve Component facilities in the State of Louisiana. The implementation of this recommendation will enhance military value, improve homeland defense capability, greatly improve training and deployment capability, create significant efficiencies and cost savings, and is consistent with the Army’s force structure plans and Army transformational objectives.
This recommendation is the result of a state-wide analysis of Reserve Component installations and facilities conducted by a team of functional experts from Headquarters, Department of the Army, the Office of the State Adjutant General, and the Army Reserve Regional Readiness Command.

This recommendation closes three Army Reserve centers, one Navy-Marine Corps Reserve Center and constructs two multicomponent or joint, multifunctional Armed Forces Reserve Centers (AFRCs), throughout the State of Louisiana, capable of accommodating National Guard, Army Reserve, Naval Reserve and Marine Corps Reserve units.

This recommendation reduces military manpower and associated costs for maintaining existing facilities by collapsing six separate facilities into two modern Armed Forces Reserve Centers.

These joint-use facilities will significantly reduce operating costs and create improved business processes. The Department understands that the State of Louisiana will close the Louisiana Army National Guard Readiness Center in Baton Rouge and Organizational Maintenance Shop #8 in Baton Rouge. The Armed Forces Reserve Centers will have the capability to accommodate these units if the state decides to relocate the units from these closed facilities into the new AFRCs.

This recommendation considered feasible locations within the demographic and geographic areas of the closing facilities and affected units. The sites selected were determined as the best locations because they optimize the Reserve Components’ ability to recruit and retain Reserve Component soldiers and to train and mobilize units affected by this recommendation.

This recommendation provides the opportunity for other Local, State, or Federal organizations to partner with the Reserve Components to enhance homeland security and homeland defense at a reduced cost to those agencies.

Although not captured in the COBRA analysis, this recommendation avoids an estimated $20.0M in mission facility renovation costs and procurement avoidances associated with meeting AT/FP construction standards and altering existing facilities to meet unit training and communications requirements. Consideration of these avoided costs would reduce costs and increase the net savings to the Department of Defense in the 6-year BRAC implementation period and in the 20-year period used to calculate NPV.

**Community Concerns**

There were no formal expressions from the community.

**Commission Findings**

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense. In addition, the Commission notes that the Army’s process was well thought-out and inclusive of the leadership of the Reserve Components and the State.

**Commission Recommendations**

The Commission found the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and force structure plan. Therefore, the Commission approved the recommendation of the Secretary.

### Reserve Component Transformation in Maryland

**Recommendation # 24 (Army 52)**

| One-time Cost: | $6.3M |
| Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings): | ($1.7M) |
| 20-Year Net Present Value: | ($17.8M) |
| Payback Period: | 3 Years |

**Secretary of Defense Recommendation**

Close the Flair Memorial Armed Forces Reserve Center and its organizational maintenance shop in Frederick, MD, and relocate US Army Reserve and US Marine Corps Reserve units to a new consolidated Armed Forces Reserve Center and organizational maintenance support facility on Fort Detrick, MD.
This recommendation transforms Reserve Component facilities in the State of Maryland. The implementation of this recommendation will enhance military value, improve homeland defense capability, greatly improve training and deployment capability, create significant efficiencies and cost savings, and is consistent with the Army’s force structure plans and Army transformational objectives.

This recommendation is the result of a state-wide analysis of Reserve Component installations and facilities conducted by a team of functional experts from Headquarters, Department of the Army, the Office of the State Adjutant General, and the Army Reserve Regional Readiness Command.

This recommendation closes one Army Reserve Center and one Organizational Maintenance Shop in Frederick, MD, and constructs a multi-service, multifunctional Armed Forces Reserve Center and Organizational Maintenance Shop on Fort Detrick, MD. This recommendation reduces military manpower and associated costs for maintaining existing facilities by reducing the number of separate DoD installations by relocating to an existing base.

This recommendation provides the opportunity for other Local, State, or Federal organizations to partner with the Reserve Components to enhance homeland security and homeland defense at a reduced cost to those agencies.

Although not captured in the COBRA analysis, this recommendation avoids an estimated $10.0M in mission facility renovation costs and procurement avoidances associated with meeting AT/FP construction standards and altering existing facilities to meet unit training and communications requirements. Consideration of these avoided costs would reduce costs and increase the net savings to the Department of Defense in the 6-year BRAC implementation period and in the 20-year period used to calculate NPV.

**Community Concerns**

There were no formal expressions from the community.

**Commission Findings**

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense. In addition, the Commission notes that the Army’s process was well thought-out and inclusive of the leadership of the Reserve Components and the State.

**Commission Recommendations**

The Commission found the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and force structure plan. Therefore, the Commission approved the recommendation of the Secretary.

**Reserve Component Transformation in Massachusetts**

**Recommendation # 25 (Army 54)**

- **One-time Cost:** $85.5M
- **Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings):** ($1.7M)
- **20-Year Net Present Value:** $60.4M
- **Payback Period:** 100+ Years

**Secretary of Defense Recommendation**

Close the Army Reserve Equipment Concentration Site 65 Annex, Ayer, MA, and relocate units to a new Armed Forces Reserve Center in Ayer, MA; realign the Devens Reserve Forces Training Area, MA, by relocating the 323d Maintenance Facility, and the Regional Training Site Maintenance to a new Armed Forces Reserve Center complex in Ayer, MA; realign Ayer Area 3713 by relocating storage functions to a new Armed Forces Reserve Center complex in Ayer, MA. Realign the Marine Corps Reserve Center Ayer, MA, by relocating the 1/25th Marines Maintenance Facility, Marine Corps Reserve...
Electronic Maintenance Section, and Maintenance Company/4th Marine Battalion to a new Armed Forces Reserve Center complex in Ayer, MA. The new Armed Forces Reserve Center complex shall have the capability to accommodate all Reserve units affected by this recommendation, including Army National Guard units from the Ayer Armory and Consolidated Support Maintenance Shop, Ayer, MA, if the state decides to relocate the National Guard units.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

This recommendation transforms Reserve Component facilities in the State of Massachusetts. The implementation of this recommendation will enhance military value, improve homeland defense capability, greatly improve training and deployment capability, create significant efficiencies and cost savings, and is consistent with the Army’s force structure plans and Army transformational objectives.

This recommendation is the result of a statewide analysis of Reserve Component installations and facilities conducted by a team of functional experts from Headquarters, Department of the Army, the Office of the State Adjutant General, and the Army Reserve Regional Readiness Command.

This recommendation closes one Equipment Concentration Site Annex, realigns a Reserve Forces Training Area and a US Marine Corps Reserve Center, and constructs a multicomponent, multifunctional Armed Forces Reserve Center in Ayer, MA. The Department understands that the State of Massachusetts will close: one Massachusetts Army National Guard Armory and one Consolidated Support Maintenance Site, Ayer, MA. The Armed Forces Reserve Centers will have the capability to accommodate these units if the state decides to relocate the units from the closed facilities to the new AFRC complex.

This recommendation considered feasible locations within the demographic and geographic areas of the closing facilities and affected units. The site selected was determined as the best location because it optimizes the Reserve Components’ ability to recruit and retain Reserve Component soldiers and to train and mobilize units affected by this recommendation.

This recommendation provides the opportunity for other Local, State, or Federal organizations to partner with the Reserve Components to enhance homeland security and homeland defense at a reduced cost to those agencies.

Although not captured in the COBRA analysis, this recommendation avoids an estimated $28.8M in mission facility renovation costs and procurement avoidances associated with meeting AT/FP construction standards and altering existing facilities to meet unit training and communications requirements. Consideration of these avoided costs would reduce costs and increase the net savings to the Department of Defense in the 6-year BRAC implementation period and in the 20-year period used to calculate NPV.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

There were no formal expressions from the community.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense. In addition, the Commission notes that the Army’s process was well thought-out and inclusive of the leadership of the Reserve Components and the State.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission found the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and force structure plan. Therefore, the Commission approved the recommendation of the Secretary.
RESERVE COMPONENT TRANSFORMATION IN MICHIGAN

RECOMMENDATION # 26 (ARMY 55)

One-time Cost: $7.9M
Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings): ($2.1M)
20-Year Net Present Value: ($21.6M)
Payback Period: 3 Years

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Close the US Army Reserve Center Stanford C. Parisian in Lansing, MI, and the Army Reserve Area Maintenance Support Activity #135 in Battle Creek, MI, and relocate units to a new Armed Forces Reserve Center on Fort Custer Reserve Training Center, MI.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

This recommendation transforms Reserve Component facilities in the State of Michigan. The implementation of this recommendation will enhance military value, improve homeland defense capability, greatly improve training and deployment capability, create significant efficiencies and cost savings, and is consistent with the Army’s force structure plans and Army transformational objectives.

This recommendation is the result of a state-wide analysis of Reserve Component installations and facilities conducted by a team of functional experts from Headquarters, Department of the Army, the Office of the State Adjutant General, and the Army Reserve Regional Readiness Command.

This recommendation closes one Army Reserve Center in Lansing, MI, and one Area Maintenance Support Activity in Battle Creek, MI, and constructs a multifunctional Armed Forces Reserve Center (AFRC) capable of accommodating Reserve units. This recommendation reduces the number of separate DoD installations by relocating to a new AFRC.

This recommendation provides the opportunity for other Local, State, or Federal organizations to partner with the Reserve Components to enhance homeland security and homeland defense at a reduced cost to those agencies.

Although not captured in the COBRA analysis, this recommendation avoids an estimated $9.0M in mission facility renovation costs and procurement avoidances associated with meeting AT/FP construction standards and altering existing facilities to meet unit training and communications requirements. Consideration of these avoided costs would reduce costs and increase the net savings to the Department of Defense in the 6-year BRAC implementation period, and in the 20-year period used to calculate NPV.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

There were no formal expressions from the community.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense. In addition, the Commission notes that the Army's process was well thought-out and inclusive of the leadership of the Reserve Components and the State.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission found the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and force structure plan. Therefore, the Commission approved the recommendation of the Secretary.
RESERVE COMPONENT TRANSFORMATION IN MINNESOTA

RECOMMENDATION # 27 (ARMY 57)

One-time Cost: $17.3M
Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings): $0.01M
20-Year Net Present Value: $17.1M
Payback Period: NEVER

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Close US Army Reserve Center Faribault, MN, and relocate units to a new Armed Forces Reserve Center at Faribault Industrial Park if the Army is able to acquire suitable land for the construction of the facilities. The new AFRC shall have the capability to accommodate units from the Faribault Minnesota Army National Guard Armory if the state decides to relocate those units.

Close US Army Reserve Center Cambridge, MN, and relocate units to a new Armed Forces Reserve Center in Cambridge, MN, if the Army is able to acquire suitable land for the construction of the facilities. The new AFRC shall have the capability to accommodate Minnesota ARNG units from the Cambridge Army National Guard Armory if the state decides to relocate those units.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

This recommendation transforms Reserve Component facilities throughout the State of Minnesota. The implementation of this recommendation will enhance military value, improve homeland defense capability, greatly improve training and deployment capability, create significant efficiencies and cost savings, and is consistent with the Army’s force structure plans and Army transformational objectives.

This recommendation is the result of a state-wide analysis of Reserve Component installations and facilities conducted by a team of functional experts from Headquarters, Department of the Army, the Office of the State Adjutant General, and the Army Reserve Regional Readiness Command.

This recommendation closes two US Army Reserve Centers in the State of Minnesota and constructs two Armed Forces Reserve Centers capable of accommodating National Guard and Reserve units. The Department understands that the State of Minnesota will close two Minnesota Army National Guard Armories: Faribault and Cambridge, MN. The Armed Forces Reserve Centers will have the capability to accommodate these units if the state decides to relocate the units from these closed facilities into the new AFRCs.

This recommendation reduces military manpower and associated costs for maintaining existing facilities by collapsing four geographically separated facilities into two modern Armed Forces Reserve Centers. These joint-use facilities will significantly reduce operating costs and create improved business practices.

This recommendation provides the opportunity for other Local, State, or Federal organizations to partner with the Reserve Components to enhance homeland security and homeland defense at a reduced cost to those agencies.

Although not captured in the COBRA analysis, this recommendation avoids an estimated $3.0M in mission facility renovation costs and procurement avoidances associated with meeting AT/FP construction standards and altering existing facilities to meet unit training and communications requirements. Consideration of these avoided costs would reduce costs and increase the net savings to the Department of Defense in the 6-year BRAC implementation period and in the 20-year period used to calculate NPV.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

There were no formal expressions from the community.
COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense. In addition, the Commission notes that the Army's process was well thought-out and inclusive of the leadership of the Reserve Components and the State.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission found the Secretary's recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and force structure plan. Therefore, the Commission approved the recommendation of the Secretary.

RESERVE COMPONENT TRANSFORMATION IN MISSOURI

RECOMMENDATION # 28 (ARMY 58)

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<td>Payback period</td>
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SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Close the United States Army Reserve Center in Greentop, MO, and relocate units to a new United States Army Reserve Center in Kirksville, MO, if the Army is able to acquire suitable land for the construction of the facilities. Close the Jefferson Barracks United States Army Reserve Center, and relocate units into a new consolidated Armed Forces Reserve Center on Jefferson Barracks, MO, if the Army is able to acquire suitable land for the construction of the facilities. The new AFRC shall have the capability to accommodate Missouri Army National Guard Units from the Readiness Center in Jefferson Barracks if the state of Missouri decides to relocate those units.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

This recommendation transforms Reserve Component facilities throughout the State of Missouri. The implementation of this recommendation will enhance military value, improve homeland defense capability, greatly improve training and deployment capability, create significant efficiencies and cost savings, and is consistent with the Army’s force structure plans and Army transformational objectives.

This recommendation is the result of a statewide analysis of Reserve Component installations and facilities conducted by a team of functional experts from Headquarters, Department of the Army, the Office of the State Adjutant General, and the Army Reserve Regional Readiness Command.

This recommendation closes two Army Reserve centers and constructs one Armed Forces Reserve Center (AFRC) and one United States Army Reserve Center in the State of Missouri capable of accommodating National Guard and Army Reserve units. This recommendation reduces military manpower and associated costs for maintaining existing facilities by collapsing four separate facilities into two modern Reserve Centers. These facilities will significantly reduce operating costs and create improved business processes. The Department understands that the State of Missouri will close one Missouri Army Guard Readiness Centers on Jefferson Barracks. The Armed Forces Reserve Center will have the capability to accommodate these units if the state decides to relocate the units from these closed facilities into the new AFRC.

This recommendation considered feasible locations within the demographic and geographic areas of the closing facilities and affected units. The sites selected were determined as the best locations because they optimize the Reserve Components’ ability to recruit and retain Reserve Component soldiers and to train and mobilize units affected by this recommendation.

This recommendation provides the opportunity for other Local, State, or Federal organizations to partner with the Reserve Components to enhance homeland security and homeland defense at a reduced cost to those agencies.

Although not captured in the COBRA analysis, this recommendation avoids an estimated $5.5M in mission facility renovation costs and procurement avoidances associated with meeting AT/FP construction standards and altering existing
facilities to meet unit training and communications requirements. Consideration of these avoided costs would reduce costs and increase the net savings to the Department of Defense in the 6-year BRAC implementation period and in the 20-year period used to calculate NPV.

**Community Concerns**

There were no formal expressions from the community.

**Commission Findings**

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense. In addition, the Commission notes that the Army's process was well thought-out and inclusive of the leadership of the Reserve Components and the State.

**Commission Recommendations**

The Commission found the Secretary's recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and force structure plan. Therefore, the Commission approved the recommendation of the Secretary.

**Reserve Component Transformation in Montana**

**Recommendation # 29 (Army 60)**

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<th>Description</th>
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<td>Payback Period:</td>
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**Secretary of Defense Recommendation**

Close Galt Hall Army Reserve Center in Great Falls, MT, and relocate units to a new Armed Forces Reserve Center on Malmstrom Air Force Base, Great Falls, MT.

Close Army Reserve Center Veuve Hall (building #26) and Area Maintenance Support Activity #75 on Fort Missoula, MT, and relocate units to a new Armed Forces Reserve Center in Missoula, MT, if the Army is able to acquire suitable land for the construction of the facilities. The new AFRC shall have the capability to accommodate Montana National Guard units from the Montana Army National Guard Armory in Missoula, MT, if the state decides to relocate those National Guard units.

**Secretary of Defense Justification**

This recommendation transforms Reserve Component facilities throughout the State of Montana. The implementation of this recommendation will enhance military value, improve homeland defense capability, greatly improve training and deployment capability, create significant efficiencies and cost savings, and is consistent with the Army's force structure plans and Army transformational objectives.

This recommendation is the result of a statewide analysis of Reserve Component installations and facilities conducted by a team of functional experts from Headquarters, Department of the Army, the Office of the State Adjutant General, and the Army Reserve Regional Readiness Command.

This recommendation closes two US Army Reserve Centers and one Army Maintenance Support Activity in the State of Montana and constructs two Armed Forces Reserve Centers capable of accommodating National Guard and Reserve units. This recommendation reduces the number of separate DoD installations by relocating to an existing base. The Department understands that the State of Montana will close one Montana Army National Guard Armory in Missoula, MT. The Armed Forces Reserve Centers will have the capability to accommodate these units if the state decides to relocate the units from these closed facilities into the new AFRCs.
This recommendation considered feasible locations within the demographic and geographic areas of the closing facilities and affected units. The sites selected were determined as the best locations because they optimize the Reserve Components’ ability to recruit and retain Reserve Component soldiers and to train and mobilize units affected by this recommendation.

This recommendation provides the opportunity for other Local, State, or Federal organizations to partner with the Reserve Components to enhance homeland security and homeland defense at a reduced cost to those agencies.

Although not captured in the COBRA analysis, this recommendation avoids an estimated $19.5M in mission facility renovation costs and procurement avoidances associated with meeting AT/FP construction standards and altering existing facilities to meet unit training and communications requirements. Consideration of these avoided costs would reduce costs and increase the net savings to the Department of Defense in the 6-year BRAC implementation period and in the 20-year period used to calculate NPV.

**COMMUNITY CONCERNS**

There were no formal expressions from the community.

**COMMISSION FINDINGS**

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense. In addition, the Commission notes that the Army’s process was well thought-out and inclusive of the leadership of the Reserve Components and the State.

**COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS**

The Commission found the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and force structure plan. Therefore, the Commission approved the recommendation of the Secretary.

**RESERVE COMPONENT TRANSFORMATION IN NEBRASKA**

**Recommendation # 30 (Army 62)**

- **One-time Cost:** $33.1M
- **Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings):** ($6.2M)
- **20-Year Net Present Value:** ($53.7M)
- **Payback Period:** 5 Years

**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION**

Close the United States Army Reserve Center in Wymore, NE, and relocate units to a new Armed Forces Reserve Center with an organizational maintenance facility in the vicinity of Beatrice, NE, if the Army is able to acquire land suitable for the construction of the facilities. The new AFRC shall have the capability to accommodate Nebraska National Guard Units from the following Nebraska ARNG Readiness Centers: Fairbury, NE, Falls City, NE, and Troop C, 1-167th Cavalry in Beatrice, NE, if the state decides to relocate those National Guard units.

Close the United States Army Reserve Center in Columbus, NE, and relocate units to a new Armed Forces Reserve Center in Columbus, NE, The new AFRC shall have the capability to accommodate Nebraska National Guard Units from the Nebraska ARNG Readiness Center, Columbus, NE, if the state decides to relocate those National Guard units.

Close the United States Army Reserve Center in Hastings, NE, and relocate units to a new Armed Forces Reserve Center on Greenlief Training Site in Nebraska. The new AFRC shall have the capability to accommodate Nebraska National Guard Units from the following Nebraska ARNG Readiness Centers: Grand Island, NE, Crete, NE, and Hastings, NE, if the state decides to relocate those National Guard units.

Close the United States Army Reserve Center in Kearney, NE, and relocate units to a new Armed Forces Reserve Center in Kearney, NE, if the Army is able to acquire suitable land for the construction of the facilities. The new AFRC shall have the
capability to accommodate Nebraska National Guard Units from the Nebraska ARNG Readiness Center, Kearney, NE, if the state decides to relocate those National Guard units.

Close the United States Army Reserve Center in McCook, NE, and relocate units to a new Armed Forces Reserve Center in McCook, NE, if the Army is able to acquire suitable land for the construction of the facilities. The new AFRC shall have the capability to accommodate Nebraska National Guard Units from the Nebraska ARNG Readiness Center, McCook, NE, if the state decides to relocate those National Guard units.

**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION**

This recommendation transforms Reserve Component facilities throughout the State of Nebraska. The implementation of this recommendation will enhance military value, improve homeland defense capability, greatly improve training and deployment capability, create significant efficiencies and cost savings, and is consistent with the Army’s force structure plans and Army transformational objectives.

This recommendation is the result of a statewide analysis of Reserve Component installations and facilities conducted by a team of functional experts from Headquarters, Department of the Army, the Office of the State Adjutant General, and the Army Reserve Regional Readiness Command.

This recommendation closes five Army Reserve centers, and constructs five multicomponent, multifunctional Armed Forces Reserve Centers (AFRCs), throughout the State of Nebraska, capable of accommodating National Guard and Reserve units.

This recommendation reduces military manpower and associated costs for maintaining existing facilities by collapsing thirteen geographically separated facilities into five modern Armed Forces Reserve Centers. These joint-use facilities will significantly reduce operating costs and create improved business processes. The Department understands that the State of Nebraska will close eight Nebraska Army Guard Armories: Grand Island, Crete, Hastings, Fairbury, Falls City, Columbus, Kearney, and McCook, NE. The Armed Forces Reserve Centers will have the capability to accommodate these units if the state decides to relocate the units from these closed facilities into the new AFRCs.

This recommendation considered feasible locations within the demographic and geographic areas of the closing facilities and affected units. The sites selected were determined as the best locations because they optimize the Reserve Components’ ability to recruit and retain Reserve Component soldiers and to train and mobilize units affected by this recommendation.

This recommendation provides the opportunity for other Local, State, or Federal organizations to partner with the Reserve Components to enhance homeland security and homeland defense at a reduced cost to those agencies.

Although not captured in the COBRA analysis, this recommendation avoids an estimated $31.4M in mission facility renovation costs and procurement avoidances associated with meeting AT/FP construction standards and altering existing facilities to meet unit training and communications requirements. Consideration of these avoided costs would reduce costs and increase the net savings to the Department of Defense in the 6-year BRAC implementation period and in the 20-year period used to calculate NPV.

**COMMUNITY CONCERNS**

There were no formal expressions from the community.

**COMMISSION FINDINGS**

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense. In addition, the Commission notes that the Army’s process was well thought-out and inclusive of the leadership of the Reserve Components and the State.

**COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS**

The Commission found the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and force structure plan. Therefore, the Commission approved the recommendation of the Secretary.
RESERVE COMPONENT TRANSFORMATION IN NEW HAMPSHIRE

Recommendation # 31 (Army 65)

One-time Cost: $54.2M
Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings): ($3.1M)
20-Year Net Present Value: $12.9M
Payback Period: 26 Years

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Close Paul Doble Army Reserve Center in Portsmouth, NH, and relocate units to a new Armed Forces Reserve Center and associated training and maintenance facilities adjacent to Pease Air National Guard Base, NH, if the Army is able to acquire suitable land for the construction of the facilities. The new AFRC and complex will have the capability to accommodate New Hampshire National Guard units from the following New Hampshire ARNG Armories: Rochester, Portsmouth, Somersworth and Dover, NH, if the state decides to relocate those National Guard units.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

This recommendation transforms Reserve Component facilities in the State of New Hampshire. The implementation of this recommendation will enhance military value, improve homeland defense capability, greatly improve training and deployment capability, create significant efficiencies and cost savings, and is consistent with the Army’s force structure plans and Army transformational objectives.

This recommendation is the result of a statewide analysis of Reserve Component installations and facilities conducted by a team of functional experts from Headquarters, Department of the Army, the Office of the State Adjutant General, and the Army Reserve Regional Readiness Command.

This recommendation closes one Armed Forces Reserve Center in Portsmouth, NH and constructs a multicomponent, multifunctional Armed Forces Reserve Center on land adjacent to Pease Air National Guard Base. The Department understands that the State of New Hampshire will close four New Hampshire Army National Guard Readiness Centers: Rochester, Portsmouth, Somersworth and Dover. The Armed Forces Reserve Centers will have the capability to accommodate these units if the state decides to relocate the units from the closed facilities into the new AFRC.

This recommendation considered feasible locations within the demographic and geographic areas of the closing facilities and affected units. The site selected was determined as the best location because it optimizes the Reserve Components’ ability to recruit and retain Reserve Component soldiers and to train and mobilize units affected by this recommendation.

This recommendation provides the opportunity for other Local, State, or Federal organizations to partner with the Reserve Components to enhance homeland security and homeland defense at a reduced cost to those agencies.

Although not captured in the COBRA analysis, this recommendation avoids an estimated $14.6M in mission facility renovation costs and procurement avoidances associated with meeting AT/FP construction standards and altering existing facilities to meet unit training and communications requirements. Consideration of these avoided costs would reduce costs and increase the net savings to the Department of Defense in the 6-year BRAC implementation period and in the 20-year period used to calculate NPV.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

There were no formal expressions from the community.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense. In addition, the Commission notes that the Army’s process was well thought-out and inclusive of the leadership of the Reserve Components and the State.
COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission found the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and force structure plan. Therefore, the Commission approved the recommendation of the Secretary.

RESERVE COMPONENT TRANSFORMATION IN NEW JERSEY

RECOMMENDATION # 32 (ARMY 66)

One-time Cost: $15.1M
Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings): ($3.0M)
20-Year Net Present Value: ($26.6M)
Payback Period: 5 YEARS

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Close the Nelson Brittin Army Reserve Center in Camden, NJ, and relocate units to a new consolidated Armed Forces Reserve Center in Camden, NJ, if the Army can acquire suitable land for the construction of the new facilities. The New AFRC shall have the capability to accommodate units from the New Jersey ARNG Armory, Burlington, if the state decides to relocate those units.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

This recommendation transforms Reserve Component facilities in the State of New Jersey. The implementation of this recommendation will enhance military value, improve homeland defense capability, greatly improve training and deployment capability, create significant efficiencies and cost savings, and is consistent with the Army’s force structure plans and Army transformational objectives.

This recommendation is the result of a state-wide analysis of Reserve Component installations and facilities conducted by a team of functional experts from Headquarters, Department of the Army, the Office of the State Adjutant General, and the Army Reserve Regional Readiness Command.

This recommendation closes Brittin Army Reserve Center in Camden, NJ, and constructs a multicomponent, multifunctional Armed Forces Reserve Center (AFRC) in Camden, NJ. This recommendation reduces costs for maintaining existing facilities by collapsing two separate facilities into one modern AFRC. The Department understands that the State of New Jersey will close one National Guard Armory in Burlington, NJ. The Armed Forces Reserve Centers will have the capability to accommodate these units if the state decides to relocate units to the new multifunctional AFRC in Camden, NJ.

This recommendation considered feasible locations within the demographic and geographic areas of the closing facilities and affected units. The sites selected were determined as the best locations because they optimize the Reserve Components’ ability to recruit and retain Reserve Component soldiers and to train and mobilize units affected by this recommendation. This recommendation provides the opportunity for other Local, State, or Federal organizations to partner with the Reserve Components to enhance homeland security and homeland defense at a reduced cost to those agencies.

Although not captured in the COBRA analysis, this recommendation avoids an estimated $14.5M in mission facility renovation costs and procurement avoidances associated with meeting AT/FP construction standards and altering existing facilities to meet unit training and communications requirements. Consideration of these avoided costs would reduce costs and increase the net savings to the Department of Defense in the 6-year BRAC implementation period and in the 20-year period used to calculate NPV.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

There were no formal expressions from the community.
COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense. In addition, the Commission notes that the Army’s process was well thought-out and inclusive of the leadership of the Reserve Components and the State.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission found the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and force structure plan. Therefore, the Commission approved the recommendation of the Secretary.

RESERVE COMPONENT TRANSFORMATION IN NEW MEXICO

RECOMMENDATION # 33 (ARMY 68)

One-time cost: $17.9M
Annual recurring costs/(Savings): ($3.0M)
20-Year Net Present Value: ($24.6M)
Payback Period: 6 years

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Close the Jenkins Armed Forces Reserve Center located in Albuquerque, NM, and relocate the units into a new Armed Forces Reserve Center on Kirtland Air Force Base.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

This recommendation transforms Reserve Component facilities in the State of New Mexico. The implementation of this recommendation will enhance military value, improve homeland defense capability, greatly improve training and deployment capability, create significant efficiencies and cost savings, and is consistent with the Army’s force structure plans and Army transformational objectives.

This recommendation is the result of a state-wide analysis of Reserve Component installations and facilities conducted by a team of functional experts from Headquarters, Department of the Army, the Office of the State Adjutant General, and the Army Reserve Regional Readiness Command.

This recommendation closes an Armed Forces Reserve Center (AFRC) located in Albuquerque, NM, and relocates units to a new multifunctional AFRC on Kirtland Air Force Base, NM. This recommendation reduces the number of separate DoD installations by relocating a geographically separate facility onto an existing base. Reducing the number of DoD installations also reduces the manpower costs required to sustain multiple facilities.

This recommendation provides the opportunity for other Local, State, or Federal organizations to partner with the Reserve Components to enhance homeland security and homeland defense at a reduced cost to those agencies.

Although not captured in the COBRA analysis, this recommendation avoids an estimated $0.8M in mission facility renovation costs and procurement avoidances associated with meeting AT/FP construction standards and altering existing facilities to meet unit training and communications requirements. Consideration of these avoided costs would reduce costs and increase the net savings to the Department of Defense in the 6-year BRAC implementation period and in the 20-year period used to calculate NPV.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

There were no formal expressions from the community.
Commission Findings

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense. In addition, the Commission notes that the Army's process was well thought-out and inclusive of the leadership of the Reserve Components and the State.

Commission Recommendations

The Commission found the Secretary's recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and force structure plan. Therefore, the Commission approved the recommendation of the Secretary.

Reserve Component Transformation in New York

Recommendation # 34 (Army 69)

One-time Cost: $103.8M
Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings): ($4.0M)
20-Year Net Present Value: $46.5M
Payback Period: 47 Years

Secretary of Defense Recommendation

Close the United States Army Reserve Center, Stewart-Newburg, NY, and relocate units to a new Armed Forces Reserve Center on Stewart Army Sub Post adjacent to Stewart Air National Guard Base, NY. The new AFRC shall have the capability to accommodate New York National Guard units from the Readiness Center at Newburg, NY, if the state of New York decides to relocate those National Guard units.

Close the United States Army Reserve Center and Army Maintenance Support Activity, Niagara Falls, NY, and construct a new Armed Forces Reserve Center on the existing site in Niagara Falls, NY. The New AFRC shall have the capability to accommodate the NY National Guard units from the Niagara Falls Readiness Center if the state of New York decides to relocate those National Guard units.

Close the BG Theodore Roosevelt United States Army Reserve Center, Uniondale, NY, the Amityville Armed Forces Reserve Center (Army Reserve and Marine Corps Reserve), Amityville, NY, and relocate units into a new Armed Forces Reserve Center with an Organizational Maintenance Shop on federal property licensed to the New York Army National Guard in Farmingdale, NY. The new AFRC shall have the capability to accommodate New York National Guard units from the following New York Army National Guard Readiness Centers: Bayshore, Freeport, Huntington Station, Patchogue and Riverhead, and Organizational Maintenance Shop 21, Bayshore, NY, if the state of New York decides to relocate those National Guard units.

Secretary of Defense Justification

This recommendation transforms Reserve Component facilities throughout the State of New York. The implementation of this recommendation will enhance military value, improve homeland defense capability, greatly improve training and deployment capability, create significant efficiencies and cost savings, and is consistent with the Army’s force structure plans and Army transformational objectives.

This recommendation is the result of a state-wide analysis of Reserve Component installations and facilities conducted by a team of functional experts from Headquarters, Department of the Army, the Office of the State Adjutant General, and the Army Reserve Regional Readiness Command.

This recommendation closes four Army Reserve centers and constructs three multicomponent, multifunctional Armed Forces Reserve Centers (AFRCs), throughout the State of New York, capable of accommodating National Guard and Reserve units. This recommendation reduces military manpower and associated costs for maintaining existing facilities by collapsing three geographically separated facilities into three modern Armed Forces Reserve Centers. These joint-use facilities will significantly reduce operating costs and create improved business processes. The Department understands that the State of New York will close six New York Army Guard Armories: Niagara Falls, Bayshore, Freeport, Huntington Station,
Patchogue and Riverhead, and Organizational Maintenance Shop 21 Bayshore, NY. The Armed Forces Reserve Centers will have the capability to accommodate these units if the state decides to relocate the units from these closed facilities into the new AFRCs.

This recommendation considered feasible locations within the demographic and geographic areas of the closing facilities and affected units. The sites selected were determined as the best locations because they optimize the Reserve Components’ ability to recruit and retain Reserve Component soldiers and to train and mobilize units affected by this recommendation.

This recommendation provides the opportunity for other Local, State, or Federal organizations to partner with the Reserve Components to enhance homeland security and homeland defense at a reduced cost to those agencies.

Although not captured in the COBRA analysis, this recommendation avoids an estimated $81.6M in mission facility renovation costs and procurement avoidances associated with meeting AT/FP construction standards and altering existing facilities to meet unit training and communications requirements. Consideration of these avoided costs would reduce costs and increase the net savings to the Department of Defense in the 6-year BRAC implementation period and in the 20-year period used to calculate NPV.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

There were no formal expressions from the community.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense. In addition, the Commission notes that the Army’s process was well thought-out and inclusive of the leadership of the Reserve Components and the State.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission found the Secretary's recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and force structure plan. Therefore, the Commission approved the recommendation of the Secretary.

RESERVE COMPONENT TRANSFORMATION IN NORTH CAROLINA

RECOMMENDATION # 35 (ARMY 72)

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<td>Payback Period</td>
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SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Close the Army Reserve Adrian B. Rhodes Armed Forces Reserve Center in Wilmington, NC, close the Rock Hill Armed Forces Reserve Center in Rock Hill, SC, close the Niven Armed Forces Reserve Center in Albermarle, NC, and relocate all Army and Navy units to a new Armed Forces Reserve Center (AFRC) and Organizational Maintenance Shop (OMS) in Wilmington, NC, if the Army is able to acquire suitable land for the construction of the facilities.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

This recommendation transforms Reserve Component facilities in the State of North Carolina. The implementation of this recommendation will enhance military value, improve homeland defense capability, greatly improve training and deployment capability, create significant efficiencies and cost savings, and is consistent with the Army’s force structure plans and Army transformational objectives.
This recommendation is the result of a statewide analysis of Reserve Component installations and facilities conducted by a team of functional experts from Headquarters, Department of the Army, the Office of the State Adjutant General, and the Army Reserve Regional Readiness Command.

This recommendation closes two Army Reserve Centers in the state of North Carolina and one Army Reserve Center in the state of South Carolina and constructs a multicomponent, multifunctional, Armed Forces Reserve Center capable of accommodating Navy and Army Reserve units. This recommendation reduces military manpower and associated costs for maintaining existing facilities by collapsing three geographically separated facilities into a modern Armed Forces Reserve Center.

This recommendation considered feasible locations within the demographic and geographic areas of the closing facilities and affected units. The site selected was determined as the best location because it optimizes the Reserve Components’ ability to recruit and retain Reserve Component soldiers and to train and mobilize units affected by this recommendation.

This recommendation provides the opportunity for other Local, State, or Federal organizations to partner with the Reserve Components to enhance homeland security and homeland defense at a reduced cost to those agencies.

Although not captured in the COBRA analysis, this recommendation avoids an estimated $10.2M in mission facility renovation costs and procurement avoidances associated with meeting AT/FP construction standards and altering existing facilities to meet unit training and communications requirements. Consideration of these avoided costs would reduce costs and increase the net savings to the Department of Defense in the 6-year BRAC implementation period and in the 20-year period used to calculate NPV.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

There were no formal expressions from the community.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense. In addition, the Commission notes that the Army’s process was well thought-out and inclusive of the leadership of the Reserve Components and the State.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission found the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and force structure plan. Therefore, the Commission approved the recommendation of the Secretary.

RESERVE COMPONENT TRANSFORMATION IN NORTH DAKOTA

RECOMMENDATION # 36 (ARMY 73)

One-time Cost: $7.9M
Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings): $0.02M
20-Year Net Present Value: $8.0M
Payback Period: NEVER

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Close 96th Regional Readiness Command David Johnson US Army Reserve Command in Fargo, ND, and relocate into a new Reserve Center on Hector Field Air National Guard Base.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

This recommendation transforms Reserve Component facilities in the State of North Dakota. The implementation of this recommendation will enhance military value, improve homeland defense capability, greatly improve training and
deployment capability, create significant efficiencies and cost savings, and is consistent with the Army’s force structure plans and Army transformational objectives.

This recommendation is the result of a statewide analysis of Reserve Component installations and facilities conducted by a team of functional experts from Headquarters, Department of the Army, the Office of the State Adjutant General, and the Army Reserve Regional Readiness Command.

This recommendation closes a United States Army Reserve Center (USARC) located in Fargo, ND, and relocates units to a new USARC on Hector Field Air National Guard Base, ND. This recommendation reduces the number of separate DoD installations by relocating to an existing base.

This recommendation considered feasible locations within the demographic and geographic areas of the closing facility and affected units. The site selected was determined as the best location because it optimizes the Reserve Components’ ability to recruit and retain Reserve Component soldiers and to train and mobilize units affected by this recommendation.

This recommendation provides the opportunity for other Local, State, or Federal organizations to partner with the Reserve Components to enhance homeland security and homeland defense at a reduced cost to those agencies.

Although not captured in the COBRA analysis, this recommendation avoids an estimated $4.0M in mission facility renovation costs and procurement avoidances associated with meeting AT/FP construction standards and altering existing facilities to meet unit training and communications requirements. Consideration of these avoided costs would reduce costs and increase the net savings to the Department of Defense in the 6-year BRAC implementation period and in the 20-year period used to calculate NPV.

**Community Concerns**

There were no formal expressions from the community.

**Commission Findings**

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense. In addition, the Commission notes that the Army’s process was well thought-out and inclusive of the leadership of the Reserve Components and the State.

**Commission Recommendations**

The Commission found the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and force structure plan. Therefore, the Commission approved the recommendation of the Secretary.

**Reserve Component Transformation in Ohio**

Recommendation # 37 (Army 75)

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**Secretary of Defense Recommendation**

Close the Scouten Army Reserve Center, Mansfield, OH, and the Parrott Army Reserve Center, Kenton, OH, and relocate all units to a new AFRC at Mansfield Air National Guard Base located at Mansfield-Lahm Airport. The new AFRC shall have the capability to accommodate units from the following facilities: Ohio ARNG Armories in Mansfield and Ashland, OH, if the state decides to relocate those National Guard units.

Close US Army Reserve Center, Springfield OH, and relocate all units to a new Armed Forces Reserve Center on the Springfield Air National Guard Base, Springfield, OH. The new AFRC shall have the capability to accommodate units from
the following facility: Ohio ARNG Readiness Center, Springfield, OH, if the state decides to relocate those National Guard units.

Close Fort Hayes US Army Reserve Center, Columbus, OH, and Whitehall US Army Reserve Center, Whitehall, OH, and relocate units to a new Armed Forces Reserve Center on Defense Supply Center Columbus, OH. The new AFRC shall have the capability to accommodate units from the following facilities: Ohio ARNG Armories Howey (Columbus), Sullivant (Columbus), Newark, Westerville and Oxford, OH, Rickenbacker Air National Guard Base, Building #943 if the state decides to relocate those National Guard units.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

This recommendation transforms Reserve Component facilities throughout the State of Ohio. The implementation of this recommendation will enhance military value, improve homeland defense capability, greatly improve training and deployment capability, create significant efficiencies and cost savings, and is consistent with the Army’s force structure plans and Army transformational objectives.

This recommendation is the result of a state-wide analysis of Reserve Component installations and facilities conducted by a team of functional experts from Headquarters, Department of the Army, the Office of the State Adjutant General, and the Army Reserve Regional Readiness Command.

This recommendation closes five US Army Reserve Centers throughout the state of Ohio and constructs three Armed Forces Reserve Centers capable of accommodating National Guard and Reserve units. This recommendation reduces military manpower and associated costs for maintaining existing facilities by collapsing thirteen geographically separated facilities into three modern Armed Forces Reserve Centers.

This recommendation reduces the number of separate DoD installations by relocating to an existing base. These joint-use facilities will significantly reduce operating costs and create improved business practices. The Department understands that the State of Ohio will close eight Ohio Army National Guard Centers: Mansfield, Ashland, Springfield, Howey (Columbus), Sullivant (Columbus), Newark, Westerville, and Oxford, OH, and realign Rickenbacker Air National Guard Base Building #943 by relocating the Regional Training Institute to the new AFRC. The Armed Forces Reserve Centers will have the capability to accommodate these units if the state decides to relocate the units from these closed facilities into the new AFRCs.

This recommendation provides the opportunity for other Local, State, or Federal organizations to partner with the Reserve Components to enhance homeland security and homeland defense at a reduced cost to those agencies.

Although not captured in the COBRA analysis, this recommendation avoids an estimated $74.4M in mission facility renovation costs and procurement avoidances associated with meeting AT/FP construction standards and altering existing facilities to meet unit training and communications requirements. Consideration of these avoided costs would reduce costs and increase the net savings to the Department of Defense in the 6-year BRAC implementation period and in the 20-year period used to calculate NPV.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

There were no formal expressions from the community.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense. In addition, the Commission notes that the Army’s process was well thought-out and inclusive of the leadership of the Reserve Components and the State.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission found the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and force structure plan. Therefore, the Commission approved the recommendation of the Secretary.
**Reserve Component Transformation in Oklahoma**

**Recommendation # 38 (Army 77)**

**ONE-TIME COST:** $168.7M

**ANNUAL RECURRING COSTS/(SAVINGS):** ($16.5M)

**20-YEAR NET PRESENT VALUE:** ($63.8M)

**PAYBACK PERIOD:** 11 YEARS

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**Secretary of Defense Recommendation**

Close the Armed Forces Reserve Center (AFRC) Broken Arrow located in Broken Arrow, OK, and relocate the Army Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve and Naval Reserve units into a new Armed Forces Reserve Center and consolidated maintenance facility in Broken Arrow, OK, if the Army is able to acquire suitable land for the construction of the facility. The new AFRC shall have the capability to accommodate Oklahoma Army National Guard units from the following Oklahoma Army National Guard Readiness Centers: Broken Arrow, Eufaula, Okmulgee, Tahlequah, Haskell, Cushing, Wagoner and the Field Maintenance Shop (FMS 14) located in Okmulgee if the state of Oklahoma decides to relocate those National Guard units.

Close the Keathley and Burris United States Army Reserve Centers located in Lawton and Chickasha, OK; close the Wichita Falls United States Army Reserve Center in Wichita Falls, TX; close the 1st, 3rd, 5th, and 6th United States Army Reserve Centers and Equipment Concentration Site (ECS) located on Fort Sill, OK, and relocate units into a new Armed Forces Reserve Center on Fort Sill and a new United States Army Reserve Equipment Concentration Site to be collocated with the Oklahoma Army National Guard Maneuver Area Training Equipment Site on Fort Sill. The new AFRC shall have the capability to accommodate Oklahoma Army National Guard units from the following Oklahoma Army National Guard Readiness Centers: Lawton, Frederick, Anadarko, Chickasha, Marlow, Walters, and Healdton; realign B/1-158 Field Artillery (MLRS) from the Oklahoma Army National Guard Readiness Center located in Duncan if the state of Oklahoma decides to relocate those National Guard units.

Close the Floyd Parker United States Army Reserve Center in McAlester, OK, and relocate units into a new Armed Forces Reserve Center and Consolidated Field Maintenance Shop on the McAlester Army Ammunition Plant, McAlester, OK. The new AFRC shall have the capability to accommodate Oklahoma Army National Guard units from the following Oklahoma Army National Guard Readiness Centers: the Field Maintenance Shop in Durant, OK; the Oklahoma Army National Guard Readiness Centers in Atoka, Allen, Harrah, Madill, McAlester and Tishomingo, OK; the Oklahoma Army National Guard Readiness Center and Field Maintenance Shop in Edmond, OK, if the state of Oklahoma decides to relocate those National Guard units.

Close the Ashworth United States Army Reserve Center located in Muskogee, OK, and relocate units into a new Armed Forces Reserve Center in Muskogee, OK, if the Army is able to acquire suitable land for the construction of the facility. The new AFRC shall have the capability to accommodate Oklahoma Army National Guard units from the following Oklahoma Army National Guard Readiness Centers: Henryetta, Muskogee, Okemah, Pryor, and Stilwell, OK, if the state of Oklahoma decides to relocate those National Guard units.

Close the Farr United States Army Reserve Center, Antlers, OK, the Roush United States Army Reserve Center, Clinton, OK, the Smalley United States Army Reserve Center, Norman, OK, and relocate units into a new Armed Forces Reserve Center and Consolidated Maintenance Facility on the Norman Military Complex, Norman, OK. The new AFRC shall have the capability to accommodate Oklahoma Army National Guard units from the following Oklahoma Army National Guard facilities: Oklahoma Army National Guard Readiness Centers in Tonkawa, OK, Konawa, OK, Wewoka, OK, Oklahoma City (23rd Street), OK, the 23rd Street Field Maintenance Shop in Oklahoma City, the Consolidated Maintenance Facility on the Norman Military Complex, Norman, OK, and C CO, 700th Support Battalion from the Readiness Center, Edmond, OK, if the state of Oklahoma decides to relocate those National Guard units.

Close the Manuel Perez and Billy Krowse United States Army Reserve Centers located in Oklahoma City, OK. Relocate units into a new Armed Forces Reserve Center in West Oklahoma City, OK, if the Army is able to acquire suitable land for the construction of the facility. The new AFRC shall have the capability to accommodate Oklahoma Army National Guard units from the following Oklahoma Army National Guard facilities: Readiness Centers located in Southwest Oklahoma City (44th Street), El Reno, Minco, and Pawnee, the Oklahoma Army National Guard 1345 Transportation Company and the
345th Quartermaster Water Support Battalion from Midwest City if the state of Oklahoma decides to relocate those National Guard units.

Close the Robbins United States Army Reserve Center located in Enid, OK, and relocate units into a new Armed Forces Reserve Center and Consolidated Field Maintenance Shop on Vance Air Force Base, OK. The new AFRC shall have the capability to accommodate Oklahoma Army National Guard units from the following Oklahoma Army National Guard facilities: Enid, Aha, Woodward, Blackwell, Cherokee, Watonga, and the National Guard Field Maintenance Shop in Enid, OK, if the state of Oklahoma decides to relocate those National Guard units.

**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION**

This recommendation transforms Reserve Component facilities throughout the State of Oklahoma. The implementation of this recommendation will enhance military value, improve homeland defense capability, greatly improve training and deployment capability, create significant efficiencies and cost savings, and is consistent with the Army’s force structure plans and Army transformational objectives.

This recommendation is the result of a state-wide analysis of Reserve Component installations and facilities conducted by a team of functional experts from Headquarters, Department of the Army, the Office of the State Adjutant General, and the Army Reserve Regional Readiness Command.

This recommendation closes eleven Army Reserve centers, realigns five Army Reserve facilities and constructs seven joint or multicomponent, multifunctional Armed Forces Reserve Centers (AFRCs) throughout the State of Oklahoma, capable of accommodating National Guard and Reserve units. This recommendation reduces military manpower and associated costs for maintaining existing facilities by collapsing units from sixty-four geographically separated facilities into seven modern, multicomponent facilities. These joint-use facilities will significantly reduce operating costs and create improved business processes. The Department understands that the State of Oklahoma will close forty Oklahoma Army National Guard Readiness Centers, close five Maintenance Facilities, realign two Readiness Centers and one Maintenance Facility. The Armed Forces Reserve Centers will have the capability to accommodate these units if the state decides to relocate the units from these closed facilities into the new AFRCs.

This recommendation considered feasible locations within the demographic and geographic areas of the closing facilities and affected units. The sites selected were determined as the best locations because they optimize the Reserve Components’ ability to recruit and retain Reserve Component soldiers and to train and mobilize units affected by this recommendation.

This recommendation provides the opportunity for other Local, State, or Federal organizations to partner with the Reserve Components to enhance homeland security and homeland defense at a reduced cost to those agencies.

Although not captured in the COBRA analysis, this recommendation avoids an estimated $61.9M in mission facility renovation costs and procurement avoidances associated with meeting AT/FP construction standards and altering existing facilities to meet unit training and communications requirements. Consideration of these avoided costs would reduce costs and increase the net savings to the Department of Defense in the 6-year BRAC implementation period and in the 20-year period used to calculate NPV.

**COMMUNITY CONCERNS**

There were no formal expressions from the community.

**COMMISSION FINDINGS**

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense. In addition, the Commission notes that the Army’s process was well thought-out and inclusive of the leadership of the Reserve Components and the State.

**COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS**

The Commission found the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and force structure plan. Therefore, the Commission approved the recommendation of the Secretary.
RESERVE COMPONENT TRANSFORMATION IN OREGON

RECOMMENDATION # 39 (ARMY 80)

One-time Cost: $24.1M
Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings): ($0.3M)
20-Year Net Present Value: $19.8M
Payback Period: 100+ Years

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Close Sears Hall United States Army Reserve Center in Portland, OR, close Sharff Hall United States Army Reserve Center in Portland, OR, and relocate units to a new Armed Forces Reserve Center on Camp Withycombe, OR. The new Armed Forces Reserve Center (AFRC) shall have the capability to accommodate Oregon National Guard units currently on Camp Withycombe and from the following Oregon ARNG Armories: Lake Oswego Armory, Maison Armory, and Jackson Band Armory, OR, if the state decides to relocate those National Guard units.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

This recommendation transforms Reserve Component facilities in the State of Oregon. The implementation of this recommendation will enhance military value, improve homeland defense capability, greatly improve training and deployment capability, create significant efficiencies and cost savings, and is consistent with the Army’s force structure plans and Army transformational objectives.

This recommendation is the result of a statewide analysis of Reserve Component installations and facilities conducted by a team of functional experts from Headquarters, Department of the Army, the Office of the State Adjutant General, and the Army Reserve Regional Readiness Command.

This recommendation closes two Army Reserve Centers in the State of Oregon and constructs a multicomponent, multifunctional Armed Forces Reserve Center capable of accommodating National Guard and Reserve units. This recommendation reduces the number of separate DoD installations by relocating to an existing base.

This recommendation reduces military manpower and associated costs for maintaining existing facilities by collapsing three geographically separated facilities into a modern Armed Forces Reserve Center. The Department understands that the State of Oregon will close: Lake Oswego Armory in Lake Oswego, OR and realign the Jackson Band Armory, and the Maison Armory. The Armed Forces Reserve Centers will have the capability to accommodate these units if the state decides to relocate the units from the closed and realigning facilities to the new AFRC complex.

This recommendation provides the opportunity for other Local, State, or Federal organizations to partner with the Reserve Components to enhance homeland security and homeland defense at a reduced cost to those agencies.

Although not captured in the COBRA analysis, this recommendation avoids an estimated $36M in mission facility renovation costs and procurement avoidances associated with meeting AT/FP construction standards and altering the existing facilities to meet unit training and communications requirements. Consideration of these avoided costs would reduce costs to the Department of Defense in the 6-year BRAC implementation period and in the 20-year period used to calculate NPV.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

There were no formal expressions from the community.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense. In addition, the Commission notes that the Army’s process was well thought-out and inclusive of the leadership of the Reserve Components and the State.
COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission found the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and force structure plan. Therefore, the Commission approved the recommendation of the Secretary.

RESERVE COMPONENT TRANSFORMATION IN PENNSYLVANIA

RECOMMENDATION # 40 (ARMY 82)

One-time Cost: $142.7M
Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings): ($14.2M)
20-Year Net Present Value: ($58.4M)
Payback Period: 10 Years

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Close the United States Army Reserve Center in Lewisburg, PA, the United States Army Reserve Center in Bloomsburg, PA, the United States Army Reserve Organizational Maintenance Shop in Bloomsburg, PA, and relocate units to a new Armed Forces Reserve Center with an organizational maintenance facility in the Lewisburg / Bloomsburg, PA, area if the Army is able to acquire suitable land for the construction of the facilities. The new AFRC shall have the capability to accommodate Pennsylvania National Guard Units from the following Army National Guard Readiness Centers: Lewisburg, PA, Sunbury, PA, Scranton, PA, and Berwick, PA, if the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania decides to relocate those units.

Close the United States Army Reserve Center in Williamsport, PA, the United States Army Reserve Organizational Maintenance Shop in Williamsport, PA, and relocate units to a new Armed Forces Reserve Center with an organizational maintenance facility in Williamsport, PA, if the Army is able to acquire suitable land for the construction of the facilities. The new AFRC shall have the capability to accommodate Pennsylvania National Guard Units from the Army National Guard Readiness Center in Williamsport, PA, if the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania decides to relocate those units.

Close the Reese United States Army Reserve Center in Chester, PA, the United States Army Reserve Organizational Maintenance Shop in Chester, PA, the Germantown Veterans Memorial United States Army Reserve Center in Philadelphia, PA, the Horsham Memorial United States Army Reserve Center in Horsham, PA, the I LT Ray S. Musselman Memorial United States Army Reserve Center in Norristown, PA, and the North Penn memorial United States Army Reserve Center in Norristown, PA, and relocate units to a new Armed Forces Reserve Center with an organizational maintenance facility at Willow Grove Joint Reserve Base, PA. The Army shall establish an enclave at Willow Grove Joint Reserve Base, PA, to retain essential facilities to support activities of the Reserve Components.

Close the Wilson Kramer United States Army Reserve Center in Bethlehem, PA, and the United States Army Reserve Organizational Maintenance Shop in Bethlehem, PA, and relocate units to a new United States Army Reserve Center with an organizational maintenance facility in the Allentown/ Bethlehem, PA, area if the Army is able to acquire suitable land for the construction of the facilities.

Close the Philadelphia Memorial United States Armed Forces Reserve Center in Philadelphia, PA, the Philadelphia Memorial United States Armed Forces Reserve Center Organizational Maintenance Shop in Philadelphia, PA, and relocate Army Reserve and Marine Corps Reserve units to a new Armed Forces Reserve Center with an organizational maintenance facility in Bristol, PA, on the existing Bristol Veterans Memorial Reserve Center site.

Close the Serrenti Memorial United States Army Reserve Center in Scranton, PA, the Serrenti Memorial United States Army Reserve Organizational Maintenance Shop in Scranton, PA, the United States Army Reserve Center in Wilkes-Barre, PA, the United States Army Reserve Organizational Maintenance Shop in Wilkes-Barre, PA, and relocate units to a new Armed Forces Reserve Center with an organizational maintenance facility in Scranton, PA, if the Army is able to acquire suitable land for the construction of the facilities.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

This recommendation transforms Reserve Component facilities throughout the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. The implementation of this recommendation will enhance military value, improve homeland defense capability, greatly improve
training and deployment capability, create significant efficiencies and cost savings, and is consistent with the Army's force structure plans and Army transformational objectives.

This recommendation is the result of a statewide analysis of Reserve Component installations and facilities conducted by a team of functional experts from Headquarters, Department of the Army, the Office of the State Adjutant General, and the Army Reserve Regional Readiness Command.

This recommendation closes eleven Army Reserve Centers, one Armed Forces Reserve Center, and seven Organizational Maintenance Shops throughout the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and constructs six multicomponent, multifunctional Armed Forces Reserve Centers, with six co-located Organizational Maintenance Facilities capable of accommodating National Guard and Reserve units. This recommendation reduces military manpower and associated costs for maintaining existing facilities by collapsing sixteen geographically separated facilities into six modern Armed Forces Reserve Centers. This recommendation reduces the number of separate DoD installations by relocating to an existing base. The Department understands that the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania will close PAARNG Readiness Centers: Lewisburg, PA, Sunbury, PA, Berwick, PA, Scranton, PA, and Williamsport, PA. The Armed Forces Reserve Centers will have the capability to accommodate these units if the state decides to relocate the units from these closed facilities into the new AFRCs.

This recommendation provides the opportunity for other Local, State, or Federal organizations to partner with the Reserve Components to enhance homeland security and homeland defense at a reduced cost to those agencies.

Although not captured in the COBRA analysis, this recommendation avoids an estimated $110.4M in mission facility renovation costs and procurement avoidances associated with meeting AT/FP construction standards and altering existing facilities to meet unit training and communications requirements. Consideration of these avoided costs would reduce costs and increase the net savings to the Department of Defense in the 6-year BRAC implementation period and in the 20-year period used to calculate NPV.

**COMMUNITY CONCERNS**

There were no formal expressions from the community.

**COMMISSION FINDINGS**

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense. In addition, the Commission notes that the Army’s process was well thought-out and inclusive of the leadership of the Reserve Components and the State.

**COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS**

The Commission found the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and force structure plan. Therefore, the Commission approved the recommendation of the Secretary.

**RESERVE COMPONENT TRANSFORMATION IN PUERTO RICO**

**Recommendation # 41 (Army 85)**

- **One-time Cost:** $87.0M
- **Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings):** ($7.3M)
- **20-Year Net Present Value:** ($8.6M)
- **Payback Period:** 15 Years

**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION**

Close the US Army Reserve Center 1st Lieutenant Paul Lavergne, Bayamon, PR, and relocate the 973rd Combat Support (CS) Company into a new Armed Forces Reserve Center on United States Army Reserve property in Ceiba, PR, and relocate all other units into a new Armed Forces Reserve Center (AFRC) on Fort Buchanan, PR. Realign the US Army Reserve Center Captain E. Rubio Junior, Puerto Nuevo, PR, by relocating the 807th Signal Company into a new Armed Forces Reserve Center on Fort Buchanan, PR. The new AFRC on Fort Buchanan, PR, shall have the capability to
accommodate units from the Puerto Rico Army Guard San Juan Readiness Center, San Juan, PR, if Puerto Rico decides to relocate those National Guard units. The new AFRC facility in Ceiba, PR, shall have the capability to accommodate Puerto Rico National Guard units from the following PRARNG Readiness Centers: Humacao, Juncos, and Ceiba, PR, if Puerto Rico decides to relocate those National Guard units.

Realignment United States Army Reserve Center Captain E. Rubio Junior, Puerto Nuevo, PR, by relocating the 8th Brigade, 108th DIV (IT) to a new Armed Forces Reserve Center on Fort Allen, PR.

Realignment United States Army Reserve Center Ramey, Aguadilla, PR, by relocating the 249th Quartermaster Company into a new Armed Forces Reserve Center in Mayaguez, PR, if the Army is able to acquire suitable land. The new facility shall have the capability to accommodate Puerto Rico National Guard units from the Puerto Rico Army National Guard Readiness Center Mayaguez if Puerto Rico decides to relocate those National Guard units.

**Secretary of Defense Justification**

This recommendation transforms Reserve Component facilities throughout Puerto Rico. The implementation of this recommendation will enhance military value, improve homeland defense capability, greatly improve training and deployment capability, create significant efficiencies and cost savings, and is consistent with the Army’s force structure plans and Army transformational objectives.

This recommendation is the result of a state-wide analysis of Reserve Component installations and facilities conducted by a team of functional experts from Headquarters, Department of the Army, the Office of the State Adjutant General, and the Army Reserve Regional Readiness Command.

This recommendation closes one and realigns four US Army Reserve Centers throughout Puerto Rico and constructs four multicomponent, multifunctional Armed Forces Reserve Centers capable of accommodating National Guard and Reserve units. This recommendation reduces the number of separate DoD installations by relocating to an existing base. This recommendation reduces military manpower and associated costs for maintaining existing facilities by collapsing five geographically separated facilities into three modern Armed Forces Reserve Centers. These joint facilities will significantly reduce operating costs and create improved business processes. The Department understands that Puerto Rico will close PRARNG Readiness Centers: Humacao, Juncos, Ceiba, and Mayaguez, PR. The Armed Forces Reserve Centers will have the capability to accommodate these units if the state decides to relocate the units from these closed facilities into the new AFRCs.

This recommendation provides the opportunity for other Local, State, or Federal organizations to partner with the Reserve Components to enhance homeland security and homeland defense at a reduced cost to those agencies.

Although not captured in the COBRA analysis, this recommendation avoids an estimated $36.4M in mission facility renovation costs and procurement avoidance associated with meeting AT/FP construction standards and altering existing facilities to meet unit training and communications requirements. Consideration of these avoided costs would reduce costs and increase the net savings to the Department of Defense in the 6-year BRAC implementation period and in the 20-year period used to calculate NPV.

**Community Concerns**

There were no formal expressions from the community.

**Commission Findings**

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense. In addition, the Commission notes that the Army’s process was well thought-out and inclusive of the leadership of the Reserve Components and the State.

**Commission Recommendations**

The Commission found the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and force structure plan. Therefore, the Commission approved the recommendation of the Secretary.
Reserve Component Transformation in Rhode Island

Recommendation # 42 (Army 87)

One-time Cost: $32.4M
Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings): ($4.6M)
20-Year Net Present Value: ($35.3M)
Payback Period: 6 years

Secretary of Defense Recommendation

Close the Bristol Army Reserve Center, Bristol, RI, the Harwood Army Reserve Center, Providence, RI, the Warwick Army Reserve Center and Organizational Maintenance Shop, Warwick, RI. Relocate all units to a new Army Reserve Center on Newport Naval Base, RI.

Secretary of Defense Justification

This recommendation transforms Reserve Component facilities in the State of Rhode Island. The implementation of this recommendation will enhance military value, improve homeland defense capability, greatly improve training and deployment capability, create significant efficiencies and cost savings, and is consistent with the Army’s force structure plans and Army transformational objectives.

This recommendation is the result of a state-wide analysis of Reserve Component installations and facilities conducted by a team of functional experts from Headquarters, Department of the Army, the Office of the State Adjutant General, and the Army Reserve Regional Readiness Command.

This recommendation closes three Army Reserve Centers in Bristol, Harwood and Warwick, RI; and closes one Army Reserve Organizational Maintenance Shop in Warwick, RI, and constructs a multifunctional Army Reserve Center (AFRC) on Newport Naval Base, RI. This recommendation reduces the number of separate DoD installations by relocating to an existing base.

The implementation of this recommendation will enhance military value, improve homeland defense capability, greatly improve training and deployment capability, create significant efficiencies and cost savings, and is consistent with the Army’s force structure plans and Army transformational objectives.

This recommendation considered feasible locations within the demographic and geographic areas of the closing facilities and affected units. The site selected was determined as the best location because it optimizes the Reserve Components’ ability to recruit and retain Reserve Component soldiers and to train and mobilize units affected by this recommendation.

This recommendation provides the opportunity for other Local, State, or Federal organizations to partner with the Reserve Components to enhance homeland security and homeland defense at a reduced cost to those agencies.

Although not captured in the COBRA analysis, this recommendation avoids an estimated $20.8M in mission facility renovation costs and procurement avoidances associated with meeting AT/FP construction standards and altering existing facilities to meet unit training and communications requirements. Consideration of these avoided costs would reduce costs and increase the net savings to the Department of Defense in the 6-year BRAC implementation period and in the 20-year period used to calculate NPV.

Community Concerns

There were no formal expressions from the community.

Commission Findings

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense. In addition, the Commission notes that the Army’s process was well thought-out and inclusive of the leadership of the Reserve Components and the State.
Commission Recommendations

The Commission found the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and force structure plan. Therefore, the Commission approved the recommendation of the Secretary.

Reserve Component Transformation in Tennessee

Recommendation # 43 (Army 89)

One-time Cost: $36.9M
Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings): ($2.7M)
20-Year Net Present Value: $1.1M
Payback Period: 18 Years

Secretary of Defense Recommendation

Close the Guerry United States Army Reserve Center, Chattanooga, TN, and Bonney Oaks United States Army Reserve Center, Chattanooga, TN, and relocate units into a new Armed Forces Reserve Center (AFRC) on Volunteer Army Ammunition Plant, Chattanooga, TN.

Close the Kingsport Armed Forces Reserve Center (AFRC), the Kingsport Organizational Maintenance Shop (OMS), and the Army Maintenance Support Activity (AMSA), Kingsport, TN, and relocate units into a new Armed Forces Reserve Center and Field Maintenance Shop on Holston Army Ammunition Plant, Kingsport, TN. The new AFRC shall have the capability to accommodate Tennessee National Guard units from the Kingsport Armed Forces Reserve Center, Kingsport, TN, if the state decides to relocate those National Guard units. Close the United States Army Reserve Center outside of Fort Campbell (located in Clarksville, TN), KY, and relocate units, along with units currently in buildings #6912 and #2907 on Fort Campbell into a new Armed Forces Reserve Center (AFRC) and Organizational Maintenance Shop (OMS) on Fort Campbell, KY. The new AFRC shall have the capability to accommodate units from the Clarksville Army National Guard Readiness Center, Clarksville, TN, if the state decides to relocate those National Guard units.

Secretary of Defense Justification

This recommendation transforms Reserve Component facilities throughout the State of Tennessee. The implementation of this recommendation will enhance military value, improve homeland defense capability, greatly improve training and deployment capability, create significant efficiencies and cost savings, and is consistent with the Army’s force structure plans and Army transformational objectives.

This recommendation is the result of a statewide analysis of Reserve Component installations and facilities conducted by a team of functional experts from Headquarters, Department of the Army, the Office of the State Adjutant General, and the Army Reserve Regional Readiness Command.

This recommendation closes four Army Reserve Centers, one Area Maintenance Support Activity and one Organizational Maintenance Shop throughout the State of Tennessee and constructs three multicomponent, multifunctional Armed Forces Reserve Centers, one Field Maintenance Shop, and one Organizational Maintenance Shop capable of accommodating National Guard and Reserve units. This recommendation reduces military manpower and associated costs for maintaining existing facilities by collapsing nine geographically separated facilities into three modern Armed Forces Reserve Centers. This recommendation reduces the number of separate DoD installations by relocating to an existing base.

The Department understands that the State of Tennessee will close the Clarksville Army National Guard Readiness Center, Clarksville, TN. The Armed Forces Reserve Centers will have the capability to accommodate these units if the state decides to relocate the units from these closed facilities into the new AFRCs.

This recommendation provides the opportunity for other Local, State, or Federal organizations to partner with the Reserve Components to enhance homeland security and homeland defense at a reduced cost to those agencies.

Although not captured in the COBRA analysis, this recommendation avoids an estimated $23.8M in mission facility renovation costs and procurement avoidances associated with meeting AT/FP construction standards and altering existing facilities to meet unit training and communications requirements. Consideration of these avoided costs would reduce costs.
and increase the net savings to the Department of Defense in the 6-year BRAC implementation period and in the 20-year period used to calculate NPV.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

There were no formal expressions from the community.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense. In addition, the Commission notes that the Army's process was well thought-out and inclusive of the leadership of the Reserve Components and the State.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission found the Secretary's recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and force structure plan. Therefore, the Commission approved the recommendation of the Secretary.

RESERVE COMPONENT TRANSFORMATION IN TEXAS

RECOMMENDATION # 44 (ARMY 91)

**One-time Cost:** $375.6M  
**Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings):** ($36.0M)  
**20-Year Net Present Value:** ($133.2M)  
**Payback Period:** 12 Years

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Close the Tharp United States Army Reserve Center, Amarillo, TX, and relocate units to a new Armed Forces Reserve Center in Amarillo, TX, if the Army is able to acquire land suitable for the construction of the facilities. The new AFRC shall have the capability to accommodate Texas National Guard Units from the following Texas ARNG Readiness Centers: Amarillo, Pampa, and Hale Co, TX, if the state decides to relocate those National Guard units.

Close the United States Army Reserve Center, Brownsville, TX, and relocate units to a new Armed Forces Reserve Center in Brownsville, TX, if the Army is able to acquire suitable land for the construction of the facilities. The new AFRC shall have the capability to accommodate Texas National Guard Units from the Texas ARNG Readiness Center in Brownsville, TX, if the state decides to relocate those National Guard units.

Close the United States Army Reserve Center, Boswell, TX, and the United States Army Reserve Center, Callaghan, TX, and relocate units to a new Armed Forces Reserve Center on existing Federal property on Camp Bullis, TX. The new AFRC shall have the capability to accommodate Texas National Guard Units from the Texas ARNG Readiness Center in Hondo, TX, A Company and Headquarters Company, 1st of the 141st Infantry, the Fifth Army ITAAS, the Regional Training Site-Intelligence, and the Texas Army National Guard Area Support Medical Battalion, if the state decides to relocate those National Guard units.

Close the Grimes United States Army Reserve Center, Abilene, TX, and relocate B Company of the 413th Civil Affairs Battalion and the Area Maintenance Support Activity 11 Sub-Shop to a new Armed Forces Reserve Center with a Field Maintenance Shop on Dyess Air Force Base, TX. The new AFRC shall have the capability to accommodate Texas National Guard Units from the following Texas ARNG Readiness Centers: Abilene, Coleman, and Snyder, TX, and the Texas Army National Guard Field Maintenance Shop, Abilene, TX, if the state decides to relocate those National Guard units.

Close the Roque O Segura United States Army Reserve Center, El Paso, Texas, the Benavidez United States Army Reserve Center, El Paso, Texas, the United States Army Reserve Center #3, Fort Bliss, Texas and the McGregor Range United States Army Reserve Center and Equipment Concentration Site, Fort Bliss New Mexico and relocate units to a new Armed Forces Reserve Center with a Consolidated Equipment Concentration Site and Maintenance Facility on Fort Bliss Texas. The new
AFRC shall have the capability to accommodate Texas Army National Guard Units from the following Texas ARNG Readiness centers: Fort Bliss and Hondo Pass in El Paso, Texas, if the state decides to relocate those National Guard units.

Close the Herzog United States Army Reserve Center, Dallas, TX, and relocate units to a new Armed Forces Reserve Center on the existing Grand Prairie Reserve Complex, Grand Prairie, TX. Realign the 490th Civil Affairs Battalion from the Grimes United States Army Reserve Center and relocate the unit into the new AFRC. The new AFRC shall have the capability to accommodate Texas National Guard Units from the following Texas ARNG Readiness Centers: Arlington, TX, and California Crossing, TX, if the state decides to relocate those National Guard units.

Close the United States Army Reserve Center, San Marcos, TX, and relocate units to a new Armed Forces Reserve Center in San Marcos, TX, if the Army is able to acquire land suitable for the construction of the facilities. The new AFRC shall have the capability to accommodate Texas Army National Guard Units from the following Texas ARNG Readiness Centers: San Marcos, Sequin, and New Braunfels, TX, if the state decides to relocate those National Guard units. Close the Hanby-Hayden United States Army Reserve Center, Mesquite, TX, and relocate units to a new Armed Forces Reserve Center with an Organizational Maintenance Shop on United States Army Reserve property in Seagoville, TX. The new AFRC shall have the capability to accommodate Texas National Guard Units from the following Texas ARNG Readiness Centers: Dallas #2,....
Kaufman and Terrell (including the Organizational Maintenance Shop), TX, if the state decides to relocate those National Guard units.

Close the United States Army Reserve Center, Tyler, TX, and the United States Army Reserve Center, Marshall, TX, and relocate units to a new Armed Forces Reserve Center with a Field Maintenance Shop in Tyler, TX, if the Army is able to acquire suitable land for the construction of the facilities. The new AFRC shall have the capability to accommodate Texas National Guard Units from the following Texas ARNG Readiness Centers: Athens, Tyler, Henderson, Kilgore, Marshall, and Corsicana, TX, and the Field Maintenance Shop in Marshall, TX, if the state decides to relocate those National Guard units.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

This recommendation transforms Reserve Component facilities throughout the State of Texas. The implementation of this recommendation will enhance military value, improve homeland defense capability, greatly improve training and deployment capability, create significant efficiencies and cost savings, and is consistent with the Army’s force structure plans and Army transformational objectives.

This recommendation is the result of a statewide analysis of Reserve Component installations and facilities conducted by a team of functional experts from Headquarters Department of the Army, the Office of the State Adjutant General and the Army Reserve Regional Readiness Command.

The recommendation closes twenty-four Army Reserve centers and one equipment concentration site, realigns one Army Reserve Center, and constructs seventeen multicomponent, multifunctional Armed Forces Reserve Centers (AFRCs), throughout the State of Texas capable of accommodating National Guard and Reserve units. This recommendation reduces military manpower and associated costs for maintaining existing facilities by collapsing seventy-seven geographically separated facilities into seventeen modern Armed Forces Reserve Centers. These joint-use facilities will significantly reduce operating costs and create improved business processes. The Department understands that the State of Texas will close forty-three Texas Army Guard Armories: Abilene, Alice, Amarillo, Arlington, Atlanta, Athens, Austin, Baytown, Beaumont, Brownsville, California Crossing, Coleman, Corsicana, Dallas #2, Denison, Denton, Ellington Field, Fort Bliss, Henderson, Hondo, Hondo Pass, Huntsville, Irving, Kaufman, Kilgore, Kingsville, Lufkin, Marshall, Nacogdoches, New Braunfels, Orange, Pampa, Pasadena, Hale Co, Port Arthur, Port Neches, San Marcos, Seinqu, Snyder, Taylor, Terrell, Texarkana and Tyler, TX; close six Army National Guard Field Maintenance Facilities in Abilene, Austin, Marshall, Ellington Field, Port Neches and Terrell; and realign Camp Bullis. The Armed Forces Reserve Centers will have the capability to accommodate these units if the state decides to relocate the units from these closed facilities into the new AFRCs.

This recommendation provides the opportunity for other Local, State, or Federal organizations to partner with the Reserve Components to enhance homeland security and homeland defense at a reduced cost to those agencies.

Although not captured in the COBRA analysis, this recommendation avoids an estimated $231.3M in mission facility renovation costs and procurement avoidances associated with meeting AT/FP construction standards and altering existing facilities to meet unit training and communications requirements. Consideration of these avoided costs would reduce costs and increase the net savings to the Department of Defense in the 6-year BRAC implementation period and in the 20-year period used to calculate NPV.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

There were no formal expressions from the community.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense. In addition, the Commission notes that the Army’s process was well thought-out and inclusive of the leadership of the Reserve Components and the State.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission found the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and force structure plan. Therefore, the Commission approved the recommendation of the Secretary.
RESERVE COMPONENT TRANSFORMATION IN VERMONT

RECOMMENDATION # 45 (ARMY 95)

ONE-TIME COST: $61.4M
ANNUAL RECURRING COSTS/(SAVINGS): ($1.4M)
20-YEAR NET PRESENT VALUE: $41.7M
PAYBACK PERIOD: 100+ YEARS

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Close Chester Memorial Army Reserve Center and Organizational Maintenance Shop, Chester, VT, and Berlin Army Reserve Center, Berlin, VT, and relocate all units to a new Armed Forces Reserve Center with an Organizational Maintenance Facility in the vicinity of White River Junction, VT, if the Army is able to acquire land suitable for the construction of the facilities. The new AFRC and OMS shall have the capability to accommodate units from the following facilities: Vermont Army National Guard Armories in Ludlow, North Springfield and Windsor, VT, if the state decides to relocate those National Guard units.

Close Army Reserve Center, Courcelle Brothers and associated Organizational Maintenance Shop, Rutland, VT; close Army Reserve Army Maintenance Support Activity, Rutland, VT, and relocate all units to a new Armed Forces Reserve Center and Organizational Maintenance Facility in the vicinity of Rutland, VT, if the Army is able to acquire land suitable for the construction of the facilities. The new AFRC and Maintenance Activity shall have the ability to accommodate units from the following facility: Vermont Army National Guard Armory Rutland, VT, if the state decides to relocate those National Guard units.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

This recommendation transforms Reserve Component facilities throughout the State of Vermont. The implementation of this recommendation will enhance military value, improve homeland defense capability, greatly improve training and deployment capability, create significant efficiencies and cost savings, and is consistent with the Army’s force structure plans and Army transformational objectives.

This recommendation is the result of a statewide analysis of Reserve Component installations and facilities conducted by a team of functional experts from Headquarters, Department of the Army, the Office of the State Adjutant General, and the Army Reserve Regional Readiness Command.

The recommendation closes four US Army Reserve Centers, one Area Maintenance Support Activity and two Organizational Maintenance Shops throughout the State of Vermont and constructs two Armed Forces Reserve Centers and collocated Organizational Maintenance facilities capable of accommodating National Guard and Reserve units. This recommendation reduces military manpower and associated costs for maintaining existing facilities by collapsing eleven geographically separated facilities into two modern Armed Forces Reserve Centers with maintenance facilities. These new facilities will significantly reduce operating costs and create improved business practices. The Department understands that the State of Vermont will close four Vermont Army National Guard Centers: Ludlow, North Springfield, Windsor and Rutland, VT. The Armed Forces Reserve Centers will have the capability to accommodate these units if the state decides to relocate the units from these closed facilities into the new AFRCs.

This recommendation provides the opportunity for other Local, State, or Federal organizations to partner with the Reserve Components to enhance homeland security and homeland defense at a reduced cost to those agencies.

Although not captured in the COBRA analysis, this recommendation avoids an estimated $30.1M in mission facility renovation costs and procurement avoidances associated with meeting AT/FP construction standards and altering existing facilities to meet unit training and communications requirements. Consideration of these avoided costs would reduce costs and increase the net savings to the Department of Defense in the 6-year BRAC implementation period and in the 20-year period used to calculate NPV.
COMMUNITY CONCERNS

There were no formal expressions from the community.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense. In addition, the Commission notes that the Army’s process was well thought-out and inclusive of the leadership of the Reserve Components and the State.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission found the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and force structure plan. Therefore, the Commission approved the recommendation of the Secretary.

RESERVE COMPONENT TRANSFORMATION IN WASHINGTON

RECOMMENDATION # 46 (ARMY 97)

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<td>20-Year Net Present Value:</td>
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<td>Payback Period:</td>
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SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Close Mann Hall Army Reserve Center, Area Maintenance Support Shop #80 and Walker Army Reserve Center in Spokane, WA, and relocate units to a new consolidated Armed Forces Reserve Center and Organizational Maintenance Shop on Fairchild Air Force Base. The new AFRC shall have the capability to accommodate units from the following Washington ARNG facilities: Washington ARNG Armory and Organizational Maintenance Shop, Geiger Field, WA, if the state decides to relocate those units.

Close Wagenaar Army Reserve Center Pasco, WA, and relocate units to a new consolidated Armed Forces Reserve Center on Yakima Training Center. Realign Pendleton Army Reserve Center on Yakima Training Center by moving all assigned units to the new Armed Forces Reserve Center on Yakima Training Center. The new AFRC shall have the capability to accommodate units from the following Washington ARNG facility: Washington ARNG Ellensburg Readiness Center if the state decides to relocate those units.

Close the Oswald United States Army Reserve Center, Everett, WA, and relocate units to a new Armed Forces Reserve Center in the Everett, WA, area if the Army is able to acquire suitable land for construction of the new facility. The new AFRC shall have the capability to accommodate units from the following Washington ARNG facilities: Washington ARNG Everett Readiness Center and Snohomish Readiness Center, if the state decides to relocate those units.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

This recommendation transforms Reserve Component facilities throughout the State of Washington. The implementation of this recommendation will enhance military value, improve homeland defense capability, greatly improve training and deployment capability, create significant efficiencies and cost savings, and is consistent with the Army’s force structure plans and Army transformational objectives.

This recommendation is the result of a state-wide analysis of Reserve Component installations and facilities conducted by a team of functional experts from Headquarters, Department of the Army, the Office of the State Adjutant General, and the Army Reserve Regional Readiness Command.

This recommendation closes four US Army Reserve Centers and one Area Maintenance Support Activity, realigns one Army Reserve Center and constructs three multicomponent, multifunctional Armed Forces Reserve Center (AFRCs)
throughout the State of Washington, capable of accommodating National Guard and Reserve units. This recommendation also reduces military manpower and associated costs for maintaining existing facilities by collapsing nine geographically separated facilities into three modern Armed Forces Reserve Centers. These joint-use facilities will significantly reduce operating costs and create improved business practices. The Department understands that the State of Washington will close four Washington Army National Guard Centers: Geiger Field, Everett, Snohomish and Ellensburg; and one Organizational Maintenance Shop, Geiger Field, WA. The Armed Forces Reserve Centers will have the capability to accommodate these units if the state decides to relocate the units from these closed facilities into the new AFRCs.

This recommendation considered feasible locations within the demographic and geographic areas of the closing facilities and affected units. The sites selected were determined as the best locations because they optimize the Reserve Components’ ability to recruit and retain Reserve Component soldiers and to train and mobilize units affected by this recommendation.

This recommendation provides the opportunity for other Local, State, or Federal organizations to partner with the Reserve Components to enhance homeland security and homeland defense at a reduced cost to those agencies.

Although not captured in the COBRA analysis, this recommendation avoids an estimated $24.5M in mission facility renovation costs and procurement avoidances associated with meeting AT/FP construction standards and altering existing facilities to meet unit training and communications requirements. Consideration of these avoided costs would reduce costs and increase the net savings to the Department of Defense in the 6-year BRAC implementation period and in the 20-year period used to calculate NPV.

**COMMUNITY CONCERNS**

There were no formal expressions from the community.

**COMMISSION FINDINGS**

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense. In addition, the Commission notes that the Army’s process was well thought-out and inclusive of the leadership of the Reserve Components and the State.

**COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS**

The Commission found the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and force structure plan. Therefore, the Commission approved the recommendation of the Secretary.

**RESERVE COMPONENT TRANSFORMATION IN WEST VIRGINIA**

**RECOMMENDATION # 47 (ARMY 99)**

| One-time Cost: | $29.5M |
| Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings): | ($7.6M) |
| 20-Year Net Present Value: | ($77.0M) |
| Payback Period: | 3 Years |

**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION**

Close the Elkins US Army Reserve Center and its supporting Maintenance Shop in Beverly, WV, and relocate units into a new Armed Forces Reserve Center in the vicinity of Elkins, WV, if the Army is able to acquire land suitable for the construction of the facilities. The new AFRC shall have the capability to accommodate West Virginia Army National Guard Units from the Readiness Center in Elkins, WV, if the state decides to relocate those National Guard units.

Close the 1LT Harry Colburn US Army Reserve Center and its supporting Maintenance Shop in Fairmont, WV, and relocate units into a new Armed Forces Reserve Center in the vicinity of Fairmont, WV, if the Army is able to acquire land suitable for the construction of the facilities. The new AFRC shall have the capability to accommodate West Virginia National Guard Units from the Readiness Center in Fairmont, WV, if the state decides to relocate those National Guard units.
Close SSG Roy Kuhl US Army Reserve Center and Maintenance Facility in Ripley and the MAJ Elbert Bias USAR Center, Huntington, WV, and relocate units into a new Armed Forces Reserve Center in the vicinity of Ripley, WV, if the Army is able to acquire land suitable for the construction of the facilities. The new AFRC shall have the capability to accommodate West Virginia National Guard Units from the West Virginia Army National Guard Readiness Center in Spencer, WV, if the state decides to relocate those National Guard units.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

This recommendation transforms Reserve Component facilities throughout the State of West Virginia. The implementation of this recommendation will enhance military value, improve homeland defense capability, greatly improve training and deployment capability, create significant efficiencies and cost savings, and is consistent with the Army’s force structure plans and Army transformational objectives.

This recommendation is the result of a state-wide analysis of Reserve Component installations and facilities conducted by a team of functional experts from Headquarters, Department of the Army, the Office of the State Adjutant General, and the Army Reserve Regional Readiness Command.

This recommendation closes four Army Reserve centers, three supporting Maintenance Shops and constructs three multicomponent, multifunctional Armed Forces Reserve Centers (AFRCs), throughout the State of West Virginia, capable of accommodating National Guard and Reserve units. This recommendation reduces military manpower and associated costs for maintaining existing facilities by collapsing ten separate facilities into three modern Armed Forces Reserve Centers. These multicomponent facilities will significantly reduce operating costs and create improved business processes. The Department understands that the State of West Virginia will close three West Virginia Army Guard Armories: Spencer, Fairmont, and Elkins, WV. The Armed Forces Reserve Centers will have the capability to accommodate these units if the state decides to relocate the units from these closed facilities into the new AFRCs.

This recommendation considered feasible locations within the demographic and geographic areas of the closing facilities and affected units. The sites selected were determined as the best locations because they optimize the Reserve Components’ ability to recruit and retain Reserve Component soldiers and to train and mobilize units affected by this recommendation.

This recommendation provides the opportunity for other Local, State, or Federal organizations to partner with the Reserve Components to enhance homeland security and homeland defense at a reduced cost to those agencies.

Although not captured in the COBRA analysis, this recommendation avoids an estimated $43.6M in mission facility renovation costs and procurement avoidances associated with meeting AT/FP construction standards and altering existing facilities to meet unit training and communications requirements. Consideration of these avoided costs would reduce costs and increase the net savings to the Department of Defense in the 6-year BRAC implementation period and in the 20-year period used to calculate NPV.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

There were no formal expressions from the community.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense. In addition, the Commission notes that the Army's process was well thought-out and inclusive of the leadership of the Reserve Components and the State.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission found the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and force structure plan. Therefore, the Commission approved the recommendation of the Secretary.
Reserve Component Transformation in Wisconsin

Recommendation # 48 (Army 102)

One-time Cost: $10.7M
Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings): ($10.8M)
20-Year Net Present Value: ($139.7M)
Payback Period: Immediate

Secretary of Defense Recommendation

Close the Truman Olson and G.F. O’Connell US Army Reserve Centers in Madison, WI, and relocate units to a new Armed Forces Reserve Center (AFRC) in Madison, WI, if the Army can acquire suitable land for the construction of the new facilities. The new AFRC shall have the capability to accommodate Army National Guard units from the following Wisconsin Army National Guard Armories; the Madison Armory (Bowman Street), Madison Armory / OMS 9, and the Madison Armory (2400 Wright Street) if the state decides to relocate those units.

Secretary of Defense Justification

This recommendation transforms Reserve Component facilities in the State of Wisconsin. The implementation of this recommendation will enhance military value, improve homeland defense capability, greatly improve training and deployment capability, create significant efficiencies and cost savings, and is consistent with the Army’s force structure plans and Army transformational objectives.

This recommendation is the result of a statewide analysis of Reserve Component installations and facilities conducted by a team of functional experts from Headquarters Department of the Army, the Office of the State Adjutant General and the Army Reserve Regional Readiness Command.

This recommendation closes two Army Reserve Centers and realigns three Wisconsin Army National Guard Armories and constructs a multi-service, multifunctional Armed Forces Reserve Center (AFRC) in Madison, WI. The Department understands that the State of Wisconsin will realign the Madison Armory (Bowman Street) by relocating the 64th Troop Command; the Madison Armory / OMS 9, by relocating the 54th Civil Support Team, the Madison Armory (2400 Wright Street) by relocating the 641st Troop Command. The Armed Forces Reserve Centers will have the capability to accommodate these units if the state decides to relocate the units from these facilities to the new AFRC.

This is a joint proposal with the Navy that supports actions to close the Navy and Marine Corps Reserve Center, Madison, WI, the Navy Reserve Center, La Crosse, WI, and the Navy Reserve Center in Dubuque, IA. This recommendation reduces costs for maintaining existing facilities by collapsing two separate facilities and units from three overcrowded facilities into one modern AFRC.

This recommendation provides the opportunity for other Local, State, or Federal organizations to partner with the Reserve Components to enhance homeland security and homeland defense at a reduced cost to those agencies.

Although not captured in the COBRA analysis, this recommendation avoids an estimated $12.7M in mission facility renovation costs and procurement avoidances associated with meeting AT/FP construction standards and altering existing facilities to meet unit training and communications requirements. Consideration of these avoided costs would reduce costs and increase the net savings to the Department of Defense in the 6-year BRAC implementation period and in the 20-year period used to calculate NPV.

Community Concerns

There were no formal expressions from the community.

Commission Findings

The Commission found DoD’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. The Commission notes that the Army’s process was well thought-out and inclusive of the leadership of the Reserve Components and the State.
**COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS**

The Commission found the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and force structure plan. Therefore, the Commission approved the recommendation of the Secretary.

**RESERVE COMPONENT TRANSFORMATION IN WYOMING**

**RECOMMENDATION # 49 (ARMY 103)**

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**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION**

Close Wyoming Army National Guard (WYARNG) Army Aviation Support Facility (AASF) in Cheyenne, WY (DA leased facility) and relocate Army National Guard units and aviation functions to a new WYARNG AASF, Readiness Center, and Field Maintenance Shop (FMS) on F.E. Warren Air Force Base, WY. The new readiness center/FMS shall have the capability to accommodate Army National Guard units from the Joint Force Headquarters Complex in Cheyenne, WY, if the state decides to relocate those units.

**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION**

This recommendation transforms Reserve Component facilities in the State of Wyoming. The implementation of this recommendation will enhance military value, improve homeland defense capability, greatly improve training and deployment capability, create significant efficiencies and cost savings, and is consistent with the Army’s force structure plans and Army transformational objectives.

This recommendation is the result of a statewide analysis of Reserve Component installations and facilities conducted by a team of functional experts from Headquarters, Department of the Army, the Office of the State Adjutant General, and the Army Reserve Regional Readiness Command.

This recommendation closes a WYARNG AASF, two WYARNG armories and constructs an AASF, readiness center and FMS on F.E. Warren Air Force Base, WY. This recommendation reduces costs for maintaining existing facilities by collapsing an AASF and consolidating with other units in the Cheyenne area into a single facility onto an existing Air Force Base. The Department understands that the State of Wyoming will close the Thermopolis Armory (vacant- no units relocating) and the Joint Force Headquarters Armory (adjacent to F.E. Warren Air Force Base). The new facility will have the capability to accommodate these units if the state decides to relocate those units.

This recommendation provides the opportunity for other Local, State, or Federal organizations to partner with the Reserve Components to enhance homeland security and homeland defense at a reduced cost to those agencies.

Although not captured in the COBRA analysis, this recommendation avoids an estimated $22.2M in mission facility renovation costs and procurement avoidances associated with meeting AT/FP construction standards and altering existing facilities to meet unit training and communications requirements. Consideration of these avoided costs would reduce costs and increase the net savings to the Department of Defense in the 6-year BRAC implementation period and in the 20-year period used to calculate NPV.

**COMMUNITY CONCERNS**

There were no formal expressions from the community.
COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense. In addition, the Commission notes that the Army's process was well thought-out and inclusive of the leadership of the Reserve Components and the State.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission found the Secretary's recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and force structure plan. Therefore, the Commission approved the recommendation of the Secretary.

SINGLE DRILL SERGEANT SCHOOL

RECOMMENDATION # 50 (ARMY 105)

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SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Realign Fort Benning, GA, and Fort Leonard Wood, MO, by relocating the Drill Sergeant School at each location to Fort Jackson, SC.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

This recommendation consolidates Drill Sergeant’s Training from three locations (Fort Benning, Fort Jackson, and Fort Leonard Wood) to one location (Fort Jackson), which fosters consistency, standardization and training proficiency. It enhances military value, supports the Army's Force Structure Plan, and maintains sufficient surge capability to address unforeseen requirements. This recommendation supports Army Transformation by collocating institutional training, MTOE units, RDTE organizations and other TDA units in large numbers on single installations to support force stabilization and engage training. It improves training capabilities while eliminating excess capacity at institutional training installations and provides the same or better level of service at a reduced cost.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

There were no formal expressions from the community.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found DoD’s proposal to consolidate drill sergeant training at one site to be consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. Fort Jackson has adequate facilities for consolidation of all three existing drill sergeant schools when augmented with proposed construction. Savings occur rapidly, reflecting the efficiencies of collocation. The Commission views the consolidation as desirable so long as the ability to foster consistency and proficiency in this critical Army asset is not affected during implementation.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission found the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and force structure plan. Therefore, the Commission approved the recommendation of the Secretary.
US Army Garrison Michigan (Selfridge)

Recommendation # 51 (Army 106)

One-time Cost: $9.5M
Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings): ($18.1M)
20-Year Net Present Value: ($260.9M)
Payback Period: Immediate

Secretary of Defense Recommendation

Close United States Army Garrison Michigan at Selfridge, which is located on Selfridge Air National Guard Base. Retain an enclave to support the Dynamic Structural Load Simulator (Bridging) Laboratory and the Water Purification Laboratory on Selfridge.

Secretary of Defense Justification

This recommendation closes the US Army Garrison Michigan (USAG-M) at Selfridge, which is located on federally owned property at Selfridge Air National Guard Base. USAG-M at Selfridge is the primary provider of housing and other support and services to certain military personnel and their dependents located in the Detroit area. Sufficient housing is available in the Detroit Metropolitan area to support military personnel stationed in the area. Closing USAG-Michigan at Selfridge avoids the cost of continued operation and maintenance of other unnecessary support facilities. A Bridging Lab and Water Purification Lab located on Selfridge, which are part of the Tank Automotive Army Research and Development Center at Detroit Arsenal, will be retained and enclaved. Six garrison personnel (Garrison Commander and staff) will be relocated to Detroit Arsenal. This recommendation enhances military value, supports the Army's Force Structure Plan, and maintains sufficient surge capability to address unforeseen requirements.

Community Concerns

The community asks that the Army land be transferred to the Air Force when the Army's activities cease to preclude private development that could lead to encroachment problems for the flight mission. They also expressed concern that the loss of housing areas, lodging operation, post exchange, commissary, and other Garrison activities would have a negative impact on recruiting and retention for the remaining units, and would negatively affect the retiree and veterans' community as well.

Commission Findings

The Commission carefully considered the community's expressed concerns that closure of the Army Garrison Activity creates the potential for future encroachment that could affect the continuing flying mission at Selfridge Air National Guard Base. The Commission found that the BRAC implementation screening process provides sufficient protections from development and possible encroachment. Federal and state agencies, — such as the US Air Force, US Air Force Reserve, National Guard Bureau, Michigan Air National Guard, or other federal or state agencies — have the opportunity to claim this land during the federal screening process. The Commission found that this, and community concerns for the effects of withdrawal of services provided by the Army Garrison, did not rise to the level of a substantial deviation.

Commission Recommendations

The Commission found the Secretary's recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and force structure plan. Therefore, the Commission approved the recommendation of the Secretary.
USAR Command and Control New England

Recommendation # 52 (Army 107)

One-time Cost: $96.1M
Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings): ($8.4M)
20-Year Net Present Value: ($21.8M)
Payback Period: 13 Years

Secretary of Defense Recommendation

Close the Westover Armed Forces Reserve Center, Chicopee, MA, the MacArthur United States Army Reserve Center, Springfield, MA, the United States Army Reserve Area Maintenance Support Activity, Windsor Locks, CT, and realign the Malony United States Army Reserve Center on Devens Reserve Forces Training Area by disestablishing the 94th Regional Readiness Command, and relocate all units from the closed facilities to a new Armed Forces Reserve Center on Westover Air Reserve Base. Establish an Army Reserve Maneuver Enhancement Brigade headquarters in the new Armed Forces Reserve Center on Westover Air Reserve Base. Realign Devens Reserve Forces Training Area by relocating the 5th JTF, 654th ASG and the 382nd MP Battalion to the new Armed Forces Reserve Center on Westover Air Reserve Base. The new Armed Forces Reserve Center shall have the capability to accommodate Massachusetts Army National Guard units from the Massachusetts Army National Guard Armory in Agawam, MA, if the state decides to relocate those National Guard units.

Secretary of Defense Justification

This recommendation transforms Reserve Component facilities and command and control structure throughout the New England Region of the United States. The implementation of this recommendation will enhance military value, improve homeland defense capability, greatly improve training and deployment capability, create significant efficiencies and cost savings, and is consistent with the Army’s force structure plans and Army transformational objectives.

This recommendation is the result of a nation-wide analysis of Reserve Component installations and facilities conducted by a team of functional experts from Headquarters, Department of the Army, the Office of the State Adjutant General, and the Army Reserve Regional Readiness Command.

This recommendation supports the Army Reserve’s Command and Control restructuring initiative to reduce Regional Readiness Commands from ten to four by disestablishing one major peacetime administrative headquarters, the 94th Regional Readiness Command, and creating a new deployable headquarters on Westover Air Reserve Base.

This recommendation closes one Armed Forces Reserve Center in Chicopee, MA, one United States Army Reserve Center in Springfield, MA, one United States Army Reserve Area Maintenance Support Activity in Windsor Locks, CT, and constructs a multicomponent, multifunctional Armed Forces Reserve Center on Westover Air Reserve Base. The Marine Corps Reserve units located in the Armed Forces Reserve Center in Chicopee will relocate to the new AFRC on Westover Air Reserve Base. The Department understands that the State of Massachusetts will close one Massachusetts Army National Guard Armory in Agawam, MA. The Armed Forces Reserve Center will have the capability to accommodate these units if the state decides to relocate the units from the closed facilities into the new AFRC.

Although not captured in the COBRA analysis, this recommendation avoids an estimated $21.6M in mission facility renovation costs and procurement avoidances associated with meeting AT/FP construction standards and altering existing facilities to meet unit training and communications requirements. Consideration of these avoided costs reduce costs and increase the net savings to the Department of Defense in the 6-year BRAC implementation period and in the 20-year period used to calculate NPV.

This recommendation provides the opportunity for other Local, State, or Federal organizations to partner with the Reserve Components to enhance homeland security and homeland defense at a reduced cost to those agencies.

Community Concerns

There were no formal expressions from the community.
COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission found the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and force structure plan. Therefore, the Commission approved the recommendation of the Secretary.

USAR COMMAND AND CONTROL—NORTHEAST

RECOMMENDATION # 53 (ARMY 109)

One-time Cost: $171.2M
Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings): ($35.9M)
20-Year Net Present Value: ($302.1M)
Payback Period: 5 YEARS

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Realign Pitt USARC, Coraopolis, PA, by disestablishing the HQ 99th Regional Readiness Command and establishing a Northeast Regional Readiness Command Headquarters at Fort Dix, NJ. Close Camp Kilmer, NJ, and relocate the HQ 78th Division at Fort Dix, NJ. Realign Fort Totten, NY, by disestablishing the HQ 77th Regional Readiness Command and establishing a Sustainment Brigade at Fort Dix, NJ. Realign Fort Sheridan, IL, by relocating the 244th Aviation Brigade to Fort Dix, NJ. Realign Fort Dix, NJ, by relocating Equipment Concentration Site 27 to the New Jersey Army National Guard Mobilization and Training Equipment Site joint facility at Lakehurst, NJ. Close Charles Kelly Support Center and relocate units to Pitt US Army Reserve Center, Coraopolis, PA. Close Carpenter USARC, Poughkeepsie, NY, close McDonald USARC, Jamaica, NY, close Fort Tilden USARC, Far Rockaway, NY, close Muller USARC, Bronx, NY, and relocate units to a new Armed Forces Reserve Center at Fort Totten, NY. Close the United States Army Reserve Center on Fort Hamilton, NY and relocate the New York Recruiting Battalion Headquarters and Army Reserve units into a new Armed Forces Reserve Center on Fort Hamilton, NY. The new AFRC shall have the capacity to accommodate units from the NYARNG 47th Regiment Marcy Armory, Brooklyn and the Brooklyn Bedford Armory/OMS, Brooklyn, NY, if the state decides to relocate those National Guard units.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

This recommendation transforms Reserve Component facilities and command and control structure throughout the Northeast Region of the United States. The implementation of this recommendation will enhance military value, improve homeland defense capability, greatly improve training and deployment capability, create significant efficiencies and cost savings, and is consistent with the Army’s force structure plans and Army transformational objectives.

This recommendation is the result of a nation-wide analysis of Reserve Component installations and facilities conducted by a team of functional experts from Headquarters, Department of the Army, the Office of the State Adjutant General, and the Army Reserve Regional Readiness Command.

This recommendation transforms Army Reserve command and control by consolidating four major headquarters onto Fort Dix, NJ; this recommendation supports the Army Reserve’s nationwide Command and Control restructuring initiative to reduce Regional Readiness Commands from ten to four. The realignment of Pitt USARC, Coraopolis, PA, by the disestablishment of the 99th Regional Readiness Command allows for the establishment of the Northeast Regional Readiness Command Headquarters at Fort Dix, NJ, which will further support the reengineering and streamlining of the Command and Control structure of the Army Reserves throughout the United States. This restructuring will allow for the closure of Camp Kilmer, NJ, and the relocation of the HQ 78th Division to Fort Dix and establishment of one of the new Army Reserve Sustainment Units of Action, which establishes a new capability for the Army Reserve while increasing the support capabilities of the Army Reserve to the Active Army. To further support restructuring; the realignment of Fort Totten and the disestablishment of the HQ 77th RRC will enable the establishment of a Maneuver Enhancement Brigade at Fort Dix, resulting in a new operational capability for the Army Reserve. The realignment of Fort Sheridan, IL, by relocating...
the 244th Aviation Brigade to Fort Dix coupled with the Department of the Navy recommendation to close NAS Willow Grove, PA, and relocate Co A/228th Aviation to Fort Dix consolidates Army aviation assets in one location. Other actions supporting restructuring include realigning maintenance functions on Fort Dix, the closure of Charles Kelly Support Center, PA, and relocation of multiple subordinate units to Pitt USARC, PA; and the closure of five US Army Reserve Centers in the greater New York City area with relocation of those units to Fort Totten. These actions will significantly enhance training, mobilization, equipment readiness and deployment.

This recommendation reduces military manpower and associated costs for maintaining existing facilities by closing one Camp, five Army Reserve Centers, realigning five facilities and relocating forces to multiple installations throughout the Northeast Region of the United States. These actions will also improve business processes. The implementation of this recommendation and creation of these new command structures will enhance military value, improve homeland defense capability, greatly improve training and deployment capability, create significant efficiencies and cost savings, and is consistent with the Army’s force structure plans and Army transformational objectives. The Department understands that the State of New York will close NYARNG Armories: 47th Regiment Marcy Armory, Brooklyn and Brooklyn Bedford Armory/OMS 12. The Armed Forces Reserve Centers will have the capability to accommodate these units if the state decides to relocate the units from these closed facilities into a new AFRC on Fort Hamilton, NY.

This recommendation provides the opportunity for other Local, State, or Federal organizations to partner with the Reserve Components to enhance homeland security and homeland defense at a reduced cost to those agencies.

This recommendation considered feasible locations within the demographic and geographic areas of the closing facilities and affected units. The sites selected were determined as the best locations because they optimize the Reserve Components’ ability to recruit and retain Reserve Component soldiers and to train and mobilize units affected by this recommendation.

Although not captured in the COBRA analysis, this recommendation avoids an estimated $168.3M in mission facility renovation costs and procurement avoidance associated with meeting Anti Terror / Force Protection construction standards and altering existing facilities to meet unit training and communication requirements. Consideration of these avoided costs would reduce costs and increase the net savings to the Department of Defense in the 6-year BRAC implementation period, and in the 20-year period used to calculate NPV.

**COMMUNITY CONCERNS**

Community representatives from the area near the Kelly Support Center, in Pittsburgh, PA, expressed concerns about the base’s Commissary and Exchange facilities. The next nearest comparable facilities are 188 miles away in Carlisle, PA. The community stated that 69,000 active and reserve military personnel, as well as retirees, are supported by these facilities. All other activities on the post will be moved to the nearby 99th RRC Reserve Center, but DoD has not indicated a plan to place the Commissary and Exchange facilities at nearby sites.

**COMMISSION FINDINGS**

The Commission found DoD’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. Community concerns were carefully weighed and considered, but the Commission did not find they rose to the level of substantial deviation. The Commission also notes that DoD will address the further requirements for the commissary and exchange at the Kelly Support Center after the BRAC recommendations are approved and the effects on the area population can be assessed.

**COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS**

The Commission found the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and force structure plan. Therefore, the Commission approved the recommendation of the Secretary.
USAR Command and Control—Northwest

Recommendation # 54 (Army 112)

One-time Cost: $80.4M

Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings): ($11.1M)

20-Year Net Present Value: ($65.0M)

Payback Period: 9 years

Secretary of Defense Recommendation

Close Vancouver Barracks and relocate the 104th Division (IT) to Fort Lewis, WA. Relocate all other units to a new Armed Forces Reserve Center in Vancouver, WA. Close Fort Lawton by disestablishing the 70th Regional Readiness Command, relocate all other units to a new Armed Forces Reserve Center on Fort Lewis, WA, and establish a Maneuver Enhancement Brigade. Realign Fort Snelling, MN, by disestablishing the 88th Regional Readiness Command and establish the Northwest Regional Readiness Command Headquarters at Fort McCoy, WI. Realign the Wichita US Army Reserve Center by disestablishing the 89th Regional Readiness Command and establishing a Sustainment Unit of Action at the Wichita Army Reserve Center in support of the Northwest Regional Readiness Command at Fort McCoy, WI. Realign Fort Douglas, UT, by disestablishing the 96th Regional Readiness Command and establishing a Sustainment Unit of Action in support of the Northwest Regional Readiness Command at Fort McCoy, WI.

Secretary of Defense Justification

This recommendation transforms Reserve Component facilities and command and control structure throughout the Northwest Region of the United States. The implementation of this recommendation will enhance military value, improve homeland defense capability, greatly improve training and deployment capability, create significant efficiencies and cost savings, and is consistent with the Army’s force structure plans and Army transformational objectives.

This recommendation is the result of a nationwide analysis of Reserve Component installations and facilities conducted by a team of functional experts from Headquarters, Department of the Army, the Office of the State Adjutant General, and the Army Reserve Regional Readiness Command.

This recommendation supports the Army Reserve’s Command and Control restructuring initiative to reduce Regional Readiness Commands from ten to four. This recommendation transforms Army Reserve command and control by consolidating two major headquarters onto Fort Lewis, WA. This sets the conditions for establishing one of three new operationally capable Army Reserve Maneuver Enhancement Brigades, which will increase the support capabilities of the Army Reserve to the Active Army and is a new operational capability for the Army Reserve. The realignment of Fort Snelling, MN, by the disestablishment of the 88th Regional Readiness Command allows for the establishment of the Northwest Regional Readiness Command Headquarters at Fort McCoy, WI, which will support the re-engineering and streamlining of the Command and Control structure of the Army Reserves throughout the United States.

This recommendation also realigns Fort Douglas, UT, and the Wichita Army Reserve Center, establishing Sustainment Units of Action in those locations in support of the Northwest Regional Readiness Command Headquarters. Relocation of multiple subordinate units from Vancouver Barracks and Fort Lawton, WA, to new Armed Forces Reserve Centers contributes significantly to enhanced training, mobilization and deployment.

This recommendation reduces military manpower and associated costs for maintaining existing facilities by closing two Reserve facilities and relocating the units onto an Active component installation and thereby significantly reducing operating costs and creating improved business processes.

This recommendation considered feasible locations within the demographic and geographic areas of the closing facilities and affected units. The sites selected were determined as the best locations because they optimize the Reserve Components’ ability to recruit and retain Reserve Component soldiers and to train and mobilize units affected by this recommendation.

Although not captured in the COBRA analysis, this recommendation avoids an estimated $70.7M in mission facility renovation costs and procurement avoidances associated with meeting AT/FP construction standards and altering existing facilities to meet unit training and communications requirements. Consideration of these avoided costs would reduce costs...
and increase the net savings to the Department of Defense in the 6-year BRAC implementation period and in the 20-year period used to calculate NPV.

This recommendation provides the opportunity for other Local, State, or Federal organizations to partner with the Reserve Components to enhance homeland security and homeland defense at a reduced cost to those agencies.

**Community Concerns**

There were no formal expressions from the community.

**Commission Findings**

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense.

**Commission Recommendations**

The Commission found the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and force structure plan. Therefore, the Commission approved the recommendation of the Secretary.

**USAR Command and Control — Southeast**

**Recommendation # 55 (Army 115)**

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**Secretary of Defense Recommendation**

Realign Birmingham Armed Forces Reserve Center, AL, by disestablishing the 81st Regional Readiness Command and establishing the Army Reserve Southeast Regional Readiness Command in a new Armed Forces Reserve Center on Fort Jackson, SC. Close Louisville United States Army Reserve Center and relocate the 100th DIV(IT) headquarters to Fort Knox, KY.

**Secretary of Defense Justification**

This recommendation transforms Reserve Component facilities and command and control structure throughout the Southeast Region of the United States. The implementation of this recommendation will enhance military value, improve homeland defense capability, greatly improve training and deployment capability, create significant efficiencies and cost savings, and is consistent with the Army’s force structure plans and Army transformational objectives.

This recommendation is the result of a nation-wide analysis of Reserve Component installations and facilities conducted by a team of functional experts from Headquarters, Department of the Army, the Office of the State Adjutant General, and the Army Reserve Regional Readiness Command.

This recommendation supports the Army Reserve’s Command and Control restructuring initiative to reduce Regional Readiness Commands from ten to four. This recommendation transforms Army Reserve command and control by relocating one major headquarters from inadequate facilities in Birmingham, AL, to Fort Jackson, SC. This supports the initiative to consolidate command structure and responsibilities on Active Army installations, which will in turn increase the support capabilities of the Army Reserve to the Active Army while establishing a new operational capability for the Army Reserve. The relocation of the 100th Division (Institutional Training) to Fort Knox, KY, supports the re-engineering and streamlining of support delivered by Army Reserve training base units in order to significantly enhance training in support of mobilization and deployment.
This recommendation reduces military manpower and associated costs for maintaining existing facilities by closing one Armed Forces Reserve Center, and moving two major commands onto Active Army installations, thus significantly reducing operating costs and creating improved business processes.

This recommendation considered feasible locations within the demographic and geographic areas of the closing facilities and affected units. The sites selected were determined as the best locations because they optimize the Reserve Components’ ability to recruit and retain Reserve Component soldiers and to train and mobilize units affected by this recommendation.

This recommendation provides the opportunity for other Local, State, or Federal organizations to partner with the Reserve Components to enhance homeland security and homeland defense at a reduced cost to those agencies.

Although not captured in the COBRA analysis, this recommendation avoids an estimated $13.1M in mission facility renovation costs and procurement avoidances associated with meeting AT/FP construction standards and altering existing facilities to meet unit training and communications requirements. Consideration of these avoided costs would reduce costs and increase the net savings to the Department of Defense in the 6-year BRAC implementation period and in the 20-year period used to calculate NPV.

**Community Concerns**

There were no formal expressions from the community.

**Commission Findings**

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense.

**Commission Recommendations**

The Commission found the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and force structure plan. Therefore, the Commission approved the recommendation of the Secretary.

**USAR Command and Control—Southwest**

**Recommendation # 56 (Army 117)**

One-time Cost: $55.5M  
Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings): ($3.4M)  
20-year Net Present Value: $9.8M  
Payback Period: 23 years

**Secretary of Defense Recommendation**

Realign the Joint Force Training Base Los Alamitos, CA, by disestablishing the 63rd Regional Readiness Command (RRC) Headquarters, Robinson Hall, USARC and activating a Southwest Regional Readiness Command headquarters at Moffett Field, CA, in a new AFRC. Realign Camp Pike Reserve Complex, Little Rock, AR, by disestablishing the 90th RRC and activating a Sustainment Brigade. Close the Major General Harry Twaddle United States Armed Forces Reserve Center, Oklahoma City, OK, and relocate the 95th DIV (IT) to Fort Sill, OK. Realign Camp Parks Reserve Forces Training Area, CA, by relocating the 91st Div (TSD) to Fort Hunter Liggett, CA.

**Secretary of Defense Justification**

This recommendation transforms Reserve Component facilities and command and control structure throughout the Southeast Region of the United States. The implementation of this recommendation will enhance military value, improve homeland defense capability, greatly improve training and deployment capability, create significant efficiencies and cost savings, and is consistent with the Army’s force structure plans and Army transformational objectives.
This recommendation is the result of a nation-wide analysis of Reserve Component installations and facilities conducted by a team of functional experts from Headquarters, Department of the Army, the Office of the State Adjutant General, and the Army Reserve Regional Readiness Command.

This recommendation supports the Army Reserve’s Command and Control restructuring initiative to reduce Regional Readiness Commands from ten to four. This recommendation transforms Army Reserve command and control by eliminating nondeployable command and control headquarters, transforming excess spaces into deployable units and moving institutional training units onto major training areas. It supports the Army Reserve’s Command and Control restructuring initiative to reduce Regional Readiness Commands from ten to four by disestablishing two major peacetime administrative headquarters—the 63d Regional Readiness Command in Los Angeles, CA, and the 90th Regional Readiness Command in Little Rock, AR—and creating a new consolidated headquarters in their place at Moffett Field, CA. It supports the transformation of Army Reserve Operational Force Structure by activating a sustainment brigade in Little Rock, AR in the place of the 90th RRC, which will increase the deployable capability of the Army Reserve to support the Active Army. The Sustainment brigade is a new operational capability for the Army Reserve. This proposal transforms the Army’s training support to the Reserve Component by relocating the 95th DIV (Institutional Training) from the Major General Harry Twaddle United States Army Reserve Center, Oklahoma City, OK, to Fort Sill, OK, and relocating the 91st Div (Training Support) from Camp Parks Reserve Forces Training Area, CA, to Fort Hunter Liggett, CA which improves operational effectiveness by putting these Training Divisions at major training sites in their regions.

This recommendation considered feasible locations within the demographic and geographic areas of the closing facilities and affected units. The sites selected were determined as the best locations because they optimize the Reserve Components’ ability to recruit and retain Reserve Component soldiers and to train and mobilize units affected by this recommendation.

Although not captured in the COBRA analysis, this recommendation avoids an estimated $16.8M in mission facility renovation costs and procurement avoidances associated with meeting AT/FP construction standards and altering existing facilities to meet unit training and communications requirements. Consideration of these avoided costs would reduce costs and increase the net savings to the Department of Defense in the 6-year BRAC implementation period and in the 20-year period used to calculate NPV.

This recommendation provides the opportunity for other Local, State, or Federal organizations to partner with the Reserve Components to enhance homeland security and homeland defense at a reduced cost to those agencies.

**Community Concerns**

There were no formal expressions from the community.

**Commission Findings**

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense.

**Commission Recommendations**

The Commission found the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and force structure plan. Therefore, the Commission approved the recommendation of the Secretary.

This recommendation follows the strategy of minimizing sites using maximum capacity of 1.5 shifts while maintaining a West Coast depot maintenance presence at Marine Corps Logistics Base Barstow to provide West Coast operating forces with a close, responsive source for depot maintenance support. Required capacity to support workloads and core requirements for the DoD is relocated to other DoD Centers of Industrial and Technical Excellence, thereby increasing the military value of depot maintenance performed at these sites. This recommendation decreases the cost of depot maintenance operations across DoD through consolidation and elimination of 30 percent of duplicate overhead structures required to operate multiple depot maintenance activities. This recommendation supports transformation of DoD’s depot maintenance operations by increasing the utilization of existing capacity by up to 150 percent while maintaining capability to support future force structure. This recommendation also results in utilization of DoD capacity to facilitate performance of interservice workload. In addition, based on present and future wartime surge projections, Marine Corps Logistics Center Barstow will establish an additional 428,000 hours of amphibious vehicle capacity.

This recommendation, along with other recommendations affecting supply and storage functions, optimizes the depot maintenance operations at Marine Corps Logistics Base Barstow.

The Barstow community argued DoD’s recommendation concerning ground depot maintenance performed at Marine Corps Logistics Base Barstow substantially deviated from BRAC selection criteria 1, 3 and 6, as well as from the Force Structure Plan. They claimed Marine Corps and Army models of ground combat maintenance are fundamentally and qualitatively different, and these differences significantly affect combat-readiness and combat-effectiveness. The community said DoD erred by leaving cycle time (turnaround time) out of the computation of military value, incorrectly based comparisons on a commodity-to-commodity rather than depot-to-depot basis, and that adopting the Army model of depot maintenance for Marine Corps equipment would greatly increase cycle times. The community stated the Marine Corps, not the Army, is America’s “9-1-1 Emergency Response Force” and that the recommendation, if adopted, would violate the National Military Strategy and the 20-Year Force Structure Plan. Barstow representatives also claimed DoD sought savings at
the expense of readiness. The community asserted DoD substantially deviated from Criteria 6 in assessing local economic impact, estimating the impact at 8 percent of Barstow’s labor force rather than the one-tenth of one percent estimated by DoD.

Lastly, Barstow advocates opposed the idea of closing two Marine Corps depots and transferring the workload to Red River Army Depot, TX, as an alternative to the DoD recommendation to close Red River Army Depot. The combined workload from two Marine Corps depots would not make a significant difference in Red River’s capacity utilization rate, and Army depots do not have the facilities, equipment or workforce to handle the Marines’ unique amphibious vehicle requirements.

**Commission Findings**

The Commission agreed with the Secretary of Defense that the proposed realignment of Marine Corps Logistics Base Barstow, CA will decrease the cost of depot maintenance operations across DoD while increasing the military value to the Warfighter. The community’s contentions that cycle times would be degraded, and the quality of work would suffer, were not supported by the Commission’s review and analysis. The realignment recommendation will leave in place sufficient depot surge capacity while generating cost savings.

**Commission Recommendations**

The Commission found the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission approves the recommendation of the Secretary.

**Naval Support Activity Corona, CA**

**Recommendation # 58 (DoN 7)**

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**Secretary of Defense Recommendation**

Close Naval Support Activity Corona, CA. Relocate Naval Surface Warfare Center Division Corona, CA, to Naval Base Ventura County (Naval Air Station Point Mugu), CA.

**Secretary of Defense Justification**

The Naval Surface Warfare Center Division Corona performs three required missions for Department of the Navy (Independent Assessment Capability, Metrology and Calibration Laboratories, and Tactical Aircrew Combat Training System Ranges). It was analyzed under 11 Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation functions (Air Platforms Development & Acquisition; Air Platforms Test & Evaluation; Ground Vehicles Test and Evaluation; Information Systems Technology Development & Acquisition; Information Systems Technology Test & Evaluation; Sea Vehicles Development & Acquisition; Sea Vehicles Test & Evaluation; Sensors, Electronics, and Electronic Warfare Development & Acquisition; Sensors, Electronics, and Electronic Warfare Test & Evaluation; Weapons Technology Development & Acquisition; and Weapons Technology Test & Evaluation). In each functional area, Naval Surface Warfare Center Division Corona’s quantitative military value scores fell in the bottom half of facilities performing the same function and thus were reviewed for relocation and/or consolidation with like functions. The Department of the Navy determined it would lose a critical capability if the 11 functions were relocated to a variety of locations, since this would fracture the full-spectrum warfare center and independent assessment capability. Considering the overall military value and the fact that Naval Support Activity Corona was a single function facility, the Department reviewed the possibility of relocating the Naval Surface Warfare Center Division Corona functions to a multifunctional location with the capability to host these functions. Relocation of Naval Surface Warfare Center Division Corona to Naval Air Station Point Mugu collocates it with other Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation activities and with fleet assets at Naval Air Station Point Mugu. This consolidation of space will provide a more efficient organization with greater synergies and increased effectiveness.
Relocation of Naval Surface Warfare Center Division Corona Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation functions to Naval Air Station Point Mugu removes the primary mission from Naval Support Activity Corona and eliminates or moves the entirety of the workforce at Naval Support Activity Corona except for those personnel associated with the base operations support function. As a result, retention of Naval Support Activity Corona is no longer necessary.

**Community Concerns**

Community advocates focused on three primary issues. First, DoD’s proposal would result in a brain drain, with fewer than 20 percent of existing employees likely to move. As evidence, they cited: (a) the large percentage of retirement eligible employees, (b) recent hiring almost exclusively from nearby universities, (c) Ventura County housing costs, twice those near Norco/Corona, and (d) projected three-to-six fold increases in Naval Base Ventura County area property taxes. Second, NSA’s mission critical independence would be threatened by status as a tenant or subordinate command. Third, the community believes DoD’s proposal will cost significantly more than projected, making an already thin net present value of savings ($360,000 after 20 years and one-time costs of $80.2 million) even less worthwhile. Last, DoD’s figures do not include the cost of training about 650 new employees at a cost in excess of $70K per employee.

**Commission Findings**

The Commission carefully considered all of the concerns voiced by the community, as well as the justification provided by the Secretary of Defense. The Commission’s analysis found that from a cost perspective, the proposed move was not advisable because even if the DoD estimates were correct, the $360,000 in anticipated savings over a 20-year period were minuscule in comparison to the plan’s likely risks and implementation challenges. Furthermore, the Commission shared community concerns regarding the likelihood that a large percentage of the employees were unlikely to make the proposed move, creating program-related disruptions and increasing cost. Finally, the Commission found substantial issues regarding the feasibility of constructing the needed specialized facilities, including the fact that a major and respected contractor estimate for construction of two key buildings was $40 million more than DoD’s military construction projections.

**Commission Recommendations**

The Commission found that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final selection criteria 1 and 4, and the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission has rejected the recommendation of the Secretary.

**Naval Weapons Station Seal Beach Detachment, Concord, CA**

**Recommendation # 59 (DON 9)**

- **One-time Cost:** $14.0M
- **Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings):** ($16.4M)
- **20-Year Net Present Value:** ($199.7M)
- **Payback Period:** 1 YEAR

**Secretary of Defense Recommendation**

Close the Inland area of Naval Weapons Station Seal Beach Detachment, Concord, CA, except retain such property and facilities as are necessary to support operations in the Tidal area of Naval Weapons Station Seal Beach Detachment Concord. The Tidal area of Naval Weapons Station Seal Beach Detachment Concord, along with the retained portion of the Inland area, shall be transferred to the Army.

**Secretary of Defense Justification**

While Department of the Navy weapons stations have no excess capacity for loading and distribution of munitions, there is an excess of munitions storage capacity. Because of the departure of Fleet units from the San Francisco area in the 1990s, Naval Weapons Station Seal Beach Detachment Concord’s Inland magazine field has been in a reduced operating status since 1999. At that time, the Inland area was retained in an effort to minimize risk should a future need develop to expand
storage capacity. The Explosive Safety Quantity Distance arcs in the Inland area were available to allow safe, temporary holding of railcars with munitions destined for loading by the Army-managed Marine Ocean Terminal Concord (at the Tidal area) during high-tempo operations. After consultation with Combatant Commanders, the Army Material Command and the Army component of the US Transportation Command, the Department of the Navy has concluded this capability is no longer necessary. The Inland area is excess to Department of the Navy/DoD needs and is severable. The closure of the Inland area, therefore, will save money and have no impact on mission capability.

The City of Concord requested closure of both the Inland and Tidal portions of Naval Weapons Station Seal Beach Detachment Concord. Munitions loading requirements preclude closing the Tidal area, but the Inland area is excess and may be closed. Because Tidal area operations are in support of the Army component of the US Transportation Command, transfer of the property to the Army aligns the property holder with the property user.

**Community Concerns**

The local community indicated to the Commission that they supported the closure of the Inland Portion of the Naval Weapons Station as the Navy phased out its activities there and strongly supported DoD’s recommendation. They noted that the land in question has been unused since 1999, and activity was phased down over the years leading up to the 1999 deactivation. The city has already drawn up redevelopment plans and believes the parcel offers an unparalleled opportunity for smart growth and transit-oriented development in central Contra Costa County that could create up to 13,000 housing units and 9,000 jobs.

**Commission Findings**

The Commission found the Navy no longer had any use for most of the Inland portion of the base, that the community expressed a desire to have the base realigned and the Inland portion closed, that no jobs would be lost, and that the Tidal portion of the base would be turned over to the Army for its continued use. Therefore, the Commission had no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense. The Commission noted, however, that the estimated savings appeared to be significantly overstated.

**Commission Recommendations**

The Commission found the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission approves the recommendation of the Secretary.

**Submarine Base New London, CT**

Recommendation # 60 (DoN 10)

| One-time Cost: | $5.5M |
| Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings): | ($4.4M) |
| 20-Year Net Present Value: | ($55.5M) |
| Payback Period: | 1 Year |

**Secretary of Defense Recommendation**

Close Naval Submarine Base New London, CT. Relocate its assigned submarines, Auxiliary Repair Dock 4 (ARDM-4), and Nuclear Research Submarine 1 (NR-1) along with their dedicated personnel, equipment and support to Submarine Base Kings Bay, GA, and Naval Station Norfolk, VA. Relocate the intermediate submarine repair function to Shore Intermediate Repair Activity Norfolk, at Naval Shipyard Norfolk, VA, and Trident Refit Facility Kings Bay, GA. Relocate the Naval Submarine School and Center for Submarine Learning to Submarine Base Kings Bay, GA. Consolidate the Naval Security Group Activity Groton, CT, with Naval Security Group Activity Norfolk, VA, at Naval Station Norfolk, VA. Consolidate Naval Submarine Medical Research Laboratory Groton, CT, with Naval Medical Research Center at Walter Reed Army Medical Center Forest Glenn Annex, MD. Relocate Naval Undersea Medical Institute Groton, CT, to Naval Air Station Pensacola, FL, and Fort Sam Houston, TX. Consolidate Navy Region Northeast, New London, CT, with Navy Region, Mid-Atlantic, Norfolk, VA.
The existing berthing capacity at surface/subsurface installations exceeds the capacity required to support the Force Structure Plan. The closure of Submarine Base New London materially contributes to the maximum reduction of excess capacity while increasing the average military value of the remaining bases in this functional area. Sufficient capacity and fleet dispersal is maintained with the East Coast submarine fleet homeports of Naval Station Norfolk and Submarine Base Kings Bay, without affecting operational capability. The intermediate submarine repair function is relocated to Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activity Norfolk at Norfolk Naval Shipyard, and the Trident Refit Facility Kings Bay, GA, in support of the relocating submarines. Consolidating the Naval Submarine Medical Research Laboratory with assets at the Walter Reed Army Medical Center Forest Glen Annex will create a DoD Center of Hyperbaric and Undersea Medicine that will increase synergy by consolidating previously separate animal and human research capabilities at a single location. The consolidation of Navy Region, Northeast with Navy Region, Mid-Atlantic is one element of the Department of the Navy efforts to reduce the number of Installation Management Regions from twelve to eight. Consolidation of the Regions rationalizes regional management structure and allows for opportunities to collocate regional entities to align management concepts and efficiencies.

Community Concerns

The New London community argued the closure of the Submarine Base would eliminate a critical US military strategic presence. Advocates repeatedly expressed concerns that the closure would sever longstanding synergies with the Submarine School, Submarine Development Squadron 12, Electric Boat Company (which designs, constructs, and maintains nuclear submarines), Naval Undersea Medical Institute and such nearby facilities at Newport, RI, as the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, Surface Warfare Officers School and the Naval War College, as well as loss of nearby college and university centers of undersea research. They argued DoD's closure recommendation deviated from the 20-year Force Structure Plan because it was premised on fewer attack submarines than their understanding of the requirement, and would restrict the future Navy because of insufficient basing capacity. Further, they asserted DoD undervalued New London's military value by not considering tenant commands such as the Submarine School, piers, Submarine Support Facility, and synergy relationships. Advocates claimed closure costs were greatly underestimated due to environmental considerations, personnel relocation and reconstitution of facilities at Norfolk, VA, and Kings Bay, GA. Similarly, savings were overestimated because of unrealistic personnel savings and construction requirements at Norfolk and Kings Bay to accommodate relocations. Last, the community projected a much greater economic impact on the local and extended area because of jobs associated with not only the base, but also those losses attendant with supporting facilities, including Electric Boat.

The Norfolk, VA, community expressed confidence that they and the Naval Station can support all personnel, submarines and equipment.

The Camden County, GA, community supported the closure recommendation, claiming the Navy can adequately support the current 55 Fast Attack Submarines. They claimed a lower force structure number would simply add to excess capacity. They backed DoD's assessment of relative military value for submarine bases. Kings Bay, a multi-use base, would provide synergy opportunities by collocating Fast Attack Submarines with a Fleet Concentration area that provided operating, training and maintenance interchange with Fleet Ballistic Missile Submarines as well as Fleet Surface and Aviation units. They asserted that DoD calculations adequately considered construction costs, environmental considerations and potential savings. Advocates for Kings Bay indicated that with several thousand acres of unencumbered, developable land, there is ample capacity to accommodate relocated personnel, submarines, support and equipment. The community adamantly claimed there would be more than an adequate amount of high quality housing, educational and quality-of-life facilities to support an increased military population since the military presence would still be less than that supported in Camden County ten years ago.

Commission Findings

The Commission found that excess capacity exists in the surface-subsurface category, that significant savings would accrue, and that a solid business case was made for closure of Submarine Base New London. However, the Commission also found that decoupling and displacing longstanding collocation relationships with undersea centers of excellence, the Submarine School and a nearby submarine construction company could adversely affect operational readiness. In addition, the Commission found the argument of overall economic impact compelling. Further, the Commission's analysis found serious doubts about the threat assessment and resultant Force Structure Plan basis for the number of required Fast Attack
Submarines. These factors combined to present an inherently unknowable and therefore unacceptable security risk to
national security if the base were to close.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission found that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final selection criteria 1, and the Force
Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following:

Realign Naval Submarine Base New London, Connecticut by consolidating Navy Region Northeast, New London, CT, with
Navy Region, Mid-Atlantic, Norfolk, VA.

The Commission found this change and the recommendation as amended are consistent with the final selection criteria and
the Force Structure Plan. The full text of this and all other recommendations can be found in Appendix Q.

OFFICER TRAINING COMMAND, PENSACOLA, FL

RECOMMENDATION # 61 (DON 12)

ONE-TIME COST: $34.1M

ANNUAL RECURRING COSTS/(SAVINGS): ($0.79M)

20-YEAR NET PRESENT VALUE: ($7.6M)

PAYBACK PERIOD: 6 YEARS

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Realign Naval Air Station Pensacola, FL by relocating Officer Training Command Pensacola, FL, to Naval Station Newport,
RI, and consolidating with Officer Training Command Newport, RI.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

Navy Officer Accession Training is currently conducted at three installations: (1) US Naval Academy Annapolis, MD, hosts
Midshipman Training; (2) Naval Station Newport, RI, hosts Naval Academy Preparatory School and Officer Training
Command Newport, which includes Officer Indoctration School and Seaman to Admiral-21 Program courses; and (3)
Naval Air Station Pensacola hosts Officer Training Command Pensacola, which includes Navy Officer Candidate School,
Limited Duty Officer Course, Chief Warrant Officer Course, and the Direct Commissioning Program. Consolidation of
Officer Training Command Pensacola and Officer Training Command Newport will reduce inefficiencies inherent in
maintaining two sites for similar training courses through reductions in facilities requirements, personnel requirements
(including administrative and instructional staff), and excess capacity. This action also supports the Department of the Navy
initiative to create a center for officer training at Naval Station Newport.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The Pensacola, FL, community argued that thorough analysis of military value and COBRA data, in combination with
clarification of inconsistent and often incorrect data provided by the Navy, proved that OTC Pensacola should remain in
place. They claimed that OTC Newport, RI, should have been consolidated at Pensacola. The community presented
information contending there were no cost savings from moving OTC Pensacola to OTC Newport.

For example, they claim differing responses to environmental data-call questions to the competing installations resulted in
significant and inexplicable differences in military value scores. Also, the Navy’s use of June Average on Board (AOB) figures
to measure surge capacity distorted the comparison since June was the only month when there were more AOB at OTC
Newport. In every other month of the year OTC Pensacola had more AOB than OTC Newport by at least 100 and in one
case over 300.

Community advocates claimed OTC Pensacola had more than enough capacity, both classroom and otherwise, to
accommodate OTC Newport’s workload. In addition, the cost savings for moving OTC Newport to OTC Pensacola would
be at least $13.5 million over twenty years and most likely much higher than that. Even after factoring in a new $1.14 million
fire and rescue training facility, Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH) savings would reduce to 10 years from “never” the period needed to achieve a positive Return on Investment (ROI) for consolidating OTC Newport at OTC Pensacola.

The community believed the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from the BRAC Criteria in the areas of capacity analysis, cost of operations, and potential costs and savings as stated above.

**COMMISSION FINDINGS**

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense. The Commission found that while the realignment was not cost effective, it produced an improvement to military value, and therefore it supported the Department of the Navy’s initiative to create a center for officer training at Naval Station Newport.

**COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS**

The Commission found the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission approves the recommendation of the Secretary.

### NAVAL AIR STATION ATLANTA, GA

**RECOMMENDATION # 62 (DON 13)**

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**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION**

Close Naval Air Station Atlanta, GA. Relocate its aircraft and necessary personnel, equipment and support to Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base New Orleans, LA; Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base Fort Worth, TX; and Robins Air Force Base, Robins, GA. Relocate Reserve Intelligence Area 14 to Fort Gillem, Forest Park, GA. Relocate depot maintenance Aircraft Components, Aircraft Engines, Fabrication and Manufacturing, and Support Equipment in support of F/A-18, C-9 and C-12 aircraft to Fleet Readiness Center West Site Fort Worth at Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base Fort Worth, TX. Relocate intermediate maintenance in support of E-2C aircraft to Fleet Readiness Center Mid-Atlantic Site New Orleans at Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base New Orleans, LA. Consolidate the Naval Air Reserve Atlanta with Navy Marine Corps Reserve Center Atlanta located at Dobbins Air Reserve Base, Marietta, GA. Retain the Windy Hill Annex.

**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION**

This recommendation reduces excess capacity while maintaining reserve forces in regions with favorable demographics. The aviation assets will be located closer to their theater of operations and/or will result in increased maintenance efficiencies and operational synergies. Relocating Reserve Intelligence Area 14 to Fort Gillem creates synergies with joint intelligence assets while maintaining the demographic base offered by the Atlanta area for this function. The Fleet Readiness Center portion of this recommendation realigns and merges depot and intermediate maintenance activities. It supports both DoD and Navy transformation goals by reducing the number of maintenance levels and streamlining the way maintenance is accomplished with associated significant cost reductions.

**COMMUNITY CONCERNS**

The community expressed concern that relocating Navy/Marine Corps Reserve squadrons to areas where the presence of qualified and trained personnel resources are uncertain would significantly degrade the military readiness of the combat ready and tested Atlanta area Reserve forces. These forces are presently engaged in the Global War on Terror and actively monitoring and deterring drug trafficking along the southern US coast. They further argued that DoD’s stated savings would not be realized by closing NAS Atlanta, because the remaining infrastructure of hangars, ramps, and administration and support buildings would be absorbed by Dobbins Air Reserve Base, and other Department of Defense and governmental agencies.
COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense. However, the original cost savings were overstated because of incorrect data submitted by Naval Air Station Atlanta. Consequently, the cost data was revised by the Department of Defense and recertified.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission found the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission approves the recommendation of the Secretary.

NAVY SUPPLY CORPS SCHOOL ATHENS, GA

RECOMMENDATION # 63 (DON 14)

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SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Close the naval installation at Athens, GA. Relocate the Navy Supply Corps School and the Center for Service Support to Naval Station Newport, RI. Disestablish the Supply Corps Museum.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

This recommendation closes a single-function installation and relocates its activities to a multi-functional installation with higher military value. Naval Station Newport has a significantly higher military value than Navy Supply Corps School and the capacity to support the Navy Supply Corps School training mission with existing infrastructure, making relocation of Navy Supply Corps School to Naval Station Newport desirable and cost efficient. Relocation of this function supports the Department of the Navy initiative to create a center for officer training at Naval Station Newport.

The Center for Service Support, which establishes curricula for other service support training, is relocated to Naval Station Newport with the Navy Supply Corps School to capitalize on existing resource and personnel efficiencies.

Relocation of the Navy Supply Corps School and Center for Service Support to Naval Station Newport removes the primary mission from the naval installation at Athens and removes or relocates the entirety of the Navy workforce at the naval installation at Athens, except for those personnel associated with base support functions. As a result, retention of the naval installation at Athens is no longer required.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The Athens, GA, community argued the base is efficiently run and school officials are dual-hatted as base officials. They contended there is little or no synergy between the school and other prospective tenants at Newport, and the school was particularly vulnerable to the BRAC process because it was assigned a low military value due to its mis-designation as a single-mission base. In sum, the Athens community believes the DoD proposal provides very little if any enhancement of military value, and with less than five percent course overlap between Officer Candidate School students and Navy Supply Corps School students, there are no synergies or efficiencies to be gained. Last, they believed the real adjusted payback will be in more than 100 years, with little or no savings for the first 20 years. Most of the savings are attributable to the questionable practice of counting savings from eliminated military billets without cutting end strength.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense. After carefully considering the community concerns and DoD’s justifications, the Commission found that while the realignment was not
particularly cost effective, it enhanced military value by contributing to a center for officer training at Naval Station Newport, and the BRAC statute required the Commission to prioritize military value over cost and other non-military considerations.

**COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS**

The Commission found the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission approves the recommendation of the Secretary.

**NAVAL SUPPORT ACTIVITY NEW ORLEANS, LA**

**Recommendation # 64 (DON 15)**

- **One-time Cost:** $46.2M
- **Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings):** ($35.3M)
- **20-Year Net Present Value:** ($387.7M)
- **Payback Period:** IMMEDIATE

**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION**

Close Naval Support Activity New Orleans, LA. Relocate the Navy Reserve Personnel Command and the Enlisted Placement and Management Center to Naval Support Activity Mid-South, Millington, TN, and consolidate with the Navy Personnel Command at Naval Support Activity Mid-South, Millington, TN. Relocate the Navy Reserve Recruiting Command to Naval Support Activity Mid-South, Millington, TN, and consolidate with the Navy Recruiting Command at Naval Support Activity Mid-South, Millington, TN. Relocate the Navy Reserve Command to Naval Support Activity Norfolk, VA, except for the installation management function, which consolidates with Navy Region Southwest, Naval Station San Diego, CA, Navy Region Northwest, Submarine Base Bangor, WA, and Navy Region Midwest, Naval Station Great Lakes, IL. Relocate Headquarters, Marine Forces Reserve to Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base New Orleans, LA, and consolidate with Marine Corps Reserve Support Command element of Mobilization Command, which is relocating from Marine Corps Support Activity, Kansas City, MO. Relocate Naval Air Systems Command Support Equipment Facility New Orleans, LA, Navy Recruiting District New Orleans, LA, and the Navy Reserve Center New Orleans, LA, to Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base New Orleans, LA. Relocate 8th Marine Corps District to Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base Fort Worth, TX. Consolidate Naval Support Activity New Orleans, LA, installation management function with Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base New Orleans, LA.

**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION**

The collocation of the Navy Reserve Personnel Command, the Enlisted Placement Management Center, and Naval Reserve Recruiting Command at Naval Support Activity Mid-South, Millington creates a Navy Human Resources Center of Excellence, improves personnel life-cycle management, and furthers active and reserve component total force integration and effectiveness. This recommendation consolidates Reserve personnel and recruiting headquarters with like active component functions in a single location and eliminates stand-alone headquarters. In addition, activities of the Bureau of Naval Personnel, Navy Manpower Analysis Center and Navy Personnel Research and Development Center are currently located at Naval Support Activity Mid-South.

The relocation of the Navy Reserve Command comprised of Navy Reserve Forces Command, Navy Reserve Forces, and Naval Reserve Air Forces, to Naval Support Activity Norfolk, VA, will enhance internal active and reserve component interoperability. By locating the reserve headquarters elements on the same base with Fleet Forces Command, its active component headquarters, this recommendation will significantly increase interaction between the two components, produce a reduction in force size by eliminating duplicative staff, and allow for further decrease in staffing size for common support functions. The consolidation of the Navy Reserve Command installation management functions with other Navy Regional organizations is part of the Department of the Navy efforts to streamline regional management structure and to institute consistent business practices.

The relocation of Headquarters, Marine Forces Reserve and the Marine Corps Reserve Support Command element of Mobilization Command to Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base New Orleans maintains a central location for management of widely-dispersed Marine Corps Reserve elements and allows consolidation of Marine Reserve management functions.
Marine Corps Reserve Support Command is currently the only geographically separated element of the Marine Forces Reserve. Consolidation with its Headquarters will significantly increase interaction and operational efficiency as well as eliminate duplicative staff. Location of this consolidated headquarters at a joint reserve base will enhance joint service interoperability concepts.

Relocation of 8th Marine Corps District to Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base Fort Worth moves this management organization within their geographic area of responsibility. It also places them at a major transportation node with reduced average distance to managed recruiting stations.

Relocating these functions removes the primary missions from Naval Support Activity New Orleans, and eliminates or moves the entirety of the workforce except for those personnel associated with the base operations support function and a number of smaller tenant activities.

As a result, retention of Naval Support Activity New Orleans is no longer required. Accordingly, this recommendation closes the installation and eliminates or relocates the remaining base operations support personnel and tenant activities. Base operations support organizations and tenant activity services currently shared between Naval Support Activity New Orleans and Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base New Orleans consolidate at Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base New Orleans to support the remaining area population.

**COMMUNITY CONCERNS**

The community argued that Naval Support Activity (NSA) New Orleans ranked 41st out of 334 bases in DoD’s ranking of military installations providing headquarters and administrative support functions. It ranked higher than the two bases slated to receive the bulk of the units leaving New Orleans—NSA Mid-South and NSA Norfolk—by 27 and 36 slots, respectively. Beyond this apparent deviation from the selection criteria, the community also claimed there were no compelling justifications in the DoD BRAC recommendation for moving major tenants from NSA New Orleans. Second, advocates stated that cost savings attributed to the closing of NSA New Orleans were overstated by $256 million. The community asserted their Federal City counter-proposal option offered $230M more in savings than the adjusted costs of DoD’s recommendation. Third, they claimed that DoD’s finding of no significant impact on the New Orleans economy from the closure of NSA was false. The community argued DoD failed to account for approximately 863 full-time contractors and 940 drilling reservists who would leave the area or lose their jobs and salaries. Also, the community felt DoD failed to take into account: (a) New Orleans’ difficulty in attracting new businesses, (b) its flat job growth over the last five years, and (c) declines in NASA and shipbuilding employment. Finally, if the base closes, the Department of the Navy will have a multi-million dollar liability because of Public Private Venture (PPV) Housing.

**COMMISSION FINDINGS**

The Commission found that the Department of the Navy is negotiating a “Federal City Project” with Louisiana state and local officials. This project calls for a "state-of-the-art and move-in-ready" complex to be constructed on Naval Support Activity (NSA) New Orleans West Bank property, at no cost to the government. In addition, the project would allow other federal tenants to participate and share operating costs. To ensure Federal City’s success, the state guaranteed funding and invested one million dollars in the project. The Commission found two viable tenants for the Federal City Project—Headquarters, Marine Forces Reserve New Orleans, LA and the Marine Corps Mobility Command, Kansas City, MO. Because their functions are financial and administrative, realigning Marine Corps operations to the West Bank would not affect their mission or operational readiness. The Commission further found that after closing NSA East Bank Property, the Federal City Plan offers greater savings than DoD’s projections, has an immediate payback, and avoids $106 million in military construction.

**COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS**

The Commission found that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final selection criteria 2, 3, 4 and 5 as well as from the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following:

Realign Naval Support Activity New Orleans, LA. Relocate the Navy Reserve Personnel Command and the Enlisted Placement and Management Center to Naval Support Activity Mid-South, Millington, TN and consolidate with the Navy Personnel Command at Naval Support Activity Mid-South, Millington, TN. Relocate the Naval Reserve Recruiting Command to Naval Support Activity Mid-South, Millington, TN and consolidate with the Navy Recruiting Command at Naval Support Activity Mid-South, Millington, TN. Relocate the Navy Reserve Command to Naval Support Activity
Norfolk, VA, except for the installation management function, which consolidates with Navy Region Southwest, Naval Station San Diego, CA, Navy Region Northwest, Submarine Base Bangor, WA, and Navy Region Midwest, Naval Station Great Lakes, IL. The remaining tenants will be relocated as stated in the DoD recommendation. If the State of Louisiana obtains funding and commences construction of the Federal City project proposed for the Naval Support Activity West Bank property on or before September 30, 2008, then relocate Headquarters, Marine Forces Reserve to the Naval Support Activity West Bank property, New Orleans, LA. If the State of Louisiana fails to do so on or before September 30, 2008, then relocate Headquarters, Marine Forces Reserve to Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base New Orleans, LA, and consolidate with Marine Corps Reserve Support Command element of Mobilization Command, which is relocating from Marine Corps Support Activity, Kansas City, MO. Relocate Naval Air Systems Command Support Equipment Facility New Orleans, LA, Navy Recruiting District New Orleans, LA, and the Navy Reserve Center New Orleans, LA, to Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base New Orleans, LA. Relocate 8th Marine Corps District to Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base Fort Worth, TX. Consolidate Naval Support Activity New Orleans, LA installation management function with Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base New Orleans, LA.

The Commission found this change and the recommendation as amended are consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. The full text of this and all Commission recommendations can be found in Appendix Q.

### NAVAL AIR STATION BRUNSWICK, ME

**Recommendation # 65/191 (DoN 18)**

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#### Secretary of Defense Recommendation

Realign Naval Air Station Brunswick, ME, to a Naval Air Facility and relocate its aircraft along with dedicated personnel, equipment and support to Naval Air Station Jacksonville, FL. Consolidate Aviation Intermediate Maintenance with Fleet Readiness Center Southeast Jacksonville, FL. This recommendation was modified to Close Naval Air Station Brunswick, ME as an addition the Secretary's recommendation list.

#### Secretary of Defense Justification

The realignment of Naval Air Station Brunswick will reduce operating costs while single-siting the East Coast Maritime Patrol community at Naval Air Station Jacksonville. This recommendation retains an operational airfield in the northeast that can be used to support the homeland defense mission, as needed, and maintains strategic flexibility. The Fleet Readiness Center portion of this recommendation realigns and merges depot and intermediate maintenance activities. It supports both DoD and Naval transformation goals by reducing the number of maintenance levels and streamlining the way maintenance is accomplished with associated significant cost reductions.

#### Community Concerns

The Brunswick community argued that the facility is the last active duty DoD airfield in New England and, other than McGuire Air Force Base, NJ, in the Northeast. DoD's realignment recommendation would harm US homeland defense, and forgo a militarily strategic location near North Atlantic sea lanes and the closest point to Europe and the Middle East. NAS Brunswick, with over $130 million of recapitalization since 2001, had modern facilities that could support the entire military aircraft inventory and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) with parallel runways, unimpeded access to the ocean with over 60,000 square miles of unencumbered training airspace, and the only hangar in the Navy that will accommodate the Multimission Aircraft (MMA), which is the followon to the P-3. They further argued that realignment would result in redeployment of P-3 forces back to the same base for little if any savings while adding additional aviation excess capacity due to required construction at the receiving site to accommodate relocated aircraft. DoD's savings were overestimated because of unrealistic personnel eliminations associated with aircraft maintenance support that are not required with MMA. The community maintained that economic impacts on the local community were grossly understated in DoD calculations, as were costs associated with aircraft relocation.
With respect to the Commission’s vote to formally consider closure of Brunswick, the community argued that closure of the Naval Air Station raised all the issues attendant with DoD’s realignment recommendation, plus the loss of the only cold weather survival school as well as Reserve facilities supporting the entire New England area and crews of Naval ships at nearby Bath Shipyard. They further argued closure would violate Criteria 2 (homeland defense). Also noted were the arguments made by Northern Command and Fleet Forces Command, which opposed closure by emphasizing Brunswick’s strategic location and future capability (Criteria 2 and 3). DoD’s senior deliberative body, the IEC, concurred in the assessment that Brunswick’s strategic location was essential. Brunswick supports one of the last reserve force populations in the Northeast, and could support Coast Guard and UAV air assets as future missions. The community has worked hard to prevent any encroachment issues at the base and staunchly support the air station and its personnel.

**Commission Findings**

Closure of Naval Air Station Brunswick, ME was initially added by the Commission for consideration so that it could fairly and properly evaluate all possible options for this facility: full closure, realignment, or remaining open. The Commission’s review and analysis of the certified data found that closure would reduce excess capacity and result in significant savings while realignment would accomplish neither. The Commission found DoD’s realignment proposal would remove military value from the installation, while still incurring many ongoing base operation support (BOS) costs. Moreover, realignment would eliminate the vast majority of the jobs, while making it virtually impossible for the community to successfully redevelop the site.

The Commission found there were suitable detachment operating sites for Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Squadrons to support homeland defense and other Department of Defense mission support responsibilities in New England. The Multimission Aircraft (MMA), when developed, procured, and deployed, will not replace P-3s on a one-for-one basis, and therefore there will continue to be excess installations, making a backfill at NAS Brunswick unlikely. Furthermore, the MMA could be deployed from other civilian or Air National Guard airfields in the event of future mission requirements in the New England region. The Commission found that other realignments under this bill addressed the homeland defense needs of New England. The Commission found that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially by not recommending closure of Naval Air Station Brunswick, ME.

**Commission Recommendations**

The Commission found that the Secretary deviated from selection criteria 2 and 5 and the Force Structure Plan. Therefore the Commission recommends the following:

Close Naval Air Station Brunswick, ME. Relocate its aircraft along with dedicated personnel, equipment and support to Naval Air Station Jacksonville, FL. Consolidate Aviation Intermediate Maintenance with Fleet Readiness Center Southeast Jacksonville, FL.

The Commission found that this change and the recommendation as amended are consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. The full text of this and all Commission recommendations can be found in Appendix Q.

**Marine Corps Support Activity Kansas City, MO**

**Recommendation # 66 (DON 19)**

| One-time Cost: | $8.2M |
| Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings): | ($6.1M) |
| 20-Year Net Present Value: | ($67.0M) |
| Payback Period: | Immediate |

**Secretary of Defense Recommendation**

The relocation of Marine Corps Reserve Support Command and its parent command, Headquarters, Marine Forces Reserve, to Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base New Orleans maintains a central location for management of widely dispersed Marine Corps Reserve elements and allows consolidation of Marine Reserve management functions. Marine Reserve Support Command is currently the only geographically separated element of the Marine Forces Reserve. Consolidation with its headquarters will significantly increase interaction and operational efficiency as well as eliminate duplicative staff. Location of this consolidated headquarters at a joint reserve base will enhance joint service interoperability concepts.

Relocating these functions removes the primary missions from Marine Corps Support Activity Kansas City and eliminates or moves the entirety of the workforce except for those personnel associated with the 9th Marine Corps District and the 24th Marine Regiment. This recommendation closes the Marine Corps Support Activity but retains an enclave for these organizations.

There were no formal expressions from the community.

The Commission found that the Department of the Navy did not analyze the Naval Support Activity (NSA) New Orleans, LA capabilities nor the operational and economical advantages of the Federal City Project. This project, as discussed previously in Commission Recommendation #64 (Naval Support Activity New Orleans), is a “state-of-the-art and move-in-ready” complex on NSA's West Bank offering operational efficiencies and significant savings. The Commission found the Marine Corps Mobilization Command Kansas City, MO was one of two tenants well-suited for Federal City. The Mobilization Command functions are financial and administrative and realigning the Marine Corps operations to the NSA West Bank New Orleans does not affect its mission or operational readiness. The Commission further found that after closing NSA East Bank Property and realigning to the NSA West Bank Property, the Federal City Plan will offer greater savings for the Kansas City Marine Corps realignment. These savings would generate an immediate payback and avoid millions in military construction costs. The Commission found that DoD’s failure to consider this viable alternative constituted a substantial deviation, and it therefore amended the recommendation to allow DoD to take advantage of the more suitable facilities at Federal City.

The Commission found that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final selection criteria 2, 4 and 5, as well as from the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following:

Close Marine Corps Support Activity, Kansas City, MO. If the State of Louisiana obtains funding and commences construction of the Federal City project proposed for the Naval Support Activity West Bank property on or before September 30, 2008, then relocate Marine Corps Reserve Support Command element of Mobilization Command to that facility on the Naval Support Activity West Bank property, New Orleans, LA, and consolidate with Headquarters, Marine Forces Reserve. The remaining tenants will be retained as stated in the DoD recommendation. If the State of Louisiana fails to do so on or before September 30, 2008, then relocate Marine Corps Reserve Support Command element of Mobilization Command to Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base New Orleans, LA, and consolidate with Headquarters, Marine Forces Reserve. Retain an enclave for the 9th Marine Corps District and the 24th Marine Regiment.

The Commission found this change and the recommendation as amended are consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. The full text of this and all Commission recommendations can be found in Appendix Q.
NAVAL STATION PASCAGOULA, MS

RECOMMENDATION # 67 (DoN 20)

One-time Cost: $17.9M
Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings): ($47.4M)
20-Year Net Present Value: ($665.7M)
Payback Period: IMMEDIATE

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Close Naval Station Pascagoula, MS. Relocate its ships along with dedicated personnel, equipment, and support to Naval Station Mayport, FL. Relocate the ship intermediate repair function to Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activity Mayport, FL.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

This recommendation will reduce excess berthing capacity while allowing for consolidation of surface ships in a fleet concentration area. Sufficient capacity and fleet dispersal is maintained with East Coast surface fleet homeports of Naval Station Norfolk and Naval Station Mayport, FL. Gulf Coast presence can be achieved as needed with available Navy ports at Naval Air Station Key West, FL, and Naval Air Station Pensacola, FL. The Guided Missile Cruisers (CG-47 Class) at Naval Station Pascagoula are scheduled for decommissioning prior to FY 2006 and will not relocate. This recommendation also supports mission elimination at Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activity Pascagoula and reduces excess repair capacity. The Defense Common Ground Station-Navy 2 facility can be relocated to another Naval activity or remain in its present location as a tenant of the US Coast Guard, if the Coast Guard elects to assume property ownership of some or all of the Pascagoula facility.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

Community advocates, criticized what they regard as DoD’s built-in bias in favor of mega-bases (fleet concentrations) during calculations of excess capacity and overall military value; DoD failed to fully consider the importance of the base’s secure and cost-effective design in supporting DoD’s emerging role in Homeland defense and security; strategic cost of losing a permanent Navy homeport on the Gulf of Mexico; and degradation of DoD’s ability to defend against threats to maritime approaches and regional infrastructure. They noted that while some bases seem to have been recommended for closure because they are old or too costly to maintain and recapitalize, Naval Station Pascagoula appears to have been penalized for being one of the Navy’s newest, best designed installations. They claimed DoD’s proposal would unfairly burden the local hotel market and will not result in actual budget savings because most of the annual savings would result from eliminating military personnel without reducing end strength.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense, as reuniting these isolated ships with the rest of the fleet will enhance military value and achieve cost savings by eliminating excess capacity. None of the issues raised by the community rose to the level of a substantial deviation.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission found the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission approves the recommendation of the Secretary.
NAVAL AIR STATION JOINT RESERVE BASE WILLOW GROVE, PA, AND CAMBRIA REGIONAL AIRPORT, JOHNSTOWN, PA

RECOMMENDATION # 68 (DO/D 21)

One-time Cost: $239.5 M
Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings): ($73.9 M)
20-Year Net Present Value: ($757.8 M)
Payback Period: 2 Years

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Close Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base Willow Grove, PA. Relocate all Navy and Marine Corps squadrons, their aircraft and necessary personnel, equipment and support to McGuire Air Force Base, Cookstown, NJ. Relocate the minimum amount of manpower and equipment to support intermediate maintenance workload and capacity for Tire and Wheel, non-destruction inspections, and Aviation Life Support System equipment to McGuire Air Force Base. Relocate intermediate maintenance workload and capacity for Aircraft Components, Aircraft Engines, Fabrication & Manufacturing, and Support Equipment to Fleet Readiness Center East, Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point, NC. Deactivate the 111th Fighter Wing (Air National Guard) and relocate assigned A-10 aircraft to the 124th Wing (Air National Guard), Boise Air Terminal Air Guard Station, Boise, ID (three primary aircraft authorized); 175th Wing (Air National Guard), Martin State Airport Air Guard Station, Baltimore, MD, (three primary aircraft authorized); 127th Wing (Air National Guard), Selfridge Air National Guard Base, Mount Clemens, MI (three primary aircraft authorized) and retired (six primary aircraft authorized). Relocate Armed Forces Reserve Center Expeditionary Combat Support manpower to Eglin Air Force Base, FL. Relocate Co A/228th Aviation to Fort Dix, Trenton, NJ. Relocate Reserve Intelligence Area 16 to Fort Dix. Establish an enclave for the Army Reserve units remaining on or relocating to Willow Grove and the Air National Guard 270th Engineering Installation Squadron. Realign Cambria Regional Airport, Johnstown, PA, by relocating Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 775 Detachment A, to include all required personnel, equipment, and support, to McGuire Air Force Base.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

This recommendation will reduce excess capacity while creating new joint opportunities in the McGuire Air Force Base/Fort Dix/Naval Aviation Engineering Station Lakehurst military concentration area. This recommendation leverages maintenance and operational efficiencies within Marine Corps Reserve Aviation and maintains reserve forces in areas with favorable demographics. Inclusion of the realignment of Cambria Regional Airport in this recommendation allows the assets currently housed there to be collocated with their headquarters at McGuire Air Force Base. The major intermediate maintenance functions are consolidated into a Fleet Readiness Center, which reduces the number of maintenance levels and streamlines the way maintenance is accomplished with associated significant cost reductions.

This recommendation enables Air Force Future Total Force transformation by consolidating the A-10 fleet at installations of higher military value, and contributes to Army’s establishment of the Northeast Army Reserve Regional Readiness Command.

The USAF KC-135E model aircraft (16 primary aircraft authorized) at McGuire Air Force Base, NJ, retire. The capacity created by the Air Force force structure retirement of KC-135Es (16 primary aircraft authorized) from McGuire Air Force Base enables the execution of this recommendation.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The Willow Grove community argued the recommendation to close Willow Grove Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base (NAS JRB), the associated deactivation of the 111th Fighter Wing (Pennsylvania Air National Guard), and the removal of the 913th Airlift Wing (AFRES) substantially deviated from the established final selection criteria and was based on flawed analyses. The substantial deviations cited by the community include: erroneous assumptions and lack of analysis in assessing jointness, substantial miscalculations in the assessment of the availability of land, facilities, and associated airspaces, lack of consideration of the base’s strategic location with respect to homeland defense and homeland security, substantial deviations and inconsistencies in the evaluation process; improper deactivation of an Air National Guard Wing; inadequate consideration of demographics, manpower, and skill-set losses; and inadequate consideration of future mission capabilities.
Numerous formatted letters and petitions have been received citing the installation as a model of joint use base facilities whose strengths include: working joint operations, including all services except the Coast Guard, critical strategic location near Northeast Corridor major metropolitan and port areas, vital part of homeland defense and security for the East Coast, huge economic impact to their local region, an 8,000 foot runway, modern Digital Radar Air Control System—one of only four in the US—available for emergency preparedness and operations, and strong community support. Advocates repeatedly raised the question: "Why close a joint base in light of the stated DoD objective of moving to jointness?"

The announced loss of jobs will have a negative economic impact on the area.

**Commission Findings**

The Commission found that the majority of community concerns as they pertained to the 111th Fighter Wing (Air National Guard) had merit. Moreover, the Commission notes that the 913th Airlift Wing (AFRES) was not included in the recommendation by the Department. As best could be determined, the Navy had forwarded their proposal to Air Force for their review, and the Air Force recommended action addressed only the Air National Guard unit.

The Commission also found, however, that the Navy recommendation to close NAS/JRB Willow Grove was analytically sound for the Navy and Marine Corps Reserve assets assigned there and at Cambria. The movement and consolidation at the new Joint Base located at McGuire/Fort Dix/Lakehurst makes efficient use of a larger joint military establishment while ameliorating many of the demographic effects of moving reserve units. The Commission therefore determined that the majority of NAS/JRB Willow Grove could be closed, while also retaining an enclave for the 111th Fighter Wing and the 913th Airlift Wing. The Commission encourages the Department of Defense to not retire service-capable A-10 aircraft. The Commission notes the quality and contributions of the 111th Fighter Wing and encourages the Department of Defense to consider identifying A-10 aircraft to form an A-10 wing or detachment using the 111th Fighter Wing of the Air National Guard located at Willow Grove, PA.

**Commission Recommendations**

The Commission found that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final selection criteria 1, as well as from the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following:

Close Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base Willow Grove, PA. Relocate all Navy and Marine Corps squadrons, their aircraft and necessary personnel, equipment and support to McGuire Air Force Base, Cookstown, NJ. Relocate the minimum amount of manpower and equipment to support intermediate maintenance workload and capacity for Tire and Wheel, non-destruction inspections, and Aviation Life Support System equipment to McGuire Air Force Base. Relocate intermediate maintenance workload and capacity for Aircraft Components, Aircraft Engines, Fabrication & Manufacturing, and Support Equipment to Fleet Readiness Center East, Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point, NC. Distribute the 15 A-10 aircraft assigned to the 111th Fighter Wing (ANG), the 15 A-10 aircraft assigned to the 124th Wing (ANG), Boise Air Terminal Air Guard Station, Boise, Idaho, the 15 A-10 aircraft assigned to the 175th Wing (ANG), Martin State Airport Air Guard Station, Baltimore, Maryland, and the 15 F-16 aircraft assigned to the 127th Wing (ANG), Selfridge Air National Guard Base, Mount Clemens, Michigan, to meet the Primary Aircraft Authorizations (PAA) requirements established by the Base Closure and Realignment recommendations of the Secretary of Defense, as amended by the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission.

Establish 18 PAA A-10 aircraft at the 124th Wing (ANG), Boise Air Terminal Air Guard Station, Boise, Idaho.

Establish 18 PAA A-10 aircraft at the 175th Wing (ANG), Martin State Airport Air Guard Station, Baltimore, Maryland.

Establish 24 PAA A-10 aircraft at the 127th Wing (ANG), Selfridge Air National Guard Base, Mount Clemens, Michigan.

If the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania decides to change the organization, composition and location of the 111th Fighter Wing (ANG) to integrate the unit into the Future Total Force, all personnel allotted to the 111th Fighter Wing (ANG), including the unit’s Expeditionary Combat Support (ECS) elements, will remain in place and assume a mission relevant to the security interests of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and consistent with the integration of the unit into the Future Total Force, including but not limited to air mobility, C4ISR, Information Operations, engineering, flight training or unmanned aerial vehicles. Where appropriate, unit personnel will be retrained in skills relevant to the emerging mission. This recommendation does not effect a change to the authorized end-strength of the Pennsylvania Air National Guard. The distribution of aircraft currently assigned to the 111th Fighter Wing (ANG) is based upon a resource-constrained determination by the Department of Defense that the aircraft concerned will better support national security requirements.
in other locations and is not conditioned upon the agreement of the commonwealth. Relocate Co A/228th Aviation to Fort Dix, Trenton, Nj. Relocate Reserve Intelligence Area 16 to Fort Dix.

Establish a contiguous enclave for the 111th Fighter Wing (ANG) and the 270th Engineering Installation Squadron (ANG) sufficient to support operations of those units, including flight operations, and compatible with joint use of the former Naval Air Station as a civilian airport. The Army Reserve units not relocated from Willow Grove by this recommendation, as amended, and those relocated to Willow Grove by other recommendations, as amended, will be incorporated into the Armed Forces Reserve Center established by Army Recommendation 82. The property retained under Federal title to construct the AFRC shall be limited to the absolute minimum essential to construct that facility, shall be encompassed within the enclave established by the 111th Fighter Wing (ANG) and the 270th Engineering Installation Squadron (ANG), and shall be sited to minimize interference with the Air Guard enclave and joint civilian use of the former Naval Air Station as a civilian airport. The Commission defines the authority granted to the Army by the words “retain essential facilities to support activities of the Reserve Components” where they appear in Army Recommendation 82, to be limited to the property necessary to construct AFRC itself. Should the Secretary of the Army determine that access to more property would be beneficial, a joint use agreement should be executed to obtain a tenancy from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

Realign Cambria Regional Airport, Johnstown, PA, by relocating Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 775 Detachment A, to include all required personnel, equipment, and support, to McGuire Air Force Base.

The Commission found that this change and the recommendation as amended are consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. The full text of this and all Commission recommendations can be found in Appendix Q.

**Naval Shipyard Portsmouth, Kittery, ME**

**Recommendation # 69 (DoN 23)**

- **One-time Cost:** N/A
- **Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings):** N/A
- **20-Year Net Present Value:** N/A
- **Payback Period:** N/A

**Secretary of Defense Recommendation**

Close the Naval Shipyard Portsmouth, Kittery, ME. Relocate the ship depot repair function to Naval Shipyard Norfolk, VA, Naval Shipyard and Intermediate Maintenance Facility Pearl Harbor, HI, and Naval Shipyard Puget Sound, WA. Relocate the Submarine Maintenance, Engineering, Planning and Procurement Command to Naval Shipyard Norfolk.

**Secretary of Defense Justification**

This recommendation retains one nuclear-capable shipyard on each coast, plus sufficient shipyard capacity to support forward deployed assets. There are four Naval Shipyards performing depot-level ship refueling, modernization, overhaul and repair work. There is sufficient excess capacity in the aggregate across the four shipyards to close either Naval Shipyard Pearl Harbor or Naval Shipyard Portsmouth. There is insufficient excess capacity to close any other shipyard or combination of shipyards. Naval Shipyard Portsmouth was selected for closure, rather than Naval Shipyard Pearl Harbor, because it is the only closure which could both eliminate excess capacity and satisfy retention of strategically-placed shipyard capability. Planned force structure and force positioning adjustments reflected in the 20-year Force Structure Plan led to the selection of Naval Shipyard Portsmouth as the preferred closure candidate between the two sites. Additional savings, not included in the payback analysis, are anticipated from reduced unit costs at the receiving shipyards because of the higher volume of work.

Relocating the ship depot repair function and Submarine Maintenance, Engineering, Planning and Procurement Command removes the primary missions from Naval Shipyard Portsmouth and eliminates or moves the entirety of the workforce at Naval Shipyard Portsmouth except for those personnel associated with the base operations support function. Naval Shipyard Portsmouth had a low military value compared to operational homeports, and, its berthing capacity is not required to support the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, closure of Naval Shipyard Portsmouth is justified.
**COMMUNITY CONCERNS**

Community, Congressional and labor union officials disputed DoD’s measurement of shipyard capacity, and asserted DoD seriously underestimated the true military value of Portsmouth Naval Shipyard (PNSY). They believe DoD overestimated capacity to perform work without PNSY and underestimated the Navy’s future maintenance workload. Advocates claimed the costs associated with moving the shipyard’s workload are inaccurate; therefore, the cost of closure is incorrectly calculated. In addition, they contended important skills and knowledge would be lost because the highly skilled workforce will probably not relocate. This workforce makes PNSY one of the Navy’s most productive shipyards. Last, they noted the facility’s non-DoD reuse potential is constrained by a non-nuclear toxic waste site within the fenceline, exacerbating the dramatic adverse economic effect of the DoD proposal.

**COMMISSION FINDINGS**

The Commission found that reducing excess capacity was a primary consideration in formulating the Secretary’s recommendation. The Commission examined a number of past shipyard capacity studies and determined that the capacity study submitted by the Navy in support of its base closure recommendation was a reasonable measure of shipyard capacity. The Commission also found that while excess capacity exists in the shipyard depot maintenance category, that level of excess capacity did not justify closing one of four public yards. The Commission also found that the closure of the Portsmouth shipyard would increase the risk of not maintaining acceptable surge capability across the public shipyards. Given the uncertainties of future threats, the Commission found that these concerns rose to the level of a substantial deviation.

**COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS**

The Commission found that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final selection criterion 3, and the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission has rejected the recommendation of the Secretary. The Commission found that this recommendation is consistent with the final selection criteria and Force Structure Plan.

**NAVAL STATION NEWPORT, RI**

**Recommendation # 70 (DON 25)**

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**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION**

Realign Naval Station Newport, RI, by relocating the Navy Warfare Development Command to Naval Station Norfolk, VA.

**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION**

Navy Warfare Development Command performs the functions of warfare innovation, concept development, fleet and joint experimentation, and the synchronization and dissemination of doctrine. Relocating the Navy Warfare Development Command to Norfolk better aligns the Navy’s warfare development organization with those of the other joint force components and Joint Forces Command, as well as places Navy Warfare Development Command in better proximity to Fleet Forces Command and the Second Fleet Battle Lab it supports, resulting in substantial travel cost savings to conduct experimentation events. Location of Navy Warfare Development Command in Hampton Roads area places it in proximity to Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, VA, and Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, VA, as well as in closer proximity to the Air Force Doctrine Center at Maxwell Air Force Base, AL, which furthers joint interoperability concepts.
COMMUNITY CONCERNS

Community representatives and employees of the Navy Warfare Development Command noted that workers would be highly unlikely to move to the Tidewater area, resulting in a loss of experience, and that it would take several years to train a new staff. They also noted DoD’s proposal would adversely affect the close synergy with the Naval War College, a relationship which was instrumental in the decision to locate the NWDC at Newport in the first place.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense. The Commission’s review and analysis concluded that while the realignment was not particularly cost effective, it met the Department of the Navy’s goals to improve military value by relocating the Navy Warfare Development Command to Norfolk so it would be in close proximity to Fleet units. The community’s arguments about potential losses of human capital were found to be insufficiently supported and did not rise to the level of a substantial deviation because the labor force in and around Norfolk is more than adequate to implement the recommendation during the BRAC six year implementation period.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission found the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission approves the recommendation of the Secretary.

NAVAL STATION INGLESIDE, TX, AND NAVAL AIR STATION CORPUS CHRISTI, TX

RECOMMENDATION # 71 (DON 26)

One-time Cost: $177.1M
Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings): ($59.5M)
20-Year Net Present Value: ($614.2M)
Payback Period: 3 Years

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Close Naval Station Ingleside, TX. Relocate its ships along with dedicated personnel, equipment and support to Naval Station San Diego, CA. Relocate the ship intermediate repair function to Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activity San Diego, CA. Consolidate Mine Warfare Training Center with Fleet Anti-submarine Warfare Training Center San Diego, CA. Realign Naval Air Station Corpus Christi, TX. Relocate Commander Mine Warfare Command and Commander Mobile Mine Assembly Group to Fleet Anti-Submarine Warfare Center, Point Loma, CA. Relocate Helicopter Mine Countermeasures Squadron 15 (HM-15) and dedicated personnel, equipment and support to Naval Station Norfolk, VA. Disestablish Commander Helicopter Tactical Wing US Atlantic Fleet Aviation Intermediate Maintenance Detachment Truax Field at Naval Air Station Corpus Christi, TX, and relocate its intermediate maintenance function for Aircraft Components, Fabrication & Manufacturing, and Support Equipment to Fleet Readiness Center Mid-Atlantic Site Norfolk, VA.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

This recommendation moves mine warfare surface and aviation assets to major fleet concentration areas and reduces excess capacity. Gulf Coast presence can be achieved as needed with available Navy ports at Naval Air Station Key West, FL, and Naval Air Station Pensacola, FL. The Minehunter Coastal ships at Naval Station Ingleside are scheduled for decommissioning between FY 2006 and FY 2008 and will not relocate. Additionally, US Coast Guard presence is expected to remain in the Gulf Coast region. Relocation of Commander Mine Warfare Command and the Mine Warfare Training Center to San Diego, CA, creates a center of excellence for Undersea Warfare, combining both mine warfare and anti-submarine warfare disciplines. This reorganization removes the Mine Warfare community from a location remote from the fleet, thereby better supporting the shift to organic mine warfare. This recommendation also supports mission elimination at Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activity Naval Reserve Maintenance Facility Ingleside, TX, and Aviation Intermediate Maintenance Detachment Truax Field at Naval Air Station Corpus Christi, and reduces excess repair capacity. The
relocation of Helicopter Mine Countermeasures Squadron 15 (HM-15) to Naval Station Norfolk single sites all Mine Warfare Aircraft in a fleet concentration area. This location better supports the HM-15 mission by locating them closer to the C-5 transport Air Port of Embarkation for overseas employment and mine countermeasures ship and helicopter coordinated exercises.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community expressed concerns that the loss of civilian jobs and high quality military personnel would have a negative economic impact. The Navy would lose synergies from collocating air and surface mine warfare communities. They believe Ingleside’s military value score did not give appropriate credit for the facilities’ unique mine warfare mission and training ranges or modern base facilities (including double decker piers and a one of a kind Electro-Magnetic Roll facility). The recommendation would weaken military presence in an area vulnerable to terrorist threats.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found that naval assets in the Gulf of Mexico are important to homeland defense because over 50 percent of imported oil and gas comes into the United States through the Gulf of Mexico ports. Additionally, 50 percent of the US refining capability is located in the Gulf of Mexico.

The Commission also found that DoD has other air and ground assets in the region that can be tasked as needed and that naval assets can also be tasked as required if the seaborne threat conditions escalate. The Commission found that the staff of the Mine Warfare Command, considered the essence of the Mine Warfare Center of Excellence that will relocate to San Diego, will have better access to the various Strike Group Commanders and that the surface minesweepers can integrate more readily with the fleet and participate in exercises to improve the operational effectiveness of the Mine Warfare Force. This is a prelude to the next generation of air and surface Mine Warfare assets that will be organic units assigned to Strike and Expeditionary forces for operations and training.

The Commission found that the original cost savings were overstated by 33.8 percent because of incorrect data submitted by Naval Station Ingleside. Consequently, the cost data was revised by the Department of Defense and recertified with a resulting savings projected in 2025 to be $614.2 million dollars.

In view of the Commission’s finding that Department of Defense recommendations to close Naval Station Ingleside and Naval Station Pascagoula are consistent with BRAC selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan, the Secretary of Defense is encouraged, in conjunction with the Department of homeland security, to ensure that there is an adequate response plan in place for Naval forces to respond to threats in the Gulf of Mexico, and that response plan be shared as appropriate with Governors responsible for the protection of their citizens.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission found the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission approves the recommendation of the Secretary.

ENGINEERING FIELD DIVISION/ACTIVITY

RECOMMENDATION # 72 (DoN 28)

One-time Cost: $37.9M
Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings): ($9.3M)
20-Year Net Present Value: ($81.8M)
Payback Period: 4 Years

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Close Naval Facilities Engineering Field Division South leased space in Charleston, SC. Consolidate Naval Facilities Engineering Field Division South, Charleston, SC, with Naval Facilities Engineering Field Activity Southeast, Jacksonville, FL, at Naval Air Station Jacksonville, FL; Naval Facilities Midwest, Great Lakes, IL, at Naval Station Great Lakes, IL; and
Naval Facilities Atlantic, Norfolk, VA, at Naval Station Norfolk, VA. Close Naval Facilities Engineering Field Activity Northeast leased space in Lester, PA. Consolidate Naval Facilities Engineering Field Activity Northeast, Philadelphia, PA, with Naval Facilities Atlantic, Norfolk, VA at Naval Station Norfolk, VA and relocate Navy Crane Center Lester, PA, to Norfolk Naval Shipyard, Norfolk, VA.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

This recommendation enhances the Navy’s longstanding initiative to accomplish common management and support on a regionalized basis by consolidating and collocating Naval Facilities commands with the installation management Regions in Jacksonville, FL, Great Lakes, IL and Norfolk, VA. This collocation aligns management concepts and efficiencies and may allow for further consolidation in the future.

Naval Facilities Engineering Field Division South, Naval Facilities Engineering Field Activity Northeast and Navy Crane Center are located in leased space, and this recommendation will achieve savings by moving from leased space to government-owned space. Naval Facilities Engineering Command is undergoing organizational transformation, and this recommendation facilitates the evolution of organizational alignment. This recommendation will result in an increase in the average military value for the remaining Naval Facilities Engineering Field Division/Engineering Field Activity activities, and it relocates the Navy Crane Center to a site with functional synergy.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

Community representatives from South Carolina claimed the recommendation overstates the number of facility personnel and would break apart the “most efficient engineering engine in NAVFAC.” The community proposed either relocating EFD South personnel to a Charleston facility that may become available through an unassociated BRAC recommendation or to a facility yet to be built within the Charleston area.

The Pennsylvania community, including union representatives, disputed DoD’s plan to move to Norfolk instead of to the Philadelphia Business Center and stated a move to Philadelphia has a lower cost and quicker return than Norfolk. They also noted the number of personnel likely to relocate was overstated, and moving NCC to Norfolk would create a conflict of interest, causing one shipyard to have undue influence over NCC’s decisions.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense. Community issues were carefully assessed and examined, but they either did not rise to the level of a substantial deviation, or were more properly categorized as manageable implementation issues that can be successfully resolved during the six-year implementation period.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission found the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission approves the recommendation of the Secretary.

NAVY AND MARINE CORPS RESERVE CENTERS

RECOMMENDATION # 73 (DON 29)

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SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Close Navy Marine Corps Reserve Center Encino, CA, and relocate the Marine Corps units to Marine Corps Reserve Center Pasadena, CA.
Close Navy Marine Corps Reserve Center Moundsville, WV, and relocate the Marine Corps units to Navy Marine Corps Reserve Center Pittsburgh, PA.

Close Navy Marine Corps Reserve Center Reading, PA, and relocate the Navy and Marine Corps units to Navy Marine Corps Reserve Centers Lehigh Valley, PA.

Close Navy Marine Corps Reserve Center Los Angeles, CA, and relocate the Navy and Marine Corps units to Armed Forces Reserve Center Bell, CA.

Close Navy Marine Corps Reserve Center Akron, OH, and Navy Reserve Center Cleveland, OH, and relocate the Navy and Marine Corps units to Armed Forces Reserve Center Akron, OH.

Close Navy Marine Corps Reserve Center Madison, WI, Navy Reserve Center Lacrosse, WI, and Navy Reserve Center Dubuque, IA, and relocate the Navy and Marine Corps units to Armed Forces Reserve Center Madison, WI.

Close Navy Marine Corps Reserve Center Baton Rouge, LA, and relocate the Marine Corps units to Armed Forces Reserve Center Baton Rouge, LA.

Close Navy Marine Corps Reserve Center Tulsa, OK, and relocate the Navy and Marine Corps units to Armed Forces Reserve Center Broken Arrow, OK.

Close Navy Marine Corps Reserve Center Mobile, AL, and relocate the Marine Corps units to Armed Forces Reserve Center Mobile, AL.

Close Inspector-Instructor West Trenton, NJ, and relocate Marine Corps reserve units and support staff to Navy Reserve Center Ft. Dix, NJ.

Close Inspector-Instructor Rome, GA, and relocate Marine Corps reserve units and support staff to Navy Marine Corps Reserve Center Atlanta, GA.

**Secretary of Defense Justification**

This recommendation will reduce excess capacity through the consolidation of 12 Navy Reserve Centers and Navy Marine Corps Reserve Centers with other reserve centers in the affected areas or into Armed Forces Reserve Centers. Nine of 12 of the reserve center closures are joint actions with the Department of the Army that support relocation into Armed Forces Reserve Centers. This recommendation will also relocate two Inspector-Instructor activities to existing reserve facilities aboard active duty bases. Sufficient capacity for drilling reserves is maintained throughout the United States, and all states will continue to have at least one Navy/Navy Marine Corps Reserve Center. This recommendation reduces excess capacity in the Department of the Navy reserve center functional area, but existing capacity in support of the Department of the Navy Reserve component continues to be in excess of force structure requirements. This recommendation is part of the closure of 37 Department of the Navy reserve centers, which includes 35 Navy centers (Navy Reserve Centers, Navy Reserve Facilities and Navy Marine Corps Reserve Centers) and two Marine Corps centers (Inspector-Instructor activities). The closure of 35 Navy centers will result in a capacity reduction of 12.7 percent of total current square footage. The closure of two Marine Corps centers will result in a capacity reduction of 5.5 percent of total current square footage.

**Community Concerns**

The Naval Air Station, Atlanta community noted that the local reservists at NAS Atlanta will face a hardship in fulfilling their duty requirements if the station were moved to Florida, Louisiana, or Virginia. The proposed move would create drastic employment difficulties for 160 full-time military civilians. Expertise and experience at previous jobs may be applicable to available jobs at the next installation. There may be opportunity if some operations merge with Dobbins Air Force Base, GA. Some jobs might be saved but there will be significant competition for scarce billets.

**Commission Findings**

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense.

**Commission Recommendations**

The Commission found the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission approves the recommendation of the Secretary.
**Navy Recruiting Districts**

**Recommendation # 74 (DoN 34)**

- **One-time Cost:** $2.4M
- **Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings):** ($14.5M)
- **20-Year Net Present Value:** ($214.5M)
- **Payback Period:** Immediate

**Secretary of Defense Recommendation**

Close the following Navy Recruiting Districts: Montgomery, AL; Indianapolis, IN; Kansas City, MO; Omaha, NE; Buffalo, NY.

**Secretary of Defense Justification**

This recommendation achieves economies of scale and scope by reducing excess capacity in management overhead and physical resources in the Navy Recruiting District functional area. Through the elimination of leased space, the recommendation results in an annual lease savings of over $0.7M. The recommendation is consistent with the Commander, Navy Recruiting Command’s Transformation Plan, which envisions consolidation of active and reserve recruiting functions, and supports the reallocation of management oversight over all Navy recruiting functions. This recommendation involves the closure of the specified Navy Recruiting Districts only and does not affect the storefront recruiting offices currently assigned to the closing Navy Recruiting Districts. The recruiting offices and associated personnel and resources will be reassigned to the remaining 26 Navy Recruiting Districts.

**Community Concerns**

There were no formal expressions from the community.

**Commission Findings**

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense.

**Commission Recommendations**

The Commission found the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission approves the recommendation of the Secretary.

**Navy Regions**

**Recommendation # 75 (DoN 35)**

- **One-time Cost:** $3.2M
- **Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings):** ($2.7M)
- **20-Year Net Present Value:** ($34.6M)
- **Payback Period:** 1 Year

**Secretary of Defense Recommendation**

Realign Naval Air Station Pensacola, FL, by consolidating Navy Region Gulf Coast, with Navy Region Southeast at Naval Air Station Jacksonville, FL. Realign Naval Air Station Corpus Christi, TX, by consolidating Navy Region South with Navy Region Midwest at Naval Station Great Lakes, IL, and Navy Region Southeast at Naval Station Jacksonville, FL.
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

In conjunction with other recommendations that consolidate Navy Region Commands, this recommendation will reduce the number of Installation Management regions from twelve to eight, streamlining the regional management structure and allowing for opportunities to collocate other regional entities to further align management concepts and efficiencies. Sufficient Installation Management capability resides within the remaining regions. As part of the closures of Naval Support Activity New Orleans, LA, and Submarine Base New London, CT, the Navy Reserve Forces Command installation management function and Navy Region Northeast are also consolidated into the remaining regions, significantly increasing operational efficiency.

This recommendation supports the Department of the Navy establishment of Commander, Navy Installations in order to align shore assets in support of Navy requirements, to find efficiencies through common business practices, and to provide consistent shore installation services to allow the operational commander and major claimants to focus on their primary missions. Consolidating Navy Regions allows for more consistency in span of responsibility and better enables Commander, Navy Installations to provide operational forces support, community support, base support, and mission support to enhance the Navy’s combat power.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

There were no formal expressions from the community.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission found the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission approves the recommendation of the Secretary.

NAVY RESERVE CENTERS

RECOMMENDATION # 76 (DON 37)

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SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Close the following Navy Reserve Centers: Tuscaloosa, AL; St. Petersburg, FL; Pocatello, ID; Forest Park, IL; Evansville, IN; Cedar Rapids, IA; Sioux City, IA; Lexington, KY; Bangor, ME; Adelphi, MD; Duluth, MN; Cape Girardeau, MO; Lincoln, NE; Glens Falls, NY; Horseheads, NY; Watertown, NY; Asheville, NC; Central Point, OR; Lubbock, TX; Orange, TX.

Close the Navy Reserve Facility in Marquette, MI.

Close the following Navy Marine Corps Reserve Centers: Grissom Air Reserve Base, Peru, IN, and Tacoma, WA.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

This recommendation will reduce excess capacity through the consolidation of 23 Navy Reserve Centers/Navy Reserve Facilities and Navy Marine Corps Reserve Centers with other reserve centers in the affected areas. These reserve centers will close and their drilling population supported by other existing centers thereby reducing management overhead. Sufficient capacity for drilling reserves is maintained throughout the United States, and all states will continue to have at least one Navy Reserve Center/Navy Marine Corps Reserve Center. This recommendation reduces excess capacity in the Department of the Navy Reserve Center functional area, but existing capacity in support of the Department of the Navy Reserve
component continues to be in excess of force structure requirements. This recommendation is part of the closure of 37 Department of the Navy reserve centers, which includes 35 Navy centers (Navy Reserve Centers, Navy Reserve Facilities and Navy Marine Corps Reserve Centers) and two Marine Corps centers (Inspector-Instructor activities). The closure of 35 Navy centers will result in a capacity reduction of 12.7 percent of total current square footage. The closure of two Marine Corps centers will result in a capacity reduction of 5.5 percent of total current square footage.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community representing the Navy Reserve Center in St. Petersburg, FL, noted that reservists that drill at the center are expected to transfer to the reserve center at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa. There are no civilians employed at the reserve center.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the Secretary’s recommendations. However, the Commission found that its subsequent decision to close Naval Air Station Brunswick, ME and its associated reserve unit would leave the state of Maine without a Navy reserve presence and subsequently deleted the Navy Reserve Center Bangor, ME from the list of closures in order to maintain a Navy Reserve Center in the state.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission found that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final selection criteria 1, as well as from the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following:

Close the following Navy Reserve Centers: Tuscaloosa, AL; St. Petersburg, FL; Pocatello, ID; Forest Park, IL; Evansville, IN; Cedar Rapids, IA; Sioux City, IA; Lexington, KY; Adelphi, MD; Duluth, MN; Cape Girardeau, MO; Lincoln, NE; Glens Falls, NY; Horseheads, NY; Watertown, NY; Asheville, NC; Central Point, OR; Lubbock, TX; Orange, TX.

Close the Navy Reserve Facility in Marquette, MI.

Close the following Navy Marine Corps Reserve Centers: Grissom Air Reserve Base, Peru, IN, and Tacoma, WA.

The Commission found that this change and the recommendation as amended are consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. The full text of this and all Commission recommendations can be found in Appendix Q.

NAVY RESERVE READINESS COMMANDS

RECOMMENDATION #77 (DON 44)

**One-time Cost:** $2.6M

**Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings):** ($6.5M)

**20-year Net Present Value:** ($91.7M)

**Payback Period:** IMMEDIATE

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Realign Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base Fort Worth, TX, by consolidating Navy Reserve Readiness Command South with Naval Reserve Readiness Command Midwest at Naval Station Great Lakes, IL. Realign Naval Station Newport, RI, and the Washington Navy Yard, Washington, DC, by consolidating Naval Reserve Readiness Command Northeast with Naval Reserve Readiness Command Mid-Atlantic and relocating the consolidated commands to Naval Station, Norfolk, VA.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

This recommendation enhances the Navy’s longstanding initiative to accomplish common management and support on a regionalized basis by consolidating and collocating reserve readiness commands with the installation management Regions. This collocation aligns management concepts and efficiencies and ensures a reserve voice at each region as well as enabling future savings through consolidation of like functions. This recommendation will result in an increase in the average military
value for the remaining Naval Reserve Readiness Commands and ensures that each of the installation management Regions has an organization to manage reserve matters within the region.

Community Concerns

There were no formal expressions from the community.

Commission Findings

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense.

Commission Recommendations

The Commission found the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission approves the recommendation of the Secretary.

NAVY BROADWAY COMPLEX, SAN DIEGO, CA

Recommendation # 192 (Add)

One-time Cost:                      $77.3M
Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings):  ($2.5M)
20-Year Net Present Value:         ($39.7M)
Payback Period:                    73 Years

Secretary of Defense Recommendation

None. The Secretary’s proposed list submitted on May 13, 2005 did not include this facility. It was added by the Commission on July 19, 2005 for further consideration.

Secretary of Defense Justification

None.

Community Concerns

Community and Congressional representatives supported redevelopment of the Broadway complex, but preferred redevelopment occur outside the BRAC process, under a detailed development agreement that expires on January 1, 2007, between the City of San Diego and the Navy.

Commission Findings

The Commission found the Navy can reduce excess property, improve force protection, and improve efficiencies by collocating support functions with operational assets on a Navy installation in San Diego, and the Department should aggressively pursue disposal of its 14-acre, stand-alone administrative office complex located in a development area of downtown San Diego, using the BRAC process. The Commission found that the Navy and the Community are again actively pursuing a plan, as authorized by Section 2732 of Public Law 99-661, permitting the Navy to enter into a long-term lease of the Broadway property in return for new facilities on the property. The Commission found that the City of San Diego supports the Navy’s plan to outlease the property, and believes private redevelopment on the Navy’s Broadway property should be accomplished under the terms and conditions of a 1992 development agreement between the City and the Navy (which is set to expire on January 1, 2007). Furthermore, the Commission found the City agrees the Broadway property should be privatized and redeveloped outside the BRAC process in order to avoid delay. However, the Commission determined that if the previously authorized option is not implemented on time, the next best alternative would be closure.
of the Navy Broadway Complex, San Diego, California through the BRAC process. Enough time has lapsed since the 1987 legislation was passed to cause the Commission to act.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission found that the Secretary deviated from selection criteria 1, 3, and 4. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: “If the Secretary of the Navy does not enter into a long-term lease on or before January 1, 2007 that provides for the redevelopment of the Navy Broadway Complex, San Diego, California, under the authority granted by Section 2732 of Public Law 99-661, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987, close Navy Broadway Complex, San Diego, California, and relocate the units and functions on Navy Broadway Complex to other Department of the Navy owned sites in San Diego.” The Commission found that this change and the recommendation as amended are consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. The full text of this and all Commission recommendations can be found in Appendix Q.

NAVAL AIR STATION OCEANA, VIRGINIA

RECOMMENDATION # 193 (ADD)

One-time Cost: $410.37M
Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings): ($17.10M)
20-Year Net Present Value: $33.39M
Payback Period: 18 Years

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

None. The Secretary’s proposed list submitted on May 13, 2005 did not include this facility. It was added by the Commission on July 19, 2005 for further consideration.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

None.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The Virginia Beach, Virginia community places high value on the military’s contribution to the community and fears the loss of over 11,000 direct jobs would devastate the local economy. The state has invested significant resources in improved roads around the base and moving schools out of the Accident Potential Zones. They acknowledged noise complaints by a small, but vocal, minority of residents but pointed out that planning commissions are developing new community planning overlays to limit encroachment and reduce development in the Accident Potential Zones. They argued funds needed to implement the Commission’s consideration to relocate the Master Jet Base to Cecil Field, Florida could be better spent on the Navy’s more pressing needs. They believe the Navy has no better or affordable alternative than remaining at NAS Oceana and managing encroachment.

The Jacksonville, Florida community offered to return all of the former NAS Cecil Field property, improved and unencumbered - free and clear. Local governments are prepared to absorb and support the approximately 11,000 personnel that would be associated with the relocation of the Navy’s Atlantic Fleet Master Jet Base to Cecil Field. The community has invested $133 million to upgrade Cecil Field’s infrastructure and has secured $130 million in funding for a high speed access road from Cecil Field to Interstate Highway 10. All required base conversion activities, including a new or updated Environmental Impact Statement, can be completed in time to allow the Navy to establish and occupy a new Master Jet Base within the BRAC timeframe.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found that significant residential and commercial encroachment had continued around NAS Oceana and Naval Auxiliary Landing Fields (NALF) Fentress for many years and was exacerbated when the 1995 BRAC Commission redirected F-18 aircraft and supporting assets from MCAS Cherry Point, NC and MCAS Beaufort, SC to NAS Oceana to
take advantage of the excess capacity at NAS Oceana. It was the sense of the Commission that the encroachment issues were having a detrimental effect on the operations and training of the Navy’s Atlantic Fleet Strike Fighter Wings and on the safety and welfare of the citizens of Virginia Beach and Chesapeake, VA. Consequently, the future for NAS Oceana as a Master Jet Base was severely limited, whereas Jacksonville, FL had taken effective and positive measures to protect the Air Installation Compatibility Use Zones (AICUZ) around Cecil Field, FL, and Naval Outlying Landing Field (NOLF) Whitehouse.

The Commission found that when the Secretary of Defense failed to recommend the realignment of Naval Air Station Oceana, Virginia Beach, VA, and Naval Air Station Fentress, particularly in the APZ1 areas. The Commission also considers that the more severe encroachment problems were created by the state and local governments by ignoring the Navy's repeated objections to incompatible residential and commercial developments under the AICUZ guidelines. Consequently, the funds to halt and reverse the encroachment should not come from federal funds, but rather from state and local funding sources.

It is the sense of the Commission that the Secretary of Defense deviated from the BRAC criteria by failing to consider NAS Oceana for closure or realignment. The longstanding and steadily worsening encroachment problem around NAS Oceana, without strong support from state and city governments to eliminate current and arrest future encroachment, will in the long term create a situation where the military value of NAS Oceana will be unacceptably degraded. The remedies presented to the Commission thus far have been unconvincing. It is also the sense of the Commission that the future of naval aviation is not Naval Air Station Oceana. The Commission urges the Navy to begin immediately to mitigate the noise encroachment and safety issues associated with flight operations around the Virginia Beach area by transitioning high-density training evolutions to other bases that are much less encroached, such as NOLF Whitehouse, FL, or Kingsville, TX.

The Secretary of Defense is directed to cause a rapid, complete due diligence review of the offer of the State of Florida to reoccupy the former NAS Cecil Field and to compare this review against any plan to build a new master jet base at any other location. This review is to be completed within 6 months from the date that the BRAC legislation enters into force and is to be made public to the affected states for comment. After review of the states’ comments, which shall be submitted within 120 days after publishing the review, the Secretary of Defense shall forward to the oversight committees of Congress the review, the state comments, and his recommendation on the location of the Navy's future Atlantic Fleet Master Jet Base.

**Commission Recommendations**

The Commission found that when the Secretary of Defense failed to recommend the realignment of Naval Air Station Oceana, Virginia Beach, VA, he substantially deviated from final selection criteria 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, and the Force Structure Plan; that the Commission add to the list of installations to be closed or realigned the recommendation:

**Realign Naval Air Station Oceana, Virginia by relocating the East Coast Master Jet Base to Cecil Field, FL, if the Commonwealth of Virginia and the municipal governments of Virginia Beach, VA, and Chesapeake, VA, fail to enact and enforce legislation to prevent further encroachment of Naval Air Station Oceana by the end of March 2006, to wit: enact state-mandated zoning controls requiring the cities of Virginia Beach and Chesapeake to adopt zoning ordinances that require the governing body to follow Air Installation Compatibility Use Zone (AICUZ) guidelines in deciding discretionary development applications for property in noise levels 70 dB Day-Night, average noise Level (DNL) or greater; enact state and local legislation and ordinances to establish a program to condemn and purchase all the incompatible use property located within the Accident Potential Zone 1 areas for Naval Air Station Oceana, as depicted in the 1999 AICUZ pamphlet published by the US Navy and to fund and expend not less than $15 million annually in furtherance of the aforementioned program; codify the 2005 final Hampton Roads Joint Land Use Study recommendations; legislate requirements for the cities of Virginia Beach and Chesapeake to evaluate undeveloped properties in noise zones 70 dB DNL or greater for rezoning classification that would not allow uses incompatible under AICUZ guidelines; establish programs for purchase of development rights of the inter-facility traffic area between NAS Oceana and NALF Fentress; enact legislation creating the Oceana-Fentress Advisory Council. It shall be deemed that the actions prescribed to be taken by the Commonwealth of Virginia, and the Cities of Virginia Beach, and Chesapeake respectively, by the end of March 2006 have not been taken in their entirety, unless the Department of Defense Inspector General so certifies in writing to the President and oversight committees of Congress by June 1, 2006; and, if the State of Florida appropriates sufficient funds to relocate commercial tenants presently located at Cecil Field, Florida, appropriates sufficient funds to secure public-private ventures for all the personnel housing required by the Navy at Cecil Field to accomplish this relocation and turns over fee simple title to the property comprising the former Naval Air Station Cecil Field, including all infrastructure improvements that presently exist, to the Department on or before December 31, 2006, if the Commonwealth of Virginia and the municipal government of Virginia Beach, VA, and Chesapeake, VA, decline from the outset to take the actions required above or within 6 months of
the Commonwealth of Virginia and the municipal governments of Virginia Beach, VA, and Chesapeake, VA, failing to carry through with any of the actions set out above, whichever is later. The State of Florida may not encumber the title by any restrictions other than a reversionary clause in favor of the State of Florida and short-term tenancies consistent with the relocation of the Master Jet Base to Cecil Field. It shall be deemed that the actions prescribed to be taken by the State of Florida and the City of Jacksonville respectively by the end of 31 December 2006 have not been taken in their entirety unless the Department of Defense Inspector General so certifies in writing to the President and oversight committees of Congress by June 1, 2007. If the Commonwealth of Virginia and the municipal governments of Virginia Beach, VA, and Chesapeake, VA, fail to take all of the prescribed actions and the State of Florida meets the conditions established by this recommendation, the units and functions that shall relocate to Cecil Field will include but are not limited to all of the Navy F/A-18 strike fighter wings, aviation operations and support schools, maintenance support, training, and any other additional support activities the Navy deems necessary and appropriate to support the operations of the Master Jet Base.
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Realign Birmingham International Airport Air Guard Station (AGS), AL. Distribute the 117th Air Refueling Wing’s (ANG) KC-135R aircraft to the 101st Air Refueling Wing (ANG), Bangor International Airport AGS, ME (two aircraft); the 134th Air Refueling Wing (ANG), McGhee-Tyson Airport AGS, TN (four aircraft); and the 161st Air Refueling Wing (ANG), Phoenix Sky Harbor International Airport AGS, AZ (two aircraft). The 117th Air Refueling Wing’s firefighter positions will move to Dannelly Field AGS, AL, and the remaining expeditionary combat support (ECS) will remain in place.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

Phoenix Sky Harbor (37) scored higher than Birmingham (63) in military value for the tanker mission. This recommendation takes advantage of available capacity at Phoenix by increasing the air refueling squadron size from eight to ten aircraft, making the wing’s overall capability more robust. It also capitalizes on the favorable recruiting environment of the greater Phoenix region, which can sustain this increased squadron size. Although McGhee-Tyson (74) and Bangor (123) ranked lower, military judgment argued in favor of retaining and adding force structure to these installations to increase their overall effectiveness. Bangor was increased in squadron size from 8 to 12 aircraft because of its critical role in the Northeast Tanker Task Force, as well as its participation in the transatlantic air bridge. The Air Force considered McGhee-Tyson’s available capacity and Air National Guard experience in replacing aging, high maintenance KC-135E aircraft with re-engined KC-135R models and in increasing the squadron from 8 to 12 aircraft. Birmingham’s ECS remains in place to support the Air Expeditionary Force and to retain trained and experienced Air National Guard personnel.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community argued DoD failed to properly calculate the base’s military value, mission capability and infrastructure. It objected to transferring tankers to bases with lower Tanker Mission Compatibility Index (MCI) scores. It criticized the unspecified structure and implementation of “Enclaves” and Expeditionary Combat Support (ECS) units, and claimed moving aircraft without altering infrastructure misused the BRAC process. It felt the national tanker lay-down plan and MCI did not address homeland defense or security requirements. The community stated DoD did not give sufficient weight to an ongoing runway lengthening project, their “world-class” tanker infrastructure, collocation with a contract depot repair and maintenance facility, and ability to accommodate contingency and surge operations.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found that the aggregate of both programmatic and BRAC-related aircraft movements into and out of the Southeastern United States, including Air Force, Navy and Marine aircraft, could lead to a potential shortage of regional air refueling aircraft for efficient, cost-effective training opportunities and homeland defense mission support. The Commission found that the potential shortfall is one of economic efficiency, not operational deficiency. The Commission found that the potential shortfall of cost-effective air-refueling support could be mitigated by rejecting one of the Department of Defense’s recommendations reducing the quantity of KC-135 tanker aircraft in the Southeast. The Commission noted the significant operational capability advantage that Birmingham will soon have as a result of its ongoing runway lengthening project (from 10,000’ to 12,000’), and additional military value of the installation. The Commission assesses that Birmingham IAP AGS,
AL should continue to operate as an eight-PAA KC-135 installation. The Commission found that this action is consistent with the Commission’s Air National Guard and Reserve Laydown Plan.

**Commission Recommendations**

The Commission found that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final selection criteria 1 and 2, and the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission has rejected the recommendation of the Secretary.

**EIELSON AFB, AK; MOODY AFB, GA; AND SHAW AFB, SC**

**Recommendation # 79 (Air Force 6)**

- **One-time Cost:** $32.9M
- **Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings):** ($12.1M)
- **20-Year Net Present Value:** ($126.9M)
- **Payback Period:** 3 years

**Secretary of Defense Recommendation**

Realign Eielson Air Force Base, AK. The 354th Fighter Wing’s assigned A-10 aircraft will be distributed to the 917th Wing Barksdale Air Force Base, LA (three aircraft); to a new active-duty unit at Moody Air Force Base, GA (12 aircraft); and to backup inventory (three aircraft). The 354th Fighter Wing’s F-16 aircraft will be distributed to the 57th Wing, Nellis Air Force Base, NV (18 aircraft). The Air National Guard Tanker unit and rescue alert detachment will remain as tenants on Eielson. Realign Moody Air Force Base, by relocating base-level ALQ-184 intermediate maintenance to Shaw Air Force Base, SC, establishing a Centralized Intermediate Repair Facility (CIRF) at Shaw Air Force Base, SC, for ALQ-184 pods. Realign Shaw Air Force Base, relocating base-level TF-34 engine intermediate maintenance to Moody Air Force Base, establishing a CIRF at Moody Air Force Base for TF-34 engines.

**Secretary of Defense Justification**

Eielson’s (11) military value is high because of its close proximity to valuable airspace and ranges; however, Eielson is an expensive base to operate and improve (build). The Air Force recommends realigning Eielson, but keeping the base open in a “warm” status using the resident Air National Guard units and a portion of the infrastructure to continue operating the base for USAF/Joint/Combined exercises. The Air Force distributes the F-16s to Nellis (13) a base with high military value, and the A-10s to Moody (11-SOF/CSAR), which also ranks high in military value. The CIRFs at Moody and Shaw compliment force structure moves and anticipate these bases as workload centers for these commodities.

**Community Concerns**

The Eielson, AK, community argued that DoD’s proposed realignment deviated from military value criteria, would not produce estimated savings, undermined joint training, and ignored the strategic value of military presence in Alaska. First, although the Air Force acknowledged Eielson’s high military value, it subordinated this value to cost savings. Further, the cost to maintain Eielson in a “warm” status is not realistic. A site survey subsequent to the original DoD proposal showed an additional 1,000 personnel would be needed to properly maintain the installation.

Second, the community asserted the loss of close air support aircraft at Eielson would reduce joint training opportunities with the Army and degrade readiness of the Stryker Brigade at Fort Wainwright, AK, and the Airborne Brigade at Fort Richardson, AK. Further, they questioned the affordability of large-scale exercises at Eielson if the Air Force has to pay higher than projected costs to properly maintain the base in “warm” status. These costs could result in underutilization of Eielson’s valuable range complex.

Finally, the community contended DoD’s recommendation ignored Eielson’s strategic location in the Pacific theater, claiming that operational units at Eielson are even more critical given plans to reduce US forces in Korea and Japan. Removing aircraft could send an unintended message that the US is reducing its interests in the Pacific and increase response times to regional contingencies.
COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found that a risk of the realignment of Eielson would be under-use of one of the Air Force’s best airspace and range complexes. Eielson’s military value is distinguished from other bases by its airspace and range complex, which is about three times the size of the Air Force’s Red Flag complex at Nellis AFB, NV. The investment in the complex’s range instrumentation is also significant. The Air Force justified its recommendation by its intention to increase the number of large scale exercises at Eielson. Eielson would have greater capacity to host these exercises without aircraft permanently based there. However, the Commission found that plans to expand exercises are not yet formalized. In order to maintain air combat forces in the region and further utilize the range, the Commission rejected the portion of the recommendation that relocates the 354th Wing’s F-16s.

The Commission found permanently basing A-10s in Alaska would have a negligible impact on the ability to respond to a contingency in the Pacific Theater. While there would be a delay in getting forces into theater, the timing would still meet operational plan requirements. The Commission also found that the lack of permanently assigned A-10 aircraft at Eielson may somewhat limit joint training opportunities with the Army in Alaska, but those losses would be offset by far more training opportunities at Moody AFB, GA, which is close to a large number of Army and Special Forces units.

The Commission found that the Air Force significantly underestimated the costs of maintaining Eielson as a “warm base.” The Commission was unable to determine how many more personnel are needed to maintain the base. The Commission found that portions of the base needed for future use, such as supporting a contingency or exercise, must be properly maintained. The Commission found that savings attributable to military personnel reductions represented an estimated 86 percent of Eielson’s net present value savings.

Finally, the Commission notes that the economic impact in the Fairbanks, AK area would be substantial. Nearly nine percent of jobs in the area would be lost.

Separately, the Commission found the air sovereignty mission could be conducted from Eielson Air Force Base and recommended closure of Galena Forward Operating Location, AK. Eielson will become the northernmost air defense site in the United States.

The Commission found no substantial deviation in paragraph 79.b and 79.c of the bill (see Appendix Q) related to the TF-34 and ALQ-184 maintenance realignments.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission found that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final selection criteria 1 and 5, and from the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following:

Realign Eielson Air Force Base, AK. The 354th Fighter Wing’s assigned A-10 aircraft will be distributed to the 917th Wing Barksdale Air Force Base, LA (three aircraft); to a new active-duty unit at Moody Air Force Base, GA (12 aircraft); and to backup inventory (three aircraft). The Air National Guard Tanker unit and rescue alert detachment will remain as tenants on Eielson.


The Commission found that this change and the recommendation as amended are consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. The full text of this and all Commission recommendations can be found in Appendix Q.
Kulis AGS AK, Elmendorf AFB, AK

RECOMMENDATION # 80 (AIR FORCE 7)

One-time Cost: $147.4M
Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings): ($16.4M)
20-Year Net Present Value: ($70.6M)
Payback Period: 10 years

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Close Kulis Air Guard Station (AGS), AK. Relocate the 176th Wing (ANG) and associated aircraft (eight C-130Hs, three HC-130Ns, and five HH-60s) and the Expeditionary Combat Support (ECS) elements to Elmendorf Air Force Base, AK. Realign Elmendorf Air Force Base. With the addition of four aircraft from another installation (see Air Force recommendation for Ellsworth Air Force Base and Dyess Air Force Base), the 176th Wing at Elmendorf will form an ANG/active duty association with 12 C-130H aircraft. The 3d Wing at Elmendorf Air Force Base will distribute 24 of 42 assigned F-15C/D aircraft to the 1st Fighter Wing, Langley Air Force Base, VA.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

This recommendation distributes C-130, HC-130 and HH-60 aircraft from Kulis AGS (110) to Elmendorf Air Force Base (51), which has a higher military value. Moving these aircraft to Elmendorf Air Force Base consolidates two installations in the same city, reduces infrastructure, creates an active/ARC association, and retains the skilled, highly trained ANG personnel from Kulis AGS. This recommendation also distributes a portion of the F-15C/Ds at Elmendorf Air Force Base (36-fighter) to Langley Air Force Base (2-fighter). Elmendorf retains one squadron (18 aircraft) for air sovereignty missions and distributes the remaining 24 F-15Cs to Langley Air Force Base.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

Alaskan community representatives argued DoD underestimated the costs of the move, citing a recent Air Force site survey estimating the relocation would require more than initially estimated. While acknowledging the move would benefit development of Anchorage International Airport, the community notes Air Guard operations would suffer if the move is underfunded. The Governor stated that his consent to the proposed relocation would be contingent on adequate funding.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found that the relocation of the C-130s and helicopters from Kulis to Elmendorf, while consistent with the BRAC selection criteria, would be considerably more expensive than originally estimated. The Commission notes that the Governor of Alaska as well as its Adjutant General supports the relocation of Kulis AGS to Elmendorf, if properly funded. If significantly under-funded, the commission is concerned that the readiness of the Air National Guard unit could be negatively impacted. Therefore, the Commission supports the DoD recommendation to move the ANG C-130 and HH-60 on Kulis AGS, contingent on the availability of adequate military construction funds to provide the necessary facilities at Elmendorf AFB.

The Commission identified no impediments to the proposed realignment of Elmendorf AFB, and relocation of some of its F-15 aircraft to Langley AFB, VA. Elmendorf is scheduled to receive F/A-22 aircraft outside of the BRAC process. The F-15s that remain at Elmendorf would continue to conduct the air sovereignty and other mission in Alaska. Because of changes in other recommendations, the full complement of C-130s may have to come from elsewhere than locations noted in the original recommendation.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission found that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final selection criteria 1 and 5, as well as from the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following:
Contingent on the availability of adequate military construction funds to provide the necessary facilities at Elmendorf AFB, AK, close Kulis Air Guard Station (AGS), AK. Relocate the 176th Wing (ANG) and associated aircraft (eight C-130Hs, three HC-130Ns, and five HH-60s) and Expeditionary Combat Support (ECS) to Elmendorf Air Force Base, AK.

Realign Elmendorf Air Force Base. The 176th Wing at Elmendorf will form an ANG/active duty association with 12 C-130H1 aircraft. The Commission recommends 3d Wing at Elmendorf Air Force Base will distribute 18 of 42 assigned F-15C/D aircraft to the 1st Fighter Wing, Langley Air Force Base, VA and 6 to an Air National Guard unit.

The Commission found that this change and the recommendation as amended are consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. The full text of this and all Commission recommendations can be found in Appendix Q.

Fort Smith Air Guard Station, AR, and Luke Air Force Base, AZ

Recommendation # 81 (Air Force 8)

One-Time Cost: $17.6M
Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings): ($1.5M)
20-Year Net Present Value: ($2.0M)
Payback Period: 16 Years

Secretary of Defense Recommendation

Realign Fort Smith Municipal Airport (MAP) Air Guard Station (AGS), AR. Distribute the 188th Fighter Wing’s (ANG) F-16s to the 144th Fighter Wing (ANG) Fresno Air Terminal AGS, CA (seven aircraft) and retirement (eight aircraft). The 144th Fighter Wing’s F-16s (15 aircraft) retire. The wing’s expeditionary combat support (ECS) elements remain in place. Firefighter positions realign to Tulsa, OK, and the Home Station Training Site moves to Savannah, GA. Realign Luke Air Force Base, AZ. The 56th Fighter Wing, Luke Air Force Base, AZ, distributes its F-16 Block 25s (13 aircraft) and F-16 Block 42s (24 aircraft) to retirement. The 944th Fighter Wing distributes its F-16s to the 144th Fighter Wing at Fresno (11 aircraft).

Secretary of Defense Justification

Military value played the predominant role coupled with homeland defense. The Air Force recommendation realigns 15 aircraft from Fort Smith (110) to Fresno (87), which supports the homeland defense Air Sovereignty Alert mission. Additionally, this recommendation helps align the eight different F-16 models across the Air Force. Finally, this recommendation makes experienced airmen available to support the new ANG flying training unit created at Little Rock Air Force Base, AR.

Community Concerns

The Fort Smith, AR, community disputed DoD’s Mission Compatibility Index (MCI) scores, claiming the Air Force’s one-size-fits-all approach for both active and reserve bases creates a built-in bias favoring large-activateduty bases. It argued that in fact, Fort Smith is the most cost-efficient fighter wing in the Air National Guard. DoD’s recommendations could adversely affect joint training opportunities, both at Fort Smith and nearby Fort Chaffee. The community noted the recommendation undermines recruiting and retention. The loss of fighter interceptors for homeland defense is a major concern for one of the five fastest growing communities in the United States. The commercial airport authority and surrounding communities would lose significant civil support and emergency disaster relief services. It would cost $7.5 million initially, and at least $2 million annually thereafter, to replicate lost air rescue and airport firefighting services.

Commission Findings

The Commission found that the Department of Defense recommendation to realign Fort Smith Municipal Airport Air Guard Station and Luke Air Force Base was not cost effective. The Commission estimated a 20-year Net Present Value cost of $13.8 million and a payback in excess of 100 years for the recommendation. However, the Commission found that the military value calculation for Fort Smith did not give proper credit to airspace, low level routes, and auxiliary airfields and nearby Fort Chaffee. The Commission agreed with the Secretary of Defense that the F-16s at Fort Smith should be withdrawn due to a shrinking inventory of this weapon system but found Fort Smith to be an ideal location for the A-10
aircraft. No objections were found to the part of the recommendation related to Luke Air Force Base. The Commission found that this action is consistent with the Commission’s Air National Guard and Reserve Laydown plan.

This recommendation directing aircraft movement and personnel actions in connection with Air National Guard installations and organizations is designed to support the Future Total Force. The Commission expects that the Air Force will find new missions where needed, provide retraining opportunities, and take appropriate measures to limit possible adverse personnel impact. The Commission's intent is that the Air Force will act to assign sufficient aircrew and maintenance personnel to units gaining aircraft in accordance with current, established procedures. However, the Commission expects that all decisions with regard to manpower authorizations will be made in consultation with the governor of the state in which the affected Air National Guard unit is located. Any manpower changes must be made under existing authorities, and must be made consistent with existing limitations. Some reclassification of existing positions may be necessary, but should not be executed until the Air Force and the state have determined the future mission of the unit to preclude unnecessary personnel turbulence. This recommendation is consistent with the Commission’s Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve Laydown Plan.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission found that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final selection criterion 1, as well as from the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following:

Realign Fort Smith Municipal Airport (MAP) Air Guard Station (AGS), AR, and Luke Air Force Base, AZ. Distribute the 15 F-16 aircraft assigned to the 188th Fighter Wing (ANG) at Fort Smith Air Guard Station, AR, 37 F-16 aircraft assigned to the 56th Fighter Wing at Luke Air Force Base, and the 15 F-16 aircraft assigned to the 144th Fighter Wing (ANG) at Fresno Air Terminal Air Guard Station, CA, to meet the Primary Aircraft Authorizations (PAA) requirements established by the Base Closure and Realignment recommendations of the Secretary of Defense, as amended by the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission;

Establish 18 PAA A-10 aircraft at the 188th Fighter Wing (ANG), Fort Smith Air Guard Station, AR.

Establish 18 PAA F-16 aircraft at the 144th Fighter Wing (ANG), Fresno Air Terminal Air Guard Station, CA.

Establish a contiguous enclave for the 188th Fighter Wing (ANG) sufficient to support operations of that unit, including flight operations, compatible with joint use of the Air Guard Station as a civilian airport. The Home Station Training Site moves to Savannah, GA.

If the State of Arkansas decides to change the organization, composition and location of the 188th Fighter Wing (ANG) to integrate the unit into the Future Total Force, all personnel allotted to the 188th Fighter Wing (ANG), including the unit’s Expeditionary Combat Support (ECS) elements, will remain in place and assume a mission relevant to the security interests of the State of Arkansas and consistent with the integration of the unit into the Future Total Force, including but not limited to air mobility, C4ISR, Information Operations, engineering, flight training or unmanned aerial vehicles. Where appropriate, unit personnel will be retrained in skills relevant to the emerging mission. This recommendation does not affect a change to the authorized end-strength of the Arkansas Air National Guard. The distribution of aircraft currently assigned to the 188th Fighter Wing (ANG) is based upon a resource-constrained determination by the Department of Defense that the aircraft concerned will better support national security requirements in other locations and is not conditioned upon the agreement of the state.

The Commission found that this change and the recommendation as amended are consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. The full text of this and all Commission recommendations can be found in Appendix Q.
**Beale Air Force Base, CA, and Selfridge Air National Guard Base, MI**

**Recommendation # 82 (Air Force 10)**

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**Secretary of Defense Recommendation**

Realign Beale Air Force Base, CA. The 940th Air Refueling Wing (AFR) will realign its KC-135R tanker aircraft while its expeditionary combat support (ECS) elements will remain in place. Beale’s KC-135R aircraft will be distributed to the Air National Guard at Selfridge ANGB, MI (four aircraft) and 134th Air Refueling Wing (ANG), McGhee-Tyson Airport Air Guard Station, TN (four aircraft). Realign Selfridge Air Reserve Base, MI. The 927th Air Refueling Wing (AFR) at Selfridge will distribute its eight KC-135 aircraft to the 127th Wing (ANG) at Selfridge. The 127th Wing will retire its 15 F-16 aircraft and eight C-130E aircraft, and will convert to A-10 and KC-135R aircraft.

**Secretary of Defense Justification**

This recommendation capitalizes on Beale’s (7-C2ISR and 33-UAV) high military value and emerging Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) mission. Realigning KC-135 force structure enables Beale to have one primary operational flying mission—manned and unmanned high altitude reconnaissance—balances the Reserve and Air National Guard KC-135 force structure, and retains reserve component manpower and experience for the new Global Hawk mission. The receiver locations for Beale’s tankers—Selfridge (57) and McGhee-Tyson (74)—each have above average military value for reserve component bases in the tanker mission.

Beale’s more modern KC-135R aircraft will replace the older, higher maintenance KC-135E models at McGhee-Tyson and help increase the new ANG tanker mission at Selfridge to an effective size of 12 aircraft. The resulting KC-135R increase at Selfridge and McGhee-Tyson increases the tanker force structure into squadron sizes that are more operationally effective.

As a reserve component base, Selfridge ANGB has above average military value as both a tanker installation (57) and fighter installation (70) as rated for those respective mission areas. This recommendation streamlines operations at Selfridge ANGB by realigning the Reserve air refueling mission, currently operating as a tenant unit, and divesting the ANG wing of its retiring force structure. The ANG wing’s older, less capable C-130E and F-16 aircraft will retire and be replaced with Reserve KC-135R aircraft from Selfridge and Beale, and 15 A-10 aircraft realigned by the recommended closures of W.K. Kellogg Airport Air Guard Station, MI, and NAS Willow Grove, PA. Reorganizing the flying operations under one component (ANG) will maximize organizational effectiveness and allow the installation to accommodate two effectively sized squadrons. The 927th Air Refueling Wing will realign to associate with the 6th Air Mobility Wing at MacDill Air Force Base, FL, to capture reserve experience in the region and enhance that unit’s capability.

**Community Concerns**

The Beale, CA, community supported DoD’s recommendation to focus the base on one primary operational flying mission (UAVs). They raised concerns about the lack of specific information as to when and how the emerging UAV mission would unfold. They felt that recruiting and retention could be difficult during the temporary period between departure of the tanker mission and arrival of the new Global Hawk mission. Experienced and skilled reservists may leave the wing without a clear sense of the new mission’s opportunities.

**Commission Findings**

The Commission found realigning the 940th Air Refueling Wing and associating it with the 9th Reconnaissance Wing would, in fact capitalize on Beale’s high Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Mission Compatibility Index (MCI) score and emerging Global Hawk mission. The Commission additionally found that the projected savings from this recommendation were modest and the primary aim of this recommendation was to realign the force structure and to maximize organizational effectiveness at Selfridge, MI. Further, this recommendation enables conversion of Selfridge ANGB from F-16s to A-10s, in
line with the Department’s intent to retire older F-16s while maintaining a flying mission, and retaining skilled Airmen, in the Michigan area.

**Commission Recommendations**

The Commission found that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final selection criteria 1 and 3, as well as from the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following:

Realignment Beale Air Force Base, CA. Distribute the 940th Air Refueling Wing’s (AFR) KC-135R/T aircraft to meet the Primary Aircraft Authorizations (PAA) requirements established by the Base Closure and Realignment recommendations of the Secretary of Defense, as amended by the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission. The 940th Air Refueling Wing’s Expeditionary Combat Support (ECS) elements will remain in place.

Establish 12 PAA KC-135R/T aircraft at the 134th Air Refueling Wing (ANG), McGhee-Tyson Airport Air Guard Station, Tennessee. The KC-135E aircraft assigned to the 134th Air Refueling Wing will be transferred to the Aerospace Maintenance and Regeneration Center (AMARC) at Davis-Monthan AFB, AZ, for appropriate disposal as economically unserviceable aircraft.

Realignment Selfridge Air Reserve Base, MI. Distribute the KC-135R/T aircraft assigned to the 927th Air Refueling Wing’s (AFR) and the 8 C-130E aircraft assigned to the 127th Wing (ANG) at Selfridge Air Reserve Base, Michigan to meet the Primary Aircraft Authorizations (PAA) requirements established by the Base Closure and Realignment recommendations of the Secretary of Defense, as amended by the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission. The 127th Wing will convert from C-130E to KC-135R/T aircraft.

Establish 8 PAA KC-135R/T aircraft at the 127th Wing (ANG), Selfridge Air Reserve Base, Michigan.

MARCH AIR RESERVE BASE, CA

**Recommendation # 83 (Air Force 11)**

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**Secretary of Defense Recommendation**

Realign March Air Reserve Base, CA. The 163d Air Refueling Wing (ANG) will distribute its nine KC-135R aircraft to the 452d Air Mobility Wing (AFR), March Air Reserve Base (four aircraft); the 157th Air Refueling Wing (ANG), Pease International Tradeport Air Guard Station, NH (three aircraft); the 134th Air Refueling Wing (ANG), McGhee-Tyson Airport Air Guard Station, TN (one aircraft); and the 22d Air Refueling Wing, McConnell Air Force Base, KS (one aircraft). The 163d Air Refueling Wing’s expeditionary combat support (ECS) will remain in place.

**Secretary of Defense Justification**

This recommendation realigns aircraft and organizationally optimizes March Air Reserve Base. With the highest military value (16) of all air reserve component bases for the tanker mission, March Air Reserve Base is retained and streamlined from two wing organizational structures to one reserve component flying mission with a more effectively sized KC-135 unit of 12 aircraft. This action distributes the remaining Air National Guard force structure at March to the higher-ranking active installation, McConnell (15), and two ANG installations, McGhee-Tyson (74) and Pease (105). McGhee-Tyson, though rated lower in military value, receives one aircraft due to military judgment to increase the squadron to a more effective size of 12 aircraft. Military judgment also placed additional force structure at Pease to support the Northeast Tanker Task Force and also increase the squadron to a more effective size of 12 aircraft. All receiver installations are increased in operational
capability with the additional aircraft because of their proximity to air refueling missions. March’s ECS remains in place to support the Air Expeditionary Force and to retain trained and experienced Air National Guard personnel.

**Community Concerns**

The community opposed DoD’s recommendation, claiming it is unfounded, adding that moving KC-135 tankers from March ARS, the highest military value ranking reserve component tanker base, to bases of substantially lower military value deviates from the selection criteria and is incongruous with optimizing the force structure.

**Commission Findings**

The Commission found the recommendation redistributed March’s KC-135 aircraft to installations with lower military value. The Commission realigned March Air Reserve Base according to the Commission’s Air National Guard and Reserve plan. This realignment would reduce the KC-135 inventory in accordance with DoD’s 2025 Force Structure Plan.

The Commission’s Air National Guard and Reserve Laydown plan also permits retiring aircraft and strengthening forces to achieve the highest military value. This recommendation directing aircraft movement and personnel actions in connection with Air National Guard installations and organizations is designed to support the Future Total Force. The Commission expects that the Air Force will find new missions where needed, provide retraining opportunities, and take appropriate measures to limit possible adverse personnel impact. The Commission's intent is that the Air Force will act to assign sufficient aircrew and maintenance personnel to units gaining aircraft in accordance with current, established procedures. However, the Commission expects that all decisions with regard to manpower authorizations will be made in consultation with the governor of the state in which the affected Air National Guard unit is located. Any manpower changes must be made under existing authorities, and must be made consistent with existing limitations. Some reclassification of existing positions may be necessary, but should not be executed until the Air Force and the state have determined the future mission of the unit to preclude unnecessary personnel turbulence. This recommendation is consistent with the Commission’s Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve Laydown Plan.

**Commission Recommendations**

The Commission found that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final selection criteria 1 and 3, as well as from the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following:

- Realign March Air Reserve Base, CA. Distribute the 163d Air Refueling Wing’s (ANG) KC-135R/T aircraft to meet the Primary Aircraft Authorizations (PAA) requirements established by the Base Closure and Realignment recommendations of the Secretary of Defense, as amended by the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission. Establish the following KC-135R/T PAA:
  - The 452nd Air Mobility Wing (AFR), March Air Reserve Base, CA (12 PAA KC-135R/T);
  - The 157th Air Refueling Wing (ANG), Pease International Tradeport Air Guard Station, NH (eight PAA KC-135R/T);
  - The 108th Air Refueling Wing (ANG), McGuire Air Force Base, NJ (eight PAA KC-135R/T). The 108th Air Refueling Wing’s KC-135E aircraft will be transferred to the Aerospace Maintenance and Regeneration Center (AMARC) at Davis-Monthan AFB, AZ, for appropriate disposal as economically unserviceable aircraft;
- If the State of California decides to change the organization, composition and location of the 163d Air Refueling Wing (ANG) to integrate the unit into the Future Total Force:
  - the 163d Air Refueling Wing’s Expeditionary Combat Support (ECS) elements remain in place;
  - reassign a sufficient number of aircrews and maintenance personnel of the 163d Air Refueling Wing (ANG) to the 146th Airlift Wing (ANG), a C-130 unit located at Channel Islands Air Guard Station, California, to bring that unit to a fully manned status, with the Air Force providing retraining where necessary, and;
  - all other personnel allotted to the 163d Air Refueling Wing (ANG) will remain in place and assume a mission relevant to the security interests of the State of California and consistent with the integration of the unit into the Future Total Force, including but not limited to air mobility, C4ISR, engineering, rescue operations or unmanned aerial vehicles. Where appropriate, unit personnel will be retrained in skills relevant to the emerging mission.
This recommendation does not affect a change to the authorized end-strength of the California Air National Guard. The distribution of aircraft currently assigned to the 163rd Air Refueling Wing (ANG) is based upon a resource-constrained determination by the Department of Defense that the aircraft concerned will better support national security requirements in other locations and is not conditioned upon the agreement of the state.

The Commission found that this change and the recommendation as amended are consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. The full text of this and all Commission recommendations can be found in Appendix Q.

**Onizuka AFS, CA**

**Recommendation # 84 (Air Force 12)**

- **One-time Cost:** $123.7M
- **Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings):** ($25.9M)
- **20-Year Net Present Value:** ($211.0M)
- **Payback Period:** 5 years

**Secretary of Defense Recommendation**


**Secretary of Defense Justification**

This recommendation consolidates satellite command and control operations while reducing excess infrastructure. Onizuka AFS (124) hosts the AFSCN Second Node and scheduling backup mission, but has no primary assigned Air Force Space Command operational mission. Onizuka AFS also supports classified tenant missions that are anticipated to phase out during the BRAC 2005 timeframe. Schriever Air Force Base, CO, (1) ranked highest in military value for satellite operations, but hosts the AFSCN Primary Node. Vandenberg Air Force Base (2) currently hosts one of the AFSCN remote tracking stations. An Air Force Space Command policy directive on backup satellite control operations prescribes the requirements for backup operations and geographical separation to preclude simultaneous degradation of both primary and secondary nodes from natural or man-made threats. During major command capacity briefings to Headquarters Air Force, Onizuka AFS was identified as having seismic and antiterrorism/force protection constraints, with no buildable land to mitigate these. Vandenberg Air Force Base offers better protection for the DSCS Sun East and Sun West antenna complexes, which are designated a Protection-Level I resource.

**Community Concerns**

There were no formal expressions from the community.

**Commission Findings**

The commission found no deviation with the Secretary of Defense’s recommendation to realign Onizuka. Onizuka AFS was realigned during the 1995 BRAC, maintaining a backup satellite mission at Onizuka along with a classified tenant mission. The Commission found closing Onizuka to be justified with the phase out of the classified mission. Relocating the mission to Vandenberg is consistent with existing policy on geographic separation of primary and secondary nodes.

**Commission Recommendations**

The Commission found the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission approves the recommendation of the Secretary.
**Bradley International Airport Air Guard Station, CT, Barnes Air Guard Station, MA, Selfridge Air National Guard Base, MI, Shaw Air Force Base, SC, and Martin State Air Guard Station, MD**

**Recommendation # 85 (Air Force 14)**

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**Secretary of Defense Recommendation**

Realign Bradley International Airport Air Guard Station, CT. The A-10s assigned to the 103d Fighter Wing will be distributed to the 104th Fighter Wing, Barnes Municipal Airport Air Guard Station, MA (nine aircraft) and retirement (six aircraft). The wing’s expeditionary combat support (ECS) elements will remain in place at Bradley, and Bradley will retain capability to support a homeland defense mission. Realign Barnes Air Guard Station, MA; Selfridge ANGB, MI; Shaw Air Force Base, SC; and Martin State Airport Air Guard Station, MD, by relocating base-level TF-34 engine intermediate maintenance to Bradley, establishing a Centralized Intermediate Repair Facility (CIRF) at Bradley for TF-34 engines.

**Secretary of Defense Justification**

Barnes (97) and Bradley (98) are located approximately 12 miles apart. The Air Force placed one full squadron at Barnes because it ranked higher in military value. By combining the two units into one squadron, the Air Force retains the trained A-10 pilots and maintenance technicians in the area and creates an optimum-sized and more effective squadron. The recommendation to close Otis ANGB, MA, generated a requirement to build an air sovereignty alert (ASA) site in the region. The Air Force priced an alert facility at both Barnes and Bradley, and chose Bradley on the basis of lower cost. The Bradley ECS elements remain in place to support the ASA mission.

Establishing a CIRF at Bradley for TF-34 engine maintenance compliments the realignment of the A-10 fleet. The CIRF at Bradley will consolidate TF-34 engine maintenance for ANG A-10 aircraft from Barnes, Selfridge, Martin State and active-duty aircraft at Spangdahlem, Germany.

Establishing this CIRF at Bradley rather than at Barnes avoids relocation of a hush house facility at an estimated cost of $3.5M, and avoids construction of additional 18,000 square feet of maintenance facilities already existing at Bradley that will be available.

**Community Concerns**

The East Granby, CT, community, including its elected representatives, challenged DoD’s Mission Compatibility Index (MCI) scores, claiming the Air Force’s one-size-fits-all approach for both active and reserve bases creates a built-in bias favoring large active-duty bases. The community claimed Bradley is one of the Air National Guard’s most efficient A-10 installations. It also claimed the Air Force significantly understated Bradley’s military value, ignoring infrastructure available through an agreement with the local airport authority. Advocates noted the loss of experienced and skilled personnel would reduce combat capability and could jeopardize homeland security. Even though the ANG facility proposed to receive Bradley’s A-10 aircraft is only 15 miles away, East Granby community leaders emphasized that Barnes’ location in a different state would pose major employment challenges for those who wished to relocate to Westfield, MA.

**Commission Findings**

The Commission placed F-15s at Barnes Air Guard Station, located 12 miles to the north of Bradley. There is essentially no difference in MCI scores between Barnes and Bradley. No objections were found with any other part of this recommendation. This recommendation directing aircraft movement and personnel actions in connection with Air National Guard installations and organizations is designed to support the Future Total Force. The Commission expects that the Air Force will find new missions where needed, provide retraining opportunities, and take appropriate measures to limit possible adverse personnel impact. The Commission’s intent is that the Air Force will act to assign sufficient aircrew and maintenance personnel to units gaining aircraft in accordance with current, established procedures. However, the
Commission expects that all decisions with regard to manpower authorizations will be made in consultation with the governor of the state in which the affected Air National Guard unit is located. Any manpower changes must be made under existing authorities, and must be made consistent with existing limitations. Some reclassification of existing positions may be necessary, but should not be executed until the Air Force and the state have determined the future mission of the unit to preclude unnecessary personnel turbulence. This recommendation is consistent with the Commission’s Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve Laydown Plan.

**Commission Recommendations**

The Commission found that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final selection criterion 1, as well as from the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following:

Realign Bradley International Airport Air Guard Station, CT. Distribute the 15 A-10 aircraft assigned to the 103d Fighter Wing (ANG) at Bradley Field, Connecticut and the 15 A-10 aircraft at the 104th Fighter Wing (ANG), Barnes Air Guard Station, Massachusetts to meet the Primary Aircraft Authorizations (PAA) requirements established by the Base Closure and Realignment recommendations of the Secretary of Defense, as amended by the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission.

Establish 18 PAA F-15 aircraft at the 104th Fighter Wing (ANG), Barnes Air Guard Station, MA.

The 103d Fighter Wing (ANG) Expeditionary Combat Support (ECS) elements will remain in place at Bradley Field, Connecticut and Bradley will retain capability to support a homeland defense mission.

If the State of Connecticut decides to change the organization, composition and location of the 103d Fighter Wing to integrate the unit into the Future Total Force, all other personnel allotted to the 103d Fighter Wing will remain in place and assume a mission relevant to the security interests of the State of Connecticut and consistent with the integration of the unit into the Future Total Force, including but not limited to air mobility, C4ISR, Information Operations, engineering, flight training or unmanned aerial vehicles. Where appropriate, unit personnel will be retrained in skills relevant to the emerging mission.

This recommendation does not effect a change to the authorized end-strength of the Connecticut or the Massachusetts Air National Guard. The distribution of aircraft currently assigned to the 103d and 104th Fighter Wings (ANG) is based upon a resource-constrained determination by the Department of Defense that the aircraft concerned will better support national security requirements in other locations and is not conditioned upon the agreement of the state or the commonwealth.

Realign Barnes Air Guard Station, MA; Selfridge ANGB, MI; Shaw Air Force Base, SC; and Martin State Airport Air Guard Station, MD, by relocating base-level TF-34 engine intermediate maintenance to Bradley, establishing a Centralized Intermediate Repair Facility (CIRF) at Bradley for TF-34 engines.

The Commission found that this change and the recommendation as amended are consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. The full text of this and all Commission recommendations can be found in Appendix Q.

**New Castle Airport Air Guard Station, DE**

**Recommendation # 86 (Air Force 15)**

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* No COBRA data available

**Secretary of Defense Recommendation**

Realign New Castle County Airport Air Guard Station (AGS), DE. Distribute the wing’s eight C-130H aircraft to the 145th Airlift Wing (ANG), Charlotte/Douglas International Airport (IAP) AGS, NC (four aircraft), and 165th Airlift Wing (ANG), Savannah IAP AGS, GA (four aircraft). Move flying related Expeditionary Combat Support (ECS) to McGuire Air
Force Base, NJ (Aeromedical Squadron), and Dover Air Force Base, DE (aerial port and fire fighters). Other ECS remains in place at New Castle.

**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION**

This recommendation makes experienced airmen from New Castle (120) available for employment at these nearby installations. Military value was the predominant consideration; New Castle had a low military value ranking and was near other bases keeping or gaining aircraft. Charlotte (33) and Savannah (77) were selected to receive aircraft because of higher military value rankings and avoiding conversion training costs. The Air Force also considered active/Air National Guard/Air Force Reserve manning mix, recruiting, cost factors (to include cost avoidance), environmental factors, and base capacity in its analysis of this recommendation.

**COMMUNITY CONCERNS**

The community objected to the complete loss of the Delaware Air National Guard’s air mission, leaving behind only an undefined enclave. It pointed out several errors in DoD’s justification, including no credit for Landing Zones within 150 nautical miles when two are located on New Castle County Air National Guard Base itself and a third in West Virginia (approximately 120 nm); reduced credit for condition and capability of ramp infrastructure even though significant renovation was in progress; and failure to consider the personnel effects on over 500 drilling guardsmen. Correcting these errors would boost the base’s MCI score from 120th to 26th of the 154 bases ranked. Additionally, the community challenged the legality of the recommendation and stated the unit’s homeland security missions under FEMA were not considered, nor its role under the Governor’s authority.

**COMMISSION FINDINGS**

The Commission found that the Secretary did not consider the unit’s homeland security missions under the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). It also found that data gathered by the Department was inaccurate in that it did not consider the two landing zones located on the Air Guard Station itself nor the landing zone located in West Virginia within the Air Force’s 150 nautical mile range parameter. The commission also found the Air Force assessment did not reflect significant improvements to the ramp infrastructure of the Air Guard Station. Therefore the Commission rejected this recommendation. This recommendation is consistent with the Commission’s Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve Laydown Plan.

**COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS**

The Commission found that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final selection criterion 1, as well as from the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following:

The 166th Airlift Wing (ANG) at New Castle County Airport Air Guard Station (AGS), Delaware, maintains its 8 PAA C-130 aircraft. Establish 10 PAA C-130 aircraft at the 145th Airlift Wing (ANG), Charlotte/Douglas International Airport AGS, North Carolina. The 165th Airlift Wing (ANG) at Savannah International Airport Air Guard Station, Georgia maintains its 8 PAA C-130 aircraft.

The Commission found that this change and the recommendation as amended are consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. The full text of this and all Commission recommendations can be found in Appendix Q.
Robins Air Force Base, GA
Recommendation # 87 (Air Force 16)

One-time Cost: $6.2M
Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings): ($14.7M)
20-Year Net Present Value: ($171.7M)
Payback Period: Immediate

Secretary of Defense Recommendation

Realign Robins Air Force Base, GA. The 19th Air Refueling Group's KC-135R aircraft will be distributed to the 22nd Air Refueling Wing, McConnell Air Force Base, KS (nine aircraft), and to backup aircraft inventory (three aircraft). The 202d Engineering Installation Squadron (ANG), a geographically separated unit at Middle Georgia Regional Airport, will be relocated into available space at Robins Air Force Base.

Secretary of Defense Justification

This recommendation realigns active-duty KC-135R aircraft from Robins (18) to McConnell (15), a base higher in military value for the tanker mission and with available capacity to receive the additional aircraft at no cost. This consolidation increases McConnell's active-duty tanker squadrons to optimum size. This recommendation also enables the Air National Guard to transfer its KC-135R aircraft based at McConnell to Forbes Field AGS, KS (35), retaining one of the higher-ranking air reserve component tanker bases. The vacated infrastructure and capacity resulting from the realignment of the tenant 19th Air Refueling Group will accommodate US Navy aircraft realigning to Robins from Naval Air Station Atlanta. The Navy will pay any costs to reconfigure the AF facility for their use. By realigning geographically separated units onto Robins, the Air Force can use excess capacity and reduce leased facilities in the community. This recommendation does not affect the blended active duty/Air National Guard Air Control Wing at Robins, which remains the major operational flying mission at Robins.

Community Concerns

The community had no specific concerns regarding departure of the KC-135 mission and supported DoD recommendations to relocate functions to Robins. It sought to rebut arguments from the Atlanta, GA, community alleging poor Reserve recruiting demographics around Robins AFB. In response, the Robins community argued its close proximity to Atlanta provides recruiting demographics virtually identical to Atlanta's. It also contended that because of extra capacity at Robins, it could absorb further flying missions without difficulty.

Commission Findings

The Commission found that Robins AFB has ample capacity and conditions for current and future flying missions. The Commission also found that the Secretary of Defense’s overall intent and concept of realigning active-duty KC-135s out of Robins AFB was acceptable.

Commission Recommendations

The Commission found that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final selection criteria 1 and 3, as well as from the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following:

Realign Robins Air Force Base, GA. Distribute the 19th Air Refueling Group’s KC-135R/T aircraft to meet the PAA requirements established by the Base Closure and Realignment recommendations of the Secretary of Defense, as amended by the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission. The 202d Engineering Installation Squadron (ANG), a geographically separated unit at Middle Georgia Regional Airport, will be relocated into available space at Robins Air Force Base.

The Commission found that this change and the recommendation as amended are consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. The full text of this and all Commission recommendations can be found in Appendix Q.
BOISE AIR TERMINAL AIR GUARD STATION, ID

RECOMMENDATION # 88 (AIR FORCE 17)

ONE-TIME COST: $16.7M

ANNUAL RECURRING COSTS/(SAVINGS): ($6.1M)

20-YEAR NET PRESENT VALUE: ($57.0M)

PAYBACK PERIOD: 3 YEARS

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Realign Boise Air Terminal Air Guard Station (AGS), ID. Distribute the four C-130H aircraft of the 124th Wing (ANG) to the 153rd Airlift Wing (ANG), Cheyenne, WY. The new, larger unit at Cheyenne will create an active duty/ANG association.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

Currently, Boise (66-SOF/CSAR, 66-airlift) operates a mix of C-130 and A-10 aircraft. These aircraft have very different missions. This recommendation realigns Boise to operate only A-10s and distributes its C-130 aircraft to Cheyenne (118-airlift). Boise is a valuable A-10 base because of its proximity to air-to-ground ranges with scoreable strafing and bombing, threat emitters, and integrated air combat training. In turn, the C-130 squadron in Cheyenne is increased to a more effective size. Additionally, Cheyenne’s proximity to an active-duty Air Force installation (F.E. Warren Air Force Base) allows it to host an active/ANG associate unit.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The Boise, ID, community criticized DoD’s Mission Compatability Index (MCI) scores, claiming the Air Force’s one-size-fits-all approach for both active and reserve bases creates a built-in bias favoring large active-duty bases. In fact, Boise Air Guard Station’s mission capability is greater than that of eight other bases scheduled to gain C-130s under DoD’s proposals. The Air Force failed to account for personnel losses associated with relocating Boise’s aerial port flight mission. The data cut-off year of 2003 did not capture the full extent of almost $25 million in infrastructure improvements over the last decade. Additionally, the community believes realigning Boise’s C-130 tactical airlifters would jeopardize transportation of civil support teams to major homeland security events in the Pacific Northwest. Last, advocates asserted DoD’s proposal would affect several tenant organizations, including the National Interagency Fire Center.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found that the Department of Defense recommendation to realign Boise Air Terminal Air Guard Station was supportable despite concerns over homeland security, military value and overstated savings raised by the community. The Commission acknowledged that the Air National Guard inventory of C-130s is shrinking and that it is not efficient to maintain the current strength of four C-130 aircraft at Boise.

This recommendation directing aircraft movement and personnel actions in connection with Air National Guard installations and organizations is designed to support the Future Total Force. The Commission expects that the Air Force will find new missions where needed, provide retraining opportunities, and take appropriate measures to limit possible adverse personnel impact. The Commission’s intent is that the Air Force will act to assign sufficient aircrew and maintenance personnel to units gaining aircraft in accordance with current, established procedures. However, the Commission expects that all decisions with regard to manpower authorizations will be made in consultation with the governor of the state in which the affected Air National Guard unit is located. Any manpower changes must be made under existing authorities, and must be made consistent with existing limitations. Some reclassification of existing positions may be necessary, but should not be executed until the Air Force and the state have determined the future mission of the unit to preclude unnecessary personnel turbulence. This recommendation is consistent with the Commission’s Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve Laydown Plan.
**COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS**

The Commission found that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final selection criterion 1, as well as from the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following:

Realign Boise Air Terminal Air Guard Station (AGS), ID. Distribute the 4 C-130 aircraft assigned to the 124th Wing (ANG) to meet the Primary Aircraft Authorizations (PAA) requirements established by the Base Closure and Realignment recommendations of the Secretary of Defense, as amended by the Base Closure and Realignment Commission.

Establish 6 PAA C-130 aircraft at the 153rd Airlift Wing (ANG), Cheyenne, Wyoming. The 153rd Airlift Wing (ANG) will create an active duty/ANG association at Cheyenne. The Air Force will supply an additional 6 PAA C-130 aircraft to establish an optimally-sized 12 PAA C-130 aircraft active duty/ANG associate airlift wing at Cheyenne.

If the State of Idaho decides to change the organization, composition and location of the 124th Wing (ANG) to integrate the unit into the Future Total Force, all personnel allotted to the 124th Wing (ANG) will remain in place and assume a mission relevant to the security interests of the State of Idaho and consistent with the integration of the unit into the Future Total Force, including but not limited to air mobility, C4ISR, engineering, flight training or unmanned aerial vehicles. Where appropriate, unit personnel will be retrained in skills relevant to the emerging mission.

This recommendation does not effect a change to the authorized end-strength of the Idaho Air National Guard. The distribution of aircraft currently assigned to the 124th Wing (ANG) is based upon a resource-constrained determination by the Department of Defense that the aircraft concerned will better support national security requirements in other locations and is not conditioned upon the agreement of the state.

The Commission found that this change and the recommendation as amended are consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. The full text of this and all Commission recommendations can be found in Appendix Q.

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**MOUNTAIN HOME AIR FORCE BASE, ID, NELLIS AIR FORCE BASE, NV, AND ELMENDORF AIR FORCE BASE, AK**

**Recommendation # 89 (Air Force 18)**

- **One-time Cost:** $91.4M
- **Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings):** ($23.8M)
- **20-Year Net Present Value:** ($189.3M)
- **Payback Period:** 3 Years

**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION**

Realign Mountain Home Air Force Base, ID. Distribute the 366th Fighter Wing assigned F-15Cs (18 aircraft) to the 57th Fighter Wing, Nellis Air Force Base, NV (nine aircraft), to the 125th Fighter Wing, Jacksonville International Airport AGS, FL (six aircraft), and to retirement (three aircraft). The 366th Fighter Wing will distribute assigned F-16 Block 52 aircraft to the 169th Fighter Wing McEntire AGS, SC (nine aircraft), the 57th Wing, Nellis Air Force Base, NV (five aircraft), and to backup inventory (four aircraft). Realign Nellis Air Force Base. The 57th Wing, Nellis Air Force Base, NV, will distribute F-16 Block 42 aircraft to the 138th Fighter Wing Tulsa International Airport AGS, OK (three aircraft), and retire the remaining F-16 Block 42 aircraft (15 aircraft). The 57th Wing also will distribute F-16 Block 32 aircraft (six aircraft) to the 144th Fighter Wing Fresno Air Terminal AGS, CA, and to retirement (one aircraft). Realign Elmendorf Air Force Base, AK. The 366th Fighter Wing, Mountain Home Air Force Base, ID, will receive F-15E aircraft from the 3d Wing, Elmendorf Air Force Base, AK (18 aircraft), and attrition reserve (three aircraft).

**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION**

Military value was the predominant consideration in moving the F-15Es from Elmendorf (36) to Mountain Home (23) and F-16s to Nellis (12) and McEntire (48). Additionally, realigning the eight F-16 models and four F-16 engine types weighed in the final F-16 force structure laydown. Mountain Home currently operates several types of aircraft; this recommendation realigns Mountain Home to fly only F-15Es, streamlining operations at a location that is well suited for air-to-ground, low-level and air-to-air flight training. This recommendation also aligns common versions of F-16s and F-15Cs.
COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The Idaho community maintained that Mountain Home AFB is ideally located and postured to receive future weapon systems such as the F-22 and Joint Strike Fighter, as well as additional personnel. Mountain Home’s remoteness provides training and expansion opportunities with no encroachment, no environmental impacts to training, nor any noise complaints. The size and location of the Mountain Home range complex, currently undergoing expansion, has allowed the base to support the training of airmen in numerous weapon systems over the years. The community contended that after a recently completed $3 million renovation, Mountain Home has one of the largest ramps in Air Combat Command and is designed to support both bomber and tanker aircraft. As many as 220 aircraft can be parked on the ramp. In addition, the base has built 600 of 1,400 new housing units planned in a ten-year program. Last, the community contended that DoD’s recommended realignment will result in a personnel loss that would have noticeable economic impacts on such a small community.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found that a potential 6 percent job loss in the Mountain Home area could have an economic impact given the small size of the community. However, not all jobs will be lost at once and GAO has reported that as local economies grow during the 2006–2011 implementation period, total employment is also likely to grow, reducing the overall percentage of job losses.

The Commission found that Mountain Home Air Force Base is well suited for various types of flight training. It also has the capacity and the infrastructure available to receive future missions. Though the realignment results in the base losing some of its weapon systems, the Air Force indicated that the base is being considered as a potential location for the beddown of the Joint Strike Fighter as well as a training ground for international squadrons. Therefore, the Commission found that the Secretary of Defense’s overall intent and concept of streamlining operations at Mountain Home and realigning aircraft is approved. The Commission revised the DoD recommendation to be consistent with the Commission’s Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve Laydown Plan.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission found that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final selection criterion 5, as well as from the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following:

Realign Mountain Home Air Force Base, ID. Distribute the 18 F-15C/D aircraft and 18 F-16 aircraft assigned to the 366th Fighter Wing (ANG) to meet the Primary Aircraft Authorizations (PAA) requirements established by the Base Closure and Realignment recommendations of the Secretary of Defense, as amended by the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission.

Establish 18 PAA F-15C/D aircraft at the 125th Wing (ANG), Jacksonville International Airport Air Guard Station, Florida.

Establish 24 PAA F-16 aircraft at the 169th Fighter Wing (ANG), McEntire Air Guard Station, South Carolina.

Realignment Nellis Air Force Base, NV. Distribute 25 of the F-16 aircraft assigned to the 57th Fighter Wing to meet the Primary Aircraft Authorizations (PAA) requirements established by the Base Closure and Realignment recommendations of the Secretary of Defense, as amended by the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission.

Establish 21 PAA F-16 aircraft at the 138th Fighter Wing Tulsa International Airport Air Guard Station, Oklahoma.

Establish 18 PAA F-16 aircraft at the 144th Fighter Wing Fresno Air Terminal Air Guard Station, California.

Realign Elmendorf Air Force Base, AK. The 366th Fighter Wing, Mountain Home Air Force Base, ID will receive F-15E aircraft from the 3d Wing, Elmendorf Air Force Base, AK (18 aircraft) and attrition reserve (three aircraft).

The Commission found that this change and the recommendation as amended are consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. The full text of this and all Commission recommendations can be found in Appendix Q.
**CAPITAL AIR GUARD STATION, IL, AND HULMAN REGIONAL AIRPORT AIR GUARD STATION, IN**

**RECOMMENDATION # 90 (AIR FORCE 20)**

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**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION**

Realign Capital International Airport Air Guard Station, IL. Distribute the 183rd Fighter Wing's F-16s to the 122nd Fighter Wing, Fort Wayne International Airport Air Guard Station, IN, (15 aircraft). Retire the 122nd Fighter Wing's F-16s (15 aircraft). The wing's expeditionary combat support (ECS) elements, the Illinois ANG State Headquarters, and the 217th Engineering Installation Squadron remain in place. Realign Hulman Regional Airport Air Guard Station, IN. The 181st Fighter Wing's F-16s are distributed to the 122nd Fighter Wing, Fort Wayne International Airport Air Guard Station, IN (nine aircraft), and retirement (six aircraft). The 181st Fighter Wing's ECS elements remain in place. Realign Dane County Regional Air Guard Station/Truax Field, WI, Joe Foss Field Air Guard Station, SD, Des Moines Air Guard Station, IA, Fort Wayne Air Guard Station, IN, and Lackland Air Force Base, TX, by relocating baselevel F-110 intermediate maintenance to Capital, establishing a Centralized Intermediate Repair Facility (CIRF) at Capital for F110 engines.

**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION**

Capital (115) and Hulman (119) were both ranked low in military value by the fighter MCI. Although somewhat lower (130), the ANG recommended Fort Wayne be retained because of its record of recruiting and its proximity to Hulman—allowing the experienced airmen there to remain available to the Indiana ANG. This recommendation also helps align common versions of the F-16.

Establishing a CIRF at Capital consolidates F-110 engine intermediate maintenance for F-16 aircraft from five air reserve component units, and compliments other Air Force CIRF recommendations. The Capital CIRF is centrally located in proximity to the serviced installations and utilizes Capital's experienced people and existing facilities as part of an Air Force effort to standardize stateside and deployed intermediate-level maintenance concepts.

**COMMUNITY CONCERNS**

The Illinois community objected to DoD's proposal to send Capital's aircraft to installations ranked lower in military capability and importance. Community leaders disagreed with DoD's assertion that the recruiting base will be stronger in Indiana, and emphasized Capital AGS is located close to St Louis, Chicago, and Louisville and is strategically located for homeland defense missions. They noted that DoD's overall proposals hurt Illinois significantly, with 2,700 jobs slated to move out of the state, and added that the installation's 355 full-time and 774 part-time Guardsmen contribute an estimated $44.7 million into the region's economy each year. The airport authority and state are willing to contribute land and some of the funds necessary to construct a needed munitions storage facility there.

The Hulman, IN, community argued its ANG unit has a long and distinguished history of flying fighter aircraft in support of combat operations around the world. The community understands older aircraft eventually need to be retired, and that another ANG unit in the state is proposed to gain more F-16s. The community proposes that its unit receive a Predator UAV mission and the Distributed Common Ground System. It also encouraged the Commission to recommend that any movement of aircraft or personnel be delayed until the Air Force releases a detailed realignment and re-missioning plan.

**COMMISSION FINDINGS**

The Commission supports the Department of Defense recommendation to realign Capital Air Guard Station and Hulman Regional Airport Air Guard Station. While valid community concerns were expressed over these realignments, the Commission found that the Air National Guard F-16 inventory is shrinking and that these two bases should have the capability to transition to emerging missions as they become defined. Therefore the Commission revised the DoD recommendation to be consistent with the Commission’s Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve Laydown Plan.
A second aspect of the Department of Defense recommendation is related to a realignment of Dane County Regional Air Guard Station/Truax Field, Joe Foss Field Air Guard Station, Des Moines Air Guard Station, Fort Wayne Air Guard Station and Lackland Air Force Base. The Commission found the relocation of base-level F-110 intermediate maintenance to Capital, establishing a Centralized Intermediate Repair Facility (CIRF) at Capital for F-16 engines, consistent with selection criteria and Force Structure Plan.

This recommendation directing aircraft movement and personnel actions in connection with Air National Guard installations and organizations is designed to support the Future Total Force. The Commission expects that the Air Force will find new missions where needed, provide retraining opportunities, and take appropriate measures to limit possible adverse personnel impact. The Commission’s intent is that the Air Force will act to assign sufficient aircrew and maintenance personnel to units gaining aircraft in accordance with current, established procedures. However, the Commission expects that all decisions with regard to manpower authorizations will be made in consultation with the governor of the state in which the affected Air National Guard unit is located. Any manpower changes must be made under existing authorities, and must be made consistent with existing limitations. Some reclassification of existing positions may be necessary, but should not be executed until the Air Force and the state have determined the future mission of the unit to preclude unnecessary personnel turbulence.

**COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS**

The Commission found that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final selection criterion 1, as well as from the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following:

Realign Capital Airport Air Guard Station, IL. Distribute the 15 F-16 aircraft assigned to the 183d Fighter Wing, Capital Airport Air Guard Station, IL and the 15 F-16 aircraft assigned to the 122d Fighter Wing, Fort Wayne International Airport Air Guard Station, IN, to meet the Primary Aircraft Authorizations (PAA) requirements established by the Base Closure and Realignment recommendations of the Secretary of Defense, as amended by the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission.

Establish 18 PAA F-16 aircraft at the 183d Fighter Wing, Fort Wayne International Airport Air Guard Station, IN.

The Illinois ANG State Headquarters and the 217th Engineering Installation Squadron remain in place at Capital Airport Air Guard Station, IL.

If the State of Illinois decides to change the organization, composition and location of the 183d Fighter Wing to integrate the unit into the Future Total Force, all personnel allotted to the 183d Fighter Wing, including the wing Expeditionary Combat Support (ECS) elements, will remain in place and assume a mission relevant to the security interests of the State of Illinois and consistent with the integration of the unit into the Future Total Force, including but not limited to the Centralized Intermediate Repair Facility (CIRF) at Capital for F110 engines, air mobility, C4ISR, Information Operations, engineering, flight training or unmanned aerial vehicles. Where appropriate, unit personnel will be retrained in skills relevant to the emerging mission.

This recommendation does not effect a change to the authorized end-strength of the Illinois Air National Guard. The distribution of aircraft currently assigned to the 183d Fighter Wing is based upon a resource-constrained determination by the Department of Defense that the aircraft concerned will better support national security requirements in other locations and is not conditioned upon the agreement of the state.

Realign Hulman Regional Airport Air Guard Station, IN. Distribute the 15 F-16 aircraft assigned to the 181st Fighter Wing to meet the PAA requirements established by the Base Closure and Realignment recommendations of the Secretary of Defense, as amended by the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission. The 181st Fighter Wing’s ECS elements remain in place.

If the State of Indiana decides to change the organization, composition and location of the 181st Fighter Wing to integrate the unit into the Future Total Force, all other personnel allotted to the 181st Fighter Wing will remain in place and assume a mission relevant to the security interests of the State of Indiana and consistent with the integration of the unit into the Future Total Force, including but not limited to air mobility, C4ISR, Information Operations, engineering, flight training or unmanned aerial vehicles. Where appropriate, unit personnel will be retrained in skills relevant to the emerging mission.

This recommendation does not effect a change to the authorized endstrength of the Indiana Air National Guard. The distribution of aircraft currently assigned to the 181st Fighter Wing is based upon a resource-constrained determination by the Department of Defense that the aircraft concerned will better support national security requirements in other locations and is not conditioned upon the agreement of the state.
Realign Dane County Regional Air Guard Station/Truax Field, WI; Joe Foss Field Air Guard Station, SD; Des Moines Air
Guard Station, IA; Fort Wayne Air Guard Station, IN; and Lackland Air Force Base, TX; by relocating base-level F-110
intermediate maintenance to Capital Air Guard Station, IL, establishing a Centralized Intermediate Repair Facility (CIRF) at
Capital for F110 engines.

The Commission found that this change and the recommendation as amended are consistent with the final selection criteria
and the Force Structure Plan. The full text of this and all Commission recommendations can be found in Appendix Q.

New Orleans Air Reserve Station, LA
Recommendation # 91 (Air Force 22)

One-time Cost: $55.9M
Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings): ($8.3M)
20-Year Net Present Value: ($41.5M)
Payback Period: 8 Years

Secretary of Defense Recommendation

Realign NAS New Orleans ARS, LA. Distribute the 926th Fighter Wing’s A-10 aircraft to the 442d Fighter Wing (AFR),
Whiteman Air Force Base, MO (nine aircraft), and the 917th Wing (AFR) at Barksdale Air Force Base, LA (six aircraft). The
442nd wing HQ element realigns to Nellis Air Force Base, NV, and the wing Expeditionary Combat Support realigns to
Buckley Air Force Base, CO.

Secretary of Defense Justification

Both Whiteman (28) and Barksdale (33) bases have a higher military value for the A-10 operational mission than New
Orleans (49). These realignments bring the units at Whiteman and Barksdale to optimal size. Additionally, the Barksdale A-
10 unit provides close air support to the US Army’s Joint Readiness Training Center, one of the nation’s premier joint
training opportunities. Finally, realigning these A-10s to reserve units helped keep the active/Air National Guard/Air Force
Reserve force structure mix constant.

Community Concerns

There were no formal expressions from the community.

Commission Findings

The Commission found DoD’s recommendation supportable, but revised the language to correct an oversight directing
manpower movements from Whiteman AFB, rather than New Orleans ARS.

Commission Recommendations

The Commission found that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final selection criteria 1 and 3, as well as
from the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following:

Realign NAS New Orleans ARS, LA. Distribute the 15 A-10 aircraft assigned to the 926th Fighter Wing (AFR) to meet the
Primary Aircraft Authorizations (PAA) requirements established by the Base Closure and Realignment recommendations of
the Secretary of Defense, as amended by the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission.

Establish 24 PAA A-10 at the 442d Fighter Wing (AFR), Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri
Establish 24 PAA A-10 at the 917th Wing (AFR) at Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana.

The 926th Wing HQ element realigns to Nellis Air Force Base, NV and the wing Expeditionary Combat Support realigns to
Buckley Air Force Base, CO.
The Commission found that this change and the recommendation as amended are consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. The full text of this and all Commission recommendations can be found in Appendix Q.

**Andrews Air Force Base, MD, Will Rogers Air Guard Station, OK, Tinker Air Force Base, OK, and Randolph Air Force Base, TX**

**Recommendation # 92 (Air Force 23)**

- **One-time Cost:** $19.4M
- **Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings):** ($6.4M)
- **20-Year Net Present Value:** ($70M)
- **Payback Period:** 3 Years

**Secretary of Defense Recommendation**

Realign Andrews Air Force Base, MD, by relocating the Air Force Flight Standards Agency (AFFSA) and its two C-21 aircraft to Will Rogers World Airport Air Guard Station, OK. Realign Randolph Air Force Base, TX, by relocating the USAF Advanced Instrument School (AIS) to Will Rogers Air Guard Station. Realign Tinker Air Force Base, OK, by relocating the Global Air Traffic Operations Program Office (GATOPO) to Will Rogers Air Guard Station. Realign Will Rogers Air Guard Station by relocating the 137th Airlift Wing (ANG) to Tinker Air Force Base and associate with the 507th Air Refueling Wing (AFR). The 137th’s C-130H aircraft are distributed to the 136th Airlift Wing (ANG), Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base Fort Worth, TX (four aircraft), and 139th Airlift Wing (ANG), Rosecrans Memorial Airport Air Guard Station, MO (four aircraft). The aerial port squadron at Will Rogers moves to Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base Fort Worth, the Aeromedical Squadron and firefighters move to Rosecrans AGB. Other elements of the 137th’s Expeditionary Combat Support remain in place at Will Rogers.

**Secretary of Defense Justification**

Consolidating AFFSA, AIS, and GATOPO at Will Rogers World Airport creates synergy between the Air Force administrative aviation functions and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) located at Will Rogers World. Associating the ANG operation at Will Rogers (64-airlift) with the AFR operation at Tinker (four-tankers) consolidates and streamlines Air Force reserve component operations in Oklahoma City at a base of high military value. Additionally, this realignment creates two larger C-130 squadrons at Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base Fort Worth (53) and Rosecrans Air Guard Station (114) from three undersized squadrons. Finally, this recommendation moves federal assets out of the National Capital Region, reducing the nation’s vulnerability.

**Community Concerns**

No formal comments were received from community officials or civic organizations, but individual concerns were expressed in support of “community basing,” recommending that existing ANG units be increased in size by assigning active-duty personnel and their associated aircraft to ANG facilities. Individuals maintained that this approach would allow the Air Force to close more active bases and realize greater savings than closing relatively inexpensive ANG bases. Other individual proposals suggested that the VIP transportation mission be transferred from the active Air Force to the ANG.

**Commission Findings**

The Commission found that this realignment was consistent with the Air Force’s goals of creating larger, more efficient fighter aircraft squadrons and improving intermediate level maintenance processes. The Commission also found that the Secretary of Defense’s overall intent and concept of realigning C-130 aircraft out of Will Rogers Air Guard Station was supportable. The Commission found that efficiencies would be gained by consolidating all Air Force aviation administration functions at Will Rogers Air Guard Station.

This recommendation directing aircraft movement and personnel actions in connection with Air National Guard installations and organizations is designed to support the Future Total Force. The Commission expects that the Air Force will find new missions where needed, provide retraining opportunities, and take appropriate measures to limit possible
adverse personnel impact. The Commission’s intent is that the Air Force will act to assign sufficient aircrew and maintenance personnel to units gaining aircraft in accordance with current, established procedures. However, the Commission expects that all decisions with regard to manpower authorizations will be made in consultation with the governor of the state in which the affected Air National Guard unit is located. Any manpower changes must be made under existing authorities, and must be made consistent with existing limitations. Some reclassification of existing positions may be necessary, but should not be executed until the Air Force and the state have determined the future mission of the unit to preclude unnecessary personnel turbulence.

**COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS**

The Commission found that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final selection criterion 1, as well as from the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following:

Realign Andrews Air Force Base, MD, by relocating the Air Force Flight Standards Agency (AFFSA) and its two C-21 aircraft to Will Rogers World Airport Air Guard Station, OK.

Realign Randolph Air Force Base, TX, by relocating the USAF Advanced Instrument School (AIS) to Will Rogers Air Guard Station.

Realign Tinker Air Force Base, OK, by relocating the Global Air Traffic Operations Program Office (GATOPO) to Will Rogers Air Guard Station.

Realign Will Rogers Air Guard Station by relocating the 137th Airlift Wing (ANG) to Tinker Air Force Base and associate with the 507th Air Refueling Wing (AFR). Distribute the 137th Air Airlift Wing’s (ANG) C-130 aircraft to meet the Primary Aircraft Authorizations (PAA) requirements established by the Base Closure and Realignment recommendations of the Secretary of Defense, as amended by the Base Closure and Realignment Commission.

If the State of Oklahoma decides to change the organization, composition and location of the 137th Wing (ANG) to integrate the unit into the Future Total Force, all other personnel allotted to the 137th Wing (ANG) will remain in place and assume a mission relevant to the security interests of the State of Oklahoma and consistent with the integration of the unit into the Future Total Force, including but not limited to air mobility, C4ISR, Information Operations, engineering, flight training or unmanned aerial vehicles. Where appropriate, unit personnel will be retrained in skills relevant to the emerging mission.

This recommendation does not effect a change to the authorized end-strength of the Oklahoma Air National Guard. The distribution of aircraft currently assigned to the 137th Wing (ANG) is based upon a resource-constrained determination by the Department of Defense that the aircraft concerned will better support national security requirements in other locations and is not conditioned upon the agreement of the state.

Establish 8 PAA C-130 aircraft at the 136th Airlift Wing ANG, Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base Fort Worth, TX.

Establish 10 PAA C-130 aircraft at the 139th Airlift Wing (ANG), Rosecrans Memorial Airport Air Guard Station, MO.

The 137th Airlift Wing’s Expeditionary Combat Support remains in place at Will Rogers Air Guard Station, Oklahoma.

The Commission found that this change and the recommendation as amended are consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. The full text of this and all Commission recommendations can be found in Appendix Q.
**Secretary of Defense Recommendation**

Realign Martin State Air Guard Station (AGS), MD. Distribute the eight C-130J aircraft of the 175th Wing (ANG) to the 146th Airlift Wing (ANG), Channel Islands AGS, CA (four aircraft), and 143rd Airlift Wing (ANG), Quonset State Airport AGS, RI (four aircraft). The Aerial Port Squadron will move to Andrews Air Force Base, MD. The 143rd and 146th Airlift Wings will each retire two C-130E aircraft (total of four).

**Secretary of Defense Justification**

Martin State (140) had a low military value ranking. This recommendation moves C-130Js to Channel Islands AGS (96), and Quonset State (125), both of which rank higher in military value and already operate the J-model C-130—avoiding conversion training costs. Additionally, this recommendation creates two right-sized C-130J squadrons. The Aerial Port Squadron is realigned to a nearby base with a robust airlift mission, retaining these skilled and highly trained ANG personnel.

**Community Concerns**

The Maryland community opposed removing aircraft from the only fully operational C-130J organization in the Air Force. The proposed receiver sites do not have the demographics to support additional aircraft, as they are currently unable to staff their existing, smaller organizations. The 175th Airlift Wing leads the international C-130J implementation group and has developed most procedures for operating these new aircraft. Air Force analysis was based on erroneous runway length (2,000 feet short), gave no credit for landing zones although three exist within the evaluation area, and considered neither the demographic base for recruiting nor the retention effects of the realignment. The DoD proposal also failed to consider this unit’s role in the National Capital Region’s Continuity of Operation missions.

**Commission Findings**

The Commission notes the 175th Airlift Wing is the only fully operational C-130J unit in the Air Force; it plays an instrumental role in the introduction of this new aircraft, and is the leader of the international C-130J implementation group, which had developed most procedures for operating these aircraft. Further, it appears the Air Force analysis was based on erroneous runway length (2,000 feet short), gave no credit for landing zones, although three exist within the evaluation area, and considered neither the demographic base for recruiting nor the retention effects of the realignment. However, the Commission found that the factors did not rise to the level of being a substantial deviation of criteria. To support the Commission’s Air National Guard and Reserve Laydown, the aircraft should be distributed from the 175th Airlift Wing.

This recommendation directing aircraft movement and personnel actions in connection with Air National Guard installations and organizations is designed to support the Future Total Force. The Commission expects that the Air Force will find new missions where needed, provide retraining opportunities, and take appropriate measures to limit possible adverse personnel impact. The Commission’s intent is that the Air Force will act to assign sufficient aircrew and maintenance personnel to units gaining aircraft in accordance with current, established procedures. However, the Commission expects that all decisions with regard to manpower authorizations will be made in consultation with the governor of the state in which the affected Air National Guard unit is located. Any manpower changes must be made under existing authorities, and must be made consistent with existing limitations. Some reclassification of existing positions may be necessary, but should not be executed until the Air Force and the state have determined the future mission of the unit to preclude unnecessary personnel turbulence.
The Commission found that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final selection criterion 1, as well as from the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following:

Realign Martin State Air Guard Station (AGS), MD. Distribute the 8 C-130J aircraft assigned to the 175th Wing (ANG) to meet the Primary Aircraft Authorizations (PAA) requirements established by the Base Closure and Realignment recommendations of the Secretary of Defense, as amended by the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission.

Establish 8 Primary Aircraft Authorizations (PAA) C-130J at the 146th Airlift Wing (ANG), Channel Islands AGS, California.

Establish 8 Primary Aircraft Authorizations (PAA) C-130J at the 143d Airlift Wing (ANG), Quonset State Airport AGS, Rhode Island.

The Aerial Port Squadron located at Martin State Air Guard Station, Maryland will move to Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland.

If the State of Maryland decides to change the organization, composition and location of the 175th Wing (ANG) to integrate the unit into the Future Total Force, all other personnel allotted to the 175th Wing (ANG) will remain in place and assume a mission relevant to the security interests of the State of Maryland and consistent with the integration of the unit into the Future Total Force, including but not limited to air mobility, C4ISR, Information Operations, engineering, flight training or unmanned aerial vehicles. Where appropriate, unit personnel will be retrained in skills relevant to the emerging mission.

This recommendation does not effect a change to the authorized end-strength of the Maryland Air National Guard. The distribution of aircraft currently assigned to the 175th Wing (ANG) is based upon a resource-constrained determination by the Department of Defense that the aircraft concerned will better support national security requirements in other locations and is not conditioned upon the agreement of the state.

The Commission found that this change and the recommendation as amended are consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. The full text of this and all Commission recommendations can be found in Appendix Q.

Otis Air National Guard Base, MA, Lambert–St. Louis International Airport Air Guard Station, MO, and Atlantic City Air Guard Station, NJ

Recommendation # 94 (Air Force 25)

One-time Cost: $53.7M
Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings): ($27.9M)
20-Year Net Present Value: ($305.4M)
Payback Period: 2 Years

Secretary of Defense Recommendation

Close Otis ANGB, MA. The 102d Fighter Wing’s F-15s will be distributed to the 125th Fighter Wing, Jacksonville International Airport Air Guard Station, FL (three aircraft), and 177th Fighter Wing, Atlantic City International Airport Air Guard Station, NJ (12 aircraft). The 253d Combat Communications Group, and 267th Communications Squadron will remain in place at Otis, with 104th Fighter Wing at Barnes providing administrative support as the parent wing. An air sovereignty alert (ASA) facility will be constructed at Bradley International Airport Air Guard Station, CT. Firefighter positions from Otis will move to Barnes Municipal Airport Air Guard Station, MA.

Realign Lambert-St. Louis International Airport Air Guard Station, St. Louis, MO. The 131st Fighter Wing’s F-15s (15 aircraft) will distribute to the 57th Fighter Wing, Nellis Air Force Base, NV (nine aircraft), and 177th Fighter Wing, Atlantic City International Airport Air Guard Station, NJ (six aircraft). Realign Atlantic City International Airport Air Guard Station, NJ. The 177th Fighter Wing’s F-16s will be distributed to the 158th Fighter Wing, Burlington International Airport Air Guard Station, VT (three aircraft), and retire (12 aircraft). The wing’s expeditionary combat support (ECS) elements will remain in place. Firefighter positions move to Scott Air Force Base, IL. The 157 Air Operations Group (AOG) and the
218th Engineering Installation Group (EIG) will relocate from Jefferson Barracks geographically separated unit (GSU) into space at Lambert International. Jefferson Barracks real property accountability will transfer to the Army.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

The Air Force distributed reserve component F-15C force structure to bases with higher military value than Otis (88) and Lambert St. Louis (127). The F-15C aircraft are realigned to Nellis (13), Jacksonville Air Guard Station (24), and Atlantic City Air Guard Station (61). The Nellis bound aircraft will help form an enhanced aggressor squadron for Operation RED FLAG, and the Atlantic City bound aircraft will provide expanded capability for the homeland defense mission.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The Massachusetts community, including public officials, criticized DoD’s Mission Compatability Index (MCI) scores for Otis, arguing they failed to account for ample unsaturated range space and operational expansion potential at the Massachusetts Military Reservation (MMR). They attributed most data call errors and inconsistencies to the fact that distant commands, rather than local officials, submitted the responses.

They claimed closing Otis would eliminate the bill payer for the MMR and shift substantial overhead costs to remaining non-DoD tenants, including the several hundred housing units used by their families. These other tenant commands were never consulted about the additional costs to them of DoD’s proposal, as required by law.

Further, they said closing Otis would compromise New England’s air defense and hurt recruiting and retention. They asserted the loss of experienced maintainers and pilots would harm mission capabilities and questioned whether Atlantic City could reconstitute the same level of operational readiness.

Additionally, they stated that Otis is an alternate landing site for NASA space shuttles, the MMR is a primary training location for tens of thousands of homeland security personnel, and the base contributes critical services to the surrounding region, including firefighting, water supply, and waste management. Finally, they asserted that aircraft cannot be removed, and National Guard bases closed or realigned, without the Governor’s consent.

The Missouri community also criticized MCI scores, claiming the Air Force’s use of a one-size-fits-all approach is inherently biased in favor of large active-duty bases. Community leaders noted the Air National Guard (ANG) Bureau limited the size of ANG installations depending on the units’ number of aircraft and mission. Lambert AGS is inherently efficient because it is co-located with an existing civilian airport.

They focused on the loss of homeland security air protection in key regions of the Midwest, and noted some data-call questions were irrelevant. They also said implementation of DoD’s recommendations could adversely affect training due to limited classroom slots and increased costs, and the announced DoD recommendation has already hurt recruiting and retention. The loss of experienced people and the subsequent negative impact on combat capability has been especially ill-timed given the extensive demands of current combat missions.

Last, they asserted that aircraft cannot be removed, or National Guard bases closed or realigned, without the Governor’s consent.

The Atlantic City New Jersey community supported DoD’s proposal to expand and convert the 177th Fighter Wing, claiming its strategic location permits unparalleled air superiority coverage over five major US cities. New York City, in particular, can be reached within seven minutes of takeoff. The community was confident it could transfer to a new aircraft type, citing its 98.9 percent endstrength, very high Fully Mission Capable Rates, nearby training ranges, and modern infrastructure. Last, it expressed concern about retiring and relocating existing aircraft without first receiving new replacement aircraft from Otis and St. Louis.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found that the Department of Defense recommendation to close Otis Air National Guard Base, and realign Lambert St. Louis International Airport Air Guard Station and Atlantic City Air Guard Station should be supported in concept, but with modifications for homeland defense reasons. Despite community concerns related to Otis and Lambert, the Commission agreed with the removal of F-15 aircraft from both locations. The Commission urges the Secretary of Defense to consult with the Secretary of the Department of homeland security and the Commandant, United States Coast Guard to minimize any impact of Otis’ closure on the operations of the Coast Guard. The Commission establishes an F-15
wing at Jacksonville, FL, an F-16 wing at Atlantic City, NJ, and an F-16 wing at Burlington, VT, consistent with the Commission’s Air National Guard and Reserve Laydown.

This recommendation directing aircraft movement and personnel actions in connection with Air National Guard installations and organizations is designed to support the Future Total Force. The Commission expects that the Air Force will find new missions where needed, provide retraining opportunities, and take appropriate measures to limit possible adverse personnel impact. The Commission’s intent is that the Air Force will act to assign sufficient aircrew and maintenance personnel to units gaining aircraft in accordance with current, established procedures. However, the Commission expects that all decisions with regard to manpower authorizations will be made in consultation with the governor of the state in which the affected Air National Guard unit is located. Any manpower changes must be made under existing authorities, and must be made consistent with existing limitations. Some reclassification of existing positions may be necessary, but should not be executed until the Air Force and the state have determined the future mission of the unit to preclude unnecessary personnel turbulence. This recommendation is consistent with the Commission’s Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve Laydown Plan.

**Commission Recommendations**

The Commission found that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final selection criterion 1, as well as from the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following:

Realign Otis ANGB, MA. Distribute the fifteen F-15 aircraft assigned to the 102d Fighter Wing’s (ANG) to meet the Primary Aircraft Authorizations (PAA) requirements established by the Base Closure and Realignment recommendations of the Secretary of Defense, as amended by the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission. The 253d Combat Communications Group, and 267th Communications Squadron will remain in place at Otis, with 104th Fighter Wing at Barnes providing administrative support as the parent wing. An air sovereignty alert (ASA) facility will be constructed at Barnes Municipal Airport Air Guard Station, MA. Firefighter positions from Otis will move to Barnes Municipal Airport Air Guard Station, MA.

If the Commonwealth of Massachusetts decides to change the organization, composition and location of the 102d Fighter Wing (ANG) to integrate the unit into the Future Total Force, all other personnel allotted to the 102d Fighter Wing (ANG) will remain in place and assume a mission relevant to the security interests of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and consistent with the integration of the unit into the Future Total Force, including but not limited to air mobility, C4ISR, Information Operations, engineering, flight training or unmanned aerial vehicles. Where appropriate, unit personnel will be retrained in skills relevant to the emerging mission.

This recommendation does not effect a change to the authorized end-strength of the Massachusetts Air National Guard. The distribution of aircraft currently assigned to the 102d Fighter Wing (ANG) is based upon a resource-constrained determination by the Department of Defense that the aircraft concerned will better support national security requirements in other locations and is not conditioned upon the agreement of the commonwealth.

Realign Lambert-St. Louis International Airport Air Guard Station, St. Louis, MO. Distribute the fifteen F-15 aircraft assigned to the 131st Fighter Wing to meet the Primary Aircraft Authorizations (PAA) requirements established by the Base Closure and Realignment recommendations of the Secretary of Defense, as amended by the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission. The 157th Air Operations Group (AOG) and the 218th Engineering Installation Group (EIG) will relocate from Jefferson Barracks geographically separated unit (GSU) into space at Lambert International. Jefferson Barracks real property accountability will transfer to the Army.

If the State of Missouri decides to change the organization, composition and location of the 131st Fighter Wing (ANG) to integrate the unit into the Future Total Force, all other personnel allotted to the 131st Fighter Wing (ANG) will remain in place and assume a mission relevant to the security interests of the State of Missouri and consistent with the integration of the unit into the Future Total Force, including but not limited to air mobility, C4ISR, Information Operations, engineering, flight training or unmanned aerial vehicles. Where appropriate, unit personnel will be retrained in skills relevant to the emerging mission.

This recommendation does not effect a change to the authorized end-strength of the Missouri Air National Guard. The distribution of aircraft currently assigned to the 131st Fighter Wing (ANG) is based upon a resource-constrained determination by the Department of Defense that the aircraft concerned will better support national security requirements in other locations and is not conditioned upon the agreement of the state.
Establish 18 PAA F-15 aircraft at the 125th Fighter Wing, Jacksonville International Airport Air Guard Station, Florida (ANG);
Establish 18 PAA F-16 aircraft at the 177th Fighter Wing, Atlantic City International Airport Air Guard Station, New Jersey (ANG);
Establish 18 PAA F-16 aircraft at the 158th Fighter Wing, Burlington International Airport Air Guard Station, Vermont (ANG).

The Commission found that this change and the recommendation as amended are consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. The full text of this and all Commission recommendations can be found in Appendix Q.

**W.K. KELLOGG AIRPORT AIR GUARD STATION, MI**

**Recommendation # 95 (Air Force 27)**

- **One-time Cost:** $8.3M
- **Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings):** ($1.5M)
- **20-Year Net Present Value:** ($11.2M)
- **Payback Period:** 7 Years

**Secretary of Defense Recommendation**

Close W.K. Kellogg Airport Air Guard Station, MI. Distribute the 110th Fighter Wing’s A-10s (15 aircraft) to the 127th Wing (ANG), Selfridge ANGB, MI.

**Secretary of Defense Justification**

The Air Force placed one squadron at Selfridge (62) because it is significantly higher in military value than Kellogg (122). The Air Force retired the older F-16s from Selfridge and combined the two A-10 units into one squadron at Selfridge to retain trained and skilled Michigan ANG Airmen from both locations.

**Community Concerns**

The community cites high volunteerism for rotation to Southwest Asia, repeated outstanding operational readiness inspections, and a nearly new facility as reasons to keep the base open. The community noted it paid to extend the runway to 10,000 feet, purchased land to maintain clear zones, and matched Federal grants funding the new air traffic control tower. Kellogg Airport is conjoined with Ft Custer Army Guard with 7,500 acres of training area, and the state has offered to construct a road directly connecting the two areas. The 110th Wing is manned at over 100 percent even though the local population is small.

The community pointed out that the unit scores ahead of its ANG contemporaries in military value analysis, although it believes the scores did not fully value existing physical plant (ramp, facilities), training ranges and airspace.

**Commission Findings**

The Commission found that Since December 2003, the base has completed a number of military construction projects to upgrade its facilities. The Commission also found that Kellogg is used as a strategic launch platform by the Air Force, Marine Corps Reserve, and Army Reserve. Kellogg’s location provides for joint training and operations with contiguous Ft. Cluster. Because the Mission Compatibility Index erroneously under valued Kellogg’s military value, the Commission did not support the Department’s recommendation to close the base. The A-10 squadron at Selfridge will have 24 aircraft and provide more opportunities for airmen at Kellogg.

This recommendation directing aircraft movement and personnel actions in connection with Air National Guard installations and organizations is designed to support the Future Total Force. The Commission expects that the Air Force will find new missions where needed, provide retraining opportunities, and take appropriate measures to limit possible adverse personnel impact. The Commission’s intent is that the Air Force will act to assign sufficient aircrew and
maintenance personnel to units gaining aircraft in accordance with current, established procedures. However, the Commission expects that all decisions with regard to manpower authorizations will be made in consultation with the governor of the state in which the affected Air National Guard unit is located. Any manpower changes must be made under existing authorities, and must be made consistent with existing limitations. Some reclassification of existing positions may be necessary, but should not be executed until the Air Force and the state have determined the future mission of the unit to preclude unnecessary personnel turbulence. This recommendation is consistent with the Commission’s Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve Laydown Plan.

**Commission Recommendations**

The Commission found that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final selection criterion 1, as well as from the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following:

Realign W.K. Kellogg Airport Air Guard Station, MI. Distribute the 15 A-10 aircraft assigned to the 110th Fighter Wing (ANG) to meet the Primary Aircraft Authorizations (PAA) requirements established by the Base Closure and Realignment recommendations of the Secretary of Defense, as amended by the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission. Establish a contiguous enclave for the 110th Fighter Wing (ANG) sufficient to support operations of that unit, including flight operations, and compatible with joint use of the Air Guard Station as a civilian airport. If the State of Michigan decides to change the organization, composition and location of the 110th Fighter Wing to integrate the unit into the Future Total Force, all other personnel allotted to the 110th Fighter Wing will remain in place and assume a mission relevant to the security interests of the State of Michigan and consistent with the integration of the unit into the Future Total Force, including but not limited to air mobility, C4ISR, Information Operations, engineering, flight training or unmanned aerial vehicles. Where appropriate, unit personnel will be retrained in skills relevant to the emerging mission. This recommendation does not effect a change to the authorized end-strength of the Michigan Air National Guard. The distribution of aircraft currently assigned to the 110th Fighter Wing is based upon a resource-constrained determination by the Department of Defense that the aircraft concerned will better support national security requirements in other locations and is not conditioned upon the agreement of the state.

The Commission found that this change and the recommendation as amended are consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. The full text of this and all Commission recommendations can be found in Appendix Q.

**Duluth International Airport Air Guard Station, MN**

**Recommendation # 96 (Air Force 28)**

- **One-time Cost:** N/A
- **Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings):** N/A
- **20-Year Net Present Value:** N/A
- **Payback Period:** N/A

**Secretary of Defense Recommendation**

Realign Duluth International Airport Air Guard Station, MN, by retiring the 148th Fighter Wing’s F-16s (15 aircraft).

**Secretary of Defense Justification**

Duluth (136) ranked low in military value. The reduction in F-16 force structure and the need to align common versions of the F-16 at the same bases argued for realigning Duluth to an ASA site using aircraft assigned elsewhere and operating from Duluth on rotational basis as tasked by US Northern Command. The 148th Fighter Wing’s expeditionary combat support will remain at Duluth supporting the air sovereignty alert (ASA) facility.

**Community Concerns**

The community of Duluth stated DoD should not strip a unit with 103 percent endstrength of all its aircraft while retaining other units’ aircraft with weaker recruiting and retention. It highlighted its unobstructed airspace for flight training, an
ongoing $26 million renovation building the military's newest aircraft maintenance hangar, and a new $3.5 million Naval Reserve Center as reasons to reject the DoD proposal.

**Commission Findings**

The Commission found that the Department of Defense recommendation to realign Duluth International Airport Air Guard Station did not accurately assess the base’s military value. The Commission found that the military value calculation for Duluth did not give proper credit to new construction, ranges, airspace, low level routes, munitions storage capacity and runway length. The Department of Defense identified Duluth as retaining an air sovereignty alert facility after its realignment, thus the Commission retained F-16s at Duluth.

**Commission Recommendations**

The Commission found that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final selection criteria 2 and 4, as well as from the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following:

Realign Duluth International Airport Air Guard Station, MN. Distribute the 15 F-16 aircraft assigned to the 148th Fighter Wing (ANG) to meet the Primary Aircraft Authorizations (PAA) requirements established by the Base Closure and Realignment Commission.

Establish 15 PAA F-16 aircraft at the 148th Fighter Wing (ANG), Duluth International Airport Air Guard Station.

The Commission found that this change and the recommendation as amended are consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. The full text of this and all Commission recommendations can be found in Appendix Q.

**Key Field Air Guard Station, MS**

Recommandation # 97 (Air Force 28)

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**Secretary of Defense Recommendation**

Realign Key Field Air Guard Station, MS. Distribute the 186th Air Refueling Wing’s KC-135R aircraft to the 128th Air Refueling Wing (ANG), General Mitchell Air Guard Station, WI (three aircraft); the 134th Air Refueling Wing (ANG), McGhee-Tyson Airport Air Guard Station, TN (three aircraft); and 101st Air Refueling Wing (ANG), Bangor International Airport Air Guard Station, ME (two aircraft). One aircraft will revert to backup aircraft inventory. The 186th Air Refueling Wing’s firefighter positions move to the 172nd Air Wing at Jackson International Airport, MS, and the expeditionary combat support (ECS) will remain in place.

**Secretary of Defense Justification**

Receiver locations General Mitchell (86) and McGhee-Tyson (74) ranked higher in military value for the tanker mission than Key Field (92). Bangor (123) also received aircraft within this recommendation. Military judgment argued for the increased unit size at Bangor because of its critical role as host base for Northeast Tanker Task Force support to the transatlantic air bridge. Key Field’s newer KC-135R aircraft help replace McGhee-Tyson’s older, higher maintenance KC-135E models, and help increase the unit size. The remainder of Key Field’s realigned aircraft help increase the squadron size at General Mitchell and maintain critical backup aircraft inventory levels. Bangor, McGhee-Tyson, and General Mitchell gain additional KC-135 aircraft to their maximum available capacity, increasing both effectiveness and unit capability. Key Field’s ECS remains in place to support the Air Expeditionary Force and to retain trained, experienced airmen.
COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community argued DoD’s recommendation would negatively affect training and readiness and incur costs exceeding projected 20-year savings. Community representatives stated the Tanker Mission Compatibility Index inadequately measured the base’s “Optimal Proximity” to airspace supporting its mission. They argued larger tanker presence in the Southeastern United States is needed to fulfill refueling requirements for receiver aircraft in the region, because using more distant tankers would add extra flight time and cost. They claimed Key Field was not properly evaluated for: its aircraft hangar, inexpensive expansion potential, KC-135 simulator, high historical manning rates, lack of noise and encroachment problems, potential loss of experienced personnel, negative economic impact on the region, and high Operations and Personnel Tempo in support of current worldwide missions and taskings. The community wants to keep its KC-135 mission and argued that the Governor and Adjutant General were not consulted on this recommendation.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission noted the Department of Defense failed to account for costs associated with relocating the KC-135 full-motion simulator at Key Field (one of only four such simulators in the Air National Guard). The aggregate of both programmatic and BRAC-related aircraft movements into and out of the Southeastern United States, including Air Force, Navy and Marine aircraft could lead to a shortage of regional air-refueling aircraft for training and homeland defense mission support. The Commission found that this potential shortfall is one of economic efficiency, not operational deficiency. The Commission further found that the Secretary of Defense’s overall intent and concept of redistributing KC-135s out of Key Field AGS was supportable if the potential shortfall of cost-effective air-refueling support is mitigated by rejecting one of the Department of Defense’s recommendations to reduce the number of KC-135 tanker aircraft in the Southeast. The commission found that Birmingham IAP AGS, AL had the best military value to meet the potential shortfall, and therefore found that the recommendation for Key Field Air Guard Station is supportable.

This recommendation directing aircraft movement and personnel actions in connection with Air National Guard installations and organizations is designed to support the Future Total Force. The Commission expects that the Air Force will find new missions where needed, provide retraining opportunities, and take appropriate measures to limit possible adverse personnel impact. The Commission’s intent is that the Air Force will act to assign sufficient aircrew and maintenance personnel to units gaining aircraft in accordance with current, established procedures. However, the Commission expects that all decisions with regard to manpower authorizations will be made in consultation with the governor of the state in which the affected Air National Guard unit is located. Any manpower changes must be made under existing authorities, and must be made consistent with existing limitations. Some reclassification of existing positions may be necessary, but should not be executed until the Air Force and the state have determined the future mission of the unit to preclude unnecessary personnel turbulence. This recommendation is consistent with the Commission’s Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve Laydown Plan.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission found that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final selection criteria 1, 3 and 4, as well as from the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following:

Realignment Key Field Air Guard Station, MS. Distribute the 186th Air Refueling Wing (ANG)’s KC-135R/T aircraft to meet the Primary Aircraft Authorizations (PAA) requirements established by the Base Closure and Realignment recommendations of the Secretary of Defense, as amended by the Base Closure and Realignment Commission.

Establish 12 PAA KC-135R/T aircraft at the 128th Air Refueling Wing (ANG), General Mitchell Air Guard Station, Wisconsin.

If the State of Mississippi decides to change the organization, composition and location of the 186th Air Refueling Wing (ANG) to integrate the unit into the Future Total Force:

Establish Key Field as a Regional Operations and Security Center (ROSC) location, with the 186th Air Refueling Wing’s Expeditionary Combat Support (ECS) elements remaining in place;

Reassign a sufficient number of aircrews and maintenance personnel of the 186th Air Refueling Wing (ANG) to the 172d Airlift Wing (ANG), a C-17 unit located on Thompson Field, Mississippi to bring that unit to a fully manned status, with the Air Force providing retraining where necessary, and;
All other personnel allotted to the 186th Air Refueling Wing (ANG) will remain in place and assume a mission relevant to the security interests of the State of Mississippi and consistent with the integration of the unit into the Future Total Force, including but not limited to air mobility, C4ISR, engineering, flight training or unmanned aerial vehicles. Where appropriate, unit personnel will be retrained in skills relevant to the emerging mission.

This recommendation does not effect a change to the authorized end-strength of the Mississippi Air National Guard. The distribution of aircraft currently assigned to the 186th Air Refueling Wing (ANG) is based upon a resource-constrained determination by the Department of Defense that the aircraft concerned will better support national security requirements in other locations and is not conditioned upon the agreement of the state.

The Commission found that this change and the recommendation as amended are consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. The full text of this and all Commission recommendations can be found in Appendix Q.

**Great Falls International Airport Air Guard Station, MT**

**Recommendation # 98 (Air Force 30)**

- **One-time Cost:** $6.8M
- **Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings):** $0.05M
- **20-Year Net Present Value:** $7.2M
- **Payback Period:** NEVER

**Secretary of Defense Recommendation**

Realign Great Falls International Airport Air Guard Station, MT. Distribute the 120th Fighter Wing's F-16s to the 187th Fighter Wing, Dannelly Field Air Guard Station, AL (three aircraft); the 132d Fighter Wing, Des Moines International Airport Air Guard Station, IA (three aircraft); and retire (nine aircraft). The wing’s expeditionary combat support (ECS) elements remain in place.

**Secretary of Defense Justification**

Great Falls (117) ranked low in military value. The reduction in F-16 force structure and the need to align common versions of the F-16 at the same bases argued for realigning F-16s out of Great Falls. The F-16s realign to Dannelly (60) and Des Moines (137). Although Des Moines was ranked somewhat lower in military value than Great Falls, the realignment to Des Moines creates a more effective unit of 18 aircraft. The wing's ECS will remain in place to support the Air Expeditionary Force and to retain trained, experienced Air National Guard personnel.

**Community Concerns**

The Great Falls, MT, community criticized MCI scores, claiming the Air Force’s use of a one-size-fits-all approach is inherently biased in favor of large active-duty bases. Community leaders noted the Air National Guard (ANG) Bureau limited the size of ANG installations depending on the units’ number of aircraft and mission. Great Falls AGS has reaped efficiencies because it is co-located with an existing civilian airport. They are particularly concerned that if DoD’s recommendation is approved, they will not receive a significant emerging mission to backfill the loss. If aircraft must be realigned, they counter-proposed those aircraft be relocated to the nearby Malmstrom AFB instead of being sent to another state.

They also said implementation of DoD’s recommendations could adversely affect training due to limited classroom slots and increased costs, and the announced DoD recommendation has already hurt recruiting and retention. The loss of experienced people and the subsequent negative impact on combat capability has been especially ill-timed given the extensive demands of current combat missions. Last, they asserted that aircraft cannot be removed, or National Guard bases closed or realigned, without the Governor's consent. The base has 300 full-time and 700 part-time jobs. There is concern in the community about knowing exactly how many jobs would be affected and what any (currently unidentified) new mission would be.
COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found that the Department of Defense recommendation to realign Great Falls International Airport Air Guard Station could not be supported due to the fact that its outstanding airspace and lack of encroachment were not properly considered. The Commission recognized that due to a shrinking number of F-16s available, the unit would have to give up its F-16s. The tremendous airspace but no impact range in Montana implied an air sovereignty mission and the Commission found this location valuable for F-15 C/D aircraft. Further, the Commission established an F-16 squadron at Dannelly Field, Alabama and F-16 squadron at Des Moines, Iowa, which is consistent with the Commission’s Air National Guard and Reserve Laydown plan.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission found that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final selection criterion 1, as well as from the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following:

Realign Great Falls International Airport Air Guard Station, MT. Distribute the fifteen F-16 aircraft assigned to the 120th Wing (ANG) to meet the Primary Aircraft Authorizations (PAA) requirements established by the Base Closure and Realignment recommendations of the Secretary of Defense, as amended by the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission.

Establish 15 PAA F-15 aircraft at the 120th Fighter Wing (ANG), Great Falls International Airport Air Guard Station, MT.

Establish 18 PAA F-16 aircraft at the 187th Fighter Wing (ANG), Dannelly Field Air Guard Station, AL.

Establish 18 PAA F-16 aircraft at the 132d Fighter Wing Des Moines International Airport Air Guard Station, IA (ANG).

The wing’s Expeditionary Combat Support (ECS) elements remain in place.

The Commission found that this change and the recommendation as amended are consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. The full text of this and all Commission recommendations can be found in Appendix Q.

RENO-TAHOE INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AIR GUARD STATION, NV

RECOMMENDATION # 99 (AIR FORCE 31)

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<tr>
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* No COBRA data available

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Realign Reno-Tahoe International Airport Air Guard Station, NV. Distribute the eight C-130H aircraft of the 152nd Airlift Wing (ANG) to the 189th Airlift Wing (ANG), Little Rock Air Force Base, AR. Flying related Expeditionary Combat Support (ECS) moves to Channel Islands Air Guard Station, CA (aerial port), and Fresno Air Guard Station, CA (firefighters). The remaining ECS elements and the Distributed Common Ground System (DCGS) remain in place.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

This recommendation distributes C-130 force structure to a higher military value base. Because of limitations to land and ramp space, Reno was unable to expand beyond 10 C-130s. This recommendation realigns Reno’s (101) C-130s to the Air National Guard at Little Rock Air Force Base (17), where a larger, more effective squadron size is possible. This larger squadron at Little Rock also creates the opportunity for an association between active duty and the Air National Guard, optimizing aircraft utilization.
COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community opposed DoD’s proposal, citing data discrepancies regarding ramp space, surge, and fuel capacity, and noted that the unit has had a positive long-term relationship with the community. The proposal would severely degrade the state’s ability to deal both with natural disasters and homeland security. The local airport authority would lose Air Guard support for key responsibilities and support functions, and the Reno Fire Department would lose the unit’s firefighting, airlift, and unique camera assets.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found that the Department of Defense recommendation to realign Reno-Tahoe International Airport Air Guard Station was based on insufficient military value data. The Commission noted that the C-130s at Reno have a special intelligence and reconnaissance mission. Therefore the Commission established a C-130 squadron at Reno-Tahoe IAP and at Little Rock AFB, Arkansas. This recommendation is consistent with the Commission’s Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve Laydown Plan.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission found that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final selection criteria 1 and 3, as well as from the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following:

Realign Reno-Tahoe International Airport Air Guard Station, NV. Distribute the 8 C-130 aircraft assigned to the 152d Airlift Wing (ANG) to meet the Primary Aircraft Authorizations (PAA) requirements established by the Base Closure and Realignment recommendations of the Secretary of Defense, as amended by the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission.

Establish 9 PAA C-130 aircraft at the 189th Airlift Wing (ANG), Little Rock Air Force Base, Arkansas.

Establish 8 PAA C-130 aircraft at the 152d Airlift Wing (ANG), Reno-Tahoe International Airport Air Guard Station, Nevada.

The Commission found that this change and the recommendation as amended are consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. The full text of this and all Commission recommendations can be found in Appendix Q.

CANNON AIR FORCE BASE, NM

RECOMMENDATION # 100 (AIR FORCE 32)

One-time Cost: $108.2M
Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings): ($206.5M)
20-Year Net Present Value: ($2,647.5M)
Payback Period: IMMEDIATE

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Close Cannon Air Force Base, NM. Distribute the 27th Fighter Wing’s F-16s to the 115th Fighter Wing, Dane County Regional Airport, Truax Field Air Guard Station, WI (three aircraft); 114th Fighter Wing, Joe Foss Field Air Guard Station, SD (three aircraft); 150th Fighter Wing, Kirtland Air Force Base, NM (three aircraft); 113th Wing, Andrews Air Force Base, MD (nine aircraft); 57th Fighter Wing, Nellis Air Force Base, NV (seven aircraft), the 388th Wing at Hill Air Force Base, UT (six aircraft), and backup inventory (29 aircraft).

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

Cannon has a unique F-16 force structure mix. The base has one F-16 Block 50 squadron, one F-16 Block 40 squadron, and one F-16 Block 30 squadron. All active-duty Block 50 bases have higher military value than Cannon. Cannon’s Block 50s move to backup inventory using standard Air Force programming percentages for fighters. Cannon’s F-16 Block 40s move to
Nellis Air Force Base (seven aircraft) and Hill Air Force Base (six aircraft to right-size the wing at 72 aircraft) and to backup inventory (11 aircraft). Nellis (12) and Hill (14) have a higher military value than Cannon (50). The remaining squadron of F-16 Block 30s (18 aircraft) are distributed to Air National Guard units at Kirtland Air Force Base, NM (16), Andrews Air Force Base, MD (21), Joe Foss Air Guard Station, SD (112), and Dane-Truax Air Guard Station, WI (122). These moves sustain the active/Air National Guard/Air Force Reserve force mix by replacing aircraft that retire in the 2025 Force Structure Plan.

Community Concerns

The Clovis community, including virtually all of its elected representatives, strongly argued that Cannon Air Force Base, one of three active-duty operational F-16 fighter bases, should remain open. They opposed the DoD recommendation, arguing that it deviated substantially from BRAC selection criteria. For instance, they claimed DoD did not appropriately consider the effect of encroachment on existing and future operations, the proposed New Mexico Training Range Initiative (NMTRI), or force structure retention and quality of life. They argued a realistic evaluation of long-term military value would close bases with significant encroachment problems, rather than Cannon. The community also argued the military-value-weighted analytical process failed to properly evaluate Cannon’s military value for the next 20 years for current and future missions, condition of infrastructure, contingency, mobilization, future forces and the cost of operations. Leaders argued that DoD used inaccurate, incomplete, outdated, and misleading data. The community was also deeply concerned about potential unemployment. While DoD projected the loss of approximately 20 percent of the community’s jobs, the community argued that DoD considered only Clovis and did not consider the nearby town of Portales. The community estimates the cumulative economic impact on the affected region to be approximately 30 percent, which in its view is a major deviation from Selection Criteria 6.

Commission Findings

DoD’s justification for closing Cannon was the Air Force’s overriding strategy to more effectively employ the shrinking Air Force structure by organizing its weapon systems into fewer, larger squadrons and by eliminating excess physical capacity. The Commission found this recommendation would allow the Air Force to relocate newer model F-16s as backup inventory to Active and to Air National Guard units. These moves would sustain the Active, the Air National Guard, and the Reserve force mix by replacing F-16 aircraft that will be retired in the 2025 Force Structure Plan.

The Commission found that prior to BRAC the Air Force had approved a programmatic out year reduction of 1,150 personnel at Cannon. This action, when combined with BRAC would result in an economic impact on the Clovis area of about 29 percent, which is about 10 percent greater than the economic impact reported by the DoD.

The Commission found that the 20-year Net Present Value savings for closing Cannon, while still significant, were substantially reduced when military personnel savings were eliminated.

The Commission further found that there is merit in disestablishing the 27th Fighter Wing and distributing its aircraft as recommended by DoD. The Commission also found that realigning Cannon Air Force Base as an enclave would enable DoD to meet potential needs for additional air base capacity.

Commission Recommendations

The Commission found that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final selection criteria 1, 6 and 7, as well as from the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following:

Realign Cannon Air Force Base, NM by disestablishing the 27th Fighter Wing and distributing its aircraft to meet the primary Aircraft Authorization (PAA) requirements established by the Base Closure and Realignment recommendations of the Secretary of Defense, as amended by the Base Closure and Realignment Commission. After disestablishing the 27th Fighter Wing, the Air Force shall establish an enclave at Cannon Air Force Base that shall remain open until December 31, 2009 during which time the Secretary of Defense shall seek other newly-identified missions with all military services for possible assignment to Cannon Air Force Base, NM. If the Secretary designates a mission for Cannon Air Force Base during this period, the enclave would revert to the status appropriate for the designated mission. If the Secretary does not find a mission for Cannon Air Force Base by December 31, 2009, Cannon Air Force Base and the enclave shall be closed. Nothing in this directive shall prohibit the State of New Mexico and the Department of Defense from entering into an agreement to close the enclave at Cannon Air Force Base earlier than December 31, 2009.
The Commission found that this change and the recommendation as amended are consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. The full text of this and all Commission recommendations can be found in Appendix Q.

Niagara Falls Air Reserve Station, NY

Recommendation # 101 (Air Force 33)

One-time Cost: $4.8M
Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings): ($0.26M)
20-Year Net Present Value: $1.2M
Payback Period: 26 YEARS

Secretary of Defense Recommendation

Close Niagara Falls Air Reserve Station (ARS), NY. Distribute the eight C-130H aircraft of the 914th Airlift Wing (AFR) to the 314th Airlift Wing, Little Rock Air Force Base, AR. The 914th’s headquarters moves to Langley Air Force Base, VA, the Expeditionary Combat Support (ECS) realigns to the 310th Space Group (AFR) at Schriever Air Force Base, CO, and the Civil Engineering Squadron moves to Lackland Air Force Base, TX. Also at Niagara, distribute the eight KC-135R aircraft of the 107th Air Refueling Wing (ANG) to the 101st Air Refueling Wing (ANG), Bangor International Airport Air Guard Station, ME. The 101st will subsequently retire its eight KC-135E aircraft, and no Air Force aircraft remain at Niagara.

Secretary of Defense Justification

This recommendation distributes C-130 force structure to Little Rock (17-airlift), a base with higher military value. These transfers move C-130 force structure from the Air Force Reserve to the active duty, addressing a documented imbalance in the active/reserve manning mix for C-130s. Additionally, this recommendation distributes more capable KC-135R aircraft to Bangor (123), replacing the older, less capable KC-135E aircraft. Bangor supports the Northeast Tanker Task Force and the Atlantic air bridge.

Community Concerns

Niagara Falls Air Reserve Station (NFARS) community representatives highlighted the proximity of NFARS to the busy US-Canadian border, and claimed that closure would harm America’s homeland defense capabilities. They pointed out that NFARS supports elements of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Army Reserves and National Guard, Coast Guard, Drug Enforcement Agency, and Customs and Border Protection. Local agencies benefiting from NFARS include Red Cross, the fire department, county sheriff, and the Niagara Falls Police. A chief concern of the community was how these agencies would be supported in the event NFARS closed.

Community representatives felt the Air Force recommendations were based on outdated or incomplete information. The “WIDGET” model, used to develop the MCI scores, did not allow for the use of 388,503 square feet of Federally owned ramp space available for use by NFARS. Further, the use of data for fiscal year 2003 did not capture significant reductions for base operating support that occurred in fiscal years 2004 through 2005. Had these factors been incorporated into DoD’s analysis, the Community believes the outcome might have been different.

Last, community advocates noted that the base is located in an economically depressed region and is the second largest employer in the area. Community leaders maintained that the COBRA model underestimated the economic impact on the locality by including Niagara Falls in the Buffalo, NY, Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) population estimates.

The Department of Defense estimated a job loss of 1,072. However, members of the Niagara Military Affairs Council (NIMAC) contend that closing NFARS will result in the loss of 2,906 jobs, eliminating 3.5 percent of Niagara County’s job base and potentially increasing the area’s unemployment rate from 6.1 percent to 7 percent. They maintain that this will create an "economic tipping point" that will cause irreversible damage. Community representatives indicated that conditions for successful redevelopment of NFARS do not exist. Since 2001; manufacturing employment is down 19.4 percent, information technology employment is down 27.6 percent, employment in the financial services sector is down 5.6 percent, and employment in the transportation and utilities industries is down by 3.9 percent.
COMMISSION FINDINGS

The DoD justification for closing Niagara Falls ARS was part of a larger effort to restructure the C-130 fleet from reserve units to active-duty units at Little Rock, in order to address an imbalance in the C-130 active/reserve manning structure. It also was intended to relocate the KC-135Rs to replace older KC-135E tankers at Bangor International Airport Air Guard Station.

The Commission found that Niagara Falls ARS has won Air Force Reserve Command’s recruiting awards for the last two years. Both Guard and Reserve wings exceeded their recruiting goals by 20 percent and have retention rates exceeding 95 percent. The Commission found that closing this installation would have affected future manpower requirements and would degrade current and future nighttime operations.

The Air Reserve Station is used jointly by the Air Force Reserve, the Air National Guard, and the Army Reserve and is one of only two Air Force installations on which Guard and Reserve units are collocated with shared facilities. Finally, the installation supports other Federal users with homeland defense missions, including the FBI, Army Guard, Coast Guard, Civil Air Patrol, Customs and Border Protection, and DEA. The Commission found that closing Niagara Falls Air Reserve Station would be detrimental to joint warfighting and homeland defense operations.

The Commission found that the savings associated with closing Niagara Falls ARS were overestimated by the Department of Defense as a result of recent cost reductions.

Niagara Falls is the second largest employer in an economically depressed region. According to data provided by the community, the closure of Niagara Falls Air Reserve Station would have resulted in the loss of 2,906 jobs as opposed to the 1,072 estimated by the Department of Defense. This figure represents 3.5 percent of the county’s job base and would have increased the area’s unemployment rate from 6.1 percent to over 7 percent.

The Commission also found the need to strengthen the Atlantic Air Bridge by transferring eight KC-135Rs from Niagara Falls ARS. This recommendation is consistent with the Commission’s Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve Laydown Plan.

This recommendation directing aircraft movement and personnel actions in connection with Air National Guard installations and organizations is designed to support the Future Total Force. The Commission expects that the Air Force will find new missions where needed, provide retraining opportunities, and take appropriate measures to limit possible adverse personnel impact. The Commission’s intent is that the Air Force will act to assign sufficient aircrew and maintenance personnel to units gaining aircraft in accordance with current, established procedures. However, the Commission expects that all decisions with regard to manpower authorizations will be made in consultation with the governor of the state in which the affected Air National Guard unit is located. Any manpower changes must be made under existing authorities, and must be made consistent with existing limitations. Some reclassification of existing positions may be necessary, but should not be executed until the Air Force and the state have determined the future mission of the unit to preclude unnecessary personnel turbulence.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission found that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final selection criteria 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6, as well as from the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following:

Realign Niagara Falls ARS, NY. Distribute the KC-135R/T aircraft assigned to the 107th Air Refueling Wing (ANG) to meet the Primary Aircraft Authorizations (PAA) requirements established by the Base Closure and Realignment recommendations of the Secretary of Defense, as amended by the Base Closure and Realignment Commission.

Establish 10 PAA KC-135R/T at the 101st Air Refueling Wing (ANG), Bangor International Airport Air Guard Station, Maine. The 101st Air Refueling Wing KC-135E aircraft will be transferred to the Aircraft Maintenance and Regeneration Center (AMARC) at Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona, for appropriate disposal as economically unserviceable aircraft.

All personnel allotted to the 107th Air Refueling Wing (ANG), including the unit’s Expeditionary Combat Support (ECS) elements, will remain in place and form an Air National Guard/Air Force Reserve associate wing with the 914th Airlift Wing. Establish a contiguous enclave for the 107th Air Refueling Wing (ANG) sufficient to support operation of that unit, including flight operations, and compatible with joint use of the Air Reserve Station as a civilian airport. Guard personnel will be provided the training necessary to support the airlift mission. This recommendation does not effect a change to the authorized end-strength of the New York Air National Guard. The distribution of aircraft currently assigned to the 107th Air Refueling Wing (ANG) is based upon a resource-constrained determination by the Department of Defense that the aircraft
concerned will better support national security requirements in other locations and is not conditioned upon the agreement of the state.

The Commission found that this change and the recommendation as amended are consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. The full text of this and all Commission recommendations can be found in Appendix Q.

Schenectady County Airport Air Guard Station, NY

Recommendation # 102 (Air Force 34)

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* No COBRA data available

Secretary of Defense Recommendation

Realign Schenectady County Airport Air Guard Station (Air Guard Station), NY. The 109th Airlift Wing (ANG) will transfer four C-130H aircraft to the 189th Airlift Wing (ANG), Little Rock Air Force Base, AR.

Secretary of Defense Justification

This recommendation distributes C-130 force structure to Little Rock (17), which has higher military value. Adding aircraft to the ANG unit at Little Rock creates a larger, more effective squadron. The LC-130 aircraft (ski-equipped) remain at Schenectady (117).

Community Concerns

Community representatives indicated that most full time and traditional Guard members will not follow the aircraft to Little Rock AFB, AR. The nearest bases from which Guard members could operate are more than 50 miles away, with some in excess of 100 miles. Additionally, they suggested that removing the C-130H will increase the usage of the ski-mounted LC-130s and shorten their operable lifespan by approximately 25 percent. The community reiterated its challenge to the legality of the proposed realignment, stating that (1) the proposed movement of aircraft is not related to infrastructure restructuring, (2) recommendations to relocate, withdraw, disband, or change the organization of an ANG unit, unless done so for infrastructure rationalization, is inconsistent with the intent of BRAC legislation, and (3) programmatic moves of aircraft are inconsistent with BRAC objectives. Last, community advocates stated that DoD’s recommendations diminished the Governor’s and DoD’s ability to defend the State by reducing the Governor’s ability to respond with airlift to high terror threat areas such as New York City, Buffalo and other highly populated northeast centers.

Commission Findings

The Secretary of Defense recommended realigning Schenectady County Airport Air Guard Station, New York by transferring four C-130H aircraft to Little Rock Air Force Base, AR as “part of a larger effort to restructure the C-130 fleet at Little Rock, which has a higher military value. By adding aircraft to the Air National Guard unit in Little Rock, the Department of Defense believes a larger, more effective squadron could be created.”

The Commission found the 109th Airlift Wing at Schenectady provides the nation’s only air cargo lift capability to polar destinations. The unit flies four C-130s and six LC-130s. Removing the C-130s would eliminate the unit’s unique summer mission serving the Arctic and Antarctica. The Commission established a 10-PAA C-130 squadron wing at Schenectady and this finding is consistent with the Commission’s Air National Guard and Reserve Laydown plan.
The Commission found that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final selection criterion 1, 2 and 3, as well as from the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following:

Realign Schenectady County Airport Air Guard Station (Air Guard Station), NY. Establish 10 Primary Authorized Aircraft (PAA) (L)C-130H at the 109th Airlift Wing (ANG), Schenectady County Airport Air Guard Station, NY.

The Commission found that this change and the recommendation as amended are consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. The full text of this and all Commission recommendations can be found in Appendix Q.

**Pope Air Force Base, NC, Pittsburgh International Airport Air Reserve Station, PA, and Yeager Air Guard Station, WV**

**Recommendation # 103 (Air Force 35)**

- **One-time Cost:** $191.3M
- **Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings):** ($209.8M)
- **20-Year Net Present Value:** ($2,711.5M)
- **Payback Period:** Immediate

**Secretary of Defense Recommendation**

Realign Pope Air Force Base, NC. Distribute the 43rd Airlift Wing’s C-130E aircraft (25 aircraft) to the 314th Airlift Wing, Little Rock Air Force Base, AR; realign the 23rd Fighter Group’s A-10 aircraft (36 aircraft) to Moody Air Force Base, GA; transfer real property accountability to the Army; disestablish the 43rd Medical Group and establish a medical squadron. At Little Rock Air Force Base, AR, realign eight C-130E aircraft to backup inventory; retire 27 C-130Es; realign one C-130J aircraft to the 143rd Airlift Wing (ANG), Quonset State Airport Air Guard Station, RI; two C-130Js to the 146th Airlift Wing (ANG), Channel Islands Air Guard Station, CA; and transfer four C-130Js from the 314th Airlift Wing (AD) to the 189th Airlift Wing (ANO), Little Rock Air Force Base.

Realign Yeager Airport Air Guard Station (AGS), WV, by realigning eight C-130H aircraft to Pope/Fort Bragg to form a 16 aircraft Air Force Reserve/active duty associate unit, and by relocating flying-related expeditionary combat support (ECS) to Eastern West Virginia Regional Airport/Shepherd Field AGS (aerial port and fire fighters). Close Pittsburgh International Airport (IAP) Air Reserve Station (ARS), PA, and relocate 911th Airlift Wing’s (AFRC) eight C-130H aircraft to Pope/Fort Bragg to form a 16 aircraft Air Force Reserve/active duty associate unit. Relocate AFRC operations and maintenance manpower to Pope/Fort Bragg. Relocate flight related ECS (aeromedical squadron) to Youngstown-Warren Regional APT ARS.

Relocate all remaining Pittsburgh ECS and headquarters manpower to Offutt Air Force Base, NE. Air National Guard units at Pittsburgh are unaffected.

**Secretary of Defense Justification**

Downsizing Pope Air Force Base takes advantage of mission-specific consolidation opportunities to reduce operational costs, maintenance costs and the manpower footprint. The smaller manpower footprint facilitates transfer of the installation to the Army. Active-duty C-130s and A-10s will move to Little Rock (17-airlift) and Moody (11-SOF/CSAR), respectively, to consolidate force structure at those two bases and enable Army recommendations at Pope. At Little Rock, older aircraft are retired or converted to backup inventory and J-model C-130s are aligned under the Air National Guard. Little Rock grows to become the single major active-duty C-130 unit, streamlining maintenance and operation of this aging weapon system. At Pope, the synergistic, multi-service relationship will continue between Army airborne and Air Force airlift forces with the creation of an active duty/Reserve associate unit. The C-130 unit remains as an Army tenant on an expanded Fort Bragg. With the disestablishment of the 43rd Medical Group, the Air Force will maintain the required manpower to provide primary care, flight and occupational medicine to support the Air Force active-duty military members. The Army will maintain the required manpower necessary to provide primary care, flight, and occupational medicine to support the Army active-duty military members. The Army will provide ancillary and specialty medical services for all assigned Army and Air Force military members (lab, X-ray, pharmacy, etc).
The major command’s capacity briefing reported Pittsburgh ARS land constraints prevented the installation from hosting more than 10 C-130 aircraft, and Yeager AGS cannot support more than eight C-130s. Careful analysis of mission capability indicates that it is more appropriate to increase the proposed airlift mission at Fort Bragg to an optimal 16 aircraft C-130 squadron, which provides greater military value and offers unique opportunities for Jointness.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

Representatives from the Pope Air Force Base (AFB) community expressed concerns about the effect of the recommendations on safety and Army operations. They maintained that safety is paramount at Pope AFB. It was noted that DoD’s recommendation would not change the mission at Pope and that air transport is the most critical aspect of the nation’s power projection capability. Community representatives stated “current leadership at Pope/Fort Bragg would execute the mission and make it successful” but that “it would be unique [in] the Army to run an airfield of the magnitude and operations tempo of Pope.” It was suggested that costs could actually increase if the Army were to take over the installation because of the additional costs associated with contracted labor. The example cited was that a civilian air traffic controller salary is three times that of a military air traffic controller. Community representatives recommended instead that Pope AFB become a C-130J Operational Center of Excellence. The C-130J is air-refuelable, making it very conducive to the mission of Fort Bragg. The same concerns were expressed about the Commission’s vote to consider expanding the scope of realignment of Pope as well.

The key issues for Pittsburgh International Airport Air Reserve Station pertained to the availability of land and whether it was considered in the Air Force model used to calculate military value. Community advocates contended that 50 to 100 acres are available for expansion of the airport, and cited memoranda of agreements since 1993 with the Pittsburgh International Airport to use an additional 21.7 acres adjacent to the Air Reserve Station. Community representatives maintained that DoD’s recommendations ignored opportunities for jointness and pointed to a report which noted that the installation supports the Military Entrance Processing Station (MEPS) by providing 9,000 applicants annually with testing, billeting, and dining, resulting in annual savings for the Army of $1.2 million. Additionally, the installation firing range is used by 50 local, State, and Federal (military and civilian) agencies and is one of the few ranges that allows for the firing of .50 caliber ammunition.

Advocates also expressed concerns about the base exchange, credit union, chapel, fitness center, consolidated club, and billeting, which are used by the 911th AW, the 171st ARW and the 99th Regional Readiness Command. The base also hosts the regional Casualty Assistance Office, and the 911th Communications Center provides Communications Security (COMSEC) and classified storage capability to over 50 Federal agencies and 100 percent of the Air National Guard’s 171st Air Refueling Wing’s communication needs. Last, advocates stated that the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) value used in the Cost of Base Realignment Actions (COBRA) model for calculating economic impact was incorrect.

The West Virginia community, including elected officials, argued that approximately half of the 320 full-time employees would leave the unit if the planes are removed from the base and that this would cripple the mission effectiveness of a unit with over 100 percent endstrength. They also stated DoD’s proposal would reduce joint training opportunities and significantly hinder the ability to rapidly transport a civil response team in the event of an emergency. The community contended DoD’s claim that Yeager’s ramp space could support no more than eight C-130s was refuted when 15 C-130s were on the ramp during a recent training exercise. Last, it would be difficult to recover from the loss of the base’s $71 million annual contribution to the local economy.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Department of Defense recommendation for realigning Pope Air Force Base, NC; closing the Pittsburgh IAP ARS PA; and realigning Yeager Air Guard Station (AGS), WV was part of a larger effort to restructure the C-130 fleet. The need for restructuring was driven by the age of the C-130E model aircraft and the participation in the replacement C-130J procurement program.

Given the importance of airlift to the Fort Bragg mission, there was concern regarding how the Air Force recommendation would be implemented. Other than the recommendation to form an Active Duty/Reserve Associate unit with the 16 C-130s transferred to Pope from Yeager and Pittsburgh, there was no discussion of how airlift operations would continue to be conducted in support of Fort Bragg. Particular concern focused on the loss of an execution planning cell and the informal working relationships that currently exists between elements at Fort Bragg and the 43rd Airlift Wing at Pope. In light of the importance of the Fort Bragg mission to national security, the Commission found the proposed action had the potential to
detrimentally affect that mission. Therefore, the Commission modified the DoD recommendation to establish an Air Force Air Operation Support Group at Pope AFB.

The justification for realigning Yeager and closing Pittsburgh was based on a 2003 data call. These data indicated that Yeager was unable to host more than eight C-130s and that Pittsburgh was unable to host more than ten C-130s. The Air Force had previously determined that the optimal size for a C-130 squadron was 16, but that 12 was an acceptable number for an Air Force Reserve or Air National Guard Squadron. Whether the data were outdated or the response misinterpreted, the Commission found that the resulting conclusions were incorrect. The Wing Commander at Yeager AGS, WV reported that the unit can park 12 C-130s. Commission staff observed eleven aircraft parked at the installation during our base visit.

Rather than closing Pittsburgh IAP ARS, the Commission determined that it should be realigned as an enclave on which a Regional Joint Readiness Center would be established. Since the Commission retained C-130 Aircraft at Pittsburgh, the Commission urges that the Department of Defense take affirmative action to identify and permanently locate and operate an optimum number of C-130 aircraft as a detachment to the Pittsburgh IAP ARS enclave in order that it may support the mission of the Regional Joint Readiness Center as well as current Air Force Reserve Command missions.

The Commission found reason to be concerned about Little Rock AFB’s ability to receive the recommended number of aircraft. BRAC staff verified that a comprehensive capacity analysis had not been conducted. Consequently, the total Military Construction costs to accommodate all the C-130 BRAC related moves to Little Rock were originally underestimated by approximately 63 percent. Recent USAF estimates are $246.7 million.

The Commission also found that the existing national security issues and the need to support the Fort Bragg mission overruled the deviations from the BRAC selection criteria. The Commission established a C-130 wing at Quonset State Airport Air Guard Station, Rhode Island; Channel Islands Air Guard Station, California; Little Rock AFB, Arkansas; and at Yeager Air Guard Station, West Virginia; consistent with the Commission’s Air National Guard and Reserve Laydown plan.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission found that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final selection criteria 1, 2 and 3, as well as from the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following:

**Realignment of Pope Air Force Base, NC:**
- Distribute the 25 C-130E aircraft assigned to the 43d Air Lift Wing and the 36 A-10 aircraft assigned to the 23d Fighter Group to meet the Primary Aircraft Authorizations (PAA) requirements established by the Base Closure and Realignment recommendations of the Secretary of Defense, as amended by the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission.
- Establish 16 PAA C-130H aircraft at Pope Army Air Field, Fort Bragg, North Carolina.
- Establish 48 PAA A-10 aircraft at Moody Air Force Base, Georgia.
- Transfer real property accountability to the Army; disestablish the 43d Medical Group and establish a medical squadron. The Air Force will establish an Air Support Operations Group to provide unity of command of Air Force units on Pope Army Air Field, mission execution planning, and management of efficient loadout of Fort Bragg assets.
- Realign Little Rock Air Force Base, Arkansas. Distribute 39 of the C-130 aircraft assigned to Little Rock Air Force Base, Arkansas to meet the Primary Aircraft Authorizations (PAA) requirements established by the Base Closure and Realignment recommendations of the Secretary of Defense, as amended by the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission.
  - Establish 8 PAA C-130J aircraft at the 143d Airlift Wing (ANG), Quonset State Airport Air Guard Station, Rhode Island;
  - Establish 8 PAA C-130J aircraft at the 146th Airlift Wing (ANG), Channel Islands Air Guard Station, California;
  - Establish 9 PAA C-130 aircraft at 189th Airlift Wing (ANG), Little Rock Air Force Base.
  - Realign Yeager Airport Air Guard Station (AGS), West Virginia. Establish 8 PAA C-130H aircraft at Yeager Airport Air Guard Station (AGS), West Virginia.
  - Realign Pittsburgh International Airport (IAP) Air Reserve Station (ARS), Pennsylvania. Establish a contiguous enclave at the Pittsburgh ARS, Pennsylvania sufficient to support continued operations of the reserve station units, including flight operations, and compatible with combined use of the civilian airport by the Air Reserve, Air National Guard and civilian users. Within that enclave, establish a Regional Joint Readiness Center (RJRC) at the Pittsburgh International Air Station with the mission of providing civil-military operations, homeland security and community-based medical support to the Department of Defense and the Department of homeland security National Incident Management Plan and the National
Response Plan. The enclave and RJRC will be staffed at the current manning level of the ARS. The PAA and personnel allocations of Air National Guard units at Pittsburgh are unaffected by this recommendation.

The Commission found that this change and the recommendation as amended are consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. The full text of this and all Commission recommendations can be found in Appendix Q.

**Grand Forks Air Force Base, ND**

Realign Grand Forks Air Force Base (AFB), ND. Distribute the 319th Air Refueling Wing’s KC-135R aircraft to the 126th Air Refueling Wing (ANG), Scott AFB, IL, (12 aircraft), which retires its eight KC-135E aircraft; the 916th Air Refueling Wing (AFR), Seymour Johnson AFB, NC, (eight aircraft), which will host an active duty associate unit; the 6th Air Mobility Wing, MacDill AFB, FL, (four aircraft), which will host a Reserve association with 927th Air Refueling Wing (AFR) manpower realigned from Selfridge ANGB, MI; the 154th Wing (ANG), Hickam AFB, HI, (four aircraft), which will host an active duty associate unit; and the 22nd Air Refueling Wing, McConnell AFB, KS, (eight aircraft), which currently associates with the 931st Air Refueling Group (AFR). Grand Forks will remain an active Air Force installation with a new active duty/Air National Guard association unit created in anticipation of emerging missions at Grand Forks.

Realign McConnell Air National Guard (ANG) Base by relocating the 184th Air Refueling Wing (ANG) nine KC-135R aircraft to the 190th Air Refueling Wing at Forbes Field AGS, KS, which will retire its eight assigned KC-135E aircraft. The 184th Air Refueling Wing’s operations and maintenance manpower will transfer with the aircraft to Forbes, while the wing’s expeditionary combat support (ECS) elements will remain at McConnell.

**Secretary of Defense Justification**

Grand Forks (40-tanker) ranked lowest in military value of all active-duty KC-135 bases. However, of Northern tier bases, Grand Forks ranked highest in military value for the UAV mission (43-UAV). Military judgment argued for a continued strategic presence in the north central US (Grand Forks is one of the last remaining active military installations in the region). Military judgment also indicated the potential for emerging missions in homeland defense, particularly for border states. Therefore, Grand Forks is retained as an active installation, but realigned to distribute its KC-135R force structure to bases with higher value for the tanker mission–MacDill (36), McConnell (15), Seymour Johnson (25), and Scott (38). The additional aircraft at MacDill optimize the unit size, establish a new active duty/Air Force Reserve association to enhance unit capability, and preserve sufficient capacity for future beddown of the next generation tanker aircraft. Scott receives KC-135R model aircraft to replace older, higher maintenance KC-135E models, capture Scott’s existing capacity, and increase its capability by robusting the ANG squadron. The additional aircraft at Seymour Johnson optimize the squadron, increase the wing’s capability, and establish another new active duty/Air Force Reserve unit association. Additional aircraft at McConnell capitalize on available excess capacity at no cost and optimize three squadrons for greater total wing capability. The Air Force used military judgment in moving force structure from Grand Forks to Hickam (87), concluding that Hickam’s strategic location argued for a more robust global mobility capability in the western Pacific. Increasing tanker force structure at Hickam strengthens the unit and establishes an active duty/Air Force Reserve association to maximize Reserve participation. Realigning ANG KC-135R aircraft from McConnell to Forbes (35) replaces aging, higher maintenance KC-135E aircraft with newer models while retaining the experienced personnel from one of the highest-ranking reserve component tanker bases.

**Community Concerns**

The North Dakota community welcomed the future Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) mission, while arguing DoD underestimated Grand Forks’ value as a tanker base. They claimed the Mission Compatibility Index (MCI) score
The community noted that the base is strategically located in the north-central United States, providing reduced flight times to key worldwide locations via shorter polar routes. In addition, DoD undervalued the absence of encroachment or air quality issues; outstanding infrastructure, to include a completely new runway estimated for completion in October 2005; the base’s support for nuclear missions; large amounts of available airspace; acreage and expansion opportunities; and its high Operations Tempo in support of the Global War on Terror. The community is concerned that the 24 aircraft Grand Forks will distribute to Air Reserve Component bases under DoD’s recommendation would be utilized at a significantly lower rate than while at Grand Forks.

The community asks why DoD recommended realigning its tankers since the Air Force’s 2003 “Tanker Roadmap” programmed Grand Forks for the first base to fully bed down KC-135 replacement aircraft (then scheduled for delivery in FY08). The community noted its strong relationship with the base, even more so since the 1997 flood, and cited its selection twice for the Abilene Trophy for most outstanding community support within Air Mobility Command. The community suggested that a recommendation to move tankers should call for distribution “as directed by the Secretary of the Air Force,” and that the base’s facilities, real property and housing be preserved to support a squadron of 12 KC-135s and a family of UAVs.

**Commission Findings**

The Commission found that Grand Forks has ample capacity and conditions for current and future flying missions, to include the Department of Defense’s intent to bed down a family of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). The Commission also found that the Secretary of Defense’s overall intent and concept of realigning KC-135s out of Grand Forks AFB was supportable. The Commission found reason to maintain a limited KC-135 presence on the base to facilitate an effective and cost-efficient mission conversion pending stand-up of a UAV.

The Commission found that Fiscal Year 2004 flying hour data revealed Air National Guard and Reserve bases slated to receive Grand Forks aircraft as a result of DoD’s recommendations flew their currently assigned aircraft an average of 49 percent fewer hours per aircraft per year, while Active Duty receiver bases flew their KC-135s an average of 8 percent more. DoD’s original recommendation would have resulted in 67 percent of Grand Forks aircraft realigning to Air Guard and Reserve bases, though the Commission found this was consistent with Air Force proportionality goals noting that Air Guard and Reserve forces currently operate 62 percent of the KC-135 fleet.

With regard to McConnell Air National Guard Base, KS, the Commission found the Secretary of Defense’s intent and concept of redistributing the Air National Guard operated KC-135s was supportable.

The Commission established Air National Guard KC-135 wings at: Scott AFB, Illinois, Seymour-Johnson AFB, North Carolina, MacDill AFB, Florida, Hickam AFB, Hawaii, McConnell AFB, Kansas, and Forbes Field, Kansas. This recommendation is consistent with the Commission’s Air National Guard Laydown plan.

**Commission Recommendations**

The Commission found that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final selection criteria 1 and 3, as well as from the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following:

Realign Grand Forks Air Force Base (AFB), ND. Distribute the 319th Air Refueling Wing’s KC-135R/T aircraft to meet the Primary Aircraft Authorizations (PAA) requirements established by the Base Closure and Realignment recommendations of the Secretary of Defense, as amended by the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission.

Establish the following KC-135R/T PAA:

The 126th Air Refueling Wing (ANG), Scott AFB, IL (eight PAA KC-135R/T). The 126th Air Refueling Wing KC-135E aircraft will be transferred to the Aerospace Maintenance and Regeneration Center (AMARC) at Davis-Monthan AFB, AZ, for appropriate disposal as economically unserviceable aircraft;

The 916th Air Refueling Wing (AFR), Seymour-Johnson AFB, NC (16 PAA KC-135R/T), which will host an active duty associate unit;

The 6th Air Mobility Wing, MacDill AFB, FL (16 PAA KC-135R/T), which will host a Reserve association with 927th Air Refueling Wing (AFR) manpower realigned from Selfridge ANGB, MI;

The 154th Wing (ANG), Hickam AFB, HI (12 PAA KC-135R/T), which will host an active duty associate unit; and,
The 22d Air Refueling Wing, McConnell AFB, KS (48 PAA KC-135R/T), which currently associates with the 931st Air Refueling Group (AFR).

Modify infrastructure at Grand Forks AFB to accommodate the emerging Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) mission. The Secretary of Defense will maintain eight KC-135 aircraft at Grand Forks Air Force Base to facilitate an efficient and cost effective bed down of UAVs. The Secretary will keep the tankers in place until the UAVs are operational at Grand Forks, but not later than 31 Dec 2010 unless otherwise required by the Department of Defense for National Emergencies. Grand Forks will remain an active Air Force installation with a new active duty/Air National Guard association unit created in anticipation of emerging missions at Grand Forks.

Realign McConnell Air National Guard Base by distributing the 184th Air Refueling Wing’s (ANG) nine KC-135R/T aircraft to meet the PAA requirements established by the Base Closure and Realignment recommendations of the Secretary of Defense, as amended by the Base Closure and Realignment Commission. Establish 12 Primary Aircraft Authorization KC-135R/T aircraft at the 190th Air Refueling Wing, Forbes Field AGS, KS. The 184th Air Refueling Wing KC-135E aircraft will be transferred to the AMARC at Davis-Monthan AFB, AZ, for appropriate disposal as economically unserviceable aircraft.

The Commission found that this change and the recommendation as amended are consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. The full text of this and all Commission recommendations can be found in Appendix Q.

**HECTOR INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AIR GUARD STATION, ND**

**RECOMMENDATION # 105 (AIR FORCE 38)**

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**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION**

Realign Hector International Airport Air Guard Station, ND. The 119th Fighter Wing’s F-16s (15 aircraft) retire. The wing’s expeditionary combat support elements remain in place.

**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION**

Hector (125) ranked low in military value. The reduction in F-16 force structure and the need to align common versions of the F-16 at the same bases argued for realigning Hector to allow its aircraft to retire without a flying mission backfill.

**COMMUNITY CONCERNS**

The North Dakota community welcome the planned Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) association with Grand Forks AFB, though it argued that the DoD recommendation language calling for the retirement of the unit’s F-16s “without a flying mission backfill” unfairly and unreasonably restricts future missions at Hector. The community argued that the Governor and Adjutant General were not consulted on the recommendation, and that the F-16 retirements were actions already programmed by the Air Force and should not be included in the BRAC process. Community representatives also argued that the Mission Compatibility Index (MCI) did not accurately assess Hector, particularly regarding its available ramp space, new runway, unencroached airspace, safety record, history of outstanding performance, and proximity to homeland defense and homeland security missions in the north-central United States (near the border with Canada). They felt that Air National Guard units were unfairly punished for their smaller, more efficient sizing, and DoD’s overall BRAC recommendations unreasonably favored units in the southern United States. Finally, they argued the loss of the F-16 mission will hurt their recruiting and retention efforts and will have negative economic impacts on the region.
COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found that the projected 20-year Net Present Value savings from realigning Hector IAP AGS were relatively modest. Regarding the Mission Compatibility Index score (MCI), there were instances when the MCI may not have comprehensively or completely assessed the base’s military value. In all cases, though, it would appear that the MCI scoring was administered consistently amongst units and bases.

The Commission found the Department of Defense’s original justification language cited Hector would be realigned with “no flying mission backfill.” Hector appeared to be the only base in which that phrase was used. While the Commission notes that the justification language is in itself not statutory, the Commission recognized that DoD’s planned Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) associate mission for Hector is itself a form of flying mission. The Commission found that DoD’s recommendation language did not sufficiently provide for future requirements related to the UAV mission Hector would support in conjunction with Grand Forks AFB, ND. This recommendation is consistent with the Commission’s Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve Laydown Plan.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission found that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final selection criteria 1 and 2, as well as from the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following:

Realign Hector International Airport Air Guard Station, ND. The 119th Fighter Wing (ANG) will be redesignated as an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle wing; the Armed Forces Reserve Center planned for construction on Hector Field will be expanded to include sufficient facilities to accommodate at minimum the UAV ground control and intelligence analysis functions and expeditionary combat support elements, including fire, crash and rescue services, of the 119th Wing (ANG), in addition to the units already identified in Army Recommendation 73, Reserve Component Transformation in North Dakota; and the Air Force will retain, adapt or construct appropriate facilities on Grand Forks Air Force Base appropriate to launch, recover, maintain and support the Unmanned Aerial Vehicles assigned to the 119th Wing (ANG). The Commission explicitly rejects the language contained in justification to the recommendation by the Secretary of Defense that there will be “no flying mission backfill” at Hector Field. The wing’s expeditionary combat support elements remain in place.

The Commission found that this change and the recommendation as amended are consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. The full text of this and all Commission recommendations can be found in Appendix Q.

MANSFIELD LAHM MUNICIPAL AIRPORT AIR GUARD STATION, OH

Recommendation # 106 (Air Force 39)

One-time Cost: $8.6M
Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings): ($6.7M)
20-Year Net Present Value: ($79.6M)
Payback Period: 1 Year

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Close Mansfield-Lahm Municipal Airport Air Guard Station (AGS), OH. Distribute the eight C-130H aircraft of the 179th Airlift Wing (ANG) to the 908th Airlift Wing (AFR), Maxwell Air Force Base, AL (four aircraft), and the 314th Airlift Wing, Little Rock Air Force Base, AR (four aircraft). Flying related Expeditionary Combat Support (ECS) moves to Louisville International Airport AGS, KY (aerial port) and Toledo Express Airport AGS, OH (firefighters).

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

This recommendation distributes C-130 aircraft to two bases with higher military value: Little Rock Air Force Base (17) and Maxwell Air Force Base (21). The addition of aircraft at Maxwell Air Force Base creates an optimally sized Reserve Component squadron. Additionally, these transfers move C-130 force structure from the Air National Guard to the Air Force Reserve and active duty, addressing a documented imbalance in the active/Air National Guard/Air Force Reserve manning mix for C-130s.
COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The Columbus, OH, community criticized Mission Compatiblility Index (MCI) scores, claiming Air Force use of a one-size-fits-all approach is inherently biased in favor of large active-duty bases and did not accurately reflect the site’s available ramp and hangar capacity. In addition to community concerns over the 300 jobs at risk, representatives contended it would be more cost effective to increase the number of the site’s aircraft because of high relocation-related military construction costs and because it has the highest personnel rating of any Air National Guard C-130 unit. Furthermore, they argued recent Congressional earmarks for infrastructure improvements could sustain the base’s flying mission through 2015, and a nearby industrial park relies on Mansfield-Lahm for fire protection services.

Last, the community noted there was extremely limited communication between the Air Force, National Guard Bureau, the Adjutants General, and the State governors. They claimed Air Force failure to engage their reserve component counterparts hurt morale and jeopardized a previously longstanding and good relationship.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found that the Department of Defense recommendation to close Mansfield-Lahm Municipal Airport Air Guard Station was not supportable. The Commission establishes an enclave at Mansfield-Lahm Municipal Airport Air Guard Station, Ohio. The Commission established a C-130 wing at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. This recommendation is consistent with the Commission’s Air National Guard Laydown plan.

This recommendation directing aircraft movement and personnel actions in connection with Air National Guard installations and organizations is designed to support the Future Total Force. The Commission expects that the Air Force will find new missions where needed, provide retraining opportunities, and take appropriate measures to limit possible adverse personnel impact. The Commission’s intent is that the Air Force will act to assign sufficient aircrew and maintenance personnel to units gaining aircraft in accordance with current, established procedures. However, the Commission expects that all decisions with regard to manpower authorizations will be made in consultation with the governor of the state in which the affected Air National Guard unit is located. Any manpower changes must be made under existing authorities, and must be made consistent with existing limitations. Some reclassification of existing positions may be necessary, but should not be executed until the Air Force and the state have determined the future mission of the unit to preclude unnecessary personnel turbulence.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission found that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final selection criteria 1, 2, 4 and 6, as well as from the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following:

Realign Mansfield-Lahm Municipal Airport Air Guard Station (AGS), OH. Distribute the 179th Airlift Wing’s C-130H aircraft to meet the Primary Aircraft Authorizations (PAA) requirements established by the Base Closure and Realignment recommendations of the Secretary of Defense, as amended by the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission.

Establish 8 C-130H PAA at the 908th Airlift Wing (AFR), Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.

Establish a contiguous enclave for the 179th Airlift Wing (ANG) sufficient to support operations of that unit, including flight operations, and compatible with joint use of the Mansfield-Lahm Municipal Airport as a civilian airport.

If the State of Ohio decides to change the organization, composition and location of the 179th Airlift Wing (ANG) to integrate the unit into the Future Total Force, all personnel allotted to the 179th Airlift Wing (ANG), including the unit’s Expeditionary Combat Support (ECS) elements, will remain in place and assume a mission relevant to the security interests of the State of Ohio and consistent with the integration of the unit into the Future Total Force, including but not limited to air mobility, C4ISR, Information Operations, engineering, flight training or unmanned aerial vehicles. Where appropriate, unit personnel will be retrained in skills relevant to the emerging mission.

This recommendation does not effect a change to the authorized end-strength of the Ohio Air National Guard. The distribution of aircraft currently assigned to the 179th Airlift Wing (ANG) is based upon a resource-constrained determination by the Department of Defense that the aircraft concerned will better support national security requirements in other locations and is not conditioned upon the agreement of the state.

The Commission found that this change and the recommendation as amended are consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. The full text of this and all Commission recommendations can be found in Appendix Q.
SPRINGFIELD-BECKLEY MUNICIPAL AIRPORT AIR GUARD STATION, OH

RECOMMENDATION # 107 (AIR FORCE 40)

ONE-TIME COST: $30.8M
ANNUAL RECURRING COSTS/(SAVINGS): ($2.5M)
20-YEAR NET PRESENT VALUE: ($5.4M)
PAYBACK PERIOD: 14 YEARS

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Realignment Springfield-Beckley Municipal Airport Air Guard Station, OH. Distribute the 178th Fighter Wing's F-16 aircraft to the 132nd Fighter Wing, Des Moines International Airport Air Guard Station, IA (nine aircraft); the 140th Wing (ANG), Buckley Air Force Base, CO (three aircraft) and 149th Fighter Wing (ANG), Lackland Air Force Base, TX (six aircraft), but retain the wing's expeditionary combat support (ECS) elements, the 251st Combat Communications Group (ANG) and 269th Combat Communications Squadron (ANG) in place, and relocate the wing's firefighter positions, which will move to Rickenbacker Air Guard Station, OH.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

The decision to realign Springfield-Beckley's F-16s and not replace force structure at Springfield-Beckley is based on considerations of military value and all other available information. Buckley (64) and Lackland (47) have higher military value than Springfield-Beckley (128), and Buckley has a role in the homeland defense mission. This recommendation optimizes the squadron size at Lackland, the only ANG F-16 Flying Training Unit. While not currently tasked with a homeland defense role, Des Moines (137) is located within the specified response timing criteria of a homeland security site of interest. The 132nd Fighter Wing, Des Moines International Airport Air Guard Station, will assume a role in the air sovereignty mission.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The Springfield-Beckley, OH, community criticized several Mission Compatibility Index (MCI) scores, claiming Air Force use of a one-size-fits-all approach is inherently biased in favor of large active-duty bases and the base's status as an F-16 formal training unit (FTU) should have exempted it from data calls pertaining to standard weapons storage requirements. DoD's military value scores reflected neither the base's mission nor mission requirements. According to the community's analysis, accurate data reflecting pavement quality, range space, training capacity, and maintenance and logistics capacity would have resulted in a significantly higher score. In addition, community representatives argued DoD failed to account for costs associated with replacing pilots and maintainers who would not move to the proposed location. They contended DoD completely ignored their proximity to Wright Patterson Air Force Base and the possibility of a community-basing program at Beckley. They felt that if quantitative military value analysis results did not satisfy the Air Force, “military judgment” was arbitrarily applied to justify the BRAC proposal. Last, the community expressed concerns about the 291 direct and 149 indirect jobs that could be lost, adding that they knew the F-16 would go away at some point but questioned if it was prudent to retire it so soon.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found that the Department of Defense recommendation to realign Springfield-Beckley Municipal Airport Air Guard Station should be supported even though the military value criteria were flawed and the realignment will be a cost instead of a savings to the Department. This unit is a training squadron for the F-16. There are currently two other Flying Training Units (FTUs) in the Total Force. The Commission agreed that with the total number of F-16s being reduced in the Air Force, the training requirements will be reduced commensurately. The Commission established an F-16 wing at Buckley AFB, Colorado and at Lackland AFB, Texas. This recommendation is consistent with the Commission's Air National Guard Laydown plan.

This recommendation directing aircraft movement and personnel actions in connection with Air National Guard installations and organizations is designed to support the Future Total Force. The Commission expects that the Air Force
will find new missions where needed, provide retraining opportunities, and take appropriate measures to limit possible adverse personnel impact. The Commission's intent is that the Air Force will act to assign sufficient aircrew and maintenance personnel to units gaining aircraft in accordance with current, established procedures. However, the Commission expects that all decisions with regard to manpower authorizations will be made in consultation with the governor of the state in which the affected Air National Guard unit is located. Any manpower changes must be made under existing authorities, and must be made consistent with existing limitations. Some reclassification of existing positions may be necessary, but should not be executed until the Air Force and the state have determined the future mission of the unit to preclude unnecessary personnel turbulence.

**Commission Recommendations**

The Commission found that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final selection criteria 2 and 5, as well as from the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following:

Realign Springfield-Beckley Municipal Airport Air Guard Station, OH. Distribute the 18 F-16 aircraft assigned to the 178th Fighter Wing (ANG) to meet the Primary Aircraft Authorizations (PAA) requirements established by the Base Closure and Realignment recommendations of the Secretary of Defense, as amended by the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission.

Establish 18 PAA F-16 aircraft at the 140th Wing (ANG), Buckley Air Force Base, Colorado.

Establish 18 PAA F-16 aircraft at the 149th Wing (ANG), Lackland Air Force Base, Texas.

Establish a contiguous enclave for the 178th Fighter Wing (ANG) sufficient to support operations of that unit, including flight operations, and compatible with joint use of the Springfield-Beckley Municipal Airport as a civilian airport.

If the State of Ohio decides to change the organization, composition and location of the 178th Fighter Wing (ANG) to integrate the unit into the Future Total Force, all personnel allotted to the 178th Fighter Wing (ANG), including the unit’s Expeditionary Combat Support (ECS) elements, will remain in place and assume a mission relevant to the security interests of the State of Ohio and consistent with the integration of the unit into the Future Total Force, including but not limited to air mobility, C4ISR, Information Operations, engineering, flight training or unmanned aerial vehicles. Where appropriate, unit personnel will be retrained in skills relevant to the emerging mission.

This recommendation does not effect a change to the authorized end-strength of the Ohio Air National Guard. The distribution of aircraft currently assigned to the 178th Fighter Wing (ANG) is based upon a resource-constrained determination by the Department of Defense that the aircraft concerned will better support national security requirements in other locations and is not conditioned upon the agreement of the state.

The Commission found that this change and the recommendation as amended are consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. The full text of this and all Commission recommendations can be found in Appendix Q.

**Portland International Airport, AGS, OR**

**Recommendation # 108 (Air Force 41)**

**One-time Cost:** $70M

**Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings):** ($3.7M)

**20-Year Net Present Value:** $19.9M

**Payback Period:** 28 YEARS

**Secretary of Defense Recommendation**

Realign Portland International Airport Air Guard Station, OR. Realign the 939th Air Refueling Wing (AFR) by distributing the wing’s KC-135R aircraft to the 507th Air Refueling Wing (AFR), Tinker Air Force Base, OK (four aircraft); the 190th Air Refueling Wing (ANG), Forbes Field Air Guard Station, KS (three aircraft); and by reverting one aircraft to backup inventory. Operations and maintenance manpower for four aircraft from the 939th Air Refueling Wing is realigned with the aircraft to Tinker Air Force Base. The 939th Air Refueling Wing's remaining manpower, to include expeditionary combat support, is realigned to Vandenberg Air Force Base, CA. Realign the 142nd Fighter Wing (ANG) by distributing the wing's
F-15 aircraft to the 177th Fighter Wing (ANG), Atlantic City, NJ (six aircraft) and the 159th Fighter Wing (ANG), New Orleans ARS, LA (nine aircraft). The 142nd Fighter Wing’s expeditionary combat support elements, along with the 244th and 272nd Combat Communications Squadrons (ANG), will remain at Portland and Portland will continue to support a homeland defense alert commitment. The 304th Rescue Squadron (AFR) at Portland is realigned to McChord Air Force Base, WA, with no aircraft involved. The 214th Engineering Installation Squadron (ANG), a geographically separated unit at Jackson Barracks, LA, is relocated onto available facilities at New Orleans.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

This recommendation realigns Portland’s KC-135R tanker aircraft to Forbes Field and Tinker, installations with higher military value. Tinker (4) and Forbes (35) ranked higher than Portland (71) for the tanker mission, and both installations remain operationally effective due to their proximity to air refueling missions. This recommendation will strengthen the Reserve squadron size at Tinker and Air National Guard squadron size at Forbes, increasing these units’ capability. An Air National Guard and Reserve KC-135 unit association will be established at Tinker to access Reserve experience and maximize regional Reserve participation in the aerial refueling mission. This recommendation will also ensure that critical KC-135 backup aircraft inventory levels are preserved.

This recommendation also realigns Portland’s F-15 fighter aircraft to an installation of higher military value. Atlantic City (61) ranks higher than Portland (77) for the fighter mission, and realigning Portland’s F-15 aircraft to Atlantic City helps create an optimum-sized fighter squadron (24 Primary Aircraft Assigned). While New Orleans (79) ranks slightly below Portland for the fighter mission, the Air Force used military judgment in realigning Portland’s remaining F-15 aircraft to New Orleans. New Orleans has above average military value for reserve component bases, and realigning aircraft from Portland creates another optimum-sized fighter squadron at New Orleans. Although the ANG will continue to support an alert commitment at Portland, the Air Force determined it is also a priority to support North American Defense Command (NORAD) and United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) air sovereignty alert requirements at Atlantic City and New Orleans. Creating effective sized squadrons at these reserve component locations ensures the Air Force can maintain trained, experienced pilots and maintenance technicians and is able to fulfill its homeland defense alert requirements. Portland’s ECS remains in place to support the Air Expeditionary Force and to retain trained, experienced Airmen.

By relocating the geographically separated Air National Guard squadron to New Orleans, the Air Force best utilizes available facilities on the installation while reducing the cost to the government to lease facilities in the community.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The Portland Community, including its elected representatives, strongly argued that the Portland International Airport Air Guard Station should remain intact. The community asserted that the proposed realignment would put the alert force structure below the pre-September 11, 2001, posture and leave Northwest population centers, airline traffic, and maritime routes vulnerable to future threats. It further expressed the opinion that the homeland defense mission was not adequately factored into the BRAC military value selection criteria. The community asserted that DoD consulted with neither the Oregon Governor nor the Adjutant General regarding the effect on their homeland security missions. The community believes that recruitment and retention of the expeditionary combat support unit that would remain in place as an enclave would suffer dramatically. The community argued the realignment makes no economic sense because there are no real personnel savings. It pointed out that the initial presentations by the Air Force staff to the Air Force Base Closure Executive Group projected payback, excluding personnel savings, to be in excess of 100 years and annual savings of $200,000, while the final report shows payback, including personnel savings, will be realized in only seven years with an annual savings of $14 million. The community argued that the 100 year payback projection is closer to being accurate.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found that the Department of Defense recommendation to realign the Portland International Airport Air Guard Station and to continue to support an alert commitment at Portland with a two-fighter-aircraft detachment on a rotational basis could not be supported. With respect to the fighter aircraft the Commission believes that the Air Force did not adequately address homeland security issues because its military value analysis was done by platform rather than by installation mission or function. The Commission found that the recommendation regarding the KC-135 tanker realignment to be adequately supported. The Commission noted that the Department of homeland security declined to participate in the public dialogue with the Commission.
The Commission found that the DoD rationale for relocating the 304th Rescue Squadron (Air Force Reserve) is no longer applicable; the Commission recommends they remain in place. This recommendation is consistent with the Commission’s Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve Laydown Plan.

**COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS**

The Commission found that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final selection criterion 1, as well as from the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following:

Realign Portland International Airport Air Guard Station, OR. Realign the 939th Air Refueling Wing (AFR). Distribute the KC-135R/T aircraft assigned to the 939th Air Refueling Wing (AFR) to meet the Primary Aircraft Authorizations (PAA) requirements established by the Base Closure and Realignment recommendations of the Secretary of Defense, as amended by the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission. Establish the 507th Air Refueling Wing (AFR), Tinker Air Force Base, OK as a twelve Primary Aircraft Authorizations (PAA) KC-135R/T wing. Operations and maintenance manpower for four PAA aircraft from the 939th Air Refueling Wing will realign to Tinker Air Force Base, OK. The 939th Air Refueling Wing’s Expeditionary Combat Support (ECS) is realigned to Vandenberg Air Force Base, California.

Realign the 142d Fighter Wing (ANG). Distribute the 15 F-15 aircraft assigned to the 142d Wing (ANG) to meet the Primary Aircraft Authorizations (PAA) requirements established by the Base Closure and Realignment recommendations of the Secretary of Defense, as amended by the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission.

Establish 18 PAA F-15 aircraft at the 142d Fighter Wing (ANG), Portland International Airport Air Guard Station, OR.

Establish 18 PAA F-15 aircraft at the 159th Fighter Wing (ANG), New Orleans ARS, LA.

The 142d Fighter Wing’s Expeditionary Combat Support elements, along with the 244th and 272d Combat Communications Squadrons (ANG), and the 304th Rescue Squadron (AFR), will remain at Portland and Portland will continue to support a homeland defense alert commitment. The 214th Engineering Installation Squadron (ANG), a geographically separated unit at Jackson Barracks, LA, is relocated onto available facilities at New Orleans.

The Commission found that this change and the recommendation as amended are consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. The full text of this and all Commission recommendations can be found in Appendix Q.

**ELLSWORTH AIR FORCE BASE, SD, AND DYESS AIR FORCE BASE, TX**

**RECOMMENDATION # 109 (AIR FORCE 43)**

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**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION**

Close Ellsworth Air Force Base, SD. The 24 B-1 aircraft assigned to the 28th Bomb Wing will be distributed to the 7th Bomb Wing, Dyess Air Force Base, TX. Realign Dyess Air Force Base, TX. The C-130 aircraft assigned to the 317th Airlift Group will be distributed to the active-duty 314th Airlift Wing (22 aircraft) and Air National Guard 189th Airlift Wing (two aircraft), Little Rock Air Force Base, AR; the 176th Wing (ANG), Elmendorf Air Force Base, AK (four aircraft); and the 302nd Airlift Wing (AFR), Peterson Air Force Base, CO (four aircraft). Peterson Air Force Base will have an active duty/Air Force Reserve association in the C-130 mission. Elmendorf Air Force Base will have an active duty/Air National Guard association in the C-130 mission.

**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION**

This recommendation consolidates the B-1 fleet at one installation to achieve operational efficiencies. Ellsworth (39) ranked lower in military value for the bomber mission than Dyess (20). To create an efficient, single-mission operation at Dyess, the Air Force realigned the tenant C-130s from Dyess to other Air Force installations. The majority of these aircraft went to
Little Rock (17-airlift), which enables consolidation of the active-duty C-130 fleet into one stateside location at Little Rock, and strengthens the Air National Guard squadron to facilitate an active duty association with the Guard unit. The other C-130s at Dyess were distributed to Elmendorf (51-airlift) and Peterson (30-airlift) to facilitate active duty associations with the Guard and Reserve units at these installations.

**Community Concerns**

The Rapid City, SD, community criticized DoD’s proposal on the grounds of national security, military value, cost, and economic impact. Representatives believe consolidating all B-1 bombers at one base poses significant security threats because a single accident or attack could wipe out or delay a major weapons platform. The community questioned DoD’s military value criteria and selection process because Ellsworth scored higher than Dyess in three of four criteria. The one lower score, in the most heavily weighted criteria, was inaccurate according to the community because it did not reflect Ellsworth’s proximity to low-level flying routes or mission supporting airspace. Further, representatives contended that operating the entire B-1 fleet at one base was inherently inefficient and would exceed the cost of maintaining two separate bases. They also questioned why Ellsworth was not considered for a tanker mission backfill when it ranked fifth for the tanker MCI score out of all Air Force bases evaluated - far higher than many other bases receiving tankers under DoD’s proposal. Finally, the community asserted closure would have a very significant economic impact.

The Abilene, TX, community asserted DoD’s recommendation to relocate their C-130s to bases with lower military value scores substantially deviated from the selection criteria. Further, the DoD proposal ignores the operational, training and maintenance efficiencies attained at Dyess with its 29 C-130H models. Last, it would cost more in military construction funding to relocate their aircraft to Little Rock than to keep them at Dyess along with the additional B-1s the base is slated to receive, thereby violating criteria five.

**Commission Findings**

The Commission found that Ellsworth is an outstanding installation. It has vast unencroached air space, is sparsely populated and has diverse terrain.

In reviewing DoD comparative military value scoring methodology for airspace and airspace training ranges the Commission found that the methodology was fairly and consistently applied, but it was narrowly focused and did not consider range utilization and the value of a range to specific aircraft. Because of this, the Commission found that Ellsworth’s airspace training range was more valuable than identified in the scoring methodology.

The Commission found that consolidating the B-1 fleet would reduce the number of bomber bases from five to four. The Commission found that the closure of Ellsworth would not result in a savings, but a cost. A significant portion of Ellsworth savings are tied to military personnel savings, but those savings would not be realized since efficiencies gained by the consolidation would not occur because the Air Force planned to use those positions for other missions, thereby negating savings and adding costs to move them.

The Commission also found the cost for military construction at Little Rock Air Force Base was significantly underestimated and therefore the military construction costs associated with this recommendation were much higher. Further, the Commission found that the military personnel movement linked to the distribution of C-130s from Dyess Air Force Base, TX to Little Rock, AR, Elmendorf Air National Guard, AK and Peterson Air Reserve Station is inefficient because it resulted in a net increase in personnel managing and maintaining the C-130s.

Additionally, the Commission found that protracted litigation in the primary airspace training range at Dyess could potentially impact readiness to the B-1 fleet if the temporary restriction were made permanent. Last, the Commission found that Ellsworth is the second largest employer in South Dakota and the closing of the base will have significant economic impact on the community. This impact would be significantly higher than DoD’s average impact on the community.

**Commission Recommendations**

The Commission found that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final selection criteria 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6, and the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission has rejected the recommendation of the Secretary.
Nashville International Airport Air Guard Station, TN

Recommendation # 110 (Air Force 44)

One-time Cost: $48.7M
Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings): $20.7M
20-Year Net Present Value: $261.3M
Payback Period: Never

Secretary of Defense Recommendation

Realignment of Nashville International Airport (IAP) Air Guard Station (AGS), TN. This recommendation distributes the C-130H aircraft of the 118th Airlift Wing (ANG) to the 182nd Airlift Wing (ANG), Greater Peoria Airport AGS, IL (four aircraft), and the 123rd Airlift Wing (ANG), Louisville IAP AGS, KY (four aircraft). Flying related ECS (aerial port and firefighters) moves to Memphis IAP AGS. The Aeromedical Squadron from Nashville moves to Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base Fort Worth. Other ECS remains in place at Nashville.

Secretary of Defense Justification

Nashville (104) had a low military value ranking and was near other ANG bases keeping or gaining aircraft. Military judgment was the predominant factor in this recommendation. This realignment creates two right-sized squadrons, Peoria (127) and Louisville (79), from three undersized squadrons and retains experienced ANG personnel.

Community Concerns

The Nashville, TN, community, including public officials, criticized Mission Compatiblity Index (MCI) scores, claiming the Air Force’s one-size-fits-all approach created a built-in bias favoring large active-duty bases. They argued that the Air Force’s optimal primary assigned aircraft (PAA) model was inappropriate for Air Guard installations. In addition, they asserted proper credit was not given for its new state-of-the-art maintenance facility and a civilian fuel depot to which the 118th Airlift Wing (AW) has unimpeded access. The community felt that when quantitative military value analysis did not generate the Air Force’s desired results, “military judgment” was arbitrarily applied to justify the BRAC proposals.

They stated the loss of experienced personnel and the subsequent negative impact on combat capability will be significant, and no members of Nashville’s aero-medical evacuation squadron are expected to relocate with their mission.

Public officials protested the loss of C-130 aircraft because they are so well-suited to civil support and emergency disaster response, and DoD’s proposal would hurt the area’s homeland security preparedness by separating transport capability from the Nashville-based 45th Civil Support Team.

Last, unlike the Army and Navy processes related to their Reserve Components, the community noted there was extremely limited communication between the Air Force, National Guard Bureau, the Adjutants General, and the State governors. The failure to engage their reserve component counterparts has had a negative effect on morale and jeopardized what was previously a longstanding and good relationship.

Commission Findings

The Commission found that the Department of Defense recommendation to remove the flying mission from Nashville International Airport Air Guard Station can be supported despite community concerns related to military value, manpower savings and impact on the state mission. The Commission also recognized the fact that the C-130 force structure is shrinking and that the number of Air National Guard C-130 operating locations must be reduced. The Commission established a C-130 wing at Greater Peoria Air Guard Station, Illinois and Louisville International Airport, Kentucky. This recommendation is consistent with the Commission’s Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve Laydown Plan.

This recommendation directing aircraft movement and personnel actions in connection with Air National Guard installations and organizations is designed to support the Future Total Force. The Commission expects that the Air Force will find new missions where needed, provide retraining opportunities, and take appropriate measures to limit possible adverse personnel impact. The Commission’s intent is that the Air Force will act to assign sufficient aircrew and
maintenance personnel to units gaining aircraft in accordance with current, established procedures. However, the Commission expects that all decisions with regard to manpower authorizations will be made in consultation with the governor of the state in which the affected Air National Guard unit is located. Any manpower changes must be made under existing authorities, and must be made consistent with existing limitations. Some reclassification of existing positions may be necessary, but should not be executed until the Air Force and the state have determined the future mission of the unit to preclude unnecessary personnel turbulence.

**Commission Recommendations**

The Commission found that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final selection criterion 1, as well as from the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following:

Realign Nashville International Airport (IAP) Air Guard Station (AGS), TN. Distribute the 8 C-130 aircraft assigned to the 118th Airlift Wing (ANG) to meet the Primary Assigned Aircraft (PAA) requirements established by the Base Closure and Realignment recommendations of the Secretary of Defense, as amended by the Base Closure and Realignment Commission.

Establish 8 PAA C-130 aircraft at the 182d Airlift Wing (ANG), Greater Peoria Airport, AGS, Illinois.

Establish 8 PAA C-130 aircraft at the 123d Airlift Wing (ANG), Louisville International Airport Air Guard Station, Kentucky.

Establish a contiguous enclave for the 118th Airlift Wing (ANG) sufficient to support operations of those units, including flight operations, and compatible with joint use of the Nashville International Airport as a civilian airport.

If the State of Tennessee decides to change the organization, composition and location of the 118th Wing (ANG) to integrate the unit into the Future Total Force, all personnel allotted to the 118th Wing (ANG) will remain in place and assume a mission relevant to the security interests of the State of Tennessee and consistent with the integration of the unit into the Future Total Force, including but not limited to air mobility, C4ISR, engineering, flight training or unmanned aerial vehicles. Where appropriate, unit personnel will be retrained in skills relevant to the emerging mission.

This recommendation does not effect a change to the authorized end-strength of the Tennessee Air National Guard. The distribution of aircraft currently assigned to the 118th Wing (ANG) is based upon a resource-constrained determination by the Department of Defense that the aircraft concerned will better support national security requirements in other locations and is not conditioned upon the agreement of the state.

The Commission found that this change and the recommendation as amended are consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. The full text of this and all Commission recommendations can be found in Appendix Q.

**Ellington Air Guard Station, TX**

**Recommendation # 111 (Air Force 45)**

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**Secretary of Defense Recommendation**

Realign Ellington Field Air Guard Station, TX. The 147th Fighter Wing’s F-16s (15 aircraft) will retire. The wing’s expeditionary combat support (ECS) elements will remain in place. Ellington retains the capability to support the homeland defense mission. The 272nd Engineering Installation Squadron, an ANG geographically separated unit, moves into available space on Ellington.

**Secretary of Defense Justification**

Ellington (80) ranked low in military value. The reduction in F-16 force structure and the need to align common versions of the F-16 at the same bases argued for allowing Ellington’s F-16s to retire in place with no fighter mission backfill. Ellington is
realigned to preserve the homeland defense Air Sovereignty Alert (ASA) site using aircraft assigned elsewhere and operating from Ellington on a rotational basis as tasked by US Northern Command. In a related recommendation, the Lackland Air Force Base, Texas Air National Guard F-16 initial training unit is increased in size to capitalize on Ellington's trained pilots and maintainers.

**Community Concerns**

The community objected to DoD’s recommendation to remove all F-16s and convert the facility into an Air Sovereignty Alert (ASA) site with only two aircraft. They disputed DoD’s military value analysis calculations, costs, and claimed the region’s homeland security would be placed at risk because the 147th is the area’s main source of homeland defense. Ellington’s MCI score would be higher if ramp space and surge capacity had been evaluated accurately. They also asserted the recommendation will increase costs with no corresponding synergy benefits. If the ASA mission is provided by another unit, increased costs will include $2500 to $3500 per flying hour, and operating an ASA not associated with an existing unit will add approximately $4 million annual costs. The impact of a terrorist attack in the area could have national ramifications because major industries produce 25 percent of the US gasoline supply and also include the Port of Houston.

**Commission Findings**

The Commission found that the Department of Defense recommendation to realign Ellington Air Guard Station should be supported despite community concerns related to homeland security and the base’s military value. The Commission recognized the high number of sensitive facilities in the Houston area. The Commission agreed with the alert posture plan developed by the Department of Defense to station fighters at Ellington for Air Sovereignty Alert (ASA) on a rotational basis. The Commission also understands that the Air National Guard F-16 inventory must be reduced.

This recommendation directing aircraft movement and personnel actions in connection with Air National Guard installations and organizations is designed to support the Future Total Force. The Commission expects that the Air Force will find new missions where needed, provide retraining opportunities, and take appropriate measures to limit possible adverse personnel impact. The Commission’s intent is that the Air Force will act to assign sufficient aircrew and maintenance personnel to units gaining aircraft in accordance with current, established procedures. However, the Commission expects that all decisions with regard to manpower authorizations will be made in consultation with the governor of the state in which the affected Air National Guard unit is located. Any manpower changes must be made under existing authorities, and must be made consistent with existing limitations. Some reclassification of existing positions may be necessary, but should not be executed until the Air Force and the state have determined the future mission of the unit to preclude unnecessary personnel turbulence. This recommendation is consistent with the Commission’s Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve Laydown Plan.

**Commission Recommendations**

The Commission found that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final selection criteria 1 and 2, as well as from the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following:

Realign Ellington Field Air Guard Station, TX. Distribute the 15 F-16 aircraft assigned to the 147th Fighter Wing (ANG) to meet the Primary Aircraft Authorizations (PAA) requirements established by the Base Closure and Realignment recommendations of the Secretary of Defense, as amended by the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission.

Establish a contiguous enclave for the 147th Fighter Wing (ANG) sufficient to support operations of that unit, including flight operations, and compatible with joint use of Ellington Field as a civilian airport.

If the State of Texas decides to change the organization, composition and location of the 147th Fighter Wing (ANG) to integrate the unit into the Future Total Force, all personnel allotted to the 147th Fighter Wing (ANG), including the unit’s Expeditionary Combat Support (ECS) elements, will remain in place and assume a mission relevant to the security interests of the State of Texas and consistent with the integration of the unit into the Future Total Force, including but not limited to air mobility, C4ISR, Information Operations, engineering, flight training or unmanned aerial vehicles. Where appropriate, unit personnel will be retrained in skills relevant to the emerging mission.

This recommendation does not effect a change to the authorized end-strength of the Texas Air National Guard. The distribution of aircraft currently assigned to the 147th Fighter Wing (ANG) is based upon a resource-constrained determination by the Department of Defense that the aircraft concerned will better support national security requirements in other locations and is not conditioned upon the agreement of the state. Ellington retains the capability to support the
The 272d Engineering Installation Squadron, an ANG geographically separated unit, moves into available space on Ellington.

The Commission found that this change and the recommendation as amended are consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. The full text of this and all Commission recommendations can be found in Appendix Q.

**Lackland Air Force Base, TX**

**Recommendation # 112 (Air Force 46)**

**One-time Cost:** $8.1M  
**Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings):** ($2.9M)  
**20-Year Net Present Value:** ($32.4M)  
**Payback Period:** 2 years

**Secretary of Defense Recommendation**


**Secretary of Defense Justification**

This recommendation enables Air Force Total Force participation by converting one of two Air Force STAMP/STRAPP missions from active duty to the Air National Guard. Lackland Air Force Base, Medina Annex is one of two STAMP mission locations within the Air Force; Hill Air Force Base, UT, is the other. This action will retain two geographically separated munitions sites to support the Air Force's Air Expeditionary Force construct, yet reduce the active-duty manpower requirement. Current munitions out-load operations from Medina Annex to the airhead at Lackland (the former Kelly Air Force Base airfield) pose transportation challenges in that explosives shipments are moved over local and interstate highways, increasing the security threat. The Air Force does not fully control the Lackland airfield, thus access and future encroachment cannot be ensured. McConnell Air Force Base has co-located munitions storage and hot-cargo handling capability on the base, enhancing out-load effectiveness with little projected interference on existing missions. The base has sufficient 1.1 net explosive weight munitions storage capacity in existing structures that supported a former bomb wing mission, and ANG personnel at McConnell currently perform a function similar to the active duty STAMP mission. Because of this existing capability, mission conversion is expected to require fewer additional full-time ANG personnel at McConnell than active-duty personnel at Medina.

**Community Concerns**

There were no formal expressions from the community.

**Commission Findings**

The Commission found that the military construction costs to realign the Standard Air Munitions Package (STAMP) and Standard Tank, Rack, Adaptor, and Pylon Package (STRAPP) at McConnell Air Force Base, KS were understated. Given this oversight, some critical military construction requirements might not be identified; and associated funding not programmed sufficiently to accommodate the storage of munitions at McConnell Air Force Base. The Commission also found an oversight in the recommendation that identified the departure of munitions personnel at Lackland Medina Annex in fiscal year 2007, yet the munitions stockpile is scheduled to be transported in fiscal year 2008. These concerns were identified to DoD who assured the Commission that adequate personnel would remain at Lackland Medina Annex until the mission was transferred. DoD also assured the Commission that any military construction shortfalls not identified would be resolved during site surveys at McConnell Air Force Base. Based on these assurances and the need to resolve the safety and security issues of transporting munitions over local and interstate highways at Lackland Medina as quickly as possible, the Commission concurred with this recommendation.
The Commission found the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission approves the recommendation of the Secretary.

HILL AIR FORCE BASE, UT, EDWARDS AIR FORCE BASE, CA, MOUNTAIN HOME AIR FORCE BASE, ID, LUKE AIR FORCE BASE, AZ, AND NELLIS AIR FORCE BASE, NV

Recommendation # 113 (Air Force 47)

One-time Cost: $28.6M
Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings): ($8.2M)
20-Year Net Present Value: ($85.0M)
Payback Period: 4 Years

Secretary of Defense Recommendation

Realign Hill Air Force Base, UT. Distribute the 419th Fighter Wing F-16s to the 482nd Fighter Wing, Homestead Air Reserve Base, FL (six aircraft) and the 301st Fighter Wing, Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base Fort Worth, TX (nine aircraft). The AFMC F-16s at Hill will remain in place. Realign Edwards Air Force Base, CA; Mountain Home Air Force Base, ID; and Luke Air Force Base, AZ, by relocating base-level LANTIRN intermediate maintenance to Hill, establishing a Centralized Intermediate Repair Facility (CIRF) for Low Altitude Navigation and Targeting Infrared for Night (LANTIRN) pods at Hill. Realign Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base Fort Worth, TX, and Nellis Air Force Base, NV, by relocating base-level F110 engine intermediate maintenance to Hill, establishing a CIRF for F110 engines at Hill.

Secretary of Defense Justification

The Air Force distributed Reserve aircraft to Homestead Air Reserve Base (31) to create an optimum sized squadron that supports the homeland defense Air Sovereignty Alert mission. The remaining Reserve aircraft are distributed to the only other remaining Reserve F-16 squadron at Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base Fort Worth (58). This laydown keeps the active/Air National Guard/Air Force Reserve force structure mix constant. Creating CIRFs for LANTIRN pods and F110 engines establishes Hill as a maintenance workload center for these commodities. This recommendation compliments other CIRF recommendations as part of an Air Force effort to standardize stateside and deployed intermediate-level maintenance concepts, and will increase maintenance productivity and support to the warfighter.

Community Concerns

Community representatives claimed the civilian personnel office (CPO) recommendation, if approved, will have a negative impact on Hill’s mission because the CPO plays a significant role in providing essential services to the base’s leadership and the large (10,000+) civilian workforce. They also noted that the DoD proposal, unlike other CPO consolidations, would not leave behind a minimum number of personnel specialists to service the base.

The community also argued that moving all of Hill’s Munitions Containment Group engineering positions to the Air Armament Center, Elgin AFB without also transferring the Munitions Sustainment mission leaves Hill without the technical expertise necessary to support the Air Force.

In addition, advocates opposed DoD’s proposed movement of Inventory Control Pont Functions for F-16 Depot Level Reparable (DLR) to the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), noting that Hill is the F-16 Center of Excellence responsible for cradle-to-grave management of F-16s. Moving a key function such as DLR management could have an adverse mission impact. Last, the Hill community strongly supported DoD’s recommendation to bed down six “block 40” F-16 aircraft at the base.
COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found that this realignment was consistent with the Air Force goals of creating larger more efficient fighter aircraft squadrons and improving intermediate level maintenance processes. The Commission found that Hill Air Force Base had capacity and conditions for current and future flying missions. The Commission also found that the Secretary of Defense’s overall intent and concept of realigning F-16 aircraft out of Hill Air Force Base was supportable. The Commission supported the recommendation to establish Hill as a Centralized Intermediate Repair Facility for Low Attitude Navigation and Targeting Infrared for Night pods and for F-110 Engines. The Commission established an F-16 wing at Homestead Air Reserve Base, Florida and the Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base Fort Worth, Texas. This recommendation is consistent with the Commission’s Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve Laydown Plan.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission found that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final selection criteria 1, 3, 4 and 5, as well as from the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following:

Realign Hill Air Force Base, UT. Distribute the 15 F-16 aircraft assigned to the 419th Fighter Wing (ANG) to meet the Primary Aircraft Authorizations (PAA) requirements established by the Base Closure and Realignment recommendations of the Secretary of Defense, as amended by the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission;

Establish 24 PAA F-16 aircraft at the 482nd Fighter Wing, Homestead Air Reserve Base, FL.

Establish 24 PAA F-16 aircraft at the 301st Fighter Wing, Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base Fort Worth, TX.

The AFMC F-16s will remain in place at Hill AFB.

Realign Edwards Air Force Base, CA; Mountain Home Air Force Base, ID; and Luke Air Force Base, AZ, by relocating base-level LANTIRN intermediate maintenance to Hill, establishing a Centralized Intermediate Repair Facility (CIRF) for Low Altitude Navigation and Targeting Infrared for Night (LANTIRN) pods at Hill AFB.

Realign Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base Fort Worth, TX, and Nellis Air Force Base, NV, by relocating base-level F110 engine intermediate maintenance to Hill, establishing a CIRF for F110 engines at Hill.

The Commission found that this change and the recommendation as amended are consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. The full text of this and all Commission recommendations can be found in Appendix Q.

LANGLEY AIR FORCE BASE, VA

RECOMMENDATION # 114 (AIR FORCE 49)

One-Time Cost: $1.79M
Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings): ($0.7M)
20-Year Net Present Value: ($8.5M)
Payback Period: 3 Years

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION


SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

This recommendation standardizes stateside and deployed intermediate-level maintenance concepts, and compliments other CIRF recommendations made by the Air Force. It will increase maintenance productivity and support to the warfighter by consolidating and smoothing dispersed, random workflows. As a result of other recommendations, Tyndall is expected to have two full squadrons (48 F-22s) as compared to only one squadron (24 F-15s) at Langley.
COMMUNITY CONCERNS

There were no formal expressions from the community.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found that the realignment is consistent with the Air Force goal's of improved efficacies and manpower costs savings for intermediate level maintenance for F-15 avionics. The Commission expressed concern that the Centralized Intermediate Repair Facility is transportation-centric and that delays to transportation of the F-15 avionics packages from the repair facility to Langley Air Force Base could affect unit readiness, but after discussion with DoD, the Commission determined that the Air Force has sufficient experience, planning and resources to mitigate against this possible effect.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission found the Secretary's recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission approves the recommendation of the Secretary.

RICHMOND AIR GUARD STATION, VA, AND DES MOINES INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AIR GUARD STATION, IA

RECOMMENDATION # 115 (AIR FORCE 50)

**One-time Cost:** $22.0M  
**Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings):** ($2.8M)  
**20-Year Net Present Value:** ($18.7M)  
**Payback Period:** 8 Years

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Realign Richmond International Airport Air Guard Station, VA. Distribute the 192nd Fighter Wing’s F-16s to the 132nd Fighter Wing, Des Moines International Airport Air Guard Station, IA (six aircraft); 482nd Fighter Wing Homestead Air Reserve Base, FL (three aircraft) and to backup inventory (six aircraft). Richmond International Airport Air Guard Station real property accountability will transfer to the Department of the Army. The 192nd Fighter Wing’s manpower will associate with the 1st Fighter Wing. Realign Des Moines International Airport Air Guard Station, IA. The F-16 aircraft currently assigned to the 132nd Fighter Wing at Des Moines are redistributed to the 180th Fighter Wing, Toledo Express Airport Air Guard Station, OH (nine aircraft) and 138th Fighter Wing, Tulsa International Airport Air Guard Station, OK (six aircraft).

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

Prior to BRAC 2005, the USAF announced a plan for the 192nd Fighter Wing (ANG) to associate at Langley Air Force Base. This announcement was made. To accommodate the association and the F-16 Force Structure Plan, the Air Force distributed the F-16s from Richmond to other F-16 bases using military value and judgment. The F-16s from Richmond (49) are distributed to Des Moines (137) and Homestead (31) to enable the capability to support the homeland defense Air Sovereignty Alert mission. Des Moines’ F-16s are distributed to Toledo (123) and Tulsa (114) to support the homeland defense Air Sovereignty Alert mission and to consolidate the precision-guided weapon employment capability that exists in the Air National Guard.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

There were no formal expressions from the community.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found that the Department of Defense recommendation to realign Richmond Air Guard Station should be supported. The Commission understands that the Air National Guard F-16 inventory must be reduced. The Commission
further understands that prior to this BRAC round Richmond entered into an agreement to associate with the active-duty F-22 unit at Langley AFB, VA. The Commission did not support the realignment of the Air Guard Station Des Moines, Iowa. The Commission established F-16 wing at Des Moines, Iowa, Toledo, Ohio, and Tulsa, Oklahoma. This recommendation is consistent with the Commission’s Air National Guard Laydown plan.

This recommendation directing aircraft movement and personnel actions in connection with Air National Guard installations and organizations is designed to support the Future Total Force. The Commission expects that the Air Force will find new missions where needed, provide retraining opportunities, and take appropriate measures to limit possible adverse personnel impact. The Commission’s intent is that the Air Force will act to assign sufficient aircrew and maintenance personnel to units gaining aircraft in accordance with current, established procedures. However, the Commission expects that all decisions with regard to manpower authorizations will be made in consultation with the governor of the state in which the affected Air National Guard unit is located. Any manpower changes must be made under existing authorities, and must be made consistent with existing limitations. Some reclassification of existing positions may be necessary, but should not be executed until the Air Force and the state have determined the future mission of the unit to preclude unnecessary personnel turbulence.

**COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS**

The Commission found that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final selection criteria 1 and 2, as well as from the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following:

Realign Richmond International Airport Air Guard Station, VA. Distribute the 15 F-16 aircraft assigned to the 192d Fighter Wing (ANG) to meet the Primary Aircraft Authorizations (PAA) requirements established by the Base Closure and Realignment recommendations of the Secretary of Defense, as amended by the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission.

Establish 24 F-16 PAA at the 482d Fighter Wing at Homestead Air Reserve Base, Florida.

Richmond International Airport Air Guard Station real property accountability will transfer to the Department of the Army. The 192d Fighter Wing’s manpower will associate with the 1st Fighter Wing. Where appropriate, unit personnel will be retrained in skills relevant to the emerging mission.

This recommendation does not effect a change to the authorized end-strength of the Virginia Air National Guard. The distribution of aircraft currently assigned to the 192d Fighter Wing (ANG) is based upon a resource-constrained determination by the Department of Defense that the aircraft concerned will better support national security requirements in other locations and is not conditioned upon the agreement of the commonwealth.

Realign Des Moines International Airport Air Guard Station, IA. Distribute the 15 F-16 aircraft assigned to the 132d Fighter Wing (ANG) to meet the Primary Aircraft Authorizations (PAA) requirements established by the Base Closure and Realignment recommendations of the Secretary of Defense, as amended by the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission.

Establish 18 F-16 PAA at the 132d Fighter Wing, Des Moines International Airport Air Guard Station, Iowa.

Establish 18 F-16 PAA at the 180th Fighter Wing, Toledo Express Airport Air Guard Station, Ohio.

Establish 21 F-16 PAA at the 138th Fighter Wing, Tulsa International Airport Air Guard Station, Oklahoma.

The Commission found that this change and the recommendation as amended are consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. The full text of this and all Commission recommendations can be found in Appendix Q.
**Fairchild Air Force Base, WA**

**RECOMMENDATION # 116 (AIR FORCE 51)**

**One-time Cost:** $6.4M  
**Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings):** ($0.9M)  
**20-Year Net Present Value:** ($6.7M)  
**Payback Period:** 8 Years

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**Secretary of Defense Recommendation**

Realign Fairchild Air Force Base, WA. The 141st Air Refueling Wing (ANG) will associate with the 92d Air Refueling Wing at Fairchild Air Force Base, and the 141st Air Refueling Wing’s eight KC-135R aircraft are distributed to the 185th Air Refueling Wing (ANG), Sioux Gateway Airport Air Guard Station, IA. The 256th Combat Communications Squadron and 242d Combat Communications Squadron, which are ANG geographically separated units at Four Lakes and Spokane, are relocated into available facilities at Fairchild Air Force Base.

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**Secretary of Defense Justification**

This recommendation realigns aircraft and streamlines operations at Fairchild by associating the Air National Guard KC-135 wing with the active-duty wing. Fairchild Air Force Base (17) ranked just behind McConnell Air Force Base as the active-duty tanker base with highest military value for a tanker mission. This realignment preserves remaining capacity for the next generation tanker aircraft, while maintaining the ANG experience and recruiting potential within the region. In distributing KC-135R force structure to Sioux Gateway Air Guard Station (67), the Air Force applied military judgment in replacing aging, higher maintenance KC-135E force structure at Sioux Gateway with newer models to increase the unit’s capability and retain trained, experienced aircrews and maintenance technicians. By relocating two geographically separated units onto Fairchild, the Air Force best uses its available resources while reducing the cost to the government of leased facilities.

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**Community Concerns**

The Fairchild, WA, community did not express specific concerns about DoD’s proposal, having been advised they were in line for some of the early new tanker aircraft once they are produced and deployed. The community is pleased to associate with the active unit until the new tanker aircraft are available.

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**Commission Findings**

While the Commission found that the community had no specific concerns regarding this recommendation, the Commission noted that the 141st Air Refueling Wing (ANG) is prepared to associate with the Active Duty’s 92d Air Refueling Wing at Fairchild AFB. The Commission recognized the stewardship of the 141st ARW and strongly supports the placement of the new tanker aircraft with the 141st to lead the force. The Commission further found that the Secretary of Defense’s overall intent and concept of redistributing the ANG KC-135s out of Fairchild AFB was supportable.

This recommendation directing aircraft movement and personnel actions in connection with Air National Guard installations and organizations is designed to support the Future Total Force. The Commission expects that the Air Force will find new missions where needed, provide retraining opportunities, and take appropriate measures to limit possible adverse personnel impact. The Commission’s intent is that the Air Force will act to assign sufficient aircrew and maintenance personnel to units gaining aircraft in accordance with current, established procedures. However, the Commission expects that all decisions with regard to manpower authorizations will be made in consultation with the governor of the state in which the affected Air National Guard unit is located. Any manpower changes must be made under existing authorities, and must be made consistent with existing limitations. Some reclassification of existing positions may be necessary, but should not be executed until the Air Force and the state have determined the future mission of the unit to preclude unnecessary personnel turbulence. This recommendation is consistent with the Commission’s Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve Laydown Plan.
General Mitchell Air Reserve Station, WI

Recommendation # 117 (Air Force 52)

One-time Cost: (See recommendation #103, Pope AFB, North Carolina)
Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings): (See recommendation #103, Pope AFB, North Carolina)
20-Year Net Present Value: (See recommendation #103, Pope AFB, North Carolina)
Payback Period: (See recommendation #103, Pope AFB, North Carolina)

Secretary of Defense Recommendation

Close General Mitchell Air Reserve Station (ARS). Distribute the eight C-130H aircraft of the 440th Airlift Wing to the 94th Airlift Wing (AFR), Dobbins Air Reserve Base (ARB), GA (four aircraft) and to the 314th Airlift Wing, Little Rock Air Force Base, AR (four aircraft). Realign the 440th Airlift Wing’s operations, maintenance and Expeditionary Combat Support (ECS) manpower to Fort Bragg, NC. Air National Guard units at Mitchell are unaffected by this recommendation.

Secretary of Defense Justification

This recommendation distributes C-130 aircraft to two bases of higher military value, Little Rock Air Force Base (17) and Dobbins Air Reserve Base (71). Adding aircraft at Little Rock and Dobbins optimizes squadron size, creating larger, more effective squadrons. Additionally, these transfers move C-130 force structure from the Air Force Reserve to the active duty, addressing a documented imbalance in the active/Air National Guard/Air Force Reserve manning mix for C-130s.

Community Concerns

The community believes that the recommendation to close General Mitchell ARS is unjustified. The community asserted that the Air Force’s use of the recommendation to recapitalize its C-130 fleet was outside the scope of BRAC and would leave no strategic Air Force Reserve presence in the Milwaukee/Chicago area. The community contended that relocating the 440th Airlift Wing would have a negative impact on recruitment and retention, citing a direct correlation between proximity to the vast industrial local labor pool and the base’s ability to attract and retain experienced personnel. Citizens also noted that closure of General Mitchell ARS would result in the loss of thousands of flying hours and years of technical experience, jeopardizing a level of combat readiness difficult to reproduce elsewhere. Further, the community contended that MCI formulas were inherently biased against smaller bases and that General Mitchell’s MCI score was improperly computed. According to the community, General Mitchell ARS should have received an Airlift MCI score better than that of two bases that were not on DoD’s list of realignments and closures. Finally, the community asserted General Mitchell ARS was more cost efficient than the three bases slated to receive Mitchell’s manpower or assets and that its depot level maintenance alone saved the Air Force $1.14 million.

Commission Findings

The Commission found that though the Mission Compatibility Index (MCI) tool did not accurately capture all aspects of the base’s military value and may appear to have favored larger bases, it appears to have been applied consistently. Regarding Mitchell’s Airlift MCI score, the Commission verified that there was in fact a calculation error for the formula assessing the quality of an installation’s pavement. Even after correcting the error, however, the base still ranked as one of two of the lowest scoring Air Force Reserve bases, according to the Air Force. The Commission found this recommendation supportable. The Commission established C-130 wings at Dobbins Air Reserve Base, Georgia and Pope Air Force Base, North Carolina. This recommendation is consistent with the Commission’s Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve Laydown plan.

Commission Recommendations

The Commission found that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final selection criterion 1, as well as from the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following:
Close General Mitchell Air Reserve Station (ARS). Distribute the 440th Airlift Wing’s C-130H aircraft to meet the Primary Aircraft Authorizations (PAA) requirements established by the Base Closure and Realignment recommendations of the Secretary of Defense, as amended by the Base Closure and Realignment Commission.

Establish the following C-130H PAA:

The 94th Airlift Wing (AFR), Dobbins Air Reserve Base (ARB), GA (8 PAA C-130H);

The Air Force Reserve/Active Duty unit (designation to be determined) at Pope Army Airfield, NC (16 PAA C-130H).

Realign the 440th Airlift Wing’s operations, maintenance and Expeditionary Combat Support (ECS) manpower to Pope Army Airfield, NC. Air National Guard units at Mitchell are unaffected by this recommendation.

The Commission found that this change and the recommendation as amended are consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. The full text of this and all Commission recommendations can be found in Appendix Q.

**AIR FORCE LOGISTICS SUPPORT CENTERS**

**RECOMMENDATION # 118 (AIR FORCE 53)**

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<td><strong>PAYBACK PERIOD:</strong></td>
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**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION**

Realign Altus Air Force Base, OK; Hickam Air Force Base, HI; Hurlburt Field, FL; Langley Air Force Base, VA; Little Rock Air Force Base, AR; Luke Air Force Base, AZ; and Scott Air Force Base, IL. Establish Air Force Logistics Support Centers (LSCs) at Langley Air Force Base and Scott Air Force Base by combining five major command (MAJCOM) Regional Supply Squadrons (RSS) into two LSCs.


Mobility Air Forces (MAF): Establish a MAF LSC at Scott Air Force Base by realigning RSS positions from Hurlburt Field and Sembach (non-BRAC programmatic) and LRS positions from Little Rock Air Force Base and Altus Air Force Base.

**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION**

This recommendation is a transformational opportunity consistent with eLog21 initiatives that will standardize Air Force materiel management command and control. This recommendation realigns RSS manpower (from three MAJCOM locations) and base-level LRS manpower (from three installations) into two LSCs in support of Combat Air Forces and Mobility Air Forces. Consolidation will provide a seamless transition from peace to war for 3,012 aircraft and weapons systems associated with CAF/MAF forces and the airmen who use them. It also provides a single point of contact to the warfighter, whether at home station or deployed. This recommendation will also result in the disestablishment of the Air Force Special Operations Command Regional Supply Squadron, Pacific Air Forces Regional Supply Squadron, and the United States Air Forces in Europe Regional Supply Squadron.

**COMMUNITY CONCERNS**

There were no formal expressions from the community.
COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found operational efficiencies gained by this recommendation. The Commission noted a risk to material management support to the Air Force during the transition period, but the Commission also recognized that the Air Force has, in-place, a detailed implementation plans to mitigate this risk.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission found the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission approves the recommendation of the Secretary.

F100 ENGINE CENTRALIZED INTERMEDIATE REPAIR FACILITIES

RECOMMENDATION # 119 (AIR FORCE 55)

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SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Realign Langley Air Force Base, VA; Tyndall Air Force Base, FL; and Jacksonville International Airport Air Guard Station, FL. Establish a Centralized Intermediate Repair Facility (CIRF) for F100 engines at Seymour Johnson Air Force Base, NC, by realigning base-level F100 engine intermediate maintenance from Langley Air Force Base. Establish a CIRF for F100 engines at New Orleans Air Reserve Station, LA (Air National Guard unit), by realigning base-level F100 engine intermediate maintenance from Tyndall Air Force Base and Jacksonville Air Guard Station.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

This recommendation standardizes stateside and deployed intermediate-level maintenance concepts, and compliments other CIRF recommendations made by the Air Force. These CIRFs increase maintenance productivity and support to the warfighter by consolidating dispersed and random workflows, improving reliability-centered maintenance. Realigning F100 engine maintenance from Langley and establishing an eastern region CIRF at Seymour Johnson anticipates the installation as a maintenance workload center for F-15 engines. Seymour Johnson is projected to have up to 87 F-15 aircraft as compared with only 24 F-15 aircraft at Langley. Realigning F100 engine maintenance from Tyndall and Jacksonville into a CIRF at New Orleans (ANG unit) establishes a southeast region CIRF that will service F100 engines for up to 96 F-15 aircraft of active duty and Air National Guard aircraft, complimenting other Air Force recommendations that increase New Orleans and Jacksonville to an optimum 24 aircraft squadron size. The Air Force considered both New Orleans and Jacksonville for the southeast CIRF, but analysis indicated New Orleans would require less construction than Jacksonville due to existing maintenance facilities. A CIRF at New Orleans can also potentially capitalize on capacity and recruitment of experienced maintenance technicians as a result of the recommended realignment of the New Orleans Reserve A-10 mission.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

Panama City, FL, expressed concerns about the loss of a jet engine facility and suggested that instead of shipping F-100 engines to a new Consolidated Intermediate Repair Facility in New Orleans, it would be more cost-effective to expand the existing engine shop at Tyndall, which already performs F-100 engine intermediate maintenance. It also questioned the accuracy and wisdom of the COBRA analysis regarding the non-medical chemical warfare research team.
COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found that this realignment is consistent with the Air Force’s goal of increased maintenance productivity and achieving economics of scale. The Commission found no substantial deviation from the military value criteria and Force Structure Plan.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission found the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission approves the recommendation of the Secretary.

GALENA FORWARD OPERATING LOCATION (FOL), AK

Recommendation # 195 (Add)

One-time Cost: $11.5M
Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings): ($12.3M)
20-Year Net Present Value: ($165.5M)
Payback Period: 1 year

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

None. The Secretary’s proposed list submitted on May 13, 2005 did not include this facility. It was added by the Commission on July 19, 2005 for further consideration.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

None.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community argued that Galena is still needed as a forward operating location (FOL) because its location offers significant operational advantages over Eielson and Elmendorf AFBs. They also cited Galena’s value as an alternate landing site for aircraft based at other locations as no other suitable landing sites are within a reasonable distance.

Galena is an extremely small community, and it estimated it would lose about a third of its total jobs, as well as utilities the Air Force provides to its schools located on the airport. If the Commission’s added recommendation is approved, the community seeks a gradual or phased transition process to mitigate the negative economic impact.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The rationale for maintaining two forward operating locations in Alaska was derived during the Cold War. However, the Commission found the security environment has changed and the requirement for maintaining these forward operation locations is not essential. The mission currently conducted at Galena could be conducted at Eielson AFB with little operational impact and acceptable risk. Another forward operating location in King Salmon, AK would continue to be maintained. Galena has also served as an alternate landing site for aircraft based at other locations who encounter mechanical or weather related problems. However, the Commission found that closing Galena would not present significant risk, as other measures could be taken depending on the specific circumstances.

The Commission also found that other Federal Agencies operate on the Galena airport, closing the Air Force forward operating location would likely increase their costs of operation. The Commission found that these costs would be modest, and that other means might be available to help them offset those costs.

The Commission shares the concerns expressed by the community about the economic impact on the community. The Commission recommends that the Air Force not close Galena Forward Operating Location until the community has adequate time for planning and redevelopment efforts. This will help ensure that the services provided by federal and state
agencies are not interrupted before these agencies have an opportunity to plan for the greater operating costs. Further, the Commission requests the Air Force to work with the state and local government to support continued winter maintenance activities at the Galena Airport runway, so that the site may serve as a viable alternative emergency airport until it closes the Galena FOL; and to expeditiously address environmental cleanup at the site. Finally, the Commission requests the Air Force to work with the local and state government to maintain the infrastructure so as to provide for an orderly transition from a military operation to a civilian operation at the Galena Airport.

**COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS**

The Commission found that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final selection criteria 1 and 4, as well as from the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following:

Close Galena Forward Operating Location, Alaska.

The Commission found that this change and the recommendation as amended are consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. The full text of this and all Commission recommendations can be found in Appendix Q.
### 2005 BRAC Commission

Air National Guard Actions by State

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JOINT CROSS-SERVICE GROUPS (JCSGs):

EDUCATION AND TRAINING

AVIATION LOGISTICS SCHOOL

RECOMMENDATION # 120 (E&T 5)

ONE-TIME COST: N/A
ANNUAL RECURRING COSTS/(SAVINGS): N/A
20-YEAR NET PRESENT VALUE N/A
PAYBACK PERIOD: N/A

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Realign Fort Eustis, VA, by relocating the Aviation Logistics School and consolidating it with the Aviation Center and School at Fort Rucker, AL.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

This recommendation consolidates Aviation training and doctrine development at a single location. Consolidating Aviation Logistics training with the Aviation Center and School fosters consistency, standardization, and training proficiency. It consolidates both Aviation skill level I–producing courses at one location, which allows the Army to reduce the total number of Military Occupational Skills training locations (reducing the TRADOC footprint). Additionally, it enhances military value, supports the Army’s Force Structure Plan, and maintains sufficient surge capability to address unforeseen requirements. It improves training capabilities while eliminating excess capacity at institutional training installations. This provides the same or better level of service at a reduced cost. This recommendation supports Army Transformation by collocating institutional training, MTOE units, RDT&E organizations, and other TDA units in large numbers on single installations to support force stabilization and engage training.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The Fort Eustis community expressed concerns that consolidation of the Aviation Logistics School and the Aviation School would not create synergies since officer flight training and maintenance enlisted personnel training call for very different skill sets. They were concerned that the move of the school would damage sophisticated training devices in transit and degrade training. They questioned the adequacy of Fort Rucker’s infrastructure and off-post instructor candidate pool. Finally, they maintained that DoD understated costs and overstated savings.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found excessive manpower savings attributed to the consolidation of the Aviation Logistics School and the Aviation School. Correcting DoD’s error reduced military manpower savings from 530 spaces to 104 spaces—eliminating 426 spaces initially claimed as military savings and reducing annual dollar savings by 73 percent. In response to the Commission, the Department reviewed military construction requirements and reduced its estimated future military construction costs by nearly $200 million, to $199.5 million. While the reduced construction estimates somewhat offset the reduced annual savings, the Commission found that the adjusted payback period was still 45 years. The Commission found that the justification for consolidation rested solely on the non-cost elements of the proposal and that the marginal potential improvements in military value did not justify or support a net investment cost of $290.3 million.
COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission finds that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final selection criteria 4 and 5 and the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission has rejected the recommendation of the Secretary.

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT CENTER

RECOMMENDATION # 121 (E&T 6)

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<td>Payback period:</td>
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SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Realign Fort Eustis, VA, by relocating the Transportation Center and School to Fort Lee, VA. Realign Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, by relocating the Ordnance Center and School to Fort Lee, VA. Realign Redstone Arsenal, AL, by relocating the Missile and Munitions Center to Fort Lee, VA. Consolidate the Transportation Center and School and the Ordnance Center and School with the Quartermaster Center & School, the Army Logistic Management College, and Combined Arms Support Command to establish a Combat Service Support Center at Fort Lee, VA.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

This recommendation consolidates Combat Service Support training and doctrine development at a single installation, which promotes training effectiveness and functional efficiencies. The moves advance the Maneuver Support Center (MANSCEN) model currently in place at Fort Leonard Wood, MO, which consolidates the Military Police, Engineer, and Chemical Centers and Schools. This recommendation improves the MANSCEN concept by consolidating functionally related branch centers and schools. It enhances military value, supports the Army’s Force Structure Plan, and maintains sufficient surge capability to address unforeseen requirements. It improves training capabilities while eliminating excess capacity at institutional training installations. This provides the same or better level of service at a reduced cost. This recommendation supports Army Transformation by collocating institutional training, MTOE units, RDT&E organizations, and other TDA units in large numbers on single installations to support force stabilization and engage training.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The Fort Lee community expressed its support for the creation of the Center and indicated that it is well equipped to handle the proposed expansion.

The community associated with Fort Eustis pointed out issues hindering rail and maritime training at Fort Lee, specifically the lack of a deepwater port and the expense of replicating the major training assets already existing at Fort Eustis. Based on the belief that some training would have to remain at Fort Eustis, the community maintained that all training should remain, and they urged the Commission to reject the DoD proposal.

The Redstone Arsenal community requested reconsideration of the EOD Training Department move to Fort Lee, citing critical EOD training support provided to the FBI Hazardous Devices School, a national resource in the fight against terrorists and one that should not be disrupted by BRAC.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found the capacity of Fort Lee sufficient to meet the new training requirements created by consolidating four schools onto the installation, except for insufficient land and space available to conduct Warrior Training involving heavy weapons and explosives. The Commission determined that the shortfall can be successfully mitigated by the use of nearby training sites at Fort Pickett, which has sufficient acreage to support all requirements.
The Commission also found that Fort Lee does not have access to a deepwater port. Since deepwater training is part of the Transportation School curriculum, some deepwater training must still be conducted at Fort Eustis, and therefore the Commission specifies that the movement of the Transportation School to Fort Lee does not prevent the conduct of training at Fort Eustis when required.

During the Commission’s review of DoD’s proposal, concerns were raised that the prerogative for assigning optimal training locations for combat service support courses might be legally constrained by a Commission decision to centralize all combat service support training, especially since combat service support training courses are currently conducted at several locations across the nation. The Commission notes that consolidation of the four schools at Fort Lee must not be interpreted in any way as a requirement that all combat service support training be conducted at Fort Lee. The Commission finds that the location of any course or any part of a course shall continue to be at the discretion of the Department based on both effectiveness and efficiency.

The Commission found that the Department calculated only the costs for the move of that portion of the museums associated with the schools’ manning documents. DoD costing did not include new museum construction or other movement of artifacts, documents, or exhibits as part of the BRAC proposal. The Commission finds that further museum actions will be left for future decision by DoD.

Last, the Commission conducted an in-depth review of projected construction costs, the accuracy of which was challenged by locally generated estimates. The Commission found that while the DoD estimate is probably low, the correction would not be as high as the locally generated estimate. Factoring in cost reductions created by leaving deepwater training at Fort Eustis, the recommendation’s payback period was extended by only a year and a half, which does not amount to a substantial deviation.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission finds the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission approves the recommendation of the Secretary.

JOINT CENTER FOR CONSOLIDATED TRANSPORTATION MANAGEMENT TRAINING

RECOMMENDATION # 122 (E&T 7)

One-time Cost: $1.5M

Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings): ($1.3M)

20-Year Net Present Value: ($18.0M)

Payback Period: 1 Year

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Realignment Lackland Air Force Base, TX, by relocating the Transportation Management training to Fort Lee, VA.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

Eliminates redundancy. “Train as we fight: jointly.” Consolidates like schools while preserving service-unique culture. Although Lackland Air Force Base, TX, has a higher military value than Fort Lee, VA, it is the military judgment of the JCSG that consolidation at the location with the largest amount of transportation training produces the greatest overall military value to the Department. Uses Inter-service Training Review Organization (ITRO) as the baseline.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

There were no formal expressions from the community.
COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the Secretary’s recommendation and justification. The Commission believes that locating all transportation management training at one location will provide significant joint benefits, enhance intra-service procedures, and reduce training duplication. The Commission also believes that course curriculums can be developed to provide service-unique training where necessary. In sum, the proposal was found to increase military value without posing undue risks of mission disruption.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission finds the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission approves the recommendation of the Secretary.

JOINT CENTER OF EXCELLENCE FOR CULINARY TRAINING

RECOMMENDATION # 123 (E&T 8)

ONE-TIME COST: $5.4M
ANNUAL RECURRING COSTS/(SAVINGS): ($1.0M)
20-YEAR NET PRESENT VALUE: ($15.7M)
PAYBACK PERIOD: 2 YEARS

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Realign Lackland Air Force Base, TX, by relocating Culinary Training to Fort Lee, VA, establishing it as a Joint Center of Excellence for Culinary Training.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

Consolidates Culinary Training at the installation with the largest Service requirement. Eliminates redundancy and costs. Provides the Services with culinary training under Interservice Training Review Organization. It is the military judgment of the JCSG that consolidation at the location with the largest amount of culinary training produces the greatest overall military value to the Department through increased training efficiency at a lower cost.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

There were no formal expressions from the community.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission’s review and analysis confirmed the Secretary’s recommendation and justification. The Commission’s approval of this recommendation endorses the concept of centers of excellence as a means of enhancing jointness and promoting transformation.

The Commission found, however, that the ultimate cost of this recommendation is still unclear.

The Commission also found that after many years of previous consolidation with the Air Force, the Navy had begun making plans, prior to BRAC, to move its culinary training program from Lackland Air Force Base to Great Lakes Naval Base. The Navy cited differences in service-unique and cultural issues as the reason for deconsolidating culinary training. While the Commission’s approval of DoD’s recommendation will move the Navy’s program to Fort Lee, the Commission cautions DoD to carefully implement the program to accommodate service-specific needs.
COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission finds the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission approves the recommendation of the Secretary.

JOINT CENTER OF EXCELLENCE FOR RELIGIOUS TRAINING & EDUCATION

RECOMMENDATION # 124 (E&T 9)

**One-time Cost:** $1.0M  
**Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings):** ($0.9M)  
**20-Year Net Present Value:** ($11.9M)  
**Payback Period:** 1 Year

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Realign Maxwell Air Force Base, AL; Naval Air Station Meridian, MS; and Naval Station Newport, RI; by relocating religious training and education to Fort Jackson, SC, establishing a Joint Center of Excellence for religious training and education.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

Consolidation at Fort Jackson, SC, creates a synergistic benefit by having each Service’s officer and enlisted programs conducted in close proximity to operational forces. Realized savings result from consolidation and alignment of similar officer and enlisted educational activities and the merging of common support functions. This recommendation supports the following DoD transformational options: (1) establish center of excellence for joint education and training by combining like schools and (2) establish joint officer and enlisted specialized skills training.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

There were no formal expressions from the community.

COMMISION FINDINGS

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the Secretary’s recommendation and justification. The Commission believes a Joint Center for Religious Education and Training at Fort Jackson will provide significant jointness benefits to the Chaplain Corps, and better prepare chaplains to comfortably minister to members of all service branches. The Commission also believes that during DoD implementation, course curricula can be developed to achieve both goals of consolidating training where appropriate, and providing service-unique training where necessary.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission finds the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission approves the recommendation of the Secretary.
JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER INITIAL JOINT TRAINING SITE

RECOMMENDATION # 125 (E&T 10)

ONE-TIME COST: $199.1M
ANNUAL RECURRING COSTS/(SAVINGS): $3.3M
20-YEAR NET PRESENT VALUE: $226.3M
PAYBACK PERIOD: NEVER

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Realign Luke Air Force Base, AZ, by relocating to Eglin Air Force Base, FL, a sufficient number of instructor pilots and operations support personnel to stand up the Air Force's portion of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Initial Joint Training Site, hereby established at Eglin Air Force Base, FL. Realign Marine Corps Air Station Miramar, CA, by relocating to Eglin Air Force Base, FL, a sufficient number of instructor pilots and operations support personnel to stand up the Marine Corps' portion of the JSF Initial Joint Training Site, hereby established at Eglin Air Force Base, FL. Realign Naval Air Station Oceana, VA, by relocating to Eglin Air Force Base, FL, a sufficient number of instructor pilots, operations, and maintenance support personnel to stand up the Navy's portion of the JSF Initial Joint Training Site, hereby established at Eglin Air Force Base, FL. Realign Sheppard Air Force Base, TX, by relocating to Eglin Air Force Base, FL, a sufficient number of frontline and instructor-qualified maintenance technicians and logistics support personnel to stand up the Air Force's portion of the JSF Initial Joint Training Site, hereby established at Eglin Air Force Base, FL. Realign Naval Air Station Pensacola, FL, by relocating to Eglin Air Force Base, FL, a sufficient number of frontline and instructor-qualified maintenance technicians and logistics support personnel to stand up the Department of the Navy’s portion of the JSF Initial Joint Training Site hereby established at Eglin Air Force Base, FL.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

This recommendation establishes Eglin Air Force Base, FL, as an Initial Joint Training Site that teaches entry-level aviators and maintenance technicians how to safely operate and maintain the new Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) (F-35) aircraft. The Department is scheduled to take delivery of the F-35 beginning in 2008. This joint basing arrangement will allow the Interservice Training Review Organization process to establish a DoD baseline program in a consolidated/joint school with curricula that permit services latitude to preserve service-unique culture and a faculty and staff that brings a “Train as we fight jointly” national perspective to the learning process.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The Sheppard AFB, TX, community endorsed the concept of establishing a single test site for the JSF program and did not voice concerns over its being located at Eglin Air Force Base. The community did request, however, that Sheppard Air Force Base be considered as a candidate installation for JSF maintenance training after the initial JSF proof-of-concept is completed.

The Pensacola, FL, community acknowledged that locating the planned JSF test center at Eglin Air Force Base was good for the Florida Gulf region, which includes the Pensacola area.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the Secretary’s recommendation and justification. The Commission understands that establishing an initial training site for the Joint Strike Fighter at Eglin Air Force Base will support the learning process for this new-generation aircraft. Careful implementation should enable DoD to harness the best aspects of each service branch while still meeting service-unique requirements.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission finds the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission approves the recommendation of the Secretary.
NET FIRES CENTER
RECOMMENDATION # 126 (E&T 12)

ONE-TIME COST: $247.0M
ANNUAL RECURRING COSTS/(SAVINGS): ($42.6M)
20-YEAR NET PRESENT VALUE: ($319.1M)
PAYBACK PERIOD: 6 YEARS

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Realign Fort Bliss, TX, by relocating the Air Defense Artillery (ADA) Center & School to Fort Sill, OK. Consolidate the ADA Center & School with the Field Artillery Center & School to establish a Net Fires Center.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

This recommendation consolidates Net Fires training and doctrine development at a single location. The moves advance the Maneuver Support Center (MANSCEN) model, currently in place at Fort Leonard Wood, which consolidated the Military Police, Engineer, and Chemical Centers and Schools. This recommendation improves the MANSCEN concept by consolidating functionally related branch centers and schools, fostering consistency, standardization, and training proficiency. It also facilitates task force stabilization by combining operational forces with institutional training. In addition, it consolidates both ADA and Field Artillery skill level I courses at one location, allowing the Army to reduce the total number of Military Occupational Skills training locations (reducing the TRADOC footprint). Additionally, it enhances military value, supports the Army’s Force Structure Plan, and maintains sufficient surge capability to address unforeseen requirements. It improves training capabilities while eliminating excess capacity at institutional training installations. This provides the same or better level of service at a reduced cost. This recommendation supports Army Transformation by collocating institutional training, Modification Table of organization and Equipment (MTOE) units, research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) organizations, and other TDA units in large numbers on single installations to support force stabilization and engage training.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The Fort Bliss community agreed with the concept of consolidating the ADA and Field Artillery schools to create a Net Fires Center but believed it should be located at Fort Bliss because it would be less expensive at Fort Bliss, and Fort Bliss’s missile ranges and maneuver space can accommodate the schools better than Fort Sill. For example, ADA missiles can be live-fired at Fort Bliss. Community representatives maintained that moving the ADA school to Fort Sill would degrade U.S. air defense weapon systems development and allied missile training conducted at Fort Bliss. They claimed that Fort Bliss is large enough to retain all units currently stationed there as well as the 1st Armored Division and that greater opportunity for stabilization exists at Fort Bliss because it will have more units than Fort Sill.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found DoD’s recommendation consistent with the Final Selection Criteria and the Force Structure Plan. The Commission carefully considered the seven major concerns raised by the Fort Bliss community. While it is true that ADA missiles cannot be live-fired at Fort Sill, the Commission found that the Army does not require live-firing of these missiles at Fort Sill. Similarly, the Commission found that sufficient training space exists at Fort Sill to accomplish the mission. Related to the concern that U.S. weapons system development and testing at Fort Bliss would be adversely impacted by relocating the ADA school and units to Fort Sill, the Commission found that development and testing are not tied to the location of these organizations and that these functions are principally the responsibility of other organizations. Moreover, the Commission found that training foreign allies at Fort Bliss is independent of the BRAC process, and allies would be free to choose to train at either Fort Bliss or Fort Sill. The Commission found compelling the Army’s argument that the highest military value of both forts was obtained by relocating the ADA units from Fort Bliss to Fort Sill, including force and family stabilization. Related to the concern that cost savings would be improved substantially by retaining ADA units at Fort Bliss while assigning other units to Fort Bliss, the Commission found that the approved recommendation correctly prioritized
gains in military value relating to mission requirements, warfighting, training, and deployability, rather than generating higher potential cost savings from collocating all units of concern at Fort Bliss.

**COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS**

The Commission finds the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission approves the recommendation of the Secretary.

**PRIME POWER TO FORT LEONARD WOOD, MO**

**RECOMMENDATION # 127 (E&T 13)**

- **One-time Cost:** $6.0M
- **Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings):** ($0.5M)
- **20-Year Net Present Value:** ($0.8M)
- **Payback Period:** 16 Years

**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION**

Realign Fort Belvoir, VA, by relocating Army Prime Power School training to Fort Leonard Wood, MO.

**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION**

The United States Army Prime Power School courses taught at Fort Belvoir, VA, are Engineer Branch courses. The United States Army Engineer Center at Fort Leonard Wood, MO, serves as the Service engineer proponent. The common-core phases of engineer courses are already taught at Fort Leonard Wood. This realignment consolidates engineer courses at Fort Leonard Wood, MO. Consolidate like schools while preserving service-unique culture. The United States Army Engineer School trains other services under the Interservice Training Review Organization.

**COMMUNITY CONCERNS**

There were no formal expressions from the community.

**COMMISSION FINDINGS**

The Commission found that while the recommendation has a small net savings, it successfully achieves the purpose of consolidating engineering courses at one location. In addition, the new facilities would significantly improve safety and training. The Commission’s review and analysis identified one issue involving a loss of the close relationship between the school and the 249th Engineer Battalion (Prime Power), the only prime power battalion in the Army. The Army is reviewing the battalion’s location and has the authority and the means to move the battalion outside the BRAC process.

**COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS**

The Commission finds the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission approves the recommendation of the Secretary.
UNDERGRADUATE PILOT AND NAVIGATOR TRAINING

RECOMMENDATION # 128 (E&T 14)

One-time Cost: $71.7M
Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings): ($18.3M)
20-Year Net Present Value: ($174.2M)
Payback Period: 4 Years

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Realignment Moody Air Force Base, GA, as follows: Relocate the Primary Phase of Fixed-wing Pilot Training to Columbus Air Force Base, MS; Laughlin Air Force Base, TX; and Vance Air Force Base, OK. Relocate Introduction to Fighter Fundamentals Training for Pilots to Columbus Air Force Base, MS; Laughlin Air Force Base, TX; Randolph Air Force Base, TX; Sheppard Air Force Base, TX; and Vance Air Force Base, OK. Relocate Introduction to Fighter Fundamentals Training for Weapons Systems Officers to Columbus Air Force Base, MS; Laughlin Air Force Base, TX; Sheppard Air Force Base, TX; and Vance Air Force Base, OK. Relocate Introduction to Fighter Fundamentals Training for Instructor Pilots to Randolph Air Force Base, TX.

Realignment Randolph Air Force Base, TX, by relocating Undergraduate Navigator Training to Naval Air Station Pensacola, FL.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

This recommendation will realign and consolidate the Air Force’s primary phase of undergraduate flight training functions to reduce excess/unused basing capacity, eliminate redundancy, enhance jointness for Undergraduate Navigator Training/Naval Flight Officer (NFO) training, reduce excess capacity, and improve military value.

The basing arrangement that flows from this recommendation will allow the Inter-service Training Review Organization process to establish a DoD baseline program in Undergraduate Navigator Training/NFO with curricula that permit services latitude to preserve service-unique culture and a faculty and staff that brings a “Train as we fight: jointly” national perspective to the learning process.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

No concerns were formally expressed by elected officials or organized civic organizations; however, individual citizens near Moody Air Force Base expressed concerns about the loss of contractor jobs.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the Secretary’s recommendation or justification. The Commission understands the proposal will realign training to other installations where the same mission already exists, maintenance facilities are established, and capacity to absorb the mission is adequate. As a result, the Commission finds the recommendation appropriately enhances military value at reasonable cost.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission finds the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission approves the recommendation of the Secretary.
Post Graduate Education

Recommendation # 197 (Add)

One-time Cost: N/A
Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings): N/A
20-Year Net Present Value: N/A
Payback Period: N/A

Secretary of Defense Recommendation

None. The Secretary’s proposed list submitted on May 13, 2005, did not include this recommendation. It was added by the Commission on July 19, 2005, for further consideration.

Secretary of Defense Justification

None.

Community Concerns

Community leaders from the Dayton, OH, and Monterey, CA, areas expressed nearly identical arguments concerning the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) and the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT), pointing out the schools’ services-specific focus, their successful partnerships with nearby private education institutions, the significance and scope of their non-resident postgraduate programs, and the national benefits of their research.

Specifically, Monterey advocates expressed significant concern about merging Defense Language Institute (DLI) programs with other institutions due to differences in missions, programs, and student body (primarily enlisted personnel fresh from basic training). They also argued relocation would devastate DLI because it would lose much of its faculty, comprised mainly of non-citizen native-speaking personnel. They also noted that the city of Monterey provides maintenance services worth millions of dollars.

Dayton questioned the accuracy of DoD costs and savings estimates and claimed an independent analysis showed no savings would be realized by the proposal to move AFIT to Monterey, CA. Similarly, they questioned the accuracy of the DoD’s data supporting AFIT’s Military Value scores. According to their independent analysis, AFIT’s scores were nearly identical to NPS. They noted AFIT facilities are recently built and state-of-the-art; Ohio’s financial support ($51 million since 1996) enables military students to attend state universities free of charge; and the availability of significantly more unrestricted buildable land than at NPS. They asserted consolidation of schools at Dayton would save DoD millions per year in housing allowances and locality pay due to differences in the cost of living.

Commission Findings

The Commission found that both the Naval Postgraduate School and the Air Force Institute of Technology provide unique graduate-level education programs to service members and DoD personnel. The uniqueness of these programs is characterized by (1) their focus on the service issues, challenges, and systems directly affecting the participants, (2) their successful partnerships with private education institutions, (3) the significance and scope of their non-resident postgraduate programs, and (4) the national benefits of their research.

While the Commission found that consolidation of the schools would generate cost savings, it also determined that such actions could potentially degrade the military value of both institutions and the quality of their program graduates. For example, consolidation could jeopardize the accreditation of the institutions, and force the cancellation of research projects that support operations of our Combatant Commanders.

School consolidation and privatization are not the only alternatives for reducing personnel and infrastructure costs. In December of 2002, the Secretaries of the Air Force and Navy developed a Memorandum of Understanding, commonly called the Educational Alliance, to improve coordination between the Naval Postgraduate School and the Air Force Institute of Technology. Joint boards for meteorology, space, acquisition, and aeronautical engineering were established, and some programs in these areas were consolidated. However, primarily because the Alliance has no enforcement powers, little else
has been achieved despite the fact that the group’s studies identified significant duplication in curriculums between the schools, underemphasized collaboration opportunities, research that could be shared, and significant unused capacity.

The Commission finds that, under its present charter, the joint service Educational Alliance has no authority to impose change regardless of the findings of its study groups. As a result, the tough issues mentioned above that could result in significant savings and improvement remain unaddressed. The Commission believes that rather than continuing as two schools focused on individual service needs, they can and need to be transformed into a joint program with two schools working together to meet joint needs. The Commission finds that an empowered Board free from individual service branch and school institutional pressures could address issues facing the schools and provide the non-service focused direction needed to transform the Naval Postgraduate School and Air Force Institute of Technology into a truly joint system of education.

**Commission Recommendations**

The Commission finds that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final selection criteria 3 and 4, as well as from the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following:

Realign the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, and the Air Force Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH, by forming a new and permanent oversight board responsible for curriculum review and approval, and program development for the resident and non-resident degree-granting programs at both schools. This Board—consisting of an equal number of members from the governing boards of each school, civilian education authorities recommended by the U.S. Secretary of Education, and other education officials as designated by the Secretary of Defense—will be chartered by the office of the Secretary of Defense and will provide a formal report of its actions and accomplishments to that office biannually. The Board’s duties will consist of those actions listed as “Goals” in the Memorandum of Agreement that formed an Educational Alliance between the Secretaries of the Air Force and Navy on December 4, 2002. This Board will be located in the National Capital Region. By this recommendation, the newly formed board will also have the authority to:

- take action to eliminate unnecessary curricula and program duplication;
- identify, approve, and implement programs of collaboration in research and instruction between the schools, and;
- expand nonresident programs and arrangements with private institutions of higher learning to meet common curriculum and non-Department of Defense focused class requirements.

The Commission finds that this change and the recommendation as amended are consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. The full text of this and all Commission recommendations can be found in Appendix Q.
JOINT CROSS-SERVICE GROUPS (JCSGs):
HEADQUARTERS AND SUPPORT ACTIVITIES

CO-LOCATE MISCELLANEOUS AIR FORCE LEASED LOCATIONS AND NATIONAL GUARD HEADQUARTERS LEASED LOCATIONS

RECOMMENDATION # 129 (H&SA 3)

One-time Cost: $90.5M
Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings): ($30.8M)
20-Year Net Present Value: ($308.2M)
Payback Period: 1 Year

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Close 1501 Wilson Blvd., a leased installation in Arlington, VA. Relocate the Air Force-Judge Advocate General to Andrews Air Force Base, MD.

Close 1560 Wilson Blvd., a leased installation in Arlington, VA. Relocate the Secretary of the Air Force-Acquisition to Andrews Air Force Base, MD.

Close Arlington Plaza, a leased installation in Arlington, VA. Relocate the Secretary of the Air Force-Auditor General to Andrews Air Force Base, MD.

Realign 1401 Wilson Blvd., the Nash Street Building, and 1919 Eads Street, leased installations in Arlington, VA, by relocating Air Force-Operations to Andrews Air Force Base, MD.

Realign 1815 N. Fort Myer Drive, a leased installation in Arlington, VA, by relocating Air Force-Operations, the Secretary of the Air Force-Administrative Assistant, and the Secretary of the Air Force-Auditor General to Andrews Air Force Base, MD.

Realign Ballston Metro Center, a leased installation in Arlington, VA, by relocating the Secretary of the Air Force-Public Affairs and the Secretary of the Air Force-Small Business to Andrews Air Force Base, MD.


Realign Crystal Gateway 2 and Jefferson Plaza 2, leased installations in Arlington, VA, by relocating Air Force-Installations and Logistics to Andrews Air Force Base, MD.

Realign Crystal Gateway North, a leased installation in Arlington, VA, by relocating Air Force-Installations and Logistics and the Secretary of the Air Force-Financial Management to Andrews Air Force Base, MD.

Realign Crystal Park 5 and Crystal Plaza 6, leased installations in Arlington, VA, by relocating the Secretary of the Air Force-Administrative Assistant to Andrews Air Force Base, MD.

Realign Crystal Plaza 5, a leased installation in Arlington, VA, by relocating the Air Force-Chief Information Officer and Air Force-Operations to Andrews Air Force Base, MD.


Realign the Webb Building, a leased installation in Arlington, VA, by relocating Air Force-Personnel and the Secretary of the Air Force/General Counsel to Andrews Air Force Base, MD.
Realign Jefferson Plaza-1, Arlington, VA, by relocating the National Guard Bureau Headquarters, the Air National Guard Headquarters, and elements of the Army National Guard Headquarters to the Army National Guard Readiness Center, Arlington, VA, and Andrews Air Force Base, MD.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

This recommendation meets two important Department of Defense (DoD) objectives with regard to future use of leased space and enhanced security for DoD activities. Additionally, the recommendation results in a significant improvement in military value as a result of the movement from leased space to a military installation. The average military value of the noted components of Headquarters Air Force (HAF) based on current locations ranges from 230th to 333rd of 334 entities evaluated by the MAH military value model. Andrews Air Force Base is ranked 51st out of 334. Implementation will reduce the Department’s reliance on leased space which has historically higher overall costs than government-owned space and generally does not meet Anti-terrorism Force Protection standards as prescribed in UFC 04-010-01. The recommendation eliminates 190,000 Usable Square Feet of leased administrative space within the NCR. This, plus the immediate benefit of enhanced Force Protection afforded by a location within a military installation fence-line, will provide HAF components with immediate compliance with Force Protection Standards. HAF’s current leased locations are non-compliant with current Force Protection Standards.

The collocation of National Guard Headquarters elements to two sites, Army National Guard Readiness Center, Arlington, VA, and Andrews Air Force Base, MD, will enhance Joint Service interoperability. Currently, the National Guard Headquarters entities are housed in three locations in metropolitan Washington, DC, creating a disjointed hindrance to organizational and operational efficiency. By virtue of being located at two operating sites, the Guard commands would significantly increase interaction between themselves for improved force enhancement. A positive result of the co-location is a reduction in force manning levels by eliminating duplicative staff. Various common support functions; i.e., administrative support, contracting and supply functions, would be merged, resulting in a decrease in staffing size. The recommendation eliminates 237,000 Usable Square Feet of leased administrative space within the Washington, DC, area. Leased cost expenditures of $11M per year and Anti-terrorism and Force Protection costs will significantly decrease through the construction of new facilities on a military reservation.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

Community leaders questioned DoD’s security standards, stating they were unnecessarily more stringent than those developed by the Interagency Security Committee (tasked with developing and evaluating security standards for Federal facilities.) Also, the communities questioned whether DoD had surveyed each facility to determine compliance and the level of compliance with the DoD security standards (or even those “less stringent” standards approved by OMB in September 2004.) The communities felt BRAC was not the proper instrument to effect DoD employee relocation from leased facilities.

Advocates expressed concerns about the negative impact on operational readiness and manpower implications. They argued the current “scattered” arrangement of leased office space makes more strategic sense than does concentration, that relocation will disrupt synergies with other agencies of the Federal Government and the Pentagon, and, finally, that leased space is better able to accommodate contingency, mobilization, surge, and future total force requirements than its alternative, military construction. Similarly, communities claimed their quality of life could be reduced because of transportation problems such as increased traffic, lack of public transportation, and increased commuting times, with the attendant issues of air pollution and increased fuel consumption.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission’s review and analysis validated the community concern that the Department failed to assess each leased-space location individually for compliance with DoD Force Protection standards. The Commission also acknowledged community concerns about personnel relocation, impact on military readiness, and possible advantages that leased space may have over military owned facilities. These concerns were carefully weighed and considered, but in the final analysis the Commission found they did not collectively rise to the level of a substantial deviation. The experience of prior rounds of BRAC has shown that numerous leased-space facilities have been closed and relocated successfully and without excessive disruption. Moreover, the Commission felt that the majority of the concerns raised about the proposal were more properly categorized as implementation issues that could be successfully managed over the six-year implementation period.
The Commission found the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission approves the recommendation of the Secretary.

**CO-LOCATE DEFENSE/MILITARY DEPARTMENT ADJUDICATION ACTIVITIES**

**Recommendation # 130 (H&SA 5)**

- **One-time Cost:** $67.10M
- **Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings):** ($5.72M)
- **20-Year Net Present Value:** ($11.30M)
- **Payback Period:** 13 Years

**Secretary of Defense Recommendation**

Close 21820 Burbank Boulevard, a leased installation in Woodland Hills, CA. Relocate all components of the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals Western Hearing Office to Fort Meade, MD.

Close 800 Elkridge Landing Road, a leased installation in Linthicum, MD. Relocate all components of the National Security Agency Central Adjudication Facility to Fort Meade, MD.

Realign 2780 Airport Drive, a leased installation in Columbus, OH, by relocating all components of the Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office and the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals Personal Security Division to Fort Meade, MD.

Realign 1777 N. Kent Street, a leased installation in Arlington, VA, by relocating all components of the Washington Headquarters Service Central Adjudication Facility to Fort Meade, MD.

Realign 875 N. Randolph Street, a leased installation in Arlington, VA, by relocating all components of the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals Headquarters to Fort Meade, MD.

Realign 10050 North 25th Avenue, a leased installation in Phoenix, AZ, by relocating all components of the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals Arizona office to Fort Meade, MD.

Realign the Washington Navy Yard Washington, DC, by relocating all components of the Navy Central Adjudication Facility to Fort Meade, MD.


Realign the Pentagon, Washington, DC, by relocating all components of the Joint Staff Central Adjudication Facility to Fort Meade, MD.

Realign the US Army Soldiers Systems Center Garrison, Natick, MA, by relocating all components of the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals Boston Hearing office to Fort Meade, MD.

**Secretary of Defense Justification**

This recommendation collocates all Military Department (MILDEP) and Department of Defense (DoD) security clearance adjudication and appeals activities at Fort Meade, MD. It meets several important DoD objectives with regard to future use of leased space, enhanced security for DoD activities, and collocates National Capital Area intelligence community activities. It also enables the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Act of 2004, the Administration’s counterintelligence strategy, and the Remodeling Defense Intelligence initiative. Additionally, this recommendation results in a significant improvement in military value due to a shift from predominately-leased space to a location on a military installation. The military value of adjudication activities current portfolio of locations ranges from 152-280 out of 334 entities evaluated by the Major Administration and Headquarters (MAH) military value model. Fort Meade, MD, ranks 94 out of 334.

Implementation will reduce the Department’s reliance on leased space, which has historically higher overall costs than government-owned space and generally does not meet Antiterrorism Force Protection standards as prescribed in UFC 04-
The benefit of enhanced Force Protection afforded by a location within a military installation fence-line will provide immediate compliance with Force Protection Standards. MILDEP and Defense adjudication activities located currently at leased locations are not compliant with current Force Protection Standards.

This recommendation eliminates 136,930 gross square feet of leased administrative space. This action provides a collocation of these activities, and reduces the number of locations from 13 to one.

**Community Concerns**

Community leaders questioned DoD’s security standards, stating they were unnecessarily more stringent than those developed by the Interagency Security Committee (tasked with developing and evaluating security standards for Federal facilities). Also, the communities questioned whether DoD had surveyed each facility to determine compliance and the level of compliance with the DoD security standards (or even those “less stringent” standards approved by OMB in September 2004.) The communities felt BRAC was not the proper instrument to effect DoD employee relocation from leased facilities.

Advocates expressed concerns about the negative impact on operational readiness and manpower implications. They argued the current “scattered” arrangement of leased office space makes more strategic sense than does concentration, that relocation will disrupt synergies with other agencies of the Federal Government and the Pentagon, and, finally, that leased space is better able to accommodate contingency, mobilization, surge, and future total force requirements than its alternative, military construction. Similarly, communities claimed their quality of life could be reduced because of transportation problems such as increased traffic, lack of public transportation, and increased commuting times, with the attendant issues of air pollution and increased fuel consumption.

In addition to the generalized comments above, the community expressed specific concerns that Anne Arundel County would be unable to handle the influx of jobs into Fort Meade because of a lack of mass transit, inadequate roads and schools, the poor military housing at Fort Meade, and paucity of safe housing in the surrounding community. The affected communities argued that moving the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) onto a military installation would make it inordinately difficult for people to have their cases heard and that the cost in terms of reduced accessibility far outweighs the benefits of the proposed consolidation. They asserted consolidation would result in exorbitant, additional travel-related expenses for employees and hearing participants and would increase the case backlog.

**Commission Findings**

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense. However, the Commission’s review and analysis discovered that the National Security Agency’s Adjudication Office is only a part of a larger NSA presence at 800 Elkridge Landing Road in Linthicum, MD, so the recommendation has been amended to realign rather than close that address.

The Commission acknowledges the community’s concerns about employee commuting but understands that the local governments involved are planning surface transportation improvements near the Fort Meade area. Additionally, the Commission acknowledges that moving the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) onto a military installation could make it difficult for people to have their cases heard but expects the impact on individuals served by DOHA to be minimal because hearing examiners (administrative judges) travel to the hearing site on most occasions.

**Commission Recommendations**

The Commission found that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final selection criteria 1 and 7 and from the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following:

Close 21820 Burbank Boulevard, a leased installation in Woodland Hills, CA. Relocate all components of the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals Western Hearing Office to Fort Meade, MD.

Realign 800 Elkridge Landing Road, a leased installation in Linthicum, MD. Relocate all components of the National Security Agency Central Adjudication Facility to Fort Meade, MD.

Realign 2780 Airport Drive, a leased installation in Columbus, OH, by relocating all components of the Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office and the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals Personal Security Division to Fort Meade, MD.

Realign 1777 N. Kent Street, a leased installation in Arlington, VA, by relocating all components of the Washington Headquarters Service Central Adjudication Facility to Fort Meade, MD.
Realign 875 N. Randolph Street, a leased installation in Arlington, VA, by relocating all components of the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals Headquarters to Fort Meade, MD.

Realign 10050 North 25th Avenue, a leased installation in Phoenix, AZ, by relocating all components of the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals Arizona office to Fort Meade, MD.

Realign the Washington Navy Yard, DC, by relocating all components of the Navy Central Adjudication Facility Fort Meade, MD.

Realign Bolling Air Force Base, DC, by relocating all components of the Air Force Central Adjudication Facility and the Defense Intelligence Agency Central Adjudication Facility to Fort Meade, MD.

Realign the Pentagon, Washington, DC, by relocating all components of the Joint Staff Central Adjudication Facility to Fort Meade, MD.

Realign the US Army Soldiers Systems Center Garrison, Natick, MA, by relocating all components of the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals Boston Hearing office to Fort Meade, MD.

The Commission found this change and the recommendation as amended are consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. The full text of this and all Commission recommendations can be found in Appendix Q.

**CO-LOCATE MILITARY DEPARTMENT INVESTIGATION AGENCIES WITH DoD COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY AGENCY**

**Recommendation # 131 (H&SA 8)**

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<td><strong>One-time cost</strong></td>
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**Secretary of Defense Recommendation**

Close 1919 South Eads Street, and 1801 South Bell Street, leased installations in Arlington, VA; 1340 Braddock Place, a leased installation in Alexandria, VA; and 938 Elkridge Landing, a leased installation in Linthicum, MD. Relocate all components of the Counterintelligence Field Activity (CIFA) and Defense Security Service (DSS) to Marine Corps Base Quantico, VA.

Realign Crystal Square 2, Crystal Square 4, and 251 18th Street South, leased installations in Arlington, VA; and 6845 and 6856 Deerpath Road, leased installations in Elkridge, MD; 1 World Trade Center, a leased installation in Long Beach, California; 2300 Lake Park Drive, a leased installation in Smyrna, GA; and 2780 Airport Drive, a leased installation in Columbus, OH, by relocating all components of CIFA and DSS to Marine Corps Base Quantico, VA.

Realign 121 Tejon, a leased installation in Colorado Springs, CO, by relocating all components of CIFA to Peterson Air Force Base, CO.

Disestablish CIFA and DSS, and consolidate their components into the newly created Department of Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency.

Realign Washington Navy Yard Washington, DC, by relocating the Naval Criminal Investigation Service (NCIS) to Marine Corp Base Quantico, VA.

Realign Andrews Air Force Base, MD by relocating the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) to Marine Corps Base Quantico, VA.

Realign Fort Belvoir, VA, by relocating the Army Criminal Investigation Command (CID) to Marine Corp Base Quantico, VA.
This recommendation produces operational synergies by locating entities with similar or related missions (CIFA, DSS, NCIS AFOSI, & CID) in one place. Proximity to nearby Federal Bureau of Investigations offices and training facilities will further enhance this effect. In addition, it collocates a CIFA component with US Northern Command headquarters, to which the component provides direct war fighting and homeland security support.

This recommendation also collapses CIFA and DSS and consolidates their activities into a new agency at Marine Corps Base Quantico, VA. It meets important DoD objectives with regard to future use of leased space, consolidation of headquarters operations at single locations, enhanced security for DoD activities, and consolidates National Capital Region (NCR) intelligence community activities. It also enables the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Act of 2004 and the Remodeling Defense Intelligence initiative.

Implementation of this recommendation will reduce the DoD’s reliance on leased space, which has historically higher overall costs than government-owned space and generally does not meet Anti-terrorism Force Protection standards as prescribed in UFC 04-010-01. The benefit of enhanced force protection afforded by a location within a military installation fenceline will provide immediate compliance with Force Protection Standards. CIFA and DSS current leased locations are not compliant with current Force Protection Standards. The CIFA, DSS portion of this recommendation eliminates 427,097 Gross Square Feet (GSF) of leased administrative space, consolidates their activities, and reduces the number of locations from 13 to two.

Co-location of military department investigation activities meets a primary DoD objective to rationalize the presence of DoD activities within the NCR. The relocation to a military installation that is largely outside the boundaries of the NCR provides a dispersion of DoD activities away from a dense concentration within the NCR. This action will free up approximately 510,000 Gross Square Feet of administrative space that can be reused by other DoD activities that require a location closer to the Pentagon. It reduces the number of locations from three to one.

This recommendation results in a significant improvement in military value. As receiving locations, Peterson Air Force Base ranks 3 out of 334, and Marine Corps Base, Quantico ranks 78 out of 334, both ranked much higher than the collective portfolio of current locations. The military value of CIFA leased space is 279 out of 334 entities evaluated by the Major Administration and Headquarters (MAH) military value model. DSS military value of its locations is 334 out of 334. The military value of military department investigative activities locations evaluated by the MAH military value model is: Air Force Office of Special Investigations, 174 out of 334; Navy Criminal Investigation Agency, 180 out of 334; and the Army’s Criminal Investigation Command, 220 out of 334.

Community Concerns

There were no formal expressions from the community.

Commission Findings

The Commission found the recommendation to disestablish the Counterintelligence Field Activity (CIFA) and the Defense Security Service (DSS) and consolidate their components into the DoD Counterintelligence and Security Agency via the BRAC process to be unwise and unnecessary. DoD’s proposal would have directed a significant reorganization of counterintelligence and security organizations with unknown mission and manpower effects, even though there were no indications of overcapacity, and the issues in question could best be addressed through non-BRAC programmatic means.

The Commission’s review and analysis found that DoD did not include Army counterintelligence (CI) components in its BRAC recommendation to co-locate investigation agencies at Marine Corps Base Quantico. As a result, the Army has developed an initiative complementary to the BRAC recommendation to consolidate Service, DSS and CIFA CI and law enforcement headquarters at Quantico.

The Commission believes that an Army counterintelligence presence at Marine Corps Base Quantico, co-located and aligned with counterpart CIFA, AFOSI and NCIS headquarters elements—will significantly enhance counterintelligence synchronization and collaboration across DoD. Co-location of Army CI will enhance DoD analytic and operational synergies and coordination—and more closely align Army CI and law enforcement units to maximize efforts in technology protection, cyber investigations and the Global War on Terrorism. Army counterintelligence at Quantico will provide a focal point for the CIFA, Navy and Air Force counterintelligence and law enforcement operational headquarters to support ever-increasing collaborative counterintelligence efforts across DoD through enhanced information sharing and economies of scale. Additionally, Army CI and law enforcement functions for national security related crimes will be enhanced with co-location.
The Commission found that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final selection criteria 1 and 4 and from the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following:

Close 1919 South Eads Street, and 1801 South Bell Street, leased installations in Arlington, VA; 1340 Braddock Place, a leased installation in Alexandria, VA; and 938 Elkridge Landing, a leased installation in Linthicum, MD. Relocate all components of the Counterintelligence Field Activity (CIFA) and Defense Security Service (DSS) to Marine Corps Base Quantico, VA.

Realignment Crystal Square 2, Crystal Square 4, and 251 18th Street South, leased installations in Arlington, VA; and 6845 and 6856 Deepth Road, leased installations in Elkridge, MD; 1 World Trade Center, a leased installation in Long Beach, CA; 2300 Lake Park Drive, a leased installation in Smyrna, GA; and 2780 Airport Drive, a leased installation in Columbus, OH, by relocating all components of CIFA and DSS to Marine Corps Base Quantico, VA.

Realignment 121 Tejon, a leased installation in Colorado Springs, CO, by relocating all components of CIFA to Peterson Air Force Base, CO.

Disestablish Counterintelligence Field Activity and Defense Security Service and consolidate their components into the Department of Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency if that agency is established by law or directive.

Realignment Washington Navy Yard, Washington, DC, by relocating the Naval Criminal Investigation Service (NCIS) to Marine Corps Base Quantico, VA.

Realignment Andrews Air Force Base, MD, by relocating the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) to Marine Corps Base Quantico, VA.

Realignment Fort Belvoir, VA, by relocating the Army Criminal Investigation Command (CID) to Marine Corps Base Quantico, VA.

The Commission found this change and the recommendation as amended are consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. The full text of this and all Commission recommendations can be found in Appendix Q.

### Co-locate Miscellaneous Army Leased Locations

**Recommendation #132 (H&SA 10)**

**One-time Cost:** $44.1M

**Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings):** ($27.8M)

**20-Year Net Present Value:** ($322.0M)

**Payback Period:** 1 Year

**Secretary of Defense Recommendation**

Realignment Ballston Metro Center, a leased installation in Arlington, VA, by relocating the US Army Legal Agency to Fort Belvoir, VA.

Realignment Park Center Office 1, a leased installation in Alexandria, VA, by relocating the US Army Audit Agency to Fort Belvoir, VA.

Realignment Skyline VI, a leased installation in Falls Church, VA, by relocating the Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army (SAAA) to Fort Belvoir, VA.

Realignment the Zachary Taylor Building, a leased installation in Arlington, VA, by relocating the US Army G6/DISC4, the G8/Force Development, the G1/Army Research Institute, the US Army Network Enterprise Technology Command, and the Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army (SAAA) to Fort Belvoir, VA.

Realignment Crystal Square 2, a leased installation in Arlington, VA, by relocating US Army National Information Security Assessment Program, the US Army Environmental Policy Institute, and Senior Executive Public Affairs Training to Fort Belvoir, VA.
Realign Crystal Gateway 2, a leased installation in Arlington, VA, by relocating the Deputy Under Secretary of the Army - Operations Research to Fort Belvoir, VA.

Realign the Hoffman 1 and 2 Buildings, leased installations in Alexandria, VA, by relocating US Army G1/Civilian Personnel Office, G1/Personnel Transformation, the Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army (SAAA), and the Communication and Electronics Command to Fort Belvoir, VA.

Realign Rosslyn Metro Center, a leased installation in Arlington, VA, by relocating the Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army (SAAA) to Fort Belvoir, VA.

Realign Jefferson Plaza 1 and 2, leased installations in Alexandria, VA, by relocating the US Army Office of the Chief Army Reserve, Assistant Secretary of the Army Financial Management and Comptroller/CEAC, the Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army (SAAA), and Chief of Chaplains to Fort Belvoir, VA.

Realign Crystal Gateway North, a leased installation in Arlington, VA, by relocating the US Army G3/Army Simulation to Fort Belvoir, VA.

Realign Crystal Plaza 5, a leased installation in Arlington, VA, by relocating the US Army Safety Office and OSAA to Fort Belvoir, VA.

Realign Crystal Mall 4, a leased installation in Arlington, VA, by relocating the Assistant Secretary of the Army Manpower and Reserve Affairs/Army Review Board/Equal Opportunity Office to Fort Belvoir, VA.

Realign Crystal Gateway 1, a leased installation in Arlington, VA, by relocating US Army Office of Environmental Technology to Fort Belvoir, VA.

**Secretary of Defense Justification**

This recommendation meets two important Department of Defense (DoD) objectives with regard to future use of leased space and enhanced security for DoD activities. Additionally, the recommendation results in a significant improvement in military value as a result of the movement from leased space to a military installation. The average military value of the noted components of Headquarters of the Department of the Army (HQDA) based on current locations ranges from 233rd to 327th out of 334 entities evaluated by the Major Administration and Headquarters (MAH) military value model. Fort Belvoir is ranked 57th out of 334. Implementation will reduce the Department’s reliance on leased space, which has historically higher overall costs than government-owned space and generally does not meet Anti-terrorism Force Protection standards as prescribed in UFC 04-010-01. The recommendation eliminates approximately 690,300 Usable Square Feet of leased administrative space within the NCR. This, plus the immediate benefit of enhanced Force Protection afforded by a location within a military installation fence-line, will provide HQDA components with immediate compliance with Force Protection Standards. HQDA’s current leased locations are non-compliant with current Force Protection Standards.

**Community Concerns**

Community leaders questioned DoD’s security standards, stating they were unnecessarily more stringent than those developed by the Interagency Security Committee (tasked with developing and evaluating security standards for Federal facilities.) Also, the communities questioned whether DoD had surveyed each facility to determine compliance and the level of compliance with the DoD security standards (or even those “less stringent” standards approved by OMB in September 2004.) The communities felt BRAC was not the proper instrument to effect DoD employee relocation from leased facilities.

Advocates expressed concerns about the negative impact on operational readiness and manpower implications. They argued the current “scattered” arrangement of leased office space makes more strategic sense than does concentration, that relocation will disrupt synergies with other agencies of the Federal Government and the Pentagon, and, finally, that leased space is better able to accommodate contingency, mobilization, surge, and future total force requirements than its alternative, military construction. Similarly, communities claimed their quality of life could be reduced because of transportation problems such as increased traffic, lack of public transportation, and increased commuting times, with the attendant issues of air pollution and increased fuel consumption.

**Commission Findings**

The Commission’s review and analysis validated the community concern that the Department failed to assess each leased-space location individually for compliance with DoD Force Protection standards. The Commission also acknowledged
community concerns about personnel relocation, impact on military readiness, and possible advantages that leased space may have over military owned facilities. These concerns were carefully weighed and considered, but in the final analysis the Commission found they did not collectively rise to the level of a substantial deviation. The experience of prior rounds of BRAC has shown that numerous leased-space facilities have been closed and relocated successfully and without excessive disruption. Moreover, the Commission felt that the majority of the concerns raised about the proposal were more properly categorized as implementation issues that could be successfully managed over the six-year implementation period.

**Commission Recommendations**

The Commission found the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission approves the recommendation of the Secretary.

**Co-locate Miscellaneous DoD, Defense Agency, and Field Activity Leased Locations**

**Recommendation #133 (H&SA 12)**

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<td>20-Year Net Present Value:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Payback Period:</td>
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**Secretary of Defense Recommendation**

Close 1010 North Glebe Road, 1515 Wilson Boulevard, 4850 Mark Center Drive, the Crown Ridge Building at 4035 Ridgetop, and 1901 N. Beauregard, leased installations in Northern VA, by relocating the Office of the Secretary of Defense to Fort Belvoir, VA.

Close North Tower at 2800 Crystal Drive, a leased installation in Arlington, VA, by relocating the DoD Inspector General to Fort Belvoir, VA.

Close 1600 Wilson Boulevard, a leased installation in Arlington, VA, by relocating the Defense Human Resources Activity to Fort Belvoir, VA.

Close 1500 Wilson Boulevard and Presidential Towers, leased installations in Arlington, VA, by relocating offices accommodating Pentagon Renovation temporary space to Fort Belvoir, VA.

Close Metro Park III and IV (6350 and 6359 Walker Lane), a leased installation in Alexandria, VA, by relocating the Defense Contract Management Agency Headquarters to Fort Lee, VA.

Realign 400 Army Navy Drive, a leased installation in Arlington, VA, by relocating the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, and the DoD Inspector General to Fort Belvoir, VA.

Realign the Webb Building, a leased installation in Arlington, VA, by relocating the Department of Defense Education Activity and the Defense Human Resources Activity to Fort Belvoir, VA.

Realign Rosslyn Plaza North, a leased installation in Arlington, VA, by relocating offices accommodating Pentagon Renovation temporary space, Washington Headquarters Services and the Defense Human Resources Activity to Fort Belvoir, VA.

Realign Crystal Gateway North, a leased installation in Arlington, VA, by relocating the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, and the DoD Inspector General to Fort Belvoir, VA.

Realign 2001 North Beauregard Street, 621 North Payne Street, Ballston Metro Center, Crystal Square 4, Crystal Square 5, Crystal Plaza 6, 4015 Wilson Boulevard, Skyline 5, and Skyline 6, leased installations in Northern VA, by relocating the Office of the Secretary of Defense to Fort Belvoir, VA.

Realign Crystal Mall 3, a leased installation in Arlington, VA, by relocating the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Defense Finance and Accounting Service at Fort Belvoir, VA.
Realign Hoffman 1, Crystal Gateway 1, Crystal Gateway 2, Crystal Gateway 3, and the James K. Polk Building, leased installations in Northern VA, by relocating the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Washington Headquarters Services to Fort Belvoir, VA.

Realign the Nash Street Building, a leased installation in Arlington, VA, by relocating the Defense Human Resources Activity to Fort Belvoir, VA.

Realign Alexandria Tech Center IV, a leased installation in Alexandria, VA, by relocating the Defense Technology Security Administration to Fort Belvoir, VA.

Realign 1400-1450 South Eads Street, a leased installation in Arlington, VA, by relocating the DoD Inspector General to Fort Belvoir, VA.

Realign 1401 Wilson Boulevard, a leased installation in Arlington, VA, by relocating the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, and Defense Human Resources Activity to Fort Belvoir, VA.

Realign 1555 Wilson Boulevard, a leased installation in Arlington, VA, by relocating offices of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Defense Human Resources Activity to Fort Belvoir, VA.

Realign Crystal Mall 2-3-4 and Skyline 4, leased installations in Northern VA, by relocating Washington Headquarters Services to Fort Belvoir, VA.

**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION**

This recommendation meets two important Department of Defense (DoD) objectives with regard to future use of leased space and enhanced security for DoD Activities. Additionally, the recommendation results in a significant improvement in military value as a result of the movement from leased space to a military installation. The average military value of the noted Department of Defense components based on current locations ranges from 272nd to 332nd out of 334 entities evaluated by the Major Administration and Headquarters (MAH) military value model. Fort Belvoir is ranked 57th out of 334; and Fort Lee is ranked 96th. Implementation will reduce the Department’s reliance on leased space which has historically higher overall costs than government-owned space and generally does not meet Anti-terrorism Force Protection standards as prescribed in UFC 04-010-01. The recommendation eliminates approximately 1,850,000 Usable Square Feet of leased administrative space within the NCR. This, plus the immediate benefit of enhanced Force Protection afforded by a location within a military installation fence-line, will provide immediate compliance with Force Protection Standards. The leased installations affected by this recommendation are generally non-compliant with current Force Protection Standards. The relocation of the DCMA headquarters to a military installation that is farther than 100 miles from the Pentagon provides dispersion of DoD activities away from a dense concentration within the National Capital Region. This recommendation has the added benefit of allowing DCMA to combine its headquarters facilities from two adjacent leased buildings into one facility that meets its current space requirements.

**COMMUNITY CONCERNS**

Community leaders questioned DoD’s security standards, stating they were unnecessarily more stringent than those developed by the Interagency Security Committee (tasked with developing and evaluating security standards for Federal facilities.) Also, the communities questioned whether DoD had surveyed each facility to determine compliance and the level of compliance with the DoD security standards (or even those “less stringent” standards approved by OMB in September 2004.) The communities felt BRAC was not the proper instrument to effect DoD employee relocation from leased facilities.

Advocates expressed concerns about the negative impact on operational readiness and manpower implications. They argued the current “scattered” arrangement of leased office space makes more strategic sense than does concentration, that relocation will disrupt synergies with other agencies of the Federal Government and the Pentagon, and, finally, that leased space is better able to accommodate contingency, mobilization, surge, and future total force requirements than its alternative, military construction. Similarly, communities claimed their quality of life could be reduced because of transportation problems such as increased traffic, lack of public transportation, and increased commuting times, with the attendant issues of air pollution and increased fuel consumption.

In addition to the generalized comments above, affected communities submitted comments on the following agency: DCMA. The specific concern was not about moving out of the leased facility but about moving to the gaining location, Fort Lee, because of constrained access to field operations and customers.
COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission’s review and analysis validated the community concern that the Department failed to assess each leased-space location individually for compliance with DoD Force Protection standards. The Commission also acknowledged community concerns about personnel relocation, impact on military readiness, and possible advantages that leased space may have over military owned facilities. These concerns were carefully weighed and considered, but in the final analysis the Commission found they did not collectively rise to the level of a substantial deviation. The experience of prior rounds of BRAC has shown that numerous leased-space facilities have been closed and relocated successfully and without excessive disruption. Moreover, the Commission felt that the majority of the concerns raised about the proposal were more properly categorized as implementation issues that could be successfully managed over the six-year implementation period.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission found the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission approves the recommendation of the Secretary.

CO-LOCATE MISSILE AND SPACE DEFENSE AGENCIES

RECOMMENDATION # 134 (H&SA 15)

One-time Cost: $178.2M
Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings): ($36.1M)
20-Year Net Present Value: ($359.1M)
Payback Period: 1 YEAR

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Close the Suffolk Building, a leased installation in Falls Church, VA. Relocate all Missile Defense Agency (MDA) functions, except the Ballistic Missile Defense System Sensors Directorate, to Redstone Arsenal, AL.

Close the Space and Missile Defense Command (SMDC) Building, a leased installation in Huntsville, AL. Relocate all functions of the Missile Defense Agency to Redstone Arsenal, AL.

Realign Federal Office Building 2, Arlington, VA, by relocating a Headquarters Command Center for the Missile Defense Agency to Fort Belvoir, VA, and by relocating all other functions of the Missile Defense Agency, except the Command and Control Battle Management and Communications Directorate, to Redstone Arsenal, AL.

Realign Crystal Square 2, a leased installation in Arlington, VA, by relocating all functions of the Missile Defense Agency and the Headquarters component of the USA Space and Missile Defense Command to Redstone Arsenal, AL.

Realign Crystal Mall 4, a leased installation in Arlington, VA, by relocating the Headquarters component of the USA Space and Missile Defense Command to Redstone Arsenal, AL.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

This recommendation meets several important Department of Defense objectives with regard to future use of leased space, rationalization of the Department’s presence within 100 miles of the Pentagon, and enhanced security for DoD activities. Relocating MDA operations from the NCR and consolidating with existing MDA activities already in Huntsville will enhance jointness and establish an invaluable synergy with the principal DoD expertise in ground-based missile research and development as well as with expertise in missile-related test and evaluation. Additionally, the recommendation results in a significant improvement in military value due to the shift from primarily leased space to locations on military installations. The military value of MDA based on its current portfolio of locations is 329 out of 334 entities evaluated by the Major Administration and Headquarters (MAH) military value model, and SMDC’s headquarters is 299 out of 334. Redstone Arsenal is ranked 48 out of 334, and Fort Belvoir is ranked 57 out of 334.

Implementation will reduce the Department’s reliance on leased space which has historically higher overall costs than government-owned space and generally does not meet Anti-terrorism Force Protection standards as prescribed in UFC 04-
The recommendation will eliminate approximately 227,000 GSF of leased space. It also provides space for the consolidation of MDA contractors with the appropriate MDA elements at Redstone Arsenal. The relocation of two activities to a military installation that is farther than 100 miles from the Pentagon provides dispersion of DoD activities away from a dense concentration within the National Capital Region. This, plus the immediate benefit of enhanced Force Protection afforded by a location within a military installation fence-line, will provide immediate compliance with Force Protection Standards. The vast majority of MDA’s and SMDC’s present leased locations are not compliant with current Force Protection Standards. This action provides a consolidation for MDA’s Washington, DC, area operations and Huntsville locations and continues movement of MDA onto Redstone Arsenal that is expected to occur with the completion in FY07 of the Von Braun 2 building, which will house approximately 800 MDA personnel. Similarly, SMDC is consolidating its headquarters office with existing activities recently moved on to Redstone Arsenal.

**Community Concerns**

The community felt the Suffolk Building, a leased installation in Falls Church, VA, would be penalized in the future by the implication that it failed to meet Anti-terrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) standards. Community representatives argued that no AT/FP survey was ever completed and that DoD incorrectly characterized all commercial leased space as unsatisfactory without making formal surveys.

**Commission Findings**

The Commission found the recommendation was incorrectly worded regarding the action at the SMDC Building in Huntsville, AL. The Commission amended DoD’s recommendation to “realign,” rather than close, the building because the Program Executive Office, Missile and Space (PEOMS) will remain in the building. The Commission found that PEOMS was overlooked by DoD during the data collection process and will move to Redstone Arsenal, AL, outside the BRAC proposal.

The Commission’s review and analysis validated the community concern that the Department failed to assess each leased-space location individually for compliance with DoD Force Protection standards. The Commission also acknowledged community concerns about personnel relocation, impact on military readiness, and possible advantages that leased space may have over military owned facilities. These concerns were carefully weighed and considered, but in the final analysis the Commission found they did not collectively rise to the level of a substantial deviation. The experience of prior rounds of BRAC has shown that numerous leased-space facilities have been closed and relocated successfully and without excessive disruption. Moreover, the Commission felt that the majority of the concerns raised about the proposal were more properly categorized as implementation issues that could be successfully managed over the six-year implementation period.

**Commission Recommendations**

The Commission found that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final selection criterion 1 and from the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following:

- Close the Suffolk Building, a leased installation in Falls Church, VA. Relocate all Missile Defense Agency (MDA) functions, except the Ballistic Missile Defense System Sensors Directorate, to Redstone Arsenal, AL.
- Realign the Space and Missile Defense Command (SMDC) Building, a leased installation in Huntsville, AL. Relocate all functions of the Missile Defense Agency to Redstone Arsenal, AL.
- Realign Federal Office Building 2, Arlington, VA, by relocating a Headquarters Command Center for the Missile Defense Agency to Fort Belvoir, VA, and by relocating all other functions of the Missile Defense Agency, except the Command and Control Battle Management and Communications Directorate, to Redstone Arsenal, AL.
- Realign Crystal Square 2, a leased installation in Arlington, VA, by relocating all functions of the Missile Defense Agency and the Headquarters component of the USA Space and Missile Defense Command to Redstone Arsenal, AL.
- Realign Crystal Mall 4, a leased installation in Arlington, VA, by relocating the Headquarters component of the USA Space and Missile Defense Command to Redstone Arsenal, AL.

The Commission found this change and the recommendation as amended are consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. The full text of this and all Commission recommendations can be found in Appendix Q.
**CO-LOCATE NAVY EDUCATION AND TRAINING COMMAND AND NAVY EDUCATION AND TRAINING PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT & TECHNOLOGY CENTER**  
**RECOMMENDATION # 135 (H&SA 17)**  

**One-Time Cost:** N/A  
**Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings):** N/A  
**20-Year Net Present Value:** N/A  
**Payback Period:** N/A

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**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION**  
Realign Naval Air Station Pensacola, FL, by relocating Navy Education and Training Command to Naval Support Activity Millington, TN.  
Realign Saufley Field, FL, by relocating Navy Education and Training Professional Development & Technology Center to Naval Support Activity Millington, TN.

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**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION**  
Realignment of Navy Education and Training Command (NETC) and Navy Education and Training Professional Development & Technology Center (NETPDTC) to Naval Support Activity Millington will collocate these activities with common functions (Bureau of Naval Personnel, Navy Manpower Analysis Center, and Navy Personnel Research and Development Center) and facilitate creation of a Navy Human Resources Center of Excellence. By relocating NETC and NETPDTC within the hub of naval personnel activities, this recommendation eliminates personnel redundancies and excess infrastructure capacity. NETC and NETPDTC will require 50,400 GSF of military construction (MILCON) and will utilize 102,400 GSF of existing administrative space and warehouse space at Millington; the parking lot additions will be new MILCON.

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**COMMUNITY CONCERNS**  
The affected communities emphasized the higher military value score for, and vacant infrastructure on, NAS Pensacola. Another expressed concern was that a move from Pensacola to Millington would mean a loss of experience because the majority of employees would probably not move from Florida to Tennessee. The communities argued that the proposed NETC move to Millington is an organizational realignment that does not necessitate a costly geographic move. Pertaining to NETPDTC, the community argued that the command could remain at Saufley or move aboard NAS Pensacola to reduce overhead costs. Finally, the community argued that industry standards should be used that recognize that advances in information technology make it possible for geographically separated organizations to function. Therefore, they recommended that NETC and NETPDTC remain in Florida.

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**COMMISSION FINDINGS**  
The Commission found that relocating the Navy Education and Training Command and Navy Education and Training Professional Development & Technology Center to Millington, TN, was not justifiable in light of the commands’ missions, was not cost effective, and would have a negative impact on the Department’s stated objective of enabling jointness.

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**COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS**  
The Commission found that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final selection criteria 1, 3, 4, and 5 and the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission has rejected the recommendation of the Secretary. The Commission found this recommendation is consistent with the Force Structure Plan and final selection criteria.
CONSOLIDATE ARMY TEST AND EVALUATION COMMAND (ATEC) HEADQUARTERS

RECOMMENDATION # 136 (H&SA 18)

One-time Cost: $7.1M
Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings): ($8.7M)
20-Year Net Present Value: ($125.7M)
Payback Period: IMMEDIATE

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Realign Park Center Four, a leased installation in Alexandria, VA, by relocating and consolidating Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC) with its subcomponents at Aberdeen Proving Ground (APG), MD.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

This recommendation meets several important Department of Defense (DoD) objectives with regard to future use of leased space, rationalization of the Department’s presence within the National Capital Region (NCR), and enhanced security for DoD activities. Additionally, the scenario results in a significant improvement in military value. The military value of ATEC’s headquarters based on its current location is ranked 319 out of 334 entities evaluated by the MAH military value model, while APG is ranked 128 out of 334. Implementation will reduce the Department’s reliance on leased space, which has historically higher overall costs than government-owned space and generally does not meet Anti-terrorism Force Protection standards as prescribed in UFC 04-010-01. The recommendation eliminates 83,000 Usable Square Feet of leased administrative space within the NCR. The relocation to a military installation outside of the NCR provides dispersion of DoD activities away from a dense concentration within the NCR. This, plus the immediate benefit of enhanced Force Protection afforded by a location within a military installation fence-line, will provide ATEC’s Headquarters with immediate compliance with Force Protection Standards. Its current location is non-compliant with current Force Protection Standards. APG has available, vacant administrative space that can support this space requirement without the need for new MILCON. This recommendation has the added benefit of allowing ATEC to consolidate its headquarters facilities with its subcomponents that are currently operating at APG: the Army Developmental Test Command and the Army Evaluation Center.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

Community leaders questioned DoD’s security standards, stating they were unnecessarily more stringent than those developed by the Interagency Security Committee (tasked with developing and evaluating security standards for Federal facilities.) Also, the communities questioned whether DoD had surveyed each facility to determine compliance and the level of compliance with the DoD security standards (or even those “less stringent” standards approved by OMB in September 2004.) The communities felt BRAC was not the proper instrument to effect DoD employee relocation from leased facilities.

Advocates expressed concerns about the negative impact on operational readiness and manpower implications. They argued the current “scattered” arrangement of leased office space makes more strategic sense than does concentration, that relocation will disrupt synergies with other agencies of the Federal Government and the Pentagon, and, finally, that leased space is better able to accommodate contingency, mobilization, surge, and future total force requirements than its alternative, military construction. Similarly, communities claimed their quality of life could be reduced because of transportation problems such as increased traffic, lack of public transportation, and increased commuting times, with the attendant issues of air pollution and increased fuel consumption.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission’s review and analysis validated the community concern that the Department failed to assess each leased-space location individually for compliance with DoD Force Protection standards. The Commission also acknowledged community concerns about personnel relocation, impact on military readiness, and possible advantages that leased space may have over military owned facilities. These concerns were carefully weighed and considered, but in the final analysis the
Commission found they did not collectively rise to the level of a substantial deviation. The experience of prior rounds of BRAC has shown that numerous leased-space facilities have been closed and relocated successfully and without excessive disruption. Moreover, the Commission felt that the majority of the concerns raised about the proposal were more properly categorized as implementation issues that could be successfully managed over the six-year implementation period.

**COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS**

The Commission found the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission approves the recommendation of the Secretary.

**CONSOLIDATE CIVILIAN PERSONNEL OFFICES (CPOs) WITHIN EACH MILITARY DEPARTMENT AND THE DEFENSE AGENCIES**

**Recommendation # 137 (H&SA 19)**

- **One-time Cost:** $87.1M
- **Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings):** $(22.2M)
- **20-Year Net Present Value:** $(180.5M)
- **Payback Period:** 4 years

**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION**

Realign Fort Richardson, AK, by relocating the Civilian Personnel Operations Center (CPOC) to Fort Huachuca, AZ, and consolidating it with the Civilian Personnel Operations Center at Fort Huachuca, AZ. Realign Rock Island Arsenal, IL, by relocating the Civilian Personnel Operations Center to Fort Riley, KS, and consolidating with the Civilian Personnel Operations Center at Fort Riley, KS, and Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD.

Realign Human Resource Service Center-Northeast, 111 S. Independence Mall, East, Bourse Bldg., a leased installation in Philadelphia, PA, by relocating the Civilian Personnel Office to the Naval Support Activity Philadelphia, PA. Realign Human Resource Service Center-Southeast, 9110 Leonard Kimble Road, a leased installation at Stennis Space Center, MS, by relocating the Civilian Personnel Office to the Naval Support Activity Philadelphia, PA, and consolidating with the relocated Human Resource Service Center-Northeast at the Naval Support Activity Philadelphia, PA.

Realign Human Resource Service Center-Pacific, 178 Main Street, Bldg 499, Honolulu, HI, by relocating the Civilian Personnel Office to the Human Resource Service Center-Northwest, 3230 NW Randall Way, Silverdale, WA, and Naval Air Station North Island or Marine Corps Air Station Miramar, CA and consolidating with the Human Resource Service Centers at Silverdale, WA and Naval Air Station North Island or Marine Corps Air Station Miramar, CA.


Realign Bolling Air Force Base Washington, DC, by relocating the Civilian Personnel Office to Randolph Air Force Base, TX. Consolidate the relocated civilian personnel offices with the Civilian Personnel Office at Randolph Air Force Base, TX.

The consolidation of Civilian Personnel Offices within each Military Department and the transactional functions among the Defense Agencies reduces excess capacity, reduces the use of leased facilities, and achieves manpower savings through consolidation and elimination of duplicate functions. This recommendation supports the Administration’s urging of federal agencies to consolidate personnel services. During the implementation of this recommendation it is important to partner with the National Security Personnel System (NSPS). NSPS provides the opportunity to improve the effectiveness of the Department through a simplified personnel management system that will improve the way it hires and assigns employees. This recommendation will be an effective tool for NSPS and provide the flexibility and responsiveness that supports the implementation of this system. Since NSPS will define a new human resource system featuring streamlined hiring, simplified job changes, and a less complex classification system, it covers all functions that would be supported by Civilian Personnel Offices.

Community Concerns

Community leaders questioned DoD’s security standards, stating they were unnecessarily more stringent than those developed by the Interagency Security Committee (tasked with developing and evaluating security standards for Federal facilities.) Also, they questioned whether DoD had surveyed each facility to determine compliance and the level of compliance with the DoD security standards (or even those “less stringent” standards approved by OMB in September 2004.) Finally, affected communities felt BRAC was not the proper instrument to effect DoD employee relocation from leased facilities. More specific concerns are noted as follows:

Army:

Rock Island Arsenal – The community emphasized that DoD previously identified Rock Island Arsenal for closure, which unfairly precluded a scenario considering the North Central CPOC as a "receiving site." DoD deviated significantly from the criteria for several reasons. NC CPOC ranked first among 25 DoD personnel offices. Rock Island Arsenal is a prime location for further consolidation of human resources (HR) processing because its automation infrastructure can support further expansion, a key element in the Army’s decision to site the Army Civilian Data Center (ACDC), the central site for all of Army’s major HR production data systems. The servicing ratio that will result from the elimination of 44 positions will alter the current servicing ratio from 1:148 to 1:175; the Army standard is 1:144. The North Central CPOC provides HR services to Fort Belvoir, Fort Meade and Fort Sam Houston, which stand to gain thousands of civilian employees as a result of other BRAC recommendations. Finally, the community argued that the OSD BRAC Clearinghouse justification that CPOC relocation enables offices to be near their customer bases is flawed. Currently, NC CPOC supports a substantial civilian workforce in Afghanistan and Iraq and is engaged in standing up a CENTCOM organization in Iraq. The community asserts that the Army's regionalization of personnel services and centers was based on a determination that the processes performed in the personnel centers did not require geographic proximity to the customer, a concept supported by NC CPOC current customer base.

Navy:

HRSC Pacific – The community argued realignment of HRSC Pacific to CONUS West Coast would negatively affect approximately 135 Navy activities and 12,000 employees in Hawaii and those served in the Western Pacific. Also, they expressed concerns over increased travel costs and the seemingly arbitrary number of consolidated centers. As an alternative, the community offered to host a consolidated DoD Human Resource Personnel Center as a pilot program in Hawaii.

HRSC Southeast – The community submitted that DoD’s recommendation to move the HRSC Southeast was based on flawed assumptions, specifically that HRSC Southeast is a typical “leased installation” and would need $2M to meet force protection standards. In reality, HRSC Southeast resides lease-free in a Level 1 security rated, federally-owned facility. Navy's fair share of installation operating costs is only $12.53/sf, a rate that is among the lowest in the nation. The community contended that jointness and synergy already exist at Stennis, that Stennis has a higher Military Value than the proposed site at Naval Support Activity Philadelphia, and that Stennis is more cost effective than Philadelphia. Currently, there are approximately 2,200 personnel employed by the various Navy tenants that include Naval Research Laboratory, Naval Small Craft Instruction and Technical Training School and Special Boat Team 22 (a Navy SEAL unit). The Navy has plans to introduce additional active-duty units permanently to the installation. The community argued that these factors gave Stennis a distinct advantage over the NSA Philadelphia site and recommended consolidation of HRSC Southeast and HRSC Northeast at the Stennis Space Center.
HRSC Northeast - The community submitted a rebuttal to the rationale and recommendation that HRSC Southeast remain at and HRSC Northeast be realigned to Stennis Space Center. The community argues that advocates for Stennis included several serious errors of fact that depart from the official COBRA report. The community supported the original DoD recommendation.

Air Force:

The community argued that “military judgment” dominated improperly over quantitative scores, and consolidating civilian personnel activities at Randolph Air Force Base would remove the customer bases farther away from the personnel who serve them.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission disagreed with three elements of the Secretary’s recommendation.

First, the Civilian Personnel Operations Center (CPOC) at Rock Island Arsenal, IL, was recommended for relocation based on a later withdrawn proposal to close the arsenal. The Commission learned that the late timing of the decision did not allow the HSA JCSG to analyze the CPOC recommendation sufficiently.

Second, HRSC Southeast is located on Stennis Space Center, a Federally-owned, level-1 security rated facility whose tenants pay a “fair share” of the base’s operating costs. Because of DoD’s blanket assumptions with regard to leased space, the facility received the low military values assigned to leased space. The Commission found that, in this case, DoD’s assumption of low military value was not supported by the facts.

Third, with regard to the relocation of the five Air Force CPOs, the effect of the recommendation would deprive the associated losing installations of mandatory personnel management advisory services, otherwise referred to as non-transactional functions. The Commission found this was not the Air Force’s intention.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission found that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final selection criteria 1, 2, 4, and 5 and the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following:

Realign Fort Richardson, AK, by relocating the Civilian Personnel Operations Center to Fort Huachuca, AZ, and consolidating it with the Civilian Personnel Operations Center at Fort Huachuca, AZ.

Realign Human Resource Service Center-Northeast, 111 S. Independence Mall, East, Bourse Building, a leased installation in Philadelphia, PA, by relocating the Civilian Personnel Office to the Naval Support Activity Philadelphia, PA.

Realign Human Resource Service Center-Southwest, 525 B Street, Suite 600, a leased installation in San Diego, CA, by relocating the Civilian Personnel Office to Naval Air Station North Island or Marine Corps Air Station Miramar, CA.

Realign Human Resource Service Center-Pacific, 178 Main Street, Bldg 499, Honolulu, HI, by relocating the Civilian Personnel Office to the Human Resource Service Center-Northwest, 3230 NW Randall Way, Silverdale, WA, and Naval Air Station North Island or Marine Corps Air Station Miramar, CA and consolidating with the Human Resource Service Centers at Silverdale, WA, and Naval Air Station North Island or Marine Corps Air Station Miramar, CA.

Realign Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH, by relocating the transactional functions of the Civilian Personnel Office to Randolph Air Force Base, TX. Retain sufficient positions and personnel to perform the personnel management advisory services, the non-transactional functions, necessary to support the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH, civilian workforce.

Realign Robins Air Force Base, GA, by relocating the transactional functions of the Civilian Personnel Office to Randolph Air Force Base, TX. Retain sufficient positions and personnel to perform the personnel management advisory services, the non-transactional functions, necessary to support the Robins Air Force Base, GA, civilian workforce.

Realign Hill Air Force Base, UT, by relocating the transactional functions of the Civilian Personnel Office to Randolph Air Force Base, TX. Retain sufficient positions and personnel to perform the personnel management advisory services, the non-transactional functions, necessary to support the Hill Air Force Base, UT, civilian workforce.

Realign Tinker Air Force Base, OK, by relocating the transactional functions of the Civilian Personnel Office to Randolph Air Force Base, TX. Retain sufficient positions and personnel to perform the personnel management advisory services, the non-transactional functions, necessary to support the Tinker Air Force Base, UT, civilian workforce.
Realign Bolling Air Force Base, DC, by relocating the transactional functions of the Civilian Personnel Office to Randolph Air Force Base, TX. Consolidate the relocated civilian personnel offices with the Civilian Personnel Office at Randolph Air Force Base, TX. Retain sufficient positions and personnel to perform the personnel management advisory services, the non-transactional functions, necessary to support the Bolling Air Force Base, DC, civilian workforce.


Realign the Department of Defense Education Activity, 4040 North Fairfax Drive, a leased installation in Arlington, VA, by relocating the transactional functions of the Civilian Personnel Office to the Defense Logistics Agency 3990 East Broad Street, Columbus, OH, and consolidating them with the Customer Support Office of the Defense Logistics Agency.

Realign the Defense Information Systems Agency, 701 S. Courthouse Road, Arlington, VA, by relocating the transactional functions of the Civilian Personnel Office to the Defense Finance and Accounting Service, 8899 E. 56th Street, Indianapolis, IN, and consolidating them with the Civilian Personnel Office of the Defense Finance and Accounting Service at Indianapolis, IN.

The Commission found this change and the recommendation as amended are consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. The full text of this and all Commission recommendations can be found in Appendix Q.

CONSOLIDATE CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES INTO JOINT REGIONAL CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES

Recommendation # 138 (H&SA 22)

One-time Cost: $171.3M
Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings): ($14.7M)
20-Year Net Present Value: ($11.2M)
Payback Period: 15 Years

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Realign Edwards Air Force Base, CA, Kirtland Air Force Base, NM, and Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton, CA, by relocating the correctional function of each to Marine Corps Air Station, Miramar, CA, and consolidating them with the correctional function already at Marine Corps Air Station Miramar, CA, to form a single Level II Southwest Joint Regional Correctional Facility.

Realign Lackland Air Force Base, TX, Fort Knox, KY, and Fort Sill, OK by relocating the correctional function of each to Fort Leavenworth, KS, and consolidating them with the correctional function already at Fort Leavenworth, KS, to form a single Level II Midwest Joint Regional Correctional Facility.

Realign Naval Air Station Jacksonville, FL, and Naval Air Station Pensacola, FL, by relocating the correctional function of each to Naval Weapons Station Charleston, SC, and consolidating them with the correctional function already at Naval Weapons Station Charleston, SC, to form a single Level II Southeastern Joint Regional Correctional Facility.

Realign Naval Support Activity Norfolk, VA, Marine Corps Base Quantico, VA, and Camp Lejeune, NC, by relocating the correctional function of each and consolidating them at Naval Support Activity, Northwest Annex, Chesapeake, VA, to form a single Level II Mid-Atlantic Joint Regional Correctional Facility.

Realign Fort Lewis, WA, by relocating the management of correctional functions to Submarine Base Bangor, WA. The correctional facilities at Submarine Base Bangor, WA, and Fort Lewis, WA, will together form the Level II Northwestern Joint Regional Correctional Facility.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

The Department of Defense (DoD) Correctional program exists to enforce the military justice system, ensuring the safety, security, administration, and good order and discipline of its prisoners under guidance of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice (UCMJ). The UCMJ is legislation that is contained in Title 10 of the United States Code. It comprises a complete set of criminal military law and code. The DoD Correctional program currently consists of 17 DoD correctional facilities, which incorporate three facility classifications and four custody levels. There are eight Level I, eight Level II and one Level III correctional facilities. Level I is capable of providing pretrial and post-trial confinement up to one year. Level II is capable of providing pretrial and post-trial confinement for prisoners/inmates with sentences to confinement of five years or less and Level III provides post-trial confinement exceeding five years, one day, to include life and death sentences.

This recommendation creates five Level II Joint Regional Correctional Facilities. The Southwest Joint Regional Correctional Facility consolidates the Naval Consolidated Brig Miramar, Marine Corps Air Station Miramar; the Edwards Confinement Facility, Edwards Air Force Base, CA; the Kirtland Confinement Facility, Kirtland Air Force Base, NM; and the Marine Corps Base Brig, Camp Pendleton, to a single Level II Joint Regional Correctional Facility at Miramar. The Midwestern Joint Regional Correctional Facility consolidates the Lackland Confinement Facility, Lackland Air Force Base, TX, the Army Regional Correctional Facility, Fort Knox, KY, the Army Regional Correctional Facility, Fort Sill, OK, and the components of the US Disciplinary Barracks at Fort Leavenworth, KS, into a single Level II Joint Regional Correctional Facility at Leavenworth. The Southeastern Joint Regional Correctional Facility consolidates the Naval Consolidated Brig Charleston, Naval Weapons Station, Charleston, SC; the Waterfront Brig Jacksonville, Naval Air Station Jacksonville, FL; and the Waterfront Brig Pensacola, Naval Air Station Pensacola, FL, to a single Level II Joint Regional Correctional Facility at Charleston. The Mid-Atlantic Joint Regional Correctional Facility consolidates the Naval Brig Norfolk, Naval Support Activity, Norfolk, VA, Marine Corps Base Brig, Quantico, VA, and Marine Corps Base Brig Camp Lejeune, NC; to a single Level II Joint Regional Correctional Facility at Chesapeake. The Northwestern Joint Regional Correctional Facility consolidates the Army Regional Correctional Facility at Fort Lewis, WA, and the Waterfront Brig Puget Sound, Silverdale, Submarine Base Bangor, WA, to a single Level II Joint Regional Correctional Facility with correctional facilities at both locations.

**Community Concerns**

There were no formal expressions from the community.

**Commission Findings**

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense. Many DoD correctional facilities were built in the 1960s and 1970s; some were built in the 1950s. The Commission found that, clearly, new facilities are required to improve safety, security, and efficiency.

**Commission Recommendations**

The Commission found the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission approves the recommendation of the Secretary.

**Consolidate Defense Commissary Agency Eastern, Midwestern Regional, and Hopewell, VA, Offices**

Recommendation # 139 (H&SA 26)

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**Secretary of Defense Recommendation**

Close 300 AFCOMS Way, a leased installation in San Antonio, TX; 5258 Oaklawn Boulevard, a leased installation in Hopewell, VA; and 5151 Bonney Road, a leased installation in Virginia Beach, VA. Relocate all components of the Defense Commissary Agency (DeCA) to Fort Lee, VA.
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

This recommendation consolidates the Defense Commissary Agency (DeCA) Eastern Region (Virginia Beach, VA), Midwest Region (San Antonio, TX), and headquarters element currently in leased space in Hopewell, VA, with DeCA’s main headquarters at Fort Lee, VA. It meets several important Department of Defense objectives with regard to future use of leased space, consolidation of Headquarters operations at single locations, and enhanced security for DoD activities. Additionally, the recommendation significantly improves military value due to the shift from leased space to a location on a military installation. The military value of DeCA leased space based on its current portfolio of locations is 216 out of 334 entities evaluated by the Major Administration and Headquarters (MAH) military value model. Fort Lee ranks 96 out of 334.

Implementation will reduce the Department’s reliance on leased space, which has historically higher overall costs than government-owned space and generally does not meet Anti-terrorism Force Protection standards as prescribed in UFC 04-01001. The benefit of enhanced Force Protection afforded by a location within a military installation fence-line will provide immediate compliance with Force Protection Standards. DeCA’s current leased locations are not compliant with current Force Protection Standards. The recommendation eliminates 99,915 Gross Square Feet (GSF) of leased administrative space. This action provides a consolidation of these DeCA regional and headquarters activities from three to two, and reduces the number of buildings from four to one.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

There were no formal expressions from the community.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense. However, the Commission questioned the number of contractors required and found the planned construction would be a wing on an already existing structure rather than a new standalone building. As a result, DoD revised its cost and savings estimates for this proposal. The one-time costs were reduced from $47.2 to $31.7 million; net costs were reduced from $35.4 to $2.5 million; annual recurring savings increased from $3.9 to $6.7 million; the payback period was reduced from 14 to 5 years, and finally net present value increased from $4.9 to $53.3 million.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission found the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission approves the recommendation of the Secretary.

CONSOLIDATE DEFENSE INFORMATION SYSTEMS AGENCY AND ESTABLISH JOINT C4ISR D&A CAPABILITY

RECOMMENDATION # 140 (H&SA 27)

One-time Cost: $220.0M
Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings): ($59.4M)
20-Year Net Present Value: ($491.2M)
Payback Period: 2 YEARS

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Close 5600 Columbia Pike and Skyline Place (Skyline VII), leased installations in Falls Church, VA, and 1010 Gause Boulevard, a leased installation in Slidell, LA.

Relocate all components of the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) to Fort Meade, MD.

Close the Logicon Building, a leased installation in Arlington, Virginia. Relocate the Joint Task Force-Global Network Operation (JTF-GNO) to Fort Meade, MD.
Realign Skyline IV and Skyline V, leased installations in Falls Church, VA, and GSA Franconia Warehouse Depot, a leased installation in Springfield, VA, by relocating all components of DISA to Fort Meade, MD.

Realign Arlington Service Center, VA, by relocating all components of DISA and the JTF-GNO to Fort Meade, MD.

Realign Naval Support Activity Panama City, Florida by relocating the Deployable Joint Command and Control (DJC2) Program Office of the Naval Surface Warfare Center to Fort Meade, MD.

Realign Rosslyn Plaza North, a leased location in Arlington, VA, by relocating the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Program Office to Fort Meade, MD.

**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION**

This recommendation consolidates headquarters components of DISA and the JTF-GNO, a related organization with a dual-hatted command and shared facilities, at Fort Meade. This recommendation also realigns the scattered Combatant Commander Development and Acquisition activities, of which certain DISA components are a part, into a single activity at Fort Meade. These DISA components include Global Information Grid-Bandwidth Expansion (GIG-BE), Global Command and Control System (GCCS), Network Centric Enterprise Services (NCES), and Teleport Program Offices. This realignment will provide for the delivery of integrated, interoperable C4ISR systems to the warfighters with increased efficiency at less cost.

The Army's recommendation to close Fort Monmouth relocates the Joint Network Management System (JNMS) Program Office from Fort Monmouth, New Jersey to Fort Meade in a complementary action to those described herein.

This recommendation meets several important Department of Defense objectives with regard to future use of leased space, rationalizing the presence of DoD activities within the National Capital Region (NCR), consolidation of Headquarters operations at single locations, and enhanced security for DoD activities.

Implementation will reduce the Department's reliance on leased space, which has historically higher overall costs than government-owned space and generally does not meet Anti-terrorism Force Protection standards as prescribed in UFC 04-010-01. The recommendation eliminates over 720,000 Usable Square Feet (USF) of leased administrative space. The relocation of a DoD Agency headquarters to a military installation that is outside of the NCR provides dispersion of DoD activities away from a dense concentration within the NCR. This, plus the immediate benefit of enhanced Force Protection afforded by a location within a military installation fence-line, will provide immediate compliance with Force Protection Standards.

DISA’s current leased locations are not compliant with current Force Protection Standards. This action provides a consolidation for DISA’s headquarters, reducing the number of buildings from eight to two.

**COMMUNITY CONCERNS**

The Slidell, LA, community argued that closure of 1010 Gause Boulevard, a leased installation, would decrease military value for the Defense Information Systems Agency. They claimed functions performed by DISA at Slidell are not headquarters functions appropriate for consolidation into headquarters operations. The Slidell facility meets DoD force protection requirements and has low operating costs. The community proposed relocating functions within the National Capital Region to Slidell, LA, as a way to meet DoD’s goal of dispersion of defense activities away from a dense concentration within the NCR and asserted construction costs at Fort Meade, MD, are underestimated. The community stated DoD’s scenario underestimated the number of employees needed to be recruited at Fort Meade to offset the loss of personnel from Slidell and therefore overestimated personnel savings. Further, the community suggested that COBRA data underestimate the cost of closing the Slidell facility and relocating associated equipment to Fort Meade, MD.

The Falls Church, VA, community argued that current leased installations occupied by DISA at Skyline Drive could meet DoD force protection requirements for less cost than relocating to Fort Meade, MD. The community suggested that cost estimates for leased space overestimated the projected cost avoidance for vacating leased space. Although spread across several buildings in Northern Virginia, DISA installations already operate in close proximity to each other and to the customer base in the NCR.

The Annapolis, MD, community argues that the Joint Spectrum Center (JSC), Annapolis, MD, should be included in DoD’s recommendation. The Department certified that the JSC has ongoing relationships with another Fort Meade tenant
that could be strengthened by collocation. DISA sees several advantages to collocating the JSC with DISA headquarters at Fort Meade, MD and no substantive disadvantages.

**COMMISSION FINDINGS**

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense. The Commission notes, however, that the recommendation erroneously failed to include the Joint Spectrum Center in Annapolis, MD, and the Defense Cyber Crime Center in Linthicum, MD, both of which would realize an increased military value from consolidation to Fort Meade, MD. These moves should occur outside the BRAC process.

**COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS**

The Commission found the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission approves the recommendation of the Secretary.

**CONSOLIDATE MEDIA ORGANIZATIONS INTO A NEW AGENCY FOR MEDIA AND PUBLICATIONS**

**Recommendation # 141 (H&SA 30)**

- **One-time Cost:** $42.0M
- **Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings):** ($9.6M)
- **20-Year Net Present Value:** ($89.0M)
- **Payback Period:** 4 YEARS

**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION**

Realign Fort Belvoir, VA, by relocating Soldier Magazine to Fort Meade, MD. Realign Anacostia Annex, District of Columbia, by relocating the Naval Media Center to Fort Meade, MD. Realign 2320 Mill Road, a leased installation in Alexandria, VA, by relocating Army Broadcasting-Soldier Radio/TV to Fort Meade, MD. Realign 103 Norton Street, a leased installation in San Antonio, TX, by relocating Air Force News Agency-Army/Air Force Hometown News Service (a combined entity) to Fort Meade, MD. Close 601 North Fairfax Street, a leased installation in Alexandria, VA, by relocating the American Forces Information Service and the Army Broadcasting-Soldier Radio/TV to Fort Meade, MD. Consolidate Soldier Magazine, Naval Media Center, Army Broadcasting-Soldier Radio/TV, and the Air Force News Agency-Army/Air Force Hometown News Service into a single DoD Media Activity at Fort Meade, MD.

**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION**

This recommendation creates a new DoD Media Activity by consolidating a number of military department media organizations with similar missions into a new organization. It also collocates the American Forces Information Service (AFIS) with the new DoD Media Activity and the existing Defense Information School.

This recommendation meets several important Department of Defense objectives with regard to future use of leased space, rationalizing the presence of DoD activities within the NCR, and enhanced security for DoD activities. The creation of a new DoD Media Activity as the result of consolidating a number of entities with similar missions promotes “jointness” and creates opportunities for cost savings and operational synergy. The co-location of AFIS with the new Activity will facilitate further consolidation of common support functions.

Implementation will reduce the Department’s reliance on leased space, which has historically higher overall costs than government-owned space and generally does not meet antiterrorism force protection standards as prescribed in UFC 04-010-01. The recommendation eliminates approximately 75,000 Usable Square Feet (USF) of leased administrative space. The relocation to a military installation that is outside the boundaries of the NCR provides a dispersion of DoD activities away from a dense concentration with the NCR. This, plus the immediate benefit of enhanced force protection afforded by a location within a military installation fence-line for those activities currently in leased space, will provide immediate compliance with force protection standards.
COMMUNITY CONCERNS

There were no formal expressions from the community.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission found the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission approves the recommendation of the Secretary.

CONSOLIDATE TRANSPORTATION COMMAND COMPONENTS

RECOMMENDATION # 142 (H&SA 31)

One-time Cost: $101.9M
Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings): ($101.5M)
20-Year Net Present Value: ($1,309.3M)
Payback Period: Immediate

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Realign Fort Eustis, VA, by relocating the Army Surface Deployment and Distribution Command to Scott Air Force Base, IL, and consolidating it with the Air Force Air Mobility Command Headquarters and Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) Headquarters at Scott Air Force Base, IL.

Realign Hoffman 2, a leased installation in Alexandria, VA, by relocating the US Army Surface Deployment and Distribution Command to Scott Air Force Base, IL, and consolidating it with the Air Force Air Mobility Command Headquarters and Transportation Command Headquarters at Scott Air Force Base, IL.


SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

Collocation of TRANSCOM and Service components will (1) collocate activities with common functions and facilitate large-scale transformation proposed by the TRANSCOM Commander, and (2) reduce personnel to realize long-term savings. The realignment will also terminate leased space operations in the National Capital Region (143,540 GSF in Alexandria, VA) and near Norfolk, VA (40,013 GSF in Newport News, VA). The scenario will terminate a total of 183,553 GSF in both locations.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The city of Newport News, VA, offered to participate in the construction of secure office facilities to retain the US Army Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC) at Fort Eustis, VA, and the SDDC - Transportation Engineering Agency (TEA), Newport News, in the Newport News area.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense.
**Commission Recommendations**

The Commission found the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission approves the recommendation of the Secretary.

**Consolidate/Co-locate Active and Reserve Personnel & Recruiting Centers for Army and Air Force**

**Recommendation # 143 (H&SA 33)**

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**Secretary of Defense Recommendation**

Realign Army Human Resources Command leased facilities in Alexandria, VA, Indianapolis, IN, and St. Louis, MO. Relocate and consolidate all functions at Fort Knox, KY.

Realign the Air Reserve Personnel Center (Buckley Annex), CO, by relocating the Air Reserve Personnel Center processing functions to Randolph Air Force Base, TX, and consolidating them with the Air Force Personnel Center at Randolph Air Force Base, TX, and by relocating the Individual Mobilization Augmentee operational management functions to Robins Air Force Base, GA, and consolidating them with the Air Force Reserve Command at Robins Air Force Base, GA.

Realign Robins Air Force Base, GA, by relocating Air Force Reserve Recruiting Service to Randolph Air Force Base, TX.

**Secretary of Defense Justification**

The collocation of military personnel and recruiting functions for Army and Air Force creates Service Human Resources Centers for Excellence and improves personnel lifecycle management. This recommendation enables Business Process Reengineering transformation to support several significant Department of Defense initiatives such as increasing Active and Reserve Component Total Force integration and effectiveness and supporting the Department’s goals for the Continuum of Service concept which permits a range of participation to assist in force management and relieve stress on military skills that have been in high demand during recent operations and also supporting the ongoing development and implementation of the Defense Integrated Military Human Resource System (DIMHRS).

For the Army, this recommendation eliminates over 1,100,000 square feet of leased space with annual lease savings of over $31.0M and a one-time cost avoidance of over $30.0M. In addition, it eliminates over 248,000 gross square feet of current excess capacity and moves a large support organization of over 2,000 personnel out of the National Capital Region. For the Air Force, this recommendation eliminates over 100,000 gross square feet of current excess capacity. The Air Force reserve Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) operational command and management functions will be relocated and consolidated with the Air Force Reserve Command at Robins Air Force Base, GA for improved command management of Reserve forces assigned to the Command. The HSA JCSG agrees with the Air Force that the operational alignment of personnel would benefit the Department and this action creates a similar organizational construct with the Marine Corps. The Air Force Recruiting Service is currently located at Randolph Air Force Base; this scenario will collocate Active and Reserve Component headquarters functions in a single location and assist with overall Total Air Force Recruiting management. Randolph Air Force Base is also the current location of the Air Education and Training Command, further improving opportunities to coordinate personnel lifecycle planning. The overarching strategy for these consolidated human resources and recruiting centers extends to other organizations within the Army and Navy. The relocation of Army Accessions Command and Cadet Command from Fort Monroe, VA, and their co-location with the US Army Recruiting Command Headquarters at Fort Knox, KY, is captured in the installation closure recommendation for Fort Monroe. The relocation of the Navy Reserve Personnel Center, the Enlisted Placement and Management Center and the Navy Recruiting Command headquarters from Naval Support Activity New Orleans, LA, and their consolidation with the Navy Personnel Command and Navy Recruiting Command Headquarters at Naval Support Activity Millington, TN, is captured in the installation closure recommendation for Naval Support Activity New Orleans.
COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The Army portion of this recommendation generated expressions of concern from the communities of Alexandria, VA, St. Louis, MO, and Indianapolis, IN, due to the negative economic impact of projected job losses associated with the DoD recommendation. In particular, community representatives from St. Louis vigorously opposed the DoD proposal, and claimed they have the space to host the Command there.

Concerns related to the Air Force portion of the recommendation came from the Denver community regarding the economic impact of jobs slated to be realigned to Randolph AFB, TX. The Denver community did not become aware of the projected job losses when the DoD BRAC report was released in May because the numbers related to the Air Reserve Personnel Center were incorrectly reported and related to another unit that shares the same facility. When the accurate numbers were finally revealed, Denver advocates opposed the plan and urged the Commission to reject it, arguing the benefits of consolidation were overstated and the costs understated.

The receiving community of Fort Knox, KY, strongly supported DoD’s recommendation and looked forward to becoming the new host for the Army’s Human Resources Command, especially given the significant job losses created by other DoD 2005 BRAC recommendations.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission’s findings supported DoD’s recommendation to consolidate the Army Human Resources Command at Fort Knox, KY, rather than in St. Louis as proposed by the Missouri community.

The Commission’s review and analysis of the Air Force portion of this recommendation found that certain elements did not promote the same kind of synergy created by the other service departments. For instance, unlike the Army plan to consolidate all personnel functions into one place, the Air Force recommended moving Reserve Component recruiting and personnel functions away from their parent command. The Commission found DoD’s plan created the potential for mission degradation and overstated the benefits of consolidation. Finally, the Commission found the Air Force portion of this recommendation was not cost-effective, with a net cost of more than $6 million in 20-year net present value rather than savings. The Commission amended the recommendation by disapproving the two Air Force realignments of the Air Reserve Personnel Center at Buckley Annex in Denver and the Air Force Reserve Recruiting Service at Robins AFB, GA, to Randolph AFB, TX. The Commission found that because the DFAS unit located at Buckley Annex was closed by another recommendation (see discussion on DFAS), moving the Air Reserve Personnel Center out of the Buckley Annex facility to nearby Buckley Air Force Base in Denver will allow the Air Force to close the facility, reducing its infrastructure and thus enabling significant savings in annual operation costs while averting the potential for mission degradation.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission found that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final selection criteria 1, 4, and 5 and the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following:

- Realign Army Human Resources Command leased facilities in Alexandria, VA, Indianapolis, IN, and St. Louis, MO.
- Relocate and consolidate all functions at Fort Knox, KY.
- Realign the Air Reserve Personnel Center (Buckley Annex), CO, by relocating the Air Reserve Personnel Center to Buckley Air Force Base, Denver, CO, and by relocating the Individual Mobilization Augmentee operational management functions to Robins Air Force Base, GA, and consolidating them with the Air Force Reserve Command at Robins Air Force Base, GA.

The Commission found this change and the recommendation as amended are consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. The full text of this and all Commission recommendations can be found in Appendix Q.
**CREATE JOINT MOBILIZATION SITES**

**RECOMMENDATION # 144 (H&S A 35)**

**ONE-TIME COST:** $0.10M  
**ANNUAL RECURRING COSTS/(SAVINGS):** ($0.8M)  
**20-YEAR NET PRESENT VALUE:** ($37.9M)  
**PAYBACK PERIOD:** IMMEDIATE

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**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION**

Realign Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, Washington Navy Yard, Washington, DC, and Naval Submarine Base New London, CT, by relocating all mobilization functions to Fort Dix, NJ, designating it as Joint Pre-Deployment/Mobilization Site Dix/McGuire/Lakehurst. Realign Submarine Base Bangor, WA, by relocating all mobilization processing functions to Fort Lewis, WA, designating it as Joint Pre-Deployment/Mobilization Site Lewis/McChord. Realign Fort Huachuca, AZ, by relocating all mobilization processing functions to Fort Bliss, TX, designating it as Joint Pre-Deployment/Mobilization Site Bliss/Holloman. Realign Fort Eustis, VA, Ft Jackson, SC, and Fort Lee, VA, by relocating all mobilization processing functions to Fort Bragg, NC, designating it as Joint Pre-Deployment/Mobilization Site Bragg/Pope.

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**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION**

This recommendation realigns eight lower threshold mobilization sites to four existing large capacity sites and transforms them into Joint Pre-Deployment/Mobilization Platforms. This action is expected to have the long-term effect of creating pre-deployment/mobilization centers of excellence, leverage economies of scale, reduce costs, and improve service to mobilized servicemembers. This recommendation specifically targets four of the larger capacity mobilization centers located in higher density Reserve Component (RC) personnel areas. These platforms have the added military value of strategic location, Power Projection Platform (PPP) and deployment capabilities. The gaining bases all have an adjoining installation from another service(s), thereby gaining the opportunity to increase partnership and enhance existing joint service facilities and capabilities. The eight realigned, lower thresholds/mobilization sites have significantly less capacity and many less mobilizations. The realignment of these pre-deployment/mobilization missions to the other joint pre-deployment/mobilization sites will not overload the gaining joint mobilization installations. These new joint regional predeployment/redeployment mobilization processing sites, Fort Dix, Fort Lewis, Fort Bliss and Fort Bragg, have the capability to adequately prepare, train and deploy members from all services while reducing overall mobilization processing site manpower and facilities requirements. Numerous other intangible savings are expected to result from transformation opportunities by consolidating all services’ mobilization operations and optimizing existing and future personnel requirements. Additional opportunities for savings are also expected from the establishment of a single space mobilization site capable of supporting pre-deployment/mobilization operations from centralized facilities and infrastructure. The establishment of these Joint Pre-Deployment/Mobilization Sites will not preclude the services from using any/all of their other existing mobilization sites, nor will they affect any service rapid mobilization units/wings. These joint platforms will not affect any of the services units that have specific unit personnel/equipment requirements necessitating their mobilization from a specified installation.

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**COMMUNITY CONCERNS**

There were no formal expressions from the community.

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**COMMISSION FINDINGS**

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense.

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**COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS**

The Commission found the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission approves the recommendation of the Secretary.
DEFENSE FINANCE AND ACCOUNTING SERVICE

RECOMMENDATION # 145/196 (H&SA 37/Add)

ONE-TIME COST: $254.4M

ANNUAL RECURRING COSTS/(SAVINGS): ($102.6M)

20-YEAR NET PRESENT VALUE: ($1,030.4M)

PAYBACK PERIOD: IMMEDIATE

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Close the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) sites at Rock Island IL; Pensacola Saufley Field, FL; Norfolk Naval Station, VA; Lawton, OK; Pensacola Naval Air Station, FL; Omaha, NE; Dayton, OH; St. Louis, MO; San Antonio, TX; San Diego, CA; Pacific Ford Island, HI; Patuxent River, MD; Limestone, ME; Charleston, SC; Orlando, FL; Rome, NY; Lexington, KY; Kansas City, MO; Seaside, CA; San Bernardino, CA; and Oakland, CA. Relocate and consolidate business, corporate and administrative functions to the Defense Supply Center-Columbus, OH, the Buckley Air Force Base Annex, Denver, CO, or the MG Emmett J. Bean Federal Center, Indianapolis, IN.

Realign DFAS Arlington, VA, by relocating and consolidating business, corporate, and administrative functions to the Defense Supply Center-Columbus, OH, the Buckley Air Force Base Annex, Denver, CO, or the MG Emmett J. Bean Federal Center, Indianapolis, IN. Retain a minimum essential DFAS liaison staff to support the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, Military Service Chief Financial Officers, and Congressional requirements.

Realign DFAS Cleveland, OH, by relocating and consolidating business, corporate, and administrative functions to the Defense Supply Center-Columbus, OH, the Buckley Air Force Base Annex, Denver, CO, or the MG Emmett J. Bean Federal Center, Indianapolis, IN. Retain an enclave for the Military Retired and Annuitant Pay Services contract function and government oversight.

Realign DFAS Columbus, OH, by relocating up to 55 percent of the Accounting Operation functions and associated corporate and administrative functions to DFAS Denver, CO, or DFAS Indianapolis, IN, and up to 30 percent of the Commercial Pay function and associated corporate and administrative functions to DFAS Indianapolis, IN, for strategic redundancy.

Realign DFAS Denver, CO, by relocating up to 25 percent of the Accounting Operation functions and associated corporate and administrative functions to DFAS Columbus, OH, or DFAS Indianapolis, IN, and up to 35 percent of the Military Pay function and associated corporate and administrative functions to DFAS Indianapolis, IN, for strategic redundancy.

Realign DFAS Indianapolis, IN, by relocating up to 10 percent of the Accounting Operation functions and associated corporate and administrative functions to DFAS Columbus, OH or DFAS Denver, CO, and up to 20 percent of the Commercial Pay function and associated corporate and administrative functions to DFAS Columbus, OH, for strategic redundancy.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

This action accomplishes a major facilities reduction and business line mission realignment, transforming the current DFAS organization into an optimum facilities configuration, which includes strategic redundancy to minimize risks associated with man-made or natural disasters/challenges. All three of the gaining sites meet DoD Antiterrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) Standards. The current number of business line operating locations (26) inhibits the ability of DFAS to reduce unnecessary redundancy and leverage benefits from economies of scale and synergistic efficiencies. Overall excess facility capacity includes approximately 43 percent or 1,776,000 Gross Square Feet (GSF) in administrative space and 69 percent or 526,000 GSF in warehouse space with many locations lacking adequate threat protection as defined in DoD AT/FP Standards. Finally, the three locations have potential to evolve into separate Business Line Centers of Excellence and further enhance “unit cost” reductions beyond the BRAC facilities/personnel savings aspect.

The three gaining locations were identified through a process that used Capacity Analysis, Military Value, Optimization Modeling, and knowledge of the DFAS organization and business line mission functions. The Military Value analysis, of 26 business operating locations, ranked the Buckley AF Base Annex, CO, the Defense Supply Center-Columbus, OH, and the
MG Emmett J. Bean Federal Center, Indianapolis, IN, as 3, 7, and 9 respectively. The Optimization analysis not only included the factors of available capacity and expansion capability, but also included business line process and business operational considerations in identifying the three-location combination as providing the optimal facilities approach to hosting DFAS business line missions/functions.

Subject matter knowledge of DFAS’ three business line missions and its operational components, along with business process review considerations and scenario basing strategy, was used to focus reduction of the 26 locations and identification of the three gaining locations. The scenario basing strategy included reducing the number of locations to the maximum extent possible, while balancing the requirements for an environment meeting DoD Antiterrorist and Force Protection standards, strategic business line redundancy, area workforce availability, and to include an anchor entity for each business line and thus retain necessary organizational integrity to support DoD customer needs while the DFAS organization relocation is executed.

Community Concerns

The communities’ concerns about DoD’s proposed closure of numerous Defense Finance and Accounting Service sites focused on criticism of military value scores. Most stated that the Headquarters & Support Activities-Joint Cross Services Group focused its analysis almost exclusively on physical facility issues and not on work quality or customer input. Some contended that DoD overweighed the value of locations on DoD installations within a controlled perimeter; a consideration they contended was irrelevant to DFAS’ mission. Others pointed out facilities proposed for closure despite meeting DoD force protection standards.

In addition, many claimed that the three sites selected by DoD for retention had higher operating costs than many DFAS sites proposed for closure, despite the heavy weight assigned to operating costs in computing military value scores. They also noted that operating costs, and therefore military value scores, were heavily influenced by differing costs for General Service Administration space that are irrelevant to a DFAS site’s effectiveness or efficiency and something a DFAS site cannot control. Some sites claimed they provide unique services not properly factored into military value scores. Some communities raised concerns about the choice of sites with high locality pay. Many claimed that only about 10 percent to 15 percent of personnel would move, creating workforce and experience losses that would negatively affect customer service.

Some DFAS facilities had been sited to mitigate the effect of previous BRAC rounds, and their closure would be a heavy blow to communities that may not have fully recovered from previous BRAC actions. Some argued that DFAS consolidation to the Denver site on Buckley Annex makes no sense as a BRAC recommendation, because another BRAC recommendation would realign the Air Reserve Personnel Center, the site’s current major tenant, to another location. Realigning DFAS personnel away from, rather than to, Denver would allow for a full closure of the property.

Commission Findings

The Commission identified discrepancies in the DFAS sites’ military value scores, but the scores were not DoD’s primary site selection driver. Instead, DoD used an optimization model to develop a best-value solution to get to the minimum number of sites. The model’s primary focus was potential receiver sites with a large capacity and, in turn, personnel. The Commission acknowledges that the work of DFAS does not have to be done on military installations. The Commission found that in the out–years, DFAS’ workforce will continue to decrease due to technology and efficiency improvements, and retaining DoD-owned property could be a liability to the organization. Therefore, as workload and personnel decrease, GSA property or similar types of properties will provide more flexibility for DFAS to reduce its facility footprint.

Further, the Commission found that closing the DFAS located in Denver, CO, at Buckley Annex, combined with other BRAC actions, would enable a full closure of property owned by the Air Force. The DFAS in Columbus and the DFAS in Indianapolis do not afford such an opportunity. Buckley Annex is approximately 38 acres, and DFAS occupies 78 percent of the building on the property. The Commission found that closing the Denver site would require keeping open another major DFAS site in order to retain desired anchor sites for business operations and strategic redundancy. According to DoD, the next major site in their selection process would be the DFAS in Cleveland, OH.

Last, the Commission found that DoD did not adequately consider economic impact in its decision process. The two sites that could have experienced severe impacts are Limestone, ME, and Rome, NY. Retaining these two sites will provide DFAS with needed capacity for business operations and strategic redundancy while also mitigating economic impacts.
The Commission found that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final selection criteria 3, 4, and 6 and from the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following:

Close the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) sites at Denver, CO; Rock Island, IL; Pensacola Saufley Field, FL; Naval Station, Norfolk, VA; Lawton, OK; Naval Air Station, Pensacola, FL; Omaha, NE; Dayton, OH; St. Louis, MO; San Antonio, TX; San Diego, CA; Pacific Ford Island, HI; NAS Patuxent River, MD; Charleston, SC; Orlando, FL; Lexington, KY; Kansas City, MO; Seaside, CA; San Bernardino, CA; and Oakland, CA. Relocate the functions performed at these locations to the DFAS sites at Cleveland, OH; Columbus, OH; Indianapolis, IN; Limestone, ME; and Rome, NY; grow the DFAS site at Cleveland, OH, to not less than 1500 Full Time Equivalents (FTE); grow the DFAS site at Limestone, ME, to not less than 600 FTE, and grow the DFAS site at Rome, NY, to not less than 1000 FTE; maintain not less than the current FTEs at the DFAS sites at Columbus, OH, and Indianapolis, IN. Assign functions among the DFAS sites retained to provide for strategic redundancy in all critical tasks. Realign the Arlington, VA, site by relocating all functions to the remaining DFAS sites except the minimum essential DFAS liaison staff to support the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, Military Service Chief Financial Officers, and Congressional requirements, which will be retained in the National Capital Region.

The Commission found this change and the recommendation as amended are consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. The full text of this and all Commission recommendations can be found in Appendix Q.

**Joint Basing**

**Recommendation # 146 (H&SA 41)**

| One-Time Cost: | $50.6M |
| Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings): | ($183.8M) |
| 20-Year Net Present Value: | ($2,342.5M) |
| Payback Period: | Immediate |

**Secretary of Defense Recommendation**

- Realign McChord Air Force Base (AFB), WA, by relocating the installation management functions to Fort Lewis, WA, establishing Joint Base Lewis-McChord.
- Realign Naval Air Facility Washington, MD, by relocating the installation management functions to Andrews AFB, MD, establishing Joint Base Andrews-Naval Air Facility Washington, MD.
- Realign Bolling AFB, Washington, DC, by relocating the installation management functions to Naval District Washington at the Washington Navy Yard, Washington, DC, establishing Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling Naval Research Laboratory (NRL), Washington, DC.
- Realign Henderson Hall, VA, by relocating the installation management functions to Fort Myer, VA, establishing Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall, VA.
- Realign Fort Richardson, AK, by relocating the installation management functions to Elmendorf AFB, AK, establishing Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, AK.
- Realign Hickam AFB, HI, by relocating the installation management functions to Naval Station Pearl Harbor, HI, establishing Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, HI.
- Realign Fort Sam Houston, TX, and Randolph AFB, TX, by relocating the installation management functions to Lackland AFB, TX.
- Realign Naval Weapons Station Charleston, SC, by relocating the installation management functions to Charleston AFB, SC.
Realign Fort Eustis, VA, by relocating the installation management functions to Langley AFB, VA.

Realign Fort Story, VA, by relocating the installation management functions to Commander Naval Mid-Atlantic Region at Naval Station Norfolk, VA.

Realign Andersen AFB, Guam, by relocating the installation management functions to Commander, US Naval Forces, Marianas Islands, Guam.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

All installations employ military, civilian, and contractor personnel to perform common functions in support of installation facilities and personnel. All installations execute these functions using similar or near similar processes. Because these installations share a common boundary with minimal distance between the major facilities or are in near proximity, there is significant opportunity to reduce duplication of efforts with resulting reduction of overall manpower and facilities requirements capable of generating savings, which will be realized by paring unnecessary management personnel and achieving greater efficiencies through economies of scale. Intangible savings are expected to result from opportunities to consolidate and optimize existing and future service contract requirements. Additional opportunities for savings are also expected to result from establishment of a single space management authority capable of generating greater overall utilization of facilities and infrastructure. Further savings are expected to result from opportunities to reduce and correctly size both owned and contracted commercial fleets of base support vehicles and equipment consistent with the size of the combined facilities and supported populations. Regional efficiencies achieved as a result of Service regionalization of installation management will provide additional opportunities for overall savings as the designated installations are consolidated under regional management structures.

Specific exceptions not included in the functions to relocate are Health and Military Personnel Services. In general, the Department anticipates transferring responsibility for all other Base Operating Support (BOS) functions and the Operations and Maintenance (O&M) portion of Sustainment, Restoration and Modernization (SRM) to the designated receiving location.

However, because of the variety of circumstances at each location, the Department requires flexibility to tailor implementation to the unique requirements at each location.

In all but three realignments, discussed below, the quantitative military value score validated by military judgment was the primary basis for determining which installation was designated as the receiving location.

McGuire’s quantitative military value compared to the Fort Dix quantitative military value score was too close to be the sole factor for determining the receiving installation for installation management functions. Military judgment favored McGuire AFB as the receiving installation for the installation management functions because its mission supports operational forces, in contrast to Fort Dix, which has a primary mission of support for Reserve Component training. As an installation accustomed to supporting operational forces, it was the military judgment of the JCSG that McGuire was better able to perform those functions for both locations.

Similarly, the quantitative military value score of Charleston AFB compared to that of Naval Weapons Station Charleston was too close to be the sole factor for determining the receiving installation for installation management functions. Military judgment favored Charleston AFB as the receiving installation for the installation management functions because of its mission in support of operational forces compared to Naval Weapons Station Charleston, which has a primary mission to support training and industrial activities. It was the military judgment of the JCSG that Charleston AFB, as an installation accustomed to supporting operational forces, was better able to perform those functions for both locations.

Langley AFB’s quantitative military value score compared to the Fort Eustis quantitative military value score was a clear margin for Fort Eustis. However, pending changes to Fort Eustis resulting from other BRAC recommendations causes military judgment to favor Langley AFB as the receiving installation for the installation management functions. Relocations of organizations currently based at Fort Eustis will cause a significant population decline and overall reduction in the scope of the installation’s supporting mission. Based on these changes, it was the military judgment of the JCSG that Langley AFB was better able to perform these functions for both locations.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

Although affected communities supported the concept of Joint Basing, several communities expressed concerns about the effect of personnel cuts on the mission, questioned DoD’s process used to determine the proposed number of personnel
cuts, and expressed concern over the overall health and welfare of the bases involved. Additionally, communities argued that the “clash of cultures” and service-specific interests would impair installation management by a different service. To avoid this likely problem, some community advocates argued DoD would need to develop a common installation management approach by establishing a joint basing office in DoD to implement the new Joint Bases so that individual military services did not issue conflicting guidance and procedures. Finally, there was concern expressed that non-appropriated fund employees were not addressed specifically in the DoD recommendation.

**Commission Findings**

While the Commission supports the concept of Joint Basing strongly, it is concerned, as is GAO, that DoD must assess and remedy several issues before implementation will be successful. For instance, common terminology is lacking to define Base Operating Support (BOS) functions among the military services and OSD. The Commission concurs with the Government Accountability Office (GAO) that DoD needs an analytic process for developing BOS requirements. Also, while each military service has standards, there are no DoD-wide standards for common support functions.

Additionally, the Commission learned that DoD determined the manpower reductions through application of a formula and not deliberations among commanders of the affected installations. In other words, the manpower savings were directed rather than derived from functional analyses and manpower studies.

Finally, the Commission found that currently Naval District Washington provides non-mission related services to the Naval Research Laboratory because the Navy has centralized its installation management functions. Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) is a Secretary of the Navy Working Capital Fund Activity, so it must maintain control of laboratory buildings, structures, and other physical assets that are essential to the NRL research mission.

**Commission Recommendations**

The Commission found that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final selection criteria 1 and 4 and from the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following:

- Realign McChord Air Force Base (AFB), WA, by relocating the installation management functions to Fort Lewis, WA, establishing Joint Base Lewis-McChord, WA.
- Realign Fort Dix, NJ, and Naval Air Engineering Station Lakehurst, NJ, by relocating the installation management functions to McGuire AFB, NJ, establishing Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, NJ.
- Realign Naval Air Facility Washington, MD, by relocating the installation management functions to Andrews AFB, MD, establishing Joint Base Andrews-Naval Air Facility Washington, MD.
- Realign Bolling AFB, DC, by relocating the installation management functions to Naval District Washington at the Washington Navy Yard, DC, establishing Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling, DC.
- Realign Henderson Hall, VA, by relocating the installation management functions to Fort Myer, VA, establishing Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall, VA.
- Realign Fort Richardson, AK, by relocating the installation management functions to Elmendorf AFB, AK, establishing Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, AK.
- Realign Hickam AFB, HI, by relocating the installation management functions to Naval Station Pearl Harbor, HI, establishing Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, HI.
- Realign Fort Sam Houston, TX, and Randolph AFB, TX, by relocating the installation management functions to Lackland AFB, TX.
- Realign Naval Weapons Station Charleston, SC, by relocating the installation management functions to Charleston AFB, SC.
- Realign Fort Eustis, VA, by relocating the installation management functions to Langley AFB, VA.
- Realign Fort Story, VA, by relocating the installation management functions to Commander Naval Mid-Atlantic Region at Naval Station Norfolk, VA.
- Realign Andersen AFB, Guam, by relocating the installation management functions to Commander, US Naval Forces, Marianas Islands, Guam.
The Commission found this change and the recommendation as amended are consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. The full text of this and all Commission recommendations can be found in Appendix Q.

## Relocate Air Force Real Property Agency (AFRPA)

**Recommendation # 147 (H&SA 44)**

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**Secretary of Defense Recommendation**

Realign Rosslyn Center and the Nash Street Building, leased installations in Arlington, VA, by relocating the Air Force Real Property Agency to Lackland Air Force Base, San Antonio, TX.

**Secretary of Defense Justification**

This recommendation meets two important Department of Defense (DoD) objectives with regard to rationalization of the Department’s presence within 100 miles of the Pentagon and enhanced security for DoD activities. Additionally, the recommendation results in a significant improvement in military value. The military value of the Air Force Real Property Agency (AFRPA) is 302nd of 334 entities evaluated by the Major Administration and Headquarters (MAH) military value model. Lackland Air Force Base is ranked 25th out of 334.

The recommendation eliminates over 16,000 Usable Square Feet of leased administrative space within the National Capital Region and relocates the involved offices to a military installation that will provide immediate compliance with Force Protection Standards. AFRPA’s current leased location is non-compliant with current Force Protection Standards. The relocation of a headquarters activity to an installation that is farther than 100 miles from the Pentagon provides dispersion of DoD activities away from a dense concentration within the National Capital Region. This recommendation provides for operational efficiency and enhanced synergy by collocating AFRPA with a related Activity, the Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence, which is also relocating to Lackland Air Force Base.

**Community Concerns**

There were no formal expressions from the community.

**Commission Findings**

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense.

**Commission Recommendations**

The Commission found the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission approves the recommendation of the Secretary.
**Relocate Army Headquarters and Field Operating Agencies**

Recommendation # 148 (H&SA 46)

**One-time Cost:** $199.9M  
**Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings):** ($23.9M)  
**20-Year Net Present Value:** ($122.9M)  
**Payback Period:** 10 Years

**Secretary of Defense Recommendation**

Realignment of Zachary Taylor Building, a leased installation in Arlington, VA, by relocating the Army Installation Management Agency headquarters to Fort Sam Houston, TX.

Realignment of Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois, as follows: relocate the Army Installation Management Agency Northwest Region headquarters to Fort Sam Houston, TX, and consolidate it with the Army Installation Management Agency Southwest Region headquarters to form the Army Installation Management Agency Western Region; and relocate the Army Network Enterprise Technology Command Northwest Region headquarters to Fort Sam Houston, TX, and consolidate it with the Army Network Enterprise Technology Command Southwest Region headquarters to form the Army Network Enterprise Technology Command Western Region.

Realignment of Crystal Square 2, a leased installation in Arlington, VA, by relocating the Army HR XXI office to Fort Knox, KY.

Realignment of the Park Center IV Building, a leased installation in Falls Church, VA, by relocating the Army Center for Substance Abuse to Fort Knox, KY.

Realignment of Seven Corners Corporate Center, a leased installation in Falls Church, VA, and 4700 King Street, a leased installation in Alexandria, VA, by relocating the Army Community and Family Support Center to Fort Sam Houston, TX.

Realignment of Rosslyn Metro Center, a leased installation in Arlington, VA, by relocating the Army Family Liaison Office to Fort Sam Houston, TX.

Realignment of Skyline Six, a leased installation in Falls Church, VA, by relocating the Army Contracting Agency headquarters to Fort Sam Houston, TX.

Realignment of the Hoffman 1 Building, a leased installation in Alexandria, VA, by relocating the Army Contracting Agency E-Commerce Region headquarters to Fort Sam Houston, TX.

Realignment of Fort Buchanan, Puerto Rico, by relocating the Army Contracting Agency Southern Hemisphere Region headquarters to Fort Sam Houston, TX.

Realignment of Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, by relocating the Army Environmental Center to Fort Sam Houston, TX.

Realignment of Fort Belvoir, VA by relocating Army Materiel Command (AMC) and the Security Assistance Command (USASAC, an AMC major subordinate command) to Redstone Arsenal, AL.

**Secretary of Defense Justification**

This recommendation relocates several Army Service Provider headquarters and regional offices in order to create operating efficiencies via co-location and/or consolidation. A new Installation Management Agency (IMA) Western Region office is created at Fort Sam Houston by relocating the IMA Northwest Region headquarters from Rock Island Arsenal; it collocates the IMA Headquarters with the IMA Western Region. Separate Army recommendations relocate other IMA regional offices to create the IMA Eastern Region at Fort Eustis.

This recommendation creates a new Network Enterprise Technology Command (NETCOM) Western Region at Fort Sam Houston by relocating the NETCOM Northwest Region headquarters from Rock Island Arsenal. Separate Army recommendations relocate other NETCOM Region headquarters to create the NETCOM Eastern Region at Fort Eustis.

The Army Contracting Agency (ACA) is relocating the ACA Southern Region office to Fort Sam Houston where it will consolidate with the ACA Southern Hemisphere Region office that is relocating from Fort Buchanan. The ACA
Headquarters and ACA E-Commerce Region will collocate with the ACA Southern Region at Fort Sam Houston. By a separate Army recommendation, the ACA Northern Region headquarters will relocate from Fort Monroe to Fort Eustis in order to collocate with the ACA Northern Contracting Center.

Several other Army entities will relocate in order to collocate with the aforementioned organizations at Fort Sam Houston: the Army Community and Family Support Center, the Army Family Liaison Office, and the Army Environmental Center. The Army Center for Substance Abuse and the Army HR XXI office are relocating to Fort Knox. Finally, the Army Materiel Command (AMC) and the Security Assistance Command will relocate to Redstone Arsenal in order to collocate with one of AMC’s major subordinate commands, the USA Aviation and Missile Command.

This recommendation meets several important Department of Defense objectives with regard to future use of leased space, rationalization of the Department’s presence within 100 miles of the Pentagon, consolidation of Headquarters operations at single locations, and enhanced security for DoD activities. It collocates the Headquarters of the Army’s regional service providers that typically interact daily. It results in improvement in military value due to the shift from leased space to locations on military installations and from re-location of organizations from installations lying outside of the Army’s portfolio of installations they intend to keep to installations with higher military value. The military value of the affected Army activities range from 219th to 303rd of 334 entities evaluated by the Major Administration and Headquarters (MAH) military value model. Fort Sam Houston is ranked 19th out of 334; Fort Knox is ranked 32nd, and Redstone Arsenal is ranked 48th.

Implementation will reduce the Department’s reliance on leased space which has historically higher overall costs than government-owned space and generally does not meet Anti-terrorism Force Protection standards as prescribed in UFC 04-01001. The recommendation eliminates approximately 234,000 Usable Square Feet (USF) of leased administrative space within the National Capital Region (NCR) by relocating 8 organizations to military installations that are farther than 100 miles from the Pentagon, thereby providing dispersion of DoD activities away from a dense concentration within the NCR. This, plus the immediate benefit of enhanced Force Protection afforded by locating service providers within a military installation fence-line, will provide immediate compliance with Force Protection Standards. Operational synergies and efficiencies gained by co-locating Headquarters and newly consolidated Regional offices will likely result in additional operational efficiency and/or personnel reductions in the future.

The relocation of AMC and USASAC to Redstone Arsenal will result in the avoidance of future military construction costs; this future cost avoidance is not reflected in the payback calculation because it is planned for post-FY05. This military construction would provide for a new headquarters building for AMC and USASAC on Fort Belvoir; the majority of AMC’s current space on Fort Belvoir is currently in temporary structures.

**Community Concerns**

No community concerns were voiced during the review and analysis process regarding this specific recommendation. All organizations visited or contacted by the analyst stated that they could perform their mission from the new location. While there were some individual issues that would require adjudication during implementation, none were of such a nature as to conflict with the move or mission performance.

Community concerns over leased space in general received by the Commission questioned DoD’s security standards, stating they were unnecessarily more stringent than those developed by the Interagency Security Committee (tasked with developing and evaluating security standards for Federal facilities.) Also, they questioned whether DoD had surveyed each facility to determine compliance and the level of compliance with the DoD security standards (or even those “less stringent” standards approved by OMB in September 2004).

**Commission Findings**

The Commission found that all organizations had indicated that they could perform their mission from the new location. Individual issues requiring careful adjudication during implementation would not conflict with the move or mission performance, and none rose to the level of a substantial deviation.

**Commission Recommendations**

The Commission found the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission approves the recommendation of the Secretary.
RELOCATE MISCELLANEOUS DEPARTMENT OF NAVY LEASED LOCATIONS

RECOMMENDATION # 149 (H&SA 49)

ONE-TIME COST: $61.8M
ANNUAL RECURRING COSTS/(SAVINGS): ($18.0M)
20-YEAR NET PRESENT VALUE: ($164.7M)
PAYBACK PERIOD: 1 YEAR

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Close Crystal Park 3 and Crystal Square 3, leased installations in Arlington, VA, and 214191 Great Mills Road and 21535 Pacific Drive, leased installations in Lexington Park, MD. Relocate all Department of the Navy organizations to DoD owned space in the National Capital Region. Realign Crystal Gateway 3, Crystal Gateway 4, Crystal Mall 2, Crystal Mall 3, Crystal Park 1, Crystal Park 5, Crystal Square 2, 1400-1450 S. Eads Street, and 2300 Clarendon Blvd., all leased installations in Arlington, VA, and any other Department of the Navy occupied leased space in the National Capital Region, by relocating all Department of the Navy organizations to DoD owned space in the National Capital Region. Realign Federal Office Building 2, Arlington, VA, by relocating all Department of the Navy organizations to DoD owned space in the National Capital Region.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

This recommendation meets two important Department of Defense (DoD) objectives with regard to future use of leased space and enhanced security for DoD activities. Implementation will reduce the Department’s reliance on leased space which has historically higher overall costs than government-owned space and generally does not meet Antiterrorism Force Protection standards as prescribed in UFC 04-010-01. This, plus the immediate benefit of enhanced Force Protection afforded by locations within a military installation fence-line, will provide the Department of the Navy (DON) activities with immediate compliance with Force Protection Standards. DON’s current leased locations are non-compliant with current Force Protection Standards. Additionally, the recommendation results in a significant improvement in military value as a result of the movement from leased space to military installations. The average military value of DON activities based on current locations ranges from 192nd to 326th out of 334 entities evaluated by the MAH military value model. All military installations to which the DON activities would relocate have higher military values.

The payback calculation in this recommendation reflects the relocation of approximately 228,000 GSF of leased space in the NCR, along with 284,000 GSF of administrative space in FOB-2, which is scheduled for closure, to locations identified by DON as the most likely relocation sites: Arlington Service Center, Anacostia Annex, and the Washington Navy Yard. This recommendation also reflects Naval Air Systems Command consolidating its headquarters operation at NAS Patuxent River by moving two locations from leased space to be contiguous with its main office. However, the recommendation is written broadly enough to relocate Navy organizations currently in leased space to any other DoD leased space in the NCR. Our analysis indicates that such alternative relocation sites will not have a significant or material impact on any of the BRAC selection criteria.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

Community leaders questioned DoD’s security standards, stating they were unnecessarily more stringent than those developed by the Interagency Security Committee (tasked with developing and evaluating security standards for Federal facilities). Also, the communities questioned whether DoD had surveyed each facility to determine compliance and the level of compliance with the DoD security standards (or even those “less stringent” standards approved by OMB in September 2004). The communities felt BRAC was not the proper instrument to effect DoD employee relocation from leased facilities.

Advocates expressed concerns about the negative impact on operational readiness and manpower implications. They argued the current “scattered” arrangement of leased office space makes more strategic sense than does concentration, that relocation will disrupt synergies with other agencies of the Federal Government and the Pentagon, and, finally, that leased space is better able to accommodate contingency, mobilization, surge, and future total force requirements than its alternative, military construction. Similarly, communities claimed their quality of life could be reduced because of transportation
problems such as increased traffic, lack of public transportation, and increased commuting times, with the attendant issues of air pollution and increased fuel consumption.

However, there were no formal expressions relating directly to Navy leased locations from the community.

**Commission Findings**

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense. While the Department did not assess individual buildings for force protection compliance or review individual leases, enough empirical data support moving DoD personnel from leased locations to force-protected locations. While the Commission approved the Secretary’s recommendation, it also included a technical change to conform to DoD’s stated intent to close 214191 Great Mills Road and 21535 Pacific Drive, leased installations in Lexington Park, MD, and relocate Naval Air Systems Command offices to Naval Air Station Patuxent River, MD.

**Commission Recommendations**

The Commission found the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission approves the recommendation of the Secretary.

**Joint Medical Command Headquarters**

**Recommendation # 198 (Add)**

- **One-time Cost:** $106.2M
- **Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings):** $(32.9M)
- **20-Year Net Present Value:** $(316.3M)
- **Payback Period:** 2 Years

**Secretary of Defense Recommendation**

None. The Secretary’s proposed list submitted on May 13, 2005, did not include these facilities. They were added by the Commission on July 19, 2005, for further consideration.

**Secretary of Defense Justification**

None.

**Community Concerns**

Northern Virginia argued closure of leased space is outside the purview of the Commission and that the TRICARE Management Activity and Office of the Army Surgeon General should remain in place. They asserted current employees would leave rather than move or commute excessive distances.

The District of Columbia argued medical commands should consolidate at Bolling AFB, the site of the Air Force Surgeon General’s Office, which is close to the Pentagon and Capitol Hill, and meets force protection standards.

**Commission Findings**

The Commission recognizes the importance of promoting jointness in Medical Command Headquarters, and found substantial military value and cost savings in the proposed collocation of standalone military headquarters, such as the Potomac Annex, DC, and multi-location headquarters such as the Office of the Air Force Surgeon General at Bolling AFB, DC, and Skyline Lease Space, VA. The Commission decided to realign the Potomac Annex, DC, to enable the flag officer housing to remain intact. The Commission acknowledges the community concern that existing leased space meeting force-protection requirements or Bolling Air Force Base could be viable locations for the new Medical Command Headquarters. The Commission believes that the National Naval Medical Center Bethesda, MD, is also a potential site that should not be
overlooked during implementation. As a result, the Commission recommendation would collocate a Medical Command Headquarters in the National Capital Region to a single force-protected installation determined by the Secretary. Moreover, DoD is directed to consolidate common support functions in order to maximize efficiencies and enhance jointness.

**Commission Recommendations**

The Commission found that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final selection criteria 1, 2 and 4, as well as from the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following:

Realign the Potomac Annex, DC. Realign Bolling Air Force Base, DC. Realign Skyline, leased space in Falls Church, VA. Collocate the Navy Bureau of Medicine, Office of the Surgeon General of the Air Force, the Air Force Medical Operating Activity, and the Air Force Medical Support Activity, Office of the Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs), Tricare Management Activity, Office of the Army Surgeon General and US Army Medical Command to a single, contiguous site that meets the current Department of Defense Anti-Terrorism Force Protection standards for new construction at either the National Naval Medical Center, Bethesda, MD, Bolling Air Force Base, DC, or federally owned or leased space in the National Capital Region and consolidate common support activity.

The Commission found that this change and the recommendation as amended are consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. The full text of this and all Commission recommendations can be found in Appendix Q.
JOINT CROSS-SERVICE GROUPS (JCSGs):

INDUSTRIAL

NAVAL WEAPONS STATION SEAL BEACH, CA

RECOMMENDATION # 150 (IND 4)

One-time Cost: $4.0M
Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings): ($1.8M)
20-Year Net Present Value: ($19.9M)
Payback Period: 1 Year

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Realignment Naval Weapons Station Seal Beach, CA, as follows: relocate the depot maintenance of Electronic Components (Non-Airborne), Fire Control Systems and Components, Radar, and Radio to Tobyhanna Army Depot, PA; relocate the depot maintenance of Material Handling to Marine Corps Logistics Base Albany, GA; relocate the depot maintenance of Other Components to Anniston Army Depot, AL; and relocate the depot maintenance of Tactical Missiles to Letterkenny Army Depot, PA.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

This recommendation supports depot maintenance function elimination at Naval Weapons Station Seal Beach and follows the strategy of minimizing sites using maximum capacity at 1.5 shifts. This recommendation eliminates over 243,000 square feet of depot maintenance production space with annual facility sustainment and recapitalization savings of $1.1M. Required capacity to support workloads and Core requirements for the Department of Defense (DoD) is relocated to other DoD Centers of Industrial and Technical Excellence, thereby increasing the military value of depot maintenance performed at these sites. This recommendation decreases the cost of depot maintenance operations across DoD by consolidation and elimination of 30 percent of duplicate overhead structures required to operate multiple depot maintenance activities. Additionally, this recommendation supports transformation of the Department’s depot maintenance operations by increasing the utilization of existing capacity by up to 150 percent while maintaining capability to support future force structure. Another benefit of this recommendation includes utilization of DoD capacity to facilitate performance of interservice workload.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The Seal Beach community noted the base would lose positions and work to four different locations. In particular, they said the recommendation to “relocate the depot maintenance of Tactical Missiles to Letterkenny Army Depot, PA,” made absolutely no sense. They claimed the Navy mischaracterized this work as depot maintenance, when in reality it consists of about $500 worth of work polishing, removing dents, tightening screws, etc. on missile containers which are returned to Seal Beach and reunited with missiles sent to the Fleet. They indicated these tasks are more efficiently performed at Seal Beach, rather than spending $960 per missile container shipping it from Seal Beach to the East Coast and back again. The community also noted that San Diego-based ships would benefit from having West Coast-based support to adjust, install, and troubleshoot fire-control and aircraft landing radar, rather than shipping it back to the depot at Tobyhanna, PA, and overhauling it there.
COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense regarding the first elements of the recommendation. The Commission carefully considered the community concerns relating to the sub-recommendation dealing with West Coast support for Fire Control Systems and Components, Radar, and Radio equipment. However, the Commission determined that this issue did not rise to the level of requiring a revision to the DoD recommendation.

The Commission found that the segment of DoD’s recommendation to direct work and personnel to Letterkenny Army Depot to correct work more efficiently performed at Seal Beach, where related work is already performed, deviated substantially from criteria #1 and #4. Rejection of the proposal also avoids holding missiles in inventory awaiting only delivery of their shipping containers from the East Coast. Therefore, the Commission deleted the section of the recommendation referring to the relocation of missile container work to Letterkenny.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission found that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final selection criteria 1 and 4, as well as from the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following:

Realign Naval Weapons Station Seal Beach, CA, as follows: relocate the depot maintenance of Electronic Components (Non-Airborne), Fire Control Systems and Components, Radar, and Radio to Tobyhanna Army Depot, PA; relocate the depot maintenance of Material Handling to Marine Corps Logistics Base Albany, GA; and relocate the depot maintenance of Other Components to Anniston Army Depot, AL.

The Commission found that this change and the recommendation as amended are consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. The full text of this and all Commission recommendations can be found in Appendix Q.

RIVERBANK ARMY AMMUNITION PLANT, CA

RECOMMENDATION # 151 (IND 5)

**One-time Cost:** $25.2M

**Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings):** ($6.5M)

**20-Year Net Present Value:** ($53.3M)

**Payback Period:** 3 Years

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Close Riverbank Army Ammunition Plant, CA. Relocate the artillery cartridge case metal parts functions to Rock Island Arsenal, IL.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

There are 4 sites within the Industrial Base producing Metal Parts. To remove excess from the Industrial Base, the closure allows DoD to generate efficiencies and nurture partnership with multiple sources in the private sector.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community believes the recommendation to close the Riverbank Army Ammunition Plant (RBAAP) defied logic and common sense. They pointed out that NI Industries, Inc. has successfully operated the installation since 1951. They noted RBAAP hosts thirteen tenants with more than 200 employees. The community and NI Industries Inc. asserted that RBAAP is the only plant producing the deep-drawn steel cartridge cases needed for the Navy’s next generation fleet and the Army’s Future Combat System. The City of Riverbank challenged the rationale for, and pointed out risks associated with, closing this high-military-value production plant and asserted that production interruptions could hinder current and future military missions. The City adamantly opposed the closure, saying the closure recommendation was based on invalid criteria and faulty information, and questioned DoD’s estimated costs for dismantling, moving, and reassembling the plant’s complex...
equipment. They contended an unsuccessful relocation of equipment and a lack of highly skilled (artisan level) transferees would have significant repercussions on military access to needed ordnance. The community concluded that the RBAAP should remain a vital entity in the military arsenal.

**COMMISSION FINDINGS**

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense. The commission acknowledges the community’s concerns with the challenges of moving the deep-drawn steel cartridge case production line. However, the commission does not find that the uniqueness of this production line reaches the level of substantial deviation from the final selection criteria. The low utilization of this ammunition plant, coupled with the significant excess capacity for munitions manufacturing in the US industrial base, created a very compelling case to rationalize manufacturing capacity.

**COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS**

The Commission found the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission approves the recommendation of the Secretary.

**SIERRA ARMY DEPOT, CA**

RECOMMENDATION # 152 (IND 6)

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**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION**

Realign Sierra Army Depot, CA. Relocate Storage to Tooele Army Depot, UT and Demilitarization to Crane Army Ammunition Activity, IN and, McAlester Army Ammunition Plant, OK.

**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION**

Capacity and capability for storage exists at numerous munitions sites. To reduce redundancy and remove excess from the Industrial Base, the realignment allows DoD to create centers of excellence and remove inefficiencies.

**COMMUNITY CONCERNS**

There were no formal expressions from the community.

**COMMISSION FINDINGS**

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense.

**COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS**

The Commission found the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission approves the recommendation of the Secretary.
ROCK ISLAND ARSENAL, IL

RECOMMENDATION # 153 (IND 7)

One-time Cost: $27.0M

Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings): ($3.1M)

20-Year Net Present Value: ($13.8M)

Payback Period: 9 Years

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Realign Rock Island Arsenal, IL, by relocating the depot maintenance of Combat Vehicles and Other to Anniston Army Depot, AL, and the depot maintenance of Other Equipment and Tactical Vehicles to Letterkenny Army Depot, PA.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

This recommendation supports minimizing the number of depot maintenance sites through the consolidation of Rock Island’s remaining Combat Vehicle workload and capacity at Anniston Army Depot, the Army’s Center for Industrial and Technical Excellence for Combat Vehicles. The recommendation also increases overall depot capability utilization by consolidating Rock Island’s remaining Tactical Vehicle workload and capability at Letterkenny, the depot with the highest Military Value for Tactical Vehicle maintenance. This recommendation eliminates over 160,000 square feet of depot maintenance production space with annual facility sustainment and recapitalization savings of $0.6M. This recommendation also decreases the cost of depot maintenance operations across DoD by consolidation and elimination of 30 percent of duplicate overhead structures required to operate multiple depot maintenance activities. Finally, this recommendation facilitates future interservice utilization of DoD depot maintenance capacity.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The Illinois/Rock Island Arsenal community argued DoD greatly deviated from the selection criteria by not basing its decisions regarding the Rock Island Arsenal on military value and cost savings. Rock Island Arsenal Tank Automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM) had a higher military value score than Detroit Arsenal TACOM, yet the lower-ranked facility would gain the management of the Depot Level Reparable mission. The community claimed facilities at Detroit Arsenal had insufficient space to accommodate Rock Island’s TACOM mission. The community expressed concerns about discrepancies in the number of positions identified (740 versus 1,129) with the moves and efficiencies at TACOM Rock Island, which in their view underestimated true costs. Similarly, they asserted military construction costs identified in the COBRA data for Detroit Arsenal were grossly understated by either $42 million or $85 million, depending on the source of data. They claimed a move to Michigan raised Force Protection and Antiterrorism issues, since Rock Island Arsenal meets and exceeds force protection requirements, while Detroit does not. Moving Rock Island TACOM away from the Engineering support and PEO combat system could also result in the loss of synergy. The community voiced concerns about the recommendation for the Joint Manufacturing & Technology Center (JMTC-RI), questioning the categorization of the JMTC-RI in comparing Depot Maintenance hours. The bulk of JMTC-RI workload is not Depot Maintenance, and therefore this may have been misreported. The Civilian Personnel Operations Center (CPOC) and Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) center, both located on Rock Island, were rated number one in military value compared to similar facilities. CPOC was recently assigned the highest-priority missions for human resources. The community recommended that the Commission overturn the Pentagon’s BRAC recommendation to realign TACOM, CPOC and other activities at Rock Island Arsenal.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found that DoD’s proposed realignment of Rock Island Arsenal, IL, will decrease the cost of depot maintenance operations while increasing the military value to the warfighter. In response to community concerns, the Commission examined the appropriateness of transferring TACOM from a higher quantitatively ranked installation to a lower ranked installation but found that military value is measured by military judgment as well as by numerical calculation and that military judgment was reasonably exercised in this recommendation. The Commission also found that while cost
projections might vary, they did not vary sufficiently to call into question the logic and financial soundness of the proposal, nor did potential cost variances rise to the level of a substantial deviation from the final selection criteria.

Commission Recommendations

The Commission found the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission approves the recommendation of the Secretary.

Newport Chemical Depot, IN

Recommendation # 154 (Ind 8)

One-time Cost: $2.3M
Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings): ($10.9M)
20-Year Net Present Value: ($132.6M)
Payback Period: Immediate

Secretary of Defense Recommendation

Close Newport Chemical Depot, IN.

Secretary of Defense Justification

There is no additional chemical demilitarization workload slated to go to Newport Chemical Depot. The projected date for completion of existing workload is 2nd quarter of 2008. There is no further use for Newport Chemical Depot.

Community Concerns

There were no formal expressions from the community.

Commission Findings

The Commission found that the International Chemical Weapons Convention Treaty requires completion of the chemical demilitarization mission prior to closure of this depot. An examination of status information for this depot’s mission completion and subsequent closure revealed that dates may slip beyond the six-year statutory period for completion of BRAC actions. Furthermore, mission completion and closure dates beyond 2011 exceed the BRAC implementation period.

Commission Recommendations

The Commission found that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final selection criteria 1 and 4, as well as from the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following:

On completion of the chemical demilitarization mission in accordance with Treaty obligations, close Newport Chemical Depot, IN.

The Commission found that this change and the recommendation as amended are consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. The full text of this and all Commission recommendations can be found in Appendix Q.
DOD 1104E/DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

KANSAS ARMY AMMUNITION PLANT, KS
RECOMMENDATION # 155 (IND 9)

One-time Cost: $25.2M
Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings): ($10.3M)
20-Year Net Present Value: ($101.4M)
Payback Period: 2 Years

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Close Kansas Army Ammunition Plant (AAP), KS. Relocate Sensor Fuzed Weapon/Cluster Bomb function and Missile warhead production to McAlester AAP, OK; 155MM ICM Artillery and 60MM, 81MM, and 120MM Mortar functions to Milan AAP, TN; 105MM HE, 155MM HE, and Missile Warhead functions to Iowa AAP, IA; and Detonators/relays/delays to Crane Army Ammunition Activity, IN.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

Capacity and capability for Artillery, Mortars, Missiles, and Pyro/Demo exists at numerous munitions sites. There are 8 sites producing Artillery, 5 producing Mortars, 9 producing Pyro/Demo, and 13 performing Demilitarization. To reduce redundancy and remove excess from the Industrial Base, the closure allows DoD to create centers of excellence, avoid single point failure, and generate efficiencies.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

Labette County and the city of Parsons supported the closure of the Kansas Army Ammunition Plant (KSAAP) but had concerns about their ability to redevelop the site’s facilities and property. They explained that the plant is located in a rural area with limited transportation access and that the loss of 267 jobs would exacerbate the county’s economic hardships. The Community wanted to accelerate the development of uncontaminated portions of the site through the use of leases prior to conveyance of the property. During the transition phase, the community proposed a $1 per annum lease between the US Government and the Local Reuse Authority (LRA). At the conclusion of the clean-up and transition phase, the community proposed the Government transfer all equipment, facilities and, property to the LRA at no cost. The Community expressed an interest in keeping the existing operating contractor in place as a tenant to compete for future DoD work, thereby retaining jobs in the community. The operating contractor noted potential issues with proprietary processes and recommended privatization in place for the KSAAP.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense. The Commission examined the community’s proposals regarding conveyance, and decided to refer them to the Department for consideration during implementation of the recommendation. The Commission carefully considered the operating contractor’s recommendation of privatization-in-place, but rejected it due to the low utilization of the plant and the need to rationalize munitions production capacity in the US industrial base.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission found the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission approves the recommendation of the Secretary.
**Lima Tank Plant, OH**

**Recommendation # 156 (Ind 10)**

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**Secretary of Defense Recommendation**

Realign Lima Tank Plant, OH. Retain the portion required to support the manufacturing of armored combat vehicles to include Army Future Combat System (FCS) program, Marine Corps Expeditionary Force Vehicle (EFV) chassis, and M1 Tank recapitalization program.

**Secretary of Defense Justification**

Capacity and capability for armored combat vehicles exists at three sites with little redundancy among the sites. The acquisition strategy for the Army Future Combat System (FCS) and Marine Corps Expeditionary Force Vehicle includes the manufacturing of manned vehicle chassis at Lima Army Tank Plant. The impact of establishing this capability elsewhere would hinder the Department's ability to meet the USA and USMC future production schedule. This recommendation to retain only the portion of Lima Army Tank Plant required to support the FCS, EFV, and M1 tank recap, reduces the footprint. This allows the Department of Defense to remove excess from the Industrial Base, create centers of excellence, avoid single point failure, and generate efficiencies within the manufacture and maintenance of combat vehicles.

**Community Concerns**

The community contended that DoD’s claims of excess capacity were no longer valid due to program changes since the BRAC data calls. They noted there had been a significant change in capacity requirements and utilization at the plant, citing M1A1 Reset, M1A1 sales to Australia, M1A1 work for Egypt, the USMC Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle, six Stryker-related programs, and the Mobile Gun System. The community cited plant expansion from 450 to 759 employees to meet these requirements and 100 percent utilization of plant facilities as evidence to support their arguments. The community argued that a 27 percent reduction in the manufacturing footprint would require termination or relocation of either all Abrams related workload or Stryker and Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle work.

**Commission Findings**

The Commission found minimal excess manufacturing space at the Lima Tank Plant. Current utilization of the manufacturing space at the plant is at 95 percent, and expected future workloads are sufficient to maintain this high utilization rate. The Commission concurs with the community’s assessment that under existing conditions, implementing this recommendation would require termination or relocation of all Abrams tank-related workload or all Stryker and Expeditionary Force Vehicle workload. Finally, the Commission found that implementing this recommendation and relocating existing production lines would be disruptive to production schedules and would incur significant costs.

**Commission Recommendations**

The Commission found that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final selection criteria 1 and 3 and the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission has rejected the recommendation of the Secretary. The Commission found this recommendation is consistent with the Force Structure Plan and final selection criteria.
**MISSISSIPPI ARMY AMMUNITION PLANT, MS**

**Recommendation # 157 (Ind 11)**

- **One-time Cost:** $32.4M
- **Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings):** ($5.1M)
- **20-Year Net Present Value:** ($38.6M)
- **Payback Period:** 7 Years

**Secretary of Defense Recommendation**

Close Mississippi Army Ammunition Plant, MS. Relocate the 155MM ICM artillery metal parts functions to Rock Island Arsenal, IL.

**Secretary of Defense Justification**

There are 4 sites within the Industrial Base producing Metal Parts. To remove excess from the Industrial Base, the closure allows DoD to generate efficiencies and nurture partnership with multiple sources in the private sector.

**Community Concerns**

The state of Mississippi supported the closure of the Army Ammunition Plant at Stennis Space Center, but also requested review and comment on the projected costs for mitigation of the existing environmental and safety concerns. The state contended that these facilities can be more effectively utilized through more aggressive and responsive local control, and that closure would ameliorate the need for the Army to continue to spend millions of dollars annually to hold on to an abandoned facility in growing disrepair.

**Commission Findings**

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense. The low utilization of this ammunition plant, coupled with significant excess capacity for munitions manufacturing in the US industrial base created a compelling argument for rationalizing munitions manufacturing capacity.

**Commission Recommendations**

The Commission found the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission approves the recommendation of the Secretary.

**HAWTHORNE ARMY DEPOT, NV**

**Recommendation # 158 (Ind 12)**

- **One-time Cost:** N/A
- **Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings):** N/A
- **20-Year Net Present Value:** N/A
- **Payback Period:** N/A

**Secretary of Defense Recommendation**

Close Hawthorne Army Depot, NV. Relocate Storage and Demilitarization functions to Tooele Army Depot, UT.
Secretary of Defense Justification

Capacity and capability for Storage and Demilitarization exists at numerous munitions sites. To reduce redundancy and remove excess from the Industrial Base, the closure allows DoD to create centers of excellence and establish deployment networks that support readiness. Hawthorne Army Depot has infrastructure problems that severely limit the ability to offload.

Community Concerns

Community advocates pointed out the slowed rates of munitions demilitarization makes storage capacity a more valuable commodity in the next few years as DoD faces the return of large quantities of ammunition from overseas. Estimates of 600,000 tons to return in 2007, would fill the existing depot system to 98 percent of capacity. Elimination of Hawthorne’s storage capacity will require building an additional 1,000 magazines at a cost of $500 million. Hawthorne’s demilitarization facilities are the most environmentally friendly in the Army, and recreating them at Tooele would cost between $157 million and $340 million, and take seven years to complete. Ongoing joint activities at Hawthorne include Navy Special Forces High Desert Training, Navy Undersea Warfare Center, Marine Corps Sniper Team Training and weapons testing, Army Ranger High Desert Training and processing of Air Force and Navy bombing ranges scrap. The depot’s training facilities are particularly well suited to simulating conditions in the Middle East. The community disagreed with DoD’s estimates for closure costs and believed that the costs could exceed $840 million and reach as high as $1.2 billion. Funds would be needed to retire outdated munitions, create duplicate capability elsewhere, and for environmental remediation. Additionally, the community argued that insufficient weight was given to the fact that the depot faces no encroachment problems, as it is surrounded by Bureau of Land Management and US Forest Services controlled lands. In direct response to DoD’s contention of offload problems at Hawthorne due to washouts at its facilities, the community countered that, with an average yearly rainfall of no more than 5 inches no offload problems exist. The community strenuously questioned the application of military judgment in the Hawthorne closure decision.

The community contended that DoD used erroneous data for employment and economic consideration. Based on community input, DoD corrected the Region of Influence to Mineral County, NV. The community contended that closure of Hawthorne Army Depot would result in direct job losses of 30 percent in the town of Hawthorne with indirect effects driving total job losses as high as 50 percent. Community leaders and elected representatives claimed the economic impacts would be so devastating that the local area would never recover and become a ghost town, noting that Mineral County is 98 percent federally managed. They believed detrimental effects included reduced property values and property tax revenue. Effects could include default on a $6 million school bond and loss of revenues for education, including Community College programs, potential loss of a hospital in Western Central Nevada, loss of a paid fire department, loss of quality of life programs (parks, libraries, museums, youth programs), loss of dental and medical service providers, increased fees for other services (water, sewer and, garbage collection) and downsizing or closure of the only food and pharmacy store in town. The community argued that closure of the depot will result in the loss of about 10 million square feet of storage capacity now filled to almost 70 percent of capacity. In sum, the community contends the DoD recommendation is a massive deviation from Selection Criteria 6.

Commission Findings

The Commission found sufficient discrepancies in the data to reject DoD’s recommendation to close Hawthorne Army Depot. Currently unused munitions demilitarization capabilities of about 30,000 tons per year and unused storage capabilities of about 44 percent at Hawthorne Army Depot would be available as significant quantities of munitions return in the near future from Korea, Europe and Southwest Asia. Added to current stockpiles, these munitions will also require demilitarization and/or storage. Past diversions from the conventional munitions demilitarization account have resulted in increasing stockpiles of obsolete munitions that have increasingly filled available storage space. The Commission received information that the Department of Defense plans to increase spending on conventional demilitarization to approximately $541 million for fiscal years 2006 through 2011 to reduce its current backlog of approximately 390,000 short tons. The degree of success or failure of this planned effort in the face of higher priority wartime needs will consequently have a major effect on conventional munitions demilitarization and storage.

The Commission found none of the problems noted by the Department of Defense that limit loading and offloading of munitions at Hawthorne. DoD undervalued additional services provided by the depot, including range scrap processing for the Navy and Corps of Engineers, testing and loading of explosive charges, ammunition testing, ammunition restoration, and testing for the next generation of robotic security systems. Further, the depot offers training opportunities in 71,287
acres of high altitude desert terrain similar to that found in Iraq and Afghanistan, including high-angle sniper and other firing ranges, high altitude patrol, and desert convoy operations. The depot has also signed an agreement with the Defense Logistics Agency to store the military’s entire stockpile of elemental mercury.

The Commission also found that DoD significantly underestimated the economic impact of closing Hawthorne by erroneously using the Reno-Sparks Metropolitan Statistical Area as its baseline location. The depot in fact draws its personnel from the Mineral County, NV, Region of Influence (ROI). Recalculation of economic impact in the appropriate ROI with correct personnel figures yielded a 37 percent negative impact to the county.

Last, the Commission determined that environmental clean-up costs of closure may reach as high as $708 M. Current estimated restoration costs are $383.24 M. Additionally, between $29.2 M and $324.8 M would be required to clean up 16 operational ranges.

**Commission Recommendations**

The Commission found that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final selection criteria 1, 2, 3, 6 and 8, and the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission has rejected the recommendation of the Secretary. The Commission found this recommendation is consistent with the Force Structure Plan and final selection criteria.

**Watervliet Arsenal, NY**

**Recommendation # 159 (IND 13)**

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**Secretary of Defense Recommendation**

Realign Watervliet Arsenal, NY, by disestablishing all capabilities for Other Field Artillery Components.

**Secretary of Defense Justification**

The Department no longer requires the capability for Other Field Artillery Components at Watervliet Arsenal. The Department will require and will retain at Watervliet Arsenal the capability to support core cannon tube, rotary forge, and swage. Disestablishing the Other Field Artillery Components capability will allow the Department to reduce its overall footprint at Watervliet Arsenal. It will also allow the Department to explore partnering with the local community, perhaps through a leaseback arrangement. This type of partnering could allow the government to reduce its footprint while maintaining that portion of Watervliet Arsenal needed to fulfill core capabilities.

**Community Concerns**

The community did not oppose the realignment of the Watervliet Arsenal. The workforce at the arsenal has experienced a steady and significant decline over the last ten years, creating economic hardship in the city of Watervliet. While supporting the recommendation, the community desired a clarification of the Secretary’s recommendation on the issue of leaseback arrangements. The DoD recommendation addressed the option of partnering with the local community and exploring leaseback options, but did not directly address the issue of conveyance. The community proposed that the entire arsenal site be conveyed to a Local Reuse Authority that will in turn lease it back to the Army for $1 dollar per year, for as long as DoD needs facilities to continue the core functions detailed in the recommendation. Conveyance to, and leaseback from, a Local Reuse Authority would provide a greater opportunity to establish a high-technology business park that would support the Arsenal’s core functions and the technology research and development functions of tenant Benet Laboratory.
COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission agrees with the Department’s goal of reducing its footprint while maintaining the portion of the arsenal needed to fulfill core capabilities. The Commission encourages continued interaction between the Department and the Local Reuse Authority to develop an industrial development plan.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission found the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission approves the recommendation of the Secretary.

UMATILLA CHEMICAL DEPOT, OR

RECOMMENDATION # 160 (IND 14)

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SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Close Umatilla Chemical Depot, OR.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

No additional chemical demilitarization workload is slated to go to Umatilla Chemical Depot. The projected date for completion of its existing workload is 2nd quarter of 2011. There is no further use for Umatilla Chemical Depot.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The Umatilla Chemical Depot had been planning for closure since the initial 1988 BRAC realignment of the site. The installation wanted to be closed through the BRAC process to obtain funds to assist site personnel and the community with the post closure transition of the depot. The disposal of some existing facilities and land generated by the 1988 BRAC realignment stopped after the 9/11 attacks in response to increased security requirements for chemical weapons storage and disposal. Facilities and land that could have been disposed of became part of the protective buffer around the storage and chemical disposal facilities. The community wanted a final decision and determination on the future of the Umatilla Chemical Depot.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found that the International Chemical Weapons Convention Treaty requires completion of the chemical demilitarization mission prior to closure of this depot. An examination of status information for this depot’s mission completion and subsequent closure revealed that dates may slip beyond the six-year statutory period for completion of BRAC actions. Furthermore, mission completion and closure dates beyond 2011 exceed the BRAC implementation period.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission found that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final selection criteria 1 and 4, as well as from the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following:

On completion of the chemical demilitarization mission in accordance with Treaty obligations, close Umatilla Chemical Depot, OR.
The Commission found that this change and the recommendation as amended are consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. The full text of this and all Commission recommendations can be found in Appendix Q.

**Lackland Air Force Base, TX**

**Recommendation # 161 (Ind 15)**

- **One-time Cost:** N/A
- **Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings):** N/A
- **20-Year Net Present Value:** N/A
- **Payback Period:** N/A

**Secretary of Defense Recommendation**

Realign Lackland Air Force Base, TX, by relocating the depot maintenance of Computers, Crypto, Electronic Components (Non-Airborne), and Radio to Tobyhanna Army Depot, PA; and disestablishing all depot maintenance capabilities.

**Secretary of Defense Justification**

This recommendation supports depot maintenance function elimination at Lackland Air Force Base, TX and follows the strategy of minimizing sites using maximum capacity at 1.5 shifts. This recommendation eliminates over 36,200 square feet of depot maintenance production space with annual facility sustainment and recapitalization savings of $0.1M. Required capacity to support workloads and Core requirements for the Department of Defense (DoD) is relocated to other DoD Centers of Industrial and Technical Excellence, thereby increasing the military value of depot maintenance performed at these sites. This recommendation decreases the cost of depot maintenance operations across DoD by consolidation and elimination of 30 percent of duplicate overhead structures required to operate multiple depot maintenance activities. Additionally, this recommendation supports transformation of the Department’s depot maintenance operations by increasing the utilization of existing capacity by 150 percent while maintaining capability to support future force structure. Another benefit of this recommendation includes utilization of DoD capacity to facilitate performance of interservice workload.

**Community Concerns**

The community argued the closure of Cryptologic Systems Group at Lackland Air Force Base would negate the efficiencies that resulted from the consolidation and co-location of complimentary intelligence functions. They claimed DoD evaluated the military value of individual functions within the Cryptologic Systems Group rather than conducting a combined value assessment of the missions of the group. The community also pointed out that collectively the three DoD proposals to split up the Cryptologic Systems Group are not cost effective, and several costs to relocate were either not considered or understated. Additionally, the community claimed the DoD mission analysis was flawed because the intelligence community was not sufficiently involved in the decision. For example, the National Security Agency has formally expressed concern about the realignment recommendation. Finally, the community believed the proposed split of the collective functions of the Cryptologic Systems Group at Lackland “has a very real potential to severely damage our national security.”

**Commission Findings**

The Commission found that DoD did not evaluate the collective military value of the Cryptologic Systems Group, but rather evaluated individual elements of the group. Consequently, the collective military value of the Group was not appropriately assessed, creating concerns not only by the community, but also among a number of the national security customers of the Group’s work products. The Commission found that DoD substantially deviated from the military value criteria by failing to account for the full scope and classified nature of the Cryptologic Systems Group work or the support it currently provides to a host of military and non-military government agencies. The Commission also found the cost estimates used in this recommendation did not represent fairly the costs associated with the breakup of the Cryptologic Systems Group at Lackland AFB. Additionally, the Commission found potential costs outweighed savings, with no payback of investment, and after taking into consideration recurring transportation costs and other adjustments, the DoD proposed annual recurring
savings of $2.9 million would change to a recurring cost of $5.7 million. The payback period changed from three years to “never” and the 20-year net present value savings of $28 million became a $53.1 million increased cost.

**Commission Recommendations**

The Commission found that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final selection criteria 1, 4 and 5, and the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission has rejected the recommendation of the Secretary. The Commission found this recommendation is consistent with the Force Structure Plan and final selection criteria.

**Lone Star Army Ammunition Plant, TX**

**Recommendation # 162 (Ind 16)**

- **One-time Cost:** $29.0M
- **Annual Recurring Costs/Savings:** ($17.3M)
- **20-Year Net Present Value:** ($164.2M)
- **Payback Period:** 1 Year

**Secretary of Defense Recommendation**

Close Lone Star Army Ammunition Plant (AAP), TX. Relocate the Storage and Demilitarization functions to McAlester AAP, OK. Relocate the 105MM and 155MM ICM Artillery, MLRS Artillery, Hand Grenades, 60MM and 81MM Mortars functions to Milan AAP, TN. Relocate Mines and Detonators/Relays/Delays functions to Iowa AAP, IA. Relocate Demolition Charges functions to Crane Army Ammunition Activity (AAA), IN.

**Secretary of Defense Justification**

Capacity and capability for Artillery, Mortars, Missiles, Pyro/Demo, and Storage exists at numerous munitions sites. There are 8 sites producing Artillery, 5 producing Mortars, 9 producing Pyro-Demo, 15 performing storage, and 13 performing Demilitarization. To reduce redundancy and remove excess from the Industrial Base, the closure allows DoD to create centers of excellence, avoid single point failure, and generate efficiencies. Goal is to establish multi-functional sites performing Demilitarization, Production, Maintenance, and Storage. Lone Star primarily performs only one of the 4 functions.

**Community Concerns**

The community noted that DoD gave the Lone Star Army Ammunition Plant (LSAAP) credit for only one of the functional areas making up a center of excellence and countered that the plant is a multifunctional site performing the full scope of functions—demilitarization, production, maintenance and, storage. The community asserted that DoD understated the number of personnel by 242, misreported current and maximum capacity as equal, and improperly excluded one-time relocation costs of $14 million from savings calculations. In addition, the community noted that some production lines were not accounted for in the data call, and that no credit was given for the complexity of producing ammunition. LSAAP also performs open burn and open detonation demilitarization and has 1.23M square feet of storage. The community asserted that directing LSAAP work to other Army ammunition activities would be contrary to DoD’s strategy to increase competitive contracting for ammunition production. They suggested that, if LSAAP is closed, its work could migrate to non-US producers. The operating contractor noted potential issues with proprietary processes and recommended privatization in place for the LSAAP.

The Texarkana community proposed a public-private partnership as an alternative reuse of the installation and proposed the transfer of workload, equipment and, facilities to the private sector or local jurisdiction as appropriate since the private sector can accommodate the workload onsite.
COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense. The Commission examined the community’s proposals regarding conveyance and decided to refer them to the Department for consideration during implementation of the recommendation. The Commission carefully considered the operating contractor’s recommendation of privatization-in-place but rejected it due to the low utilization of the plant and the need to rationalize munitions production capacity in the US industrial base.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission found the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission approves the recommendation of the Secretary.

DESERET CHEMICAL DEPOT, UT

RECOMMENDATION # 163 (IND 17)

One-time Cost: $18.3M
Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings): ($38.0M)
20-Year Net Present Value: ($407.5M)
Payback Period: Immediate

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Close Deseret Chemical Depot, UT. Transfer the storage igloos and magazines to Tooele Army Depot, UT.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

There is no additional chemical demilitarization workload slated to go to Deseret Chemical Depot. The projected date for completion of its existing workload is 2nd quarter of 2008. Because of the close proximity of Deseret Chemical Depot to Tooele Army Depot, the sophistication of the security system, the number and conditions of igloos and magazines, this recommendation increases the storage and distribution deployment network capability at Tooele Army Depot at a minimal cost.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

There were no formal expressions from the community.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found that the International Chemical Weapons Convention Treaty requires completion of the chemical demilitarization mission prior to closure of this depot. An examination of status information for this depot’s mission completion and subsequent closure revealed that dates may slip beyond the six-year statutory period for completion of BRAC actions. Mission completion and closure dates beyond 2011 exceed the BRAC implementation period. The Commission notes that the community would like the opportunity to convert the chemical demilitarization plant into a conventional munitions demilitarization plant within the BRAC implementation timeframe.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission found that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final selection criteria 1 and 4, as well as from the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following:

On completion of the chemical demilitarization mission in accordance with Treaty obligations and if, after completion of a comprehensive study to evaluate Deseret Chemical Depot, UT, as a site for conventional weapons demilitarization it is
shown that such a use is not feasible, close Deseret Chemical Depot, UT. Transfer the storage igloos and magazines to Tooele Army Depot, UT.

The Commission found that this change and the recommendation as amended are consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. The full text of this and all Commission recommendations can be found in Appendix Q.

**SHIP INTERMEDIATE MAINTENANCE ACTIVITY NORFOLK, VA**

**Recommendation # 164 (IND 18)**

- **One-time Cost:** $10.6M
- **Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings):** ($8.2M)
- **20-Year Net Present Value:** ($104.3M)
- **Payback Period:** 1 Year

**Secretary of Defense Recommendation**

Realign Ship Intermediate Maintenance Activity (SIMA) Norfolk, VA, by relocating intermediate ship maintenance function to Naval Shipyard Norfolk, VA.

**Secretary of Defense Justification**

This recommendation supports capacity reduction at the SIMA Norfolk, VA, and reduces excess ship repair capacity. This consolidation matches the ship maintenance infrastructure at the other major Fleet concentrations where depot and intermediate level activities are collocated. This consolidation will lead to synergy and efficiency in ship maintenance. This recommendation assumes that Norfolk Naval Shipyard becomes a Direct or Mission Funded activity.

**Community Concerns**

There were no formal expressions from the community.

**Commission Findings**

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense.

**Commission Recommendations**

The Commission found the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission approves the recommendation of the Secretary.

**FLEET READINESS CENTERS**

**Recommendation # 165 (IND 19)**

- **One-time Cost:** $33.5M
- **Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings):** ($248.4M)
- **20-Year Net Present Value:** ($3,715.0M)
- **Payback Period:** IMMEDIATE

**Secretary of Defense Recommendation**

Realign Naval Air Station Oceana, VA, by disestablishing the Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Department Oceana, the Naval Air Depot Cherry Point Detachment, and the Naval Air Depot Jacksonville Detachment; establishing Fleet Readiness
Realign Naval Air Station Patuxent River, MD, by disestablishing the Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Department at Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division; establishing Fleet Readiness Center Mid-Atlantic Site Patuxent River, Naval Air Station Patuxent River, MD; and transferring all intermediate maintenance workload and capacity to Fleet Readiness Center Mid-Atlantic Site Patuxent River, Naval Air Station Patuxent River, MD.

Realign Naval Air Station Norfolk, VA, by disestablishing the Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Department Norfolk VA, the Naval Air Depot Jacksonville Detachment, and Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division Lakehurst Detachment; establishing Fleet Readiness Center Mid-Atlantic Site Norfolk, Naval Air Station Norfolk, VA; and transferring all intermediate and depot maintenance workload and capacity for Aircraft Avionics/Electronics Components (approximately 11K DLHs), Aircraft Hydraulic Components (approximately 19K DLHs), Aircraft Landing Gear Components (approximately 2K DLHs), Aircraft Other Components (approximately 6K DLHs) to Fleet Readiness Center Mid-Atlantic Site Norfolk, Naval Air Station Norfolk, VA; relocate depot maintenance workload and capacity for Aircraft Avionics/Electronics Components (approximately 6K DLHs), Aircraft Hydraulic Components (approximately 10K DLHs), Aircraft Landing Gear Components (approximately 1K DLHs), Aircraft Other Components (approximately 3K DLHs), and Aircraft Structural Components (approximately 18K DLHs) to Fleet Readiness Center Mid-Atlantic Site Patuxent River, Naval Air Station Patuxent River, MD; relocate depot maintenance workload and capacity for Aircraft Avionics/Electronics Components (approximately 2K DLHs), Aircraft Hydraulic Components (approximately 3K DLHs), Aircraft Landing Gear Components (approximately 0.4K DLHs), Aircraft Other Components (approximately 1K DLHs), and Aircraft Structural Components (approximately 18K DLHs) to Fleet Readiness Center Southeast Site Mayport, hereby established at Marine Corps Air Station New River, Camp Lejeune, NC; and transfer all remaining depot maintenance workload and capacity to Fleet Readiness Center Southeast Site Mayport, hereby established at Marine Corps Air Station New River, Camp Lejeune, NC.

Realign Marine Corps Air Station Beaufort, SC, by disestablishing Naval Air Depot Beaufort and transferring all depot maintenance workload and capacity to Fleet Readiness Center East Site Beaufort, Marine Corps Air Station Beaufort, SC.

Realign Naval Air Station Jacksonville, FL, as follows: disestablish Naval Air Depot Jacksonville, Naval Air Depot Jacksonville Detachment Jacksonville, and Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Department Jacksonville; establish Fleet Readiness Center Southeast, Naval Air Station, Jacksonville, FL; relocate depot maintenance workload and capacity for Aircraft Avionics/Electronics Components (approximately 8K DLHs), Aircraft Hydraulic Components (approximately 6K DLHs), Aircraft Landing Gear Components (approximately 3K DLHs), Aircraft Other Components (approximately 27K DLHs), and Aircraft Structural Components (approximately 9K DLHs) to Fleet Readiness Center Southeast Site Mayport, hereby established at Marine Corps Air Station Beaufort, SC; relocate depot maintenance workload and capacity for Aircraft Avionics/Electronics Components (approximately 30K DLHs) and Aircraft Structural Components (approximately 9K DLHs) to Fleet Readiness Center Mid-Atlantic Site Beaufort, hereby established at Marine Corps Air Station Beaufort, SC; relocate depot maintenance workload and capacity for Aircraft Avionics/Electronics Components (approximately 11K DLHs), Aircraft Hydraulic Components (approximately 20K DLHs), Aircraft Landing Gear Components (approximately 2K DLHs), Aircraft Other Components (approximately 6K DLHs), Aircraft Structural Components (approximately 36K DLHs), Aircraft Rotary (approximately 1K DLHs), Aircraft VSTOL (approximately 2K DLHs), Aircraft Cargo/Tanker (approximately 0.02K DLHs), Aircraft Other (approximately 18K DLHs), Aircraft Structural Components (approximately 0.001K DLHs), Calibration (approximately 0.15K DLHs) and "Other" Commodity (approximately 0.3K DLHs) to Fleet Readiness Center East Site New River, hereby established at Marine Corps Air Station New River, Camp Lejeune, NC; and transfer all remaining depot maintenance workload and capacity to Fleet Readiness Center East, Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point, NC.
established at Naval Air Station, Mayport, FL; transfer all remaining intermediate and depot maintenance workload and capacity to Fleet Readiness Center Southeast, Naval Air Station Jacksonville, FL.

Realign Naval Air Station Mayport, FL, by disestablishing Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Department, Naval Air Depot Jacksonville Detachment Mayport, and Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division Lakehurst Voyage Repair Team Detachment Mayport and transferring all intermediate maintenance workload and capacity to Fleet Readiness Center Southeast Site Mayport, Naval Air Station Mayport, FL.

Realign Naval Air Station Lemoore, CA, by disestablishing Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Department Lemoore and Naval Air Depot North Island Detachment; establishing Fleet Readiness Center West, Naval Air Station Lemoore, CA; and transferring all intermediate and depot maintenance workload and capacity to Fleet Readiness Center West, Naval Air Station Lemoore, CA.

Realign Naval Air Station Fallon, NV, by disestablishing the Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Department Fallon and the Naval Air Depot North Island Detachment Fallon; establishing Fleet Readiness Center West Site Fallon, Naval Air Station Fallon, NV; and transferring all intermediate and depot maintenance workload and capacity to Fleet Readiness Center West Site Fallon, Naval Air Station Fallon, NV.

Realign Naval Air Station Whidbey Island, WA, by disestablishing the Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Department, establishing Fleet Readiness Center Northwest, Naval Air Station Whidbey Island, WA, and transferring all intermediate maintenance workload and capacity to Fleet Readiness Center Northwest, Naval Air Station Whidbey Island, WA.

Realign Naval Support Activity Crane, IN, by relocating the depot maintenance workload and capacity for ALQ-99 Electronic Warfare to Fleet Readiness Center Northwest, Naval Air Station Whidbey Island, WA.

Realign Naval Air Station North Island, Naval Base Coronado, CA, as follows: disestablish Naval Air Depot North Island, COMSEACONWINGPAC (AIMD), and NADEP North Island Detachment North Island; establish Fleet Readiness Center Southwest, Naval Air Station North Island, Naval Base Coronado, CA; relocate depot maintenance workload and capacity for Aircraft Avionics/Electronics Components (approximately 6K DLHs), Aircraft Structural Components (approximately 13K DLHs), Aircraft Other Components (approximately 17K DLHs), and Aircraft Hydraulic Components (approximately 2K DLHs) from Naval Air Depot North Island to Fleet Readiness Center Southwest Site Point Mugu, hereby established at Naval Air Station Point Mugu, Naval Base Ventura, CA; relocate depot maintenance workload and capacity for Aircraft Avionics/Electronics Components (approximately 8K DLHs), Aircraft Structural Components (approximately 5K DLHs), Aircraft Hydraulic Components (approximately 2K DLHs), Aircraft Landing Gear Components (approximately 4K DLHs), and Aircraft Other Components (approximately 12K DLHs) from Naval Air Depot North Island to Fleet Readiness Center Southwest Site Yuma, hereby established at Marine Corps Air Station Yuma, AZ; relocate depot maintenance workload and capacity for Aircraft Avionics/Electronics Components (approximately 6K DLHs), Aircraft Structural Components (approximately 5K DLHs), Aircraft Hydraulic Components (approximately 2K DLHs), Aircraft Landing Gear Components (approximately 4K DLHs), and Aircraft Other Components (approximately 12K DLHs) from Naval Air Depot North Island to Fleet Readiness Center West Site Fort Worth, Fort Worth TX; relocate depot maintenance workload and capacity for Aircraft Avionics/Electronics Components (approximately 25K DLHs), Aircraft
Hydraulic Components (approximately 8K DLHs), Aircraft Landing Gear Components (approximately 13K DLHs), Aircraft Other Components (approximately 53K DLHs), and Aircraft Structural Components (approximately 15K DLHs), from Naval Air Depot North Island to Fleet Readiness Center Northwest, Naval Air Station Whidbey Island, WA; and transfer all remaining intermediate and depot maintenance workload and capacity to Fleet Readiness Center Southwest, Naval Air Station North Island, Naval Base Coronado, CA.

Realign Naval Air Station Point Mugu, Naval Base Ventura, CA, by disestablishing the Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Department and transferring all intermediate maintenance workload and capacity to Fleet Readiness Center Southwest Site Point Mugu, Naval Base Ventura, CA.

Realign Marine Corps Air Station Miramar, CA, by transferring depot maintenance workload and capacity for Aircraft Other (approximately 28K DLHs) and Aircraft Fighter/Attack (approximately 39K DLHs) and intermediate maintenance workload and capacity for Aircraft Components, Aircraft Engines, Fabrication & Manufacturing and Support Equipment from Marine Aviation Logistics Squadrons (MALS) 11 and 16 to Fleet Readiness Center Southwest Site Miramar, Marine Corps Air Station Miramar, CA.

Realign Marine Corps Air Station Camp Pendleton, CA, by transferring depot maintenance workload and capacity for Aircraft Other (approximately 22K DLHs) and Aircraft Rotary (approximately 102K DLHs) and intermediate maintenance workload and capacity for Aircraft Components, Aircraft Engines, Fabrication & Manufacturing and Support Equipment from MALS-39 to Fleet Readiness Center Southwest Site Camp Pendleton, Marine Corps Air Station Camp Pendleton, CA.

Realign Marine Corps Air Station Yuma, AZ, by transferring depot maintenance workload and capacity for Aircraft Fighter/Attack, Aircraft Other and Aircraft Rotary and intermediate maintenance workload and capacity for Aircraft Components, Aircraft Engines, Communication/Electronics Equipment, Ordnance Weapons & Missiles, Software and Support Equipment from MALS-13 to Fleet Readiness Center Southwest Site Yuma, Marine Corps Air Station Yuma, AZ.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

This recommendation realigns and merges depot and intermediate maintenance activities. It creates 6 Fleet Readiness Centers (FRCs), with 13 affiliated FRC Sites at satellite locations. FRC Mid-Atlantic will be located on NAS Oceana, VA, with affiliated FRC Sites at NAS Patuxent River, MD, NAS Norfolk, VA, and JRB New Orleans, LA. FRC East is located at Cherry Point, NC, with affiliated FRC Sites at MCAS Beaufort, SC, and MCAS New River, NC. The existing intermediate level activity associated with HMX-1 at MCB Quantico, VA, will also be affiliated with FRC East. FRC Southeast will be located on NAS Jacksonville, FL, and will have an affiliated FRC Site at NAS Mayport, FL. FRC West will be located on NAS Lemoore, CA, and will have FRC affiliated sites at NAS JRB Fort Worth, TX, and NAS Fallon, NV. FRC Southwest will be located on Naval Station Coronado, CA, and will have affiliated sites at MCAS Miramar, CA, MCAS Pendleton, CA, MCAS Yuma, AZ, and NAS Point Mugu, CA. FRC Northwest will be located on NAS Whidbey, WA, with no affiliated FRC Sites.

This recommendation supports both DoD and Navy transformation goals by reducing the number of maintenance levels and streamlining the way maintenance is accomplished with associated significant cost reductions. It supports the Naval Aviation Enterprise’s (NAE’s) goal of transforming to fewer maintenance levels, i.e., from 3 to 2 levels, and it supports the NAE’s strategy of positioning maintenance activities closer to fleet concentrations when doing so will result in enhanced effectiveness and efficiency, greater agility, and allows Naval Aviation to achieve the right readiness at the least cost. This transformation to FRCs produces significant reductions in the total cost of maintenance, repair and overhaul plus the associated Supply system PHS&T (Packaging, Handling, Storage and Transportation) as well as repairables inventory stocking levels as a result of reduced total repair turn-around times, reduced transportation, lower spares inventories, less manpower, and more highly utilized infrastructure. It requires integration and collaboration between Depot-level Civil Service personnel and Military Intermediate-level Sailors and Marines. At those FRCs involving Marine Corps MALS (Marine Aviation Logistics Squadrons), because the MALS remain deployable commands, they will affiliate with their FRC organizations, but will remain operationally distinct and severable in all respects. The FRC D-level functions within the MALS fall under the Commanding Officer of each MALS. The FRC Commander is the provider of embedded depot personnel, as well as D-level technical and logistics support within the MALS. For all FRCs, there is a combined annual facility sustainment savings of $1.1M; elimination of a total of 529,000 square feet of depot/intermediate maintenance production space and military construction cost avoidances of $0.2M. This recommendation also includes a military construction cost of $85.7M.
In addition to the actions described in this recommendation, there are four additional actions involved in the comprehensive merger of depot and intermediate maintenance: Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base Willow Grove, PA, Naval Air Station Corpus Christi, TX, Naval Air Station Brunswick, ME, and Naval Air Station Atlanta, GA. The actions at these installations are described in separate installation closure recommendations in the Department of the Navy section of the BRAC Report.

**Community Concerns**

The majority of the communities affected by this recommendation had no formal expressions of concern. A number of community leaders expressed general support for the bases within their community and their support for Navy and Marine Corps missions. Specific comments from community leaders representing the Lakehurst Naval Air Engineering Station suggested that the maintenance of unique Aircraft Launch and Recovery Equipment, and Aviation Support Equipment at Lakehurst should be considered and included with the proposed reorganization of the depot and intermediate maintenance activities into Fleet Readiness Centers.

The community from Naval Support Activity, Crane, Indiana questioned the proposed movement of the ALQ-99 airborne Electronic Warfare Center (EWC) because it fractures a truly joint EWC that supports all services, and moves one system’s depot operation from Crane’s total depot capability and destroys the synergy of operations at Crane to a single platform within a single service at Whidbey Island. The community was also critical of the proposal because they claimed it was neither cost effective nor logical given that the system being moved will be out of the inventory in 10 – 12 years.

**Commission Findings**

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the vast majority of this recommendation of the Secretary of Defense. The Commission found that pre-BRAC reorganizations considered the unique maintenance at Lakehurst and planned to address reorganization of Lakehurst during the implementation of this recommendation.

The Commission’s assessment of the proposed realignment of Naval Support Activity Crane, IN, portion of this very complex DoD recommendation would require substantial construction at Whidbey Island for a system to support EA-6B aircraft to be phased out of the inventory in 10 to 15 years regardless of BRAC. Additionally, the proposed realignment is not cost effective, with implementation costs of $143.6 million and a 20-year Net Present Value cost of $163.9 million. As a result, the Commission amended the recommendation by deleting this portion.

The Commission found construction costs and savings projections were overstated. The Commission found that savings should not be attributed to elimination of unencumbered positions unlikely to be filled. Costs and savings for the final, amended recommendation approved by the Commission have been adjusted to reflect newly estimated military construction costs, the elimination of the Crane realignment to Whidbey Island, and savings that were incorrectly attributed to the elimination of positions already empty as a result of previous efficiency measures. The Commission found that the approved recommendation still enhances military value and generates substantial cost savings.

**Commission Recommendations**

The Commission found that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final selection criteria 1, 3, 4 and 5, as well as from the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following:

Realign Naval Air Station Oceana, VA, by disestablishing the Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Department Oceana, the Naval Air Depot Cherry Point Detachment, and the Naval Air Depot Jacksonville Detachment; establishing Fleet Readiness Center Mid-Atlantic, Naval Air Station Oceana, VA; and transferring all intermediate maintenance workload and capacity to Fleet Readiness Center Mid-Atlantic, Naval Air Station Oceana, VA.

Realign Naval Air Station Patuxent River, MD, by disestablishing the Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Department at Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division; establishing Fleet Readiness Center Mid-Atlantic Site Patuxent River, Naval Air Station Patuxent River, MD; and transferring all intermediate maintenance workload and capacity to Fleet Readiness Center Mid-Atlantic Site Patuxent River, Naval Air Station Patuxent River, MD.

Realign Naval Air Station Norfolk, VA, by disestablishing the Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Department Norfolk VA, the Naval Air Depot Jacksonville Detachment, and Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division Lakehurst Detachment; establishing Fleet Readiness Center Mid-Atlantic Site Norfolk, Naval Air Station Norfolk, VA; and transferring all
intermediate and depot maintenance workload and capacity to Fleet Readiness Center Mid-Atlantic Site Norfolk, Naval Air Station Norfolk, VA.

Realign Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base New Orleans, LA, by disestablishing the Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Department, establishing Fleet Readiness Center Mid-Atlantic Site New Orleans, Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base New Orleans, LA; and transfer all intermediate maintenance workload and capacity to Fleet Readiness Center Mid-Atlantic Site New Orleans, Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base New Orleans, LA.

Realign Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point, NC, as follows: disestablish Naval Air Depot Cherry Point; establish Fleet Readiness Center East, Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point, NC; relocate depot maintenance workload and capacity for Aircraft Avionics/Electronics Components (approximately 39K DLHs), Aircraft Hydraulic Components (approximately 69K DLHs), Aircraft Landing Gear Components (approximately 8K DLHs), Aircraft Other Components (approximately 23K DLHs), and Aircraft Structural Components (approximately 126K DLHs) to Fleet Readiness Center Mid-Atlantic, Naval Air Station Oceana, VA; relocate depot maintenance workload and capacity for Aircraft Avionics/Electronics Components (approximately 11K DLHs), Aircraft Hydraulic Components (approximately 19K DLHs), Aircraft Landing Gear Components (approximately 2K DLHs), Aircraft Structural Components (approximately 35K DLHs), and Aircraft Other Components (approximately 36K DLHs) to Fleet Readiness Center Mid-Atlantic Site Norfolk, Naval Air Station Norfolk, VA; relocate depot maintenance workload and capacity for Aircraft Avionics/Electronics Components (approximately 11K DLHs), Aircraft Hydraulic Components (approximately 19K DLHs), Aircraft Landing Gear Components (approximately 2K DLHs), Aircraft Structural Components (approximately 35K DLHs), and Aircraft Other Components (approximately 36K DLHs) to Fleet Readiness Center Mid-Atlantic Site Patuxent River, Naval Air Station Patuxent River, MD; relocate depot maintenance workload and capacity for Aircraft Avionics/Electronics Components (approximately 11K DLHs), Aircraft Hydraulic Components (approximately 19K DLHs), Aircraft Landing Gear Components (approximately 2K DLHs), Aircraft Structural Components (approximately 35K DLHs), and Aircraft Other Components (approximately 36K DLHs) to the Fleet Readiness Center East Site Beaufort, hereby established at Marine Corps Air Station Beaufort, SC; relocate depot maintenance workload and capacity for Aircraft Avionics/Electronics Components (approximately 11K DLHs), Aircraft Hydraulic Components (approximately 19K DLHs), Aircraft Landing Gear Components (approximately 2K DLHs), Aircraft Structural Components (approximately 35K DLHs), and Aircraft Other Components (approximately 36K DLHs) to Fleet Readiness Center West, Naval Air Station Lemoore, CA; and transfer all remaining intermediate and depot maintenance workload and capacity to Fleet Readiness Center West, Naval Air Station Lemoore, CA; and...
transferring all intermediate and depot maintenance workload and capacity to Fleet Readiness Center West, Naval Air Station Lemoore, CA.

Realignment of Naval Air Station Fallon, NV, by disestablishing the Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Department Fallon and the Naval Air Depot North Island Detachment Fallon; establishing Fleet Readiness Center West Site Fallon, Naval Air Station Fallon, NV; and transferring all intermediate and depot maintenance workload and capacity to Fleet Readiness Center West Site Fallon, Naval Air Station Fallon, NV.

Realignment of Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division China Lake, CA, by disestablishing the Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Department and relocating its maintenance workload and capacity for Aircraft (approximately 3K DLHs), Aircraft Components (approximately 45K DLHs), Fabrication & Manufacturing (approximately 6K DLHs) and Support Equipment (approximately 16K DLHs) to Fleet Readiness Center West, Naval Air Station Lemoore, CA.

Realignment of Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base Fort Worth, TX, by disestablishing the Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Department, establishing Fleet Readiness Center West Site Fort Worth, Naval Air Station Fort Worth, TX, and transferring all intermediate maintenance workload and capacity to Fleet Readiness Center West Site Fort Worth, Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base Fort Worth, TX.

Realignment of Naval Air Station Whidbey Island, WA, by disestablishing the Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Department, establishing Fleet Readiness Center Northwest, Naval Air Station Whidbey Island, WA, and transferring all intermediate maintenance workload and capacity to Fleet Readiness Center Northwest, Naval Air Station Whidbey Island, WA.

Realignment of Naval Air Station North Island, Naval Base Coronado, CA, as follows: disestablish Naval Air Depot North Island, COMSEACONWINGPAC (AIMD), and NADEP North Island Detachment North Island; establish Fleet Readiness Center Southwest, Naval Air Station North Island, Naval Base Coronado, CA; relocate depot maintenance workload and capacity for aircraft Avionics/Electronics Components (approximately 6K DLHs), Aircraft Hydraulic Components (approximately 2K DLHs), Aircraft Landing Gear Components (approximately 3K DLHs), aircraft Other Components (approximately 13K DLHs), and Aircraft Structural Components (approximately 4K DLHs) from Naval Air Depot North Island to Fleet Readiness Center Southwest Site Point Mugu, hereby established at Naval Air Station Point Mugu, Naval Base Ventura, CA; relocate depot maintenance workload and capacity for Aircraft avionics/Electronics Components (approximately 26K DLHs), Aircraft Hydraulic Component (approximately 8K DLHs), Aircraft Landing Gear Components (approximately 13K DLHs), Aircraft Other Components (approximately 55K DLHs), Aircraft Structural Components (approximately 16K DLHs) from Naval Air Depot North Island to Fleet Readiness Center Southwest Site Miramar, hereby established at Marine Corps Air Station Miramar, CA; relocate depot maintenance workload and capacity for Aircraft Avionics/Electronics Components (approximately 8K DLHs), Aircraft Hydraulic Components (approximately 2K DLHs), Aircraft Landing Gear Components (approximately 4K DLHs), Aircraft Other Components (approximately 17K DLHs), and Aircraft Structural Components (approximately 5K DLHs) from Naval Air Depot North Island to Fleet Readiness Center Southwest Site Pendleton, hereby established at Marine Corps Air Station Camp Pendleton, CA; relocate depot maintenance workload and capacity for Aircraft Avionics/Electronics Components (approximately 6K DLHs), Aircraft Hydraulic Components (approximately 2K DLHs), Aircraft Landing Gear Components (approximately 3K DLHs), Aircraft Other Components (approximately 12K DLHs), Aircraft Structural Components (approximately 3K DLHs) from Naval Air Depot North Island to Fleet Readiness Southwest Site Yuma, hereby established at Marine Corps Air Station Yuma, AZ; relocate depot maintenance workload and capacity for Aircraft Avionics/Electronics Components (approximately 6K DLHs), Aircraft Hydraulic Components (approximately 2K DLHs), Aircraft Landing Gear Components (approximately 3K DLHs), Aircraft Other Components (approximately 12K DLHs), and Aircraft Structural Components (approximately 3K DLHs) from Naval Air Depot North Island to Fleet Readiness Center West Site Fort Worth, Fort Worth, TX; relocate depot maintenance workload and capacity for Aircraft Avionics/Electronics Components (approximately 25K DLHs), Aircraft Hydraulic Components (approximately 8K DLHs), Aircraft Landing Gear Components (approximately 13K DLHs), Aircraft Other Components (approximately 53K DLHs), and Aircraft Structural Components (approximately 15K DLHs), from Naval Air Depot North Island to Fleet Readiness Center Northwest, Naval Air Station Whidbey Island, WA; and transfer all remaining intermediate and depot maintenance workload and capacity to Fleet Readiness Center Southwest, Naval Air Station North Island, Naval Base Coronado, CA.

Realignment of Naval Air Station Point Mugu, Naval Base Ventura, CA, by disestablishing the Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Department and transferring all intermediate maintenance workload and capacity to Fleet Readiness Center Southwest Site Point Mugu, Naval Base Ventura, CA.

Realignment of Marine Corps Air Station Miramar, CA, by transferring depot maintenance workload and capacity for Aircraft Other (approximately 28K DLHs) and Aircraft Fighter/Attack (approximately 39K DLHs) and intermediate maintenance workload and capacity for Aircraft Components, Aircraft Engines, Fabrication & Manufacturing and Support Equipment.
from Marine Aviation Logistics Squadrons (MALS) 11 and 16 to Fleet Readiness Center Southwest Site Miramar, Marine Corps Air Station Miramar, CA.

Realign Marine Corps Air Station Camp Pendleton, CA, by transferring depot maintenance workload and capacity for Aircraft Other (approximately 22K DLHs) and Aircraft Rotary (approximately 102K DLHs) and intermediate maintenance workload and capacity for Aircraft Components, Aircraft Engines, Fabrication & Manufacturing and Support Equipment from MALS-39 to Fleet Readiness Center Southwest Site Camp Pendleton, Marine Corps Air Station Camp Pendleton, CA.

Realign Marine Corps Air Station Yuma, AZ, by transferring depot maintenance workload and capacity for Aircraft Fighter/Attack, Aircraft Other and Aircraft Rotary and intermediate maintenance workload and capacity for Aircraft Components, Aircraft Engines, Communication/Electronics Equipment, Ordnance Weapons & Missiles, Software and Support Equipment from MALS-13 to Fleet Readiness Center Southwest Site Yuma, Marine Corps Air Station Yuma, AZ.

The Commission found that this change and the recommendation as amended are consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. The full text of this and all Commission recommendations can be found in Appendix Q.

**NAVAL SHIYARD DETACHMENTS**

**RECOMMENDATION # 166 (IND 26)**

| One-time Cost | $12.5M |
| Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings) | ($2.3M) |
| 20-Year Net Present Value | ($20.7M) |
| Payback Period | 4 Years |

**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION**

Realign Puget Sound Naval Shipyards Detachment Boston, MA, by relocating the ship repair function to Puget Sound Naval Shipyards, WA.

Realign Naval Station Annapolis, MD, by relocating the Norfolk Naval Shipyards Detachment, Naval Sea Systems Command Plant Equipment Support Office ship repair function to Norfolk Naval Shipyards, VA.

Realign the Navy Philadelphia Business Center, PA, by relocating the Norfolk Naval Shipyards Detachment, Naval Sea Systems Command Shipbuilding Support Office ship repair function to Norfolk Naval Shipyards, VA.

**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION**

This recommendation supports mission elimination at Puget Sound Naval Shipyards Detachment Boston, MA, Norfolk Naval Shipyards Detachment, Naval Sea Systems Command Plant Equipment Support Office, Annapolis, MD, and Norfolk Naval Shipyards Detachment, Naval Sea Systems Command Shipbuilding Support Office, Philadelphia, PA, and reduces excess ship repair capacity. This relocation will create synergy among like functions at Puget Sound Naval Shipyards and Norfolk Naval Shipyards. Although this expected synergy is not captured in the payback calculations, experience has shown that it will produce additional long-term savings.

**COMMUNITY CONCERNS**

Community representatives and employees of the Puget Sound Naval Shipyards (PSNSY) Detachment Boston noted the detachment performs engineering and planning and is not a shipyard or repair facility. Inapplicable ship repair and overhaul facility metrics improperly reduced the detachment’s military value score. DoD also improperly projects savings due to elimination of building lease payments. The detachment makes no lease payments and its housing costs are already included in the Detachment’s Base Operating Support account, hence the recommendation’s projected savings are improperly inflated by double-counted savings for the cost of space.

The NAVSHIPS union and Congressional representatives believe the proposed realignment would result in the loss of intellectual capital, since most NAVSHIPS personnel would not relocate to Norfolk. The community recommended
moving the facility to Government-owned spaces at the Naval Foundry & Propeller Center, Philadelphia, rather than Norfolk. It was noted the recommendation would move the facility back onto a shipyard, even though BRAC 1993 moved them out of one.

**Commission Findings**

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense. The issues raised by the community were more properly categorized as implementation issues that could be managed during the six-year implementation period, and did not individually or collectively rise to the level of a substantial deviation.

**Commission Recommendations**

The Commission found the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission approves the recommendation of the Secretary.
JOINT CROSS-SERVICE GROUPS (JCSGs):

INTELLIGENCE

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
(A CLASSIFIED VERSION OF THIS RECOMMENDATION IDENTIFIES SPECIFIC FUNCTIONS TO BE MOVED.)

RECOMMENDATION # 167 (INT 3)

One-time Cost: $96.7M
Annual recurring costs/(savings): ($10.1M)
20-Year Net Present Value: ($52.8M)
Payback Period: 8 Years

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Realign Defense Intelligence Analysis Center, Bolling Air Force Base, DC, by relocating select Defense Intelligence Agency intelligence analysis functions to a new facility at Rivanna Station, VA. Realign Crystal Park 5, a leased facility in Arlington, VA, by relocating the Defense Intelligence Agency analysis function to the Defense Intelligence Analysis Center, Bolling Air Force Base, DC.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

This recommendation is a realignment of select personnel, equipment and intelligence analysis functions of the Defense Intelligence Agency. It co-locates select intelligence analysis functions and personnel with the National Ground Intelligence Center into a new facility at Rivanna Station. This recommendation improves information flow/mission synergy; addresses capacity shortage at the Defense Intelligence Analysis Center; meets the spirit of the Secretary of Defense’s guidelines for relocation outside the National Capital Region, and improves Continuity of Operations (COOP)/Mission Assurance by locating functions on a secure Department of Defense-owned location. The realignment of personnel from Crystal Park 5 to the Defense Intelligence Analysis Center, Bolling Air Force Base, DC, reduces vulnerable leased space while addressing Anti-terrorism/Force Protection deficiencies by locating functions onto a secure Department of Defense-owned location. This recommendation accommodates current and surge requirements and is consistent with the 20-year Force Structure Plan.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

There were no formal expressions from the community.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission finds the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission approves the recommendation of the Secretary.
**National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency Activities**

**Recommendation # 168 (INT 4)**

- **One-time Cost:** $1,117.3M
- **Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings):** $127.7M
- **20-Year Net Present Value:** ($535.1M)
- **Payback Period:** 8 Years

**Secretary of Defense Recommendation**

Close National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) Dalecarlia and Sumner sites, Bethesda, MD; Reston 1, 2 and 3, leased installations in Reston, VA; Newington buildings 8510, 8520, and 8530, Newington, VA; and Building 213 a leased installation at the South East Federal Center, Washington, DC. Relocate all functions to a new facility at Fort Belvoir, VA. Realign the National Reconnaissance Office facility, Westfields, VA, by relocating all NGA functions to a new facility at the Fort Belvoir, VA. Consolidate all NGA National Geospatial-Intelligence College functions on Fort Belvoir into the new facility at Fort Belvoir, VA.

**Secretary of Defense Justification**

This recommendation is a strategic consolidation of the personnel, equipment and functions of NGA's 22 legacy organizations into a new geospatial intelligence consolidated campus. It consolidates multiple NGA National Capital Region-based intelligence community activities now occupying small, government facilities and privately-owned leased space, to a secure Department of Defense-owned location, reducing excess capacity and increasing overall military value. It optimizes mission efficiencies, improves readiness, and enhances mission partner coordination, while addressing Antiterrorism/Force Protection deficiencies. This recommendation accommodates current and surge requirements and is consistent with the 20-year Force Structure Plan.

**Community Concerns**

The Maryland community maintains the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency is a good neighbor. They are concerned by the potential reduction in quality of life that would result from transportation problems, such as increased traffic over poor roads, lack of public transportation around the Fort Belvoir area, and increased commuting times with the attendant issues of air pollution and increased fuel consumption. Inadequate road infrastructure and lack of mass transit will lead to large increases in auto commuting and extreme traffic congestion on already overburdened highways and local roads.

Maryland argued the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) is a unique and vital piece of the U.S. intelligence community, and that a new, larger site to accommodate a consolidated NGA is needed. The community expressed concerns that the logistical challenges associated with the realignment of Fort Belvoir will interfere with NGA's ability to carry out its mission if moved to Fort Belvoir as proposed by DoD. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) expressed a similar concern in its July 1, 2005 report. According to GAO, DoD's proposal to add nearly 8,500 new employees to Fort Belvoir should be considered by the Commission in light of “the impact [of this move] on the local community structure, such as roads and public transportation.” Community advocates urged the Commission to accept their counter-proposal in which NGA would establish itself faster, more securely and with less disruption to its mission at Fort Meade than at Fort Belvoir. They claimed Fort Meade is unquestionably one of the most secure military facilities in the National Capital Region, and has the space to accommodate the roughly 2,000 NGA employees who must be relocated from the Washington Navy Yard. They assert this counter-proposal could be accomplished within the six-year implementation period because Fort Meade has completed or is completing substantial infrastructure upgrades, which would allow NGA to "plug in" quickly at Fort Meade, including: privatizing the power supply and the water and waste facilities; and laying fiber for enhanced communications. Lastly, the community argued that Fort Meade’s secure, superior facilities make it better suited than Fort Belvoir to accommodate the special needs of a high-tech intelligence facility. Consolidating NGA at Fort Meade would also facilitate closer interaction between NGA and the National Security Agency (NSA), Fort Meade's largest tenant. The Maryland Delegation asserts the United States Government needs to consider ways to streamline and improve cooperation between NGA, NSA, and the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), whose missions are closely intertwined.
COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission carefully considered the community input, but found no evidence that it would cost less money to move the NGA to Fort Meade than to Fort Belvoir. The Commission also noted that the bulk of NGA staff resides in Northern Virginia, which would better facilitate a commute to Fort Belvoir. The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission finds the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission approves the recommendation of the Secretary.
JOINT CROSS-SERVICE GROUPS (JCSGs):

MEDICAL

WALTER REED NATIONAL MILITARY MEDICAL CENTER, BETHESDA, MD

Recommendation # 169 (Med 4)

One-time Cost: $988.8M
Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings): ($145.3M)
20-Year Net Present Value: ($830.6M)
Payback Period: 6 Years

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Realign Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Washington, DC, as follows: relocate all tertiary (sub-specialty and complex care) medical services to National Naval Medical Center, Bethesda, MD, establishing it as the Walter Reed National Military Medical Center Bethesda, MD; relocate Legal Medicine to the new Walter Reed National Military Medical Center Bethesda, MD; relocate sufficient personnel to the new Walter Reed National Military Medical Center Bethesda, MD, to establish a Program Management Office that will coordinate pathology results, contract administration, and quality assurance and control of DoD second opinion consults worldwide; relocate all non-tertiary (primary and specialty) patient care functions to a new community hospital at Fort Belvoir, VA; relocate the Office of the Secretary of Defense supporting unit to Fort Belvoir, VA; disestablish all elements of the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology except the National Medical Museum and the Tissue Repository; relocate the Armed Forces Medical Examiner, DNA Registry, and Accident Investigation to Dover Air Force Base, DE; relocate enlisted histology technician training to Fort Sam Houston, TX; relocate the Combat Casualty Care Research sub-function (with the exception of those organizational elements performing neuroprotection research) of the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research (Forest Glen Annex) and the Combat Casualty Care Research sub-function of the Naval Medical Research Center (Forest Glen Annex) to the Army Institute of Surgical Research, Fort Sam Houston, TX; relocate Medical Biological Defense Research of the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research (Forest Glen Annex) and Naval Medical Research Center (Forest Glen Annex) to Fort Detrick, MD, and consolidate it with US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases; relocate Medical Chemical Defense Research of the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research (Forest Glen Annex) to Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, and consolidate it with the US Army Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defense; and close the main post.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

This recommendation will transform legacy medical infrastructure into a premier, modernized joint operational medicine platform. This recommendation reduces excess capacity within the National Capital Region (NCR) Multi-Service Market (MSM: two or more facilities collocated geographically with “shared” beneficiary population) while maintaining the same level of care for the beneficiaries. Walter Reed Army Medical Center (AMC) has a military value of 54.46 in contrast to the higher military values of National Naval Medical Center (NNMC) Bethesda (63.19) and DeWitt Hospital (58). This action relocates medical care into facilities of higher military value and capacity. By making use of the design capacity inherent in NNMC Bethesda (18K RWP) and an expansion of the inpatient care at DeWitt Hospital (13K RWP), the entire inpatient care produced at Walter Reed AMCA (17K RWP) can be relocated into these facilities along with their current workload (11K RWP and 1.9K RWP, respectively). This strategically relocates healthcare in better proximity to the beneficiary base, which census data indicates is concentrating in the southern area of the region. As a part of this action, approximately 2,069 authorizations (military and civilian) will be realigned to DeWitt Hospital and 797 authorizations will be realigned to NNMC Bethesda in order to maintain the current level of effort in providing care to the NCR beneficiary population. DeWitt Hospital will assume all patient care missions with the exception of the specific tertiary care missions that will go to the newly established Walter Reed National Military Medical Center at Bethesda. Specialty units, such as the Amputee
Center at WRAMC, will be relocated within the National Capitol Region. Casualty care is not impacted. Development of a premier National Military Medical Center will provide enhanced visibility, as well as recruiting and retention advantages to the Military Health System. The remaining civilian authorizations and contractors at Walter Reed AMC that represent unnecessary overhead will be eliminated. Military personnel filling similar “overhead positions” are available to be redistributed by the Service to replace civilian and contract medical personnel elsewhere in Military Healthcare System activities of higher military value.

Co-location of combat casualty care research activities with related military clinical activities of the trauma center currently located at Brooke Army Medical Center, Fort Sam Houston, TX, promotes translational research that fosters rapid application of research findings to health care delivery, and provides synergistic opportunities to bring clinical insight into bench research through sharing of staff across the research and health care delivery functions.

This action will co-locate Army, Navy, Air Force and Defense Agency program management expertise for non-medical chemical and biological defense research, development and acquisition (each at Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD) and two separate aspects of medical chemical and biological research: medical biological defense research (at Ft. Detrick, MD) and medical chemical defense research (at Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD). It will promote beneficial technical interaction in planning and headquarters-level oversight of all defense biomedical R&D, fostering a joint perspective and sharing of expertise and work in areas of joint interest; create opportunities for synergies and efficiencies by facilitating integrated program planning to build joint economies and eliminate undesired redundancy, and by optimizing use of a limited pool of critical professional personnel with expertise in medical product development and acquisition; foster the development of common practices for DoD regulatory interactions with the US Food and Drug Administration; and facilitate coordinated medical systems lifecycle management with the medical logistics organizations of the Military Departments, already co-located at Fort Detrick.

The Armed Forces Institute of Pathology (AFIP) was originally established as the Army Medical Museum in 1862 as a public and professional repository for injuries and disease specimens of Civil War soldiers. In 1888, educational facilities of the Museum were made available to civilian medical professions on a cooperative basis. In 1976, Congress established AFIP as a joint entity of the Military Departments subject to the authority, control, and direction of the Secretary of Defense. As a result of this recommendation, in the future the Department will rely on the civilian market for second opinion pathology consults and initial diagnosis when the local pathology labs capabilities are exceeded.

**Community Concerns**

The Washington, DC community argued that moving Walter Reed Army Medical Center to the National Naval Medical Center in Bethesda, MD would disrupt the mission of the premier military medical facility, and have a negative effect on the economy of the District of Columbia and homeland security in the nation’s capital. Concerns were also expressed about whether there would be sufficient housing for family members visiting service members recovering from serious conditions or injuries. They claimed DoD substantially deviated from the BRAC criteria by incorrectly calculating Walter Reed’s military value, underestimating the costs for closure and realignment, and ignoring environmental cleanup costs. They suggested Walter Reed remain open, and the mission of the National Naval Medical Center be aligned with Walter Reed to ensure there are no disruptions during a time of war. They also expressed concerns about the disestablishment of the Armed Force Institute of Pathology (AFIP), which is a part of the larger Walter Reed Recommendation. The community argued that AFIP is an irreplaceable resource for disease research and education, and disestablishing elements like the tissue repository would have far-reaching implications for military and civilian medicine.

**Commission Findings**

The Commission acknowledged Walter Reed Army Medical Center’s rich heritage and earned reputation as a world-class medical center. However, the Commission found that service members deserve a state-of-the-art 21st century medical center and that the Secretary’s proposal would increase military value. The Commission considered the community’s concerns that realigning medical services will disrupt Walter Reed’s mission, but the Commission found that the Walter Reed legacy will be preserved in the plan for the new facility and that service members would continue to receive needed medical services during the implementation period. The Commission concurred with the Department’s objective to transform medical infrastructure within the National Capital Region. However, the Commission agrees with the communities’ concern about whether sufficient housing will be available for family members at the Bethesda Campus and urges the DoD to address this issue.
The professional community regards AFIP and its services as integral to the military and civilian medical and research community, and relies on AFIP for pathology consultations and the training of radiology residents. The Commission found that DoD failed to sufficiently address several AFIP functions, such as the Radiologic Pathology program, with the associated tissue repository, veterinary pathology and continuing medical education.

**Commission Recommendations**

The Commission found that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final selection criteria 1, as well as from the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following:

Realign Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Washington, DC, as follows: relocate all tertiary (sub-specialty and complex care) medical services to National Naval Medical Center, Bethesda, MD, establishing it as the Walter Reed National Military Medical Center Bethesda, MD; relocate Legal Medicine to the new Walter Reed National Military Medical Center Bethesda, MD; relocate sufficient personnel to the new Walter Reed National Military Medical Center Bethesda, MD, to establish a Program Management Office that will coordinate pathology results, contract administration, and quality assurance and control of DoD second opinion consults worldwide; relocate all non-tertiary (primary and specialty) patient care functions to a new community hospital at Fort Belvoir, VA; disestablish all elements of the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology except the National Medical Museum and the Tissue Repository; relocate the Armed Forces Medical Examiner, DNA Registry, and Accident Investigation to Dover Air Force Base, DE; AFIP capabilities not specified in this recommendation will be absorbed into other DoD, Federal, or civilian facilities, as necessary; relocate enlisted histology technician training to Fort Sam Houston, TX; relocate the Combat Casualty Care Research sub-function (with the exception of those organizational elements performing neuroprotection research) of the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research (Forest Glen Annex) and the Combat Casualty Care Research sub-function of the Naval Medical Research Center (Forest Glen Annex) to the Army Institute of Surgical Research, Fort Sam Houston, TX; relocate Medical Biological Defense Research of the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research (Forest Glen Annex) and Naval Medical Research Center (Forest Glen Annex) to Fort Detrick, MD, and consolidate it with US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases; relocate Medical Chemical Defense Research of the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research (Forest Glen Annex) to Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, and consolidate it with the US Army Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defense; and close the main post.

The Commission found that this change and the recommendation as amended are consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. The full text of this and all Commission recommendations can be found in Appendix Q.

**Brooks City Base, TX**

**Recommendation # 170 (Med 6)**

**One-time Cost:** $325.3M

**Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings):** ($102.1M)

**20-Year Net Present Value:** ($940.7M)

**Payback Period:** 2 Years

**Secretary of Defense Recommendation**

Close Brooks City Base, San Antonio, TX. Relocate the Air Force Audit Agency and 341st Recruiting Squadron to Randolph AFB. Relocate the United States Air Force School of Aerospace Medicine, the Air Force Institute of Occupational Health, the Naval Health Research Center Electro-Magnetic Energy Detachment, the Human Systems Development and Acquisition function, and the Human Effectiveness Directorate of the Air Force Research Laboratory to Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH. Consolidate the Human Effectiveness Directorate with the Air Force Research Laboratory, Human Effectiveness Directorate at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH. Relocate the Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence, the Air Force Medical Support Agency, Air Force Medical Operations Agency, Air Force Element Medical Defense Agency, Air Force Element Medical-DoD, Air Force-Wide Support Element, 710th Information Operations Flight and the 68th Information Operations Squadron to Lackland Air Force Base, TX. Relocate the Army Medical Research Detachment to the Army Institute of Surgical Research, Fort Sam Houston, TX. Relocate the Non-Medical Chemical Biological Defense
Development and Acquisition to Edgewood Chemical Biological Center, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD. Disestablish any remaining organizations.

Realign Holloman AFB by disestablishing the high-onset gravitational force centrifuge and relocating the physiological training unit (49 ADOS/SGGT) to Wright-Patterson AFB.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

This recommendation enables technical synergy, and positions the Department of the Air Force to exploit a center-of-mass of scientific, technical, and acquisition expertise required by the 20-year Force Structure Plan. Greater synergy across technical capabilities and functions will be achieved by consolidating geographically separate units of the Air Force Research Laboratory.

The end state will co-locate the Human Systems Development & Acquisition function and the Human Systems Research function with Air Force Aerospace Medicine and Occupational Health education and training. This action will co-locate the Development & Acquisition for Human Systems with the Research function and will concentrate acquisition expertise for Human Systems at one site. Additionally, the relocation of the physiological training unit from Holloman AFB with the relocation of the high-onset gravitational-force centrifuge, enables the continued use of a critical piece of equipment required for both Human Systems Research and Aerospace Medicine Education and Training. This end state will also increase synergy with the Air Platform Research and Development & Acquisition functions and continue the efficient use of equipment and facilities implemented under Biomedical Reliance and BRAC 91 at Wright-Patterson AFB, OH.

Co-location of combat casualty care research activities with related military clinical activities of the trauma center currently located at Brooke Army Medical Center, Fort Sam Houston TX, promotes translational research that fosters rapid application of research findings to health care delivery, and provides synergistic opportunities to bring clinical insight into bench research through sharing of staff across the research and health care delivery functions. The availability of a co-located military trauma center also provides incentives for recruitment and retention of military physicians as researchers, and is a model that has proven highly successful in civilian academic research centers.

Edgewood Chemical and Biological Center, Aberdeen Proving Ground, is home to the military’s most robust infrastructure supporting research utilizing hazardous chemical agents. Relocation of the Non-medical Chemical Biological Defense Development and Acquisition to Aberdeen Proving Ground will increase synergy, focus on joint needs, and efficient use of equipment and facilities by co-locating Tri-Service and Defense activities performing functions in chemical-biological defense and medical RDA.

This recommendation also moves the Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence (AFCEE) to Lackland AFB, where it will be co-located with the Air Force Real Property Agency (AFRPA) that is being relocated to Lackland in a separate recommendation. The military value of AFCEE is 265th out of 336 entities evaluated by the Major Administrative and Headquarters (MAH) military value model. Lackland Air Force Base is ranked 25th out of 336.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

Community representatives argued DoD’s proposed closure of Brooks City Base, Texas would be too costly and eliminated already existing synergies. Specifically, they questioned why the US Air Force School of Aerospace Medicine (USAFSAM) would be moved to the Human Effectiveness Directorate at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base when the mission of USAFSAM involves training and has nothing to do with human system research or development. Alternatively, they suggested realigning USAFSAM with Fort Sam Houston where a co-located medical training organization is proposed. The community also recommended that the Air Force Institute of Operational Health remain in San Antonio and be realigned with USAFSAM because such an alignment would create greater military value than moving to Wright-Patterson. Finally, they argued that the Tri-Service Directed Energy Bioeffects Laboratory, created as a result of a prior BRAC process, remain intact so that such tri-service research can continue.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found that several elements of this recommendation were not supportable as originally proposed. For instance, moving the Naval Health Research Center Electro-Magnetic Energy Detachment and the directed energy aspects of the Human Effectiveness Directorate of the Air Force Research Laboratory to Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH, and the Army Medical Research Detachment to the Army Institute of Surgical Research at Fort Sam Houston, TX, would break apart valuable research synergies established over a 10-year period at the Tri-Service Directed Energy Laboratories. In fact, the
Tri-Service Directed Energy Laboratory was brought together at Brooks City Base in 1993 under a special project to collocate similar research and development activities of the military services. Therefore, the Commission found that the work conducted on the effect of directed energy on humans could be placed at risk under the DoD proposal.

**COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS**

The Commission found that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final selection criteria 1, as well as from the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following:


Realign Holloman AFB by disestablishing the high-onset gravitational force centrifuge and relocating the physiological training unit (49 ADOS/SGGT) to Wright-Patterson AFB.

The Commission found that this change and the recommendation as amended are consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. The full text of this and all Commission recommendations can be found in Appendix Q.

**McChord Air Force Base, WA**

Recommandation # 171 (Med 9)

- **One-time Cost:** $1.1M
- **Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings):** ($11.6M)
- **20-Year Net Present Value:** ($164.4M)
- **Payback Period:** Immediate

**Secretary of Defense Recommendation**

Realign McChord Air Force Base, WA, by relocating all medical functions to Fort Lewis, WA.

**Secretary of Defense Justification**

The primary rationale for this recommendation is to promote jointness and reduce excess capacity. This recommendation supports strategies of reducing excess capacity and locating military medical personnel in areas with enhanced opportunities for medical practice. McChord AFB’s medical facility produced 44,283 Relative Value Units (RVUs) in FY02, which is well below the Military Health System average of 166,692 RVUs. Its Healthcare Services Functional Military Value of 51.45, is much lower than that of Fort Lewis (73.30). Military personnel stationed at McChord AFB’s Medical Facility can be placed in activities of higher military value with a more diverse workload, providing them with enhanced opportunities to maintain their medical currency and making them better able to support Army medical readiness requirements. Approximately 169 military and civilian authorizations will be realigned to Fort Lewis in order to maintain the current level of effort in providing care to the McChord AFB beneficiary population. The remaining civilian authorizations and contractors at McChord AFB that represent unnecessary overhead will be eliminated. Military personnel that are filling similar “overhead positions” will be redistributed by the Service to replace civilian and contract medical personnel elsewhere in the Military Health System activities of higher military value. The large savings along with the reduction of inefficiencies and workload
available supports this action. While the jobs are lost in the military system the same type of job is available in the community.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community expressed concerns about access to medical services if the McChord AFB, WA Clinic is closed and all medical functions are relocated at Madigan Army Medical Center at Fort Lewis. Specifically, they questioned whether Madigan Army Medical Center has the capacity to take on the patient population from the McChord Clinic, how long patients would have to wait for an appointment, if there will be enough staff to treat all patients, and whether the TRICARE civilian network in the area was adequate.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found merit in the community’s concern that Madigan Army Medical Center at Fort Lewis may not have sufficient capacity to accept McChord Medical Clinic’s patient population. Built in 2000, the McChord Clinic provides care to about 14,500 active duty members and their families, as well as retirees and their families. Madigan Army Medical Center, located approximately eight miles from the McChord clinic, has a 172-bed capacity and serves a six-state area. Additionally, the Commission found that, while the medical functions would be realigned to Madigan, the McChord Clinic would be an optimal “satellite” facility to provide health care services. The Commission believes its recommendation will reduce duplication of services while maintaining sufficient future medical capacity.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission found that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final selection criteria 2, 3 and 4, as well as from the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following:

Realign McChord Air Force Base, WA, by reorganizing medical functions under Madigan Army Medical Center, Fort Lewis, WA. McChord Air Force Base medical functions will be reorganized and relocated as directed by the Commander, Madigan Army Medical Center.

The Commission found that this change and the recommendation as amended are consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. The full text of this and all Commission recommendations can be found in Appendix Q.

SAN ANTONIO REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, TX

RECOMMENDATION # 172 (MED 10)

One-time Cost: $1,040.9M
Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings): ($129.0M)
20-Year Net Present Value: ($476.2M)
Payback Period: 10 Years

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Realignment Lackland Air Force Base, TX, by relocating the inpatient medical function of the 59th Medical Wing (Wilford Hall Medical Center) to the Brooke Army Medical Center, Fort Sam Houston, TX, establishing it as the San Antonio Regional Military Medical Center, and converting Wilford Hall Medical Center into an ambulatory care center.

Realignment Naval Air Station Great Lakes, IL, Sheppard Air Force Base, TX, Naval Medical Center Portsmouth, Naval Medical Center San Diego, CA, by relocating basic and specialty enlisted medical training to Fort Sam Houston, TX.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

The primary rationale for this recommendation is to transform legacy medical infrastructure into a modernized joint operational medicine platform. This recommendation reduces excess capacity within the San Antonio Multi-Service Market (MSM: two or more facilities collocated geographically with “shared” beneficiary population) while maintaining the level of
care for the beneficiaries, enhancing opportunities for provider currency, and maintaining surge capacity. By making use of the design capacity inherent in Brooke Army Medical Center (BAMC), the entire inpatient care produced at WHMC can be relocated into this facility. In terms of military value, while BAMC had a slightly lower quantitative military value score than WHMC, the difference was so small as to not be a meaningful discriminator. Additionally, the small difference is primarily attributable to the efficiency of the Dental Clinic at WHMC, a facility that is excluded from this recommendation. It was the military judgment of the MJCSG that in the context of this recommendation, the condition of the facilities and their average weighted age were the most important elements of the military value of the two locations. In this area, BAMC received a significantly higher score than WHMC. Additionally, it is more cost effective and timely to return BAMC to its inherent design capacity and convert WHMC to an ambulatory care center, than to do the reverse. BAMC is located in a more centralized location, enabling it to better support the broader population area. WHMC and BAMC support Level 1 Trauma Centers, this capability is maintained in this recommendation by expanding the BAMC Level 1 Trauma Center to the capacity of both trauma centers. It was therefore the military judgment of the MJCSG that regionalization at BAMC provided the highest overall military value to the Department. Development of a premier Regional Military Medical Center will provide enhanced visibility, as well as, recruiting and retention advantages to the Military Health System. The remaining civilian authorizations and contractors at Wilford Hall Medical Center that represent unnecessary overhead will be eliminated. Military personnel filling similar “overhead positions” are available to be redistributed by the Service to replace civilian and contract medical personnel elsewhere in Military Healthcare System activities of higher military value. While the jobs are lost in the military system the same type of job is available in the community.

This recommendation also co-locates all (except Aerospace Medicine) medical basic and specialty enlisted training at Fort Sam Houston, TX, with the potential of transitioning to a joint training effort. This will result in reduced infrastructure and excess system capacity, while capitalizing on the synergy of the co-location similar training conducted by each of the three Services. In addition, the development of a joint training center will result in standardized training for medical enlisted specialties enhancing interoperability and joint deployability.

Co-location of medical enlisted training with related military clinical activities of the San Antonio Regional Medical Center at Brooke Army Medical Center, Fort Sam Houston, TX, provides synergistic opportunities to bring clinical insight into the training environment, realtime. As a result, both the healthcare delivery and training experiences are exponentially enhanced.

**Community Concerns**

The Lackland Air Force Base community questioned DoD’s decision to convert Wilford Hall Medical Center into an outpatient clinic and ambulatory surgery center, and move inpatient services and the Level 1 Trauma Center to Brooke Army Medical Center at Fort Sam Houston. They argued that the south side of the city would no longer have a trauma center, and it would take longer to get to the trauma center located on the north side of the city.

The Sheppard Air Force Base community questioned DoD’s decision to move basic medical training from Sheppard to Fort Sam Houston, TX. They felt Sheppard ranked better in excess capacity, buildable acreage, and nearby field training, which were three of the four reasons given by DoD for moving the training to Fort Sam Houston. Advocates claimed the fourth area, clinical capacity, is irrelevant because basic medical training does not require nearby clinical activities. They proposed adjusting the weighted value given to clinical capacity, which would give Sheppard a higher military value score than Fort Sam Houston or Great Lakes. Additionally, they estimated moving basic medical training to Sheppard saves 45.9 percent and 61.8 percent in military construction costs over Fort Sam Houston or Great Lakes respectively. Community leaders noted that Sheppard has a unique one-of-a-kind medical training facility for non-prior service students where joint medical training already exists. They explained Sheppard also offers better infrastructure utilization because it has the largest footprint for classrooms reported by all installations, with an excess capacity of 24,482 students, on average.

Community representatives for Naval Station Great Lakes argued that DoD’s proposal goes too far in centralizing basic enlisted medical training at Fort Sam Houston, and asserted it would be better to provide training at two locations: Fort Sam Houston and Great Lakes. They believed two locations would better balance the goals of savings and operational flexibility. Additionally, centralizing at Fort Sam Houston would be risky due to the 10 year payback period for associated costs. DoD’s proposal would also have an adverse impact on the local economy with the loss of 2,000 military positions and a smaller cut in civilian jobs.
COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found merit in DoD’s rationale for transforming its medical infrastructure by bringing together two locations in a multi-service market (Wilford Hall Medical Center and Brooke Army Medical Center) and creating a modernized operational medicine installation in San Antonio, TX. The Commission recognizes that both medical institutions have an enviable history of providing quality health care services for active duty service members and their families, and retirees and their dependents. However, it believes implementation of this recommendation will improve service delivery and efficiency.

The Commission also found that collocating all medical basic and specialty enlisted training would create an opportunity for the service branches to develop a joint training center that could result in standardized and enhanced training opportunities, as well as improved interoperability and joint deployability.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission found the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission approves the recommendation of the Secretary.

CONVERT INPATIENT SERVICES TO CLINICS

RECOMMENDATION # 173 (MED 12)

ONE-TIME COST: $141.3M
ANNUAL RECURRING COSTS/(SAVINGS): ($94.0M)
20-YEAR NET PRESENT VALUE: ($1,146.5M)
PAYBACK PERIOD: IMMEDIATE

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Realign Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point, NC by disestablishing the inpatient mission at Naval Hospital Cherry Point; convert the hospital to a clinic with an ambulatory surgery center.

Realign Fort Eustis, VA, by disestablishing the inpatient mission at the Fort Eustis Medical Facility; convert the hospital to a clinic with an ambulatory surgery center.

Realign the United States Air Force Academy, CO, by relocating the inpatient mission of the 10th Medical Group to Fort Carson Medical Facility, CO; convert the 10th Medical Group into a clinic with an ambulatory surgery center.

Realign Andrews Air Force Base, MD, by disestablishing the inpatient mission at the 89th Medical Group; convert the hospital to a clinic with an ambulatory surgery center.

Realign MacDill Air Force Base, FL, by disestablishing the inpatient mission at the 6th Medical Group; convert the hospital to a clinic with an ambulatory surgery center.

Realign Keesler Air Force Base, MS, by disestablishing the inpatient mission at the 81st Medical Group; convert the medical center to a clinic with an ambulatory surgery center.

Realign Scott Air Force Base, IL, by disestablishing the inpatient mission at the 375th Medical Group; convert the hospital to a clinic with an ambulatory surgery center.

Realign Naval Station Great Lakes, IL, by disestablishing the inpatient mission at Naval Hospital Great Lakes; convert the hospital to a clinic with an ambulatory surgery center.

Realign Fort Knox, KY, by disestablishing the inpatient mission at Fort Knox’s Medical Facility; convert the hospital to a clinic with an ambulatory surgery center.
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

The Department will rely on the civilian medical network for inpatient services at these installations. This recommendation supports strategies of reducing excess capacity and locating military personnel in activities with higher military value with a more diverse workload, providing them with enhanced opportunities to maintain their medical currency to meet COCOM requirements. Additionally, a robust network with available inpatient capacity of Joint Accreditation of Hospital Organizations (JCAHO) and/or Medicare accredited civilian/Veterans Affairs hospitals is located within 40 miles of the referenced facilities.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The Keesler Air Force Base, MS community questioned DoD’s decision asserting a flawed military value analysis, an ineffective analysis of the effects of shutting down Keesler’s Graduate Medical Education program on the community, and disputing the costing data used in estimating savings. If the recommendation is not reversed the community fears healthcare services for active duty personnel, dependents, veterans, and retirees will be drastically reduced in the 4-state area served by Keesler. Additionally, the readiness of medical training for deployment teams, and the medical support provided to the education and training mission of the base, would be adversely affected. Other community effects would be the loss of the current support provided for emergency services, medical support to retirees, and the loss of synergies and personnel support with VA and local hospitals.

Community leaders representing Kentucky questioned DoD’s decision to convert Ireland Army Hospital at Fort Knox to an outpatient clinic and ambulatory surgery center when the Army planned to locate a brigade combat team (BCT) at Fort Knox. Standing up a BCT at Fort Knox will result in an increase in permanent party and families, thereby changing the overall demand for soldier and family medical support. Additionally, the community was concerned that if the Ireland Hospital were converted into an outpatient clinic, the local civilian hospitals could not absorb the projected increase in obstetrical care that will be required by the Ft. Knox population.

Community representatives from Cherry Point, NC and North Chicago, IL expressed concerns about converting their hospitals, Halyburton Naval Hospital, NC and Great Lakes Naval Station, IL to clinics with ambulatory surgery centers because active duty service members and their families would no longer have nearby access to inpatient medical services.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found that DoD did not make a sufficiently detailed assessment of the available health care services within the referenced communities and failed to determine whether the civilian medical network would be able to provide needed medical services. Additionally, the Commission noted that GAO’s analysis showed DoD did not coordinate with the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to determine whether military beneficiaries in the referenced communities could have adequate access to care at VA hospitals.

More specifically, the Commission found that the civilian medical network around Ireland Hospital at Fort Knox would have difficulty providing medical services, particularly obstetrical care, to the service members and their dependents who would use Ireland Hospital. Moreover, the demand for health care services would measurably grow when Fort Knox gained an overseas brigade. Finally, the Commission acknowledged community concerns about available health care in the area surrounding Keesler Air Force Base and found DoD’s proposal created a risk of insufficient health care services available to Keesler beneficiaries if the medical center was downsized to a clinic with an ambulatory surgery center. It was noted that several hospitals in the area of Keesler AFB are not part of the TRICARE network.

Additionally, in that this recommendation realigns several facilities to clinics with ambulatory surgery centers, increasing demand on outpatient services, the Commission urges DoD to provide the appropriate mix of healthcare providers and the proper level of staff to meet the demand.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission found that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final selection criteria 1, 3 and 7, as well as from the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following:

Realign Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point, NC, by disestablishing the inpatient mission at Naval Hospital Cherry Point; convert the hospital to a clinic with an ambulatory surgery center.
Realign Fort Eustis, VA, by disestablishing the inpatient mission at the Fort Eustis Medical Facility; convert the hospital to a clinic with an ambulatory surgery center.

Realign the United States Air Force Academy, CO, by relocating the inpatient mission of the 10th Medical Group to Fort Carson Medical Facility, CO; convert the 10th Medical Group into a clinic with an ambulatory surgery center.

Realign Andrews Air Force Base, MD, by disestablishing the inpatient mission at the 89th Medical Group; convert the hospital to a clinic with an ambulatory surgery center.

Realign MacDill Air Force Base, FL, by disestablishing the inpatient mission at the 6th Medical Group; convert the hospital to a clinic with an ambulatory surgery center.

Realign Keesler Air Force Base, MS, by convert the medical center to a community hospital.

Realign Scott Air Force Base, IL, by disestablishing the inpatient mission at the 375th Medical Group; convert the hospital to a clinic with an ambulatory surgery center.

Realign Naval Station Great Lakes, IL, by disestablishing the inpatient mission at Naval Hospital Great Lakes; convert the hospital to a clinic with an ambulatory surgery center.

The Commission found that this change and the recommendation as amended are consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. The full text of this and all Commission recommendations can be found in Appendix Q.

**JOINT CENTERS OF EXCELLENCE FOR CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, AND MEDICAL RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AND ACQUISITION**

**Recommendation # 174 (Med 15)**

**One-time Cost:** $55.2M

**Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings):** ($7.3M)

**20-Year Net Present Value:** ($39.5M)

**Payback Period:** 6 YEARS

**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION**

Realign Building 42, 8901 Wisconsin Ave, Bethesda, MD, by relocating the Combat Casualty Care Research sub-function of the Naval Medical Research Center to the Army Institute of Surgical Research, Fort Sam Houston, TX.

Realign Naval Station Great Lakes, IL, by relocating the Army Dental Research Detachment, the Air Force Dental Investigative Service, and the Naval Institute for Dental and Biomedical Research to the Army Institute of Surgical Research, Fort Sam Houston, TX.

Realign 13 Taft Court and 1600 E. Gude Drive, Rockville, MD, by relocating the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, Division of Retrovirology to the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, Walter Reed Army Medical Center – Forest Glen Annex, MD, establishing it as a Center of Excellence for Infectious Disease.

Realign Naval Air Station Pensacola, FL, by relocating the Naval Aeromedical Research Laboratory to Wright-Patterson AFB, OH.

Realign 12300 Washington Ave, Rockville, MD, by relocating the Medical Biological Defense Research sub-function to the U. S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, Ft. Detrick, MD.

Realign Potomac Annex-Washington, DC, by relocating Naval Bureau of Medicine, Code M2, headquarters-level planning, investment portfolio management and program and regulatory oversight of DoD Biomedical Science and Technology programs and FDA-regulated medical product development within the biomedical RDA function to a new Joint Biomedical Research, Development and Acquisition Management Center at Fort Detrick, MD.

Realign 64 Thomas Jefferson Drive, Frederick, MD, by relocating the Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical Biological Defense, Joint Project Manager for Chemical Biological Medical Systems headquarters-level planning, investment portfolio management and program and regulatory oversight of DoD Biomedical Science and Technology programs and FDA-regulated medical product development within the RDA function to a new Joint Biomedical Research, Development and Acquisition Management Center at Fort Detrick, MD.
Realign Fort Belvoir, VA, by relocating the Chemical Biological Defense Research component of the Defense Threat
Reduction Agency to Edgewood Chemical Biological Center, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD.

Realign Tyndall AFB, FL, by relocating Non-medical Chemical Biological Defense Research to Edgewood Chemical
Biological Center, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, and consolidating it with Air Force Research Laboratory.

Realign Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division, VA, by relocating Non-medical Chemical Biological Defense
Research and Development & Acquisition to Edgewood Chemical Biological Center, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD.

Realign Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane Division, IN, by relocating the Non-medical Chemical Biological Defense
Development and Acquisition to Edgewood Chemical Biological Center, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD.

Realign Skyline 2 and 6, Falls Church, VA, by relocating the Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical Biological
Defense to Edgewood Chemical Biological Center, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

This recommendation creates Joint Centers of Excellence for Battlefield Health and Trauma research at Fort Sam Houston,
TX; Infectious Disease research at Walter Reed–Forest Glen Annex, MD; Aerospace Medicine research at Wright-Patterson
AFB, OH; Regulated Medical Project development & acquisition at Fort Detrick, MD; Medical Biological Defense research
at Fort Detrick, MD; and Chemical Biological Defense research, development & acquisition at Aberdeen Proving Ground,
MD. These actions will increase synergy, focus on joint needs, and efficient use of equipment and facilities by co-locating Tri-
Service and Defense activities performing functions in chemical-biological defense and medical RDA. Fort Sam Houston is
the best location for the Center for Battlefield Health and Trauma because it is the only current biomedical S&T location
that also includes a military trauma center, providing enhanced translational research opportunities and ability to recruit and
retain physician/scientists. Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Forest Glen Annex, is the CONUS hub of the worldwide
Army and Navy activities in infectious diseases of military significance. Fort Detrick, MD, is the site of an Interagency
Biodefense Campus and the military’s only Bio-Safety Level 4 containment facilities for medical research. The realignment of
Air Force Aerospace medical and non-medical R&D to Wright-Patterson AFB, OH, with co-location of associated education
and training activities relocated in another recommendation, makes this location most suitable for a joint center for
Aerospace Medical Research. Fort Detrick, MD is home of Tri-Service medical logistics as well the Department’s largest
Medical RDA management activity. Edgewood Chemical and Biological Center, Aberdeen Proving Ground, is home to the
military’s most robust infrastructure supporting research utilizing hazardous chemical agents. These actions will also reduce
the use of leased space within the National Capital Region, and increase the force protection posture of the realigning
activities. Specific benefits occurring as a result of this recommendation include:

Promote beneficial technical and management interaction in the functional research areas of combat casualty care including
combat dentistry and maxillofacial care, infectious disease, aerospace medicine, medical and non-medical chemical and
biological defense research, as well as in the functional area of medical development and acquisition, fostering a joint
perspective and sharing of expertise and work in areas of joint interest.

Build joint economies and optimize use of limited pools of critical professional personnel with expertise in unique mission
areas.

Co-location of combat casualty care research activities with related military clinical activities of the trauma center currently
located at Brooke Army Medical Center, Fort Sam Houston, TX, promotes translational research that fosters rapid
application of research findings to health care delivery, and provides synergistic opportunities to bring clinical insight into
bench research through sharing of staff across the research and health care delivery functions. The availability of a co-located
military trauma center also provides incentives for recruitment and retention of military physicians as researchers, and is a
model that has proven highly successful in civilian academic research centers.

Reduce the number of DoD animal facilities.

Provide increased opportunities to share management and scientific support functions across Services and reduce costs.

Foster the development of common practices for DoD regulatory interactions with the US Food and Drug Administration.

Facilitate coordinated medical systems lifecycle management with the medical logistics organizations of the Military
Departments, already co-located at Fort Detrick.
Promote jointness, enable technical synergy, and position the Department of Defense to exploit a center-of-mass of scientific, technical, and acquisition expertise with the personnel necessary to provide defense against current and emerging chemical and biological warfare threats.

Complete earlier consolidations of military Service Chemical Biological Defense programs into a joint, consolidated Chemical Biological Defense program.

Directly support the Department’s Strategy for homeland defense and Civil Support.

**Community Concerns**

The Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren (Fredericksburg, Virginia) community expressed concern about DoD’s recommended transfer of the US Navy’s non-medical chemical and biological defense research and development to Edgewood Chemical Biological Center, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. The community maintained that the transfer would remove the research and development effort from an organization focused on the Navy’s unique concerns, to a facility with no prior experience in this area. In addition, community advocates claimed that only about 20 percent of the staff would move from the Fredericksburg, Virginia, area to Harford County, Maryland, where Aberdeen Proving Ground is located. This would cause a significant loss of intellectual and human capital, thereby jeopardizing the Navy mission.

The Tyndall Air Force Base (Bay County, Florida) community expressed concern that the DoD recommendation overstated number of people to be moved to Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. Specifically, they felt the DoD recommendation improperly cited all the staff at the Air Force Research Lab, not just the people working in chemical and biological defense research.

The Naval Surface Warfare Center Crane (Southern Indiana) community expressed concern about the recommended realignment of 57 positions, including 16 engineering and 15 technicians, in Crane’s development, acquisition and support of Chemical and Biological detection devices to Edgewood Arsenal at Aberdeen, Maryland. The community feels this action separates the Chemical and Biological detection technical capability which moves, from the industrial depot repair which stays. This causes duplication of knowledge and facilities.

**Commission Findings**

The Commission found DoD’s recommendation to realign chemical-biological defense activities at (1) Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane, IN, (2) Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren, VA, and (3) Tyndall Air Force Base, FL, to Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, would not enhance DoD’s chemical-biological defense research, development and acquisition activities at Aberdeen Proving Ground, but would instead degrade engineering and logistics support to chemical-biological defense equipment at operational units.

**Commission Recommendations**

The Commission found that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final selection criterion 1, as well as from the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following:

Realign Building 42, 8901 Wisconsin Ave, Bethesda, MD, by relocating the Combat Casualty Care Research sub-function of the Naval Medical Research Center to the Army Institute of Surgical Research, Fort Sam Houston, TX.

Realign Naval Station Great Lakes, IL, by relocating the Army Dental Research Detachment, the Air Force Dental Investigative Service, and the Naval Institute for Dental and Biomedical Research to the Army Institute of Surgical Research, Fort Sam Houston, TX.

Realign 13 Taft Court and 1600 E. Gude Drive, Rockville, MD, by relocating the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, Division of Retrovirology to the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, Walter Reed Army Medical Center – Forest Glen Annex, MD, establishing it as a Center of Excellence for Infectious Disease.

Realign Naval Air Station Pensacola, FL, by relocating the Naval Aeromedical Research Laboratory to Wright-Patterson AFB, OH.

Realign 12300 Washington Ave, Rockville, MD, by relocating the Medical Biological Defense Research sub-function to the U. S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, Ft. Detrick, MD.
Realign Potomac Annex-Washington, DC, by relocating Naval Bureau of Medicine, Code M2, headquarters-level planning, investment portfolio management and program and regulatory oversight of DoD Biomedical Science and Technology programs and FDA-regulated medical product development within the biomedical RDA function to a new Joint Biomedical Research, Development and Acquisition Management Center at Fort Detrick, MD.

Realign 64 Thomas Jefferson Drive, Frederick, MD, by relocating the Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical Biological Defense, Joint Project Manager for Chemical Biological Medical Systems headquarters-level planning, investment portfolio management and program and regulatory oversight of DoD Biomedical Science and Technology programs and FDA-regulated medical product development within the RDA function to a new Joint Biomedical Research, Development and Acquisition Management Center at Fort Detrick, MD.

Realign Fort Belvoir, VA, by relocating the Chemical Biological Defense Research component of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency to Edgewood Chemical Biological Center, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD.

Realign Skyline 2 and 6, Falls Church, VA, by relocating the Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical Biological Defense to Edgewood Chemical Biological Center, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD.

The Commission found that this change and the recommendation as amended are consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. The full text of this and all Commission recommendations can be found in Appendix Q.
JOINT CROSS-SERVICE GROUPS (JCSGs):

SUPPLY AND STORAGE

COMMODITY MANAGEMENT PRIVATIZATION

RECOMMENDATION # 175 (S&S 5)

ONE-TIME COST: $6.4M
ANNUAL RECURRING COSTS/(SAVINGS): ($43.8M)
20-YEAR NET PRESENT VALUE: ($735.9M)
PAYBACK PERIOD: IMMEDIATE

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Realignment of Detroit Arsenal, MI, by relocating the supply contracting function for tires to the Inventory Control Point at Defense Supply Center Columbus, OH, and disestablishing all other supply functions for tires.

Realignment of Hill Air Force Base, UT, as follows: relocate the supply contracting function for tires to the Inventory Control Point at Defense Supply Center Columbus, OH; disestablish all other supply functions for tires; and disestablish the storage, and distribution functions for tires, packaged petroleum, oils, and lubricants, and compressed gases.

Realignment of Naval Support Activity, Mechanicsburg, PA, by relocating the supply contracting function for packaged petroleum, oils, and lubricants to the Inventory Control Point at Defense Supply Center, Richmond, VA, and disestablishing all other supply functions for packaged petroleum, oils, and lubricants.

Realignment of Defense Supply Center, Richmond, VA, by disestablishing storage and distribution functions for tires, the supply, storage, and distribution functions for packaged petroleum, oils, and lubricants, and compressed gases. Retain the supply contracting function for packaged petroleum, oils, and lubricants, and compressed gases.

Realignment of Defense Supply Center Columbus, OH, Tobyhanna Army Depot, PA, Defense Distribution Depot Susquehanna, PA, Naval Station Norfolk, VA, Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point, NC, Marine Corps Logistics Base, Albany, GA, Robins Air Force Base, GA, Anniston Army Depot, AL, Naval Air Station Jacksonville, FL, Tinker Air Force Base, OK, Corpus Christi Army Depot, TX, Naval Station Bremerton, WA, Naval Station San Diego, CA, Defense Distribution Depot Barstow, CA, Defense Distribution Depot San Joaquin, CA, and Naval Station Pearl Harbor, HI, by disestablishing storage and distribution functions for tires, packaged petroleum, oils, and lubricants, and compressed gases at each location.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

This recommendation achieves economies and efficiencies that enhance the effectiveness of logistics support to forces as they transition to more joint and expeditionary operations. This recommendation disestablishes the wholesale supply, storage, and distribution functions for all tires; packaged petroleum, oils and lubricants; and compressed gases used by the Department of Defense, retaining only the supply contracting function for each commodity. The Department will privatize these functions and will rely on private industry for the performance of supply, storage, and distribution of these commodities. By doing so, the Department can divest itself of inventories and can eliminate infrastructure and personnel associated with these functions. This recommendation results in more responsive supply support to user organizations and thus adds to capabilities of the future force. The recommendation provides improved support during mobilization and deployment, and the sustainment of forces when deployed worldwide. Privatization enables the Department to take advantage of the latest technologies, expertise, and business practices, which translates to improved support to customers at less cost.
It centralizes management of tires; packaged petroleum, oils, and lubricants; and compressed gases; and eliminates unnecessary duplication of functions within the Department. Finally, this recommendation supports transformation by privatizing the wholesale storage and distribution processes from DoD activities.

In addition to the actions described in this recommendation, the Department is also disestablishing storage and distribution functions for tires, packaged petroleum, oils, and lubricants, and compressed gases at Red River Army Depot, TX. The storage and distribution functions at this additional location are now being disestablished as part of a recommendation for the full closure of the Red River Army Depot installation. The recommendation to close the installation fully supports all objectives intended by this recommendation.

**Community Concerns**

There were no formal expressions from the community.

**Commission Findings**

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense.

**Commission Recommendations**

The Commission found the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission approves the recommendation of the Secretary.

**Depot-Level Repairable Procurement Management Consolidation**

**Recommendation # 176 (S&S 7)**

- **One-time Cost:** $124.9M
- **Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings):** ($156.8M)
- **20-Year Net Present Value:** ($1,857.8M)
- **Payback Period:** Immediate

**Secretary of Defense Recommendation**

Realign Lackland Air Force Base, TX, as follows: relocate the Budget/Funding, Contracting, Cataloging, Requisition Processing, Customer Services, Item Management, Stock Control, Weapon System Secondary Item Support, Requirements Determination, and Integrated Materiel Management Technical Support Inventory Control Point functions for Consumable Items to Defense Supply Center Columbus, OH, and reestablish them as Defense Logistics Agency Inventory Control Point functions; relocate the procurement management and related support functions for depot-level repairables to Robins Air Force Base, GA, and designate them as Defense Supply Center Columbus, OH, Inventory Control Point functions; relocate the remaining integrated materiel management, user, and related support functions to Robins Air Force Base, GA.

Realign Soldier Systems Center, Natick, MA, by relocating the Budget/Funding, Contracting, Cataloging, Requisition Processing, Customer Services, Item Management, Stock Control, Weapon System Secondary Item Support, Requirements Determination, and Integrated Materiel Management Technical Support Inventory Control Point functions for Consumable Items to Defense Supply Center Philadelphia, PA, and reestablishing them as Defense Logistics Agency Inventory Control Point functions and by disestablishing the procurement management and related support functions for depot-level repairables and designating them as Defense Supply Center Philadelphia, PA, Inventory Control Point functions.

Realign Detroit Arsenal, MI, by relocating the Budget/Funding, Contracting, Cataloging, Requisition Processing, Customer Services, Item Management, Stock Control, Weapon System Secondary Item Support, Requirements Determination, and Integrated Materiel Management Technical Support Inventory Control Point functions for Consumable Items to Defense Supply Center Columbus, OH, and reestablishing them as Defense Logistics Agency Inventory Control Point functions, and by disestablishing the procurement management and related support functions for depot-level repairables and designating them as Defense Supply Center Columbus, OH, Inventory Control Point functions.
Realign Rock Island Arsenal, IL, as follows: relocate the Budget/Funding, Contracting, Cataloging, Requisition Processing, Customer Services, Item Management, Stock Control, Weapon System Secondary Item Support, Requirements Determination, and Integrated Materiel Management Technical Support Inventory Control Point functions for Consumable Items to Defense Supply Center Columbus, OH, and reestablish them as Defense Logistics Agency Inventory Control Point functions; relocate the procurement management and related support functions for depot-level repairables to Detroit Arsenal, MI, and designate them as Defense Supply Center Columbus, OH, Inventory Control Point functions; and relocate the remaining integrated materiel management, user, and related support functions to Detroit Arsenal, MI.

Realign Ft. Huachuca, AZ, as follows: relocate the Budget/Funding, Contracting, Cataloging, Requisition Processing, Customer Services, Item Management, Stock Control, Weapon System Secondary Item Support, Requirements Determination, and Integrated Materiel Management Technical Support Inventory Control Point functions for Consumable Items to Defense Supply Center Columbus, OH, and designate them as Defense Logistics Agency Inventory Control Point functions; relocate the procurement management and related support functions for depot-level repairables to Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, and designate them as Defense Supply Center Columbus, OH, Inventory Control Point functions; and relocate the remaining integrated materiel management, user, and related support functions to Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD.

Realign Naval Support Activity Mechanicsburg, PA, as follows: relocate the Budget/Funding, Contracting, Cataloging, Requisition Processing, Customer Services, Item Management, Stock Control, Weapon System Secondary Item Support, Requirements Determination, and Integrated Materiel Management Technical Support Inventory Control Point functions for Consumable Items, except those Navy items associated with Nuclear Propulsion Support, Level I/Subsafe and Deep Submergence System Program (DSSP) Management, Strategic Weapon Systems Management, Design Unstable/Preproduction Test, Special Waivers, Major End Items and Fabricated or Reclaimed items to Defense Supply Center Columbus, OH, and reestablish them as Defense Logistics Agency Inventory Control Point functions; disestablish the procurement management and related support functions for depot-level repairables and designate them as Defense Supply Center Columbus, OH, Inventory Control Point functions; and relocate the oversight of Budget/Funding, Contracting, Cataloging, Requisition Processing, Customer Services, Item Management, Stock Control, Weapon System Secondary Item Support, Requirements Determination, and Integrated Materiel Management Technical Support Inventory Control Point functions for Consumable Items and the oversight of procurement management and related support functions for depot-level repairables to the Defense Logistics Agency, Fort Belvoir, VA.

Realign Naval Support Activity Mechanicsburg, PA, as follows: relocate the Budget/Funding, Contracting, Cataloging, Requisition Processing, Customer Services, Item Management, Stock Control, Weapon System Secondary Item Support, Requirements Determination, and Integrated Materiel Management Technical Support Inventory Control Point functions for any residual Consumable Items to Defense Supply Center Columbus, OH, and reestablish them as Defense Logistics Agency Inventory Control Point functions; disestablish the procurement management and related support functions for depot-level repairables and designate them as Defense Supply Center Columbus, OH, Inventory Control Point functions; and relocate the oversight of Budget/Funding, Contracting, Cataloging, Requisition Processing, Customer Services, Item Management, Stock Control, Weapon System Secondary Item Support, Requirements Determination, Integrated Materiel Management Technical Support Inventory Control Point functions for Consumable Items and the oversight of procurement management and related support functions for depot-level repairables to the Defense Logistics Agency, Fort Belvoir, VA.

Realign Marine Corps Base, Albany, GA, as follows: relocate the Budget/Funding, Contracting, Cataloging, Requisition Processing, Customer Services, Item Management, Stock Control, Weapon System Secondary Item Support, Requirements Determination, and Integrated Materiel Management Technical Support Inventory Control Point functions for any residual Consumable Items to Defense Supply Center Columbus, OH, and reestablish them as Defense Logistics Agency Inventory Control Point functions; disestablish the procurement management and related support functions for depot-level repairables and designate them as Defense Supply Center Columbus, OH, Inventory Control Point functions; and relocate the oversight of Budget/Funding, Contracting, Cataloging, Requisition Processing, Customer Services, Item Management, Stock Control, Weapon System Secondary Item Support, Requirements Determination, Integrated Materiel Management Technical Support Inventory Control Point functions for any residual Consumable Items to Defense Supply Center Columbus, OH, Inventory Control Point functions.

Realign Redstone Arsenal, AL, as follows: relocate the Budget/Funding, Contracting, Cataloging, Requisition Processing, Customer Services, Item Management, Stock Control, Weapon System Secondary Item Support, Requirements Determination, and Integrated Materiel Management Technical Support Inventory Control Point functions for Aviation Consumable Items to Defense Supply Center Richmond, VA, and reestablish them as Defense Logistics Agency Aviation Inventory Control Point functions; disestablish the procurement management and related support functions for Aviation depot-level repairables and designate them as Defense Supply Center Richmond, VA, Aviation Inventory Control Point functions; relocate the Budget/Funding, Contracting, Cataloging, Requisition Processing, Customer Services, Item Management, Stock Control, Weapon System Secondary Item Support, Requirements Determination, and Integrated Materiel Management Technical Support Inventory Control Point functions for Aviation Consumable Items to Defense Supply Center Richmond, VA, and reestablish them as Defense Logistics Agency Aviation Inventory Control Point functions; disestablish the procurement management and related support functions for Aviation depot-level repairables and designate them as Defense Supply Center Richmond, VA, Aviation Inventory Control Point functions.
Materiel Management Technical Support Inventory Control Point functions for Missile Consumable Items to Defense Supply Center Columbus, OH; reestablish them as Defense Logistics Agency Missile Inventory Control Point functions; disestablish the procurement management and related support functions for missile depot-level repairables and designate them as Defense Supply Center Columbus, OH, Missile Inventory Control Point functions; and realign a portion of the remaining integrated materiel management, user, and related support functions necessary to oversee the Inventory Control Point activities at Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, Detroit Arsenal, MI, Soldier System Center, Natick, MA, and Redstone Arsenal, AL, to Headquarters Army Materiel Command (AMC).


SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

The Supply & Storage Joint Cross Service Group looked at the responsibility for consumable and depot-level repairable item management across the Department of Defense. This recommendation, together with elements of a base closure recommendation, supports the migration of the remaining Service Consumable Items to the oversight and management of a single DoD agency/activity. This proposal moves select Inventory Control Point functions (Budget/Funding, Contracting, Cataloging, Requisition Processing, Customer Services, Item Management, Stock Control, Weapon System Secondary Item Support, Requirements Determination, and Integrated Materiel Management Technical Support) to DLA. A number of Inventory Control Point functions (Allowance/Initial Supply Support List Development, Configuration Management, User Engineering Support, Provisioning, and User Technical Support) will be retained by the Services to maintain the appropriate critical mass to perform requirements and engineering. In addition, this recommendation realigns or relocates the procurement management and related support functions for the procurement of DLRs to DLA.

For both consumable items and the procurement management of DLRs, this recommendation provides the opportunity to further consolidate Service and DLA Inventory Control Points by supply chain type. Defense Supply Center Columbus, OH (DSCC), manages the Maritime and Land supply chain, the Defense Supply Center Richmond, VA (DSCR), manages the Aviation supply chain, and Defense Supply Center Philadelphia, PA (DSCP), manages the Troop Support supply chain. The realignment should provide labor savings through transfer in place (application of standard labor rates across Inventory Control Points, headquarters staff reductions, and consolidation of support functions), reduce labor and support costs (from site consolidation) and business process improvements, such as consolidation of procurement under a single inventory materiel manager, reduction of disposal costs, and improved stock positioning. Savings related to overhead/support functions, especially at those locations where physical realignments occur at a lead center, can be anticipated. Finally, this recommendation supports transformation by transferring procurement management of all Service DLRs to a single DoD agency/activity.

This recommendation also allows for the relocation of the remaining Army ICP functions at Fort Huachuca (integrated materiel management, user, and related support functions) to be collocated with its respective Life Cycle Management Command.

This recommendation relocates Air Force ICP functions from Lackland AFB to Robins AFB to provide for the continuation of secure facilities required by the Lackland ICP.

In addition, while this recommendation incorporates most of the actions required to complete the transfer of management to DLA, one element is captured in the closure recommendation associated Fort Monmouth, NJ, as noted below:

The realignment of Fort Monmouth, NJ, which relocates the Budget/Funding, Contracting, Cataloging, Requisition Processing, Customer Services, Item Management, Stock Control, Weapon System Secondary Item Support, Requirements Determination, and Integrated Materiel Management Technical Support Inventory Control Point functions for Consumable Items to Defense Supply Center Columbus, OH, and reestablishes them as Defense Logistics Agency Inventory Control Point functions; relocates the procurement management and related support functions for depot-level repairables to
Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, and designates them as Defense Supply Center, Columbus, OH, Inventory Control Point functions; and relocates the remaining integrated materiel management, user, and related support functions to Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, has been incorporated into the closure of Fort Monmouth, NJ.

**Community Concerns**

The Illinois/Rock Island Arsenal community argued DoD greatly deviated from the selection criteria by not basing its decisions regarding the Rock Island Arsenal on military value and cost savings. Rock Island Arsenal Tank Automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM) had a higher military value score than Detroit Arsenal TACOM, yet the lower-ranked facility would gain the management of the depot-level repairable mission. The community claimed facilities at Detroit Arsenal had insufficient space to accommodate Rock Island’s TACOM mission. The community expressed concerns about discrepancies in the number of positions identified (740 versus 1,129) with the moves and efficiencies at TACOM Rock Island, which in their view underestimated true costs. Similarly, they asserted military construction costs identified in the COBRA data for Detroit Arsenal were grossly understated by either $42 million or $85 million, depending on the source of data. They claimed a move to Michigan raised Anti-terrorism and Force Protection issues, since Rock Island Arsenal meets and exceeds force protection requirements, while Detroit does not. Moving Rock Island TACOM away from the Engineering support and PEO combat system could also result in the loss of synergy.

The Lackland Air Force Base community claimed the DoD recommendation to disassemble the Cryptologic Systems Group (CPaSG) could severely damage our national security, which therefore would violate several BRAC military value criteria. The community argued that the loss of intellectual capital and experienced workers in a very specialized field would be difficult to reconstitute.

**Commission Findings**

The Commission found there was a discrepancy in the number of positions identified to transfer from Rock Island Arsenal, IL. The entire TACOM-Rock Island organization with approximately 1,100 positions would be affected by this recommendation. Re-running COBRA to capture additional costs to account for DoD’s personnel discrepancy resulted in increased moving costs, and a $15 million dollar increase in military construction for gaining facility Detroit Arsenal for this recommendation. However, even accounting for this cost increase, the overall Rock Island portion of this recommendation remained sound from a military value standpoint, as well as being cost effective.

Finally, the Commission found that disestablishing and realigning the mission of the Cryptologic Systems Group at Lackland Air Force Base has a potential to damage national security, and constituted a substantial deviation. This section of the recommendation was therefore deleted by the Commission by amendment.

**Commission Recommendations**

The Commission found that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final selection criteria 1, 4 and 5, as well as from the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following:

Realignment Soldier Systems Center, Natick, MA, by relocating the Budget/Funding, Contracting, Cataloging, Requisition Processing, Customer Services, Item Management, Stock Control, Weapon System Secondary Item Support, Requirements Determination, and Integrated Materiel Management Technical Support Inventory Control Point functions for Consumable Items to Defense Supply Center Philadelphia, PA, and reestablishing them as Defense Logistics Agency Inventory Control Point functions and by disestablishing the procurement management and related support functions for depot-level repairables and designating them as Defense Supply Center Philadelphia, PA, Inventory Control Point functions.

Realignment Detroit Arsenal, MI, by relocating the Budget/Funding, Contracting, Cataloging, Requisition Processing, Customer Services, Item Management, Stock Control, Weapon System Secondary Item Support, Requirements Determination, and Integrated Materiel Management Technical Support Inventory Control Point functions for Consumable Items to Defense Supply Center Columbus, OH, and reestablishing them as Defense Logistics Agency Inventory Control Point functions, and by disestablishing the procurement management and related support functions for depot-level repairables and designating them as Defense Supply Center Columbus, OH, Inventory Control Point functions.

Realignment Rock Island Arsenal, IL, as follows: relocate the Budget/Funding, Contracting, Cataloging, Requisition Processing, Customer Services, Item Management, Stock Control, Weapon System Secondary Item Support, Requirements Determination, and Integrated Materiel Management Technical Support Inventory Control Point functions for Consumable Items to Defense Supply Center Columbus, OH, and reestablish them as Defense Logistics Agency Inventory
Realign Ft. Huachuca, AZ, as follows: relocate the Budget/Funding, Contracting, Cataloging, Requisition Processing, Customer Services, Item Management, Stock Control, Weapon System Secondary Item Support, Requirements Determination, and Integrated Materiel Management Technical Support Inventory Control Point functions for Consumable Items to Defense Supply Center Columbus, OH, and designate them as Defense Logistics Agency Inventory Control Point functions; relocate the procurement management and related support functions for depot-level repairables to Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, and designate them as Defense Supply Center Columbus, OH, Inventory Control Point functions; and relocate the remaining integrated materiel management, user, and related support functions to Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD.

Realign Naval Support Activity Mechanicsburg, PA, as follows: relocate the Budget/Funding, Contracting, Cataloging, Requisition Processing, Customer Services, Item Management, Stock Control, Weapon System Secondary Item Support, Requirements Determination, and Integrated Materiel Management Technical Support Inventory Control Point functions for Consumable Items to Defense Supply Center Columbus, OH, and designate them as Defense Logistics Agency Inventory Control Point functions; relocate the procurement management and related support functions for depot-level repairables to Defense Supply Center Columbus, OH, and reestablish them as Defense Logistics Agency Inventory Control Point functions; disestablish the procurement management and related support functions for depot-level repairables and designate them as Defense Supply Center Columbus, OH, Inventory Control Point functions; and relocate the oversight of Budget/Funding, Contracting, Cataloging, Requisition Processing, Customer Services, Item Management, Stock Control, Weapon System Secondary Item Support, Requirements Determination, Integrated Materiel Management Technical Support Inventory Control Point functions for Consumable Items and the oversight of procurement management and related support functions for depot-level repairables to the Defense Logistics Agency, Fort Belvoir, VA.

Realign Marine Corps Base, Albany, GA, as follows: relocate the Budget/Funding, Contracting, Cataloging, Requisition Processing, Customer Services, Item Management, Stock Control, Weapon System Secondary Item Support, Requirements Determination, and Integrated Materiel Management Technical Support Inventory Control Point functions for any residual Consumable Items to Defense Supply Center Columbus, OH, and reestablish them as Defense Logistics Agency Inventory Control Point functions; disestablish the procurement management and related support functions for depot-level repairables and designate them as Defense Supply Center Columbus, OH, Inventory Control Point functions; relocate the oversight of Budget/Funding, Contracting, Cataloging, Requisition Processing, Customer Services, Item Management, Stock Control, Weapon System Secondary Item Support, Requirements Determination, Integrated Materiel Management Technical Support Inventory Control Point functions for Consumable Items and the oversight of procurement management and related support functions for depot-level repairables to the Defense Logistics Agency, Fort Belvoir, VA.

Realign Naval Support Activity Philadelphia, PA, Tinker Air Force Base, OK, Hill Air Force Base, UT, and Robins Air Force Base, GA, by relocating the Budget/Funding, Contracting, Cataloging, Requisition Processing, Customer Services, Item Management, Stock Control, Weapon System Secondary Item Support, Requirements Determination, and Integrated Materiel Management Technical Support Inventory Control Point functions for Consumable Items, except those Navy items associated with Design Unstable/Preproduction Test, Special Waivers, Major End Items and Fabricated or Reclaimed items to Defense Supply Center Columbus, OH, and reestablishing them as Defense Logistics Agency Inventory Control Point functions, and by disestablishing the procurement management and related support functions for depot-level repairables and designating them as Defense Supply Center Richmond, VA, Inventory Control Point functions.

Realign Redstone Arsenal, AL, as follows: relocate the Budget/Funding, Contracting, Cataloging, Requisition Processing, Customer Services, Item Management, Stock Control, Weapon System Secondary Item Support, Requirements Determination, and Integrated Materiel Management Technical Support Inventory Control Point functions for Aviation Consumable Items to Defense Supply Center Richmond, VA, and reestablish them as Defense Logistics Agency Aviation Inventory Control Point functions; disestablish the procurement management and related support functions for Aviation depot-level repairables and designate them as Defense Supply Center Richmond, VA, Aviation Inventory Control Point functions; relocate the Budget/Funding, Contracting, Cataloging, Requisition Processing, Customer Services, Item Management, Stock Control, Weapon System Secondary Item Support, Requirements Determination, and Integrated Materiel Management Technical Support Inventory Control Point functions for Missile Consumable Items to Defense Supply Center Columbus, OH; reestablish them as Defense Logistics Agency Missile Inventory Control Point functions; disestablish the procurement management and related support functions for Missile depot-level repairables and designate them as Defense Supply Center Columbus, OH, Missile Inventory Control Point functions; and realign a portion of the
remaining integrated materiel management, user, and related support functions necessary to oversee the Inventory Control Point activities at Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, Detroit Arsenal, MI, Soldier System Center, Natick, MA, and Redstone Arsenal, AL, to Headquarters Army Materiel Command (AMC).


The Commission found that this change and the recommendation as amended are consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. The full text of this and all Commission recommendations can be found in Appendix Q.

**Supply, Storage, and Distribution Management Reconfiguration**

**Recommendation # 177 (S&S 13)**

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**Secretary of Defense Recommendation**

Realignment of Defense Supply Center Columbus, OH, by disestablishing the Defense Distribution Depot Columbus, OH. Relocate the storage and distribution functions and associated inventories to the Defense Distribution Depot Susquehanna, PA, hereby designated the Susquehanna Strategic Distribution Platform.

Realignment of Tobyhanna Army Depot, PA, by consolidating the supply, storage, and distribution functions and associated inventories of the Defense Distribution Depot Tobyhanna, PA, with all other supply, storage, and distribution functions and inventories that exist at Tobyhanna Army Depot to support depot operations, maintenance, and production. Retain the minimum necessary supply, storage, and distribution functions and inventories required to support Tobyhanna Army Depot, and to serve as a wholesale Forward Distribution Point. Relocate all other wholesale storage and distribution functions and associated inventories to the Susquehanna Strategic Distribution Platform.

Realignment of Naval Station Norfolk, VA, by consolidating the supply, storage, and distribution functions and associated inventories of the Defense Distribution Depot Norfolk, VA, with all other supply, storage, and distribution functions and inventories that exist at Norfolk Naval Base and at Norfolk Naval Shipyard to support shipyard operations, maintenance, and production. Retain the minimum necessary supply, storage, and distribution functions and inventories required to support Norfolk Naval Shipyard operations, maintenance and production, and to serve as a wholesale Forward Distribution Point. Relocate all other wholesale storage and distribution functions and associated inventories to the Susquehanna Strategic Distribution Platform.

Realignment of Defense Supply Center Richmond, VA, by relocating the storage and distribution functions and associated inventories of the Defense Distribution Depot Richmond, VA, to the Susquehanna Strategic Distribution Platform. Retain the minimum necessary storage and distribution functions and associated inventories at Defense Distribution Depot Richmond, VA, to serve as a wholesale Forward Distribution Point.

Realignment of Marine Corps Air Station, Cherry Point, NC by consolidating the supply, storage, and distribution functions and associated inventories of the Defense Distribution Depot, Cherry Point, NC, with all other supply, storage, and distribution functions and inventories that exist at Naval Aviation Depot Cherry Point, NC, to support depot operations, maintenance and production. Retain the minimum necessary supply, storage, and distribution functions and inventories required to
support Naval Air Depot Cherry Point, and to serve as a wholesale Forward Distribution Point. Relocate all other wholesale storage and distribution functions and associated inventories to the Defense Distribution Depot Warner Robins, GA, hereby designated the Warner Robins Strategic Distribution Platform.

Realign Robins Air Force Base, GA, by consolidating the supply, storage, and distribution functions and associated inventories supporting depot operations, maintenance, and production at the Warner Robins Air Logistics Center with the supply, storage, and distribution functions at the Warner Robins Strategic Distribution Platform.

Realign Marine Corps Logistics Base, Albany, GA, by consolidating the supply, storage, and distribution functions and associated inventories of the Defense Distribution Depot Albany, GA, with all other supply, storage, and distribution functions and inventories that exist at the Maintenance Center Albany, GA, to support depot operations, maintenance, and production. Retain the minimum necessary supply, storage, and distribution functions and inventories required to support the Maintenance Center Albany, GA, and to serve as a wholesale Forward Distribution Point. Relocate all other wholesale storage and distribution functions and associated inventories to the Warner Robins Strategic Distribution Platform.

Realign Naval Air Station Jacksonville, FL, by consolidating the supply, storage, and distribution functions and associated inventories of the Defense Distribution Depot, Jacksonville, FL, with all other supply, storage, and distribution functions and inventories that exist at the Naval Aviation Depot, Jacksonville, FL, to support depot operations, maintenance, and production. Retain the minimum necessary supply, storage, and distribution functions and inventories required to support the Naval Aviation Depot, Jacksonville, FL, and to serve as a wholesale Forward Distribution Point. Relocate all other wholesale storage and distribution functions and associated inventories to the Warner Robins Strategic Distribution Platform.

Realign Anniston Army Depot, AL, by consolidating the supply, storage, and distribution functions and associated inventories of the Defense Distribution Depot Anniston, AL, with all other supply, storage, and distribution functions and inventories that exist at Anniston Army Depot, AL, to support depot operations, maintenance, and production. Retain the minimum necessary supply, storage, and distribution functions and inventories required to support Anniston Army Depot, AL, and to serve as a wholesale Forward Distribution Point. Relocate all other wholesale storage and distribution functions and associated inventories to the Warner Robins Strategic Distribution Platform.

Realign Corpus Christi Army Depot, TX, by consolidating the supply, storage, and distribution functions and associated inventories of the Defense Distribution Depot, Corpus Christi, TX, with all other supply, storage, and distribution functions and inventories that exist at Corpus Christi Army Depot, TX, to support depot operations, maintenance, and production. Retain the minimum necessary supply, storage, and distribution functions and inventories required to support Corpus Christi Army Depot, TX, and to serve as a wholesale Forward Distribution Point. Relocate all other wholesale storage and distribution functions and associated inventories to the Defense Distribution Depot Oklahoma City, hereby designated the Oklahoma City Strategic Distribution Platform.

Realign Tinker AFB, OK, by consolidating the supply, storage, and distribution functions and associated inventories supporting depot operations, maintenance, and production at the Air Logistics Center, Oklahoma City, OK, with the supply, storage, and distribution functions and inventories at the Oklahoma City Strategic Distribution Platform.

Realign Hill AFB, UT, by consolidating the supply, storage, and distribution functions and associated inventories of the Defense Distribution Depot, Hill, UT, with all other supply, storage, and distribution functions and inventories that exist at the Ogden Air Logistics Center, UT, to support depot operations, maintenance, and production. Retain the necessary supply, storage, and distribution functions and inventories required to support the Ogden Air Logistics Center, UT, and to serve as a wholesale Forward Distribution Point. Relocate all other wholesale storage and distribution functions and associated inventories to the Defense Distribution Depot, San Joaquin, CA, hereby designated the San Joaquin Strategic Distribution Platform.

Realign Naval Station Bremerton, WA, by consolidating the supply, storage, and distribution functions and associated inventories of the Defense Distribution Depot, Puget Sound, WA, with all other supply, storage and distribution functions and inventories that exist at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, WA, to support shipyard operations, maintenance, and production. Retain the minimum necessary supply, storage, and distribution functions and inventories required to support Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, WA, and to serve as a wholesale Forward Distribution Point. Relocate all other wholesale storage and distribution functions and associated inventories to the San Joaquin Strategic Distribution Platform.

Realign Naval Station, San Diego, CA, by consolidating the supply, storage, and distribution functions and associated inventories of the Defense Distribution Depot, San Diego, CA, with all other supply, storage and distribution functions and inventories that exist at Naval Aviation Depot, North Island, CA, to support depot operations, maintenance, and production. Retain the minimum necessary supply, storage, and distribution functions and inventories required to support
Naval Aviation Depot, North Island, CA, and to serve as a wholesale Forward Distribution Point. Relocate all other wholesale storage and distribution functions and associated inventories to the San Joaquin Strategic Distribution Platform.

Realign Marine Corps Logistics Base, Barstow, CA, by consolidating the supply, storage, and distribution functions and associated inventories of the Defense Distribution Depot Barstow CA, with all other supply, storage, and distribution functions and inventories that exist at the Maintenance Center Barstow, CA, to support depot operations, maintenance, and production. Retain the minimum necessary supply, storage, and distribution functions and inventories at Defense Distribution Depot Barstow, CA, that are required to support the Maintenance Center Barstow, CA, and to serve as a wholesale Forward Distribution Point. Relocate all other wholesale storage and distribution functions and associated inventories to the San Joaquin Strategic Distribution Platform.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

This recommendation achieves economies and efficiencies that enhance the effectiveness of logistics support to operational joint and expeditionary forces. It reconfigures the Department’s wholesale storage and distribution infrastructure to improve support to the future force, whether home-based or deployed. It transforms existing logistics processes by creating four CONUS support regions, with each having one Strategic Distribution Platform and multiple Forward Distribution Points. Each Strategic Distribution Platform will be equipped with state-of-the-art consolidation, containerization and palletization capabilities, and the entire structure will provide for in-transit cargo visibility and real-time accountability. Distribution Depots, no longer needed for regional supply, will be realigned as Forward Distribution Points and will provide dedicated receiving, storing, and issuing functions, solely in support of on-base industrial customers such as maintenance depots, shipyards and air logistics centers. Forward Distribution Points will consolidate all supply and storage functions supporting industrial activities, to include those internal to depots and shipyards, and those at any intermediate level that may exist. This consolidation eliminates unnecessary redundancies and duplication, and streamlines supply and storage processes.

In addition to the actions in this recommendation, the Department is abolishing the Defense Distribution Depot at Red River Army Depot. This action is included as part of a recommendation to close the Red River Army Depot installation. The recommendation to fully close the installation achieves the objective of disestablishing the Defense Distribution Depot and is consistent with the intent of this recommendation.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

There were no formal expressions from the community.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission found the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission approves the recommendation of the Secretary.
JOINT CROSS-SERVICE GROUPS (JCSGs):

TECHNICAL

CO-LOCATE EXTRAMURAL RESEARCH PROGRAM MANAGERS

Recommendation # 178 (Tech 5)

One-time Cost: N/A
Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings): N/A
20-Year Net Present Value: N/A
Payback Period: N/A

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Close the Office of Naval Research facility, Arlington, VA; the Air Force Office of Scientific Research facility, Arlington, VA; the Army Research Office facilities, Durham, NC, and Arlington, VA; and the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency facility, Arlington, VA. Relocate all functions to the National Naval Medical Center, Bethesda, MD. Realign Fort Belvoir, VA, by relocating the Army Research Office to the National Naval Medical Center, Bethesda, MD. Realign the Defense Threat Reduction Agency Telegraph Road facility, Alexandria, VA, by relocating the Extramural Research Program Management function (except conventional armaments and chemical biological defense research) to the National Naval Medical Center, Bethesda, MD.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

This recommendation co-locates the managers of externally funded research in one campus. Currently, these program managers are at seven separate locations. The relocation allows technical synergy by bringing research managers from disparate locations together to one place. The end state will be co-location of the named organizations at a single location in a single facility, or a cluster of facilities. This “Co-Located Center of Excellence” will foster additional coordination among the extramural research activities of OSD and the Military Departments. Further it will enhance the Force Protection posture of the organizations by relocating them from leased space onto a traditional military installation.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The Virginia community argued a “Co-Located Center of Excellence” already exists in Northern Virginia, promoting interagency synergy and providing mission-critical access to their civilian counterparts. DoD’s proposal would isolate defense researchers and impede mission essential exchanges. They asked the Commission to preserve the flexibility to find the best environment for the “Center of Excellence.” However, the community developed alternatives for consideration, which they contended would preserve vital synergistic relationships in the research community, meet AT/FP requirements, and cost less than DoD’s proposal.

The North Carolina community argued existing coordination between Army Research Office (ARO) researchers and adjacent academic institutions and high-tech commercial entities is superior to the so-called “synergy” that might be gained through consolidation with other service research agencies. They stated relocating the facility would not be cost-effective and, existing NCR ARO liaison offices can facilitate interagency synergy requirements. They counter-proposed relocating to federally-owned land or leased space meeting AT/FP requirements available inside Research Triangle Park. They also suggested ARO liaison offices in Fort Belvoir and Arlington, VA should relocate and expand to enhance interoperability between the service organizations.
COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found DoD’s recommendation to collocate Extramural Research Program Managers at the National Naval Medical Center, Bethesda, MD would have a detrimental effect on the research managers’ ability to successfully perform their missions. Placing the organizations onto a military installation would restrict their key partners’ access to them, and the Commission found that visibility and public accessibility is mission critical in the performance of their functions. The Commission also had concerns about the availability of space at the Bethesda Campus. Additionally, the Commission found that a “Co-located Center of Excellence” currently exists in Northern Virginia, which already promotes interagency synergy.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission found that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final selection criteria 1 and 2, and the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission has rejected the recommendation of the Secretary.

CONSOLIDATE AIR AND SPACE C4ISR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT & ACQUISITION, TEST & EVALUATION

RECOMMENDATION # 179 (TECH 6)

One-time Cost: N/A
Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings): N/A
20-Year Net Present Value: N/A
Payback Period: N/A

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION


SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

This recommendation will reduce the number of technical facilities engaged in Air & Space Sensors, Electronic Warfare, and Electronics and Information Systems RDAT&E from 6 to 2. Through this consolidation, the Department will increase efficiency of RDAT&E operations resulting, in a multi-functional center of excellence in the rapidly changing technology area of C4ISR.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The Maxwell-Gunter Air Force Base community argued that the movement of the Operations and Sustainment Systems Group (OSSG) from Maxwell-Gunter to Hanscom Air Force Base as part of the research and development Center of Excellence ran counter to the basic premise of this initiative. They stated OSSG is not a research and development organization but rather an operations and sustainment organization ensuring the day-to-day running and upkeep of information technology combat support systems. The community asserted that operations and sustainment are more closely aligned to the warfighter than to research and development. Moving OSSG to Hanscom Air Force Base would atrophy invaluable synergies at Maxwell-Gunter’s on-site Defense Information Systems Agency reducing support for the warfighter. The community also believed the entire OSSG workforce was not properly captured in the DoD’s cost-analysis, which incorrectly lowered the return on investment and increased annual savings.

The community claimed the DoD recommendation did not: (1) fit the concept of establishing a “Center of Excellence,” (2) increase military value or decrease risk for the warfighter, (3) increase the ability to operate jointly, and (4) save money.

Accordingly, the Maxwell-Gunter community believes the Secretary of Defense’s recommendation should be amended to move only Research, Development, Acquisition Test & Evaluation functions and personnel to Hanscom Air Force Base and retain Operations and Sustainment activities at Maxwell-Gunter Air Force Base.
The Dayton community recommended that the Development and Fielding Systems Group (DFSG) and other OSSG elements be retained at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base. The community argued there would be a clear risk of failure in DFSG operations supporting acquisition programs, thereby jeopardizing logistics support for warfighting commanders. Specifically, they maintained that military value would be critically degraded, with a potential cost in dollars, performance and schedule delays due to the realignment of DFSG and OSSG elements to Hanscom Air Force Base. The Dayton community contended that when development contractors affected by the realignment were considered, projected savings would become a loss. The community further contended that creation of Hanscom Air Force Base as a “Center of Excellence” for potential “Joint” growth in the future is not feasible due to high costs in the Boston area and the lack of available land to expand. Further the community asserted that many civilians in DFSG are retired military, and will not move with the position.

The Dayton community observed that most of the work conducted at Hanscom Air Force Base relates to developing and acquiring C4ISR weapons systems and subsystems for rapid use by the warfighter. DFSG acquires commercial off-the-shelf software, assists customers with business process engineering, evaluates business management solutions and manages the acquisition and fielding of operational support systems for DoD.

The Eglin Air Force Base community asserted that the realignment of certain Eglin Air Force Base functions to Edwards Air Force Base is illogical. The community contended that Eglin’s military value for Information Systems test and evaluation is almost double that of Edwards Air Force Base, and DoD made a significant error in methodology by lumping military value data of dissimilar functions together (Air & Space Sensors, Electronic Warfare & Electronics; and Information Systems). The community also argued that DoD significantly understated military construction cost and manpower necessary to support test and evaluation functions. The community further contended there will be no savings if Electronic Warfare & Electronics testing is consolidated at Edwards Air Force Base. The community believes that high operations tempo, limited availability of aircraft and the distance to Edwards’ ranges would deny Special Forces located at Eglin the opportunity to train and test, significantly degrading operational readiness.

The Lackland AFB community argued realignment of the Cryptologic Systems Group to Hanscom AFB would negate the effectiveness from the consolidation and collocation of complementary intelligence functions. They claimed DoD evaluated the military value of the individual functions of the Cryptologic Systems Group rather than conducting a combined value assessment of its missions. The community also noted that splitting up the Systems Group into five separate locations is not cost effective, and identified a number of understated costs associated with the individual recommendations. Additionally, they claimed DoD’s mission analysis is flawed because it omitted significant mission requirements such as support to the National Security Agency, the Air Intelligence Agency, and the special projects and space missions performed by the Group.

**Commission Findings**

The Commission found that DoD’s recommendation to relocate activities to Hanscom Air Force Base would combine facilities with dissimilar functions and limit gains in efficiency, with the risk of reduced readiness. For example, Maxwell-Gunter Air Force Base is primarily engaged in the operation and sustainment of information technology for legacy combat support systems, not the research, development and acquisition function. Wright-Patterson Air Force Base’s Defense and Fielding Systems Group acquires commercial off-the-shelf software, assists customers with business process engineering, and evaluates business management solutions for fielded operational support systems. Last, Lackland Air Force Base’s Cryptologic Systems Group provides a “one-stop-shop” for cryptologic systems, and breaking up the capabilities within this group is likely to decrease its efficiency and adversely impact the warfighter. Overall, the Commission found these organizations do not perform the C4ISR research, development and acquisition mission that is intended to be consolidated at Hanscom Air Force Base.

The Commission also found that issues associated with the loss of intellectual capital, the higher cost of living in the New England area, and the economic impact to the Maxwell-Gunter Air Force Base area, also contributed to the need to keep the operational functions in place and not realign them to Hanscom Air Force Base.

The Commission also found that relocation of Air and Space Sensors, Electronic Warfare and Electronics and Information Systems test and evaluation personnel from Eglin to Edwards Air Force Base would reduce synergy that currently exists at Eglin Air Force Base between test organizations and users. Further, the Commission found that Eglin is ranked higher than Edwards in military value for this category. The Commission also found that a new $17 million facility was recently constructed at Eglin to support command and control, test and evaluation.
The Commission found that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final selection criteria 1 and 4, and the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission has rejected the recommendation of the Secretary.

**Consolidate Ground Vehicle Development & Acquisition in a Joint Center**

**Recommendation # 180 (Tech 7)**

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**Secretary of Defense Recommendation**

Realign Redstone Arsenal, Huntsville, AL, by relocating the joint robotics program development and acquisition activities to Detroit Arsenal, Warren, MI, and consolidating them with the Program Executive Office Ground Combat Systems, Program Executive Office Combat Support and Combat Service Support and Tank Automotive Research Development Engineering Center. Realign the USMC Direct Reporting Program Manager Advanced Amphibious Assault (DRPM AAA) facilities in Woodbridge, VA, by relocating the Ground Forces initiative D&A activities to Detroit Arsenal, Warren, MI.

**Secretary of Defense Justification**

This recommendation consolidates those USMC and Army facilities that are primarily focused on ground vehicle activities in development and acquisition (D&A) at Detroit Arsenal in Warren, MI, to increase joint activity in ground vehicle development & acquisition. The D&A being consolidated is centered on manned and unmanned ground vehicle program management. In Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), effectiveness in combat depends heavily on “jointness,” or how well the different branches of our military can communicate and coordinate their efforts on the battlefield. This collection of D&A expertise will not only foster a healthy mix of ideas, but will increase the ground vehicle community’s ability to develop the kinds of capabilities that can position us for the future as well as adapt quickly to new challenges and to unexpected circumstances. The ability to adapt is critical where surprise and uncertainty are the defining characteristics of the new threats.

The Joint Center for Ground Vehicle D&A located at Detroit Arsenal will be the Department of Defense’s premier facility for ground vehicle D&A. Detroit Arsenal is located in southeastern Michigan where the Research and Development headquarters reside for General Motors, Ford, Chrysler, General Dynamics Land Systems, Toyota-North America, Nissan-North America, Hino, Hyundai, Suzuki, Visteon, Delphi, Johnson Controls, Dana, and many others. The synergies gained from having a critical mass located in southeastern Michigan, and being able to leverage the world’s intellectual capital for automotive/ground vehicle Research and Development & Acquisition, will ensure the Department is prepared to meet the future demands.

The end state of this recommendation is to consolidate Department of Defense expertise in Ground Vehicle D&A activities at Detroit Arsenal. It promotes jointness, enables technical synergy, and positions the Department of Defense to exploit a center-of-mass of scientific, technical, and acquisition expertise with the personnel involved in ground vehicle Research, Development & Acquisition that currently resides at Detroit Arsenal.

**Community Concerns**

The Redstone Arsenal community stated that program management, development and acquisition functions for unmanned robotics systems are currently assigned to Redstone Arsenal, and assigning responsibility for unmanned components for ground combat vehicles to Detroit Arsenal would destroy existing collaborative working relationships. Robotics systems require three major components (vehicle, payload and controls) for an unmanned system to perform its mission. Ground vehicle development work should be retained because Redstone is the recognized leader in the integration of unmanned systems. They noted that several unmanned systems companies are established in the Redstone community and that moving
vehicle work to Detroit would significantly harm the synergies gained from established working relationships. The community questioned how the relocation would increase military value, and believed moving robotics-related vehicle development and acquisition work to Detroit would produce a negative return on investment.

**COMMISSION FINDINGS**

The Commission carefully examined community concerns with regard to the possible break-up of the existing center of excellence for developing and acquiring robotics components to be installed in combat vehicles. While the Commission recognizes the synergies that exist between developers of these components and private sector vendors located within the Redstone community, the Commission found merit in the underlying purpose of the recommendation, which is to consolidate programmatic decision-makers for ground combat vehicles with the Program Executive Office for Ground Combat Systems and the Tank Automotive Research and Development Center, both of which are located at Detroit Arsenal. The Commission expects that details concerning the exact number and type of personnel positions to be relocated will be determined during the post-BRAC implementation process. In making these final determinations, the Department may want to consider the overall impact the moves may have on the existing technically oriented robotics center of excellence at Redstone. Also, the Commission recognized that DoD's initial COBRA estimate improperly claimed savings for lease cost-avoidance at the Marine Corps' Woodbridge, VA facility. At the Commission's request, the Department provided a corrected cost and savings analysis which showed an 11-year return on investment, rather than the 2-year payback period originally reported. The Commission found that while adjusted savings are less than DoD's initial estimates, the recommendation provided for an overall enhancement of military value by collocating three geographically separated facilities into one location.

**COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS**

The Commission found the Secretary's recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission approves the recommendation of the Secretary.

**Consolidate Maritime C4ISR Research, Development & Acquisition, Test & Evaluation**

**Recommendation # 181 (Tech 9)**

| One-time Cost: | $86.6M |
| Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings): | ($34.8M) |
| 20-Year Net Present Value: | ($420.9M) |
| Payback Period: | 1 Year |

**Secretary of Defense Recommendation**

Realign Washington Navy Yard, DC, by disestablishing the Space Warfare Systems Center Charleston, SC, detachment Washington Navy Yard and assign functions to the new Space Warfare Systems Command Atlantic Naval Amphibious Base, Little Creek, VA.

Realign Naval Station, Norfolk, VA, by disestablishing the Space Warfare Systems Center Norfolk, VA, and the Space Warfare Systems Center Charleston, SC, detachment Norfolk, VA, and assign functions to the new Space Warfare Systems Command Atlantic Naval Amphibious Base, Little Creek, VA.

Realign Naval Weapons Station Charleston, SC, as follows: relocate Surface Maritime Sensors, Electronic Warfare, and Electronics Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation of the Space Warfare Center to Naval Surface Warfare Center Division, Dahlgren, VA; relocate Subsurfase Maritime Sensors, Electronic Warfare, and Electronics Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation of the Space Warfare Center to Naval Station Newport, RI; and relocate the Command Structure of the Space Warfare Center to Naval Amphibious Base, Little Creek, VA, and consolidate it with billets from Space Warfare Systems Command San Diego to create the Space Warfare Systems Command Atlantic, Naval Amphibious Base, Little Creek, VA. The remaining Maritime Information Systems Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation functions at Naval Weapons Station Charleston, SC, are assigned to Space Warfare Systems Command Atlantic, Naval Amphibious Base, Little Creek, VA.
Realign Naval Base Ventura County, CA, Naval Surface Warfare Center Division, Dahlgren, VA, and Naval Station Newport, RI, by relocating Maritime Information Systems Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation to Naval Submarine Base Point Loma, San Diego, CA, and consolidating with the Space Warfare Center to create the new Space Warfare Systems Command Pacific, Naval Submarine Base Point Loma, San Diego, CA.

Realign Naval Submarine Base Point Loma, San Diego, CA, as follows: relocate Surface Maritime Sensors, Electronic Warfare, and Electronics Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation of the Space Warfare Center to Naval Surface Warfare Center Division, Dahlgren, VA; relocate Subsurface Maritime Sensors, Electronic Warfare, and Electronics Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation of the Space Warfare Center to Naval Station Newport, RI; disestablish Space Warfare Systems Center Norfolk, VA, detachment San Diego, CA, and assign functions to the new Space Warfare Systems Command Pacific, Naval Submarine Base Point Loma, San Diego, CA; disestablish Naval Center for Tactical Systems Interoperability, San Diego, CA, and assign functions to the new Space Warfare Systems Command Pacific, Naval Submarine Base Point Loma, San Diego, CA; and disestablish Space Warfare Systems Command San Diego, CA, detachment Norfolk, VA, and assign functions to the new Space Warfare Systems Command Atlantic, Naval Amphibious Base, Little Creek, VA.

Realign Naval Air Station Patuxent River, MD, by relocating Subsurface Maritime Sensors, Electronic Warfare, and Electronics Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation of the Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division to Naval Station Newport, RI.

Realign Naval Air Station Jacksonville, FL, by disestablishing the Space Warfare Systems Center Charleston, SC, detachment Jacksonville, FL.

Realign Naval Air Station Pensacola, FL, by relocating the Space Warfare Systems Center Charleston, SC, detachment Pensacola, FL, to Naval Weapons Station Charleston, SC.

Realign Naval Weapons Station Yorktown, VA, by relocating the Space Warfare Systems Center Charleston, SC, detachment Yorktown, VA, to Naval Station Norfolk, VA, and consolidating it into the new Space Warfare Systems Command Atlantic detachment, Naval Station Norfolk, VA.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

These recommended realignments and consolidations provide for multifunctional and multidisciplinary Centers of Excellence in Maritime C4ISR. This recommendation will also reduce the number of technical facilities engaged in Maritime Sensors, Electronic Warfare, & Electronics and Information Systems RDAT&E from twelve to five. This, in turn, will reduce overlapping infrastructure increase the efficiency of operations and support an integrated approach to RDAT&E for maritime C4ISR. Another result would also be reduced cycle time for fielding systems to the warfighter.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

Except for the Naval Undersea Warfare Center (NUWC) Newport’s observation that they would gain more people than expected, none of the gaining communities commented on recommendations to consolidate Maritime C4ISR Research, Development, Acquisition, Test & Evaluation. However, the Commission heard numerous comments from communities that could experience job losses under DoD’s recommendation.

The Charleston, SC, community argued it should remain the East Coast center for maritime Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) research. They argued that the Space Warfare System Center has the highest military value on the East Coast of all Navy Information Systems Technology (IST) Development and Acquisition activities. It ranked higher than San Diego, CA for IST Test and Evaluation (T&E). Charleston, SC has the most efficient Navy C4ISR organization, lower labor rates, lower costs of living, and significantly fewer electronic emission issues than San Diego. They argued there are currently twice as many Space Warfare Command (SPAWAR) personnel in Charleston as Norfolk, VA and questioned the wisdom of separating Space Warfare Systems Command Atlantic headquarters from the location where most of the work is performed. SPAWAR Charleston embodies a joint command, with nearly one-half of its work being non-Navy. According to the community, this recommendation would override the decision of BRAC 1993 to make Charleston the East Coast center of C4ISR with a new world class facility, far removed from the electronic encroachment problems which have plagued Norfolk.

The Dahlgren, VA, community said the Navy would give up, under DoD’s plan, inextricably linked mission capabilities because ship-borne warfare systems are specifically designed to be fully embedded within a ship’s hull design, interoperable with the ship’s own systems, as well as those of other ships in the battle group. Systems are functionally integrated and not
separable as independent components. Furthermore, based on BRAC 1995 experiences, only 20 percent to 25 percent of Dahlgren area personnel are likely to move to high-priced San Diego, CA, creating program disruption risks.

The Naval Undersea Warfare Center, Newport, RI community believed realignment of submarine communications work from Newport, RI to San Diego, CA would generate no net savings, add significant costs, and damage existing critical Navy capability resident only in Newport. They believe a historical transfer rate of about 15 percent will result in the loss of thousands of years of unique submarine communications experience. The proposed move would severely degrade end-to-end testing of submarine combat system infrastructure. Security and data latency issues would severely degrade the capability of the “virtual submarine” located in Newport if the land-based submarine radio rooms were extracted from the remaining submarine combat subsystems.

The Naval Base Ventura County (NBVC) community claimed the realignment would result in significant losses of intellectual capital, would adversely affect war fighting capabilities, and would waste hundreds of millions of dollars of taxpayer money. Citing a preliminary survey showing that 18 percent will relocate, they estimated that only 20–25 percent of current staff will move if the C4ISR work is moved from NBVC to China Lake, CA. They also questioned the business case for the realignment asserting the TJCSG did an extremely poor job analyzing and managing data, judging military value and considering jointness.

**Commission Findings**

The Commission determined that the proposed movement of these components would seriously fracture the “system of systems work” performed at the affected installations. In particular, there was a high likelihood that the synchronization of the “virtual radio room,” which was proposed to be moved to San Diego, would not be successfully coordinated with the remainder of the “virtual submarine” that would be left in Newport. The Commission found similar concerns for the weapon systems integration work conducted at Dahlgren. In addition, but subordinate to the technological issues, were concerns about the likely loss of intellectual capital with these moves for which the COBRA data reflects a need to move all personnel associated with their projects. While the Commission notes that intellectual capital losses can and have been successfully managed in the past, the amended recommendation has a higher ratio of savings-to-investment than the original DoD recommendation, and eliminates a strong likelihood that several key projects would prove extremely expensive to replicate, if not technologically impossible to implement as originally proposed.

**Commission Recommendations**

The Commission found that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final selection criteria 1 and 4, as well as from the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following:

- Realign Washington Navy Yard, DC, by disestablishing the Space Warfare Systems Center Charleston, SC, detachment Washington Navy Yard and assign functions to the new Space Warfare Systems Command Atlantic Naval Amphibious Base, Little Creek, VA.
- Realign Naval Station, Norfolk, VA, by disestablishing the Space Warfare Systems Center Norfolk, VA, and the Space Warfare Systems Center Charleston, SC, detachment Norfolk, VA, and assign functions to the new Space Warfare Systems Command Atlantic Naval Amphibious Base, Little Creek, VA.
- Realign Naval Weapons Station Charleston, SC, as follows: relocate Surface Maritime Sensors, Electronic Warfare, and Electronics Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation of the Space Warfare Center to Naval Surface Warfare Center Division, Dahlgren, VA; relocate Subsurface Maritime Sensors, Electronic Warfare, and Electronics Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation of the Space Warfare Center to Naval Station Newport, RI; and relocate the Command Structure of the Space Warfare Center to Naval Amphibious Base, Little Creek, VA, and consolidate it with billets from Space Warfare Systems Command San Diego to create the Space Warfare Systems Command Atlantic, Naval Amphibious Base, Little Creek, VA. The remaining Maritime Information Systems Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation functions at Naval Weapons Station Charleston, SC, are assigned to Space Warfare Systems Command Atlantic, Naval Amphibious Base, Little Creek, VA.
- Realign Naval Submarine Base Point Loma, San Diego, CA, as follows: relocate Surface Maritime Sensors, Electronic Warfare, and Electronics Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation of the Space Warfare Center to Naval Surface Warfare Center Division, Dahlgren, VA; relocate Subsurface Maritime Sensors, Electronic Warfare, and Electronics Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation of the Space Warfare Center to Naval Station Newport, RI; disestablish Space Warfare Systems Center Norfolk, VA, detachment San Diego, CA, and assign functions to

287
the new Space Warfare Systems Command Pacific, Naval Submarine Base Point Loma, San Diego, CA; disestablish Naval Center for Tactical Systems Interoperability, San Diego, CA, and assign functions to the new Space Warfare Systems Command Pacific, Naval Submarine Base Point Loma, San Diego, CA; and disestablish Space Warfare Systems Command San Diego, CA, detachment Norfolk, VA, and assign functions to the new Space Warfare Systems Command Atlantic, Naval Amphibious Base, Little Creek, VA.

Realign Naval Air Station Patuxent River, MD, by relocating Subsurface Maritime Sensors, Electronic Warfare, and Electronics Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation of the Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division to Naval Station Newport, RI.

Realign Naval Air Station Jacksonville, FL, by disestablishing the Space Warfare Systems Center Charleston, SC, detachment Jacksonville, FL.

Realign Naval Air Station Pensacola, FL, by relocating the Space Warfare Systems Center Charleston, SC, detachment Pensacola, FL, to Naval Weapons Station Charleston, SC.

Realign Naval Weapons Station Yorktown, VA, by relocating the Space Warfare Systems Center Charleston, SC, detachment Yorktown, VA, to Naval Station Norfolk, VA, and consolidating it into the new Space Warfare Systems Command Atlantic detachment, Naval Station Norfolk, VA.

The Commission found that this change and the recommendation as amended are consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. The full text of this and all Commission recommendations can be found in Appendix Q.

**CONSOLIDATE NAVY STRATEGIC TEST & EVALUATION**

**RECOMMENDATION # 182 (TECH 12)**

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<tr>
<td>Payback Period</td>
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**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION**

Realign Patrick Air Force Base, Cape Canaveral, FL, by relocating Nuclear Test and Evaluation at the Naval Ordnance Test Unit to Strategic Weapons Facility Atlantic, Kings Bay, GA.

**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION**

This recommendation realigns the standalone East Coast facility working in full-scale Nuclear Test & Evaluation at Cape Canaveral into a fully supported Navy nuclear operational site at Kings Bay to gain synergy in security Anti-terrorism Force Protection (AT/FP), Fleet operational support and mission support infrastructure. Since 1956, the Fleet Ballistic Missile (FBM) Program, in support of the TRIDENT (D-Series) Missile, has executed land-based (pad) as well as sea-based (SSBN) test launches supported by the Naval Ordnance Test Unit (NOTU) at Cape Canaveral, FL. This facility provided both the launch support infrastructure as well as docking for sea-based pre- and post-launch events. Recent changes in ATFP requirements, the recent establishment of the Western Test Range in the Pacific, and the programmatic decision to no longer require land based (pad) launches at Cape Canaveral all lead to the realignment/relocation of this function to Kings Bay. This action aligns nicely with the overall Weapons and Armaments strategy to move smaller activities at remote sites into larger facilities to realize a significant synergy in support functions and costs while maintaining mission capability.

**COMMUNITY CONCERNS**

The community contended that the proposed realignment of Naval Ordnance Test Unit (NOTU), Cape Canaveral, FL to Kings Bay, GA would reduce military value, degrade Anti-terrorism Force Protection (AT/FP), and eliminate jointness. The community stated that NOTU provides a full spectrum of submarine launched ballistic missile test and evaluation capabilities and that uprooting this operation at extensive cost in infrastructure, personnel relocations, contractor changes, and mission disruption, would reduce military value and degrade the mission. The community also contended that of equal
importance, test missions will experience greater exposure to the potential of terrorist attack. Further, the current joint cooperation and cost sharing arrangement in place to support NOTU operations at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station would be lost along with the synergistic benefits of NOTU personnel working on a day-to-day basis with the Air Force’s 45th Space Wing and personnel on the Eastern Test Range. The community believed the realignment undermines an active, essential Joint Service interaction that is necessary to accomplish the test mission, thus violating DoD’s basic premise of promoting transformation through close Joint Service interaction.

The community further contended that the port facility on Cape Canaveral enjoys immediate access to open water whereas Kings Bay is located on an inland waterway requiring lengthy surface transit to open water and the test launch point. The community believed this to be a disadvantage and clearly reduces military value. Lengthy and restricted transits render submarines vulnerable to terrorist operations.

According to the community, the NOTU labor force consists of missile flight test engineers, found at Cape Canaveral but not Kings Bay. The community stated that its statewide analysis shows that fewer than 30 percent of personnel are expected to relocate from Florida to Kings Bay.

The community stated their analysis showed that DoD failed to account for the cost and availability of mission essential contractor personnel at the receiving site who are critical to day-to-day operations, training and preparation for submarine systems checks and test firings.

**Commission Findings**

The Commission found that Kings Bay Submarine Base, GA, does not perform the test and evaluation mission that is performed by the Naval Ordnance Test Unit, Patrick Air Force Base, Cape Canaveral, FL. The Commission determined that Kings Bay performs a strategic operational mission, and the addition of the test and evaluation mission would represent a significant added responsibility.

The Commission found that implementation of DoD’s recommendation would impair (1) existing day-to-day working relationships and synergy between Naval Ordnance Test Unit testing personnel and several organizations on Cape Canaveral, FL such as the Air Force’s 45th Space Wing, and (2) the test and evaluation mission and testing schedule, due to the loss of intellectual capital, especially flight test engineers, increasing missile test workload, and the need for training at Kings Bay, GA; and that adjusted savings and cost estimates would increase the payback period from 7 to 10 years.

**Commission Recommendations**

The Commission found that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final selection criteria 1, 4 and 5, and the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission has rejected the recommendation of the Secretary.

**Consolidate Sea Vehicle Development & Acquisition**

**Recommendation # 183 (Tech 13)**

**One-time Cost:** $1.5M  
**Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings):** $(0.22M)  
**20-Year Net Present Value:** $(2.0M)  
**Payback Period:** 7 Years

**Secretary of Defense Recommendation**

Realign Detroit Arsenal, MI, by relocating Sea Vehicle Development and Acquisition to Naval Surface Warfare Center Carderock Division, Bethesda, MD, and Program Management and Direction of Sea Vehicle Development and Acquisition to Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington Navy Yard, DC.
This recommendation positions technical sites for jointness through co-location with functions at the receiving locations. It also increases efficiency by consolidating program management of Sea Vehicle Development and Acquisition (D&A) from three sites to two principal sites; the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEASYSCOM) at the Washington Navy Yard (WNY), DC, and the Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC) Carderock Division, Bethesda, MD.

The consolidation and co-location leverages existing concentration of research, design and development, and acquisition support capabilities residing within the US Navy Headquarters and Warfare Center RD&A infrastructure. Program management for D&A will be at the Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington Navy Yard. In support of joint and transformational initiatives, this recommendation relocates management and direction of Theater Support Vessels (TSV) and other Sea Vehicle/Watercraft programs for US Army to the Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington Navy Yard. Consolidation of all program management of Sea Vehicle Programs at the Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington Navy Yard co-locates these functions and aligns with related program offices supporting Sea Vehicle Weapons and Combat systems, Hull Mechanical and Electrical, C4I integration and related sea vehicle equipment and support functions. This also places it near the principal technical direction and development agent for sea vehicles located at Naval Surface Warfare Center Carderock Division in Bethesda, MD. This recommendation is consistent with the existing partnership collaboration between the USA and the USN on Theater Support Vessels as reflected in a Memorandum of Understanding between the US Army Program Executive Office (PEO) for Combat Support and Combat Service Support (PEO CS & CSS) and the US Navy PEO for Ships Systems.

The recommendation will enhance synergy by consolidating Sea Vehicle functions to major sites, preserve healthy competition, leverage existing infrastructure, minimize environmental impact, and effect reasonable homeland security risk dispersal. The recommendation will increase efficiency by making a robust acquisition organization available to all DoD Sea Vehicle and watercraft program requirements and will increase efficiency by reducing overall manpower requirements.

**Community Concerns**

There were no formal expressions from the community.

**Commission Findings**

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense.

**Commission Recommendations**

The Commission found the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission approves the recommendation of the Secretary.

**Create a Naval Integrated Weapons & Armaments Research, Development & Acquisition, Test & Evaluation Center**

**Recommendation # 184 (Tech 15)**

- **One-time Cost:** $343.3M
- **Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings):** ($52.1M)
- **20-Year Net Present Value:** ($349.5M)
- **Payback Period:** 7 Years

**Secretary of Defense Recommendation**

Realign Naval Surface Warfare Center Crane, IN, by relocating all Weapons and Armaments Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation, except gun/ammo, combat system security, and energetic materials to Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake, CA.
Realign Naval Surface Warfare Center Indian Head, MD, by relocating all Weapons and Armaments Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation, except gun/ammo, underwater weapons, and energetic materials, to Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake, CA.

Realign Naval Air Station Patuxent River, MD, by relocating all Weapons and Armaments Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation, except the Program Executive Office and Program Management Offices in Naval Air Systems Command, to Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake, CA.

Realign Naval Base Ventura County, Point Mugu, CA, by relocating all Weapons and Armaments Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation, except underwater weapons and energetic materials, to Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake, CA.

Realign Naval Weapons Station Seal Beach, CA, by relocating all Weapons and Armaments Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation, except underwater weapons and energetic materials, to Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake, CA.

Realign Naval Surface Warfare Center, Yorktown, VA, by relocating all Weapons and Armaments Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation to Naval Surface Warfare Center Indian Head, MD.

Realign Naval Base Ventura County, Port Hueneme, CA, by relocating all Weapons and Armaments Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation, except weapon system integration, to Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake, CA.

Realign Fleet Combat Training Center, CA (Port Hueneme Detachment, San Diego, CA), by relocating all Weapons and Armaments weapon system integration Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation to Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren, VA.

Realign Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren, VA, by relocating all Weapons & Armaments Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation, except guns/ammo and weapon systems integration to Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake, CA.

**Secretary of Defense Justification**

This recommendation realigns and consolidates those facilities working in Weapons & Armaments (W&A) Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test and Evaluation (RDAT&E) into a Naval Integrated RDAT&E center at the Naval Air Warfare Center, China Lake, CA. Additional synergistic realignments for W&A was achieved at two receiver sites for specific focus. The Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren, VA, is a receiver specialty site for Naval surface weapons systems integration and receives a west coast site for consolidation. This construct creates an integrated W&A RDAT&E center in China Lake, CA, energetics center at Indian Head, MD, and consolidates Navy surface weapons system integration at Dahlgren, VA.

All actions relocate technical facilities with lower overall quantitative Military Value (across Research, Development & Acquisition and Test & Evaluation) into the Integrated RDAT&E center and other receiver sites with greater quantitative Military Value.

Consolidating the Navy’s air-to-air, air-to-ground, and surface launched missile RD&A, and T&E activities at China Lake, CA, would create an efficient integrated RDAT&E center. China Lake is able to accommodate with minor modification/addition both mission and lifecycle/sustainment functions to create synergies between these traditionally independent communities.

During the other large scale movements of W&A capabilities noted above, Weapon System Integration was specifically addressed to preserve the synergies between large highly integrated control system developments (Weapon Systems Integration) and the weapon system developments themselves. A specialty site for Naval Surface Warfare was identified at Dahlgren, VA, that was unique to the services and a centroid for Navy surface ship developments. A satellite unit from the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Port Hueneme, San Diego Detachment will be relocated to Dahlgren.

The Integrated RDAT&E Center at China Lake provides a diverse set of open-air range and test environments (desert, mountain, forest) for W&A RDAT&E functions. Synergy will be realized in air-to-air, air-to-ground, and surface launched mission areas.

This recommendation enables technical synergy, and positions the Department of Defense to exploit center-of-mass scientific, technical and acquisition expertise with weapons and armament Research, Development & Acquisition that currently resides at 10 locations into the one Integrated RDAT&E site, one specialty site, and an energetics site.
COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The Naval Surface Warfare Center Crane, IN, community believed initial placement on DoD’s closure list precluded its consideration as a gainer. Their joint customer base and Army Ammunition plant tenant were not recognized as a joint transformation asset, and that separate evaluation as a technical and industrial facility unfairly disadvantaged them in comparison to large Research Development & Acquisition (RD&A) facilities. They argued their highly experienced workforce helped them grow 20 percent per year since 2001, on one of the largest bases in the US with no encroachment problems. The combined recommendations for NSWC Crane would cost Martin County more than one-ninth of its jobs.

The Indian Head, MD community claimed initial placement on DoD’s closure list precluded consideration as a “gainer,” and that the recommendation would be reasonable if energetics work from other commands, including China Lake and Picatinny, were brought to Indian Head. The Indian Head community concurred with DoD’s recommendations sending work to them, and strongly opposed proposed losses of workload.

The Naval Weapons Station Seal Beach, CA, community noted that test and calibration equipment need not be purchased for China Lake if Seal Beach employees assist NSA Corona with calibration and other related work using Corona-based equipment.

Some members of the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Yorktown, VA, community said energetics work should be sent to Indian Head, and that a large percentage of Virginia employees would likely make this move. They noted that Indian Head, MD, would have been among the top three in most military value categories if the number of military personnel had been included in the evaluation.

However, others in the Yorktown, VA, community said DoD’s recommendation is seriously flawed and should be rejected. They claimed locally generated cost, savings, and other data were changed or distorted at DoD to achieve the results needed to support DoD recommendations. Reported savings depended on staffing reductions unlikely to materialize as well as omitted or reduced implementation costs in COBRA. Correction of obvious errors would result in a net cost of over a million dollars, rather than a savings; and payback would stretch to over 20 years. They also argued DoD’s recommendation would cause the Navy to lose capabilities and crucial magazine space, therefore hindering future operations.

The Port Hueneme, CA, community contended DoD overstated savings, and understated costs and the repayment period, including the additional costs incurred from training replacement staff and moving the aviation support unit. They said that savings are exaggerated by assuming 15 percent rather than GAO-recommended 5.7 percent for personnel savings. Most of the recommendations are Service-centric, contrary to DoD requirements for jointness and transformation, and would compromise existing synergies of the base, laboratories, and proximity to the Sea Range. They insisted operation of the Sea Range from China Lake would be less safe and more expensive. The realignment would result in significant losses of intellectual capital, adversely affect war fighting capabilities, and waste hundreds of millions of dollars of taxpayer money. They stated the Navy ignored requests for clarification of issues involving personnel relocations and COBRA computed savings.

The Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren, VA, community said this particular recommendation conflicts with DoD’s other recommendation to establish Dahlgren as a specialty site for Naval Surface Warfare, and would reduce military value and impair Navy warfighting capability. Consolidation of “big gun” RD&A and T&E at Picatinny Arsenal, NJ, would reduce the ability to engineer and integrate shipboard combat systems. Single siting violates a TJCSG guiding principal and, since Picatinny has neither big guns nor a test range, its transplanted employees would have to make frequent trips back to
Less than 20 percent of the educated, trained, and experienced engineering and technical workforce can be expected to move from the region, resulting in a brain drain.

According to the China Lake, CA, community, it was ranked highest in military value for research, acquisition, and T&E and was ranked first in two of three categories for Sensors/EW and Electronics. They argued that China Lake is the best site for synergism and efficiency and it has a record of identifying key problems and creating effective, affordable solutions. Relocation of Point Mugu’s electronic warfare capability to China Lake would improve integration of the next generation combat aircraft. They fully support DoD’s recommendation to establish a full-spectrum, integrated RDAT&E center at China Lake. The community can and would provide needed utilities, good schools and affordable housing, and they stated the proposal would generate a relatively small increase from Ridgecrest’s 1990s-level population. China Lake has a high retention rate and over 80 percent of the NAWC China Lake retirees stay in the community. They agreed that the Sea Range is a critical joint service asset, with the only question being the number of Point Mugu staff needed to efficiently and effectively operate the sea range.

**COMMISSION FINDINGS**

The Commission found that the issues and concerns raised about the recommendation did not rise to the level of a substantial deviation from the Selection Criteria or Force Structure Plan. For instance, the Commission determined that the potential loss of intellectual capital was not likely to be as serious as feared by the affected communities. Moreover, Commissioners found unconvincing the arguments by the Point Mugu community that after 13 years under the same Commanding Officer as China Lake, all possible duplication had been wrung out, therefore rendering a significant percentage of the anticipated savings unachievable. The Commission found instead that military value would be enhanced over the long run by bringing the teams working on these major armament projects into a single “center of excellence.”

However, the Commission was not able to reconcile the large differences between the number of affected personnel as proposed by DoD with the number of personnel identified by the community, primarily the number of people needed to support the Sea Range. The Commission urges the Secretary of the Navy, during the implementation process, to realign the Naval Integrated Weapons and Armaments RDAT&E functions for optimum effectiveness, rather than for narrow compliance with COBRA personnel numbers.

**COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS**

The Commission found the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission approves the recommendation of the Secretary.

**CREATE AN AIR INTEGRATED WEAPONS & ARMAMENTS RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT & ACQUISITION, TEST & EVALUATION CENTER**

**RECOMMENDATION # 185 (TECH 18)**

- **One-time Cost:** $2.7M
- **Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings):** ($1.4M)
- **20-Year Net Present Value:** ($17.9M)
- **Payback Period:** 2 Years

**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION**


**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION**

Eglin is one of three core integrated weapons and armaments RDAT&E centers (with China Lake, CA, and Redstone Arsenal, AL) with high MV and the largest concentration of integrated technical facilities across all three functional areas. Eglin AFB has a full spectrum array of Weapons & Armaments (W&A) Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test &
Evaluation (RDAT&E) capabilities. Accordingly, relocation of Hill AFB and DTRA NCR W&A capabilities will further complement and strengthen Eglin as a full spectrum W&A RDAT&E Center.

The overall impact of this recommendation will be to: increase W&A life cycle and mission related synergies/integration; increase efficiency; reduce operational costs; retain the required diversity of test environments; and facilitate multiple uses of equipment, facilities, ranges, and people. Hill AFB and DTRA NCR technical facilities recommended for relocation have lower quantitative MV than Eglin AFB in all functional areas.

This recommendation includes Research, D&A, and T&E conventional armament capabilities in the Air Force and DTRA NCR. It consolidates armament activities within the Air Force and promotes jointness with DTRA NCR. It also enables technical synergy, and positions the DoD to exploit center-of-mass scientific, technical, and acquisition expertise within the RDAT&E community that currently resides as DoD specialty locations. This recommendation directly supports the Department’s strategy for transformation by moving and consolidating smaller W&A efforts into high military value integrated centers, and by leveraging synergy among RD&A, and T&E activities. Capacity and military value data established that Eglin AFB is already a full-service, integrated W&A RDAT&E center. Relocation of W&A D&A In-Service Engineering (ISE) from Hill AFB to Eglin AFB will increase life cycle synergy and integration. ISE encompasses those engineering activities that provide for an “increase in capability” of a system/sub-system/component after Full Operational Capability has been declared. ISE activities mesh directly with on-going RDAT&E at Eglin AFB.

Relocation of DTRA NCR W&A technical capabilities will increase life cycle synergy and integration at Eglin AFB. Conventional armament capabilities possessed by DTRA NCR directly complement on-going RDAT&E at Eglin AFB. Cost savings from the relocation of DTRA NCR to Eglin AFB will accrue largely through the elimination of the need for leased space, and by virtue of the fact that Eglin AFB can absorb the DTRA NCR (and Hill AFB) functions without the need for MILCON.

**Community Concerns**

There were no formal expressions from the community.

**Commission Findings**

The Commission found merit in DoD’s proposal to create a full-spectrum capability at Eglin for Weapons and Armaments, and found no reason to disagree with the Secretary’s recommendation. The Commission carefully examined the justification for the Secretary’s recommendation to transfer in-service engineering responsibilities for research, development and acquisition, test and evaluation from Hill Air Force Base to Eglin Air Force Base, and found it would enhance long-term military value.

**Commission Recommendations**

The Commission found the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission approves the recommendation of the Secretary.

**Create an Integrated Weapons & Armaments Specialty Site for Guns and Ammunition**

**Recommendation # 186 (Tech 19)**

- **One-Time Cost:** $66.8M
- **Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings):** ($9.1M)
- **20-Year Net Present Value:** ($51.8M)
- **Payback Period:** 9 years

**Secretary of Defense Recommendation**

Realign the Adelphi Laboratory Center, MD, by relocating gun and ammunition Research and Development & Acquisition to Picatinny Arsenal, NJ.
Realignment of Naval Surface Warfare Center Division Crane, IN, by relocating gun and ammunition Research and Development & Acquisition to Picatinny Arsenal, NJ.

Realignment of the Fallbrook, CA, detachment of Naval Surface Warfare Center Division Crane, IN, by relocating gun and ammunition Research and Development & Acquisition to Picatinny Arsenal, NJ.

Realignment of Naval Surface Warfare Center Division Dahlgren, VA, by relocating gun and ammunition Research and Development & Acquisition to Picatinny Arsenal, NJ.

Realignment of the Louisville, KY, detachment of Naval Surface Warfare Center Division Port Hueneme, CA, by relocating gun and ammunition Research and Development & Acquisition to Picatinny Arsenal, NJ.

Realignment of Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division China Lake, CA, by relocating gun and ammunition Research and Development & Acquisition to Picatinny Arsenal, NJ.

Realignment of Naval Surface Warfare Center Division Indian Head, MD, by relocating gun and ammunition Research and Development & Acquisition to Picatinny Arsenal, NJ.

Realignment of Naval Surface Warfare Center Division Earle, NJ, by relocating weapon and armament packaging Research and Development & Acquisition to Picatinny Arsenal, NJ.

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SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

This recommendation realigns and consolidates those gun and ammunition facilities working in Weapons and Armaments (W&A) Research, Development & Acquisition (RD&A). This realignment would result in a more robust joint center for gun and ammunition Research, Development & Acquisition at Picatinny Arsenal, NJ. This location is already the greatest concentration of military value in gun and ammunition W&A RD&A.

Picatinny Arsenal is the center of mass for DoD’s Research, Development & Acquisition of guns and ammunition, with a workload more than an order of magnitude greater than any other DoD facility in this area. It also is home to the DoD’s Single Manager for Conventional Ammunition. Movement of all the Services’ guns and ammunition work to Picatinny Arsenal will create a joint center of excellence and provide synergy in armament development for the near future and beyond, featuring a Joint Packaging, Handling, Shipping and Transportation (PHS&T) Center, particularly important in this current time of high demand for guns and ammunition by all the services. Technical facilities with lower quantitative military value are relocated to Picatinny Arsenal.

This recommendation includes Research, Development & Acquisition activities in the Army and Navy. It promotes jointness, enables technical synergy, and positions the Department of Defense to exploit center-of-mass scientific, technical, and acquisition expertise within the weapons and armament Research, Development & Acquisition community that currently resides at this DoD specialty location.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The Naval Surface Warfare Center Crane, IN, community believes their initial consideration for closure unfairly precluded consideration as a gaining facility. They should not have been compared to large Research Development & Acquisition (RD&A) facilities since their business is mostly advanced research, in-service engineering, testing and evaluation. Their joint customer base was not recognized in evaluating “jointness.” Crane is a very large base with no encroachment problems, has a firing range over three times longer than Picatinny Arsenal, NJ and is backed by 3.5 miles of uninhabited space. DoD’s proposal would cost Martin County over 11 percent of its jobs.

They believe their fast, responsive performance on special mission projects was not properly recognized. Crane offers a secure isolated location with integrated specialized capabilities such as ordnance, power sources, pyrotechnics, explosives, demolition, night vision devices, small arms, and targeting devices. Crane’s co-location with an Army Ammunition Activity provides valuable limited manufacturing and prototyping capability, extensive testing and evaluation resources, and storage capacity for a wide variety of ordnance and related devices.

The Fallbrook, CA, community believes the organization was inappropriately and negatively evaluated in comparison to RD&A activities, rather than on the test and evaluation (T&E) functions they actually perform. Fallbrook is contiguous to Camp Pendleton, CA with ready access to USMC personnel, equipment, and ammunition as well as facilities at Camp Pendleton and Hawthorne, NV. They questioned the Army’s ability and willingness to address Marine Corps interests. Picatinny does not have significant T&E capabilities and must send testing and/or personnel to other facilities.
The Dahlgren, VA, community stated DoD's proposal ignored the goals of operational efficiency, enhanced synergy, and reduced excess capacity through consolidation of technical facilities while retaining at least two geographically separated sites. They said that if the work is transferred to Picatinny, personnel will have to return twice a week to conduct testing. They also observed that Navy guns are integrated parts of a ship and differ from relatively standalone Army guns. They warned of an employee brain drain, expecting no more than 20 percent to 25 percent of employees to relocate.

The Louisville, KY, community explained that prior BRAC rounds converted their facility to a public-private partnership in a highly synergistic relationship with three original equipment manufacturers. They stressed the difference between Navy and Army gun systems. Most importantly, they assert they should not have been even considered for realignment because they perform a key in-service engineering role, and only about one percent of their work is RD&A or T&E. They believe DoD's projected savings, attributable to the elimination of Civil Service jobs, is not realistic, citing GAO's previous analyses. The community projects a 17-year breakeven period rather than DoD's 13 years; with 20 year savings of only $42.4 million.

The Indian Head, MD community noted they were at a tremendous disadvantage because they were considered as a closing base until late in the process and thus were never considered as a potential receiver. In general they conceded that it made some sense to move their guns and ammunition work to Picatinny, but stressed that Indian Head is the DoD-designated Center of Excellence for Energetics, and thus the Energetics work and capability currently at China Lake and Picatinny (in particular) should be moved to Indian Head.

The NSWC Earle, NJ community noted that Earle is the Navy’s designated expert in Packaging, Handling, Storage and Transportation (PHS&T), and DoD’s only organization fully responsible for all four functions; explaining that integration of these functions is critical for handling ammunition in the confined spaces of Navy ships and aircraft. They believe the Navy should retain responsibility for all aspects of Navy ammunition handling. DoD’s analysis was flawed because DoD misidentified the “S” in PHS&T to mean “shipping” rather than “storage.” Picatinny does not have a packaging design department and only a limited testing capability. The Army’s testing and transportation offices are not at Picatinny and neither was mentioned in DoD’s proposal. Thus, the Army would still not have a unified PHS&T Center even if the recommendation is approved. They also noted that Air Force PHS&T is not included in DoD’s recommendation.

The community criticized DoD’s use of a 15 percent elimination of civilian job factor, rather than GAO’s suggested 5.5 percent benchmark. They argue projected savings are overstated because Earle’s ratio of working-level to high grade employees is 12:1 compared to Picatinny’s 5:1.

**Commission Findings**

The Commission found that the recommendation would enhance long-term military value after several individual components of the proposal were rejected or modified.

Specifically, the Commission found that Special Operations organizations were particularly pleased with the rapid and responsive support they receive from NSWC Crane. In the past, they had less satisfactory experiences with other organizations with similar capability, and they expressed a strong desire to continue the relationship with Crane; an installation with an Army tenant on-base that stores and manufactures limited amounts of ammunition, has special capabilities to design and test solutions to unique problems, and has been successful in turning around these quick-response projects in a matter of days, allowing for real-time adjustments that can be immediately put to use by the warfighter.

The Commission also found that NSWC Dahlgren has a unique capability to test large over-water guns, and that it possesses most of the expertise in Research, Development, and Acquisition and Testing and Evaluation of these large guns and of the weapons systems integration. The Commission determined that it made more sense to retain the life-cycle management of these guns at a single location, NSWC Dahlgren. However, the Commission found that minor caliber gun RD&A should be performed at Picatinny Arsenal.

**Commission Recommendations**

The Commission found that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final selection criteria 1 and 4, and the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following:

Realign the Adelphi Laboratory Center, MD, by relocating gun and ammunition Research and Development & Acquisition to Picatinny Arsenal, NJ.

Realign Naval Surface Warfare Center Division Crane, IN, by relocating gun and ammunition Research and Development & Acquisition to Picatinny Arsenal, NJ, except energetics and RD&A and T&E in support of Special Operations.
Realignment of Fallbrook, CA, detachment of Naval Surface Warfare Center Division Crane, IN, by relocating gun and ammunition Research and Development & Acquisition to Picatinny Arsenal, NJ.

Realignment of Louisville, KY, detachment of Naval Surface Warfare Center Division Port Hueneme, CA, by relocating gun and ammunition Research and Development & Acquisition to Picatinny Arsenal, NJ.

Realignment of Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division China Lake, CA, by relocating gun and ammunition Research and Development & Acquisition except energetics to Picatinny Arsenal, NJ.

Realignment of Naval Surface Warfare Center Division Indian Head, MD, by relocating gun and ammunition Research and Development & Acquisition except energetics to Picatinny Arsenal, NJ. Consolidate energetics RD&A and T&E at Indian Head, MD except the RD&A and T&E performed at China Lake, CA and Picatinny Arsenal, NJ.

Realignment of Naval Surface Warfare Center Division Earle, NJ, by relocating weapon and armament packaging Research and Development & Acquisition to Picatinny Arsenal, NJ.

The Commission found that these changes and the recommendation as amended are consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. The full text of this and all Commission recommendations can be found in Appendix Q.

**DEFENSE RESEARCH SERVICE LED LABORATORIES**

**Recommendation # 187 (Tech 22)**

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**Secretary of Defense Recommendation**

Close the Air Force Research Laboratory, Mesa City, AZ. Relocate all functions to Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH.

Realignment of Air Force Research Laboratory, Hanscom, MA, by relocating the Sensors Directorate to Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH, and the Space Vehicles Directorate to Kirtland Air Force Base, NM.

Realignment of Rome Laboratory, NY, by relocating the Sensor Directorate to Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH, and consolidating it with the Air Force Research Laboratory, Sensor Directorate at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH.

Realignment of Air Force Research Laboratory, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH, by relocating the Information Systems Directorate to Hanscom Air Force Base, MA.

Realignment of Army Research Laboratory Langley, VA, and Army Research Laboratory Glenn, OH, by relocating the Vehicle Technology Directorates to Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD.

Realignment of the Army Research Laboratory White Sands Missile Range, NM, by relocating all Army Research Laboratory activities except the minimum detachment required to maintain the Test and Evaluation functions at White Sands Missile Range, NM, to Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD.

**Secretary of Defense Justification**

This recommendation realigns and consolidates portions of the Air Force and Army Research Laboratories to provide greater synergy across technical disciplines and functions. It does this by consolidating geographically separate units of the Air Force and Army Research Laboratories.

A realignment of Air Force Research Laboratory Human Factors Division from Brooks City Base, TX, research to Wright-Patterson AFB was initially part of this recommendation, and still exists, but is presented in the recommendation to close Brooks City Base, TX.
This recommendation enables technical synergy, and positions the Department of the Defense to exploit a center of mass of scientific, technical, and acquisition expertise.

**Community Concerns**

The Arizona AFRL Mesa City community argued there is a greater potential for synergistic activities by linking the Warfighting Training Laboratory with other Arizona activities, than from relocating to Wright-Patterson Air Force Base. The community felt the spirit of the DoD recommendation could be better met by re-establishing the Laboratory through a contractual privatization-in-place arrangement. This alternative would enhance future collaboration, improve training research, and reduce the Air Force's infrastructure footprint. The community estimates 20 year cost savings for the privatization-in-place option as $76 million compared to $66M estimated by DoD for its relocation recommendation. Community officials claimed Arizona State University would invest $2M per year to enhance the potential of the Warfighting Laboratory under the community's alternative.

The Kirtland Air Force Base community believed that moving the Mesa Laboratory to Kirtland Air Force Base would better align the mission with two operational units. According to the community, the Warfighting training laboratory needs to be in the field and on an installation with warfighters. The community argued that moving the laboratory to Wright-Patterson (with no warfighting flying missions) will make it less effective.

The Rome Research Site community argued that DoD's assertion that unifying separate laboratory functions will result in superior research and reduced costs is a dubious justification for relocating Rome's sensors mission to Wright-Patterson Air Force Base. The Rome community contends that the recommendation would cause a loss of existing high value synergy for meeting the nation's homeland security and warfighting needs. The community further stated that a field survey at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, shows contractor savings assumptions are grossly overstated. In addition advocates claimed that net costs would exceed projected savings. The community further contended that unique sensor siting costs and frequency allocation issues were not properly considered. They also believed that when accurate and full information is considered, the payback period grows, savings decrease, and one-time costs increase.

The Rome Research Site community also believed that its high military value and cost-effectiveness were the defining reasons why DoD recommended that Rome remain as the headquarters for Information Technology. According to its advocates, relocation and splitting Information Technology functions from Wright-Patterson AFB and Rome to Hanscom AFB does not make sense and should be centralized at Rome Research Site.

The White Sands Missile Range community said DoD's BRAC criteria was supposed to primarily look at military value, with potential cost savings being just one part of the total criteria. They stated that the criteria used by DoD to develop its recommendations were based on the false and preconceived idea that combining all "like disciplines" would automatically create synergy and savings. The community also contends that DoD is under the illusion that moving individuals to a central location would create new "Centers of Excellence"; disregarding the existing Centers of Excellence developed by current test and evaluation directorates. The community believed that proper implementation of the BRAC criteria should have resulted in an expansion of Army Research Laboratory's role at White Sands Missile Range to take advantage of the of the excellent range capabilities, top-flight facilities and future joint operations expansion. The community also expressed concern over increased costs of transitioning back and forth from Maryland to New Mexico to accomplish important testing activities that cannot be conducted at Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD.

**Commission Findings**

The Commission found that DoD rated Rome Laboratory (Rome Research Site) significantly higher in military value than either Wright-Patterson or Hanscom Air Force Base for the information technology research focus area. The Commission supports the concept of establishing and retaining a single site for information technology research, rather than multiple sites proposed by DoD. The Commission found that Rome Laboratory is the headquarters for the Information Systems Directorate, and rather than moving its Information Systems Directorate to Hanscom Air Force Base as originally called for in the Secretary's recommendation, it should be relocated to Rome.

The recommendation to relocate the Army Research Laboratory, White Sands Missile Range, NM to Aberdeen, MD was intended to consolidate geographically dispersed research activities performing similar work. Although Army has not specifically identified the number of research personnel to relocate to Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, the Commission found that laboratory personnel need to be retained at White Sands Missile Range to support ongoing and future test and evaluation functions performed there. After conducting a cost and savings analysis of this portion of the recommendation, the Commission found that savings would not be realized until 100 years. While there appears to be some overlap in
research capabilities resident at both White Sands and Aberdeen, the Commission found the poor return on investment, and the potential adverse impact on system effectiveness at the missile range in New Mexico, were greater than the marginal possible gains in military value.

**COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS**

The Commission found that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final selection criteria 1, 4 and 5, as well as from the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following:

Close the Air Force Research Laboratory, Mesa City, AZ. Relocate all functions to Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH.

Realignment of Air Force Research Laboratory, Hanscom, MA, by relocating the Sensors Directorate to Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH, and the Space Vehicles Directorate to Kirtland Air Force Base, NM.

Realign Rome Laboratory, NY, by relocating the Sensor Directorate to Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH, and consolidating it with the Air Force Research Laboratory, Sensor Directorate at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH.

Realign Air Force Research Laboratory, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH, by relocating the Information Systems Directorate to Rome Laboratory, NY.

Realign Army Research Laboratory Langley, VA, and Army Research Laboratory Glenn, OH, by relocating the Vehicle Technology Directorates to Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD.

The Commission found that this change and the recommendation as amended are consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. The full text of this and all Commission recommendations can be found in Appendix Q.

**ESTABLISH CENTERS FOR FIXED WING AIR PLATFORM RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT & ACQUISITION, TEST & EVALUATION**

**Recommendation # 188 (TECH 24)**

- **One-time Cost:** $17.7M
- **Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings):** ($2.7M)
- **20-Year Net Present Value:** ($17.9M)
- **Payback Period:** 9 Years

**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION**

Realign Tinker Air Force Base, OK, Robins Air Force Base, GA, and Hill Air Force Base, UT, by relocating fixed wing related Air Platform Development and Acquisition to Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH.

Realign Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH, by relocating fixed wing related Live Fire Test and Evaluation to Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake, CA.

**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION**

This recommendation completes the consolidation of all Fixed Wing Air Platform RDAT&E, begun during the previous BRAC rounds, at two principal sites: Naval Air Station (NAS) Patuxent River, MD, and Wright-Patterson Air Force Base (AFB), OH, while retaining several specialty sites. Research and Development & Acquisition will be performed at NAS Patuxent River and Wright-Patterson AFB. Lakehurst will be retained as a dedicated RDAT&E facility for Navy Aircraft Launch and Recovery Equipment and Aviation Support Equipment.

This recommendation includes Research, Development & Acquisition and Test & Evaluation activities in Fixed Wing Air Platforms across the Navy and Air Force. The planned component moves will enhance synergy by consolidating to major sites, preserve healthy competition, leverage existing infrastructure, minimize environmental impact, and affect reasonable homeland security risk dispersal. The relocation of Fixed Wing Air Platform Research was previously accomplished in response to the S&T Reliance Agreements resulting in the consolidation at Wright-Patterson AFB with the maritime related Fixed Wing Air Platform Research consolidated at NAS Patuxent River.
This recommendation consolidates Air Force Development & Acquisition functions currently resident at Logistic Centers (Hill AFB, Tinker AFB, and Robins AFB) at Wright-Patterson AFB. These moves will increase efficiency by creating RD&A centers with all attendant support activity and a robust acquisition organization available to all Air Force Fixed Wing Air Platform D&A functions.

The consolidation of all Fixed Wing Air Platform Survivability Live Fire T&E at China Lake is driven by the inefficiencies that currently exist between the two sites (Wright-Patterson AFB and China Lake), and the potential savings afforded by establishing a single live fire test range for fixed wing air platforms. China Lake has this capability and has been doing similar work related to weapons lethality for many years. This action will increase efficiency by reducing overall manpower requirements while also reducing redundancies that exist across the Live Fire Testing domain.

**Community Concerns**

The Robins and Hill Air Force Base communities expressed concern over the number of people potentially affected by DoD’s recommendation to establish a research, development, acquisition, and test and evaluation center at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base. Robins’ community representatives stated the people potentially impacted by this recommendation provide support for the fixed wing aircraft development and acquisition process as well as supporting operational aircraft. They argued the sustainment mission and applicable personnel should be retained at Robins, and that only development and acquisition personnel should be relocated to Wright-Patterson Air Force Base. Hill community representatives stated that the 18 positions potentially impacted by this recommendation include 9 engineering positions that have already been transferred from Hill to Wright-Patterson Air Force Base.

As a gaining activity, the Dayton community supported the location of additional fixed wing aircraft acquisition personnel at Wright-Patterson. Community representatives believed co-locating additional acquisition resources with the Program Executive Officer for Aeronautical Systems would create synergies. They stated this recommendation could be implemented with minimal disruption to ongoing programs. However, Ohio community officials opposed DoD’s recommendation to realign the Air Force’s live fire test and evaluation work to Naval Air Weapons Station, China Lake, California. Ohio-based advocates contended this would negatively impact live-fire testing of Air Force-unique weapon systems. As an alternative to DoD’s recommendation, they suggested the Commission consider retaining both the Air Force facility at Wright-Patterson and the Navy facility at China Lake to be managed as a composite operation under a memorandum of agreement between the two services.

The Lakehurst Naval Air Engineering Station community argued the DoD recommendation left out the creation of a Center of Excellence for the specialty area of Aircraft Launch and Recovery Equipment, and urged the Commission to synchronize the DoD justification explanation with the Final Commission recommendation.

**Commission Findings**

The Commission found merit in DoD’s recommendation to establish two primary centers for fixed wing research, development and acquisition, test and evaluation—one center located at Naval Air Station Patuxent River, MD and established under previous BRAC rounds, and a new second site to be established at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH. In addition, the Commission acknowledges and supports DoD’s underlying plan to retain specialty sites, including the specialty site currently established at the Lakehurst Naval Air Engineering Station, NJ to support aircraft launch and recovery systems and aviation support equipment.

With regard to DoD’s recommendation to relocate fixed wing live fire testing capability from Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH to China Lake, CA, the Commission carefully weighed the benefits of consolidating to a single live fire test facility at China Lake versus retention of two facilities—one for Air Force-unique weapon systems and the other for Navy-unique weapon systems. The Commission found no reason to disagree with the Secretary’s proposal to establish a single facility and noted that China Lake’s military value score for fixed wing test and evaluation is substantially higher than Wright-Patterson AFB.

**Commission Recommendations**

The Commission found the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission approves the recommendation of the Secretary.
Establish Centers for Rotary Wing Air Platform Development & Acquisition, Test & Evaluation

Recommendation # 189 (Tech 26)

One-time Cost: $49.4M
Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings): ($2.8M)
20-Year Net Present Value: $11.8M
Payback Period: 26 Years

Secretary of Defense Recommendation

Realign Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH, by relocating Air Force Materiel Command V-22 activities in rotary wing air platform development and acquisition to Patuxent River, MD. Realign the Naval Air Engineering Station Lakehurst, NJ, by relocating activities in rotary wing air platform development, acquisition, test and evaluation to Patuxent River, MD. Realign Ft. Rucker, AL, by relocating the Aviation Technical Test Center to Redstone Arsenal, AL, and consolidating it with the Technical Test Center at Redstone Arsenal, AL. Realign Robins Air Force Base, GA, by relocating activities in rotary wing air platform development and acquisition to Redstone Arsenal, AL.

Secretary of Defense Justification

This Air Land Sea & Space (ALSS) recommendation realigns and consolidates those activities that are primarily focused on Rotary Wing Air Platform activities in Development, Acquisition, Test and Evaluation (DAT&E). This action creates the Joint Center for Rotary Wing Air Platform DAT&E at the Redstone Arsenal, Huntsville, AL, and enhances the Joint Center at the Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division (NAWCAD), Patuxent River, MD. The end state of this recommendation builds upon existing rotary wing air platform technical expertise and facilities in place at the two principal sites and provides focused support for future aviation technological advances in rotorcraft development.

The planned component moves enhance synergy by consolidating rotary wing work to major sites, preserving healthy competition, and leveraging climatic/geographic conditions and existing infrastructure, minimize environmental impact. These consolidations co-locate aircraft and aircraft support systems with development and acquisition personnel to enhance efficiency and effectiveness of rotary wing air platform design and development activities.

Community Concerns

The Robins community stated the 50 personnel potentially impacted by this recommendation provide support for the rotary wing development and acquisition process as well as sustaining operational aircraft. They believed the sustainment mission and applicable personnel authorizations should be retained at Robins and that only development and acquisition personnel should be relocated to Redstone Arsenal. The Fort Rucker and Redstone communities expressed support for the recommendation.

There were no formal expressions from the Wright-Patterson, Lakehurst and Patuxent River communities regarding the recommendation to establish a rotary wing aircraft research, development, and acquisition test and evaluation center at Naval Air Station Patuxent River.

Commission Findings

The Commission found that the number of positions to be transferred from the realigning organizations to create or enhance joint centers of excellence for development, acquisition and test and evaluation (DAT&E) of rotary wing aircraft at Naval Air Station Patuxent River, MD, and Redstone Arsenal, AL, are not necessarily tied to the number of positions identified in the Department's COBRA analysis. In some cases, the Commission determined that the COBRA numbers were not based on full-time equivalent position counts, but instead on a tally of personnel whose duties at one time or another address DAT&E functions. The Commission believes DoD should use its discretion in determining what specific skill sets and personnel authorizations are needed to properly staff the new joint centers. The Commission notes that the 26-year payback is driven in large part due to requirements for new aircraft test and evaluation facilities at Redstone.
issues were found by the Commission to be implementation matters that can be resolved successfully during the six-year implementation period, and did not rise to the level of a substantial deviation.

**COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS**

The Commission found the Secretary’s recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission approves the recommendation of the Secretary.

**NAVY SENSORS, ELECTRONIC WARFARE, AND ELECTRONICS RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT & ACQUISITION, TEST & EVALUATION**

**RECOMMENDATION # 190 (TECH 28)**

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**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION**

Realign Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division, Point Mugu, CA. Relocate the Sensors, Electronic Warfare (EW), and Electronics Research, Development, Acquisition, Test & Evaluation (RDAT&E) functions to Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division, China Lake, CA.

**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION**

Consolidating the Sensors, EW, and Electronics RDAT&E functions at China Lake will eliminate redundant infrastructure between Point Mugu and China Lake and provide for the more efficient use of the remaining assets including the Electronic Combat Range and other integration laboratories at China Lake.

**COMMUNITY CONCERNS**

The Naval Base Ventura County (Point Mugu) community opposed the realignment of sensor, electronic warfare and electronics research, development & acquisition, test & evaluation functions to Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division, China Lake because the recommendation deviates from BRAC criteria, military value to the warfighter would be decreased, supporting data was absent and expected cost savings would not materialize. The community contended DoD did an extremely poor job analyzing the missions and value of the technical activities of Point Mugu. They cited the negative impact of DoD’s recommendations on the warfighter, and the failure by DoD to recognize that all duplication and redundancy between Point Mugu and China Lake had been eliminated long ago, as reasons for the Commission to reject the recommendation. They stated Point Mugu is already recognized as the Joint Center of Excellence for Electronic Warfare. The community contended that human and intellectual capital would be lost because experts would refuse to relocate from the coast to the desert, disrupting mission performance.

The China Lake community supported the BRAC recommendation and cited the high military ranking of the installation. They stated that the consolidation supports transformation. The community further stated that collocating sensors, electronic warfare and electronics capabilities with the laboratories and expertise at China Lake will further enhance the transformation of aviation systems. The community claimed their infrastructure, including water supply, sewer, schools and roads presented no insurmountable obstacles to receiving the large influx of people envisioned from the DoD recommendation.

**COMMISSION FINDINGS**

The Commission found that both Naval Base Ventura County (Point Mugu), CA, and Naval Air Warfare Center China Lake, CA, perform electronic warfare research, development, acquisition, and test and evaluation functions. China Lake is rated higher than Point Mugu for military value in 2 of 3 categories. It is rated significantly higher than Point Mugu in test
and evaluation, primarily because of its electronic warfare test range capability. Point Mugu works on the current EA-6B electronic warfare aircraft while China Lake works on the advanced EA-18G electronic warfare aircraft.

The Commission found that any consolidation of electronic functions could be accomplished outside the BRAC process because organizationally, both Point Mugu and China Lake work for Naval Air Systems Command.

The Commission closely examined community concerns about the possible loss of intellectual capital if too many experienced employees living in Santa Barbara opt not to move to China Lake. The Commission found that while careful management of the implementation could mitigate impacts to readiness and mission interruption risks, the cost and savings analysis showed a long 12-year payback with a one-time cost of about $73 million, and no net personnel eliminations, make the recommendation unsupportable.

The Commission found that the current management arrangement seems to be working well and if work needs to be shifted among the two sites, Naval Air Systems Command has the authority to accomplish needed changes without BRAC at an appropriate time based on workload and/or cost considerations.

**Commission Recommendations**

The Commission found that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final selection criteria 1, 4, and 5, and the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission has rejected the recommendation of the Secretary. The Commission found this recommendation is consistent with the Force Structure Plan and final selection criteria.
CHAPTER 2

ISSUES FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION

As an independent commission, the 2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission examined tremendous volumes of information about the nation’s domestic military installations. The Commission believes that during its independent analysis and review it gained insights and experiences that may be valuable to the President, Congress, the Department of Defense, and the general public. The Commission wishes to share these insights, raise major issues or concerns meriting further examination, or to pose questions and/or recommendations for future policymakers on the subjects under its jurisdiction.

Like the 1993 and 1995 Commissions, the 2005 Commission discusses below several major issues that arose during the course of its review and analysis process.

THE FUTURE OF BRAC

American military history records repeated transformation of military doctrine and force structure in response to geopolitical and technological developments. Over the last century, military force structure and strategy changed roughly every fifteen years. Recent history indicates these transformations are likely to continue, possibly at a more rapid pace.

When prior BRAC commissions convened, military strength was declining, with no apparent end in sight. The number of active-duty servicemembers fell from 3.5 million in 1968 to 2.1 million in 1974, where it had stabilized when the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 created the current BRAC system. By the time the 1995 BRAC Commission completed its business and disbanded, 1.5 million servicemembers were on active duty. However, the strategic and military situation prior to the Balkans, before 9/11, before Afghanistan, and before Iraq would be virtually unrecognizable today.

It is highly likely America’s security environment and corresponding military organization will continue to change, necessitating periodic re-examinations of the infrastructure supporting that organization. The Base Closure and Realignment process has repeatedly proven its worth by enabling the painful and difficult decisions needed to restructure military installations into alignment with future military requirements. The BRAC process provides for a series of checks and balances between the Department of Defense, the Commission, and the President with oversight by the Congress. The need for such a process will continue after the 2005 Commission ends, and it is likely the Department of Defense will again request Congressional authorization of future base closures or realignments.

The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 is a viable, proven, practical and effective mechanism to achieve difficult but necessary goals and the Commission strongly recommends future BRACs every 8 to 12 years, immediately following a Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The Commission recommends that the next round of BRAC formally begin in 2015 and has proposed legislative text in Appendix R for referral and consideration by Congress and the President.

STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS AND THE TIMING OF BRAC

The Commission’s work took place during a national strategic debate with an uncertain outcome. The nation is embroiled in a Global War on Terror, with significant deployments in Afghanistan and Iraq, in addition to other worldwide commitments. Simultaneously, military services (particularly the Army) are pursuing transformation of process, organization, and structure. Under the Integrated Global Posture and Basing Strategy (IGPBS), the United States is undertaking a massive movement of heavy forces, previously based in Europe and Korea, to locations within the continental United States. The Mobility Capabilities Study, soon to be finalized, will assess the ability to redeploy these forces if necessary. The Commission conducted its analysis in the context of a force structure plan derived from the QDR completed in late 2001. Although national strategies have been modified since that time, the underlying strategic plan predates the Global War on Terror. The Department of Defense is now conducting a new QDR, and unofficial reports indicate that sizes and composition of forces may change drastically.

In short, it would have been far preferable for BRAC 2005 to have occurred after the new QDR so that the strategic underpinnings for nearly irreversible infrastructure and capacity changes could have been informed by the QDR’s output, rather than BRAC providing input to the QDR. The QDR will provide a long-term strategic plan addressing force structure,
force modernization, infrastructure, and budget priorities. The Commission strongly recommends that future BRAC rounds begin after the QDR is completed. Infrastructure decisions should flow from a strategic vision, not the other way around.

Access to DoD Justification and Backup Data

Commission analysis of DoD’s BRAC recommendations requires timely access to the backup data justifying the Department’s recommendations. In April 2005, senior Commission staff met with senior DoD officials to discuss the release of all backup and certified data and, to facilitate the process, met again with senior DoD officials on May 9, 2005, to formally finalize Commission requirements.

DoD delivered Volume I of the BRAC report on May 13, three days earlier than the statutory deadline. Within seven days, DoD delivered the three Service and five of the six Joint Cross-Service Group-specific Analysis and Recommendation Volumes and the Force Structure Plan. The final Joint Cross-Service Group volume was delivered the next day, following a DoD security review. Between May 18 and May 28 the Commission received the corresponding “Supplemental Information,” but DoD was unable to provide open access to the preponderance of backup data due to continuing internal concerns regarding the potential compromise of information. As a result of these concerns, most of the remaining data were classified “Secret” pending completion of an internal DoD review.

On June 1, 2005, DoD established a secure reading room for Commission and Congressional staff holding appropriate security clearances. However, only five staff clearances were complete by June 1, and the reading room was therefore virtually unusable until the required security clearances were processed for Commission staff. On June 14, 2005, DoD had finished its internal review and declassified and made publicly available all but approximately 2 percent of the backup and supporting data. By that date, most of the Commission’s Review and Analysis staff had received appropriate clearances, and their analysis was well under way.

In hindsight, the Commission feels that the process could have been expedited had the Department anticipated the potential security risks presented by the aggregation of data and planned ahead to prevent problems with its release.

Other Methodological Problems

DoD’s presentation of related actions in separate recommendations compounded the inherent complexity of the Commission’s task. The Commission often had to deconstruct seemingly unrelated recommendations and reassemble all the actions proposed for individual installations or activities to obtain a clear picture of the Secretary’s overall intent for the installations or activities. Determinations of compliance (or non-compliance) with the selection criteria and Force Structure Plan required multiple analyses to evaluate how a change in one recommendation might create a ripple effect across several others. The Commission even had to establish special “revoting” procedures for use if subsequent votes substantially changed the rationale of an already “decided” matter. In future BRAC rounds, DoD should clearly identify interrelated recommendations and aggregate the net impact of all recommendations on each individual installation or activity.

The Commission also identified proposed actions with tenuous apparent relationships to each other bundled within specific recommendations. The Commission agrees with DoD’s “Red Team” observation that combining unrelated proposals complicates the analysis of the recommendations and calls into question the validity of the methodology used in their assembly.

Additionally, the Commission found DoD’s recommendations in some cases swept up, in one recommendation, hundreds of positions assigned to divisions or departments with similar sounding titles for realignment without an in-depth analysis to determine which of the hundreds of positions actually were intended to be moved. All too frequently site visits and community inputs revealed that tiny minorities of positions involved were indeed suitable for realignment, but that large numbers were not. It was not possible for the Commission to sort out, position by position, what was the correct number of positions to be realigned. The DoD recommendations were accompanied by COBRA analyses which contained numbers and costs relevant to the recommendation, but these analyses were based on aggregate numbers, not detailed manpower studies, and therefore are viewed by the Commission as illustrative examples of what a realignment or closure might cost or save, but are not to be viewed as part of the official report and are not directive in nature. The Commission recommends DoD to review each of the realignments to determine the appropriate number of positions to be moved.

Joint Cross Service Groups and Promoting Jointness

The Commission noted major differences between the role of Joint Cross-Service Groups (JCSG) in the 1995 and 2005 BRAC processes. In the 2005 BRAC, DoD gave the JCSGs their first-ever substantive role, in contrast with previous BRACs
where JCSGs were advisory to the military departments and were unable to advance their own recommendations. DoD’s promotion of JCSGs allowed the military departments to focus on operational concerns, while also ensuring that common business functions benefited from the collective wisdom of all the services and defense agencies. Even though the JCSG process in 2005 was a vast improvement over prior efforts, there are always areas that could be improved, and the Commission highlights several such ideas below.

Combatant Commander (COCOM) input was formally solicited in October 2004, fairly late in the process. Although the Vice Chairman, JCS, was briefed on items of interest to the COCOMs before all Infrastructure Executive Council (IEC) and Infrastructure Steering Group (ISG) meetings, the 2005 process could have benefited from a formal advisory role for the COCOMs. In the future, DoD should consider early and clear definitions of the use and weight of COCOM input. The COCOMs’ operational experience and input would improve a numbers-driven exercise wholly executed in Washington, DC.

The JCSG process was hampered by the lack of DoD visits to sites considered for closure or realignment. The installations and Major Commands were not requested to consider the full operational impact of JCSG recommendations and were requested to only validate specific data requests supporting JCSG recommendations. Additionally, JCSG data requests were submitted piecemeal; at no time were installations or MAJCOMS requested to consider and/or evaluate the total operational impact of multiple JCSG recommendations on their installation.

In many cases, the first person involved in the BRAC process, other than a military service BRAC team member assigned to an installation, to actually visit a site facing closure or significant realignment was a BRAC Commissioner or staff member. While it is not practical for DoD representatives to visit all locations under review, the Commission believes that conducting an analytical process affecting infrastructure valued in the billions of dollars without ever physically looking at the major assets under review detracts from the credibility of DoD’s process.

Each of the military departments gathered the data they submitted to COBRA differently. The Navy made data calls to the installations; the Army used a combination of data bases and data calls; the Air Force relied on central data bases. Halfway through the BRAC review, the Air Force uncovered approximately $900 million in possible changes to its COBRA input when it made site surveys while preparing budget justification books. The differences in service branch data collection were also reflected in the data submitted to the JCSGs. DoD’s differing information collection systems complicated the Commission’s review and analysis. These methodologies led to inconsistencies in individual responses to the questions within a service. Methodological differences complicated meaningful comparison of individual services’ recommendations as well as of recommendations crossing service lines. In the future, DoD should consider a standardized method of data collection. Specifically, the Navy method could be used as the model, since it directly engages the installations where the recommendations will be executed as part of the analysis process. This is particularly important if DoD continues to conduct cross-service business functions through the JCSGs. Reliance on existing data bases that were originally designed to perform non-BRAC functions should not be used for future BRAC processes.

In addition, data should be normalized, especially when the services use conflicting data elements—e.g. differences in the square feet allowed per person—and do not standardize common Base Operating Support (BOS) rules. As joint basing becomes a reality, DoD should task a neutral party to study and recommend ways to normalize data, particularly in the real estate/installation areas amenable to common standards.

The Deputy Assistant Secretaries (DAS) deconflicted JCSG scenario options in order to integrate JCSG and military department scenarios. The process could be improved if an independent and dedicated integration group comprehensively presented all of the JCSG options and scenarios to the ISG. The independent group should be able to cancel or amend JCSG options in operational conflict with a service branch scenario if the tradeoffs between cost and risk are unacceptable.

Numerous DoD recommendations were premised on the assumption that realigning military department activities to one location would “enhance jointness.” However, the mechanism for improving jointness was often left unspecified. As initially described by the Department of Defense, the 2005 BRAC was to be an opportunity to promote jointness and jointness was to be its overriding theme. However, of the hundreds of proposals submitted by the DOD, very few increased jointness, and some actually decreased or removed joint and cross-service connections. While jointness was initially described by the DOD as a high principle for the 2005 BRAC, in fact most of the DOD proposed consolidations and reorganizations were within the Military Departments, not across the Services.

Given the proposals from the DOD, in several instances the Commission acted to increase jointness through its final decisions. The Commission regrets that joint and cross service proposals were not a stronger part of the DOD recommendations overall.
COORDINATION OF BRAC WITH OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

DoD and the Commission are mandated to assess costs and savings to the U.S. government as a whole, not just the Department of Defense. Coordination with other Departments such as Homeland Security (DHS, including the U.S. Coast Guard and FEMA), Veterans Affairs (VA), Justice (DoJ, including the FBI), and agencies such as the General Services Administration (GSA) is crucial to successful development and implementation of final recommendations. The Commission found a lack of sufficient interagency coordination in DoD’s 2005 BRAC proposals.

For example, many recommendations affect installations used by the Coast Guard. If the Coast Guard has to assume the costs of keeping the installation operational, DoD’s costs would not be saved as DoD projects, but simply shifted into the U.S. Coast Guard’s already limited budget. Similarly, GSA may incur early termination fees as DoD implements several approved proposals to vacate leased space in the National Capital Region.

Additionally, DoD did not solicit input from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) regarding sharing of health care system capacity between DoD and VA, an unfortunate oversight given that the nation is at war and that VA hospitals are located in some of the areas affected by the DoD recommendations.

Neither the Commission nor DoD was well served by the lack of Department of Homeland Security input on the homeland defense role of military installations. While the U.S. Northern Command found “no unacceptable risk” in DoD’s post-BRAC support provided to civil authorities, no corollary statement was forthcoming from DHS.

The 2005 BRAC Commission strongly recommends that DoD improve coordination with other affected federal agencies so that savings estimates do not ignore the increased or shifted costs of non-DoD Federal operations. Similarly, DHS must coordinate with DoD on future BRAC processes so DoD fully understands and incorporates the roles and uses of military installations in homeland security as well as in homeland defense missions and capabilities.

COORDINATION OF BRAC WITH THE AIR NATIONAL GUARD

The states’ Adjutants General (TAGs) expressed grave concerns due to lack of consultation or coordination with the active duty Air Force regarding the impact of the Secretary’s recommendations on the Air National Guard. The Air Force stated its communications with the Director of the National Guard Bureau satisfied legal requirements but the Air Force process led to a negative reaction by the states, their TAGs, elected officials, and the general public. Several states are in court challenging the process. The Commission conducted three special hearings where these issues were raised and discussed. TAG and state dissention with the Air Force unnecessarily cost the Commission additional time and resources and damaged the previously exemplary relationship between the Air National Guard and the Air Force. For future BRAC rounds the Commission strongly recommends that all of the services provide for early and constructive TAG and Governor consultation and input on potential base closure and realignment proposals.

COMMISSION INDEPENDENCE

BRAC Commissions’ independence, both de jure and de facto, was a key ingredient in prior base closing and realignment rounds’ success. The legislative and executive branches, and the citizens to whom they are accountable, are more likely to accept BRAC outcomes if they are convinced the Commission’s review of DoD’s complex and controversial base restructuring proposals are handled independently, objectively, and honestly. Thus, preserving and protecting the independence of the Commission (both perceived and actual) is not a mere academic exercise, but a necessity.

Independence is not determined solely by statute, but also by policies, perceptions, and practices. The 2005 Commission faced a short mission time frame, combined with delays in initiating administrative support. The 1993 and 1995 Commissions drew from a cadre of 15 permanent staff who rapidly geared up to handle the exploding workload when Commissioners were appointed. However, the permanent staff, office equipment, and office space were dispersed when the BRAC statute expired in 1995. The 2005 Commission had to literally re-create a 100-person operation from scratch in a matter of weeks. Additionally, staff could not be hired or detailed from other agencies prior to the appointment of the Chairman, and even then valuable time was expended overcoming the administrative obstacles inherent in standing up any organization. For example, DoD’s Washington Headquarters Service (WHS), whose many responsibilities include support for DoD commissions, was unable, for a variety of reasons, to easily and quickly expedite accommodation to the needs of a large-scale, high-profile, fast-paced, non-DoD entity such as the BRAC Commission. The Commission’s organizational needs and available support capabilities were inadvertently but systematically mismatched.
The Commission’s mission could have been compromised but for the hard work of many individuals, and steady assistance from its support contractor. In addition to proposals for Congressional consideration, the Commission also recommends the Administration significantly reform arrangements for administrative support of future BRAC Commissions. For example, the Administration could establish a temporary caretaker staff of roughly 15 persons to begin organizing several months prior to the formal appointment of Commissioners. Once the Chairman is appointed and in place, he or she could hire an Executive Director, and the caretaker staff could either be kept or replaced as appropriate. The Commission would then have basic office infrastructure in place when Commissioners are confirmed and an Executive Director appointed. The Commission could then focus on the substance of its mission immediately and exclusively, rather than dissipating time and energy by simultaneously grappling with both logistics and substance.

Additionally, Congress should either ensure the Commission’s activities do not span two fiscal years or alter appropriations language to allow expenditure of Commission funds throughout the Commission’s lifetime, without regard to fiscal year. Similarly, the independence of a future Commission would be enhanced if it could manage its expenditures autonomously rather than continuously negotiating budget and expenses with DoD, a process inherent in the current organizational structure. If the Congress desires oversight and accountability for funds entrusted to the Commission, it could provide for review by GAO.

The widespread use of electronic document control and management is a success story recommended to future BRAC Commissions. Participants and public consumers of the 2005 BRAC process gave extremely high marks to the E-Library system established with the assistance of the Commission’s support contractor. The Commission’s web site, www.brac.gov, which had near-complete access to the E-Library, received approximately 25 million hits between May 19 (the launch date) and August 28 (more than three months). It provided unprecedented openness and transparency to the BRAC process, giving citizens access to nearly 200,000 unclassified documents at the click of a button. The Commission received approximately 500 electronic comments per week, received tens of thousands of pieces of written correspondence, and made available to the public such internal Commission documents as trip reports, base visit briefing books, memoranda of meetings, and all non-classified submittals to the Commission from interested base communities. Vast amounts of DoD material were initially scanned as unsearchable images but converted into user-friendly, full text-searchable documents when entered into the E-Library.

**THREAT ASSESSMENT**

The Commission finds illogical the seemingly inverse order that the Department followed in arriving at its list of facilities for closure and realignment. In short, this consisted of the May 13, 2005, announcement of the Secretary of Defense’s recommendations to be followed by a QDR later in the year. The Commission, as a result, looked to the 20-year threat assessment the Department was required to complete under Sec. 2912(a)(1)(A) of the Base Closure Law, as the basis for the force structure plan, probable end-strength levels and major military force levels that were submitted with the FY 2005 budget. The Commission could find no evidence that a 20-year threat assessment was ever prepared or submitted. Formal requests to DoD in July 2005 for a copy of the threat assessment also confirmed that no threat assessment was ever completed. Nonetheless, DoD’s Base Closure and Realignment Report, Volume I and Volume II, May 2005, does contain a four-page summary titled “Probable Threats to National Security.”

**Recommendations on Statutory Changes to BRAC**

In response to these and other issues considered during the 2005 BRAC process, the Commission has developed draft legislative proposals for the consideration of Congress. The full text and explanation of the proposals can be found in Appendix R.
In the early 1960’s, at the President’s direction, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara developed and implemented a base closure program within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, with minimal consultation with the military departments or Congress. Hundreds of bases closures and realignments took place during this period, and more than 60 major bases were closed.

In 1965 President Johnson vetoed legislation that would have established reporting requirements providing more Congressional oversight in any DoD base closure program and the Department of Defense retained broad legal authority to complete base realignments and closures, and did so routinely throughout the 1960’s.

The Congress failed to override President Ford’s veto of the 1976 Military Construction Authorization Bill, which contained a provision prohibiting any base closure or reduction of more than 250 civilian employees until the Department had notified Congress of the proposed actions, assessed the personnel and economic impacts, followed the study provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), and waited nine months.

However, in 1977, the Congress passed legislation (codified as Title 10, United States Code, Section 2687) requiring DoD to notify Congress if an installation became a closure or realignment candidate. The law also subjected proposed closure actions to NEPA’s comprehensive environmental evaluation requirements and required reports on local economic and strategic consequences. In addition, DoD had to wait 60 days after Congressional notification before proceeding with proposed base restructurings. These and other procedural requirements established in Section 2687 effectively halted base closures. For a decade following the passage of Section 2687, attempts to close major installations failed, and proposed realignments of small military units were often thwarted by Congressional opposition.

THE 1988 COMMISSION

By 1988, the Defense budget had declined for three straight years and was predicted to decline further. To ensure that scarce DoD resources would be devoted to the most pressing operational and investment needs rather than maintaining unneeded property, facilities, or overhead, Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci chartered the Defense Secretary’s Commission on Base Realignment and Closure on May 3, 1988. Enacted in October 1988, Public Law 100-526 provided the statutory basis for this one-time approach. The law also provided relief from certain statutory impediments to closures, such as a partial exemption from NEPA, delegated property disposal authority, and an expedited process for Congressional review of BRAC recommendations.

The 1988 Commission recommended the closure of 86 military facilities and the realignment of 59 others, approximately 3 percent of the domestic base structure. Annual savings were estimated at $693.6 million.

Secretary Carlucci accepted all of the recommendations and Congress did not enact a joint resolution of disapproval. As a result, the Commission’s 1988 recommendations went into effect and have the force of law.

The 1988 Commission was appointed by, and reported directly to, the Secretary of Defense. It generated its own list of recommended closures and realignments. All hearings and votes were conducted in closed sessions. Little information about how the Commission arrived at its recommendations was available to the public.

Critics of the 1988 closure process felt the closure list unfairly targeted facilities located in Congressional districts represented by Members out of favor with the Administration and that the absence of outside oversight allowed subjective biases or pre-ordained conclusions of the individual decision makers to find their way into the final recommendations. It was feared that without a clear and auditable analytical and decision-making process, favorable or unfavorable impressions of an installation could come from decision makers’ personal experiences rather than quantifiable or objective military value.

Many of the 1988 Commission’s experiences—both positive and negative—were incorporated and applied into lessons learned during future BRAC rounds.
Public Law 100-526 established a onetime only Commission whose authority expired on December 31, 1988. With the end of the Cold War, proposals to close or realign bases were once again governed by the procedures mandated by Section 2687 of Title 10, United States Code—procedures that had de facto prevented base closures for over a decade.

In January, 1990, Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney unilaterally proposed closing 35 bases and realigning or reducing the forces at more than 20 others. Congress responded by passing the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (Title XXIX of Public Law 101-510) which effectively halted all closures based on the Secretary’s January, 1990 list and established a new series of procedures for closing or realigning bases.

P.L. 101-510: THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION


The 1990 legislation required that all bases be considered equally without regard to whether the installation had been previously considered or proposed for realignment or closure. DoD’s recommendations had to be consistent with the current force-structure plan and congressionally approved selection criteria. For each of the next three BRAC rounds, the services (i.e., military departments) and DoD agencies submitted their candidates for closure and realignment to the Secretary of Defense and, after reviewing service candidates, the Secretary submitted his recommendations to the BRAC Commission for its independent review.

The 1991, 1993 and 1995 BRAC Commissions had four months to scrutinize and analyze the Secretary’s recommendations. In addition, the Commission could add, delete, or modify the Secretary’s list. The Commission submitted its report with recommendations to the President who had 15 days to either accept or reject the Commission’s recommendations in their entirety; if he rejected them, the Commission could give the President a revised list of recommendations. If the President accepted the Commission’s recommendations, he forwarded the list to the Congress, which could either do nothing and accept the list, or reject it in full by passing a joint resolution of disapproval. Such a resolution would be subject to Presidential veto. Unless rejected, the BRAC Commission’s recommendations effectively became law.

The BRAC Commission was created “to provide a fair process that will result in the timely closure and realignment of military installations inside the United States.” Public Law 101-510 required each Commission to conduct public hearings on the Secretary of Defense’s list of closures and realignments and on any proposed changes to those recommendations. In addition, its records were made open to public scrutiny.

Procedurally, the P.L. 101-510 BRAC Commissions differed substantially from the 1988 DoD Commission. The 1988 Commission, working for the Secretary of Defense, generated an internal list of recommended closures and realignments. The 1991, 1993, and 1995 BRACs independently reviewed and analyzed DoD’s recommendations and submitted its findings and recommendations directly to the President. The President could end the process at multiple stages (although he could not pick and choose among individual recommendations) if he believed the process was in danger of producing a poor outcome. To ensure an independent assessment, P.L. 101-510 required the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to provide the Commission a detailed analysis of DoD’s recommendations and selection process, and to assist the Commission in its analysis of the Secretary’s recommendations.

The process under which the 1991, 1993, and 1995 BRAC Commissions operated was open, largely transparent, and heavily insulated from partisan politics. The Commission met only during the non-election years of 1991, 1993, and 1995. All meetings and hearings were open to the public. The BRAC Commission provided numerous opportunities to interested parties, as well as community and Congressional leaders to provide testimony and express their viewpoints. Transcripts of hearings, correspondence, and other data received by the Commission were available for public review. For all BRAC Commissions conducted after November 30, 1993, public testimony presented before the Commission was under oath.

Major sites proposed for closure during the 1991 thru 1995 timeframe were visited by at least one commissioner, in order to gain a firsthand look at the installations and their mission capabilities.
THE 1991 COMMISSION

The 1991 Commission held 47 base visits, 14 regional hearings, and 9 investigative hearings in Washington, D.C. The Commission recommended the closure of 34 bases and the realignment of 45 others. These actions generated an estimated FY 1992–1997 net savings of $2.3 billion and recurring savings of $1.5 billion annually after a one-time cost of $4.1 billion. This represented a reduction of approximately 5.4 percent of the domestic base structure.

The President accepted all of the Commission’s recommendations. The House rejected a resolution of disapproval and the recommendations of the 1991 Commission have the force of law. Initiation of the 1991 closures and recommendations was required by July 1993, with completion by July 1997.

THE 1993 COMMISSION

The 1993 Commission held 125 base visits, 17 regional hearings, and 16 investigative hearings in Washington, D.C. Its report to the President recommended the closure of 130 bases and the realignment of 45 others, approximately 6.2 percent of the domestic base structure. Estimated FY 1994–1999 net savings were approximately $3.8 billion after one-time costs of approximately $7.43 billion. The savings from these actions are estimated to total approximately $2.33 billion annually. The President accepted all of the Commission’s recommendations and the Senate rejected a resolution of disapproval. Initiation of the 1993 recommendations was required by July, 1995 with completion by July, 1999.

THE 1995 COMMISSION

The third BRAC Commission to operate under P.L. 101-510 analyzed DoD recommendations affecting 146 domestic military installations, including 33 major closures, 26 major realignments, and an additional 27 changes to prior base closure round decisions, or “redirects.” The Commission subsequently considered an additional 32 installations as possible alternatives and additions to the bases recommended for closure or realignment by DoD.

The statute required the Secretary of Defense to base all recommendations on a force-structure plan submitted to Congress with the Department’s FY 1996 budget request and on selection criteria developed by the Secretary of Defense and approved by Congress. The 1995 selection criteria were identical to those used in 1991 and 1993.

The Commission held 13 investigative hearings, conducted 206 fact-finding visits to 167 military installations and activities, held 16 regional hearings nationwide, listened to hundreds of Members of Congress, and received thousands of letters from concerned citizens from across the country. At least one commissioner visited every major site proposed for closure or realignment. All meetings were open to the public. All data received by the Commission, including testimony under oath, as well as all transcripts of Commission hearings, were available for public review.

As required by law, The Government Accountability Office (GAO) evaluated DoD’s selection process and recommendations, and provided their detailed analysis to both the Commission and the Congress.

After thorough review and analysis, the Commission recommended the closure or realignment of a grand total of 132 military installations in the United States, including 123 of DoD’s 146 closure or realignment recommendations (an average Commission acceptance rate of 84.2%). Nine of the 36 installations considered at the Commission’s initiative were ultimately adopted and approved (an average “add” acceptance rate of 25%).

The Commission estimated at the time these closures and realignments would require one-time, upfront costs of $3.6 billion, and would result in annual savings of $1.6 billion. Twenty-year savings were estimated at approximately $19.3 billion. 1995 was the first time that BRAC Commission recommendations proposed savings greater than those originally proposed by the Secretary of Defense.

The President transmitted the recommendations to Congress, where the House of Representatives rejected a resolution of disapproval and the Commission’s recommendations effectively became law. However, two of the recommended closures, the Kelly, TX and McClellan, CA Air Logistics Centers, were implemented as “privatizations-in-place” rather than closures, with contractors assuming the facilities’ workload.
According to the Congressional Research Service (CRS) BRACs made the following recommendations:

1988 BRAC: 145 recommendations  
1991 BRAC: 82 recommendations  
1993 BRAC: 175 recommendations  
1995 BRAC: 132 recommendations  
= 534 individual recommendations

However, the 1995 BRAC commission report stated that the cumulative number of BRAC decisions from all four rounds totaled 505. In December 1998, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported that the four BRAC commissions generated 499 recommendations, but that in its final tally “only 451 of these ultimately required action, primarily because 48 were changed in some manner by recommendations of a later commission.”

The Department of Defense has estimated that the four previous BRAC rounds eliminated approximately 21 percent of DoD’s 1988 installation capacity. These changes required an up-front investment of $22 billion, and through fiscal year 2001, produced net savings of approximately $17.7 billion, including the cost of environmental cleanup. Recurring savings and cost avoidances beyond 2001 are approximately $7.3 billion annually.

A total of 97 bases and installations categorized by DoD as “major” were closed as a result of the 1988 through 1995 processes. In addition, DoD has stated there were 55 “major” realignments and at least 235 smaller sized closures and realignments as a result of past actions. According to the Congressional Research Service, closure activities at all 451 major and minor facilities impacted by prior BRAC recommendations were completed by the end of FY 2001, as scheduled.

In independent studies conducted over the last decade, both the Government Accountability Office and the Congressional Budget Office have consistently concluded that realigning and closing unneeded military installations produced savings that exceeded their costs. However, GAO has also noted that tracking auditable savings from BRAC is extremely difficult because DoD’s accounting systems are not structured to capture this kind of data. Moreover, most of the “savings” take the form of cost avoidances—i.e., costs that would have been paid by DoD had BRAC not occurred, and were therefore avoided. Since the future is inherently unknowable, cost avoidances are much difficult to calculate in precise terms than cost savings.

GAO also produced slightly lower estimates of cost savings and avoidances from prior-BRAC rounds. Its reports and research led to the conclusion of net cumulative BRAC savings of $16.7 billion through the end of FY 2001, and annual savings of $6.6 billion.

STATUTORY EXPIRATION

From 1997 to 2000, the House of Representatives repeatedly rejected Administration requests to conduct two additional rounds of base closures in 2001 and 2005. In 1998, the Senate Armed Services Committee rejected an amendment to allow a single round of base closures. Congress allowed statutory authority for BRAC to expire and did not renew it until after the paradigm-shifting September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. As a result, the BRAC Commission’s permanent caretaker staff and other institutional infrastructure disbanded after December 1995. The 2005 BRAC Commission would begin its work from scratch without any semblance of an ongoing operation.
CHAPTER 4

THE 2005 BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT PROCESS

KEY PROVISIONS OF THE LAW AUTHORIZING THE 2005 BRAC COMMISSION


Both law and policy directed the 2005 Base Closure and Realignment Commission to conduct an open and transparent process. The Commission’s records, meetings, and hearings were (and are) open to the public, except for classified information. Testimony before the Commission is provided under oath. Notice of hearings was published in advance in the Federal Register. The statute also directed the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to analyze DoD’s recommendations and publish a report on their findings.

Congress authorized the Commission to “add” additional installations to DoD’s proposed BRAC closure and realignment recommendations only if the Commission provided the Secretary of Defense with a list of possible additions and gave him at least 15 days to explain the reasons why the installations were not originally recommended for closure or realignment; provided the Secretary with an opportunity to testify at a public hearing discussing the potential additions; and, after reviewing the Secretary’s explanation, conducting a separate “Adds Hearing” at which seven of nine Commissioners must vote in favor of any proposed “add”; fourth, publishing a notice of all successfully proposed additions in the Federal Register not less than 45 days before transmitting its recommendations to the President. At least two Commissioners must conduct base visits and public hearings must be held on all proposed additions.

The statute directs Commissioners to vote on whether each DoD recommendation deviated substantially from the force structure plan and the final selection criteria. The Commission can change, or reject entirely, those recommendations it finds deviated substantially from the submitted force structure plan and selection criteria. However, any proposed change that would (a) add an installation for closure or realignment, or (b) increase the extent of the realignment beyond what was originally proposed by the Secretary, is considered an “add” and will require the votes of seven of nine Commissioners, as described in the paragraph above. The Commission cannot change recommendations that do not deviate substantially from the force structure plan and the final selection criteria.

The Commission reports its findings and recommendations to the President and to the American people by September 8, 2005. The Commission’s final and approved changes have the force of law unless the President terminates the process by not forwarding the report to the Congress, or the Congress enacts a resolution of disapproval.

By September 23, 2005, the President must either forward the Commission’s report to the Congress (accepting all recommendations as a whole) or return the report to the Commission for further evaluation. If he returns the report to the Commission, the President can indicate his disapproval of the report as a whole or in part. The BRAC Commission would then have until October 20, 2005, to resubmit its report to the President. The deadline for the President to transmit his approval and certification of a resubmitted report to Congress is November 7, 2005.

Congress has 45 days from the day it receives the report from the President to enact a joint resolution rejecting the report in full, or else the report effectively becomes law. If both chambers of Congress enact a joint resolution of disapproval, the
President can veto the resolution. A Presidential veto of a joint resolution would be sustained unless a two-thirds majority in both chambers votes to override (like any other bill or resolution).

The 2005 BRAC Commission will, by law, terminate on April 15, 2006.

**Requirements for the Department of Defense**

The Congress directed DoD to (1) define and implement an objective set of “selection criteria” for selecting bases and facilities for closure or realignment; (2) predicate closure/realignment recommendations on a force structure plan that reflected future threats, (3) prepare a Comprehensive (i.e., global in scope) Base Inventory to be submitted to the Congress as part of the budget justification documents supporting the Fiscal Year 2005 budget request; and (4) certify, in writing, that the 2005 round of BRAC was necessary and that it would result in annual net savings for each military department beginning not later than 2011.

**Selection Criteria Finalized**

P.L. 107-107 provided DoD with basic guidance on selection criteria but gave the Department discretionary authority to modify the criteria so long as “military value is the primary consideration in the making of recommendations for the closure or realignment of military installations.” P.L. 107-107 guidance followed very closely the historical selection criteria used in the 1991, 1993, and 1995 BRAC processes.

The Department published its draft selection criteria in the Federal Register for comment and review by the public on December 23, 2003. After reviewing the draft criteria, GAO testified before Congress on March 25, 2004, that DoD’s selection criteria were generally sound and had “more specificity” in its four military value elements than the criteria used for prior rounds of BRAC. GAO expressed concern as to whether the selection criteria would adequately assess total restructuring costs and whether environmental remediation costs would be appropriately calculated.

Differences between the 2005 and prior round’s selection criteria are centered on the four military value criteria. The 2005 DoD criteria emphasized cross-service or joint operational capabilities and emphasized a facility’s location-specific attributes. Appendix E to this report provides a more complete comparison of the criteria.

DoD finalized the selection criteria without change and published them in the February 12, 2004, Federal Register. Congress later enshrined the final selection criteria into law (P.L. 108-375).

**Force Structure, Worldwide Inventory, Certification Requirements**

The DoD “Force Structure Plan” (printed in Appendix D in its unclassified form) provided both end-strength levels (numbers of divisions, air wings, aircraft carriers, etc.) and the baseline military infrastructure needed at the end of the BRAC process to support the future force structure. It included only a short description of future threats. Congress later amended P.L. 101-510 to require DoD to retain sufficient additional infrastructure to accommodate unexpected “surge” or temporary increases in military activity. The 2005 BRAC Commission’s May 4, 2005, hearing discussed and evaluated the Force Structure Plan and its relationship to the BRAC process, among other issues.

The Department of Defense submitted its global inventory of military installations and facilities to Congress in March 2004. This inventory is derived from DoD’s Facilities Assessment Database (FAD), a resource updated annually from the real property records of the Military Departments. It revealed that the Department owns more than 520,000 facilities (buildings and structures), of which about 87 percent are in the United States and territories. These real property records provided the basis for identifying facilities subject to BRAC analysis.

The Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (P.L. 108-375) prohibited DoD from revising the Force Structure Plan and Comprehensive Base Inventory after March 15, 2005, for BRAC purposes. This precluded changing the basic parameters for BRAC analysis while the selection process was under way.

DoD’s March 23, 2004, budget justification documents included the required certification by Secretary Rumsfeld that the 2005 BRAC round was needed and justified and that the end result of the recommended restructuring “would result in annual net savings for each of the military departments beginning not later than fiscal year 2011.”
**Overseas Basing and BRAC**

DoD conducted a comprehensive inventory of all overseas US military installations, and submitted the results to Congress during the FY 2005 budget process. DoD concluded that forward deployment of US military assets at foreign bases in Europe and the Middle East did not offer nearly as many advantages (in terms of speed of military response) as previously thought. As a result, President Bush announced on August 16, 2004 that as part of the nearly three-year Global Posture Review, approximately 60,000 to 70,000 personnel previously stationed overseas would be gradually returning home to the US.

The Commission’s May 4, 2005, hearing discussed overseas realignments, their impact on BRAC, and the Global Posture Review. Overseas basing, while not explicitly mentioned in the final selection criteria, was subsequently incorporated in DoD’s BRAC review and analysis, and is partially reflected in DoD’s 2005 BRAC recommendations.

**Major Differences between the 2005 and Prior BRAC Rounds**

The 2005 Commission consists of nine members rather than eight, thereby minimizing the possibility of tie votes.

For the 2005 round, the time horizon for assessing future threats in preparing DoD’s Force Structure Plan is 20 years rather than five.

Moreover, prior BRAC rounds occurred during a time of declining defense budgets where the focus was on eliminating excess capacity and realizing cost savings without sacrificing military value. The 2005 BRAC process took place during a time of war, where many military capabilities are surging to meet new battlefield requirements. Consequently, the emphasis on the 2005 round was on enhancing military value without sacrificing cost savings.

In 2005, DoD shifted away from a traditional focus on end-strengths, and toward a capabilities-based approach supporting an emphasis on joint operations. The 1988, 1991, and 1993 rounds did not include a Joint Cross-Service element. The 1995 round had such an element, but the three military departments (Army, Navy/Marines, and Air Force) could reject the recommendations of Joint Cross-Service Groups (JCSGs) within DoD that examined six areas: depot maintenance, military medical treatment facilities, test and evaluation, undergraduate pilot training, laboratories, and economic impact. The final military department recommendations were forwarded to the Secretary of Defense for his final review and approval. In contrast, DoD’s 2005 BRAC process established seven JCSGs: Education and Training; Headquarters and Support Activities; Industrial; Intelligence; Medical; Supply and Storage; and Technical. These seven JCSGs developed specific recommendations alongside, and in most cases in cooperation with, the three military departments. More important, JCSG recommendations were submitted directly to the DoD Infrastructure Executive Council (IEC).

The 1995 criteria stated only that “the environmental impact” had to be considered with any base closure or realignment. The 2005 criteria required the Department of Defense (and ultimately the Commission) to consider “the impact of costs related to potential environmental restorations, waste management and environmental compliance activities.”

Other changes include more detailed military value criteria and, more specifically, elements containing training areas, staging grounds, and homeland defense missions. Ten years ago, before the September 11th terrorist attacks, “homeland defense” was not a criterion. It is now a significant element among the military value criteria. Language on “joint warfighting, training, and readiness” supports Secretary Rumsfeld’s well-publicized use the 2005 BRAC process to advance transformation and jointness goals. Military value scores generally reflect installations’ capacity to absorb new missions, or provide “surge” capabilities.

The special rules applicable if the Commission proposes a closure or realignment not originally on the Secretary’s May 13, 2005, list are described elsewhere in this chapter. The 1991 Commission added 35 bases for further consideration, the 1993 Commission added 72, and the 1995 Commission added 36, whereas the 2005 Commission added only eight.

In prior rounds, DoD recommendations were generally confined to one base per recommendation. Sometimes a closing/realigning base’s workload was distributed among several receiving installations or activities, but only a single base would be closed or significantly realigned within the same recommendation. The 2005 DoD report often lumped several—sometimes dozens—of separate but interlinked BRAC actions under the broad title of a single “recommendation.” The 1995 Commission evaluated DoD recommendations affecting 146 domestic military installations. The 2005 DoD report proposed at least 222 separately listed “recommendations,” some of which were merely a broad thematic grouping for dozens of individually identifiable closures and realignments, each one affecting numerous people and communities. The figure of 222 includes 34 recommendations (affecting Navy and Marine Corps reserve centers) that the Commission counts as two recommendations. This consolidation leads to the Commission’s count of 190 separate DoD recommendations that would
produce as many as 837 distinct and identifiable recommended BRAC “close” or “realign” actions; more than twice the number of BRAC actions from the 1988, 1991, 1993 and 1995 rounds combined. These 837 distinct actions involve another 160 “gaining” locations, receiving jobs from the closures and realignments. These actions include 435 actions recommended by DoD Joint Cross Service Groups, a category not identifiable in past BRAC rounds. The total number of DoD recommendations is more than double the number considered by all past BRAC Commissions combined. Appendix K of this report lists the DoD recommended BRAC actions identified by the Commission.

Congress amended the BRAC law to allow “privatization in place” only if it “is a method of closure or realignment of the military installation specified in the recommendations of the Commission” in the Commission’s Final Report, and only if the Commission determines that privatization in place is “the most-cost effective method of implementation of the recommendation.”

Similarly, the Congress prohibited the conversion of military facilities to “inactive status” in the 2005 BRAC. In prior rounds, “inactive” status mothballed a building, production line, or capability while preserving it for possible reactivation at a future date. Bases in inactive status still require substantial funds for maintenance while putting significant obstacles in the way of site reuse by the local community.

Finally, prior BRAC rounds did not take place in the face of the planned movement of tens of thousands of troops from abroad back to the United States.

**Composition of the 2005 Base Closure and Realignment Commission**

The nine Commissioners chosen to serve on the 2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission have diverse backgrounds. Two served in Presidential Cabinet-level positions, two are former Members of Congress, four are former flag or general officers, and others offer decades of government, private sector, and science-based careers in public service. Commissioners were nominated as follows:

**Nominated by President George W. Bush:**
- Commission Chairman Anthony J. Principi
- General James T. Hill, US Army (Ret.)
- Brigadier General Sue E. Turner, US Air Force (Ret.)

**Nominated by President George W. Bush in consultation with House Speaker J. Dennis Hastert:**
- The Honorable Samuel K. Skinner
- The Honorable James V. Hansen

**Nominated by President George W. Bush in consultation with House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi:**
- The Honorable Philip E. Coyle, III

**Nominated by President George W. Bush in consultation with Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist:**
- General Lloyd W. “Fig” Newton, US Air Force (Ret.)
- Admiral Harold W. Gehman, Jr., US Navy (Ret.)

**Nominated by President George W. Bush in consultation with Senate Minority Leader Harry Reid:**
- The Honorable James H. Bilbray

Full biographical information on each Commissioner can be found in Appendix G.

The Commission staff, numbering over 100 persons, was drawn from diverse backgrounds encompassing government, law, academia, and the military. In addition to those hired directly by the Commission, or brought on as consultants, other staffers were detailed from the Department of Defense, the Government Accountability Office, the Department of Commerce, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Federal Aviation Administration. Detailees’ expertise contributed significantly to the Commission’s independent review and analysis. Additional staff assistance was provided by the Analytic Services (ANSER) Corporation.

The Commission created a review and analysis staff with five teams: Army, Navy/Marines, Air Force, Interagency Issues, and Joint Cross-Service. As required by law, a direct-hire civilian managed each of the teams. Department of Defense detailees
were limited to a maximum of 20 percent of the Commission’s analysts. A complete list of all 2005 BRAC Commission full-time staff, as well as the organizational charts, can be found in Appendix H.

Commissioners pledged to recuse themselves from Commission decision-making potentially in conflict with their prior positions or that could cast doubt on the validity and legitimacy of the Commission’s final recommendations. Commissioner Gehman recused himself from all official business dealing with military facilities in the Commonwealth of Virginia. Commissioner Coyle recused himself from Commission decisions affecting the State of California. Former Congressmen James Hansen and James Bilbray recused themselves from Commission decision making affecting the states of Utah, and Nevada, respectively.

To further protect the integrity of the 2005 process, all BRAC Commission staff members were required to receive special ethics briefings and were encouraged to meet with the Commission’s legal team to disclose any potential or perceived conflicts of interest that might affect their work. Potential hires and contractor personnel were instructed during their interviews that maintaining the public’s confidence in the integrity of the BRAC process was vital to the successful completion of the Commission’s statutory mission. All Commission staff members were required to complete financial disclosure forms designed to uncover potential financial conflicts of interest and flag such items for further discussion with the General Counsel’s legal team.

**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BRAC PROCESS**

The Secretary of Defense initiated the Department’s BRAC process with his November 15, 2002, memorandum, *Transformation Through Base Realignment and Closure*. The Secretary emphasized eliminating excess capacity and transforming DoD by rationalizing infrastructure. Further policy guidance established policies, procedures, and authorities for selecting installations for realignment or closure.

The Secretary established the Infrastructure Executive Council (IEC) to oversee and operate the Department’s BRAC 2005 process, set policy, and provide oversight. It was chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense and included the Secretaries of the Military Departments and their Chiefs of Service, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics) (USD(AT&L)). The IEC met more than 20 times during the BRAC process and presented a package of recommendations to the Secretary of Defense for his final review and approval.

The subordinate Infrastructure Steering Group (ISG), was chaired by the USD(AT&L) and composed of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Military Department Assistant Secretaries for Installations and Environment, the Service Vice Chiefs, and the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment). The ISG oversaw the joint cross-service (JCSG) analyses of common business-oriented functions and ensured the integration of that process with the Military Departments’ analysis of all other functions. The ISG met more than 60 times during the BRAC process, setting milestones and resolving issues as the analyses unfolded.

Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld submitted Volume I (parts 1 and 2) of the Defense Department’s recommendations for military base closures and realignments to the Commission, and to the public (including Congress), on Friday, May 13, 2005, earlier than required. Much of the primary backup data, meeting minutes, and scenario evaluations used to develop and justify DoD’s closure and realignment recommendations was initially deemed classified or sensitive information, and not declassified and transmitted to the Commission and to Congress until June 17, 2005. This lengthy delay occurred despite language in Section 2903(c)(2) and Section 2903(c)(4) of the BRAC statute which required that the Department make “all information used by the Secretary to prepare the recommendations ... available to Congress ... [and] the Commission” within seven days of the recommendations’ transmittal.

**THE ARMY PROCESS**

The Army’s BRAC analysis unit, The Army Basing Study (TABS) Group directed by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Infrastructure Analysis, assessed Army installations, ensured consistency with DoD’s force structure plan, the installation inventory, selection criteria, and the BRAC statute.

The Army collected data on each of its 97 installations, including 10 leased sites, determined excesses and shortages, and, using the Force Structure Plan, assessed its requirements and capacity, including a surge analysis to ensure capacity to accommodate uncertainty and future requirements.
The military value of each facility was then calculated using a common set of 40 attributes linked to the military value criteria. The Army defined military value broadly, capturing facility capability, not just current use. This approach permitted the Army to assess relative installation capabilities to contribute to current and future base uses. The military value (MV) is the summed collective scores of weighted attributes, ranked from 1 (highest) to 97 (lowest).

The Army then developed strategy-based scenarios facilitating transformation, rebasing of overseas units, Joint operations, and Joint business functions. Scenarios moved units and activities to installations with higher MV, taking advantage of excess capacity and divesting less relevant or less effective installations. The Army augmented its MV analysis with military judgment. Recognizing the unique aspects of US Army Reserve Component (USARC) stationing and infrastructure, the Army used a bottom-up review that involved USARC Commanders, state governors, and Adjutants General. After military value analyses were completed, the Army then determined the impact of the remaining four selection criteria.

The BRAC Senior Review Group (SRG), co-chaired by the Army’s Under Secretary and Vice Chief of Staff, evaluated recommendations for the Army’s Executive Office, Headquarters to consider for submission to the Secretary of Defense through the Infrastructure Executive Council (IEC).

THE NAVY PROCESS

The Navy’s BRAC recommendations were developed by its Infrastructure Evaluation Group (IEG), consisting of nine senior military and civilian personnel and supported by the DoN Analysis Group (to analyze Navy-unique functions) and the Infrastructure Analysis Team (IAT) (providing analytic and staff support). The IEG ensured evaluations complied with the Base Closure Act, implemented guidance from higher levels and considered the concerns of operational commanders. The IEG applied the selection criteria to the recommendations, ensuring consistency with the 20-year Force Structure Plan, infrastructure inventory, and surge and homeland defense requirements.

The Navy analyzed 590 of the Navy and Marine Corps’ 889 unique functions while Joint Cross Service Groups (JCSGs) analyzed 469. Some activities were analyzed by both the Navy and one or more JCSGs. Data calls collected information for the base structure database and subsequent analyses. Capacity analyses, conducted on a functional basis (e.g., ship berthing) rather than by installation category (e.g., naval stations), compared the current base structure to future force structure requirements and identified excess capacity within a functional area. Military values were then assigned to functional activities using an objective, quantitative methodology.

Configuration analysis, combining military value and capacity analyses of each function, identified activities best meeting the needs of the Navy and Marine Corps in light of future requirements while eliminating the most excess capacity. These solutions were the starting point for DoN Analysis Group evaluation of closure and realignment scenarios. These assessments—combined with calculations of return on investment, Cost of Base Realignment Actions (COBRA) analyses and inputs from senior Defense leadership—were used to craft additional options through an iterative process.

THE AIR FORCE PROCESS

The Base Closure Executive Group (BCEG), consisting of 12 senior military and civilian executives, assisted in the development of the Air Force’s BRAC recommendations. The Air Force BRAC analysis was rooted in the 20-year Force Structure Plan, the Air Force’s facility inventory, and the selection criteria. Air Force analyses were shaped by three underlying rules: military value, both quantitative and qualitative—the primary factor; equal treatment for all installations; and determination of military value on the basis of capacity to support other core missions as well as current missions.

Estimates of the maximum capacity of each installation (based on data call responses, information from Headquarters, and weapons system templates) were used to identify an optimal set of bases to support a specified force. In using certified data to assess military value, the Air Force stressed installation characteristics that were (a) immutable, e.g., geographic location and proximity to other physical features or defense activities, terrain, and prevailing weather, (b) outside the control of the Air Force, or (c) difficult to replicate elsewhere due to expense or complexity, e.g., the installation’s transportation infrastructure, missile silos, or basic airfield infrastructure.

Operational capability data, the military value criteria, and the weighing guidance assigned by the BCEG, were combined to assign a Mission Capability Index (MCI) score for eight mission areas (fighter, bomber, tanker, airlift, special operation/combat search and rescue, intelligence/surveillance/reconnaissance, unmanned aerial vehicles, and space control) to all 154 Air Force installations. All Active and Reserve Component installations were assessed on an equal basis and rank-ordered on their relative ability to support each of the eight missions.
The BCEG refined “first-look” scenarios through iterative deliberation, rejecting options that failed to improve aggregate military value or ran counter to compelling military rationale. The process continued until it reached potential force structure deployments conforming to Air Force principles and imperatives, improved aggregate military value, and were consistent with sound military judgment.

A Joint Action Scenario Team (JAST) coordinated and managed the development of joint operational basing scenarios, and passed along scenarios affecting other service department installations. Opportunities for joint basing were worked into Air Force scenarios and formal analyses and were briefed to BCEG as part of the development of the Air Force’s candidate recommendations.

The BCEG reviewed potential closure and realignment options and selected the most promising for application of the COBRA model and criteria 5 through 8. The results of these analyses—i.e., payback (as determined by COBRA), community infrastructure support capability, and economic and environmental impacts of each scenario—were briefed to the BCEG and, if approved by the Secretary of the Air Force, sent to DoD’s review group, the Infrastructure Executive Council (IEC).

THE JOINT CROSS-SERVICE GROUP PROCESS

E& T EDUCATION AND TRAINING JOINT CROSS-SERVICE GROUP

The Education and Training Joint Cross-Service Group (E&T JCGS) reviewed common business-oriented education and training functions, including flight training, professional development education, specialized skill training, and range activities. The Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) chaired the E&T JCS. Principals included senior members from each Military Department, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Staff. The E&T JCSG was organized into subgroups corresponding to the categories of functions evaluated and was chaired by a flag/general officer or civilian equivalent to evaluate the potential of cross-service, joint, and transformational opportunities to improve DoD’s education and training programs.

The JCSG analyzed existing education and training capacity using certified data and developing recommendations best satisfying current and future DoD requirements. Military value was the primary consideration, balanced by other selection criteria and the future force structure to evaluate and document realignment and closure recommendations. Each subgroup calculated capacity for each function and sub-function using defined attributes and metrics. Questions, formulas, and filters were developed and tested for validity, adequacy, and quality. Certified data were obtained from responses to Military Department/Agency–controlled data calls. Each E&T subgroup analyzed installations’ capacity, including potential surge requirements. Locations performing the full scope of each function were identified and assessed for military value based on a facility’s functional capability. The military value criteria analyses dealt with each facility’s mission capability, condition, potential for future contingencies, and cost of operation. The subgroups calculated the military value of facilities performing similar education and training functions, and the results were examined to identify strategy-based, data-supported realignment or closure scenarios. After scenarios were developed, the E&T JCGS applied criteria 5 through 8, using DoD BRAC standard procedures and/or models. DoD’s Inspector General (DoD IG) independently validated the data’s adequacy and quality throughout the process.

The 295 E&T JCGS subgroup-generated ideas were refined into 164 proposals which, after deliberation, were developed into 64 declared scenarios. After detailed analysis, 17 fully developed candidate recommendations were forwarded to the Infrastructure Steering Group (ISG) for consideration. ISG disapproved two candidate recommendations, and the Infrastructure Executive Council (IEC) disapproved another two. During JCSG and MILDEP integration of candidate recommendations, four E&T candidate recommendations were absorbed into Military Department recommendations resulting in nine E&T JCSG recommendations.

THE HEADQUARTERS AND SUPPORT ACTIVITIES JOINT CROSS-SERVICE GROUP

The Headquarters and Support Activities Joint Cross-Service Group (HSA JCSG) was created to address common business-related functions across DoD, Military Departments, and Defense agencies. The HSA JCSG had no counterpart in previous BRAC rounds and therefore had to define appropriate functions and sub-functions for analysis. The HSA JCSG had six members representing OSD, the Joint Staff, and the four services, chaired by the Army member. The HSA JCSG formed three subgroups: the Geographic Clusters and Functional (GC&F) Subgroup (Air Force lead) analyzed common functions of financial management, communications/information technology, personnel management, corrections, installation
management, and selected Defense Agencies. The Mobilization Subgroup (Marine Corps lead) analyzed joint mobilization. The Major Administration and Headquarters (MAH) Subgroup (Navy lead) analyzed all headquarters located within 100 miles of the Pentagon (the “DC area”), including leased space, selected headquarters outside the 100-mile radius, and common support functions (headquarters “backshop” functions).

The HSA JCSG conducted a comprehensive review of assigned functions, evaluated alternatives, and developed and documented realignment and closure recommendations. The HSA JCSG established internal policies and procedures consistent with: DoD policy memoranda, the force structure plan and installation inventory; BRAC selection criteria; and the requirements of the BRAC statute. The HSA JCSG’s strategy was guided by the principles of: improving jointness; eliminating redundancy, duplication and excess capacity; enhancing force protection; exploiting best business practices; increasing effectiveness, efficiency, and interoperability; and reducing costs.

JCSG capacity analysis focused on functions and activities with the highest potential for payoff. Functions and activities with excellent potential were placed initially into a middle tier from which they were either moved into the top tier and fully analyzed, or placed in a lower tier. In the lower tier they were either eliminated or sent to the Military Departments for an appropriate level of review. After capacity analyses were complete, the JCSG concluded that each functional area it reviewed had excess capacity, and it compiled target lists for further military value analyses.

Military value, as the primary consideration, was assessed by HSA JCSG using quantitative methods to examine headquarters, organizations, and activities performing assigned functions at current locations. Throughout the process, the military value scoring plans were reviewed and updated as necessary to ensure that the quantitative results were valid and fair and that the entities in the model could be differentiated.

Initial military value analyses served as the starting point for scenario development. The results of optimization, consideration of the overarching strategy, and military judgment contributed to the family of strategy-driven, data-verified scenarios the JCSG brought forward to its members for deliberation. The three HSA JCSG subgroups developed 204 ideas, which generated 194 proposals, 117 of which were analyzed fully as scenarios using criteria 1 through 8. Fifty scenarios were forwarded to the ISG as candidate recommendations. The ISG and IEC approved 47 and disapproved three. Integration of the HSA JCSG’s recommendations with the Military Departments and the other JCSGs led to 21 final recommendations.

THE INDUSTRIAL JOINT CROSS-SERVICE GROUP

The Industrial Joint Cross-Service Group (Industrial JCSG) reviewed DoD’s industrial functions: maintenance (depot and intermediate), munitions and armaments (including their storage), and ship overhaul and repair. The Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) chaired the Industrial JCSG, which included members from each military service and the Joint Staff.

The Industrial JCSG conducted a comprehensive review of assigned functions, evaluated alternatives, and developed and documented realignment and closure recommendations. The Industrial JCSG established internal policies and procedures consistent with: DoD policy memoranda, the force structure plan, and installation inventories; BRAC selection criteria; and the requirements of the BRAC statute.

After establishing three subgroups based on the three main functions being analyzed, subordinate functions were identified, and the chair of each subgroup was a principal member of the Industrial JCSG and a subject matter expert. The subgroups comprised members from each service and, as needed for support, contract personnel.

Each subgroup identified installations related to its assigned functions and developed defined capacity measure attributes and metric questions related to the assigned functions. The Military Departments reviewed all questions, and the Infrastructure Steering Group (ISG) approved them prior to each installation responding to the controlled data call with certified data. The subgroups used the certified data to analyze the capacity, including surge requirements, for their assigned functions, and created an inventory of installations performing industrial functions.

The subgroups developed strategy-based, data-supported realignment or closure scenarios to advance joint capabilities, maximize the use of capacity, align infrastructure with operations, save money, provide for future expansion capability, and maximize military value. The subgroups assessed the scenarios based on the remaining selection criteria (5 through 8) and using DoD’s standard procedures and/or models.

The disparate nature of the functions did not lend themselves to a “one-size-fits-all” analytic approach or strategy. The functions can overlap, and to obtain a meaningful analysis the Industrial JCSG initially examined maintenance, munitions and armaments, and ship overhaul and repair as discrete functions.
The maintenance subgroup established a strategy to minimize the number of sites performing maintenance while retaining sufficient redundancy within the industrial base and maximizing military value at the commodity level. The munitions and armaments subgroup addressed the entire life-cycle of munitions, except RDT&E, and sought to create multi-functional installations that avoided single-point failures while eliminating excess capacity through closures versus realignments. The ship overhaul and repair subgroup efficiently and effectively addressed ship maintenance requirements as the Navy reallocated fleet forces by rationalizing the number of organic shipyards and the workloads flowing from the 2025 force structure. Finally, the subgroup consolidated ship maintenance support functions and consolidated and regionalized intermediate-level ship maintenance within geographic regions. The final outcome resulted in reduced excess capacity.

The Industrial JCSG reviewed and selected the most promising 120 of subgroup-developed scenarios for further analysis. After full development and JSG review of 34 candidate recommendations, all were sent to the Infrastructure Executive Council (IEC). The IEC reviewed and approved all but three, while several candidate recommendations were either combined or integrated into larger Military Department candidate recommendations.

**The Intelligence Joint Cross-Service Group**

The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Counterintelligence and Security) chaired the Intelligence Joint Cross-Service Group (JCSG) review of intelligence functions. The Group included senior members from the Defense Intelligence Agency, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, National Reconnaissance Office, National Security Agency, each Military Department, the Joint Staff/J2, and representation from the Director of Central Intelligence Community Management Staff. The Chair of the Intelligence JCSG represented Counterintelligence Field Activity and the Under Secretary of Defense, Intelligence elements.

The Intelligence JCSG reviewed all intelligence functions except those already evaluated by the Military Departments and other JCSGs. The Group evaluated alternatives and developed and documented realignment and closure recommendations for submission to the Secretary of Defense. The Group ensured consistency with Department of Defense policy memoranda, the 20-year Force Structure Plan, selection criteria, and the BRAC statute. Four analytical frameworks were used to evaluate intelligence functions: relocate and upgrade facilities onto protected installations as appropriate; reduce vulnerable commercial leased space; realign selected intelligence functions/activities and establish facilities to support Continuity of Operations and Mission Assurance requirements; and provide infrastructure to improve the flow of information between analysts, collectors and operators at all echelons and to achieve mission synergy.

Its review identified facilities performing intelligence functions and developed attributes, metrics and questions for analysis. Data calls gathered certified data on intelligence facilities, and capacity analyses led to identification of excess capacity/shortage. A military value scoring plan was developed, and scores were computed for each facility. Afterwards, strategy-based, data-supported, realignment or closure scenarios consistent with the 20-year Force Structure Plan were developed, registered, and assessed against the remaining selection criteria (5 through 8) using DoD’s standard procedures and models.

The Intelligence JCSG developed 21 ideas that led to 18 proposals. From these, 13 scenarios were declared. After using the BRAC selection criteria and military judgment, six candidate recommendations were presented to the Infrastructure Steering Group (ISG). The ISG and Infrastructure Executive Council approved three candidate recommendations. During the integration process, one of these recommendations was incorporated by the Headquarters and Support Activities Joint Cross-Service Group into their own proposal.

**The Medical Joint Cross-Service Group**

The Medical Joint Cross-Service Group (JCSG) reviewed DoD healthcare functions and provided base closure and realignment recommendations for the following functions: Healthcare Education and Training; Healthcare Services; and Medical and Dental Research, Development and Acquisition (RD&A). The Air Force Surgeon General chaired the Medical JCSG with membership drawn from Service Department senior medical leadership, the Joint Staff, and OSD.

The Medical JCSG established internal policies and procedures consistent with DoD policy memoranda, the force structure plan, installation inventory, final selection criteria, and the requirements of the BRAC statute.

Its efforts were focused on: supporting the warfighters (in garrison and deployed) and their families; maximizing military value while reducing infrastructure footprint and maintaining adequate surge capability; maintaining or improving access to care for all beneficiaries, including retirees; enhancing jointness; identifying and maximizing synergies from collocation or
consolidation opportunities; and examining outsourcing opportunities. The group organized categories of functions into corresponding subgroups, and guided by the selection criteria, evaluated them on the Medical JCSG’s key focus areas.

This iterative process was conducted concurrently with the Military Departments and the other Joint Cross Service Groups. The subgroups generated ideas, proposed overall scope for analyses and sent its recommendations for higher-level consideration.

The subgroups used data call responses to perform a capacity analysis and review surge requirements. All data collection was conducted and certified in accordance with BRAC process guidance, and at each step the DoD Inspector General independently validated the data’s adequacy and quality.

After the capacity analysis was complete, a military value assessment of each function at each installation was developed, and military value data calls generated data for the quantitative portion of military value, which included both quantitative data, as well as military judgment. After reviewing the responses, the subgroups identified data-supported realignment or closure scenarios corroborating their strategies. Scenarios that advanced jointness, achieved synergy, capitalized on technology, exploited best practices, and minimized redundancy, while maintaining fundamental healthcare missions were selected for further analysis. Then DoD’s standard procedures and/or models assessed selection criteria 5 through 8.

Twenty-two candidate recommendations were presented to the Infrastructure Steering Group (ISG) and Infrastructure Executive Council (IEC) with final recommendations completed after review and adjudication by the ISG and IEC.

THE SUPPLY AND STORAGE JOINT CROSS-SERVICE GROUP

The Supply and Storage (S&S) JCSG reviewed common business-oriented supply and storage logistics functions. The Director, Defense Logistics Agency chaired the S&S JCSG, a deliberative body of senior flag and general officer logisticians from each Military Department, the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The S&S JCSG examined logistics economics and efficiencies with a goal of transforming military logistics into a networked, force-focused operation utilizing fewer sites and less capacity. The S&S JCSG’s BRAC analysis followed those of the service departments and other JCSGs because continuing supply and storage functions at specific locations could depend on BRAC actions of another JCSG or defense component.

The S&S JCSG used an optimization model to rationalize capacity, maximize military value, and synchronize both with force structure capabilities. Given the inherent limitations of the computer-based optimization modeling tool, the S&S JCSG explored ancillary methodologies to identify business process improvements, better fiscal management, and reduce excess infrastructure.

To determine capacity, individual activities’ infrastructure were examined for productivity of key resource inputs, e.g., labor (man hours) and actual space (office, warehouse, etc.). Capacities and functions were calculated from FY 2003 data responses. Questions, formulas, and filters were developed and tested for validity, adequacy, and data quality. A controlled data call obtained additional certified data. The information was sorted and assessed, with clarifications sought as needed, and then COBRA data were used to develop scenarios.

A quantitative scoring plan arrayed the relative military value of supply and storage activities across DoD and within categorical groupings of activities: Inventory Control Points (ICPs), Defense Distribution Depots (DDD), and Defense Reutilization and Marketing Offices (DRMOs). The group identified strategy-based, data-supported business realignment scenarios to advance jointness, achieve synergy, capitalize on technology, exploit best business practices, and/or minimize redundancy. After the scenarios were developed, selection criteria 5 through 8 were then assessed using DoD’s standard procedures and/or models.

In accordance with the BRAC statute and OSD guidance, the S&S JCSG assessed the relationship between the 20-Year Force Structure Plan and required supporting supply and storage capabilities. The correlation between the plan and actual supply and storage capabilities is indirect, making it difficult to ascertain the formal measurement of the impacts of recommendations. However, using military judgment, the group evaluated known and potential impacts of candidate recommendations. Comments submitted by the Military Departments and the JCS concerning supply, storage, and distribution requirements were also considered.

A sensitivity analysis assessed whether enough capacity remained to handle surges. The S&S JCSG deliberative body determined that demand on the system due to the global war on terrorism was an extraordinary demand on surge, and therefore 20 percent at the high end of surge was sufficient for the 20-year planning horizon associated with the force structure plan. Excess capacity was still visible when performance was calculated at these rates. This enabled the S&S JCSG to ensure that the post-BRAC supply and storage system would be able to handle future surge demands.
The recommendations applied BRAC criteria, capacity and military value analysis, assessment of requirements to support the 20-year force structure plan, and the use of military judgment. The S&S JCSG concluded its proposals would create a supply storage and distribution structure enabling DoD to more efficiently and effectively support joint and coalition forces in a transformed global environment while at the same time introducing new world-class business processes.

**The Technical Joint Cross-Service Group**

The Technical Joint Cross-Service Group (TJCSG) reviewed Research, Development and Acquisition and Test and Evaluation (RDAT&E) functions. The Director, Defense Research and Engineering, chaired the TJCSG, which included senior members from each Military Department and the Joint Staff. The TJCSG coordinated with other JCSGs to consider outdoor ranges, medical research, some intelligence functions, and headquarters functions.

The TJCSG examined installations’ RDAT&E functions including basic research, exploratory development, and advanced development. The development/acquisition function included system development and demonstration, systems modifications, experimentation and concept demonstration, product/in-service life-cycle support and acquisition. The test and evaluation function included the formal developmental test and evaluation (DT&E) and the formal operational test and evaluation (OT&E).

The TJCSG sought to establish multifunctional and multidisciplinary technical (RDAT&E) Centers of Excellence to provide scientific and technical advances enabling development of technologically superior capabilities and weapons. Existing DoD technical facilities with a disciplinary focus would complement the newly developed Centers. TJCSG infrastructure analysis and recommendations were configured to adapt to future uncertainties and surge capability.

The TJCSG established five subgroups: Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (C4ISR); Air, Land, Sea, and Space Systems (ALSS); Weapons and Armaments (W&A); Innovative Systems (IS); and Enabling Technology (ET). Each evaluated technical activities and conducted detailed analyses for military value, capacity, scenario development and analysis, and finally, the development and evaluation of candidate recommendations for ISG review. A Capability Integration Team (CIT) and an Analytical Team supported the subgroups. The TJCSG also coordinated with other JCSGs, especially the Education and Training JCSG, the Headquarters and Support Activity JCSG, the Medical JCSG, and the Intelligence JCSG.

The TJCSG delineated RDAT&E functions using the FY 2003 Defense Technical Area Plan (DTAP) to identify discrete technical facilities that could be appropriately compared to one another; 39 technical facility categories were defined as “a collection of people and physical infrastructure that performs a technical function (or functions) in a specific technical capability area at a specific location.” The TJCSG analyzed the technical capacity for each of these 39 technical facility categories and considered current capacity, surge capacity estimates, and possible future capacity estimates. The group issued standardized data calls to installations, and created a DoD database for comparative analyses of responses. A similar analysis was performed for military value. For both military value and capacity analyses, the general attributes of people, physical environments, physical structures and equipment, operational impact, and synergy were used to characterize the capacity and military value of technical functions.

The subgroups identified scenarios using military value and technical capacity to meet current and future needs and presented them to the TJCSG for deliberation and approval. If approved, the subgroups applied final Selection Criteria 5 through 8 to each scenario using DoD standardized procedures. The TJCSG deliberated and approved all assumptions prior to conducting analyses.

The TJCSG generated over 100 ideas that were developed into 69 declared scenarios and later narrowed into 23 candidate recommendations. In the recommendation coordination process, nine candidate recommendations associated with closures or other proposed actions were transferred to the Military Departments or other JCSGs for their use. The IEC disapproved one candidate recommendation, resulting in 13 TJCSG recommendations approved by OSD to create Centers of Excellence in the following three areas: Defense Research Laboratories; Integrated RDAT&E Centers; and Integrated C4ISR Centers.

**Commission Review**

The Commission established five teams within its Directorate of Review and Analysis (R&A)—one team to review each respective Service application of the military value criteria to the base closure process, an Interagency Issues Team that reviewed Criteria Five through Eight, and a Joint Cross-Service Team to review the application of military value by the recommendations issued by the seven Joint Cross-Service Groups (JCSGs). Each team analyzed the services’ and JCSGs’
methodology to ensure general compliance with the law, to confirm accuracy of data, and to determine if bases-specific recommendations were properly offered by the Secretary of Defense.

In addition, the Interagency Issues Team analyzed the final four criteria—Return on Investment, Economic Impacts, Community Infrastructure, and Environmental Impacts—across all services. The Interagency Issues Team also provided analysis on airspace issues when applicable.

**Additions to the Secretary’s Recommendation List**

After reviewing and analyzing DoD’s certified data, senior level review group deliberations, prior BRAC reports, assessing information obtained during base visits, regional hearings and other public input, reviewing the GAO report, and the personal impressions of Commissioners, the Commission identified 12 recommendations to consider adding to the Secretary’s list. In a July 1, 2005, letter to the Secretary of Defense, the Commission posed questions about specific recommendations and installations, and requested the Department’s rationale for not recommending the facilities closure, realignment, or significant restructuring in the original May 13, 2005, recommendations. The letter also invited the Secretary to testify at a special public hearing on July 18. The Department responded in writing on July 14.

On July 19, after reviewing the Department’s testimony and responses, the Commission met and voted to consider eight of the 12 proposed “adds” for possible closure or realignment. In accordance with the law, seven of the nine Commissioners voted to “add” the facilities to the Commission’s review. A complete list of the proposed additions is found in Appendix L. Notice of the proposed additions was published in the Federal Register on July 22.

At least two commissioners then visited each of the affected bases, and the Commission held two additional public regional hearings on the proposed additions. A complete list of all regional hearings and site visits is found in Appendices I and J.

In order to finally approve a recommendation to close or realign a facility added by the Commission, the Commission was required to (1) determine that the Secretary deviated substantially from the force-structure plan and final selection criteria by not including the base on the May 13th list, (2) determine that the additions would be consistent with the force-structure plan and final selection criteria, and (3) vote separately on each added facility recommendation with seven of the nine Commissioners voting in favor of the addition.

**Criteria 1 through 4: Military Value**

In accordance with P.L. 101-510, as amended, all of the information used by the Secretary of Defense to prepare his recommendations must be sent to Congress, the Commission, and the Comptroller General (i.e., the Government Accountability Office (GAO)). Within the Commission, each R&A team began its review and analysis with an examination of the documents provided by the Department.

Although the Base Closure Law required DoD to submit its explanatory and justification documents within seven days of the release of its selection list, DoD classified much of this information as SECRET and slowly declassified it over the period of a month. DoD delivered the supplemental information (consisting of Volumes III thru XII) to the Commission between May 18 thru 28, 2005. A reading room was established on June 1 for information that had been deemed classified, and by June 14 the vast majority of the back-up and justification data had been declassified and provided to the Commission. As the full range of documents was provided, the R&A teams utilized them to fully assess each recommendation in an objective manner.

First, all teams determined whether DoD’s recommendations were based on the Force Structure Plan and the eight final selection criteria and whether all bases were considered equally. The teams then considered if functions, categories, subcategories, and base exclusions were reasonable.

Each of the teams reviewed the military departments’ and JCSGs’ process for assessing military value, as well as the reasonableness of the data they used and the comparisons they made. Each team examined the services’ capacity analyses and identified installation functions and categories requiring additional scrutiny. Specific data analyses included a review and independent analysis of COBRA input data and military construction cost estimates, as well as the capacity of receiver installations to accept the proposed additional missions.

Throughout the review and analysis process, the Commission staff maintained an active, open, and ongoing dialogue with base-associated communities. Staff members accompanied Commissioners on base visits, attended regional hearings, and visited closure and realignment candidates and receiving installations. Site visits, regional hearings, and community
presentations (via meetings, mailings, and web site feedback) provided valuable context to the information provided by the Department of Defense.

**ARMY TEAM PROCESS**

The Army Team’s process for analyzing each DoD recommendation was to assess its justification against established Military Value selection criteria. In accordance with the statute, Army Team analysts sought to confirm for each recommendation the consistency of basing and organization plans with final selection criteria and DoD’s Force Structure Plan. Each recommendation’s justification was analyzed for effects on operational readiness, training, and jointness. All Army rebasing and closure initiatives were assessed to verify the basing potential for each gaining and losing location, and to ensure that potential operating and training space, and existing and proposed facilities, supported each recommendation’s objectives. Every Army-related recommendation was assessed to identify its compatibility with ongoing and planned reorganizations of Army units, rebasing units from overseas into the US, and strategic repositioning of forces inside the US to support both operational readiness, training, mobilization, surge, and deployment considerations. DoD’s estimates for costs and manpower resources to support each realignment or closure action were adjusted for new information, recomputed, and compared to DoD’s assumptions to confirm or correct characterizations of each recommendation’s effect.

For each military value criteria, community concerns about possible DoD deviations were also evaluated by the Army Team for accuracy, validity, relevancy, and magnitude. The Commission found that the Army generally followed established Military Value Selection Criteria in developing its BRAC recommendations. The Army’s Reserve Component-related recommendations were recognized DoD-wide as properly developed and coordinated in a way that increased the military value of Reserve Component units nationwide. As the Army developed its BRAC recommendations, it was also waging war in Iraq and Afghanistan as part of the Global War on Terrorism, restructuring its units into modular forces to increase the number of combat brigades, and rebasing units from Germany and Korea into the US. Consequently, the Army matched its base structure to its force structure to support plans for both current and future training, operations, and deployment missions. Examples of recommendations that achieved increases in military value include consolidating Infantry and Armor training at a single base, consolidating human resources functions at a single base, restationing overseas units to US bases from which they can readily deploy, and creating new combat brigades with force structure generated from realignments to reduce soldier assignments to base support functions. On occasion, correctly locating a command to better perform its mission meant relocating it to a lower ranked installation and exercising military judgment. The Commission found this was the case for a major Army command that could better perform its command and control mission from a central US location because of its nationwide mission focus.

Although the vast majority of Army recommendations adhered to the Military Value Selection Criteria, the Army Team’s analysis did find some errors and substantial deviations. For example, an aviation logistics recommendation miscalculated the cost of operations and manpower implications, prompting the Commission to amend and correct the deviation. In addition, the use of 2003 for a workload base year proved particularly troublesome in the area of depots because current vehicle maintenance workload due to wartime wear-and-tear had increased. Although Army industrial and depot recommendations to reduce excess capacity appeared reasonable on their face, the Commission chose to proceed cautiously due to statutorily mandated surge assessments and a 20-year force structure analytic horizon, and limited several depot closings during this time of war and uncertain future workload.

**NAVY-MARINE CORPS TEAM PROCESS**

The Navy-Marine Corps Team first evaluated each DoD recommendation, in accordance with the Base Closure Law, against the approved military value criteria and the Force Structure Plan to ensure that no proposals would degrade operational readiness. The potential affect on future mission growth was then assessed to ensure that proposed actions did not limit growth in any area, whether force structure, training, or support capability. Finally, the potential impact on jointness (war fighting, training, and readiness) was analyzed to ensure that there were no unintended limitations on future mission flexibility. The team then assessed the status of facilities slated to be closed, realigned, and gain forces and functions, to determine if the recommendations would enhance or degrade the capacity of the Navy and Marine Corps to sustain, train, and operate its forces. Similarly, future capacity was analyzed taking into consideration future uncertainties that could require surges in geographic areas or mobilizations to meet some future crisis. Finally, the Navy-Marine Corps Team assessed the ramifications of the recommended changes on the cost of operating the force in the changed environment and the effects on personnel.
For each military value criteria, community concerns about possible DoD deviations were also evaluated by the Navy/Marine Corps Team for accuracy, validity, relevancy, and magnitude. The Commission’s conclusion was that in general, the Department of the Navy was consistent in its application of quantifiable data in each of the military value criteria. The Commission found that in the case of Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, while some excess capacity would exist even if closed, the margin of 8 percent was insufficient to provide enough flexibility for surge or future force structure growth. Hence the Commission voted to retain the shipyard. Although the Department’s analytic case for closing Submarine Base New London was valid, the Commission felt that the unquantifiable aspects of Military Value Criteria 1, especially with respect to the synergies in place at the Sub Base, outweighed the solid business case presented by Navy.

**Air Force Team Process**

The Air Force Team focused on assessing the DoD justification against the military value selection criteria and the DoD Force Structure Plan, as required by law. The accuracy of installations’ Air Force’s Mission Compatibility Index scores was a key component of this analysis. Each recommendation was also analyzed for effects on operational readiness, training, and joint warfighting. The Air Force Team also considered the ability of installations to support mobilization, surge operations, and deployments. All proposed Air Force closure and realignments were assessed to verify the ability of receiving locations, including land, facilities, airspace and ranges, to accommodate the forces it was to receive. Finally, the Air Force Team evaluated the accuracy of cost and manpower implications of each recommendation.

In the case of the Air National guard, the Commission’s recommendations were based on the military value criteria; the Air Force’s objective of creating optimally-sized flying squadrons in light of the availability of fewer total aircraft; the interests of States in using Air National Guard resources for certain missions, such as homeland security; and the geographic distribution of units across the United States with special consideration to areas of strategic interest.

In making recommendations on each Guard and Reserve Component installation, the Commission did not direct the relocation of a specific number of aircraft from one to another. The Commission believes that decision is best made by the Secretary of Defense and that the Secretary must have full authority to move weapon systems, and their directly associated manpower, within the parameters of Commission recommendations. To this end, the Commission’s recommendations, rather than citing specific aircraft movements from “losing” to “gaining” bases, instead established an end-state at “gaining” bases in terms of the number of primary aircraft authorized.

**Joint Cross Service Team Process**

The Joint Cross Service Team confirmed current and future mission capabilities and the impact of DoD’s recommendations on military value, operational readiness, including the impact on joint war fighting, training, and readiness with DoD’s Force Structure Plan, as required by law. Rebasing and closure initiatives were assessed to ensure the gaining and losing locations had available land, facilities and associated requirements to ensure that existing and proposed facilities supported the recommendation’s objectives. Joint Cross Service Team-related recommendations, for both existing and potential receiving locations, were assessed to ensure the recommendations adequately considered contingency, mobilization, and surge requirements. DoD’s cost of operations and manpower estimates were reviewed and adjusted when required to reflect current cost data and manpower information. Additionally, DoD’s cost and savings estimates were clarified when individual components within a broad recommendation required visibility.

The Joint Cross Service Team analysts applied the military value criteria to DoD’s recommendations. The team found that, generally, DoD followed the established Military Value Selection Criteria in developing its BRAC proposals.

In the Headquarters and Support Activities recommendations, the military values dealing with leased space appeared biased because DoD’s assumptions concerning leased space led to a predetermined outcome.

The Industrial recommendations followed military value selection criteria except when similar functions were grouped together or were evaluated separately without regard to the collective mission value or operational costs of the affected organization. For example, DoD analysis of three recommendations affecting the Cryptologic Systems Group at Lackland Air Force Base evaluated military value of individual elements of the Cryptologic Systems Group, and the collective military value of the Group was not captured. Taken separately, the recommendations did not represent fairly the costs associated with individual or collective costs. The team also found instances of infrastructure problems severely limiting the ability to accomplish mission, facilities undervalued, and errors resulted in excessive manpower savings.

The Commission observed a lack of depot consolidation recommendations within the Air Force. DoD recommendations recognized and encouraged centers of excellence within individual military services such as the Fleet Readiness Centers in
the Navy but did not propose the same for Defense-wide centers of excellence, especially within DoD aircraft depot maintenance.

Overall, DoD’s Supply and Storage recommendations followed military value principles, but military judgment took precedence over military value when the Army established three life cycle centers of excellence to provide the best possible support to the war fighters. In that case, one chosen center ranked lower than the losing center. Additionally, the numbers of positions identified to transfer were incorrect, which resulted in understated cost estimates.

The Commission found that the Technical Joint Cross-Service Group (TJCSG) generally followed established military value selection criteria in developing its recommendations. However, the Commission overturned three of the TJCSG recommendations because of substantial deviation from BRAC military value criteria. One of the recommendations attempted to combine facilities with dissimilar functions, thereby limiting gains in efficiency and military readiness at the receiving activity. Another recommendation, if implemented, would have resulted in a significant mission impact and loss of existing synergy because the receiving installation did not have the mission. While collocation would have been achieved, the overall efficiency gains would have been limited. Last, another recommendation was rejected by the Commission because of the potential loss of highly experienced personnel supporting electronic warfare systems currently in use and scheduled to be phased out in the near future.

**CRITERION 5: COSTS AND SAVINGS**

The military service departments and Joint Cross Service Groups used the Cost of Base Realignment Actions (or COBRA) model to assess Selection Criterion #5, Return on Investment, for all proposed realignment and closure scenarios. COBRA is a quantitative cost model providing a uniform methodology to estimate and itemize the projected costs and savings associated with closure and realignment scenarios. While COBRA does not provide “budget quality” estimates, its consistent methodology supports comparative analysis of competing scenarios. COBRA employs extensive algorithms using data sets of standard and dynamic factors. Standard factors are generally constant values such as demographics, pay and allowances, and construction costing factors. Dynamic factors are scenario-specific values, including personnel realignments and eliminations, equipment moving requirements, and time-phasing of events. Using these data sets, COBRA calculates scenarios’ costs, savings, 20-Year Net Present Value, and Return on Investment. Twenty-Year Net Present Value is the cumulative value (in 2005 dollars) of all costs and savings of a particular scenario from 2006 through 2025. Return on Investment is the period required (in years) before savings offset all the scenario’s costs. Appendix M provides the COBRA (cost/savings) statistics for each Commission-approved recommendation. Appendix N compares the 2005 BRAC summary COBRA statistics to previous BRAC rounds.

DoD provided the Commission with COBRA data for each recommendation, as well as for alternative scenarios used in DoD deliberations but not ultimately recommended. Bundling of multiple scenarios into single recommendations produced over 225 individual COBRA runs supporting 190 DoD recommendations. The Commission verified all DoD COBRA submissions, resolving questions and concerns directly with DoD. DoD submitted revised COBRA runs correcting self- or Commission-identified mistakes or irregularities in its original runs.

The Commission produced over 600 independent COBRA runs developing and supporting comparative analysis of alternative scenarios, or variations of existing scenarios. Local communities also provided their own COBRA runs, which were verified by the Commission’s COBRA Team, for Commission review and analysis. Communities displayed exceptional capabilities with the model, and their COBRA submissions frequently provided the Commission with valuable insights.

The COBRA model, while valuable as a comparative tool employing a uniform methodology, produces realistic results only if the model reflects unique scenario requirements, the input data are accurate, and output results are correctly interpreted. A DoD Joint Process Action Team adapted the model to current-day conditions and addressed shortcomings identified during previous BRAC rounds. As a result, COBRA runs reflected additional installation-specific data (e.g., locality rates and freight rates); the costs and savings of enclaves; and improved algorithms (e.g., Base Operating Support (BOS) costs and military construction).

Nevertheless, the Commission was compelled to address several key issues in DoD’s assessment of Criterion 5, Return on Investment. GAO published similar concerns with respect to return on investment calculations. These concerns are addressed individually below.
DoD policy guidance mandated the use of certified data for all analysis, including cost and savings analysis. GAO reports the DoD Inspector General, along with Services’ Inspectors General, played significant roles in ensuring accuracy and senior-level certification of all data. The Commission had concerns, however, about the accuracy of some certified input data, especially military construction requirements. The Commission had the opportunity to review some post-recommendation site surveys and saw some with significant cost escalation, which would reduce projected savings.

DoD policy excluded environmental remediation from its COBRA calculation of costs and savings. DoD’s exclusion of environmental remediation costs from COBRA results required the Commission to separately assess the effect of these costs on a recommendation’s total return-on-investment. Previous BRAC rounds’ environmental remediation costs usually exceeded original cost estimates. While the Commission is well aware of the difficulties in accurately estimating these costs and supports DoD’s continued efforts to produce more precise cost estimates, the Commission is concerned that any significant increase in costs would further diminish the savings of this BRAC round.

It is the view of the Commission that DoD’s depiction of military personnel savings (as opposed to cost avoidances) further distorts assessment of actual savings attributable to DoD’s BRAC recommendations. DoD counted as “savings” the salary and other personnel costs of individuals eliminated from installations recommended for closure or realignment. DoD projected that its recommendations, if approved, would generate approximately $47.8 billion in savings over 20 years, including the elimination of almost 27,000 military personnel. However, DoD’s 20-Year Force Structure Plan projects no reduction in military end strength by any service except the Navy. Thus, while personnel "slots" now assigned to installations recommended for closure or realignment might be redeployed elsewhere, DoD’s net personnel costs would remain constant and no “savings” realized if “savings” are defined to mean reduced costs. The Commission remains adamant that military personnel savings projected by DoD mask the amount of expenditures that would be reduced through implementation of BRAC recommendations. Recalculating projected savings of DoD’s recommendations, excluding savings attributed to military personnel eliminations, reduces net 20-year savings to $18.6 billion, or 39% of the initial projection.

The Commission is also concerned about (a) savings DoD claims for business process re-engineering recommendations, and (b) savings that are computed on the basis of positions authorized for a process or installation rather than the positions actually assigned. GAO thoroughly reviewed and analyzed these two issues, and the Commission echoes the concerns stated in GAO's July 1, 2005 report. Specifically, the Commission questions DoD’s assumptions supporting projected savings attributed to recommendations of the Industrial and Supply and Storage Joint Cross Service Groups that purport to improve the business process. While the Commission does not doubt these recommendations may create efficiencies, no savings would be realized if savings are calculated based on staffing levels actually filled or intended to be filled. For example, DoD’s Fleet Readiness Centers recommendation estimates saving 1,187 civilian and contractor positions and 353 military positions. The Commission found that 776 of the civilian and contractor positions and 303 of the military billets projected to be “saved” are not currently filled and hence have no current costs. Exclusion of these “savings” has a significant effect on assessment of this recommendation, which has the highest 20-year net present value savings of all of DoD’s recommendations.

It is the Commission’s conclusion that, (1) given the magnitude of the DoD reported savings associated with military personnel costs; (2) the potential to not realize the amount of savings attributed to business process reengineering; (3) the high probability that actual implementation costs, including the costs of environmental remediation, will exceed original estimates; and (4) the use of authorized rather than filled positions in calculating personnel-based savings, the Department could assume a high financial risk during the BRAC implementation period, 2006–2011. The Commission therefore recommends that DoD produce a detailed BRAC implementation plan to mitigate the financial risks (in addition to operational and force management risks) implicit with base realignment and closures. In fact, the Commission is concerned that, given the combined potential effect of all of these factors, there is a likelihood that the 2005 BRAC round could produce only marginal net savings over the 20year period.
The Commission’s economist, detailed from the Department of Commerce, was directed to assess DoD’s compliance with BRAC selection criterion 6: “the economic impact on existing communities in the vicinity of military installations.” Three major aspects of DoD’s approach were evaluated: methodology, identifiable geography, and data reliability for all areas affected by the recommendations.

The Commission commends DoD for its uniform and consistent estimates of the regional economic impact on affected areas. The Joint Process Action Team 6 (JPAT6) consistently identified BRAC-affected economic areas, carefully calculated the impact of each recommendation using reliable data sources and meticulously documented data sources and findings. Further, the Commission concurs with GAO’s finding, in its July 1 report, that DoD’s economic impact “methodology has limitations but is reasonable for BRAC purposes.”

DoD’s analysis assumed that other socioeconomic or financial outcomes—such as the area’s housing market, fiscal conditions, or school funding—would eventually correlate with employment changes in the affected areas. While it would be preferable to not have to make this assumption, the Commission realized that alternative methods to comprehensively estimate the impact of BRAC actions on regional economies would be just as debatable, lack uniformity, and be costly and time-consuming to implement for all affected areas.

EVALUATION

Because the 2005 BRAC language for Criterion 6 is little changed from 1995, DoD decided to retain the 1995 BRAC methodology to estimate economic impact, or more precisely, employment impact for affected areas. However, unlike prior rounds, DoD did not enumerate a cumulative BRAC impact for BRAC 2005 because the impacts of the 1993 and 1995 BRACs have been realized by now. The Commission agrees that this approach was consistent and compliant with criterion 6’s guidance.

Methodology and Geography: DoD calculated the economic impact of its proposals for areas physically containing the affected installations and labeled these areas as regions of influence (ROIs). ROIs could be metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs), micropolitan statistical areas (MISAs), or Metropolitan Divisions, collectively referred to as metro areas for brevity. DoD designated the appropriate counties as ROIs for installations located in counties not belonging to a metro area. Accurate assessment of the regional economic impact depends upon identification of the correct ROI.

Although some communities disputed DoD’s use of metro areas for its ROI assignments, the Commission believes DoD’s assignment of installations to certain metro areas or counties before calculating economic impact was sound.

Except for isolated errors (e.g., Hawthorne and Tobyhanna Army Depots), the Commission finds DoD assigned locations to appropriate ROIs (i.e., affected metro areas or counties). The Commission finds that DoD treated all affected installations and areas on a consistent and equal basis.

The Commission was concerned by ROI assignments for about a dozen installations whose economic impacts may not be correctly identified and allocated. In these instances, the installations were assigned to specific metro areas, although they were physically located close to borders of additional metro areas or counties, whose impacts were not reflected in the model. For example, Naval Shipyard Portsmouth, which is recommended for closure, is located on the border of the Portland-Biddeford MSA and the Boston-Cambridge-Quincy MSA. DoD allocated all employment impact (-2.8%) to the latter area and none to the former.

Calculator: DoD’s approach and methodology, including the model used in BRAC 2005, were very similar to those used in BRAC 1995. In determining regional economic impact, DoD used products (input-output employment multipliers) from a proprietary economic modeling source to calculate the total employment effects—gains or losses in jobs—of a specific DoD recommendation on a region’s economy. This device is a popular method to estimate the economic consequences of external changes to a regional economy.

DoD created the Economic Impact Tool (EIT) to uniformly estimate direct and indirect job changes and aggregate them to get total net changes from 2006 through 2011 for all affected regions.

Unlike mathematical tools used in previous BRAC rounds, EIT allows users to track personnel changes and movements for any actions in affected installations. In order to capture the relative economic impact on all affected regions, DoD used impact ratios, expressed as a fraction or percent of total job change, to ROI employment level. These ratios allow analysts to assess the magnitude of impact regardless of the regional economic structure. For example, 200 job losses in small, remote
areas like Aroostook County (Maine) had a different impact than the same job losses in larger, urban areas like Portland-North Portland MSA (also in Maine).

The Commission believes that the estimated impact on most of the 250 ROIs affected by its 190 recommendations in BRAC 2005 are in an acceptable range. In addition, the Commission finds that the DoD's direct job multipliers are generally higher than those computed by communities with different economic models. This issue met DoD's goal of erring on the high end of job impact estimates.

The Commission found, and GAO also observed, that DoD's methodology is an acceptable tool for determining the total employment impact on affected regions; however, the Commission also noted community concerns about the static nature of DoD's model, which can only account for:

- **Job Changes:** EIT equates economic impacts with potential job gains or losses only. It offers no insight into other important factors such as excess housing capacity, infrastructure, or public schools. DoD addressed community infrastructure capabilities for gaining installations only in Criterion 7.

- **Snapshot Condition:** EIT assumes job losses or gains occur instantly rather than actually and gradually over a six-year period (2006–2011).

The Commission concluded that while DoD should continue to refine its economic impact models, projecting the impact of BRAC actions is an inherently imprecise science. Any new theoretical model for comprehensively estimating other impacts of BRAC actions on regional economies could depend upon debatable methodology, lack a uniform approach, and be costly and time-consuming to implement for all affected areas equally.

**Economic Data:** Direct job changes, EIT's most important input for determining indirect effects, were extracted from COBRA's database. EIT reports also compared an area's annual job growth for the 1988–2002 period, unemployment rates for 1990–2003, and per capita incomes 1988–2002 to national averages.

The Commission found that EIT data were appropriate and timely for BRAC 2005 purposes and deadlines. However, the Commission also found that the EIT reports were designed mainly for DoD's decision makers to broadly understand how BRAC 2005 recommendations might affect particular ROIs. They provide little interpretation of economic conditions in affected areas.

The reports are informative, but provide little context for communities to explore or digest their unique economic structures or conditions. For example, EIT results are less helpful in understanding the huge differences between closing or realigning facilities in densely populated urban areas with diversified economies and shutting down or downsizing facilities like DFAS Limestone in Aroostook County (Maine), realigning Eielson AFB in Fairbanks MSA (Alaska), or closing Hawthorne Army Depot in Mineral County (Nevada).

Finally, the Commission is also concerned about underestimated economic impacts due to the failure of the EIT to consider non-BRAC programmatic changes, which also have economic impacts, as well as BRAC changes. The Commission realizes that although the DoD approach completely complies with the law, the cumulative impact of both BRAC and non-BRAC changes on affected communities may be underestimated.

Based on DoD’s recommendations, the Commission estimated that 10 communities would have high negative impacts (due to both closures and realignments) while seven communities would have high positive impacts (due to realignments). The model is too static to incorporate other factors that may take place regardless of any BRAC actions. The Commission’s assessment of the estimated economic impact of its final recommendations can be found in Appendix O.

**RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE BRAC ROUNDS**

1. DoD should use a consistent standard in designating geographic units for all BRAC selection criteria. Currently, geographic areas are defined differently for different purposes:
   - **Criteria 1–4:** 50-mile radius from the installation to determine labor pool and resources for the installation.
   - **Criterion 6:** ROIs, i.e., MSAs, MISAs, or counties (2004 redefinition by OMB).
Criterion 7: MSAs and PMSAs (Primary Metropolitan Statistical Areas based on 1990 definitions by OMB) for demographic, cost of living, employment data. MHAs (Military Housing Areas) which are a combination of data collecting by zip codes, 20-mile radius from the installations, and 60-minute commuting time.

2. For data consolidation and maintenance, DoD should do one of the following:
   - Incorporate EIT into COBRA because EIT’s database can be designed to be a subset of COBRA’s and draw installations’ personnel data from COBRA’s database.
   - Merge EIT’s database with selection criterion 7’s database to create a common database eliminating inconsistencies and reducing maintenance and data updating.

3. Eliminate redundancy in data collection and maintenance for criteria 6 and 7.
   - Population and unemployment rates are collected in both criteria separately.

**Criterion 7: Community Infrastructure**

A DoD Joint Process Action Team (JPAT), with representatives of the three Military Departments and OSD, assessed each DoD recommendation, using a consistent Department-wide approach, for compliance with BRAC selection criterion 7, “the ability of the infrastructure of both the existing and potential receiving communities to support forces, missions, and personnel.” The JPAT identified ten common attributes – demographics, child care, cost of living, education, employment, housing, medical providers, safety/crime, transportation, and utilities – to evaluate the ability of a community’s infrastructure to support existing and potential additional forces, missions, and personnel. The Military Departments and Joint Cross-Service Groups used the JPAT final report in their BRAC 2005 analyses.

Army analysts compared the number of common attributes at gaining and losing installations to assess the gaining community’s ability to absorb additional units relative to the losing community. The goal was to locate units at installations with the capacity to absorb additional missions, and assess the need for additional local-area infrastructure support. The Army identified an issue at Fort Gillem based on local community concerns that the infrastructure of the installation would not be accessible for reuse if multiple enclaves were established. The Commission directed the establishment of a contiguous enclave.

The Navy created installation profiles summarizing common community attributes. In addition, the Navy collected certified data regarding community infrastructure impacts in scenario data calls. The Navy identified no significant, quantifiable community infrastructure impacts that would hinder any of its closure or realignment recommendations.

The Air Force summarized data for each installation affected by proposed BRAC actions, based on analysis of detailed reports submitted to OSD as supporting documentation. The Air Force identified no significant, quantifiable community infrastructure impacts for any of its closure or realignment recommendations.

Each Joint Cross-Service Group evaluated communities affected by their recommendations using the common attributes and associated questions established by the JPAT. JCSGs identified no significant, quantifiable community infrastructure impacts for their closure or realignment recommendations.

The Commission reviewed the Community Infrastructure Assessments for all DoD oriented recommendations, and took these assessments into account in considering the Secretary’s compliance with this selection criterion.

**Criterion 8: Environmental Impact and Remediation**

While the BRAC statute requires “priority consideration to the military value criteria” DoD, and the Commission, are also required to consider “the environmental impact, including the impact of costs related to potential environmental restoration, waste management, and environmental compliance activities,” a broader and more detailed environmental standard than applied in prior rounds.

DoD assessed environmental resource impacts, the impact of costs related to potential environmental restoration, and the impact of costs related to potential waste management and environmental compliance activities. A DoD Joint Process Action Team (JPAT) developed procedures, analytical tools, and databases to facilitate a common analytical approach for the Services and Joint Cross Service Groups (JCSGs) assessing environmental selection criteria.
The JPAT obtained environmental data from all DoD installations and provided procedural instructions for environmental assessment. It developed three templates—1) Installation Environmental Profiles; 2) Summary of Scenario Environmental Impacts; and 3) Summary of Cumulative Scenarios’ Environmental Impacts—to facilitate use of the data.

**Environmental Resources Impacts and Costs**

DoD used these templates, profile information, and other certified data to summarize impacts on ten resource areas for both losing and gaining installations—air quality; cultural/archeological/tribal resources; dredging; land use constraints/sensitive resource areas; marine mammals/marine resources/marine sanctuaries; noise; threatened and endangered species/critical habitat; waste management; water resources; and wetlands. A Summary of Cumulative Environmental Impacts was generated for installations affected by more than one scenario under final DoD consideration.

DoD did not include environmental restoration costs in Cost of Base Realignment Actions (COBRA) estimates on the grounds those costs would be incurred without regard to BRAC. BRAC certified data included only estimated “costs-to-complete” for Installation Restoration (IR) sites managed and reported under the Defense Environmental Restoration Account (DERA). DERA costs are calculated on a “clean-to-current-use” standard. The presence of DERA-managed sites was a land use constraint for installations receiving missions as a result of a potential realignment decision.

The cost to remediate munitions contamination was not captured in estimated-cost-to-complete for IR sites with operational ranges, due to the unknown nature of munitions contamination and reuse requirements. Auditable or certifiable cost estimates for operational ranges require site surveys and analysis not attainable within the BRAC timeframe. Experience shows range remediation costs vary from small to very significant depending on the type, quantity, and location of munitions used over the entire life of the range, other uses of the range such as open burn, open detonation and burial sites, potential future uses of the land, and the lack of an agreed-upon process for hazard identification and removal.

DoD’s exclusion of environmental restoration costs in payback calculations avoided the perverse incentive of rewarding (through retention) polluted sites or encouraging closure of clean sites. DoD’s approach was consistent with procedures used in prior BRAC rounds and responds to the Government Accountability Office (GAO) concerns. GAO stated that final restoration cost determinations could be problematic before a closure decision, since neither reuse plans nor studies to identify related restoration requirements would have been initiated.

Although the cost of environmental restoration did not dictate closure decisions, these costs are noted in installation environmental profiles, the summaries of scenarios’ environmental impacts, and the summary of cumulative scenarios’ environmental impact.

**COBRA Model Assessment of Environmental Costs**

The COBRA model captures both recurring and non-recurring environmental compliance and waste management activity costs. These expenses are included in the Base Operating Support (BOS) statistics and in Criterion 5 using COBRA estimates for each evaluated scenario. COBRA also includes one-time costs associated with waste management or compliance activities specific to shutdown or realignment of a facility. These costs are then included in COBRA’s estimated payback calculations, as noted in the Summary of Scenario Environmental Impact.

**Commission Analysis of Environmental Restoration Costs**

The Commission reviewed DoD’s environmental cost data as clarified or corrected, when necessary, through the DoD Clearing House. A summary of the environmental restoration cost data is provided below, with more detailed information in Appendix P.

In general, DERA includes the costs associated with remediation of pre-1986 contamination. After this time frame, costs are generally included in facilities’ operating or compliance budgets.

The estimated costs to complete environmental restoration of DERA-managed sites and the military munitions response program (MMRP), at the 33 major facilities proposed for closure by DoD are as follows:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DoD Proposed</th>
<th>Commission Results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army, 14 major closures, $615,940,000;</td>
<td>Army, 12 major closures, $170,180,000;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy, 9 major closures, $121,610,000;</td>
<td>Navy, 6 major closures, $50,610,000;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force, 10 major closures, $180,590,000;</td>
<td>Air Force, 5 major closures, $5,390,000.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total cost: $918,140,000.</td>
<td>Total cost: $226,180,000.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These environmental cost estimates include neither cleanup of currently operational ranges nor costs such as underground storage tanks, oil/water separators, waste water treatment plants and wash racks. Estimates for some of these costs are not available to the Commission. Through FY 2003, DoD had already spent $684,700,000 on environmental restoration at the 33 major facilities proposed for closure.

Eight Army installations indicated they have operational ranges. The cost to close or remediate these ranges could be $70,000,000 to $655,200,000. Remediation cost estimates at four additional installations (Newport Chemical Depot, Deseret Chemical Depot, Umatilla Chemical Depot and Fort Monroe) with some type of ordnance or other explosive material are incomplete or impossible to estimate without future studies.

Environmental clean-up “cost-to–complete” also does not include controlled burning or decontamination or demolition of industrial structures heavily contaminated with explosives. This could be an issue for six of the 33 major closures, with costs ranging from $1 to $10 million each.

Completion dates for DERA-managed-sites range from 2011 to 2032, indicating that additional resources may be needed to complete cleanups within the BRAC timeframe.

In summary, the Commission’s review of environmental restoration costs found that:

- the costs associated with the military munitions response program (MMRP) are substantial
- DoD’s MMRP primarily addresses closed ranges and other closed/abandoned areas with unexploded ordnance, discarded munitions, and munitions constituents but does not address restoration of currently operational ranges
- DoD may need to decontaminate heavily contaminated structures at closing facilities, but these costs are not included in Environmental Restoration “costs-to–complete.”
- costs to close other types of environmental sites could be substantial and are unknown at this time
- current completion dates for environmental restoration may impact reuse
- land-use controls will restrict reuse at some facilities.

**Government Accountability Office (GAO) Environmental Impact Assessment**

GAO’s July 1, 2005 report on the DoD’s recommendations and selection process generally accepted DoD’s process and discussed estimated environmental restoration costs. The report concludes that increased costs may be incurred as closures are implemented, more intensive environmental investigations occur, and additional hazardous conditions arise. Finally, the report concludes the services’ preliminary estimates are based on restoration standards applicable for the current use of the base property. Community reuse plans sometimes reflect different uses which could lead to more stringent, and thus more expensive, restoration.

GAO indicated a $949,100,000 cost to complete environmental restoration using data from the DoD’s Scenario Summaries. Some Military Departments provided data from sources other than the FY2003 DERA reports to Congress. The Commission used revised cost-to-complete remediation figures from certified answers to questions submitted to DoD.

The BRAC Commission generally agrees with GAO’s assessment of potential environmental restoration impacts due to unknown factors and land-use changes. The Commission notes that, except for the emerging Military Munitions Response Program, DoD’s environmental program appears to be further along than in previous BRAC rounds.
THE ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (GAO)

The law authorizing the 2005 base closure process directed the Comptroller General to independently assess the Department of Defense process and recommendations and provide his findings to the Congress and the BRAC Commission by July 1, 2005. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) was also invited to testify before the Commission and delivered sworn testimony on May 3 and July 18, 2005.

In preparing its July 1 report, the GAO's stated objectives were to (1) determine the extent to which DoD's recommendations achieved DoD's stated BRAC goals, (2) determine if the process for developing recommendations was logical and reasoned, and (3) identify issues warranting further attention by the Commission. GAO noted that the sheer number of individual DoD recommendations (more than all previous rounds combined) made it impossible to separately analyze and evaluate each proposal. Instead, the GAO assessed major trends and common themes cutting across multiple recommendations.

GAO's July 1, 2005 report concluded that DoD had varying degrees of success in achieving its 2005 BRAC goals of (a) reducing excess infrastructure and producing savings, (b) furthering transformation, and (c) fostering jointness.

Specifically, GAO concluded the DoD, military department, and Joint Cross Service Group selection process "was generally logical, reasoned, and well documented." DoD's process was marked by an emphasis on objective certified data, backed up by subjective military judgment in those instances when numbers could not tell the whole story.

GAO gave high marks to the military services and seven joint cross-service groups, (which focused on common business oriented functions) for adapting their analytical approaches to the unique aspects of their respective responsibilities while still remaining consistent in the use of military value criteria, including new considerations introduced in this round, such as surge and homeland defense needs.

GAO noted that many DoD proposals focused on reserve bases while closing relatively few active bases. Importantly, GAO wrote that "Projected savings are almost ... as large ... as all prior BRAC rounds combined, but about 80 percent of the projected 20-year net present value savings (savings minus up-front investment costs) are derived from only 10 percent of the recommendations." The report also pointed out several instances in which DoD bundled otherwise unrelated recommendations with long payback periods with a recommendation providing substantial savings and a rapid payback, thereby creating a combined recommendation with an attractive savings and payback profile. GAO analysts found that approximately 36 of all DoD recommendations had a payback of six years or more, while 25 did not produce savings in excess of costs for a decade or more.

Overall, GAO estimated that the DoD proposals would reduce the total plant replacement value of all military facilities by five percent, or $27 billion. GAO forecast that an up-front investment cost of $24 billion would be required to implement the DoD recommendations. GAO also cautioned that "there are clear limitations associated with DoD’s projection of nearly $50 billion in savings over a 20-year period. Much of the projected net annual recurring savings (47 percent) is associated with eliminating jobs currently held by military personnel. However, rather than reducing end-strength levels, DoD indicates the positions are expected to be reassigned to other areas, which may enhance capabilities but does not result in actual dollar savings available for other uses. Sizeable savings were projected from efficiency measures and other actions, but "underlying assumptions have not been validated and could be difficult to track over time.”

GAO raised questions about several specific recommendations, such as the Red River Army Depot, Submarine Base New London, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, Ellsworth Air Force Base, Hawthorne Army Depot, and Watervliet Arsenal.

GAO also recommended that the Commission pay special attention to those major recommendations approved by the military departments, Joint Cross Service Groups, and/or Infrastructure Steering Group, but changed or dropped in the final weeks by the Infrastructure Executive Council (sometimes for reasons of "military judgment" that are hard to quantify).

This GAO’s concern was partly reflected in the questions and possible “adds” sent to Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld on July 2, 2005. The Commission’s potential additions list included at least five installations about which GAO expressed specific concerns (Pearl Harbor, HI; Naval Postgraduate School, CA; Air Force Institute of Technology, OH; Naval Air Station Brunswick, ME; and Grand Forks Air Force Base, ND).

GAO generally found that the 2005 round made measurably greater progress on DoD’s transformation and jointness goals than in prior BRAC rounds. The Joint Cross-Service Groups had a greatly expanded role in 2005 and were allowed to develop their own candidate recommendations and scenarios for direct ISG and IEC consideration. The military service...
departments could not block JCSG recommendations by not forwarding them to the Secretary of Defense, as occurred in 1995. Indeed, many of the JCSG proposals were accepted or incorporated into military service department recommendations. GAO stated there was unprecedented coordination between the JCSGs and the service departments.

However, GAO also noted several missed opportunities and noted that “progress in each area varied, with many decisions reflecting consolidations within, and not across, the military services. In addition, transformation was often cited as support for proposals, but it was not well defined, and there was a lack of agreement on various transformation options.”

GAO also noted that while the Army did not use the same military value analysis for Reserve Component facilities, it sought extensive national and state-level Reserve and Guard input and feedback when putting together its Reserve and Guard recommendations. In contrast, the Air Force and Navy/Marine Corps applied the same military value analysis to their Reserve Components, but the Air Force in particular did not involve any state-level officials or Adjutants General in their decision-making processes.

Last, GAO identified four other issues for the Commission’s consideration: “(1) instances of lengthy payback periods (time required to recoup up-front investment costs), (2) inconsistencies in how DoD estimated costs for BRAC actions involving military construction projects, (3) uncertainties in estimating the total costs to the government to implement DoD’s recommended actions, and (4) potential impacts on communities surrounding bases that are expected to gain large numbers of personnel if DoD’s recommendations are implemented.”